Soviet biological weapons program

860:. For instance, tularaemia is endemic in the region, and outbreaks had previously occurred in 1938 and the winter of 1941-1942; the disease was already present among the civilian population by the time German troops arrived. Infected rodents — rampant at the front, as sanitation systems had completely broken down and the uncollected grain harvest provided plentiful food for the rodent population — were the key to the large-scale outbreaks, which spread through inhalation of dust from contaminated straw in mattresses or from consumption of tainted food and water. Crucially, Geissler notes that there are no contemporary accounts by neither the German or Soviet armies nor intelligence services regarding the use of 895:, Commander of the Kwantung Army had already ordered the destruction and evacuation of these facilities. The NKVD now switched its focus to apprehending any personnel associated with Units 100 and 731 and began a process of filtration of the 560,000-760,000 Japanese prisoners of war. In December 1949, the military figures identified by the Soviets as participating in the Japanese BW programme were put on trial in Khabarovsk. The defendants were found guilty and sentenced to terms ranging from two to twenty-five years in Soviet labour correction camps. However, the officers, doctors and other personnel from Unit 731 were in fact transferred to the comparative comfort of the 3536: 1568:. A research ship of the Aral fleet had come within 15 km from the island (it was forbidden to come any closer than 40 km). The lab technician of this ship took samples of plankton twice a day from the top deck. The smallpox formulation— 400 gr. of which was exploded on the island—”got her”, and she became infected. After returning home to Aralsk, she infected several people, including children. All of them died. I suspected the reason for this and called the General Chief of Staff at the Ministry of Defense and requested to forbid the 926:, the Soviet minister of internal affairs, maintained control of the Soviet BW programme and further developed its offensive capabilities. The key hub of the Soviet BW programme at this time was the Scientific-Research Institute of Epidemiology and Hygiene located in Kirov. It continued to utilise the biological weapons test site on Vozrozhdeniya Island in the Aral Sea. During the period 1947-1949 a new military biological weapons facility, the USSR Ministry of Defence's Scientific-Research Institute of Hygiene, was established in 969:), the prime task of which was to create covert dual-use BW facilities at a number of pharmaceutical and microbiological enterprises. Over the next decade or so, dual-use BW production plants were created at Berdsk, Omutninsk, Penza and Kurgan. It is therefore apparent that previous perceptions by Western scholars of the Khrushchev era as contributing little to the development of the Soviet Union's biological warfare capabilities are incorrect. Rimmington argues that this " 340: 1650: 1229: 930:, It occupied the site of the former Cherkassk-Sverdlovsk Infantry Academy on Ulitsa Zvezdnaya, 1. The new facility became operational in July 1949. Its core staff were sourced from the Kirov BW facility. The first group to arrive from Kirov included the new director of the Institute of Hygiene, Major General Nikolai Fillipovich Kopylov. The Sverdlovsk facility launched a scientific programme in 1951 which focused on botulinum toxin. 33: 1174:, the first deputy chief of Biopreparat from 1988 to 1992, confirmed that the program had been massive and that it still existed. On 11 April 1992, Yeltsin decreed "the termination of research on offensive biological weapons, the dismantlement of experimental technological lines for the production of biological agents and the closure of biological weapons testing facilities", and in September 1992 Yeltsin agreed in a 775: 1186:(2012), state flatly that "In March 1992...Yeltsin acknowledged the existence of an illegal bioweapons program in the former Soviet Union and ordered it to be dissolved. His decree was, however, not obeyed." They conclude that "In hindsight, we know that with the ultimate failure of the... process and the continued Russian refusal to open the... facilities to the present day, neither the Yeltsin or 981:(BWC). However, citing doubts concerning the United States’ compliance with the BWC, they subsequently augmented their biowarfare programs. The Soviet bioweapon effort became a huge program rivaling its considerable investment in nuclear arms. It comprised various institutions operating under an array of different ministries and departments including the Soviet 699:. Around 100 personnel from Velikanov's Biotechnical Institute participated in the experiments. In July 1937, while planning for a second expedition to the island, Velikanov was arrested by the Soviet security organs and subsequently shot. Later that same summer, Leonid Moiseevich Khatanever, the new director of the Biotechnical Institute and an expert on 758:(the causative organism of plague) and other dangerous pathogens. Zlatogorov was in fact one of the world's leading authorities on pneumonic plague and had studied 40 strains of plague bacilli from around the world. He had been a leading participant of a Russian team despatched to combat the October 1910 to February 1911 outbreak of 1528:

biologics plant is the best-documented of the agricultural BW mobilisation facilities. A UK/US inspection team visited the facility in 1993 and identified five underground reinforced concrete bunkers holding hundreds of thousands of hen’s eggs being used to grow massive quantities of virus, allegedly

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with the United States and the United Kingdom that the two Western nations would "have a blanket invitation to visit facilities of concern in Russia under ground rules that guarantee unprecedented access, including access to the entire facility, the ability to take samples, the right to interview the

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under the leadership of Dr. Ustinov who was accidentally killed by the virus. The samples of Marburg taken from Ustinov's organs were more powerful than the original strain. The new strain, called "Variant U", had been successfully weaponized and approved by the Soviet Ministry of Defense in 1990.

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In the early 1950s the Soviet leadership became concerned that the USSR was vulnerable to attack by a new generation of virus-based biological weapons. At this time the country only possessed a single facility focused on viruses, the Moscow-based D.I. Ivanovskii Institute of Virology. In 1952, as a

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confirmed that the program had been massive and still existed. In 1992, a Trilateral Agreement was signed with the United States and the United Kingdom promising to end biological weapons programs and convert facilities to benevolent purposes, but compliance with the agreement—and the fate of the

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United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities. (11 October 2013). Biodefense: Worldwide Threats and Countermeasure Efforts for the Department of Defense : Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging

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were implemented to counter the perceived threat of biological sabotage by the German and Japanese intelligence services. As a result there was a tightening-up of state control over personnel working on microbial pathogens and an emphasis on the gathering of intelligence from foreign legations

938:) in Zagorsk. It was transferred to the control of the USSR Ministry of Defence in March 1954. The new military institute later pursued major programmes focused on variola virus and viral haemorrhagic fevers. In his uncorroborated account, Alibek claims that capacity for the production of 766:, located at Kronstadt. Here they aimed to develop strains of plague that remained viable when loaded into artillery shells, aerial bombs and other means of dispersal. German intelligence independently identified the secret BW programme allegedly managed by Zlatogorov and Maslakovets. 914:). The leniency with which the Japanese BW specialists were treated - the longest sentence any served was seven years - has led a number of scholars to conclude that some sort of deal was struck between the Soviet authorities and the Unit 731 personnel held captive in the USSR. 1215:

As of 2021, the United States "assesses that the Russian Federation (Russia) maintains an offensive BW program and is in violation of its obligation under Articles I and II of the BWC. The issue of compliance by Russia with the BWC has been of concern for many years".

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prohibited development, testing, and production efforts... cites several Gorbachev decrees stepping up the pace of work within the biological weapons complex, and directing the creation of mobile production facilities so that inspectors could not uncover the program.

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was in fact a pivotal period in the Soviet programme, when BW production technology was being transferred from the military to facilities concealed within civil manufacturing plants. This was later to manifest itself as a key feature of the subsequent Biopreparat

1409:"Pokrov, Berdsk and Omutninsk all revealed evidence of biological activity since 1975, such as large-scale production in hardened facilities, aerosol test chambers, excessive containment levels for current activity and accommodation for weapons-filling lines." 3599: 2006: 2796: 752:(SIS) - commonly known as MI6. A total of fourteen highly detailed reports on the Soviet BW programme were issued in the period 1924-1927. SIS identifies Petr Petrovich Maslakovets and Semen Ivanovich Zlatogorov as the lead BW scientists working on 680:). Velikanov was placed in command of the Gorodomlya Island facility which was named as the Biotechnical Institute, also known by the code designation V/2-1094. German intelligence reported that the institute was engaged in experiments focused on 655: 1275: 1278:, Kol'tsovo (1974-1991): "At Koltsova access was again difficult and problematic. The most serious incident was when senior officials contradicted an admission by technical staff that research on smallpox was being conducted there." 703:(the causative agent of tularaemia), led a second expedition to Vozrozhdeniya. Two special ships and two aircraft were assigned to Khatanever for use in tests focused on the dissemination of tularaemia bacteria. Germany launched 811:) - on Gorodomlya Island, was under immediate threat of capture. At some point around the 25 September, the facility was evacuated and the buildings partially destroyed. There are various accounts regarding the relocation of 1681: 1480:

A Soviet-era agricultural biowarfare programme was pursued from 1958 through to the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This program focused on anti-crop and anti-livestock biological weapons, with Soviet efforts starting with

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workers and scientists, and the right to record the visits on video and audio tape." Yeltsin promised to end the Russian bio-weapons program and to convert its facilities for benevolent scientific and medical purposes.

961:" (Ecology), the new network incorporated three virology facilities. These worked in close collaboration with Soviet military virologists and focused on both animal pathogens such as FMD and exotic zoonotic infections. 3621: 2835: 1154:

aimed to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction, including the Soviet biological weapons program. The threat reduction assisted post-Soviet states in containing and destroying the pathogens in Soviet labs.

905: 815:, with official Russian sources indicating that it was initially transferred to Saratov. In the later summer of 1942, in the face of the German offensive to capture Stalingrad, there was a second evacuation of 670:, where around nineteen leading plague and tularaemia specialists were forced to work on the development of biological weapons. By 1936, scientists working on BW at both Vlasikha and Suzdal were transferred to 2239:

Eric Croddy, Sarka Krčálová, Tularemia, Biological Warfare, and the Battle for Stalingrad (1942–1943), Military Medicine, Volume 166, Issue 10, October 2001, Pages 837–838. Retrieved February 2 2024, from

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and invaded the Soviet Union along a 2,900-kilometre front. Such was the rapidity and depth of penetration of the attack that, by September, the Red Army's BW facility - the Sanitary Technical Institute

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The Soviet Union continued the development and mass production of offensive biological weapons, despite having signed the 1972 BWC. The development and production were conducted by a main directorate ("

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In 1953 the management of the Soviet BW programme was assigned to the USSR Ministry of Defence's Fifteenth Administration. In August 1958, the latter created a new Scientific-Research Technical Bureau

786:" had actively undertaken BW preparations and that the use of such weapons, in case of emergency, was a foregone conclusion. Stalin in response ordered an acceleration of BW preparations and appointed 641:

Running parallel to the work underway at Vlasikha, BW research was also being pursued in an institution controlled by the state security apparatus. In July 1931, the Joint State Political Directorate (

1475: 1287: 1175: 1387: 1701: 401:(BWC), the Soviet authorities subsequently augmented their biowarfare programs. Over the course of its history, the Soviet program is known to have weaponized and stockpiled the following 1098:

in 1990. The development of genetically altered strains of smallpox was presumably conducted in the Institute under the leadership of Dr. Sergei Netyosov in the mid-1990s, according to

618:, emerged as the lead scientist in the early Soviet biological weapons program. In 1930, Velikanov was placed in command of a new facility, the Red Army's Vaccine-Sera Laboratory in 1497:. Another innovation was the "mobilization production facilities"—ostensibly civil manufacturing plants—which incorporated capacity for production of weapons in wartime emergency." 1087:

to kill chicken. These agents were prepared to be sprayed down on enemy fields from tanks attached to airplanes over hundreds of miles. The secret program was code-named "Ecology".

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Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, Hearing Held October 11, 2013. p. 34.

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programmes was one reason why Alibek defected to the United States in 1992. Journal articles by scientists suggest that in 1999 the experiments were still being continued.

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regarding its applicability and use in retaliation. The Soviet Union was one, when it deposited its ratification notice. Due to these reservations, it was in practice a "

1803: 3501: 1633: 1317: 1095: 2609: 1303: 551:, which prohibits the use but not the possession or development of chemical and biological weapons. Upon ratification of the Geneva Protocol, several countries made 3202:

Re-Evaluating Russia's Biological Weapons Policy, as Reflected in the Criminal Code and Official Admissions: Insubordination Leading to a President's Subordination

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in the summer of 1942, and at a later unspecified date, again by Unit 731. On the 9 August 1945, the Soviet Union launched its invasion of Japanese-controlled

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Compliance with the agreement, as well as the fate of the former Soviet bio-agents and facilities, is still mostly undocumented. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, in

517:, for example, was 90 to 100 tons. In the 1980s and 1990s, many of these agents were genetically altered to resist heat, cold, and antibiotics. In the 1990s, 3260: 1362: 369: 2520: 934:

response to this perceived area of weakness, the Soviet government issued a special decree for the creation of the Scientific-Research Sanitary Institute (

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in April 1979. The death toll was at least 66, but no one knows the precise number, because all hospital records and other evidence were destroyed by the

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institute, subordinate to the People's Commissariat of Health, were transferred to the military facility. Early programs at the military lab focused on

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These programs became immense and were conducted at dozens of secret sites employing up to 65,000 people. Annualized production capacity for weaponized

1686: 736:. The Leningrad Military Medical Academy began cultivating typhus in chicken embryos. He also alleges that human experimentation occurred with typhus, 674:

where they occupied an institute for the study of foot-and-mouth disease which had been built originally for the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture (

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covertly operated the world's largest, longest, and most sophisticated biological weapons program, thereby violating its obligations as a party to the

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By 1960, numerous military-purposed biological research facilities existed throughout the Soviet Union. Although the former USSR also signed the 1972

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was the codename for the budget to develop microbial weapons with new properties of high virulence, improved stability, and new clinical syndromes.

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under the control of OGPU (see above). According to Alibek, in 1928, the Revolutionary Military Council signed a decree about the weaponization of

3553: 3531: 1733: 1403: 1038: 954: 748:. Another, possibly more reliable source, regarding the Soviet BW programme in Leningrad are a series of secret reports generated by the British 676: 3211:"The Memoirs of an Inconvenient Man: Revelations About Biological Weapons Research in the Soviet Union" by Igor V. Domaradskij and Wendy Orent, 3526: 1270: 270: 71: 1961: 1934: 1548:

An outbreak of weaponized smallpox occurred during testing in 1971. General Professor Peter Burgasov, former Chief Sanitary Physician of the

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administrations ever carried out 'a visible campaign to dismantle once and for all' the residual elements of the Soviet bioweapons program".

275: 3201: 728:, describes a quite separate strand of early BW research being pursued in Leningrad. This work was allegedly initiated in the 1920s at the 322: 230: 225: 3000: 2695: 2129:

Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World - Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran it.

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In the 2000s, the academician, "A.S.", proposed a new biological warfare program, called the "Biological Shield of Russia" to president

3711: 900: 280: 3253: 3151: 362: 95: 90: 3135: 3680: 2430: 2308: 1760: 205: 190: 105: 1564:, the strongest formulations of smallpox were tested. Suddenly, I was informed that there were mysterious cases of mortalities in 3690: 695:

In the summer of 1936, Ivan Mikhailovich Velikanov led the Red Army's first expedition to conduct tests of biological weapons on

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Geißler, Erhard. (2005). Alibek, Tularaemia and The Battle of Stalingrad. CBW Convention Bull. Retrieved February 2 2024, from

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of 1972. The Soviet program began in the 1920s and lasted until at least September 1992 but has possibly been continued by

355: 343: 145: 140: 1657: 1236: 1159: 762:. The SIS reports indicate that Zlatogorov and Maslakovets conducted some of their research on a so-called Plague Fort - 949:

Just four years after the creation of the Zagorsk facility, the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers issued a decree "

1034: 982: 2797:"From Offence to Defence? Russia's Reform of its Biological Weapons Complex and the Implications for Western Security" 3506: 3449: 3389: 3232: 3120: 2729: 2691: 2136: 1787:(pp. 698-712). Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press. Retrieved February 7, 2021, from 1293: 1042: 990: 763: 642: 3156: 2864: 1871: 1804:"2021 Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments" 1135:

to pressure Gorbachev into opening for inspection several of his facilities. The visits occurred in January 1991.

1102:. (aka Kanatjan Alibekov). In 1998, Alibek reported that "there was significant discussion of the possible use of 3548: 3038: 1517: 155: 1576:, who at that time was the Chief of the KGB, and informed him of the unique formulation of smallpox obtained on 794:, in overall command of the country's biological warfare programme. In May 1941, a number of measures codenamed 3222: 2966: 1494: 599: 3069: 1193:

In the 1990s, specimens of deadly bacteria and viruses were stolen from western laboratories and delivered by

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research. It conducted its secret activities at numerous sites across the USSR and employed 30-40,000 people.

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Biological Espionage: Special Operations of the Soviet and Russian Foreign Intelligence Services in the West

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Ministry of Agriculture and Food (Soviet Union) § Role in offensive Soviet biological warfare programme

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The Soviet Union's Invisible Weapons of Mass Destruction: Biopreparat's Covert Biological Warfare Programme

1661: 1482: 1240: 849: 842:, suggests that in the late summer of 1942 the Red Army engaged in the deliberate aerosol dissemination of 492: 2627:

Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments

2007:"The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: The Case of the Biological Weapons Convention" 3644: 3584: 3364: 3196: 3048: 2165: 2087: 2060: 1707: 749: 607: 525:

of 1979, which had resulted in the deaths of at least 64 people. Defecting Soviet bioweaponeers such as

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train from stopping in Aralsk. As a result, an epidemic throughout the country was prevented. I called

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of 1979, which had resulted in the deaths of at least 64 people. Soviet defectors, including Colonel

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By 1939, with the USSR on a war footing, the Soviet leadership is reported to have believed that the "

3095: 1266: 606:" and proposed a plan for the organisation of Soviet military bacteriology. It was at this time that 2652: 2648: 1628:

The Soviet Union reportedly had a large biological weapons program enhancing the usefulness of the

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Shoham D, Wolfson Z (2004). "The Russian biological weapons program: vanished or disappeared?".

1983: 1219: 3419: 3191: 2699: 2631: 2625: 2148: 1543: 1114: 1072: 867:

In the Far East the Soviet Union had been subject of a BW attack in 1939 during the battles of

844: 682: 434: 856:. However, a number of prominent scholars have disputed Alibek's version of events, including 3675: 3146:

Statement by Dr. Kenneth Alibek before the Joint Economic Committee of United States Congress

1552:, and a senior researcher within the program of biological weapons described this incident: 1498: 595: 301: 3166: 1890:. London: Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). pp. 93–109. 3543: 2404: 1830:

Preventing Proliferation of Biological Weapons: U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet States

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planes to support the Russian biological weapons program. At least one of the pilots was a

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in October, the BW facility on Gorodomlya Island was evacuated and eventually relocated to

704: 696: 62: 3221:, a useful page about non-state weapons transfers with a lot of links to information from 3176: 3090: 2591: 1394:

Today Virological Center NIIM (Scientific research institute) Russian Defense Ministry in

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admitted to an offensive biological weapons program as well as to the true nature of the

446: 2408: 1604:(the causative agent of anthrax) were accidentally released from a military facility in 3665: 3579: 3343: 3318: 3238: 2914: 2816: 2501: 2034: 1697: 1600: 1110: 591: 526: 410: 391: 3145: 2836:"The Soviet Union's Offensive Program: The Implications for Contemporary Arms Control" 562:

The principal architect of the Soviet Union's first military biological programme was

3434: 3186: 3180: 3116: 2941: 2918: 2904: 2843: 2820: 2775: 2748: 2725: 2687: 2613: 2493: 2344: 2314: 2287: 2260: 2228: 2205: 2171: 2132: 2093: 2066: 2026: 1891: 1691: 1490: 1486: 1208:. The program reportedly includes institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences from 1171: 1132: 1128: 1061: 1014: 888: 759: 671: 552: 530: 470: 2505: 1882: 1166:, admitted to an offensive bio-weapons program as well as to the true nature of the 1071:

In the 1980s, the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture successfully developed variants of

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for strengthening scientific-research work in the field of microbiology and virology

857: 3660: 3611: 2896: 2808: 2485: 2412: 2038: 2018: 1912:"What happened after an explosion at a Russian disease research lab called VECTOR?" 1463: 1420:

was the codename for the budget to develop antibiotic-resistant microbial strains.

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officer". At least two agents died, presumably from the transported pathogens.

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All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Veterinary Virology and Microbiology

1205: 1187: 1139: 1099: 911: 602:) on the Soviet Union's preparedness for biological warfare. It asserted that " 547:

International restrictions on biological warfare began only with the June 1925

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List of Soviet/Russian biological weapons institutions, programs and projects

1163: 1018: 1005:, was created under the Main Administration of the Microbiological Industry ( 927: 518: 507: 502: 2893:

The Soviet Union's Agricultural Biowarfare Programme: Ploughshares to Swords

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Working Paper: Biological Weapons in the 20th Century: A Review and Analysis

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The Soviet Union's Agricultural Biowarfare Programme: Ploughshares to Swords

2241: 1956: 1001:. In April 1974, a new agency, the All-Union Science Production Association 3454: 3384: 3348: 2562: 2497: 1451: 556: 383: 3491: 3424: 3404: 3399: 3379: 3303: 2974: 2741:

Leitenberg, Milton; Zilinskas, Raymond A.; Kuhn, Jens H. (29 June 2012).

2521:"Ex-Soviet Bioweapons Labs Are Fighting COVID-19. Moscow Doesn't Like It" 2280:

Leitenberg, Milton; Zilinskas, Raymond A.; Kuhn, Jens H. (29 June 2012).

1613: 1549: 1459: 1345: 1325: 1260: 1124: 1084: 1030: 946:. It was reported to use chicken eggs for the cultivation of the virus. 838: 741: 724: 718:

In his account of the history of the Soviet BW programme, Alibek, who as

463: 953:". This decree established a secret network of BW institutes within the 823:, located some 896 kilometres north-east of Moscow on the Vyatka river. 3574: 3439: 1872:"The Trilateral Agreement: lessons for biological weapons verification" 1502: 1076: 833: 719: 635: 2416: 1282:

All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Highly Pure Biopreparations

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former Soviet bio-agents and facilities—is still mostly undocumented.

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Geissler, Erhard; Gazsó, Lajos G.; Buder, Ernst (30 September 1998).

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Leitenberg, M., Zilinskas, R., & Kuhn, J. (2012). Conclusion. In

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and then the following year created a special prison laboratory, or

3308: 3298: 3283: 3170: 3001:"Anthrax genome reveals secrets about a Soviet bioweapons accident" 2666: 1569: 1561: 1532: 1455: 1358: 1350: 1194: 1091: 939: 880: 872: 737: 627: 619: 615: 567: 514: 497: 458: 451: 1377:

Sverdlovsk bioweapons production facility (Military Compound 19),

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Biological Warfare and Disarmament: New Problems/New Perspectives

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The Russian Biological Weapons Program: Vanished or Disappeared?

2696:"Interview: Alexander Kouzminov, Author of Biological Espionage" 2256: