677:
162:
43:
729:. Here too, however, relations were complicated by mid-level military realities, and even by Najibullah himself. Although the Soviet military leadership and diplomats had been in contact with Massoud since the early 80's, military operations against his troops, the DRA's insistence on his disarmament, and information leaks about his relations with the Soviets derailed progress towards achieving a formal ceasefire with him. Conversely, Najibullah was in ostensibly regular contact with unnamed rebel leaders "through certain channels", as Cordovez found out during his first meeting with the Afghan leader.
145:
819:, but he was eventually placated by Soviet promises to dramatically expand aid and assistance measures post-withdrawal. Although the USA was not bound under the Geneva Accords to cease its military aid, Pakistan (through which this aid flowed) was obligated to prevent cross-border armament flows to Afghanistan (Kalinovsky 149). On April 14, 1988 the Geneva Accords were signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the USSR and US acting as guarantors, stating provisions for the withdrawal of Soviet forces and mutual non-interference between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
700:, Najibullah's predecessor, was deemed by the Soviet leadership to be an obstacle to both military withdrawal and the diplomatic process. Although Soviet military, diplomatic and intelligence agencies were not singleminded about his appointment, Najibullah was seen as a leader that could work with the Soviet Union in order to find a negotiated settlement. Mirroring shifts within the USSR itself, the Soviet effort in Afghanistan placed "a much greater emphasis on pacification through winning over rebel commanders" rather than transforming "Afghanistan along
307:
186:
198:
725:"mid-ranking officers sometimes failed to grasp the political significance of their operations" and the Afghan army had to be convinced "to stop calling the opposition "a band of killers," "mercenaries of imperialism," "skull-bashers,"'. Nevertheless, some progress was achieved by Soviet intelligence agencies, military and diplomats in improving relations with rebel factions. The canonical example is the establishment of tentative collaboration with noted rebel commander and Afghan National Hero (posthumously)
284:
273:
132:
2210:
241:
296:
174:
229:
696:, the political will for Soviet involvement in Afghanistan dwindled. The level of Soviet forces in the country was not adequate to achieve exhaustive military victory, and could only prevent the allied DRA from losing ground. The Soviet Union began the gradual process of withdrawal from Afghanistan by installing Muhammed Najibullah Ahmadzai as the General Secretary of the Afghan Communist Party, seeing him to be capable of ruling without serious involvement from the Soviet Union.
967:
Army finished their withdrawal from
Afghanistan. General Gromov walked across the "Bridge of Friendship" between Afghanistan and the USSR last. When Gromov was met by Soviet TV crews while crossing the bridge, he swore at them profusely when they tried to interview him. Recalling the events in an interview with a Russian newspaper in 2014, Gromov said that his words were directed at "the leadership of the country, at those who start wars while others have to clean up the mess."
720:, later wrote that Najibullah's success in establishing more control within Kabul and some sectors of the government led them to believe that they had found a solution that could be replicated everywhere in Afghanistan: "Faith in Najibullah and in the dependability of his security organs created illusions on the part of the KGB leadership. . . . These dangerous illusions, the unwillingness to look truth in the face, delayed the withdrawal of Soviet troops by several years." (99)
786:, the Soviet leadership came under the impression that the US would cease military shipments to the mujahideen immediately after Soviet withdrawal, with the condition that the USSR "front-loaded" its withdrawal (i.e. withdrew the majority of its troops in the beginning of the process, thereby complicating redeployment). This was conveyed to the Najibullah government, managing to convince him that the Soviet-American diplomatic effort would benefit the Kabul government.
253:
2196:
1996:
2331:
2008:
799:
continue supporting Kabul). On
February 8, 1988, the Soviet leadership announced a conditional date for the beginning of the military withdrawal (which the United States had insisted on for years) in an attempt to encourage the US to compromise on ceasing military shipments. This announcement failed to change the American position on shipments, and simultaneously decreased Soviet bargaining power at the negotiations. Nevertheless, Gorbachev decided that
738:
Marxist-revolutionary agenda. Throughout 1987 the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was renamed the Republic of Afghanistan, participation of all political parties in government was permitted conditional on their non-violence towards each other, and Afghanistan's Islamic identity was reassumed. These political reforms were met by scepticism from rebel leaders and PDPA members alike, and were generally unproductive. Cordovez and Harrison write:
217:
1001:, the Army (already encountering a critical lack of resources and critical rates of desertion) was purged. Ultimately, the cessation of Soviet aid and the instability that it caused allowed the mujahideen to storm Kabul. Najibullah was removed from power by his own party, after which the mujahideen futilely attempted to form a stable coalition government. Disagreements and infighting between the likes of Massoud and
2346:
949:'s forces as Soviet troops withdrew through territories under his control, the KGB and Shevardnadze attempted to convince Gorbachev that an attack on Massoud was necessary to guarantee Najibullah's survival. In the words of Soviet military commanders, Najibullah himself also aimed to retain the Soviet military in Afghanistan – Generals Varennikov (in charge of the withdrawal operation), Gromov (commander of the
2018:
709:
withdrawal. Najibullah achieved considerable success in reinvigorating the government security apparatus, and consolidating his power within the state. This, however, may have encouraged the
Soviets to place excessive trust in Najibullah, and did not achieve the primary objective: meaningfully incorporating the opposition into Najibullah's support base. Kalinovsky writes:
953:), and Sotskov (chief Soviet military advisor in Afghanistan) all pleaded with top Soviet military and political leadership to control Najibullah's attempts to use Soviet troops to achieve his own security, and to convey to him that the Soviet military would not stay in Afghanistan. After the departure of
966:
began against the forces of Ahmad Shah
Massoud. Up until the end of the military withdrawal, Shevardnadze and the head of the KGB unsuccessfully attempted to convince Gorbachev to retain a contingent of Soviet military volunteers in Afghanistan to defend land routes to Kabul. On February 15, the 40th
798:
continued to make contradictory statements on the issue. The issue dissipated when the
Department of State suggested that an immediate cessation of US military aid could occur if the Soviets did the same (prior, the US had agreed to an asymmetric cessation of aid, whereby the USSR would be allowed to
778:
with weaponry as soon as Soviet forces withdrew, and to reach an agreement on a power-sharing proposal that would permit the PDPA to remain a key actor in Afghan politics. Najibullah was receptive to the prior, but the Soviet Union did not manage to come to this agreement with the United States. From
661:
allies. He, like Soviet leaders before him, considered only a dignified withdrawal to be acceptable. This necessitated the creation of stability within
Afghanistan, which the Soviet Union would attempt to accomplish until its eventual withdrawal in 1988-9. Three objectives were viewed by Gorbachev as
984:
missiles. Due primarily to this aid, the
Najibullah government held onto power for much longer than the CIA and State Department expected. The mujahideen made considerable advances following the withdrawal of the Soviet contingent, and were even able to take and control several cities; nevertheless,
883:
monitoring bodies, and even pleaded with the United States to influence the factions that they were supplying. The desire of the Soviet Union to withdraw, however, coupled with the United States' inability to control the behaviour of the mujahideen, meant that the Soviet objections did not yield any
747:
decisions were implemented on the ground, and realising that the Policy of
National Reconciliation by itself would not result in a favourable outcome, the Soviet leadership began looking for alternate ways to create the necessary degree of stability in Afghanistan for a withdrawal to be permissible.
746:
Within the ruling party, the Policy of
National Reconciliation was criticised by those who believed it would result in the PDPA losing power over the country, while the opponents of the PDPA and the Soviet Union dismissed the efforts as propaganda. Hampered by the slow pace at which top-level policy
708:
To achieve reconciliation, the Soviet Union dedicated a serious effort to helping the Najibullah government establish relations with rebel factions, sent record packages of aid, and promised that "absolutely all of the military infrastructure would be handed over to the DRA armed forces" upon Soviet
724:
The Soviet-led attempts to encourage reconciliation were also complicated by mid-level military commanders, both Soviet and Afghan. While the military and political leadership of the USSR worked with the Najibullah government on raising the level of cooperation with rebel and tribal leaders, Soviet
656:
that the impact of the war lobby should not be overestimated; Cordovez recalls that Gorbachev's advisors were not unanimous in this pronouncement, but all agreed that disagreements with the US, Pakistan, and realities in Kabul played a bigger role in delaying withdrawal). Abroad, Gorbachev aimed to
651:
to do so ". He later strengthened his support base at the top level of Soviet government further by expanding the Politburo with his allies. To fulfill domestic and foreign expectations, Gorbachev aimed to withdraw having achieved some degree of success. At home, Gorbachev was forced to satisfy the
789:
This impression made by Shultz was false – though mixed signals were sent by various US officials at and around time of the summit, Reagan could not agree to stop arms shipments immediately . In late 1987, when this US commitment was conveyed to the Soviet Union, negotiations came to a halt, but
759:
agreed that reconciliation would mean accepting that the PDPA would lose its leading position". In a personal meeting on the July 20, 1987, Gorbachev again attempted to impress on Najibullah the need to incorporate opposition leaders into the Afghan government, but this effort, like earlier, was
750:
Beginning in early 1987, Soviet faith in the Policy of National Reconciliation in the format in which it was initially conceived began to falter. While previously the preeminence of the PDPA in leadership, and the desired identity of Najibullah as the party leader was indisputable for the Soviet
961:
in the fall of 1988, Gorbachev adopted the Shevardnadze-KGB line of policy regarding supporting Najibullah at the cost of antagonising rebel factions, and a halt of the withdrawal was ordered on November 5, 1988. In December, Gorbachev decided to resume the withdrawal, but also to carry out an
773:
Faced by the failure of the Policy of National Reconciliation to stabilise the country by itself, and hoping to benefit from the gradually thawing relationship with the United States, the Soviet Union pushed forward with its effort to attain a diplomatic solution that would limit Pakistani and
704:
lines winning over the population through economic incentives and establishing a party and government influence in the cities and countryside". As a whole, the policies the Soviet Union and their allies powers in Afghanistan pursued after the transition of power from Babrak to Najibullah were
621:
would not produce sufficient results to maintain the PDPA's power in the long term. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Gorbachev's government continued to militarily and politically support Najibullah against the Afghan opposition, though this aid was abruptly halted due to the
764:
and Kryuchkov. Najibullah retained a strong hold over Kabul and the government apparatus – bar internal divisions within the PDPA – but was not able to incorporate the opposition into the government in any meaningful way, instead giving out "relatively powerless posts to prominent non-PDPA
737:
Political reforms were enacted by the DRA government and their Soviet allies as part of the Policy of National Reconciliation. Generally, these reforms can be characterised as seeking to allow rebel factions to align with the government and state order in Afghanistan by stripping it of its
1064:
997:) cut aid to their Afghan allies. This had a severe impact on the Hizb-i Watan (formerly known as the PDPA), and on the armed forces, already weakened by their fight against the mujahideen and internal struggles – following an abortive
646:
Understanding that the Soviet Union's troublesome economic and international situation was complicated by its involvement in the Afghan War, Gorbachev "had decided to seek a withdrawal from Afghanistan and had won the support of the
2252:
742:
Najibullah's policy of "national reconciliation" went just far enough to antagonize hard-liners in the PDPA but not far enough to win over significant local tribal and ethnic leaders to support of his government.
975:
Soviet support for the Najibullah government did not end with the withdrawal of the regular troops. Aid totalling several billion dollars was sent by the Soviet Union to Afghanistan, including military aircraft
2247:
851:
directly). As agreed, the withdrawal was "front-loaded", with half of the Soviet force leaving by August. The withdrawal was complicated, however, by the rapid deterioration of the situation in
1858:
2237:
803:
it was desirable to withdraw within the framework of an international agreement, however flawed, rather than to proceed independently. "We weren't thinking only of Afghanistan," recalled
916:
Bearden: It is not what I will do, Counselor; it is what the Afghans will do. And I think they will simply keep on fighting and killing your soldiers until you finally just go home.
662:
conditions needed for withdrawal: internal stability, limited foreign intervention, and international recognition of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's Communist government.
1848:
945:
caused policy disagreements between the different services of the Soviet Union. For example: while the Soviet military had succeeded in establishing a de facto cease-fire with
505:
2290:
962:
operation against Massoud, ignoring arguments from his advisors and military commanders on the ground. In January 1989, the Soviet withdrawal continued, and on January 23
579:
353:
2409:
2429:
751:
leadership, now the "emerging consensus in the Politburo was that the PDPA would be but one of the political forces in power after Soviet troops left. Even
2127:
1018:
958:
648:
583:
1418:
1337:
2310:
653:
2404:
1454:
346:
2414:
2242:
56:
2295:
2262:
587:
2109:
1387:
1369:
426:
339:
774:
American interference in Afghanistan. Throughout 1987, Soviet diplomats attempted to convince the United States to stop supplying the
617:
showed signs of improvement, as it had become increasingly clear to the Soviet government that propping up Najibullah's government in
1562:
1853:
808:
614:
676:
1523:
2374:
2021:
510:
867:, the latter was not delivering on its commitment to prevent weaponry and militants from flowing into Afghanistan through the
2434:
2144:
671:
595:
2054:
652:
hawkish military-industrial complex, military leadership, and intelligence agencies (later, Gorbachev would tell UN Envoy
2305:
1880:
1447:
1299:
1038:
2232:
2155:
2063:
1507:
852:
545:
150:
2389:
2384:
2350:
1427:
1333:
1267:
1235:
1199:
1149:
1087:
795:
685:
2177:
1080:
War in Afghanistan: A Short History of 80 Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier 1839 to 2011
780:
627:
569:
110:
42:
623:
520:
52:
2379:
2011:
1950:
1929:
1863:
1832:
1440:
391:
2424:
2300:
1344:
582:
in March 1985, began planning for a military disengagement from Afghanistan soon after he was elected by the
515:
2399:
2394:
2257:
889:
811:
agreement on missiles in Europe was particularly important, and all of these things were interconnected."
2139:
1791:
1557:
837:
471:
2315:
1971:
1655:
406:
2047:
998:
963:
950:
848:
553:
2115:
1540:
941:
As the Soviet military withdrawal and rebel attacks continued, the deteriorating security of the
717:
190:
2080:
1936:
1771:
451:
626:
in December 1991. The ensuing collapse of Najibullah's government in April 1992 triggered the
2160:
2098:
1915:
1463:
876:
816:
561:
537:
436:
363:
103:
1398:
586:. Under his leadership, the Soviet Union attempted to aid the consolidation of power by the
2419:
2335:
2150:
1943:
1801:
1645:
1599:
1552:
483:
202:
871:. Likewise, the mujahideen also continued their attacks on withdrawing Soviet forces. The
8:
2103:
2093:
2040:
1796:
1761:
1751:
1735:
1730:
1725:
1720:
1715:
1710:
1705:
1700:
1695:
1690:
1685:
1665:
1650:
1619:
1614:
1002:
942:
840:
833:
761:
591:
564:
to a close after nearly a decade of fighting. It marked a significant development in the
557:
476:
401:
377:
311:
288:
83:
2201:
2000:
1978:
1660:
1635:
1545:
954:
946:
929:, you must still understand that there will be consequences if these attacks continue.
752:
726:
421:
300:
2133:
2032:
1781:
1604:
1423:
1363:
1329:
1263:
1231:
1195:
1145:
1083:
913:
Botshan-Kharchenko: Then perhaps we will halt our withdrawal. Then what will you do?
860:
713:
575:
461:
431:
166:
2215:
1922:
1894:
1776:
1640:
922:
Bearden: No one has control over such matters, Counselor, except the Soviet Union.
859:
was not bound by any commitment to stop arms shipments and continued to supply the
603:
456:
446:
2165:
2087:
1887:
1827:
1806:
1589:
1528:
1475:
844:
693:
565:
490:
441:
411:
384:
178:
30:
765:
personalities who had until then neither supported nor opposed the government."
548:
between 15 May 1988 and 15 February 1989. Headed by the Soviet military officer
2283:
2182:
2121:
1957:
1908:
1786:
1766:
1756:
977:
907:
880:
804:
756:
466:
416:
396:
246:
1390:
Breaking contact without leaving chaos: the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
2368:
1609:
1594:
1533:
994:
885:
856:
783:
697:
234:
1502:
896:(as told by the latter in a book he co-authored), is cited by Kalinovsky:
872:
549:
541:
277:
258:
137:
2273:
1285:
The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB
986:
985:
they failed to unseat Najibullah until the spring of 1992. Following the
868:
791:
658:
775:
681:
87:
1964:
1901:
893:
768:
1432:
1065:"The anniversary of the withdrawal of the Red Army from Afghanistan"
904:, that these attacks against our troops as they withdraw must stop.
884:
results. The following conversation between a Soviet diplomat and a
331:
1479:
864:
631:
610:
599:
222:
34:
598:" through diplomacy between his PDPA government and the rebelling
2268:
1006:
919:
Botshan-Kharchenko: But you have some control over such matters.
701:
635:
680:
Soviet soldiers returning from Afghanistan, 18 October 1986, in
1419:
Phased Withdrawal, Conflict Resolution and State Reconstruction
1326:
Phased Withdrawal, Conflict Resolution and State Reconstruction
990:
48:
815:
This factor complicated convincing Najibullah to agree to the
2278:
1192:
Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal
665:
618:
807:. "There were many processes taking place at that time. The
732:
580:
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
981:
1228:
Conflict in Afghanistan: Studies in Asymetric Warfare (1)
827:
760:
weakened by Najibullah's biliateral conversations with
2062:
1142:
A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan
705:
referred to as the Policy of National Reconciliation
2191:
1031:
769:Pakistani and American interference in Afghanistan
594:was directed by the Soviets towards a policy of "
2366:
1189:
2430:Military operations involving the Soviet Union
2311:Democratic Women's Organisation of Afghanistan
836:began on 15 May 1988, under the leadership of
568:, having served as the precursor event to the
2048:
1448:
1262:. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
1260:Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History
1135:
1133:
1131:
1129:
1127:
1125:
1123:
1121:
1119:
936:
932:Bearden: I am sure there will be, Counselor.
900:Botshan-Kharchenko: You must understand, Mr.
347:
141:
47:Final column of Soviet troops, consisting of
1282:
1190:Cordovez, Diego; Harrison, Selig S. (1995).
1117:
1115:
1113:
1111:
1109:
1107:
1105:
1103:
1101:
1099:
875:repeatedly reported these violations of the
2410:Military government of Pakistan (1977–1988)
1144:. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
1005:set the stage for the eventual rise of the
544:conducted a total military withdrawal from
2055:
2041:
1455:
1441:
1253:
1251:
1249:
1247:
1194:. New York: Oxford University Press (US).
1139:
354:
340:
1096:
733:Ineffectiveness and Soviet disenchantment
1257:
675:
588:People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
506:Mujahideen raids inside the Soviet Union
1972:Pictures from Afghanistan (documentary)
1524:Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen
1297:
1244:
1221:
1219:
1217:
1215:
1213:
1211:
615:Soviet Union–United States relationship
2367:
1368:: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (
1283:Bearden, Milton; Risen, James (2003).
2036:
1859:Military equipment used by Mujahideen
1462:
1436:
1225:
1185:
1183:
1181:
1077:
828:Attacks on departing Soviet personnel
672:National Reconciliation (Afghanistan)
361:
335:
2017:
1422:; Conflict Research Studies Centre;
1328:; Conflict research Studies Centre;
1208:
1179:
1177:
1175:
1173:
1171:
1169:
1167:
1165:
1163:
1161:
1071:
1019:American withdrawal from Afghanistan
16:Final phase of the Soviet–Afghan War
2345:
1082:. Kenthurst: Rosenberg Publishing.
13:
2405:Afghanistan–Soviet Union relations
2065:Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
1812:Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
1508:Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
1298:Абрамов, Юрий (14 February 2014).
989:, the Soviet Union (and later the
511:Pakistan–Soviet air confrontations
24:Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
14:
2446:
1379:
1158:
427:Kulchabat, Bala Karz and Mushkizi
2344:
2330:
2329:
2208:
2194:
2016:
2007:
2006:
1994:
1385:
666:PDPA's "National Reconciliation"
305:
294:
282:
271:
251:
239:
227:
215:
196:
184:
172:
160:
143:
130:
41:
2415:Pakistan–Soviet Union relations
1318:
657:retain prestige in the eyes of
624:dissolution of the Soviet Union
558:Union Republics of Central Asia
521:Afghan SCUD attacks in Pakistan
1864:Afghanistan War Memorial, Kyiv
1300:"Главный вывод Бориса Громова"
1291:
1276:
1140:Kalinovsky, Artemy M. (2011).
1057:
71:15 May 1988 – 15 February 1989
1:
2375:Battles involving Afghanistan
2243:Democratic Youth Organisation
2099:Soviet control and deployment
1025:
822:
790:proceeded tentatively as the
590:(PDPA); the Afghan president
516:KHAD-KGB campaign in Pakistan
2435:Battles involving the Tajiks
970:
7:
1012:
890:Central Intelligence Agency
10:
2451:
1792:Battle of Arghandab (1987)
999:coup attempt in March 1990
937:Response and disagreements
669:
641:
100:Afghan Mujahideen victory
2324:
2263:People's Democratic Party
2225:
2189:
2128:Afghan Airlines shootdown
2072:
1988:
1979:Bitter Lake (documentary)
1872:
1841:
1820:
1744:
1678:
1628:
1582:
1575:
1516:
1495:
1488:
1470:
1258:Barfield, Thomas (2010).
373:
317:
264:
123:
63:
40:
28:
23:
2390:1989 in the Soviet Union
2385:1988 in the Soviet Union
1833:Kabul students' uprising
964:Operation Typhoon (1989)
925:Botshan-Kharchenko: Mr.
2145:National Reconciliation
1541:Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin
1230:. New York: Routledge.
628:Second Afghan Civil War
596:National Reconciliation
191:Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin
2156:Parliamentary election
2001:Afghanistan portal
1854:War in popular culture
1849:Soviet aircraft losses
1772:Battle of Maravar Pass
1226:Ewans, Martin (2005).
1039:"How Not to End a War"
934:
847:Gromov commanding the
832:The withdrawal of the
813:
744:
722:
716:, deputy chief of the
689:
609:In the context of the
570:First Afghan Civil War
540:of 14 April 1988, the
265:Commanders and leaders
2306:Revolutionary Council
2104:Assassination of Amin
1416:Marshall, A. (2006);
1078:Baker, Kevin (2011).
943:Najibullah government
910:: And if they don't?
898:
801:
740:
718:KGB First Directorate
711:
679:
613:, the dynamic of the
560:formally brought the
552:, the retreat of the
318:Casualties and losses
2425:Military withdrawals
2233:Council of Ministers
2178:Civil War: 1989–1992
2151:Battle for Hill 3234
1944:The Living Daylights
1930:Charlie Wilson's War
1802:Battle for Hill 3234
1646:Abdullah Yusuf Azzam
1600:Konstantin Chernenko
1553:Hezb-e Islami Khalis
1324:Marshall, A.(2006);
1067:. 18 September 2018.
203:Hezb-e Islami Khalis
2400:1989 in Afghanistan
2395:1988 in Afghanistan
2301:Heads of government
2140:Battle of Arghandab
1797:Operation Magistral
1762:Panjshir offensives
1752:Operation Storm-333
1745:Military operations
1666:Burhanuddin Rabbani
1651:Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
1620:Abdul Rashid Dostum
1615:Mohammad Najibullah
1404:on 25 December 2010
1287:. Novato: Presidio.
1043:The Washington Post
1003:Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
987:coup of August 1991
841:Valentin Varennikov
838:General of the Army
796:Department of State
779:statements made by
762:Eduard Shevardnadze
692:After the death of
592:Mohammad Najibullah
312:Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
289:Valentin Varennikov
2202:Afghanistan portal
2116:Salang Tunnel fire
1951:The Magic Mountain
1661:Abdul Rahim Wardak
1636:Ahmad Shah Massoud
1546:Maktab al-Khidamat
1397:. . Archived from
1350:on 1 December 2007
991:Russian Federation
947:Ahmad Shah Massoud
781:Secretary of State
753:Vladimir Kryuchkov
727:Ahmad Shah Massoud
690:
301:Ahmad Shah Massoud
59:(15 February 1989)
2380:Soviet–Afghan War
2362:
2361:
2238:Central Committee
2172:Soviet withdrawal
2134:Battles of Zhawar
2030:
2029:
1821:Civilian protests
1782:Battles of Zhawar
1674:
1673:
1605:Mikhail Gorbachev
1571:
1570:
1464:Soviet–Afghan War
861:Afghan mujahideen
714:Vadim Kirpichenko
604:Afghan mujahideen
578:, who became the
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1503:Soviet Union
1489:Belligerents
1474:Part of the
1417:
1406:. Retrieved
1399:the original
1389:
1352:. Retrieved
1345:the original
1325:
1320:
1308:. Retrieved
1306:(in Russian)
1303:
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1227:
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1047:. Retrieved
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855:. While the
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533:
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477:
452:Maravar Pass
437:Baraki Barak
385:
378:
278:Boris Gromov
259:Saudi Arabia
210:
138:Soviet Union
124:Belligerents
99:
84:Central Asia
29:Part of the
2420:Perestroika
2352:WikiProject
2176:1990–1992:
1354:12 February
1021:(2020–2021)
869:Durand Line
853:Afghanistan
792:White House
686:Turkmen SSR
659:third-world
546:Afghanistan
432:Caravan war
151:Afghanistan
102:End of the
2369:Categories
2267:Factions:
2253:Government
2022:Multimedia
1629:Mujahideen
1517:Mujahideen
1026:References
823:Withdrawal
776:mujahideen
323:523 killed
88:South Asia
2291:Politburo
2120:1983–84:
1965:Rambo III
1923:Cargo 200
1916:The Beast
1902:Afghantsi
1656:Abdul Haq
1408:17 August
971:Aftermath
959:Politburo
957:from the
951:40th Army
894:Islamabad
849:40th Army
649:Politburo
600:Islamists
584:Politburo
556:into the
554:40th Army
484:Hill 3234
478:Magistral
472:Arghandab
379:Storm-333
53:Uzbek SSR
2337:Category
2226:Politics
2081:Timeline
2012:Category
1583:Alliance
1496:Alliance
1480:Cold War
1478:and the
1364:cite web
1013:See also
955:Yakovlev
865:Pakistan
634:-backed
632:Pakistan
611:Cold War
402:Panjshir
223:Pakistan
78:Location
35:Cold War
33:and the
2269:Parcham
2073:History
1576:Leaders
1007:Taliban
978:MiG-27s
927:Buurdon
908:Bearden
902:Buurdon
888:of the
845:General
702:Marxist
642:Prelude
636:Taliban
602:of the
457:Badaber
447:Laghman
422:Marmoul
326:Unknown
49:BTR-80s
2349:
2334:
2170:1989:
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1426:
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1234:
1198:
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1086:
1049:23 May
993:under
980:) and
843:(with
682:Kushka
462:Zhawar
442:Kunduz
412:Rauzdi
386:3 Hoot
256:
244:
232:
220:
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96:Result
2279:Khalq
1402:(PDF)
1395:(PDF)
1348:(PDF)
1341:(PDF)
1310:7 May
1304:MK.ru
619:Kabul
492:Arrow
417:Urgun
397:Khost
1736:1989
1731:1988
1726:1987
1721:1986
1716:1985
1711:1984
1706:1983
1701:1982
1696:1981
1691:1980
1686:1979
1424:ISBN
1410:2007
1370:link
1356:2008
1330:ISBN
1312:2017
1264:ISBN
1232:ISBN
1196:ISBN
1146:ISBN
1084:ISBN
1051:2010
982:Scud
794:and
755:and
467:Jaji
86:and
68:Date
2274:Kar
892:in
879:to
863:in
809:INF
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