Geneva Peace Conference (1991)

237:, Assistant Secretary Of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. After sitting down with Tariq Aziz, Baker handed him President Bush's letter. After reading it Aziz refused to accept it on the count that it is full of threats and includes language that is not normally used in dialogue between heads of state. There was speculation at the time that Baker would deliver a letter to Saddam, and Aziz had told Saddam that if the letter was not cordial and objective that he would return it to Baker. Baker reiterated that the coalition would not move from its position of a complete withdrawal. Arab leaders had been in touch with President Bush and informed him that the United States prior to the meeting that they should not accept a partial withdrawal, only a full withdrawal would be acceptable. 290:. Baker's reaction after the meeting was that Iraq was unwilling to uphold the United Nations resolutions and that it was willing to continue its current occupation of Kuwait. Baker had little hope that anything other than military action would remove Iraq from Kuwait. Although little was accomplished in the meeting, it was a historic meeting in which both countries met face-to-face. Both countries held strong to their positions, and it gave the world one last hope of a peaceful solution. 199:, and other foreign nations, on the other, combatants will not keep in mind that they will be fighting to vindicate UN resolutions.... The soldier in our region does not fight only when ordered to do so. Indeed he fights out of convictions.... Against the backdrop of your ties with Israel, I would like to tell you in all sincerity that if you initiate military action against an Arab country, you will be faced with hostile sentiment in the region, and in many Muslim states as well. 270:. Tariq Aziz had little power to change Iraq's position and was required to uphold Saddam's initial position. Saddam used the conference for propaganda purposes within Iraq, while the United States used the meeting to show the world it was serious about resolving the crisis without military action and to notify Saddam what would happen if he failed to remove the Iraqi army from Kuwait. The meeting set the stage for what would eventually be known as the Gulf War or 145:

order to give Saddam enough time to withdraw the Iraqi army. The closer to the resolution deadline, the more flexibility Saddam would have. It would be unrealistic to withdraw a large number of troops within a few days. While Saddam continued to hold out for a meeting closer to the deadline of Resolution 678, President Bush reluctantly offered that the meeting be held in

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aspirations…However, we do not want to see these principles implemented with regard to a single issue... this would mean that double standards were at work.... If you are willing to work to achieve peace, justice, stability, and security in the while region, then you would find us at the forefront of those willing to co-operate with you in this regard.

207:. Again, Aziz referred to the Palestinian issue, citing that it was a double standard if Iraq was forced to withdraw and Israel could still occupy Palestinian land. Aziz said, "We truly believe that the failure to resolve the Palestinian question will pose threats to Iraq's security." His idea of a settlement is laid out in his statement to Baker, 253:

use of such weapons, our objective would not be only the liberation of Kuwait, but also the toppling of the present regime. Any person who is responsible for the use of these weapons would be held accountable in the future." This warning was meant to communicate that the United States had the option to retaliate with

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on Iran and his own people. Baker gave Aziz a firm warning, "If the conflict starts, God forbid, and chemical or biological weapons are used against our forces, the American people would demand revenge, and we have the means to implement this. This is not a threat, but a pledge that if there is any

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insisted on going an "extra mile for peace". This initiative allowed the opportunity for open dialogue between Iraq and the United States. The U.S. position included the option of receiving Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and sending Secretary of State Baker to Iraq. The main goal behind this policy was

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President Bush wanted to convey the message that the United States and its allies would not agree to anything less than a full withdrawal of Kuwait. He stated this in a letter he wrote directly to Saddam. The goal of this letter was to clarify and make sure Saddam fully understood the consequences

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When trying to decide on a date for Iraqi and U.S. personnel to meet, Saddam insisted on a date close to the January 15 deadline of Resolution 678. His goal was to try to evade the United Nations resolution. The United States wanted the date to be between December 20, 1990, and January 3, 1991, in

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Iraq welcomed the opportunity for direct talks with the U.S. From the beginning of the Kuwait invasion, Saddam had lobbied for direct negotiations with the United States. Iraq had been previously denied any face-to-face negotiations. Iraq's Information Minister, Latif Nusseit Jasim, stated that

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tried to persuade Saddam to look out for his own and Iraq's best interests. He was successful in having fellow United Nations member states include a 'period of goodwill' within Resolution 678. The period of goodwill was designed to give Iraq an opportunity to review its policy and actions and

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was the United States representative. Lasting nearly seven hours, both parties refused to move on their initial positions. Iraq refused to withdraw from Kuwait, while the United States and its allies continued to demand Iraq's immediate withdrawal. The meeting was the final initiative that

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On January 9, 1991, Tariq Aziz was scheduled to meet James Baker. For publicity reasons, Iraq insisted that Aziz and Baker walk into the room together and sit at the same time. The two men also shook hands for a photo. Aziz smiled, while Baker refrained from showing any emotion. Aziz was

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I would like to tell you in all sincerity and seriousness that we would have no problems implementing legitimacy and the rules of justice and fairness if these principles were to be honored with regard to all regional conflicts. Such a thing would promote our interests and realize our

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Aziz came into the meeting with little leverage. Saddam had instructed him on the Iraqi position, and he had little flexibility to deviate from it. The Iraqi position had been throughout the crisis that Iraq would not consider withdrawing from Kuwait, unless the

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issued a statement that stated "Bush's initiative creates the last chance for removing the danger of war from the region. Saddam had better seize this opportune moment to withdraw from Kuwait, rather than embroil the region in a bloody and futile war.

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issue was resolved. Aziz tried to turn any potential military conflict with the United States and its allies into a war between Iraq and the United States. When confronted with the possibility of fighting other Arab countries, Aziz stated,

274:. Arab countries persisted in their position that the United States should implement Resolution 678 and offer its economic, political, and military support in executing all the resolutions regarding the occupation of Kuwait. 257:

on Iraq, if any chemical or biological weapons were used on its troops. James Baker made sure that Tariq Aziz fully understood this concept, because the United States feared any use of weapons of mass destruction.

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After the meeting Aziz explained to the media that Iraq wanted a peaceful resolution to the problems of the region, but it could not just be about the occupation of Kuwait, that it must include the occupation of

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his actions would have. President Bush's letter was not designed to threaten, but to inform Saddam that the United States and its allies would implement Resolution 678 and use all means necessary to do so.

85:, which authorized member states 'to use all necessary means to uphold and implement all previous resolutions demanding the immediate withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait.' The goal of the resolution was to give 153:, on January 9, 1991. It was finally agreed that Tariq Aziz and James Baker would meet to discuss the occupation of Kuwait and the United Nations Resolutions. President Bush had promised the 94: 113:

Iraq was willing to discuss "every aspect of the crisis of the Gulf, without exception, so long as the Americans were prepared to negotiate without any preconditions."

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one last firm message that the United Nations would not allow Iraq to continue its occupation of Kuwait. Even its close ally and former enemy of the United States, the

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and Saudi King Fahd, along with other heads of state, publicly called for an unconditioned withdrawal from Kuwait. Syrian Minister of Defense Mustafa Tlas stated that

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and warned him that it held a technological advantage over Iraq. Baker also brought up one of the major concerns of the coalition,

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to assure American voters that the US government was taking steps to avoid a military conflict with Iraq.

245: 267: 540: 469: 183: 58: 271: 154: 121: 435: 530: 436:"Voices In The Storm - At The Brink Of War | The Gulf War | FRONTLINE | PBS" 8: 333:"Persian Gulf: Mission of Peace, James Baker and Gerald Post on the Iran-Kuwait Crisis" 203:

No change was made in the Iraqi position, besides an offer extended for Baker to visit

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dictatorships called for Saddam to comply with Resolution 678. Egyptian President

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The Geneva meeting resulted in no significant progress toward a resolution to the

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that no resolution would be presented to it until after the Geneva meeting.

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country on the one hand, and foreign powers such as the United States,

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would increase its military if Iraq did not comply. After a meeting in

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Throughout the meeting, Baker emphasized the full capabilities of the

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1991 failed attempt between Iraq and the U.S. to prevent the Gulf War

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hopefully come to the conclusion that it would be best to withdraw.

66: 204: 192: 171: 146: 42: 30: 470:"Oral History | The Gulf War | FRONTLINE | PBS" 233:, Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, and 216: 137: 129: 125: 488: