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non-programmatic policy, clientelism is then distinguished from 'pork-barrel politics' in that voters are given a benefit or are able to avoid a cost conditional on their returning the favor with a vote. The patron/client system can be defined as a mutual arrangement between a person that has authority, social status, wealth, or some other personal resource (patron) and another who benefits from their support or influence (client). The patron provides selective access to goods and opportunities, and place themselves or their support in positions from which they can divert resources and services in their favor. Their partners-clients- are expected to buy support, and in some cases, votes. Patrons target low-income families to exchange their needed resources for their abundant resources: time, a vote, and insertion into networks of other potential supporters whom they can influence; however, patrons are unable to access the information needed to effectively form the exchange; thus they hire intermediaries, brokers, that more equipped to find out what the targeted voter needs, which voters will require less prodding, and if the voter followed through on their end of the bargain. As Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, and Brusco emphasize, brokers in turn serve political leaders, and they may also not target resources exactly as leaders would wish; the resulting
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solve the commitment problems that are so critical to making clientelism work. Some of the more contemporary work underscores the salience of partisan loyalties: politicians direct the bulk of their vote-buying efforts at persuadable swing voters, those who are either indifferent to the party's professed programmatic goals or moderately opposed to them. Some studies have challenged those claims but suggest that most instances of vote-buying in clientelist democracies might actually be instances of turnout-buying in which parties shower benefits on their most loyal supporters in the hope they will show up at the polling booth on election day. However, the lack of well-developed political machines does not preclude clientelist targeting. Recent studies have shown that in many emerging democracies, parties often lack the organizational capacity to monitor individual-level voting behavior and so they finetune their targeting strategies by updating their beliefs about what sorts of groups have been most responsive to their clientelist appeals.
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factors. In some contexts, clientelistic behavior is almost expected, as such interactions can become embedded in the formal political structures. Some types of leaders such as hereditary traditional leaders, who remain in power for extended periods of time, are more effective in carrying out clientelistic relationships than others such as elected officials. Research has also shown that politicians can benefit electorally from clientelistic relationships by gaining support from those who receive goods from them, but there are also potential costs since clientelistic politicians may lose support from wealthier voters, who do not engage in clientelistic relationships themselves view the practice negatively. Not all voters view clientelistic behavior as a positive trait in politicians, especially voters of higher socioeconomic statuses. In short, there is no single factor that causes clientelism to take hold.
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clientelism is seen as "the distribution of benefits targeted to individuals or groups in exchange for electoral support". It is common to associate the two together because they moderately overlap. There are different forms of corruption that have nothing to do with clientelism, such as voter intimidation or ballot stuffing. "Clientelism is considered negative because its intention is to generate 'private' revenue for patrons and clients and, as a result obstruct 'public' revenue for members of the general community who are not a part of the patron-client arrangement."
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politician in the next election. Individual level clientelism can also be carried out through coercion where citizens are threatened with lack of goods or services unless they vote for a certain politician or party. The relationship can also work in the opposite direction, where voters pressure politicians into clientelistic relationships in exchange for electoral support.
781:: and then everybody would shamelessly cry, "Long live the King!" The fools did not realize that they were merely recovering a portion of their own property, and that their ruler could not have given them what they were receiving without having first taken it from them. A man might one day be presented with a sesterce and gorge himself at the public feast, lauding
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find out who committed to supporting them. Thus, Stokes concluded that to be one of the reasons that vote buying is more frequent in relatively small communities. Another reason is that smaller communities are generally poorer. Furthermore, smaller communities, which are generally poorer and have a greater need for resources, are a more attractive target.
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benefits while also holding voters accountable, ensuring that they keep their commitments. That leads parties to hire intermediaries, often referred to as 'brokers', who supply them with fine-grained information about who needs what and what sorts of voters will and will not vote for them, regardless of the benefit(s) provided.
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et al. distinguish clientelism as a form of non-programmatic policy within distributive politics. It meets the criteria through failing to meet the two requirements of programmatic distribution, that are (1) 'formalized and public' and (2) 'shape actual distribution of benefits or resources'. Within
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and the perception of corruption have also been established as strongly correlated with clientelist systems for many reasons. One is that patrons often appear above the law in many clientelist systems. Also, some acts in clientelist systems such as vote buying, could be inherently illegal. Finally,
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Scholarly consensus has thus far eluded the question of why parties channel clientelist benefits to certain groups more than others. Some of the earlier work on group-level targeting argues that politicians are more likely to direct party largesse to their co-ethnics because ethnicity helps parties
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are subcategories of clientelism. Patronage refers to an intra-party flow of benefits to members. Turnout buying, coined by
Nichter, treats or bribes voters to the polls whereas abstention buying treats or bribes voters to keep them from going to the polls. Vote buying is a direct transfer of goods
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Clientelism may not look the same from context to context. Several individual and country-level factors may shape if and how clientelism takes hold in a country including the types of individual leaders, socio-economic status of individuals, economic development, democratization, and institutional
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system. Stokes's argument was that the potential for vote buying depends on the accuracy with which the patron party, the
Peronists in the case of Argentina, can monitor votes. She uses evidence to show that overall smaller communities offer less anonymity, which makes it easier for the patrons to
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was providing financial support to prospective voters to buy their votes. It was hypothesized that
Peronists targeted moderately opposed voters because they were thought to be easily persuaded to change sides at the party's minimal expense. Stokes elaborated on the need of the Peronist Party to be
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In many young low-income democracies, clientelism may assume the form of group-level targeting in which parties channel benefits to specific groups of voters that are conditional on past or future electoral support. For group-based targeting to work, parties must find efficient ways to distribute
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Clientelism as a strategy of political organisation is substantially different from other strategies which rely on appeals to wider programmatic objectives or simply emphasize higher degrees of competence. It is often assumed that clientelism is a vestige of political underdevelopment, a form of
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It is common to link clientelism with corruption; both involve political actors using public and private resources for personal gain, but they are not synonymous. Corruption is commonly defined as "dishonest and fraudulent conduct by those in power, typically involving bribery", while political
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Research by
Nichter promoted a simpler hypothesis for the Argentinian election cycle: to prove Peronists that were solely buying supporting voters' turnout, not all of their votes. He dismissed Stokes's arguments on patrons spying on smaller and poorer communities and instead said the Peronists
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would dissolve in the absence of such monitoring, rendering clientelism highly inefficient at best and completely ineffective at worst; however, evidence suggests that systematic monitoring of voter choice at the polls is surprisingly uncommon. Patronage, turnout buying, abstention buying, and
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Politicians can engage in clientelism on either (or both) a group or individual level. One way individual level clientelism can manifest itself is in a vote buying relationship: a politician gives a citizen goods or services, and, in exchange, that individual citizen promises to vote for that
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for handsome liberality, who on the morrow, would be forced to abandon his property to their avarice, his children to their lust, his very blood to the cruelty of these magnificent emperors, without offering any more resistance than a stone or a tree stump. The mob has always behaved in this
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Clientelism has generally negative consequences on democracy and government and has more uncertain consequences on the economy. The accountability relationship in a democracy in which voters hold elected officials accountable for their actions, is undermined by clientelism. That is because
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rely on the subordination and dependence of the clients. In return for receiving some benefits the clients should provide political support. Standard modeling of clientelism assumes that politicians are able to monitor votes, and in turn reward or punish voters based on their choices.
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A key to understanding clientelism might come in stressing not only the mutually beneficial relationships of exchange but also asymmetries in power or standing. Implied is a certain selectivity in access to key resources and markets. Those with access, the
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were seen as crucial to understanding the political process. While the obligations between these were mutual, the key point is they were hierarchical. These relationships might be best viewed not as an entity but rather as a network
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resources needed for patrons to maintain the clientelist system may require illicit means to obtain goods. A 2021 study found that voters in clientelist systems are less willing to punish corrupt politicians electorally.
677:. Although many definitions for clientelism have been proposed, according to the political scientist Allen Hicken, it is generally thought that there are four key elements of clientelistic relationships:
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corruption, and that political modernization will reduce or end it. But alternative views stressing the persistence of clientelism – and the patronage associated with it – have been recognized.
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initially targeted votes assumed to be their strong supporters. In that case, the patrons would be reasonably sure that they received a vote from a person who receives a good from them.
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Roniger, Luis. Political
Clientelism, Democracy, and Market Economy. 3rd ed. Vol. 36. New York: : PhD. Program in Political Science of the City U of New York, 2004. 353-375. Print.
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and corruption, prevalent in clientelist systems, could negatively impact the economy as well. Nevertheless, there is still great uncertainty in the economic effects of clientelism.
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clientelism makes votes contingent on gifts to clients, rather than the performance of elected officials in office. Clientelism also degrades democratic institutions such as the
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system, such as in the United States, where lobbying can have considerable power shaping public policy. The opposite of client politics is entrepreneurial politics, or
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1929:
Gottlieb, Jessica; Larreguy, Horacio (2020). "An
Informational Theory of Electoral Targeting in Young Clientelistic Democracies: Evidence from Senegal".
1339:
Roniger, Luis; Briquet, Jean-Louis; Sawicki, Frederic; Auyero, Javier; Piattoni, Simona (2004). "Political
Clientelism, Democracy, and Market Economy".
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acted as restrictions on their autonomy but allowed a more complex society to develop. Historians of the late medieval period evolved the concept into
2007:
Baldwin, Kate (2019). "Elected MPs, Traditional Chiefs, and Local Public Goods: Evidence on the Role of
Leaders in Co-Production From Rural Zambia".
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or services, in exchange for one's support and vote. The result for the good or service is a question of "did you or will you vote for me?"
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769:, but described the practice of emperors who used gifts to the public to gain loyalty from those who were eager to accept what amounted to
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Lindberg, Staffan I. (March 2010). "What accountability pressures do MPs in Africa face and how do they respond? Evidence from Ghana*".
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742:. There is, as is usual, ambiguity in the use of political terminology and the terms "clientelism", the "patron–client relationship", "
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and administrative oversight. Such factors both weaken democratic institutions and negatively impact the efficiency of government.
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Gans-Morse, Jordan; Mazzuca, Sebastián; Nichter, Simeon (2014). "Varieties of
Clientelism: Machine Politics during Elections".
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perhaps having more than one patron. These extensions increase the possibilities of conflicting interests arising. While the
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Stokes, Susan C. (August 2005). "Perverse
Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina".
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Kawata, Junʼichi. Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism. Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2006. Print.
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Larreguy, Horacio A. (January 2013). "Monitoring Political Brokers: Evidence from Clientelistic Networks in Mexico".
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Some scholars believe that because patrons focus on the control and procurement of private goods, they also neglect
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761:(14–16 AD) have been characterized as examples of widespread clientelism. In the 1500s, French political theorist
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Graham, Richard (1997) Clientelismo na cultura política brasileira. Toma lá dá cá, Braudel Center Papers No. 15
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Nichter, Simeon (February 2008). "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot".
1714:
Nichter, Simeon (February 2008). "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot".
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benefits at the expense of the public. Client politics may have a strong interaction with the dynamics of
1964:
Kitschelt, Herbert (September 2000). "Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities".
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on the citizen's actions on behalf of the politician or party through which they are receiving services.
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is the exchange of goods and services for political support, often involving an implicit or explicit
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1305:"Clientelism's Red Herrings: Dead Ends and New Directions in the Study of Nonprogrammatic Politics"
318:
208:
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2094:. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Meeting – via Researchgate.
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Contingency and iteration are the two components shared across most definitions of clientelism.
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Clientelism involves an asymmetric relationship between groups of political actors described as
2483:
2053:
Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca (2012). "What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism".
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Goodin, Robert E. The Oxford Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. Print.
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are not the only type of intermediaries that mediate clientelist exchanges. There are also
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The origin of the practice has been traced to ancient Rome. Here relationships between the
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such as roads and public schools, which aid economic development. Scholars also note that
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who neither represent specific group interests nor exhibit stable partisan attachments.
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who also represent specific interest groups but demonstrate strong party loyalties, and
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1989:
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1133:"Clientelism from the Client's Perspective: A Meta-Analysis of Ethnographic Literature"
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847:
639:
565:
158:
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Stokes, Susan C.; Dunning, Thad; Nazareno, Marcelo; Brusco, Valeria (September 2013).
1532:
Stokes, Susan C.; Dunning, Thad; Nazareno, Marcelo; Brusco, Valeria (September 2013).
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Hierarchy: The politician or party is in a higher position of power than the citizen.
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52:
25:
2107:"Why Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from South Africa"
1993:
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Buying Voters with Dirty Money: The Relationship between Clientelism and Corruption
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2016:
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510:
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120:
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Hicken, Allen; Aspinall, Edward; Weiss, Meredith L.; Muhtadi, Burhanuddin (2022).
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problems can have important implications for understanding how clientelism works.
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who represent specific interest groups but mobilize voters for multiple parties,
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1977:
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Holland, Alisha C.; Palmer-Rubin, Brian (12 April 2015). "Beyond the Machine".
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Money for Votes: The Causes and Consequences of Electoral Clientelism in Africa
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Money for Votes: The Causes and Consequences of Electoral Clientelism in Africa
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Tornquist, Olle (1999) Politics and Development: A Critical Introduction, SAGE
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Tyrants would distribute largesse, a bushel of wheat, a gallon of wine, and a
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2020:
1985:
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1203:
1180:"Buying Brokers: Electoral Handouts beyond Clientelism in a Weak-Party State"
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852:
754:
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Contingency: Delivery of a service to a citizen by a politician or broker is
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173:
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Pellicer, Miquel; Wegner, Eva; Bayer, Markus; Tischmeyer, Christian (2021).
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Iteration: The relationship is not a one-off exchange, but rather, ongoing.
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2204:"Corruption" Def. 1. Oxford Dictionary Online, n.d., Mon. 1 November 2014.
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1236:
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1942:
1106:; Dunning, Thad; Nazareno, Marcelo; Brusco, Valeria (16 September 2013).
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2892:
Commission for the Prevention of Corruption of the Republic of Slovenia
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was the basic unit underlying Roman society, the interlocking networks
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Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India
1759:
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics
1534:
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics
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Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics
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himself perhaps being obligated to someone of greater power, and the
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Stokes, Susan (July 2009). Boix, Carles; Stokes, Susan C (eds.).
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128:
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1424:
The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude
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Stokes' research on clientelism in Argentina assumed that the
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Dyadic relationships: Simply, these are two-way relationships.
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are sometimes used to describe similar or related concepts.
2426:
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1531:
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2817:
Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania
1177:
3014:
International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities
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1413:, University of California Press, Vol. 1, pp. 162–163.
2811:
Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program
2770:
Independent Commission Against Corruption (Hong Kong)
2752:
Anti-corruption and Economic Malpractice Observatory
16:
Exchange of goods and services for political support
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Citizen's Charter and Grievance Redressal Bill 2011
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1615:
1613:
1426:(Harry Kurz, transl.), New York: Free Life, p. 40
3098:
2104:
1928:
1610:
1571:
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2921:Central Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption
2788:Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption
2719:UNCAC Coalition of Civil Society Organisations
2105:Bøttkjær, Louise; Justesen, Mogens K. (2021).
2282:
2236:
2052:
1576:Mares, Isabela; Young, Lauren (11 May 2016).
1566:
1262:
1260:
1258:
1256:
606:
3024:United Nations Convention against Corruption
3004:Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
1411:The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome
1302:
3062:Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity
2897:Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission
2741:Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
1578:"Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes"
1372:
1370:
2909:National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine
2805:Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau
2289:
2275:
1575:
1253:
665:. This is particularly common in an elite
613:
599:
1963:
1593:
1334:
1332:
1320:
1284:
1231:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
887:
2839:Independent Corrupt Practices Commission
2213:
1619:
1367:
1298:
1296:
851:able to track its clientele despite the
2881:Sierra Leone Anti-corruption Commission
2746:Anti-Corruption Commission (Bangladesh)
2238:Scambio illecito se il metodo è mafioso
2162:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566020.001.0001
2006:
1885:
1840:
1713:
1303:Hicken, Allen; Nathan, Noah L. (2020).
837:
3099:
2969:Freedom of information laws by country
2886:Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
2254:
2151:
2087:
1931:Quarterly Journal of Political Science
1667:
1453:
1329:
1266:
1224:
2833:Anti-Corruption Commission of Myanmar
2775:Commission Against Corruption (Macau)
2704:International Anti-Corruption Academy
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2242:, Diritto e giustizia,13 maggio 2000.
2055:American Journal of Political Science
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2046:
1709:
1707:
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1622:The Journal of Modern African Studies
1595:10.1146/annurev-polisci-060514-120923
1498:American Journal of Political Science
1322:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-032657
1293:
1286:10.1146/annurev.polisci.031908.220508
3052:2012 Indian anti-corruption movement
3047:2011 Indian anti-corruption movement
2828:Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission
2758:National Anti-Corruption Observatory
1098:
1096:
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1092:
1090:
1088:
1086:
1084:
2974:The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013
2869:National Anticorruption Directorate
2863:Anti-Corruption General Directorate
657:. In client politics, an organized
13:
2699:Group of States Against Corruption
2145:
2043:
1704:
1656:
1582:Annual Review of Political Science
1422:Étienne de La Boétie (1552–1553).
1309:Annual Review of Political Science
1273:Annual Review of Political Science
1218:
14:
3128:
2875:Investigative Committee of Russia
1888:American Political Science Review
1716:American Political Science Review
1670:American Political Science Review
1081:
481:Biology and political orientation
3067:Russian anti-corruption campaign
3057:Anti-austerity movement in Spain
2964:Foreign Extortion Prevention Act
2088:Singer, Matthew (January 2009).
2067:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00578.x
582:
2903:Servicio de Vigilancia Aduanera
2764:National Supervisory Commission
2245:
2226:
2207:
2198:
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2081:
2000:
1957:
1922:
1879:
1834:
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1525:
1516:
1489:
1447:
1438:
1429:
1416:
1392:
896:
2851:Investigation Task Force Sweep
2845:National Accountability Bureau
2317:Corruption in local government
2305:Corruption in different fields
2296:
1379:
1171:
1124:
1110:. Cambridge University Press.
927:
476:Theories of political behavior
102:Political history of the world
1:
2959:Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
2857:Central Anticorruption Bureau
2009:Comparative Political Studies
1966:Comparative Political Studies
1800:Comparative Political Studies
1074:
491:Critique of political economy
3019:OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
3009:International asset recovery
2793:Central Vigilance Commission
2348:Corruption Perceptions Index
1385:Clapham, Christopher (1985)
794:
72:Outline of political science
7:
3077:2017–2019 Romanian protests
1267:Hicken, Allen (June 2011).
948:Big man (political science)
940:
790:way—eagerly open to bribes.
638:. It is closely related to
10:
3133:
3082:2017–2018 Russian protests
2714:Transparency International
2689:Global Financial Integrity
1978:10.1177/001041400003300607
701:
77:Index of politics articles
3042:2011 Azerbaijani protests
3032:
2992:
2943:
2934:
2727:
2681:
2672:
2627:
2529:
2519:Offshore financial centre
2370:
2361:
2340:
2322:Interest group corruption
2304:
1900:10.1017/S0003055408080106
1728:10.1017/S0003055408080106
1682:10.1017/S0003055405051683
1634:10.1017/S0022278X09990243
1196:10.1017/S0043887121000216
1149:10.1017/S153759272000420X
993:Interest group liberalism
2984:Whistleblower protection
2472:Cryptocurrency and crime
2021:10.1177/0010414018774372
1812:10.1177/0010414015574883
1767:10.1017/cbo9781107324909
1542:10.1017/cbo9781107324909
1137:Perspectives on Politics
2353:Economics of corruption
2111:The Journal of Politics
486:Political organisations
249:International relations
87:Politics by subdivision
2979:UK Bribery Act of 2010
2735:Oficina Anticorrupción
2484:Noble cause corruption
2341:Measures of corruption
2237:
888:Clientelism in context
870:organizational brokers
3107:Political terminology
2709:Mo Ibrahim Foundation
2489:Professional courtesy
2452:Honest services fraud
2154:Political Clientelism
1856:10.1017/9781108573481
1466:10.1017/9781108149839
1454:Kramon, Eric (2018).
1237:10.1017/9781108149839
1225:Kramon, Eric (2017).
958:Politics of the belly
765:did not use the term
566:Political campaigning
306:Public administration
139:Collective leadership
3117:Public choice theory
3112:Political corruption
2673:Institutions dealing
2407:Conflict of interest
2332:Political corruption
1943:10.1561/100.00019018
1387:Third World Politics
1341:Comparative Politics
1023:Political corruption
838:Forms of clientelism
763:Étienne de La Boétie
416:Separation of powers
287:Political psychology
262:Comparative politics
240:political scientists
227:Academic disciplines
107:Political philosophy
2514:Offshore investment
878:independent brokers
675:conviction politics
589:Politics portal
438:Election commission
409:Government branches
292:Political sociology
144:Confessional system
82:Politics by country
2915:Warioba Commission
2853:(Papua New Guinea)
2597:Regulatory capture
2402:Commercial bribery
1850:. Cambridge Core.
1510:10.1111/ajps.12058
1460:. Cambridge Core.
1053:Regulatory capture
973:Electoral district
968:Earmark (politics)
640:patronage politics
272:Political analysis
204:Semi-parliamentary
3094:
3093:
3090:
3089:
2930:
2929:
2668:
2667:
2645:Election security
2592:Political scandal
2327:Police corruption
2171:978-0-19-956602-0
2015:(12): 1925–1956.
1865:978-1-108-57348-1
1784:978-1-107-32490-9
1559:978-1-107-32490-9
1475:978-1-108-14983-9
1246:978-1-107-19372-7
1117:978-1-107-66039-7
1043:Political dynasty
1028:Political machine
1013:Neopatrimonialism
988:Identity politics
815:and/or sometimes
748:political machine
740:bastard feudalism
663:identity politics
623:
622:
571:Political parties
511:Electoral systems
235:Political science
209:Semi-presidential
121:Political systems
97:Political history
92:Political economy
3124:
2941:
2940:
2679:
2678:
2660:Vote suppression
2547:Crony capitalism
2477:Hawala and crime
2467:Money laundering
2447:Graft (politics)
2427:Confidence trick
2368:
2367:
2362:Forms or aspects
2291:
2284:
2277:
2268:
2267:
2261:
2258:
2252:
2249:
2243:
2240:
2234:
2230:
2224:
2223:
2211:
2205:
2202:
2196:
2195:
2189:
2185:
2183:
2175:
2149:
2143:
2142:
2102:
2096:
2095:
2085:
2079:
2078:
2050:
2041:
2040:
2004:
1998:
1997:
1972:(6–7): 845–879.
1961:
1955:
1954:
1926:
1920:
1919:
1883:
1877:
1876:
1874:
1872:
1842:Chandra, Kanchan
1838:
1832:
1831:
1806:(9): 1186–1223.
1795:
1789:
1788:
1754:
1748:
1747:
1711:
1702:
1701:
1665:
1654:
1653:
1617:
1608:
1607:
1597:
1573:
1564:
1563:
1529:
1523:
1520:
1514:
1513:
1493:
1487:
1486:
1484:
1482:
1451:
1445:
1442:
1436:
1433:
1427:
1420:
1414:
1396:
1390:
1383:
1377:
1374:
1365:
1364:
1336:
1327:
1326:
1324:
1300:
1291:
1290:
1288:
1264:
1251:
1250:
1222:
1216:
1215:
1175:
1169:
1168:
1128:
1122:
1121:
1100:
1038:Political family
757:(49–44 BCE) and
651:patrons, brokers
615:
608:
601:
587:
586:
377:
322:
277:Political theory
267:Election science
257:
243:
21:
20:
3132:
3131:
3127:
3126:
3125:
3123:
3122:
3121:
3097:
3096:
3095:
3086:
3034:
3028:
2996:
2994:
2988:
2945:
2936:Anti-corruption
2926:
2723:
2675:with corruption
2674:
2664:
2640:Electoral fraud
2635:Ballot stuffing
2623:
2525:
2363:
2357:
2336:
2312:Corporate crime
2300:
2295:
2265:
2264:
2259:
2255:
2250:
2246:
2232:
2231:
2227:
2212:
2208:
2203:
2199:
2187:
2186:
2177:
2176:
2172:
2156:. Vol. 1.
2150:
2146:
2103:
2099:
2086:
2082:
2051:
2044:
2005:
2001:
1962:
1958:
1927:
1923:
1884:
1880:
1870:
1868:
1866:
1839:
1835:
1796:
1792:
1785:
1755:
1751:
1712:
1705:
1666:
1657:
1618:
1611:
1574:
1567:
1560:
1530:
1526:
1521:
1517:
1494:
1490:
1480:
1478:
1476:
1452:
1448:
1443:
1439:
1434:
1430:
1421:
1417:
1399:Gruen, Erich S.
1397:
1393:
1384:
1380:
1375:
1368:
1353:10.2307/4150135
1337:
1330:
1301:
1294:
1265:
1254:
1247:
1223:
1219:
1176:
1172:
1129:
1125:
1118:
1104:Stokes, Susan C
1101:
1082:
1077:
1072:
1003:Minoritarianism
943:
930:
899:
890:
840:
805:principal-agent
797:
704:
630:client politics
619:
581:
576:
575:
506:
505:
496:
495:
453:
452:
443:
442:
411:
410:
401:
400:
396:Public interest
381:Domestic policy
371:
364:
363:
352:
351:
316:
309:
308:
297:
296:
258:
251:
244:
237:
229:
228:
219:
218:
124:
123:
112:
111:
67:
66:
57:
26:Politics series
17:
12:
11:
5:
3130:
3120:
3119:
3114:
3109:
3092:
3091:
3088:
3087:
3085:
3084:
3079:
3074:
3069:
3064:
3059:
3054:
3049:
3044:
3038:
3036:
3030:
3029:
3027:
3026:
3021:
3016:
3011:
3006:
3000:
2998:
2990:
2989:
2987:
2986:
2981:
2976:
2971:
2966:
2961:
2956:
2949:
2947:
2938:
2932:
2931:
2928:
2927:
2925:
2924:
2918:
2912:
2906:
2900:
2894:
2889:
2883:
2878:
2872:
2866:
2860:
2854:
2848:
2842:
2836:
2830:
2825:
2819:
2814:
2808:
2802:
2796:
2790:
2785:
2779:
2778:
2777:
2772:
2761:
2755:
2749:
2743:
2738:
2731:
2729:
2725:
2724:
2722:
2721:
2716:
2711:
2706:
2701:
2696:
2694:Global Witness
2691:
2685:
2683:
2676:
2670:
2669:
2666:
2665:
2663:
2662:
2657:
2652:
2650:Gerrymandering
2647:
2642:
2637:
2631:
2629:
2625:
2624:
2622:
2621:
2616:
2611:
2610:
2609:
2599:
2594:
2589:
2584:
2579:
2574:
2569:
2567:Ghost soldiers
2564:
2559:
2554:
2549:
2544:
2539:
2533:
2531:
2527:
2526:
2524:
2523:
2522:
2521:
2516:
2506:
2501:
2496:
2491:
2486:
2481:
2480:
2479:
2474:
2464:
2459:
2454:
2449:
2444:
2439:
2434:
2429:
2424:
2423:
2422:
2417:
2409:
2404:
2399:
2394:
2389:
2380:
2374:
2372:
2365:
2359:
2358:
2356:
2355:
2350:
2344:
2342:
2338:
2337:
2335:
2334:
2329:
2324:
2319:
2314:
2308:
2306:
2302:
2301:
2294:
2293:
2286:
2279:
2271:
2263:
2262:
2253:
2244:
2225:
2206:
2197:
2188:|journal=
2170:
2144:
2123:10.1086/710146
2117:(2): 788–793.
2097:
2080:
2061:(3): 568–583.
2042:
1999:
1956:
1921:
1878:
1864:
1844:(March 2004).
1833:
1790:
1783:
1749:
1703:
1676:(3): 315–325.
1655:
1628:(1): 117–142.
1609:
1588:(1): 267–288.
1565:
1558:
1524:
1515:
1504:(2): 415–432.
1488:
1474:
1446:
1437:
1428:
1415:
1391:
1378:
1366:
1347:(3): 353–375.
1328:
1292:
1252:
1245:
1217:
1184:World Politics
1170:
1143:(3): 931–947.
1123:
1116:
1079:
1078:
1076:
1073:
1071:
1070:
1065:
1060:
1055:
1050:
1045:
1040:
1035:
1030:
1025:
1020:
1015:
1010:
1005:
1000:
995:
990:
985:
980:
975:
970:
965:
960:
955:
950:
944:
942:
939:
929:
926:
898:
895:
889:
886:
874:hybrid brokers
848:Peronist Party
839:
836:
796:
793:
792:
791:
753:The reigns of
703:
700:
696:
695:
692:
689:
682:
659:interest group
621:
620:
618:
617:
610:
603:
595:
592:
591:
578:
577:
574:
573:
568:
563:
558:
553:
552:
551:
535:
530:
525:
524:
523:
513:
507:
503:
502:
501:
498:
497:
494:
493:
488:
483:
478:
473:
460:
454:
451:Related topics
450:
449:
448:
445:
444:
441:
440:
435:
430:
425:
419:
418:
412:
408:
407:
406:
403:
402:
399:
398:
393:
388:
386:Foreign policy
383:
378:
365:
359:
358:
357:
354:
353:
350:
349:
348:
347:
333:
328:
323:
310:
304:
303:
302:
299:
298:
295:
294:
289:
284:
282:Policy studies
279:
274:
269:
264:
259:
247:
245:
233:
230:
226:
225:
224:
221:
220:
217:
216:
211:
206:
201:
196:
191:
186:
181:
176:
171:
166:
161:
156:
151:
146:
141:
136:
131:
125:
119:
118:
117:
114:
113:
110:
109:
104:
99:
94:
89:
84:
79:
74:
68:
65:Primary topics
64:
63:
62:
59:
58:
56:
55:
50:
45:
39:
36:
35:
29:
28:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3129:
3118:
3115:
3113:
3110:
3108:
3105:
3104:
3102:
3083:
3080:
3078:
3075:
3073:
3070:
3068:
3065:
3063:
3060:
3058:
3055:
3053:
3050:
3048:
3045:
3043:
3040:
3039:
3037:
3031:
3025:
3022:
3020:
3017:
3015:
3012:
3010:
3007:
3005:
3002:
3001:
2999:
2993:International
2991:
2985:
2982:
2980:
2977:
2975:
2972:
2970:
2967:
2965:
2962:
2960:
2957:
2954:
2951:
2950:
2948:
2942:
2939:
2937:
2933:
2922:
2919:
2916:
2913:
2910:
2907:
2904:
2901:
2899:(South Korea)
2898:
2895:
2893:
2890:
2887:
2884:
2882:
2879:
2876:
2873:
2870:
2867:
2864:
2861:
2858:
2855:
2852:
2849:
2846:
2843:
2840:
2837:
2834:
2831:
2829:
2826:
2823:
2820:
2818:
2815:
2812:
2809:
2806:
2803:
2800:
2797:
2794:
2791:
2789:
2786:
2783:
2780:
2776:
2773:
2771:
2768:
2767:
2765:
2762:
2759:
2756:
2753:
2750:
2747:
2744:
2742:
2739:
2736:
2733:
2732:
2730:
2726:
2720:
2717:
2715:
2712:
2710:
2707:
2705:
2702:
2700:
2697:
2695:
2692:
2690:
2687:
2686:
2684:
2682:International
2680:
2677:
2671:
2661:
2658:
2656:
2653:
2651:
2648:
2646:
2643:
2641:
2638:
2636:
2633:
2632:
2630:
2626:
2620:
2617:
2615:
2614:State capture
2612:
2608:
2605:
2604:
2603:
2600:
2598:
2595:
2593:
2590:
2588:
2585:
2583:
2580:
2578:
2575:
2573:
2570:
2568:
2565:
2563:
2560:
2558:
2557:Elite capture
2555:
2553:
2550:
2548:
2545:
2543:
2540:
2538:
2535:
2534:
2532:
2528:
2520:
2517:
2515:
2512:
2511:
2510:
2507:
2505:
2502:
2500:
2497:
2495:
2492:
2490:
2487:
2485:
2482:
2478:
2475:
2473:
2470:
2469:
2468:
2465:
2463:
2460:
2458:
2455:
2453:
2450:
2448:
2445:
2443:
2440:
2438:
2435:
2433:
2430:
2428:
2425:
2421:
2418:
2416:
2413:
2412:
2410:
2408:
2405:
2403:
2400:
2398:
2395:
2393:
2390:
2388:
2384:
2381:
2379:
2376:
2375:
2373:
2369:
2366:
2364:of corruption
2360:
2354:
2351:
2349:
2346:
2345:
2343:
2339:
2333:
2330:
2328:
2325:
2323:
2320:
2318:
2315:
2313:
2310:
2309:
2307:
2303:
2299:
2292:
2287:
2285:
2280:
2278:
2273:
2272:
2269:
2257:
2248:
2241:
2239:
2229:
2221:
2217:
2210:
2201:
2193:
2181:
2173:
2167:
2163:
2159:
2155:
2148:
2140:
2136:
2132:
2128:
2124:
2120:
2116:
2112:
2108:
2101:
2093:
2092:
2084:
2076:
2072:
2068:
2064:
2060:
2056:
2049:
2047:
2038:
2034:
2030:
2026:
2022:
2018:
2014:
2010:
2003:
1995:
1991:
1987:
1983:
1979:
1975:
1971:
1967:
1960:
1952:
1948:
1944:
1940:
1937:(1): 53–104.
1936:
1932:
1925:
1917:
1913:
1909:
1905:
1901:
1897:
1893:
1889:
1882:
1867:
1861:
1857:
1853:
1849:
1848:
1843:
1837:
1829:
1825:
1821:
1817:
1813:
1809:
1805:
1801:
1794:
1786:
1780:
1776:
1772:
1768:
1764:
1760:
1753:
1745:
1741:
1737:
1733:
1729:
1725:
1721:
1717:
1710:
1708:
1699:
1695:
1691:
1687:
1683:
1679:
1675:
1671:
1664:
1662:
1660:
1651:
1647:
1643:
1639:
1635:
1631:
1627:
1623:
1616:
1614:
1605:
1601:
1596:
1591:
1587:
1583:
1579:
1572:
1570:
1561:
1555:
1551:
1547:
1543:
1539:
1535:
1528:
1519:
1511:
1507:
1503:
1499:
1492:
1477:
1471:
1467:
1463:
1459:
1458:
1450:
1441:
1432:
1425:
1419:
1412:
1408:
1404:
1400:
1395:
1388:
1382:
1373:
1371:
1362:
1358:
1354:
1350:
1346:
1342:
1335:
1333:
1323:
1318:
1314:
1310:
1306:
1299:
1297:
1287:
1282:
1278:
1274:
1270:
1269:"Clientelism"
1263:
1261:
1259:
1257:
1248:
1242:
1238:
1234:
1230:
1229:
1221:
1213:
1209:
1205:
1201:
1197:
1193:
1190:(1): 77–120.
1189:
1185:
1181:
1174:
1166:
1162:
1158:
1154:
1150:
1146:
1142:
1138:
1134:
1127:
1119:
1113:
1109:
1105:
1099:
1097:
1095:
1093:
1091:
1089:
1087:
1085:
1080:
1069:
1066:
1064:
1061:
1059:
1056:
1054:
1051:
1049:
1046:
1044:
1041:
1039:
1036:
1034:
1031:
1029:
1026:
1024:
1021:
1019:
1016:
1014:
1011:
1009:
1006:
1004:
1001:
999:
996:
994:
991:
989:
986:
984:
981:
979:
976:
974:
971:
969:
966:
964:
961:
959:
956:
954:
951:
949:
946:
945:
938:
934:
925:
923:
919:
914:
911:
907:
905:
904:secret ballot
894:
885:
881:
879:
875:
871:
867:
866:Party brokers
861:
857:
854:
853:secret ballot
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19:
2824:(Madagascar)
2748:(Bangladesh)
2655:Vote pairing
2607:Rent-setting
2602:Rent-seeking
2562:Failed state
2536:
2462:Match fixing
2432:Embezzlement
2411:Corporation
2383:Black market
2256:
2247:
2233:(in Italian)
2228:
2209:
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2153:
2147:
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2090:
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2012:
2008:
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1969:
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1934:
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1924:
1894:(1): 19–31.
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1869:. Retrieved
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1722:(1): 19–31.
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1479:. Retrieved
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1063:Tammany Hall
1058:Rent-seeking
1048:Prebendalism
935:
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922:rent-seeking
918:public goods
915:
908:
900:
897:Consequences
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882:
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869:
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826:Quid pro quo
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635:quid-pro-quo
633:
629:
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624:
319:street-level
194:Presidential
154:Dictatorship
24:Part of the
18:
2997:and efforts
2995:instruments
2946:enforcement
2888:(Singapore)
2801:(Indonesia)
2737:(Argentina)
2619:State crime
2577:Mafia state
2572:Kleptocracy
2537:Clientelism
2504:Tax evasion
2387:Grey market
1775:11086/18791
1550:11086/18791
1403:Patrocinium
1315:: 277–294.
1279:: 289–310.
1033:Pork barrel
1018:Pay to play
928:Controversy
831:vote buying
817:sub-patrons
767:clientelism
746:", and the
736:(clientela)
722:, with the
720:(clientela)
712:and client
671:duopolistic
669:or rigidly
644:vote buying
626:Clientelism
458:Sovereignty
423:Legislature
326:Technocracy
314:Bureaucracy
179:Meritocracy
159:Directorial
3101:Categories
3072:Yo Soy 132
2917:(Tanzania)
2847:(Pakistan)
2760:(Cameroon)
2587:Plutocracy
2542:Coronelism
2499:Slush fund
2298:Corruption
1871:6 December
1481:7 November
1435:webref.org
1075:References
1008:Money loop
963:Corruption
910:Corruption
710:(patronus)
686:contingent
548:Governance
538:Government
533:Federalism
134:City-state
3035:movements
2955:(pending)
2923:(Vietnam)
2911:(Ukraine)
2871:(Romania)
2865:(Romania)
2841:(Nigeria)
2835:(Myanmar)
2813:(Liberia)
2784:(Croatia)
2754:(Burundi)
2628:Elections
2509:Tax haven
2437:Extortion
2397:Collusion
2378:Baksheesh
2190:ignored (
2180:cite book
2139:188767507
2131:0022-3816
2075:1540-5907
2037:158062055
2029:0010-4140
1986:0010-4140
1951:214436911
1908:1537-5943
1828:156379074
1820:0010-4140
1736:1537-5943
1690:1537-5943
1642:1469-7777
1604:1094-2939
1407:clientela
1212:246488907
1204:0043-8871
1165:234377324
1157:1537-5927
953:Caciquism
795:Mechanics
744:patronage
667:pluralist
528:Unitarism
516:Elections
504:Subseries
433:Judiciary
428:Executive
331:Adhocracy
214:Theocracy
169:Feudalism
149:Democracy
2944:Laws and
2877:(Russia)
2859:(Poland)
2807:(Latvia)
2766:(China)
2728:National
2582:Nepotism
2552:Cronyism
2457:Kickback
1994:22282599
1916:54757367
1744:54757367
1698:36014179
1650:33722499
1401:(1986) "
1068:Votebank
998:Lobbying
978:Cronyism
941:See also
783:Tiberius
779:sesterce
759:Tiberius
724:patronus
714:(cliens)
556:Ideology
374:doctrine
335:Service
199:Republic
184:Monarchy
164:Federacy
53:Category
33:Politics
3033:Protest
2905:(Spain)
2795:(India)
2494:Scandal
2392:Bribery
2371:General
2220:2225027
1361:4150135
821:brokers
813:patrons
771:bribery
732:familia
708:patron
702:Origins
655:clients
561:Culture
471:Country
129:Anarchy
43:Outline
2822:BIANCO
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1409:," in
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1114:
728:cliens
653:, and
521:voting
463:Polity
361:Policy
340:Public
254:theory
2782:USKOK
2530:State
2442:Fraud
2420:Shell
2415:Dummy
2135:S2CID
2033:S2CID
1990:S2CID
1947:S2CID
1912:S2CID
1824:S2CID
1740:S2CID
1694:S2CID
1646:S2CID
1357:JSTOR
1208:S2CID
1161:S2CID
983:Graft
544:forms
467:State
344:Civil
48:Index
2216:SSRN
2192:help
2166:ISBN
2127:ISSN
2071:ISSN
2025:ISSN
1982:ISSN
1904:ISSN
1873:2019
1860:ISBN
1816:ISSN
1779:ISBN
1732:ISSN
1686:ISSN
1638:ISSN
1600:ISSN
1554:ISBN
1483:2019
1470:ISBN
1405:and
1241:ISBN
1200:ISSN
1153:ISSN
1112:ISBN
787:Nero
785:and
642:and
2799:KPK
2158:doi
2119:doi
2063:doi
2017:doi
1974:doi
1939:doi
1896:doi
1892:102
1852:doi
1808:doi
1771:hdl
1763:doi
1724:doi
1720:102
1678:doi
1630:doi
1590:doi
1546:hdl
1538:doi
1506:doi
1462:doi
1349:doi
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