Deterrence theory - Knowledge

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about the defending state's expected behaviour in future conflicts. The credibilities of a defending state's policies are arguably linked over time, and reputations for resolve have a powerful causal impact on an attacking state's decision whether to challenge either general or immediate deterrence. The second approach argues that reputations have a limited impact on deterrence outcomes because the credibility of deterrence is heavily determined by the specific configuration of military capabilities, interests at stake, and political constraints faced by a defending state in a given situation of attempted deterrence. The argument of that school of thought is that potential attacking states are not likely to draw strong inferences about a defending states resolve from prior conflicts because potential attacking states do not believe that a defending state's past behaviour is a reliable predictor of future behavior. The third approach is a middle ground between the first two approaches and argues that potential attacking states are likely to draw reputational inferences about resolve from the past behaviour of defending states only under certain conditions. The insight is the expectation that decisionmakers use only certain types of information when drawing inferences about reputations, and an attacking state updates and revises its beliefs when a defending state's unanticipated behavior cannot be explained by case-specific variables.

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regime security are better served by defiance, or there are domestic political gains to be made from improving relations with the defending state. The second factor is an economic calculation of the costs that military force, sanctions, and other coercive instruments can impose and the benefits that trade and other economic incentives may carry. That is partly a function of the strength and flexibility of the attacking state's domestic economy and its capacity to absorb or counter the costs being imposed. The third factor is the role of elites and other key domestic political figures within the attacking state. To the extent that such actors' interests are threatened with the defending state's demands, they act to prevent or block the defending state's demands.

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seemingly resolved adversary. If all defending states have such incentives, potential attacking states may discount statements made by defending states along with any movement of military forces as merely bluffs. In that regard, rational deterrence theorists have argued that costly signals are required to communicate the credibility of a defending state's resolve. Those are actions and statements that clearly increase the risk of a military conflict and also increase the costs of backing down from a deterrent threat. States that bluff are unwilling to cross a certain threshold of threat and military action for fear of committing themselves to an armed conflict.

1447:, said: Deterrence is working in the Ukraine crisis, just not for the right side. The United States and its allies failed to deter Russia from invading. The purpose of deterrence strategy is to prevent the conflict entirely, and there Washington failed badly. On the other hand, Russian deterrence is enjoying spectacular success. Russia has convinced the West that even a whisper of NATO military action in Ukraine would bring disastrous consequences. Putin threatens, blusters, uses the word “nuclear,” and the West wilts. 613:

and military co-operation into a crisis or militarized confrontation that threatens armed conflict and possibly war. The prevention of crises of wars, however, is not the only aim of deterrence. In addition, defending states must be able to resist the political and the military demands of a potential attacking nation. If armed conflict is avoided at the price of diplomatic concessions to the maximum demands of the potential attacking nation under the threat of war, it cannot be claimed that deterrence has succeeded.

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equally, if not more, the art of coercion, intimidation and deterrence. Schelling says the capacity to harm another state is now used as a motivating factor for other states to avoid it and influence another state's behavior. To be coercive or deter another state, violence must be anticipated and avoidable by accommodation. It can therefore be summarized that the use of the power to hurt as bargaining power is the foundation of deterrence theory and is most successful when it is held in reserve.

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persuade the other guy to give in, when the only method at your disposal—threatening to push him off the cliff—would doom you both? Answer: You start dancing, closer and closer to the edge. That way, you don't have to convince him that you would do something totally irrational: plunge him and yourself off the cliff. You just have to convince him that you are prepared to take a higher risk than he is of accidentally falling off the cliff. If you can do that, you win."

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and interpret intentions, the advantage of offense over defense, and weak actors and non-state actors can develop considerable cyber capabilities. Scholars have also debated the feasibility of launching highly damaging cyber attacks and engaging in destructive cyber warfare, with most scholars expressing skepticism that cyber capabilities have enhanced the ability of states to launch highly destructive attacks. The most prominent cyber attack to date is the

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state's costs of compliance and the greater need for the defending state's strategy to increase the costs of noncompliance and the benefits of compliance. That is a challenge, as deterrence is by definition a strategy of limited means. George (1991) goes on to explain that deterrence sometimes goes beyond threats to the actual use of military force, but if force is actually used, it must be limited and fall short of full-scale use to succeed.

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orientation of potential attacking states generally is for the short term and is driven by concerns about military cost and effectiveness. For successful deterrence, defending states need the military capacity to respond quickly and strongly to a range of contingencies. Deterrence often fails if either a defending state or an attacking state underestimates or overestimates the other's ability to undertake a particular course of action.

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at stake for the defending state that would justify the risks of a military conflict. The argument is that defending states that have greater interests at stake in a dispute are more resolved to use force and more willing to endure military losses to secure those interests. Even less well-established arguments are the specific interests that are more salient to state leaders such as military interests and economic interests.

1330:(MAD). Therefore, the period of détente was characterized by a general reduction in the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States and a thawing of the Cold War, which lasted from the late 1960s until the start of the 1980s. The doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence then characterized relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and relations with Russia until the onset of the 1253:

Logan have challenged this assertion. A 2023 study found that a state with nuclear weapons is less likely to be targeted by non-nuclear states, but that a state with nuclear weapons is not less likely to target other nuclear states in low-level conflict. A 2022 study by Kyungwon Suh suggests that nuclear superiority may not reduce the likelihood that nuclear opponents will initiate nuclear crises.

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the extent of an attacking state's vulnerability as shaped by its domestic political and economic conditions. In broad terms, a state wishing to implement a strategy of deterrence is most likely to succeed if the costs of noncompliance that it can impose on and the benefits of compliance it can offer to another state are greater than the benefits of noncompliance and the costs of compliance.

1486:, said that Western fears about nuclear weapons and World War III have left it "fully deterred" and Putin "completely undeterred." The West have "ceded the initiative to the enemy." No attempt was made by NATO to deter Moscow with the threat of military force, wondered another expert. To the contrary, it was Russia’s deterrence that proved to be successful. 778:

costs on an attacking state in an armed conflict, and the attacking state believes that the defending state is resolved to use its available military forces. Huth goes on to explain the four key factors for consideration under rational deterrence theory: the military balance, signaling and bargaining power, reputations for resolve, interests at stake.

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reductions without the state becoming vulnerable, but it has been noted that there comes a point that further reductions may be undesirable, once minimal deterrence is reached, as further reductions beyond that point increase a state's vulnerability and provide an incentive for an adversary to expand

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Scholars have also argued that leaders do not behave in ways that are consistent with the predictions of nuclear deterrence theory. Scholars have also argued that rational deterrence theory does not grapple sufficiently with emotions and psychological biases that make accidents, loss of self-control,

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Scholars have debated how cyber capabilities alter traditional understandings of deterrence, given that it may be harder to attribute responsibility for cyber attacks, the barriers to entry may be lower, the risks and costs may be lower for actors who conduct cyber attacks, it may be harder to signal

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give nations the potential to destroy their enemies but also the rest of humanity without drawing immediate reprisal because of the lack of a conceivable defense system and the speed with which nuclear weapons can be deployed. A nation's credible threat of such severe damage empowers their deterrence

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The central problem for a state that seeks to communicate a credible deterrent threat by diplomatic or military actions is that all defending states have an incentive to act as if they are determined to resist an attack in the hope that the attacking state will back away from military conflict with a

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Deterrence is often directed against state leaders who have specific territorial goals that they seek to attain either by seizing disputed territory in a limited military attack or by occupying disputed territory after the decisive defeat of the adversary's armed forces. In either case, the strategic

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must be sufficiently credible to raise the attacking state's perceived costs of noncompliance. A defending state having a superior military capability or economic strength in itself is not enough to ensure credibility. Indeed, all three elements of a balanced deterrence strategy are more likely to be

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Definition of deterrence from the Dictionary of Modern Strategy and Tactics by Michael Keane: "The prevention or inhibition of action brought about by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. It assumes

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where proposed steps to achieve nuclear disarmament. Kissinger has argued, "The classical notion of deterrence was that there was some consequences before which aggressors and evildoers would recoil. In a world of suicide bombers, that calculation doesn't operate in any comparable way." Shultz said,

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in 1985. They "agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the U.S. could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to

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A 2022 study by Brian Blankenship and Erik Lin-Greenberg found that high-resolve, low-capability signals (such as tripwires) were not viewed as more reassuring to allies than low-resolve, high-capability alternatives (such as forces stationed offshore). Their study cast doubt on the reassuring value

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provides further detail in relation to those factors. Proportionality refers to the relationship between the defending state's scope and nature of the objectives being pursued and the instruments available for use to pursue them. The more the defending state demands of another state, the higher that

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A threat serves as a deterrent to the extent that it convinces its target not to carry out the intended action because of the costs and losses that target would incur. In international security, a policy of deterrence generally refers to threats of military retaliation directed by the leaders of one

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Most of the innovative work on deterrence theory occurred from the late 1940s to mid-1960s. Historically, scholarship on deterrence has tended to focus on nuclear deterrence. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an extension of deterrence scholarship to areas that are not specifically about

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immoral in nature. In addition, he observes that deterrence theories serve to perpetuate a state of mutual assured destruction between nations over time. Holmes further argues that it is therefore both irrational and immoral to utilize a methodology for perpetuating international peace which relies

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According to Lennart Maschmeyer, cyber weapons have limited coercive effectiveness due to a trilemma "whereby speed, intensity, and control are negatively correlated. These constraints pose a trilemma for actors because a gain in one variable tends to produce losses across the other two variables."

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Furthermore, Huth argues that both supporters and critics of rational deterrence theory agree that an unfavorable assessment of the domestic and international status quo by state leaders can undermine or severely test the success of deterrence. In a rational choice approach, if the expected utility

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Although costly signaling and bargaining power are more well established arguments in rational deterrence theory, the interests of defending states are not as well known. Attacking states may look beyond the short-term bargaining tactics of a defending state and seek to determine what interests are

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argue, two key sets of factors for successful deterrence are important: a defending state strategy that balances credible coercion and deft diplomacy consistent with the three criteria of proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility and minimizes international and domestic constraints and

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While the army was dealing with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the spread of nuclear technology to other nations beyond the United States and Russia, the concept of deterrence took on a broader multinational dimension. The US policy on deterrence after the Cold War was outlined in 1995 in the

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columnist and one of Schelling's former students, anecdotally summarizes Schelling's reorientation of game theory thus: "ou're standing at the edge of a cliff, chained by the ankle to someone else. You'll be released, and one of you will get a large prize, as soon as the other gives in. How do you

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A successful deterrence policy must be considered in military terms but also political terms: International relations, foreign policy and diplomacy. In military terms, deterrence success refers to preventing state leaders from issuing military threats and actions that escalate peacetime diplomatic

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Scholars have debated whether having a superior nuclear arsenal provides a deterrent against other nuclear-armed states with smaller arsenals. Matthew Kroenig has argued that states with nuclear superiority are more likely to win nuclear crises, whereas Todd Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann and David C.

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is a key concept in rational deterrence theory. It states that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases. This occurs because rational actors want to avoid

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There are three different arguments that have been developed in relation to the role of reputations in influencing deterrence outcomes. The first argument focuses on a defending state's past behavior in international disputes and crises, which creates strong beliefs in a potential attacking state

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Deterrence theorists have consistently argued that deterrence success is more likely if a defending state's deterrent threat is credible to an attacking state. Huth outlines that a threat is considered credible if the defending state possesses both the military capabilities to inflict substantial

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that must be taken into consideration is the domestic political and economic conditions in the attacking state affecting its vulnerability to deterrence policies and the attacking state's ability to compensate unfavourable power balances. The first factor is whether internal political support and

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As outlined by Huth, a policy of deterrence can fit into two broad categories: preventing an armed attack against a state's own territory (known as direct deterrence) or preventing an armed attack against another state (known as extended deterrence). Situations of direct deterrence often occur if

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Intrawar deterrence is deterrence within a war context. It means that war has broken out but actors still seek to deter certain forms of behavior. In the words of Caitlin Talmadge, "intra-war deterrence failures... can be thought of as causing wars to get worse in some way." Examples of intrawar

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becomes involved. The latter case has generated most interest in academic literature. Building on the two broad categories, Huth goes on to outline that deterrence policies may be implemented in response to a pressing short-term threat (known as immediate deterrence) or as strategy to prevent a

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brought his background in game theory to the subject of studying international deterrence. Schelling's (1966) classic work on deterrence presents the concept that military strategy can no longer be defined as the science of military victory. Instead, it is argued that military strategy was now

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Deterrence theory has been criticized by numerous scholars for various reasons, the most basic being skepticism that decision makers are rational. A prominent strain of criticism argues that rational deterrence theory is contradicted by frequent deterrence failures, which may be attributed to

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Proponents of nuclear deterrence theory argue that newly nuclear-armed states may pose a short- or medium-term risk, but that "nuclear learning" occurs over time as states learn to live with new nuclear-armed states. Mark S. Bell and Nicholas L. Miller have however argued that there is a weak

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International relations scholars Dan Reiter and Paul Poast have argued that so-called "tripwires" do not deter aggression. Tripwires entail that small forces are deployed abroad with the assumption that an attack on them will trigger a greater deployment of forces. Dan Altman has argued that

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outlines that reciprocity involves an explicit understanding of linkage between the defending state's carrots and the attacking state's concessions. The balance lies in not offering too little, too late or for too much in return and not offering too much, too soon, or for too little return.

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Finally, coercive credibility requires that in addition to calculations about costs and benefits of co-operation, the defending state convincingly conveys to the attacking state that failure to co-operate has consequences. Threats, uses of force, and other coercive instruments such as

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was established, with peaceful co-existence was sought between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although all of those factors contributed to this shift, the most important factor was probably the rough parity achieved in stockpiling nuclear weapons with the clear capability of

1420:) not to threaten the United States, its interests, or allies. The document explains that such threats must also be used to ensure that nations without nuclear technology refrain from developing nuclear weapons and that a universal ban precludes any nation from maintaining 1157:

In 1966, Schelling is prescriptive in outlining the impact of the development of nuclear weapons in the analysis of military power and deterrence. In his analysis, before the widespread use of assured second strike capability, or immediate reprisal, in the form of

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military force or action refrains from doing so. Scholars distinguish between "extended deterrence" (the protection of allies) and "direct deterrence" (protection of oneself). Rational deterrence theory holds that an attacker will be deterred if they believe

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An example shows that the problem extends to the perception of the third parties as well as main adversaries and underlies the way in which attempts at deterrence can fail and even backfire if the assumptions about the others' perceptions are incorrect.

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Timo S. Koster who served at NATO as Director of Defence Policy & Capabilities similarly argued: A massacre is taking place in Europe and the strongest military alliance in the world is staying out of it. We are deterred and Russia is not.

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argued in 1994 that nuclear weapons were obsolete in the "new world disorder" after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and he advocated reliance on precision guided munitions to secure a permanent military advantage over future adversaries.

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refers to the scholarship and practice of how threats of using force by one party can convince another party to refrain from initiating some other course of action. The topic gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the

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have all called upon governments to embrace the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and created the Nuclear Security Project to advance that agenda. In 2010, the four were featured in a documentary film entitled

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and loss of control over others likely. Frank C. Zagare has argued that deterrence theory is logically inconsistent and empirically inaccurate. In place of classical deterrence, rational choice scholars have argued for

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There is a risk of unintended escalation in cyberspace due to difficulties in discerning the intent of attackers, and complexities in state-hacker relationships. According to political scientists Joseph Brown and

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deterrence include deterring adversaries from resorting to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons attacks or attacking civilian populations indiscriminately. Broadly, it involves any prevention of escalation.

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otherwise take an action refrains from doing so due to the consequences that the deterrer is perceived likely to take. "Immediate deterrence" is considered successful when an actor seriously contemplating

5885: 687:, which has been seen in Libya, Iraq, and North Korea. There, defending states have sought to change the leadership of a state and to policy changes relating primarily to their nuclear weapons programs. 532:", his country needed an air force that could immediately retaliate: "If we are prepared it may never come. It is not immediately conceivable that any nation will dare to attack us if we are prepared". 4914: 4010:

the findings reinforce a key theoretical tenet of the nuclear revolution: Once states have achieved a secure second-strike capability, nuclear superiority does not confer additional political benefits.

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Since the consequence of a breakdown of the nuclear deterrence strategy is so catastrophic for human civilisation, it is reasonable to employ the strategy only if the chance of breakdown is zero.

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Deterrence is most likely to be successful when a prospective attacker believes that the probability of success is low and the costs of attack are high. Central problems of deterrence include the

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would devastate both parties. The central problem of deterrence revolves around how to credibly threaten military action or nuclear punishment on the adversary despite its costs to the deterrer.

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nuclear wars, and thus they neither start major conflicts nor allow minor conflicts to escalate into major conflicts—thus making it safe to engage in minor conflicts. For instance, during the

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of not using force is reduced by a declining status quo position, deterrence failure is more likely since the alternative option of using force becomes relatively more attractive.

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would be met with a nuclear response. Later Ukrainian attacks on the same fleet using a different communications system also caused deterrence, this time to the Russian Navy.

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The concept of deterrence can be defined as the use of threats in limited force by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action. In

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Deterrence theory holds that nuclear weapons are intended to deter other states from attacking with their nuclear weapons, through the promise of retaliation and possibly

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between neighboring states in which major powers like the United States do not directly intervene. On the other hand, situations of extended deterrence often occur when a

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in which a state possesses no more nuclear weapons than is necessary to deter an adversary from attacking is presently the most common form of deterrence practiced by

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misperceptions. Here it's argued that misestimations of perceived costs and benefits by analysts contribute to deterrence failures, as exemplified in case of

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state to the leaders of another in an attempt to prevent the other state from resorting to the use of military force in pursuit of its foreign policy goals.

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The two most prominent deterrent strategies are "denial" (denying the attacker the benefits of attack) and "punishment" (inflicting costs on the attacker).

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tripwires do work to deter aggression, citing the Western deployment of forces to Berlin in 1948–1949 to deter Soviet aggression as a successful example.

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A successful nuclear deterrent requires a country to preserve its ability to retaliate by responding before its own weapons are destroyed or ensuring a

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Glenn Snyder also offers a broad definition of deterrence, as he argues that deterrence involves both the threat of sanction and the promise of reward.

4243: 1036: 6267: 1650:"If you think of the people who are doing suicide attacks, and people like that get a nuclear weapon, they are almost by definition not deterrable." 1346:'s arms build-up during the 1980s. Reagan attempted to justify the policy by concerns of growing Soviet influence in Latin America and the post-1979 6045:"Reviewed work: On War and Morality, Robert L. Holmes; Paths to Peace: Exploring the Feasibility of Sustainable Peace, Richard Smoke, Willis Harman" 4429: 1898: 6635: 6212: 4383: 1443:, many western hawks expressed the view that deterrence worked in that war but only in one way – in favor of Russia. Former US security advisor, 1108: 570:

often depends upon a president withstanding "the inevitable charges of appeasement that accompany any decision to negotiate with hostile powers.

4628: 4292:"An explosive Elon Musk biography is just hitting shelves. But the book's acclaimed author is already walking back a major claim | CNN Business" 3515: 3457: 1428:. The current tensions with Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programs are caused partly by the continuation of the policy of deterrence. 7821: 3917: 2725: 2261: 5507: 1374:, who were fighting for independence from the Soviet Union, and several anticommunist movements in Latin America such as the overthrow of the 1042: 3706: 4517: 1103: 4892: 4269: 3391: 3021:

See, for example, Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989)

1994: 1610:, which assumes that states may vary in their internal characteristics and especially in the credibility of their threats of retaliation. 1092: 467:. Compellence has been characterized as harder to successfully implement than deterrence. Deterrence also tends to be distinguished from 2508: 4826: 1413: 1113: 5685:

Zagare, Frank C. (2004), "Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory",

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Tavberidze, Vazha, (2022). "Former NATO Commander Says Western Fears Of Nuclear War Are Preventing A Proper Response To Putin,"

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One approach to theorizing about deterrence has entailed the use of rational choice and game-theoretic models of decision making (see

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attack on Iran's nuclear program. By 2019, the only publicly acknowledged case of a cyber attack causing a power outage was the

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Part of a state's nuclear arsenal must appear to be able to survive an attack by the adversary and be used for a retaliatory

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NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice

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The final expression of the full impact of deterrence during the cold war can be seen in the agreement between Reagan and

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throughout most of the globe, particularly Africa, Asia, Central America, and South America. One notable conflict was the

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under the belief that the United States will refuse to risk its own cities by assisting Western Europe in a nuclear war.

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exclusively upon the continuous development of new iterations of the very weapons which it is designed to prohibit.

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This article is about Deterrent in peace and conflict studies and nuclear weapons. For legal theory of justice, see

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era, philosophical objections to the reliance upon deterrence theories in general have also been raised on purely

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Since the early 2000s, there has been an increased focus on cyber deterrence. Cyber deterrence has two meanings:

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Mueller, Karl (2021), Osinga, Frans; Sweijs, Tim (eds.), "The Continuing Relevance of Conventional Deterrence",

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during World War II, was thinking about how the next war would be fought. He said in a speech that month to the

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From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons

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The use of military threats as a means to deter international crises and war has been a central topic of

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Huth, P. K. (1999), "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debate",

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Rynning, Sten (2021). "Deterrence Rediscovered: NATO and Russia". In Osinga, Frans; Sweijs, Tim (eds.).

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Deterrence is widely defined as any use of threats (implicit or explicit) or limited force intended to

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communication of threats and assurance. Deterrence does not necessarily require military superiority.

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Norms: the establishment and maintenance of norms that establish appropriate standards of behavior

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policies and fuels political coercion and military deadlock, which can produce proxy warfare.

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Entanglement and interdependence: interdependence between actors can have a deterrent effect

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Denial: preventing adversaries from achieving military objectives by defending against them

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and spent substantial amounts of money and manpower on gaining relative influence over the

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presumption which prohibits the killing of innocent life. Consequently, such theories are

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are supportive, and opposition within the defending state's domestic politics is limited.

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A distinction is sometimes made between nuclear deterrence and "conventional deterrence."

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during arms negotiations between the United States and Russia allows each state to make

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The main source of disproportionality is an objective that goes beyond policy change to

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have noted that the implementation of such theories is inconsistent with a fundamental

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argued Musk had been deterred by Russia after the country's ambassador warned him an

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wrote in 1959 that a credible nuclear deterrent must be always ready but never used.

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and Kenneth Osgood, "Munich and appeasement have become among the dirtiest words in

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an actor from taking an action (i.e. maintain the status quo). Deterrence is unlike

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military conflict or short-term threat from arising (known as general deterrence).

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In an article celebrating Schelling's Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics,

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The early stages of the Cold War were generally characterized by the

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was founded 1949 with a role including deterring aggression.

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No air attack, once it is launched, can be completely stopped

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The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics

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capability. A nuclear deterrent is sometimes composed of a

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The other important considerations outlined by Jentleson

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There are various ways to engage in cyber deterrence:

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achieved if other major international actors like the

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Other countries, such as the 7867:Subfields of political science 7832:International relations theory 6916:Evolutionarily stable strategy 6133:. Princeton University Press. 5953:Journal of Conflict Resolution 5474:. Cambridge University Press. 5372:. Princeton University Press. 5318:. Princeton University Press. 4795:Journal of Conflict Resolution 4323:Applebaum, Anne (2023-09-11). 3396:Texas National Security Review 3315:Schelling, T. C. (1966), "2", 3074:. Princeton University Press. 3055:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.25 2859:Huntington, Samuel P. (1983). 2616:Rhodes, Richard (1995-06-11). 2221: 2175: 2032: 1890: 1865: 1691:its nuclear arsenal secretly. 1432: 1392:International Court of Justice 1272: 816:Signaling and bargaining power 690: 289:Alternative dispute resolution 1: 6844:Simultaneous action selection 6201:. Cambridge University Press. 5766:. 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Cornell University Press. 5230:Journal of Strategic Studies 5175:Maschmeyer, Lennart (2021). 4670:10.1080/09636412.2013.816122 4597:Journal of Strategic Studies 4290:Darcy, Oliver (2023-09-12). 3666:. Cornell University Press. 2692:Shimshoni, Jonathan (1988). 2228:Shimshoni, Jonathan (1988). 1748:Confidence-building measures 1672:mutually assured destruction 1568: 1522:2015 Ukraine power grid hack 1462:by denying to enable needed 856: 626:mutually assured destruction 7: 7245:Optional prisoner's dilemma 6976:Self-confirming equilibrium 5038:Strategic Studies Quarterly 3752:. Oxford University Press. 3608:Political Science Quarterly 3542:. W.W. Norton. p. 20. 2836:10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_4 2798:Strategic Studies Quarterly 2756:10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_3 2578:Glaser, Charles L. (1990). 1999:. Oxford University Press. 1948:Morgan, Patrick M. (1977). 1730: 1587:Russian invasion of Ukraine 10: 7883: 7862:Peace and conflict studies 7710:Principal variation search 7426:Aumann's agreement theorem 7089:Strategy-stealing argument 7001:Trembling hand equilibrium 6931:Markov perfect equilibrium 6926:Mertens-stable equilibrium 6712:Peace and conflict studies 6328:Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 6172:Freedman, Lawrence. 2004. 5818:Ben Goddard (2010-01-27). 5224:Talmadge, Caitlin (2019). 4158:Cohen, Michael D. (2017). 4092:Horowitz, Michael (2009). 3856:International Organization 3790:International Organization 2477:International Interactions 1714:grounds. Scholars such as 1670:As opposed to the extreme 1577: 1493: 1397:Nicaragua v. United States 1328:mutual assured destruction 1308: 884:Mutual assured destruction 873: 828: 734:Rational deterrence theory 616:Furthermore, as Jentleson 573: 511: 438:mutual assured destruction 432:with regard to the use of 356:Peace and conflict studies 263:Mutual assured destruction 18: 7746:Combinatorial game theory 7733: 7692: 7474: 7418: 7405:Princess and monster game 7200: 7102: 7009: 6961:Quasi-perfect equilibrium 6886:Bayesian Nash equilibrium 6867: 6766: 6669: 6621: 6419: 6376: 6351: 6305: 6296: 6283: 6192:Psychology and Deterrence 6176:. New York: Polity Press. 6043:Rock, Stephen R. (1989). 6001:Meyers, Diana T. (1992). 5520:10.1017/9781108910194.008 4931:10.1017/S0002930000016894 4865:10.1017/S0002930000016894 4071:10.1177/00223433211067899 4059:Journal of Peace Research 3868:10.1017/S0020818312000392 3802:10.1017/S0020818312000367 3784:Kroenig, Matthew (2013). 3746:Kroenig, Matthew (2018). 3317:The Diplomacy of Violence 3131:10.1162/isec.2005.30.3.47 3068:Snyder, Glenn H. (1966). 2088:. Yale University Press. 1601:Misprediction of behavior 1593:can be seen as rewarding 870:Nuclear deterrence theory 771:Cost-benefit calculations 516:By November 1945 general 7827:Geopolitical terminology 7761:Evolutionary game theory 7494:Antoine Augustin Cournot 7380:Guess 2/3 of the average 7177:Strictly determined game 6971:Satisfaction equilibrium 6789:Escalation of commitment 6010:The Philosophical Review 5709:10.1177/0951629804041117 5561:Sagan, Scott D. (1994). 5443:The Washington Quarterly 4807:10.1177/0022002717737138 4758:Journal of Cybersecurity 4652:Lindsay, Jon R. (2013). 4110:10.1177/0022002708330388 3970:Logan, David C. (2022). 2136:Pape, Robert A. (1996). 1874:A Dictionary of Aviation 1872:Wragg, David W. (1973). 1839: 1439:By the beginning of the 1386:in Nicaragua led to the 1187:The state must maintain 753:Unitary actor assumption 526:Ohio Society of New York 442:second-strike capability 351:Non-aggression principle 309:Conflict style inventory 113:Nonviolent Communication 7766:Glossary of game theory 7365:Stackelberg competition 6991:Strong Nash equilibrium 6687:Foreign policy analysis 6499:International community 6277:International relations 6197:Morgan, Patrick. 2003. 5853:"The new abolitionists" 5366:Jervis, Robert (1976). 5312:Carson, Austin (2018). 4480:Nye, Joseph S. (2017). 4434:Cross-Domain Deterrence 4220:10.7591/j.ctv310vm0j.11 3660:Jervis, Robert (1989). 3602:Jervis, Robert (1979). 2185:Conventional Deterrence 1758:International relations 825:Reputations for resolve 781:The American economist 450:international relations 198:International relations 128:Speaking truth to power 7837:International security 7791:Tragedy of the commons 7771:List of game theorists 7751:Confrontation analysis 7461:Sprague–Grundy theorem 6981:Sequential equilibrium 6901:Correlated equilibrium 5890:washingtonpost dot com 5661:International Security 5567:International Security 5437:Jung, Karsten (2023). 5181:International Security 4486:International Security 4053:Suh, Kyungwon (2022). 3976:International Security 3355:International Security 3119:International Security 3071:Deterrence and Defense 2931:International Security 2865:International Security 2529:Lee, Do Young (2021). 2489:10.1080/03050620210390 2471:Fearon, James (2002). 2329:International Security 1808:Peace through strength 1580:Salami slicing tactics 765:Strategic interactions 580:international security 509: 497: 41: 7564:Jean-François Mertens 5141:10.1017/9781316422724 5032:Lin, Herbert (2012). 4767:10.1093/cybsec/tyw015 3928:10.1017/9781316227305 2789:Wirtz, James (2018). 2704:10.7591/9781501737831 2240:10.7591/9781501737831 1680:nuclear weapon states 1646:Nuclear Tipping Point 1480:Philip Breedlove 1382:. The funding of the 749:: actors are rational 505: 493: 273:Nuclear proliferation 29: 21:Deterrence (penology) 7817:Cold War terminology 7693:Search optimizations 7569:Jennifer Tour Chayes 7456:Revelation principle 7451:Purification theorem 7390:Nash bargaining game 7355:Bertrand competition 7340:El Farol Bar problem 7305:Electronic mail game 7270:Lewis signaling game 6814:Hierarchy of beliefs 6677:Comparative politics 6085:Lee, Steven (1992). 5194:10.1162/isec_a_00418 5129:Maurer, Tim (2018). 4498:10.1162/isec_a_00266 4250:on December 8, 2008. 3989:10.1162/isec_a_00434 3420:Altman, Dan (2018). 2341:10.1162/isec_a_00313 2204:10.7591/j.ctt1rv61v2 2158:10.7591/j.ctt1287f6v 1027:Nuclear-armed states 704:Coercive credibility 695:Secondly, Jentleson 339:Paradox of tolerance 7741:Bounded rationality 7360:Cournot competition 7310:Rock paper scissors 7285:Battle of the sexes 7275:Volunteer's dilemma 7147:Perfect information 7074:Dominant strategies 6911:Epsilon-equilibrium 6794:Extensive-form game 6459:Collective security 6343:United Nations (UN) 6130:On War and Morality 5865:on 17 February 2014 5324:10.2307/j.ctv346p45 4992:10.1017/eis.2021.18 4040:10.1093/isq/sqac067 3343:, October 12, 2005. 3341:The Washington Post 2094:10.2307/j.ctt5vm52s 1753:Decapitation strike 1620:nuclear disarmament 1574:Deterrence failures 1560:Intrawar deterrence 1287:sphere of influence 1189:command and control 880:Massive retaliation 630:massive retaliation 602:territorial dispute 520:, who led American 268:Nuclear disarmament 167:Conflict escalation 144:Conflict management 48:Conflict resolution 7720:Paranoid algorithm 7700:Alpha–beta pruning 7579:John Maynard Smith 7410:Rendezvous problem 7250:Traveler's dilemma 7240:Gift-exchange game 7235:Prisoner's dilemma 7152:Large Poisson game 7119:Bargaining problem 7024:Backward induction 6996:Subgame perfection 6951:Proper equilibrium 5934:2017-09-21 at the 5921:2015-06-20 at the 5892:. WP Company LLC. 3335:2019-09-25 at the 2085:Arms and Influence 1813:Prisoner's dilemma 1743:Chainstore paradox 1702:Ethical objections 1684:minimal deterrence 1676:minimum deterrence 1666:Minimum deterrence 1654:Stronger deterrent 1608:perfect deterrence 1426:biological weapons 1418:pre-emptive action 1388:Iran-Contra Affair 1366:, support for the 1283:developing nations 844:Interests at stake 711:economic sanctions 587:Arms and Influence 522:air raids on Japan 386:Track II diplomacy 334:Prisoner's dilemma 304:Conflict continuum 299:Conflict avoidance 84:Dispute resolution 42: 7842:Military strategy 7812:Cold War policies 7799: 7798: 7705:Aspiration window 7674:Suzanne Scotchmer 7629:Oskar Morgenstern 7524:Donald B. Gillies 7466:Zermelo's theorem 7395:Induction puzzles 7350:Fair cake-cutting 7325:Public goods game 7255:Coordination game 7129:Intransitive game 7059:Forward induction 6941:Pareto efficiency 6921:Gibbs equilibrium 6891:Berge equilibrium 6839:Simultaneous game 6725: 6724: 6697:International law 6566:Right of conquest 6531:National interest 6474:Deterrence theory 6372: 6371: 6359:League of Nations 6231:Waltz, Kenneth N. 6225:978-0-226-65002-9 6209:Patrick M. Morgan 6167:978-0-8179-1845-3 6140:978-1-4008-6014-2 5851:(30 March 2012). 5736:. June 16, 2011. 5529:978-1-108-90677-7 5508:"The Nuclear Age" 5481:978-1-108-48986-7 5379:978-1-4008-8511-4 5333:978-0-691-18424-1 5287:978-0-8014-2938-5 5150:978-1-107-12760-9 4451:978-0-19-090864-5 4398:Radio Free Europe 4211:978-1-5017-6701-2 4171:978-1-62616-495-6 3937:978-1-107-10694-9 3759:978-0-19-084918-4 3712:on 12 August 2017 3698:Krepon, Michael. 3673:978-0-8014-9565-6 3549:978-0-393-03810-1 3081:978-1-4008-7716-4 2846:978-94-6265-419-8 2765:978-94-6265-418-1 2713:978-1-5017-3783-1 2667:978-1-4422-3306-5 2591:978-1-4008-6202-3 2249:978-1-5017-3783-1 2195:978-1-5017-1325-5 2149:978-0-8014-3134-0 2103:978-0-300-00221-8 2052:978-1-4422-3306-5 2014:978-0-19-090960-4 1961:978-0-8039-0819-2 1918:978-0-19-090960-4 1798:Nuclear terrorism 1778:Nuclear blackmail 1763:Launch on warning 1738:Balance of terror 1696:nuclear deterrent 1688:nuclear stockpile 1412:document called " 1405:Mikhail Gorbachev 1319:Sino-Soviet Split 1155: 1154: 919:Nuclear explosion 888:Flexible response 568:US foreign policy 564:American politics 560:Frederik Logevall 536:nuclear weapons. 425:Deterrence theory 422: 421: 294:Anti-war movement 258:Nuclear blackmail 162:Communal violence 38:Regulus I missile 7874: 7852:Nuclear strategy 7786:Topological game 7781:No-win situation 7679:Thomas Schelling 7659:Robert B. Wilson 7619:Merrill M. Flood 7589:John von Neumann 7499:Ariel Rubinstein 7484:Albert W. Tucker 7335:War of attrition 7295:Matching pennies 6936:Nash equilibrium 6859:Mechanism design 6824:Normal-form game 6779:Cooperative game 6752: 6745: 6738: 6729: 6728: 6717:Security studies 6509:Internationality 6504:Internationalism 6303: 6302: 6270: 6263: 6256: 6247: 6246: 6184:Richard N. Lebow 6161:, Hoover Press, 6145: 6144: 6124: 6118: 6117: 6091: 6082: 6076: 6075: 6058:(4): 1447–1448. 6049: 6040: 6034: 6033: 6007: 5998: 5992: 5991: 5963: 5957: 5945: 5939: 5912: 5906: 5905: 5903: 5901: 5881: 5875: 5874: 5872: 5870: 5861:. 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Holmes 1591:Frozen conflicts 1490:Cyber deterrence 1472:attack on Crimea 1435:-Cold War period 1434: 1299:George F. Kennan 1147: 1140: 1133: 1084: 978:Target selection 906: 892: 891: 876:Nuclear strategy 807:Military balance 783:Thomas Schelling 552:Lesson of Munich 414: 407: 400: 44: 43: 7882: 7881: 7877: 7876: 7875: 7873: 7872: 7871: 7857:Nuclear warfare 7847:Military ethics 7802: 7801: 7800: 7795: 7729: 7715:max^n algorithm 7688: 7684:William Vickrey 7644:Reinhard Selten 7599:Kenneth Binmore 7514:David K. Levine 7509:Daniel Kahneman 7476: 7470: 7446:Negamax theorem 7436:Minimax theorem 7414: 7375:Diner's dilemma 7230:All-pay auction 7196: 7182:Stochastic game 7134:Mean-field game 7105: 7098: 7069:Markov strategy 7005: 6871: 6863: 6834:Sequential game 6819:Information set 6804:Game complexity 6774:Congestion game 6762: 6756: 6726: 6721: 6665: 6656:Postcolonialism 6617: 6546:Non-state actor 6541:Non-belligerent 6536:Neutral country 6521:Interventionism 6454:Co-belligerence 6415: 6368: 6347: 6292: 6279: 6274: 6244: 6188:Janice G. Stein 6154: 6152:Further reading 6149: 6148: 6141: 6125: 6121: 6106:10.2307/2216042 6089: 6083: 6079: 6064:10.2307/1961738 6047: 6041: 6037: 6022:10.2307/2185583 6005: 5999: 5995: 5980:10.2307/1148862 5964: 5960: 5948:Nalebuff, Barry 5946: 5942: 5936:Wayback Machine 5923:Wayback Machine 5913: 5909: 5899: 5897: 5882: 5878: 5868: 5866: 5846: 5842: 5833: 5831: 5816: 5812: 5803: 5801: 5788: 5787: 5783: 5773: 5771: 5758: 5757: 5753: 5743: 5741: 5728: 5727: 5723: 5700:10.1.1.335.7353 5683: 5679: 5670: 5668: 5655: 5654: 5650: 5641: 5639: 5626: 5625: 5621: 5612: 5610: 5579:10.2307/2539178 5559: 5555: 5547: 5545: 5530: 5504: 5500: 5491: 5489: 5482: 5466: 5462: 5435: 5431: 5402: 5398: 5389: 5387: 5380: 5364: 5360: 5351: 5349: 5334: 5310: 5306: 5297: 5295: 5288: 5269: 5265: 5222: 5218: 5173: 5169: 5160: 5158: 5151: 5127: 5123: 5080: 5076: 5067: 5065: 5030: 5026: 5017: 5015: 4972: 4965: 4956: 4954: 4911: 4907: 4898: 4896: 4845: 4841: 4832: 4830: 4787: 4783: 4750: 4743: 4700: 4693: 4650: 4643: 4634: 4632: 4589: 4582: 4539: 4532: 4523: 4521: 4478: 4469: 4461: 4459: 4452: 4426: 4417: 4408: 4404: 4395: 4391: 4375: 4374: 4368: 4366: 4351: 4347: 4338: 4336: 4321: 4314: 4305: 4303: 4288: 4284: 4275: 4273: 4260: 4259: 4255: 4242: 4241: 4237: 4229: 4227: 4212: 4194: 4190: 4181: 4179: 4172: 4156: 4152: 4143: 4141: 4090: 4086: 4051: 4047: 4020: 4016: 3968: 3964: 3955: 3953: 3938: 3914: 3910: 3901: 3899: 3848: 3844: 3835: 3833: 3782: 3778: 3769: 3767: 3760: 3744: 3740: 3729: 3725: 3715: 3713: 3709: 3702: 3696: 3692: 3683: 3681: 3674: 3658: 3654: 3645: 3643: 3620:10.2307/2149629 3600: 3596: 3587: 3585: 3572: 3568: 3559: 3557: 3550: 3534: 3530: 3521: 3519: 3476: 3472: 3463: 3461: 3418: 3414: 3405: 3403: 3390: 3389: 3382: 3367:10.2307/2538549 3351: 3347: 3337:Wayback Machine 3328: 3324: 3312: 3303: 3294: 3292: 3261:10.2307/2010511 3241: 3237: 3228: 3226: 3195:10.2307/2010405 3175: 3171: 3160: 3156: 3148: 3146: 3115:"Who Won Libya" 3111: 3100: 3091: 3089: 3082: 3066: 3062: 3038: 3025: 3020: 3016: 2989: 2985: 2976: 2974: 2943:10.2307/2538686 2923: 2919: 2910: 2908: 2877:10.2307/2538699 2857: 2853: 2847: 2823: 2819: 2810: 2808: 2804: 2793: 2787: 2783: 2766: 2744: 2740: 2731: 2729: 2714: 2690: 2686: 2677: 2675: 2668: 2652: 2648: 2639: 2637: 2614: 2610: 2601: 2599: 2592: 2576: 2572: 2527: 2523: 2514: 2512: 2469: 2462: 2453: 2451: 2420:10.2307/2010184 2400: 2385: 2376: 2374: 2321: 2314: 2305: 2303: 2288:Foreign Affairs 2280: 2276: 2267: 2265: 2250: 2226: 2222: 2213: 2211: 2196: 2180: 2176: 2167: 2165: 2150: 2134: 2130: 2121: 2119: 2104: 2080: 2071: 2062: 2060: 2053: 2037: 2033: 2024: 2022: 2015: 1991: 1980: 1971: 1969: 1962: 1946: 1937: 1928: 1926: 1919: 1895: 1891: 1884: 1870: 1866: 1861: 1856: 1850: 1846: 1842: 1837: 1818:Reagan Doctrine 1803:Nuclear warfare 1733: 1704: 1668: 1656: 1636:Henry Kissinger 1616: 1614:Suicide attacks 1603: 1582: 1576: 1571: 1562: 1502: 1494:Main articles: 1492: 1460:Black Sea fleet 1458:on the Russian 1437: 1340: 1311: 1275: 1263: 1164:nuclear weapons 1151: 1102: 1082: 1072: 1041: 896:Nuclear weapons 890: 874:Main articles: 872: 859: 846: 833: 827: 818: 809: 796:Washington Post 791:Michael Kinsley 736: 706: 693: 673: 671:Proportionality 576: 514: 434:nuclear weapons 418: 346:Liaison officer 253:Nuclear warfare 237:Multilateralism 177:Just war theory 24: 17: 12: 11: 5: 7880: 7870: 7869: 7864: 7859: 7854: 7849: 7844: 7839: 7834: 7829: 7824: 7819: 7814: 7797: 7796: 7794: 7793: 7788: 7783: 7778: 7773: 7768: 7763: 7758: 7753: 7748: 7743: 7737: 7735: 7731: 7730: 7728: 7727: 7722: 7717: 7712: 7707: 7702: 7696: 7694: 7690: 7689: 7687: 7686: 7681: 7676: 7671: 7666: 7661: 7656: 7651: 7649:Robert Axelrod 7646: 7641: 7636: 7631: 7626: 7624:Olga Bondareva 7621: 7616: 7614:Melvin Dresher 7611: 7606: 7604:Leonid Hurwicz 7601: 7596: 7591: 7586: 7581: 7576: 7571: 7566: 7561: 7556: 7551: 7546: 7541: 7539:Harold W. Kuhn 7536: 7531: 7529:Drew Fudenberg 7526: 7521: 7519:David M. Kreps 7516: 7511: 7506: 7504:Claude Shannon 7501: 7496: 7491: 7486: 7480: 7478: 7472: 7471: 7469: 7468: 7463: 7458: 7453: 7448: 7443: 7441:Nash's theorem 7438: 7433: 7428: 7422: 7420: 7416: 7415: 7413: 7412: 7407: 7402: 7397: 7392: 7387: 7382: 7377: 7372: 7367: 7362: 7357: 7352: 7347: 7342: 7337: 7332: 7327: 7322: 7317: 7312: 7307: 7302: 7300:Ultimatum game 7297: 7292: 7287: 7282: 7280:Dollar auction 7277: 7272: 7267: 7265:Centipede game 7262: 7257: 7252: 7247: 7242: 7237: 7232: 7227: 7222: 7220:Infinite chess 7217: 7212: 7206: 7204: 7198: 7197: 7195: 7194: 7189: 7187:Symmetric game 7184: 7179: 7174: 7172:Signaling game 7169: 7167:Screening game 7164: 7159: 7157:Potential game 7154: 7149: 7144: 7136: 7131: 7126: 7121: 7116: 7110: 7108: 7100: 7099: 7097: 7096: 7091: 7086: 7084:Mixed strategy 7081: 7076: 7071: 7066: 7061: 7056: 7051: 7046: 7041: 7036: 7031: 7026: 7021: 7015: 7013: 7007: 7006: 7004: 7003: 6998: 6993: 6988: 6983: 6978: 6973: 6968: 6966:Risk dominance 6963: 6958: 6953: 6948: 6943: 6938: 6933: 6928: 6923: 6918: 6913: 6908: 6903: 6898: 6893: 6888: 6883: 6877: 6875: 6865: 6864: 6862: 6861: 6856: 6851: 6846: 6841: 6836: 6831: 6826: 6821: 6816: 6811: 6809:Graphical game 6806: 6801: 6796: 6791: 6786: 6781: 6776: 6770: 6768: 6764: 6763: 6755: 6754: 6747: 6740: 6732: 6723: 6722: 6720: 6719: 6714: 6709: 6704: 6699: 6694: 6689: 6684: 6679: 6673: 6671: 6667: 6666: 6664: 6663: 6658: 6653: 6648: 6643: 6638: 6636:English school 6633: 6631:Constructivism 6627: 6625: 6619: 6618: 6616: 6615: 6610: 6609: 6608: 6603: 6601:Non-aggression 6598: 6593: 6588: 6578: 6573: 6568: 6563: 6558: 6553: 6548: 6543: 6538: 6533: 6528: 6523: 6518: 6517: 6516: 6511: 6501: 6496: 6491: 6486: 6481: 6476: 6471: 6466: 6461: 6456: 6451: 6446: 6445: 6444: 6439: 6434: 6423: 6421: 6417: 6416: 6414: 6413: 6408: 6403: 6398: 6393: 6388: 6382: 6380: 6374: 6373: 6370: 6369: 6367: 6366: 6361: 6355: 6353: 6349: 6348: 6346: 6345: 6340: 6335: 6330: 6325: 6320: 6315: 6309: 6307: 6300: 6294: 6293: 6291: 6290: 6284: 6281: 6280: 6273: 6272: 6265: 6258: 6250: 6243: 6242:External links 6240: 6239: 6238: 6228: 6213:James J. Wirtz 6202: 6199:Deterrence Now 6195: 6180:Jervis, Robert 6177: 6170: 6153: 6150: 6147: 6146: 6139: 6119: 6100:(4): 559–562. 6077: 6035: 6016:(2): 481–484. 5993: 5968:Foreign Policy 5958: 5940: 5907: 5876: 5849:Hugh Gusterson 5840: 5810: 5781: 5751: 5721: 5693:(2): 107–141, 5677: 5648: 5634:. 2023-02-26. 5619: 5553: 5528: 5498: 5480: 5460: 5429: 5416:(4): 544–560. 5396: 5378: 5358: 5332: 5304: 5286: 5272:Legro, Jeffrey 5263: 5236:(6): 864–887. 5216: 5167: 5149: 5121: 5094:(3): 452–481. 5074: 5024: 4986:(4): 401–417. 4963: 4925:(3): 425–479. 4905: 4859:(3): 425–479. 4839: 4801:(2): 317–347. 4781: 4741: 4714:(2): 316–348. 4691: 4664:(3): 365–404. 4641: 4603:(3): 534–569. 4580: 4553:(3): 452–481. 4530: 4467: 4450: 4415: 4402: 4389: 4345: 4312: 4282: 4268:. 2022-03-09. 4253: 4235: 4210: 4188: 4170: 4150: 4104:(2): 234–257. 4084: 4065:(2): 337–351. 4045: 4014: 3982:(4): 172–215. 3962: 3936: 3908: 3862:(1): 173–195. 3842: 3796:(1): 141–171. 3776: 3758: 3738: 3723: 3690: 3672: 3652: 3614:(4): 617–633. 3594: 3566: 3548: 3528: 3470: 3412: 3398:. 2021-06-02. 3380: 3345: 3322: 3301: 3255:(4): 466–501. 3249:World Politics 3235: 3189:(2): 143–169. 3183:World Politics 3169: 3154: 3098: 3080: 3060: 3023: 3014: 2983: 2917: 2851: 2845: 2817: 2781: 2764: 2738: 2712: 2684: 2666: 2646: 2622:The New Yorker 2608: 2590: 2570: 2541:(5): 761–796. 2521: 2460: 2414:(4): 496–526. 2408:World Politics 2383: 2335:(4): 128–169. 2312: 2274: 2248: 2220: 2194: 2174: 2148: 2128: 2102: 2069: 2051: 2031: 2013: 1978: 1960: 1935: 1917: 1889: 1882: 1863: 1862: 1860: 1857: 1855: 1854: 1843: 1841: 1838: 1836: 1835: 1830: 1828:Tripwire force 1825: 1820: 1815: 1810: 1805: 1800: 1795: 1790: 1785: 1783:Nuclear ethics 1780: 1775: 1770: 1765: 1760: 1755: 1750: 1745: 1740: 1734: 1732: 1729: 1703: 1700: 1667: 1664: 1655: 1652: 1618:Advocates for 1615: 1612: 1602: 1599: 1575: 1572: 1570: 1567: 1561: 1558: 1545: 1544: 1541: 1538: 1535: 1532: 1513: 1512: 1509: 1491: 1488: 1468:Anne Applebaum 1436: 1430: 1378:government in 1356:Saddam Hussein 1350:government of 1339: 1336: 1310: 1307: 1274: 1271: 1262: 1259: 1247:Bernard Brodie 1192: 1191: 1185: 1182: 1153: 1152: 1150: 1149: 1142: 1135: 1127: 1124: 1123: 1122: 1121: 1116: 1111: 1106: 1096: 1095: 1090: 1085: 1076: 1066: 1065: 1060: 1055: 1053:United Kingdom 1050: 1045: 1030: 1029: 1023: 1022: 1021: 1020: 1015: 1010: 1005: 1000: 995: 990: 985: 980: 975: 969: 968: 963: 958: 952: 951: 946: 941: 936: 931: 926: 921: 913: 912: 908: 907: 899: 898: 871: 868: 866:of tripwires. 858: 855: 845: 842: 829:Main article: 826: 823: 817: 814: 808: 805: 775: 774: 768: 762: 756: 750: 735: 732: 705: 702: 692: 689: 672: 669: 661:United Kingdom 575: 572: 513: 510: 501:game-theoretic 420: 419: 417: 416: 409: 402: 394: 391: 390: 389: 388: 383: 378: 373: 368: 363: 358: 353: 348: 343: 342: 341: 336: 326: 321: 319:Family therapy 316: 311: 306: 301: 296: 291: 283: 282: 278: 277: 276: 275: 270: 265: 260: 255: 247: 246: 242: 241: 240: 239: 234: 229: 224: 219: 214: 209: 201: 200: 194: 193: 192: 191: 190: 189: 179: 174: 169: 164: 156: 155: 149: 148: 147: 146: 138: 137: 133: 132: 131: 130: 125: 120: 115: 110: 109: 108: 106:Party-directed 98: 97: 96: 91: 86: 76: 71: 66: 58: 57: 51: 50: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 7879: 7868: 7865: 7863: 7860: 7858: 7855: 7853: 7850: 7848: 7845: 7843: 7840: 7838: 7835: 7833: 7830: 7828: 7825: 7823: 7820: 7818: 7815: 7813: 7810: 7809: 7807: 7792: 7789: 7787: 7784: 7782: 7779: 7777: 7774: 7772: 7769: 7767: 7764: 7762: 7759: 7757: 7754: 7752: 7749: 7747: 7744: 7742: 7739: 7738: 7736: 7734:Miscellaneous 7732: 7726: 7723: 7721: 7718: 7716: 7713: 7711: 7708: 7706: 7703: 7701: 7698: 7697: 7695: 7691: 7685: 7682: 7680: 7677: 7675: 7672: 7670: 7669:Samuel Bowles 7667: 7665: 7664:Roger Myerson 7662: 7660: 7657: 7655: 7654:Robert Aumann 7652: 7650: 7647: 7645: 7642: 7640: 7637: 7635: 7632: 7630: 7627: 7625: 7622: 7620: 7617: 7615: 7612: 7610: 7609:Lloyd Shapley 7607: 7605: 7602: 7600: 7597: 7595: 7594:Kenneth Arrow 7592: 7590: 7587: 7585: 7582: 7580: 7577: 7575: 7574:John Harsanyi 7572: 7570: 7567: 7565: 7562: 7560: 7557: 7555: 7552: 7550: 7547: 7545: 7544:Herbert Simon 7542: 7540: 7537: 7535: 7532: 7530: 7527: 7525: 7522: 7520: 7517: 7515: 7512: 7510: 7507: 7505: 7502: 7500: 7497: 7495: 7492: 7490: 7487: 7485: 7482: 7481: 7479: 7473: 7467: 7464: 7462: 7459: 7457: 7454: 7452: 7449: 7447: 7444: 7442: 7439: 7437: 7434: 7432: 7429: 7427: 7424: 7423: 7421: 7417: 7411: 7408: 7406: 7403: 7401: 7398: 7396: 7393: 7391: 7388: 7386: 7383: 7381: 7378: 7376: 7373: 7371: 7368: 7366: 7363: 7361: 7358: 7356: 7353: 7351: 7348: 7346: 7345:Fair division 7343: 7341: 7338: 7336: 7333: 7331: 7328: 7326: 7323: 7321: 7320:Dictator game 7318: 7316: 7313: 7311: 7308: 7306: 7303: 7301: 7298: 7296: 7293: 7291: 7288: 7286: 7283: 7281: 7278: 7276: 7273: 7271: 7268: 7266: 7263: 7261: 7258: 7256: 7253: 7251: 7248: 7246: 7243: 7241: 7238: 7236: 7233: 7231: 7228: 7226: 7223: 7221: 7218: 7216: 7213: 7211: 7208: 7207: 7205: 7203: 7199: 7193: 7192:Zero-sum game 7190: 7188: 7185: 7183: 7180: 7178: 7175: 7173: 7170: 7168: 7165: 7163: 7162:Repeated game 7160: 7158: 7155: 7153: 7150: 7148: 7145: 7143: 7141: 7137: 7135: 7132: 7130: 7127: 7125: 7122: 7120: 7117: 7115: 7112: 7111: 7109: 7107: 7101: 7095: 7092: 7090: 7087: 7085: 7082: 7080: 7079:Pure strategy 7077: 7075: 7072: 7070: 7067: 7065: 7062: 7060: 7057: 7055: 7052: 7050: 7047: 7045: 7044:De-escalation 7042: 7040: 7037: 7035: 7032: 7030: 7027: 7025: 7022: 7020: 7017: 7016: 7014: 7012: 7008: 7002: 6999: 6997: 6994: 6992: 6989: 6987: 6986:Shapley value 6984: 6982: 6979: 6977: 6974: 6972: 6969: 6967: 6964: 6962: 6959: 6957: 6954: 6952: 6949: 6947: 6944: 6942: 6939: 6937: 6934: 6932: 6929: 6927: 6924: 6922: 6919: 6917: 6914: 6912: 6909: 6907: 6904: 6902: 6899: 6897: 6894: 6892: 6889: 6887: 6884: 6882: 6879: 6878: 6876: 6874: 6870: 6866: 6860: 6857: 6855: 6854:Succinct game 6852: 6850: 6847: 6845: 6842: 6840: 6837: 6835: 6832: 6830: 6827: 6825: 6822: 6820: 6817: 6815: 6812: 6810: 6807: 6805: 6802: 6800: 6797: 6795: 6792: 6790: 6787: 6785: 6782: 6780: 6777: 6775: 6772: 6771: 6769: 6765: 6761: 6753: 6748: 6746: 6741: 6739: 6734: 6733: 6730: 6718: 6715: 6713: 6710: 6708: 6705: 6703: 6700: 6698: 6695: 6693: 6690: 6688: 6685: 6683: 6680: 6678: 6675: 6674: 6672: 6668: 6662: 6659: 6657: 6654: 6652: 6649: 6647: 6644: 6642: 6639: 6637: 6634: 6632: 6629: 6628: 6626: 6624: 6620: 6614: 6611: 6607: 6604: 6602: 6599: 6597: 6594: 6592: 6589: 6587: 6584: 6583: 6582: 6579: 6577: 6574: 6572: 6569: 6567: 6564: 6562: 6559: 6557: 6554: 6552: 6549: 6547: 6544: 6542: 6539: 6537: 6534: 6532: 6529: 6527: 6524: 6522: 6519: 6515: 6512: 6510: 6507: 6506: 6505: 6502: 6500: 6497: 6495: 6492: 6490: 6487: 6485: 6482: 6480: 6477: 6475: 6472: 6470: 6467: 6465: 6462: 6460: 6457: 6455: 6452: 6450: 6447: 6443: 6440: 6438: 6435: 6433: 6430: 6429: 6428: 6425: 6424: 6422: 6418: 6412: 6409: 6407: 6404: 6402: 6399: 6397: 6394: 6392: 6389: 6387: 6384: 6383: 6381: 6379: 6375: 6365: 6362: 6360: 6357: 6356: 6354: 6350: 6344: 6341: 6339: 6336: 6334: 6331: 6329: 6326: 6324: 6321: 6319: 6316: 6314: 6311: 6310: 6308: 6304: 6301: 6299: 6298:Organizations 6295: 6289: 6286: 6285: 6282: 6278: 6271: 6266: 6264: 6259: 6257: 6252: 6251: 6248: 6236: 6232: 6229: 6226: 6222: 6218: 6214: 6210: 6206: 6203: 6200: 6196: 6193: 6189: 6185: 6181: 6178: 6175: 6171: 6168: 6164: 6160: 6156: 6155: 6142: 6136: 6132: 6131: 6123: 6115: 6111: 6107: 6103: 6099: 6095: 6088: 6081: 6073: 6069: 6065: 6061: 6057: 6053: 6046: 6039: 6031: 6027: 6023: 6019: 6015: 6011: 6004: 5997: 5989: 5985: 5981: 5977: 5973: 5969: 5962: 5955: 5954: 5949: 5944: 5937: 5933: 5930: 5929: 5924: 5920: 5917: 5911: 5895: 5891: 5887: 5884:Nitze, Paul. 5880: 5864: 5860: 5859: 5854: 5850: 5844: 5829: 5825: 5821: 5814: 5799: 5795: 5791: 5785: 5769: 5765: 5764:The Economist 5761: 5755: 5739: 5735: 5734:The Economist 5731: 5725: 5718: 5714: 5710: 5706: 5701: 5696: 5692: 5688: 5681: 5666: 5662: 5658: 5652: 5637: 5633: 5629: 5623: 5608: 5604: 5600: 5596: 5592: 5588: 5584: 5580: 5576: 5573:(4): 66–107. 5572: 5568: 5564: 5557: 5543: 5539: 5535: 5531: 5525: 5521: 5517: 5513: 5509: 5502: 5487: 5483: 5477: 5473: 5472: 5464: 5456: 5452: 5448: 5444: 5440: 5433: 5424: 5419: 5415: 5411: 5407: 5400: 5385: 5381: 5375: 5371: 5370: 5362: 5347: 5343: 5339: 5335: 5329: 5325: 5321: 5317: 5316: 5308: 5293: 5289: 5283: 5279: 5278: 5273: 5267: 5259: 5255: 5251: 5247: 5243: 5239: 5235: 5231: 5227: 5220: 5212: 5208: 5204: 5200: 5195: 5190: 5186: 5182: 5178: 5171: 5156: 5152: 5146: 5142: 5138: 5134: 5133: 5125: 5117: 5113: 5109: 5105: 5101: 5097: 5093: 5089: 5085: 5078: 5063: 5059: 5055: 5051: 5047: 5043: 5039: 5035: 5028: 5013: 5009: 5005: 5001: 4997: 4993: 4989: 4985: 4981: 4977: 4970: 4968: 4952: 4948: 4944: 4940: 4936: 4932: 4928: 4924: 4920: 4916: 4909: 4894: 4890: 4886: 4882: 4878: 4874: 4870: 4866: 4862: 4858: 4854: 4850: 4843: 4828: 4824: 4820: 4816: 4812: 4808: 4804: 4800: 4796: 4792: 4785: 4777: 4773: 4768: 4763: 4759: 4755: 4748: 4746: 4737: 4733: 4729: 4725: 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Paul 5695:CiteSeerX 5603:153925234 5587:0162-2889 5538:244858515 5449:: 25–43. 5342:240182441 5258:202312573 5250:0140-2390 5211:239770382 5203:0162-2889 5108:0963-6412 5050:1936-1815 5008:238358851 5000:2057-5637 4947:151870657 4939:0002-9300 4889:151870657 4873:0002-9300 4815:0022-0027 4776:2057-2085 4728:0963-6412 4686:154019562 4678:0963-6412 4625:238842794 4617:0140-2390 4567:0963-6412 4506:0162-2889 4411:Quillette 4118:0022-0027 4079:248609130 4006:248723655 3998:0162-2889 3946:157599829 3892:154642193 3876:0020-8183 3826:155075459 3810:0020-8183 3716:12 August 3628:0032-3195 3512:247040733 3504:0963-6412 3454:148987375 3446:0963-6412 3285:154490426 3269:0043-8871 3219:153591618 3203:0043-8871 3048:: 25–48, 2967:154732192 2951:0162-2889 2901:154133787 2885:0162-2889 2722:243305936 2630:0028-792X 2565:246241390 2557:0963-6412 2497:0305-0629 2444:153596965 2428:0043-8871 2359:0162-2889 2296:0015-7120 2258:243305936 1833:Wargaming 1569:Criticism 1452:Elon Musk 1380:Nicaragua 1313:With the 1233:Nicaragua 1008:Terrorism 993:Espionage 988:Blackmail 983:Arms race 857:Tripwires 503:terms as: 488:immediate 314:Democracy 227:Diplomacy 222:Ceasefire 212:Armistice 136:Workplace 101:Mediation 31:USS 7725:Lazy SMP 7419:Theorems 7370:Deadlock 7225:Checkers 7106:of games 6873:concepts 6641:Feminism 6494:Idealism 6489:Hegemony 6442:Military 6427:Alliance 6420:Concepts 6406:Cold War 6288:Glossary 6190:. 1985. 5932:Archived 5919:Archived 5894:Archived 5828:Archived 5824:The Hill 5798:Archived 5768:Archived 5738:Archived 5717:13900591 5665:Archived 5663:. 2023. 5636:Archived 5607:Archived 5542:archived 5486:Archived 5384:Archived 5346:Archived 5292:Archived 5274:(1995). 5155:Archived 5116:46356854 5062:Archived 5058:26267261 5012:Archived 4951:Archived 4893:Archived 4827:Archived 4823:44364372 4629:Archived 4575:46356854 4518:Archived 4514:29361290 4456:archived 4378:cite web 4363:Archived 4333:Archived 4300:Archived 4270:Archived 4224:archived 4176:Archived 4138:Archived 4134:55200649 4126:20684583 3950:Archived 3896:Archived 3884:43282156 3830:Archived 3818:43282155 3764:Archived 3678:Archived 3640:Archived 3582:Archived 3554:Archived 3516:Archived 3458:Archived 3400:Archived 3333:Archived 3289:Archived 3223:Archived 3143:archived 3139:57572461 3086:Archived 3009:27870285 2971:Archived 2905:Archived 2802:Archived 2726:Archived 2672:Archived 2634:Archived 2596:Archived 2509:Archived 2505:35580738 2448:Archived 2371:Archived 2367:57570578 2300:Archived 2262:Archived 2208:Archived 2162:Archived 2116:Archived 2057:Archived 2019:Archived 1966:Archived 1923:Archived 1731:See also 1708:cold war 1628:Sam Nunn 1422:chemical 1267:Cold War 1207:and the 1201:Cold War 1109:Belarus 1088:Pakistan 973:Arsenals 944:Delivery 554:, where 476:credible 465:coercion 457:dissuade 430:Cold War 153:Violence 118:Pacifism 7477:figures 7260:Chicken 7114:Auction 7104:Classes 6661:Realism 6651:Marxism 6514:Liberal 6432:Entente 6378:History 6306:Present 6169:, 2015. 6114:2216042 6072:1961738 6030:2185583 5988:1148862 5900:July 2, 5796:. 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