July Crisis - Knowledge

1566: 1684:

Austro-Hungarian demands, and following Pourtalès's advice, rejected Grey's conference proposal in favour of direct talks with the Austro-Hungarians. Pourtalès reported to Germany that Sazonov was being "more conciliatory", seeking "to find a bridge... to satisfy... Austrian demands" and willing to do almost anything to save the peace. At the same time, Pourtalès warned that changes in the Balkan balance of power would be regarded as a highly unfriendly act by Russia. The following Austro-Russian talks were sabotaged by Austria-Hungary's refusal to abandon any of the demands on Serbia As a preparatory move in case a war did break out, and Britain were to become involved, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the British Admiralty, ordered the British fleet not to disperse as planned, arguing that news of the British move might serve as a deterrent to war, and thus help persuade Germany to put pressure on Austria to abandon some of the more outrageous demands in their ultimatum. Grey stated that a compromise solution could be worked out if Germany and Britain were to work together. His approach generated opposition from British officials, who felt the Germans were dealing with the crisis in bad faith. Nicolson warned Grey that in his opinion "Berlin is playing with us". Grey for his part, rejected Nicolson's assessment, and believed that Germany was interested in stopping a general war.

1786:, the British ambassador in Berlin, presented Grey's conference proposal to Jagow, the Germans totally rejected the offer. In a letter to Grey, Bethmann Hollweg stated that Germany "could not summon Austria before a European court of justice in her case with Serbia". Austro-Hungarian troops began to concentrate in Bosnia as a preparatory step towards invading Serbia. Falkenhayn told the German government, "It has now been decided to fight the matter through, regardless of the cost", and advised Bethmann Hollweg to order a German attack on Russia and France at once. Moltke supported Falkenhayn by submitting the assessment that 1914 was a "singularly favourable situation" for Germany to go to war as both Russia and France were not prepared whereas Germany was. Once the Russian Great Military Programme would be completed by 1917, Moltke stated that Germany would never be able to entertain the prospect of a victorious war again and so should destroy both France and Russia while it was still possible. Moltke ended his assessment with: "We shall never hit it again so well as we do now." Jagow backed up Moltke by sending a message to Vienna telling the Austro-Hungarians they must attack Serbia at once because otherwise the British peace plan might be accepted. 1758:

highest importance to prevent Britain from making common cause with Russia and France. We must therefore avoid any action might cut the line, which has so far worked so well, between Germany and Britain". Szögyény ended his telegram: "If Germany candidly told Grey that it refused to communicate England’s peace plan, that objective might not be achieved." Bethmann Hollweg, in a message to Tschirschky, wrote on 27 July that Germany must appear to consider British mediation if they were not to be perceived as war-mongers. In passing on Grey's message, Bethmann Hollweg deleted the last line, which read: "Also, the whole world here is convinced, and I hear from my colleagues that the key to the situation lies in Berlin, and that if Berlin seriously wants peace, it will prevent Vienna from following a foolhardy policy." In his reply to London, Bethmann Hollweg pretended that: "We have immediately initiated mediation in Vienna in the sense desired by Sir Edward Grey." Jagow sent Grey's offer to Tschirschky, his ambassador in Vienna, but ordered him not to show it to any Austro-Hungarian official, in case they might accept it. At the same time, Bethmann Hollweg sent a distorted account of Grey's offer to Wilhelm.

2194: 1390:

point 6 that Austro-Hungarian police be allowed to operate in Serbia. Others, notably Clark, argue the Serbs drafted their reply to the ultimatum in such a way as to give the impression of making significant concessions but: "In reality, then, this was a highly perfumed rejection on most points". Which was the same sentiment the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office expressed in a public letter, which was later published in the New York Times, issued upon receiving the response in a letter from Serbia. In the letter the Foreign Office said, “The object of the Serbian note is to create the false impression that the Serbian Government is prepared in great measure to comply with our demands… The Serbian note contains such far reaching reservations and limitations not only regarding the general principles of our action, but also in regards to the individual claims we have put forward that the concessions actually made by Serbia become insignificant.” Baron Aleksandar von Musulin, author of the first draft of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, famously described the Serbian reply as "the most brilliant specimen of diplomatic skill" that he had ever encountered".

2779:"These expressions of the Austrian diplomats must be regarded as indications of more recent wishes and aspirations. I regard the attitude of the Austrian Government and its unparalleled procedure towards the various Governments with increasing astonishment. In St. Petersburg it declares its territorial disinterestedness; us it leaves wholly in the dark as to its programme; Rome it puts off with empty phrases about the question of compensation; in London, Count Mensdorff (the Austrian ambassador) hands out part of Serbia to Bulgaria and Albania and places himself in contradiction with Vienna's solemn declaration at St. Petersburg. From these contradictions I must conclude that the telegram disavowing Hoyos {who, on July 5/6 at Berlin, had spoken unofficially of Austria's partitioning of Serbia} was intended for the gallery, and that the Austrian Government is harboring plans which it sees fit to conceal from us, in order to assure itself in all events of German support and to avoid the refusal which might result from a frank statement." 1676:

message to Belgium demanding that German troops be allowed to pass through that kingdom "in the event of an imminent war against France and Russia". Bethmann Hollweg in a message to the German ambassadors in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg stated that the principal aim of German foreign policy now was to make it appear that Russia had forced Germany into a war, in order to keep Britain neutral and ensure that German public opinion would back the war effort. Bethmann Hollweg advised Wilhelm to send Nicholas a telegram, which he assured the Emperor was for public relations purposes only. As Bethmann Hollweg put it, "If war should come after all, such a telegram would make Russia's guilt glaringly plain". Moltke visited the German Foreign Ministry to advise Jagow that Germany should start drafting an ultimatum to justify an invasion of Belgium. Later, Moltke met with Bethmann Hollweg, and told his wife later that same day that he had informed the Chancellor he was "very dissatisfied" that Germany had not yet attacked Russia.

2216:

and personal meeting with Bethmann Hollweg, who invited Goschen to dine with him. During their highly emotional conversation Bethmann Hollweg, who had spent his career trying to improve relations, accused Britain of going to war for its own national agenda, which was unrelated to that of Belgium, who would have been compensated for the wrong done to it. He quoted Grey's speech as evidence that Britain was not going to war for Belgium's sake. According to Goschen's report to Grey, Bethmann Hollweg said the 1839 Treaty of London was for Britain (not for Germany), an excuse i.e. a "scrap of paper" and, compared to the "fearful fact of Anglo-German war", the steps taken by His Majesty's Government were terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality", a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with it.

2047:

Russia's general mobilisation began to arrive in Berlin" the Chancellor instructed the ambassador in Vienna "that all mediation attempts be stopped", and the directive be suspended. Fritz Fischer and some other scholars have maintained the alternative view that Prince Henry's assurances that King George had promised him that Britain would remain neutral accounted for the change. Fischer notes the telegram reporting these "vague" assurances arrived 12 minutes before the dispatch of the suspending telegram and that Bethmann Hollweg himself justified the cancellation that way, while acknowledging that before then Bethmann Hollweg had already prepared, but not yet sent, a telegram to Vienna explaining that he had "cancelled execution of instructions in No. 200, because the General Staff has just informed me that military measures of our neighbors, especially in the east, compel speedy decision if we are not to be taken by surprise".

1470:

Germany immediately follow an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia with a German attack on Russia. Moltke repeatedly stated that 1914 would be the best time for starting a "preventive war", or the Russian Great Military Programme would finish by 1917, making Germany unable to ever again risk a war. Moltke added that Russian mobilisation was regarded as an opportunity to be sought rather than as a sort of threat, as it would allow Germany to go to war while presenting it as forced on Germany. The German military attaché in Russia reported that Russian preparations for mobilisation were on a much smaller scale than was expected. Though Moltke at first argued that Germany should wait for Russia to mobilise before beginning the "preventive war", by the end of the week he urged that Germany should launch it anyway. In Moltke's view, in order to invade France successfully, Germany would need to seize the Belgian fortress of

1817:

exposed during the intervening period to the other Powers’ proposals for mediation and conferences, and if it continues to maintain its previous reserve towards such proposals, the odium of having provoked a world war will in the end recoil on it, even in the eyes of the German people. But a successful war on three fronts (viz, in Serbia, Russia and France) can not be initiated and carried on such a basis. It is imperative that the responsibility for any extension of the conflict to the Powers not directly concerned should under all circumstances fall on Russia alone." At the same time, the German ambassador to Russia, Portalés, reported that, based on a conversation with Sazonov, Russia was prepared to make "astonishing" concessions by promising to pressure Serbia to agree to most of the Austro-Hungarian demands to avoid a war. The prospect of talks was rejected out of hand by Bethmann Hollweg.

1486:" (involving Russia, Austria, France and Germany) if Austro-Hungarian troops entered Serbia. Grey suggested mediation between Italy, France, Germany, and Britain as the best way of stopping an Austro-Serbian war. Jagow sabotaged Grey's offer by waiting until after the ultimatum had expired to pass on the British offer. Jagow claimed that "e exercised no influence of any kind with regard to the contents of the note ", and that Germany "was unable to counsel Vienna to retract" because that would humiliate Austria-Hungary too much. The Russian ambassador to Britain warned Prince Lichnowsky: "Only a government that wanted war could possibly write such a note ." Upon reading an account of a meeting in which Berchtold informed the Russian ambassador of his country's peaceful intentions towards Russia, Wilhelm wrote on the margin "absolutely superfluous!" and called Berchtold an "Ass!" 1189:

take advantage of the favourable moment, even at the risk of further complications", but that he doubted "whether Vienna would nerve herself to act". Zimmermann ended his memo that "he gathered that Vienna, timid and undecided as it always was, was almost sorry" that Germany had given the "blank cheque" of 5 July 1914, instead of advising restraint with Serbia. Conrad himself was pressuring the Dual Monarchy for "haste" in starting a war, in order to prevent Serbia from "smelling a rat and herself volunteering compensation, perhaps under pressure from France and Russia". On 22 July, Germany refused an Austro-Hungarian request to have the German Minister in Belgrade present the ultimatum to Serbia because as Jagow had said, it would look too much "as though we were egging Austria on to make war".

55: 1813:, which bombarded Belgrade in response to Serbian sappers blowing up the railway bridge over the river Sava which linked the two countries. In the Russian Empire, partial mobilisation was ordered for the four military districts bordering Austria-Hungary. Wilhelm sent a telegram to Nicholas asking for Russian support for the Austro-Hungarian war against Serbia. Nicholas replied: "Am glad you are back... I appeal to you to help me. An ignoble war has been declared on a weak country... Soon I shall be overwhelmed by pressure brought upon me... to take extreme measures which will lead to war. To try and avoid such a calamity as a European war, I beg you in the name of our old friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from going too far." 2680:"In taking these steps, Sazonov and his colleagues escalated the crisis and greatly increased the likelihood of a general European war. For one thing, Russian pre-mobilization altered the political chemistry in Serbia, making it unthinkable that the Belgrade government, which had originally given serious consideration to accepting the ultimatum, would back down in the face of Austrian pressure. It heightened the domestic pressure on the Russian administration ... it sounded alarm bells in Austria-Hungary. Most importantly of all, these measures drastically raised the pressure on Germany, which had so far abstained from military preparations and was still counting on the localisation of the Austro-Serbian conflict." 2844:"If Vienna ... refuses ... to give way at all, it will hardly be possible to place the blame on Russia for the outbreak of the European conflagration. H. M. has, on the request of the Tsar, undertaken to intervene in Vienna because he could not refuse without awakening an irrefutable suspicion that we wanted war ... If these efforts of Britain's meet with success, while Vienna refuses everything, Vienna will prove that it is set on having a war, into which we are dragged, while Russia remains free of guilt. This puts us in a quite impossible position in the eyes of our own people. We can therefore only urgently recommend Vienna to accept Grey's proposal, which safeguards its position in every way." 1826:, Moltke instead argued that Germany should mobilise at once and attack France. In two meetings on 29 July, Moltke was overruled by Bethmann Hollweg, who argued that Germany should wait for Russia to begin a general mobilisation. As Bethmann Hollweg told Moltke, this was the best way to ensure that blame for the "whole shemozzle" could be placed on Russia's door, and thus ensure British neutrality. While promising not to start mobilisation without the Chancellor's orders, Moltke ordered the German military attaché in Belgium to ask for permission for German troops to cross through on the way to attack France. Also, on 28 July, Bethmann Hollweg offered to form an anti-Russian military alliance with the Ottoman Empire. 1080: 2116: 27: 1442:

Britain's "condescending orders" were to be totally rejected, and Austria-Hungary would not retract any of its "impossible demands" on Serbia. He continued: "Am I to do that? Wouldn’t think of it! What does he mean by ‘impossible’?" Jagow ordered Lichnowsky to tell Grey of the supposed German ignorance of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, and that Germany regarded Austro-Serbian relations as "an internal affair of Austria-Hungary, in which we had no standing to intervene". Jagow's statement did much to discredit Germany in British eyes. Lichnowsky reported to Berlin "If we do not join the mediation, all faith here in us and in our love of peace will be shattered."

2639:"Russia is trying to drag us in. The news this morning is that Serbia had capitulated on the main points, but it is very doubtful if any reservations will be accepted by Austria, who is resolved upon a complete and final humiliation. The curious thing is that on many, if not most of the points, Austria has a good and Serbia a very bad case. But the Austrians are quite the stupidest people in Europe (as the Italians are the most perfidious), and there is a brutality about their mode of procedure, which will make most people think that is a case of a big Power wantonly bullying a little one. Anyhow, it is the most dangerous situation of the last 40 years." 1268:. As Christopher Clark notes "Poincare had come to preach the gospel of firmness and his words had fallen on ready ears. Firmness in this context meant an intransigent opposition to any Austrian measure against Serbia. At no point do the sources suggest that Poincare or his Russian interlocutors gave any thought whatsoever to what measures Austria-Hungary might legitimately be entitled to take in the aftermath of the assassinations". The delivery of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was intended to coincide with the departure of the French delegation from Russia on 23 July. The meetings were centrally concerned with the crisis unfolding in central Europe. 2127:

British proposal to guarantee the neutrality of France and thus limit the war to one fought in the east. Wilhelm then ordered German forces to strike against Russia alone, leading to fierce protests from Moltke that it was not technically possible for Germany to do so as the bulk of the German forces were already advancing into Luxembourg and Belgium. Wilhelm immediately accepted the proposal by telegrams at the ambassadorial and royal levels. In keeping with this decision, Wilhelm II demanded his generals shift the mobilisation to the east. Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff, told him that this was impossible, to which the Kaiser replied "Your

2893:"For I no longer have any doubt that England, Russia and France have agreed among themselves—knowing that our treaty obligations compel us to support Austria-Hungary—to use the Austro-Serb conflict as a pretext for waging a war of annihilation against us. ... Our dilemma over keeping faith with the old and honorable Emperor has been exploited to create a situation which gives England the excuse she has been seeking to annihilate us with a spurious appearance of justice on the pretext that she is helping France and maintaining the well-known Balance of Power in Europe, i.e. playing off all European States for her own benefit against us." 1429:, wrote, "Europe is trembling on the verge of a general war. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia being the most insolent document of its kind ever devised", but believed that Britain would stay neutral in the coming war. Grey suggested to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador that the deadline for the ultimatum be extended as the best way of saving the peace. When Grey told his friend Lichnowsky that "Any nation that accepted conditions like that would really cease to count as an independent nation", Wilhelm wrote on the margin of Lichnowsky's report "That would be very desirable. It is not a nation in the European sense, but a band of robbers!" 1105:, the State Secretary for Alsace-Lorraine, that he couldn't care less about Serbia or alleged Serbian complicity in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. All that mattered was that Austria-Hungary attack Serbia that summer, to result in a win-win situation for Germany. If Bethmann Hollweg's view was correct, an Austro-Serbian war would either cause a general war (which Bethmann Hollweg believed Germany would win) or cause the Triple Entente to break up. That same day, the Russian Ambassador to Austria-Hungary suggested to St. Petersburg that Russia should inform Austria-Hungary of its negative view of Austro-Hungarian demands. 926:

and this would lead to a continental war. However, this was thought even more unlikely since the Russians had not yet finished their French-funded rearmament programme scheduled for completion in 1917. Moreover, they did not believe that Russia, as an absolute monarchy, would support regicides, and more broadly "the mood across Europe was so anti-Serbian that even Russia would not intervene". Personal factors also weighed heavily and the German Kaiser was close to the murdered Franz Ferdinand and was affected by his death, to the extent that German counsels of restraint vis-à-vis Serbia in 1913 changed to an aggressive stance.

1936: 1015: 2612:"... he situation is just about as bad as it can possibly be. Austria has sent a bullying and humiliating ultimatum to Serbia, who cannot possibly comply with it, and demanded an answer within forty-eight hours-failing which she will march. This means, almost inevitably, that Russia will come to the scene in defence of Serbia and in defiance of Austria, and if so, it is difficult for Germany and France to refrain from lending a hand to one side or the other. So that we are in measurable, or imaginable, distance of a real Armageddon. Happily, there seems to be no reason why we should be anything more than spectators." 391:. Though Russia’s military leadership knew they were not yet strong enough for a general war, they believed that the Austro-Hungarian grievance against Serbia was a pretext orchestrated by Germany, and considered a forceful response to be the best course of action. Russia’s partial mobilisation—the first major military action not undertaken by a direct participant in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia—increased the willingness of Serbia to defy the threat of an Austro-Hungarian attack; it also alarmed the German leadership, having not anticipated the idea of needing to fight Russia before France. 1830: 1962:

Austro-Hungarian ultimatum were a "suitable basis for negotiation." Berchtold replied that though the acceptance of the Austro-Hungarian note would have been satisfactory before hostilities had begun, "now after a state of war has begun, Austria's conditions must naturally take another tone." In response, Bethmann Hollweg, now aware of the Russian order for partial mobilisation, fired off several telegrams in the early morning hours of 30 July. He telegraphed Vienna at 2:55 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. urging that Austria-Hungary accept the Serbian terms in order to avoid drawing Germany into a general war.

2096:

waiting for Russian mobilisation had paid off, and the Social Democrats rallied to support the government. The Bavarian military attaché reported celebration in the halls of the War Ministry at word of the Russian mobilisation. Under the Schlieffen Plan, for Germany to mobilise was to mean war because as part of the plan, German troops as they were called up were to invade Belgium automatically. Unlike the war plans of the other powers, for Germany to mobilise was to go to war. Both Moltke and Falkenhayn told the government that Germany should declare war even were Russia to offer to negotiate.

2536:"If Austria really wants to clear up her relationship with Serbia once and for all, which Tisza himself in his recent speech called ‘indispensable’, then it would pass comprehension why such demands were not being made as would make the breach unavoidable. If the action simply peters out, once again, and ends with a so-called diplomatic success, the belief which is already widely held there that the Monarchy is no longer capable of vigorous action will be dangerously strengthened. The consequences, internal and external, which would result from this, inside Austria and abroad, are obvious." 2862:"The European situation is at least one degree worse than it was yesterday, and has not been improved by a rather shameless attempt on the part of Germany to buy our neutrality during the war by promises that she will not annex French territory (except colonies) or Holland or Belgium. There is something very crude & childlike about German diplomacy. Meanwhile, the French are beginning to press in the opposite sense, as the Russians have been doing for some time. The City, wh. is in a terrible state of depression and paralysis, is the time being all against English intervention." 1672:

between Belgrade and Vienna. Jagow accepted the Franco-Russian offer as it offered the best chance to sever Britain from France and Russia. In his talks with Prince Lichnowsky, Grey drew a sharp distinction between an Austro-Serbian war, which did not concern Britain, and an Austro-Russian war, which did. Grey added that Britain was not working in concord with France and Russia, which heightened Jagow's hopes of severing Britain from the Triple Entente. On the same day, Jagow sent another message to Vienna to encourage the Austro-Hungarians to hurry up with declaring war on Serbia.

2738:. If we rejected every attempt at mediation, the whole world would hold us responsible for the conflagration and represent us as the real war-mongers. That would also make our position impossible here in Germany, where we have got to appear as though the war had been forced on us. Our position is the more difficult because Serbia seems to have given way very extensively. We cannot therefore reject the role of mediator; we have to pass on the British proposal to Vienna for consideration, especially since London and Paris are continuously using their influence on St. Petersburg." 1368: 2770:"I propose that we say to Austria: Serbia has been forced to retreat in a very humiliating manner and we offer our congratulations. Naturally, as a result, no more cause for war exists, but a guarantee that the promises will be carried out is probably necessary. That could be secured by a temporary military occupation of a portion of Serbia, similar to the way we left troops in France in 1871 until the billions were paid. On this basis I am ready to mediate for peace with Austria. Submit a proposal to me along the lines I have sketched out, to be communicated to Vienna." 1954:, and may therefore have been thought to offer the best possible prospect of keeping the Austro-Serb dispute localised. On 28 July, Russia ordered partial mobilisation in response to Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia, Bethmann Hollweg became alarmed and changed his attitude 180 degrees. Already on 28 July, two hours before becoming aware of the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war, the Kaiser had suggested the "Halt in Belgrade" plan and instructed Jagow that a cause for war no longer existed with the Serbian reply and he was ready to mediate with Serbia. 922:

attack against Serbia as the best way of starting a general war, whereas Wilhelm believed that an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia would be purely local. Austro-Hungarian policy based upon pre-existing plans to destroy Serbia involved not waiting to complete judicial inquiries to strike back immediately and not to strain its credibility in the coming weeks as it would become more and more clear that Austria-Hungary was not reacting to the assassination. Likewise, Germany wished to give the impression of its ignorance of Austro-Hungarian intentions.

1766:, reported to Vienna: "The far-reaching compliance of Serbia, which was not regarded as possible here, has made a strong impression. Our attitude gives rise to the opinion that we want war at any price." A Russian diplomat in London presciently criticised Grey for putting too much faith in Germany as a force for peace. The British were warned that "War is inevitable and by the fault of England; that if England had at once declared her solidarity with Russia and France and her intention to fight if necessary, Germany and Austria would have hesitated." In Berlin, 1727:

further." Bethmann Hollweg sabotaged Wilhelm's proposal by instructing Tschirschky not to restrain Austria-Hungary. In passing on Wilhelm's message, Bethmann Hollweg excluded the parts wherein the Emperor told the Austro-Hungarians not to go to war. Jagow told his diplomats to disregard Wilhelm's peace offer, and continue to press for war. General Falkenhayn told Wilhelm he "no longer had control of the affair in his own hands". Falkenhayn went on to imply that the military would stage a coup d'état, and depose Wilhelm in favour of his son the hawkish

2240: 1386:

the Serbs only moral support while Nicholas II told the Serbs to simply accept the ultimatum, and hope that international opinion would force the Austro-Hungarians to change their minds. The militaries of both Russia and France were not prepared for a war against Germany in 1914, hence the pressure on Serbia to accede to the terms of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. Because the Austro-Hungarians had repeatedly promised the Russians that nothing was planned against Serbia that summer, their harsh ultimatum did not do much to antagonise Sazonov.

735: 2016: 811:. Russia was working toward an alliance of Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro against Austria-Hungary, dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, and the movement of borders from east to west. To break up this effort, Germany and Austria-Hungary should first ally with Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. To this letter was added a post-script on the Sarajevo Outrage and its impact. Finally, Emperor Franz Joseph added his own letter to Emperor Wilhelm II which closed with advocating the end of Serbia as a political power factor. 1979:, who insisted partial mobilisation was not technically possible, and that, given Germany's attitude, a general mobilisation was required. Nicholas at first ordered a general mobilisation, and then after receiving an appeal for peace from Wilhelm cancelled it as a sign of his good faith. The cancellation of general mobilisation led to furious protests from Sukhomlinov, Sazonov, and Russia's top generals, all urging Nicholas to reinstate it. Under strong pressure, Nicholas gave in and ordered a general mobilisation on 30 July. 1286: 1975:

St. Petersburg informed Nicholas that Germany would mobilise if Russia did not cease all military preparations at once, including those it had previously assured Russia it did not see as a threat against Germany or cause for German mobilisation. The German military attaché in Russia reported that the Russians appeared to be acting out of fear but "without aggressive intentions". At the same time, Nicholas's order for a partial mobilisation met with protests from both Sazonov and the Russian War Minister General

1455: 425: 2080: 822:, and another letter by Franz Joseph stating that the only way of preventing the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy was "to eliminate Serbia" as a state. The letter by Franz Joseph was based closely upon Berchtold's 14 June memo calling for the destruction of Serbia. Franz Joseph's letter explicitly stated that the decision for war against Serbia had been made before the assassination of the Archduke, and that the events of Sarajevo only confirmed the already pre-existing need for a war against Serbia. 1966:

Emperor. After Berchtold had departed for his audience with Emperor Franz Joseph on the afternoon of Thursday, 30 July, Berchtold's advisors Forgach and Hoyos informed Bethmann Hollweg that he should not expect a reply until the following morning (Friday, 31 July), as Tisza, who would not be in Vienna until then, must be consulted. Bethmann spent the remainder of the day, 30 July, continuing to impress Vienna with the need for negotiations and to inform the Powers of his mediation efforts.

1782:, saw Grey's conference offer as "the only possibility of avoiding a general war" and hoped "to get full satisfaction for Austria, as Serbia would be more apt to give in to the pressure of the Powers and to submit to their united will than to the threats of Austria". Tyrrell relayed Grey's view that if Serbia were invaded, "world war would be inevitable". Lichnowsky in his dispatch to Berlin offered "an urgent warning against believing any further in the possibility of localisation ". When 1870:'s notes, Wilhelm "expressed himself without reserve regarding Bethmann's incompetence" in foreign affairs. Bethmann Hollweg suggested that Germany sign a naval agreement with Britain limiting the size of the High Seas Fleet to keep Britain out of the war. Tirpitz went on to record: "The Kaiser informed the company that the Chancellor had proposed that in order to keep England neutral, we should sacrifice the German fleet for an agreement with England, which he, the Kaiser had refused." 1245: 2509:

Russia, possibly also France ... Not only have Anglo-German relations so improved that Germany feels that she need no longer feel fear a directly hostile attitude by Britain, but above all, Britain at this moment is anything but anxious for war, and has no wish whatever to pull chestnuts out of the fire for Serbia, or in the last instance, Russia ... In general, then, it appears from all this that the political constellation is as favourable for us as it could possibly be."

511: 939: 2797:"The refusal of every exchange of views with St. Petersburg would be a serious mistake, for it provokes Russia precisely to armed interference, which Austria is primarily concerned in avoiding. We are ready, to be sure, to fulfill our obligations as an ally, but we must refuse to allow ourselves to be drawn by Vienna into a world conflagration frivolously and in disregard of our advice. Please say this to Count Berchtold at once with all emphasis and with great seriousness." 1398:

with the crisis, the German Foreign Ministry flatly stated the Emperor should continue his cruise because "everything must be done to ensure that he does not interfere in things with his pacifist ideas". At the same time, a message was sent to Berchtold from his ambassador in Berlin reminding him "Here every delay in the beginning of war operations is regarded as signifying the danger that foreign powers might interfere. We are urgently advised to proceed without delay."

1023:

German Ambassador reported that "Count Berchtold appeared to hope that Serbia would not agree to the Austro-Hungarian demands, as a mere diplomatic victory would put the country here again in a stagnant mood". Count Hoyos told a German diplomat "that the demands were really of such a nature that no nation that still possessed self-respect and dignity could possibly accept them". On 11 July, German Foreign Office wanted to know if they should send a telegram congratulating

2554:"The administration will, immediately upon the presentation of the Austrian note at Belgrade, initiate diplomatic action with the Powers, in the interest of the localization of the war. It will claim that that Austrian action has been just as much of a surprise to it as to the other Powers, pointing out the fact that the Emperor is on his northern journey, and that the Prussian Minister of War, as well as the Chief of the Grand General Staff are away on leave of absence." 2284: 679: 1193:

presented—Jagow asked all German ambassadors (except for Austria-Hungary) to pass along support for Austro-Hungarian action against Serbia. Jagow realised that this statement was incompatible with his claims of ignorance, thus leading to a hasty second dispatch claiming total ignorance of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, but threatening "incalculable consequences" if any power tried to stop Austria-Hungary from attacking Serbia if the ultimatum were rejected.

999:"stated most emphatically that Berlin expected the Monarchy to act against Serbia, and that Germany would not understand it, if... the present opportunity were allowed to go by... without a blow struck". At the same meeting, Tschirschky told Berchtold, "if we compromised or bargained with Serbia, Germany would interpret this as a confession of weakness, which could not be without effect on our position in the Triple Alliance and on Germany's future policy". 611: 1874:

Germany to reject it. Bethmann Hollweg asked that Austria-Hungary at least make an effort to show some interest in the British peace plan. In an effort to sabotage Bethmann Hollweg's offer (which though not sincere was regarded as dangerous in case it might succeed), Moltke asked Vienna not to consider the British peace plan, and instead to order general mobilisation and activate War Plan R, the Austro-Hungarian war plan for a war against Russia.

1918:

Bethmann Hollweg suddenly changed course, writing to Tschirschky that Austria-Hungary should accept mediation. Five minutes later, Bethmann Hollweg asked Vienna in a second message to stop "refusing any exchange of views with Russia", and warned that they "must refuse to allow Vienna to draw us into a world conflagration frivolously and without regard to our advice". In another message, Bethmann Hollweg wrote "To avert a general catastrophe or

2007:") the two proclaimed their desire for peace, and each attempted to get the other to back down. Nicholas desired that Russia's mobilisation be only against the Austro-Hungarian border, in the hopes of preventing war with Germany. However, his army had no contingency plans for a partial mobilisation, and on 31 July 1914 Nicholas took the fateful step of confirming the order for general mobilisation, despite being strongly counseled against it. 2160:. Cambon's account stated: "I felt the battle was won. Everything was settled. In truth a great country does not wage war by halves. Once it decided to fight the war at sea it would necessarily be led into fighting it on land as well." Within the British Cabinet, the widespread feeling that Germany would soon violate Belgium's neutrality and destroy France as a power led to the increasing acceptance that Britain would be forced to intervene. 995:

about whether Austria-Hungary should just launch an unprovoked attack or issue an ultimatum to Serbia with demands so stringent that it was bound to be rejected. Stürgkh warned Tisza that if Austria-Hungary did not launch a war, its "policy of hesitation and weakness" would cause Germany to abandon Austria-Hungary as an ally. All present, except Tisza, finally agreed that Austria-Hungary should present an ultimatum designed to be rejected.

1778:, as well as Grey. Lichnowsky wrote that the King desired that "British-German joint participation, with the assistance of France and Italy, may be successful in mastering in the interest of peace the present extremely serious situation". At 4:25 p.m. on 28 July, Lichnowsky reported to Berlin that "since appearance of Austrian demands nobody here believes in possibility of localising conflict". Nicolson, and the Private Secretary to Grey, 1124:

Austria-Hungary look weak. On 18 July, to reassure Stolberg, Count Hoyos promised him that the demands in the draft text of the ultimatum "were really of such a nature that no nation that still possessed self-respect and dignity could possibly accept them". The same day, in response to rumours about an Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, Serbian Prime Minister Pašić stated that he would not accept any measures compromising on Serbian sovereignty.

1498:(emphasis in the original)." When the German ambassador in Belgrade reported how sad the Serbian people were with being faced with the choice of either war or national humiliation, Wilhelm wrote on the margins of the report: "Bravo! One would not have believed it of the Viennese!... How hollow the whole Serbian power is proving itself to be; thus, it is seen to be with all the Slav nations! Just tread hard on the heels of that rabble!" 2806:"If Austria refuses all negotiations, we are face to face with a conflagration in which England will be against us ... under these circumstances we must urgently and emphatically urge upon the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the adoption of mediation in accordance with the above honourable conditions. The responsibility for the consequences which would otherwise follow would be, for Austria and us, an uncommonly heavy one." 2902:"One needs only to read this speech through carefully to learn the reason of England's intervention in the war. Amid all his beautiful phrases about England's honour and England's obligations, we find it over and over again expressed that England's interests—its own interests—called for participation in war, for it was not in England's interests that a victorious, and therefore stronger, Germany should emerge from the war." 1094:". That same day, Conrad, the Chief of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army, told Berchtold that due to his desire to get the summer harvest in, the earliest that Austria could declare war was 25 July. At the same time, the visit of the French President and Premier to St. Petersburg meant that it was considered undesirable to present the ultimatum until the visit was over. The ultimatum, officially called a 2527:"Information reaches me that the Austro-Hungarian government at the conclusion of the inquiry intends to make certain demands on Belgrade ... It would seem to me desirable that at the present moment, before a final decision on the matter, the Vienna Cabinet should be informed how Russia would react to the fact of Austria's presenting demands to Serbia such as would be unacceptable to the dignity of that state" 502:

sickened them. Both were arrested. Within 45 minutes of the shooting, Princip began telling his story to interrogators. The next day, based on the interrogations of the two assassins, Potiorek telegraphed Vienna to announce that Princip and Čabrinović had conspired in Belgrade with others to obtain bombs, revolvers, and money to kill the Archduke. A police dragnet quickly caught most of the conspirators.

1795: 1516: 799: 695:

mobilisation against Serbia, while Berchtold wanted to ensure public opinion be prepared first. On 30 June, Berchtold suggested they demand Serbia disband anti-Austro-Hungarian societies and relieve certain officials of their responsibilities, but Conrad continued to argue for the use of force. On 1 July, Berchtold told Conrad that Emperor Franz Joseph would await the criminal inquiry results, that

1402: 1051:. On that day, Tschirschky reported to Berlin that Austria-Hungary would present an ultimatum "which would almost certainly be rejected and should result in war". That same day, Jagow sent instructions to Prince Lichnowsky stating Germany had decided to do everything within its power to cause an Austro-Serbian war, but Germany must avoid the impression "that we were egging Austria on to war". 1584:, who was especially trusted by Tsar Nicholas II, argued that Russia was not militarily ready for a conflict with Germany and Austria-Hungary, and that it could achieve its objectives with a cautious approach. Sazonov stated that Russia had usually been moderate in its foreign policy, but that Germany had viewed its moderation as weakness to be taken advantage of. The Russian War Minister 1181:, in case of a general war. Riezler's diary states Bethmann Hollweg saying on 20 July that Russia with its "growing demands and tremendous dynamic power would be impossible to repel in a few years, especially if the present European constellation continues to exist". Riezler ended his diary noting that Bethmann Hollweg was "determined and taciturn", and quoted former Foreign Minister 1200:, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, reported that Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov warned that Germany "must reckon with Europe" if she supported an Austro-Hungarian attack against Serbia, Wilhelm wrote on the margin of Pourtalès's dispatch "No! Russia, yes!" In supporting an Austro-Hungarian war with Serbia, Germany's leaders knew the risks of a general war. As historian 1490:

Tschirschky, calling Austria-Hungary "weak" for not being aggressive enough in the Balkans, and writing that alteration in the power in the Balkans "has got to come. Austria must become predominant in the Balkans as compared to the little ones, and at Russia’s expense." Szögyény reported to Vienna that "here, it is generally taken for granted that if Serbia rejects our demands,

1706:

then Britain would have no other choice but to side with France and Russia. The French Foreign Minister informed the German ambassador in Paris, Schoen, that France was anxious to find a peaceful solution, and was prepared to do his utmost with his influence in St. Petersburg if Germany should "counsel moderation in Vienna, since Serbia had fulfilled nearly every point".

1007:

ever increasing nightmare to us". Bethmann Hollweg reasoned the "existing order was lifeless and void of ideas" and that such a war could only be welcomed as a blessing to Germany. Such fears about Russia led Bethmann Hollweg to credit Anglo-Russian naval talks in May 1914 as the beginning of an "encirclement" policy against Germany that could only be broken through war.

2573:"Since we want to localize the conflict between Austria and Serbia, we must not have the world alarmed by His Majesty’s returning prematurely; on the other hand, His Majesty must be within reach, in case unpredictable developments should force us to take important decisions, such as mobilization. His Majesty might perhaps spend the last days of his cruise in the Baltic." 662:, saw it as an opportunity to destroy Serbia's ability to interfere in Bosnia. Moreover, the Archduke, who had been a voice for peace in the previous years, had now been removed from the discussions. The assassination combined with existing instability in the Balkans sent deep shockwaves through the Austro-Hungarian elite. The murder has been described by historian 1067:, the Bavarian Minister in Berlin, that "a moment so favourable from the military point of view might never occur again". Moltke argued that due to the alleged superiority of German weaponry and training, combined with the recent change in the French Army from a two-year to a three-year period of service, Germany could easily defeat both France and Russia in 1914. 2545:"We do not know the facts. The German government clearly do know. They know what the Austrian government is going to demand ... and I think we may say with some assurance that they had expressed approval of those demands and promised support should dangerous complications ensure ... the German government did not believe that there is any danger of war." 1433:

which the Austro-Hungarians refused to do as they lacked any conclusive as opposed to circumstantial evidence. Several times, the Austro-Hungarians refused Russian requests to extend the deadline, despite warnings that an Austro-Serbian war could easily cause a world war. Sazonov accused the Austro-Hungarian ambassador of intending to go to war with Serbia.

1635:

Crucially, the French had provided their clear support for their Russian allies for a robust response in their recent state visit just days before. Also in the background was Russian anxiety of the future of the Turkish straits—"where Russian control of the Balkans would place Saint Petersburg in a far better position to prevent unwanted intrusions on the

2871:"I thank you heartily for your mediation which begins to give one hope that all may yet end peacefully. It is technically impossible to our military preparations which were obligatory owing to Austria's mobilization. We are far from wishing war. As long as the negotiations with Austria on Serbia's account are taking place my troops shall not make any 2132:

Russia to back out, too." Since no such offer was actually given, Wilhelm's acceptance of the proposal was met with confusion in London; no deal was completed, and King George responded by writing "I think there must be some misunderstanding." After receiving King George's telegram, Wilhelm told Moltke to proceed with the invasion of Luxembourg.

1011:

neutral. On 10 July, Berchtold told Tschirschky he would present Serbia with an ultimatum containing "unacceptable demands" as the best way of causing war, but "chief care" would be taken about how to present these "unacceptable demands". In response, Wilhelm wrote angrily on the margins of Tschirschky's dispatch "They had time enough for that!"

1565: 930:

the Germans anticipated that their support would mean the war would be a localised affair between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. This would be particularly true if Austria-Hungary moved quickly, "while the other European powers were still disgusted over the assassinations and therefore likely to be sympathetic to any action Austria-Hungary took".

1885:"Germany will mobilise" against Russia, were Austria-Hungary to do the same. Count Szogyeny reported to Vienna that the German government "regarded the possibility of a European conflict with the most complete calm", and that the Germans were only concerned about the possibility of Italy not honouring the Triple Alliance. 1863:

to Germany, and asked that Germany mobilise to deter Russia from supporting Serbia. In response to the Austro-Hungarian message, Jagow told a Russian diplomat that "Germany was likewise obliged to mobilise ; there was therefore nothing left to be done and the diplomatists must now leave the talking to the cannon."

2030:

Britain would in all likelihood not remain neutral, he launched a vehement rant, denouncing Britain as "that filthy nation of grocers." That same day, the anti-Russian German-Ottoman alliance was signed. Moltke passed on a message to Conrad asking for general mobilisation as a prelude to a war against Russia.

333:. A complex web of alliances, coupled with the miscalculations of numerous political and military leaders (who either regarded war as in their best interests, or felt that a general war would not occur), resulted in an outbreak of hostilities amongst most of the major European states by early August 1914. 2270:

Domestically, the Liberal Cabinet was split and in the event that war was not declared the government would fall as Asquith, Grey, and Churchill made it clear they would resign. In that event, the existing Liberal government would lose control of Parliament and the pro-war Conservatives would come to

2262:

Rather, Britain's support for France was decisive. Grey argued that the naval agreements with France (although they had not been approved by the Cabinet) created a moral obligation vis-à-vis Britain and France. British Foreign office mandarin Eyre Crowe stated: "Should the war come, and England stand

2063:

The German ambassador in Paris delivered an ultimatum to Viviani telling him they had to either bring the Russians to stop their mobilisation, or 'accept responsibility for bringing on a conflict'. Viviani did have the option of threatening the Tsar, that France would no longer be an ally, if Russia

1965:

These early-morning telegrams from Bethmann Hollweg were given by Tschirschky to Berchtold while the two men lunched on Thursday, 30 July. Tschirschky reported to Berlin that Berchtold was "pale and silent" as the Bethmann telegrams were read twice, before stating that he would take the matter to the

1926:

noted, only when Bethmann Hollweg received a clear warning that Britain would intervene in a war did he begin to apply pressure on Austria-Hungary for peace. Bethmann Hollweg's advice was rejected by Austria-Hungary as being too late. Berchtold told the German ambassador that he would need a few days

1905:

At another meeting with Goschen late on the night of 29 July, Bethmann Hollweg stated that Germany would soon be going to war against France and Russia, and sought to ensure British neutrality by promising him that Germany would not annex parts of metropolitan France (Bethmann Hollweg refused to make

1884:

for Germany to mobilise likewise. In the same message, Moltke expressed hope that the British peace plan would fail, and announced his belief that the only way of saving Austria-Hungary as a power was through a general European war. In the evening, Moltke repeated his request, and promised again that

1862:

On 29 July, Wilhelm sent a telegram to Nicholas stating "I think a direct understanding between your government and Vienna possible and desirable". The Austro-Hungarian General Staff sent a note to Jagow complaining about his statement that he did not regard a Russian partial mobilisation as a threat

1816:

Shortly after declaring war on Serbia, Conrad informed the Germans that Austria-Hungary could not start operations until 12 August, to much fury in Berlin. Bavarian diplomat Count Lerchenfeld reported to Munich: "The Imperial government is thus put into the extraordinarily difficult position of being

1739:

had denounced Austria-Hungary for declaring war on Serbia and ordered street demonstrations to protest Germany's actions in supporting Austria-Hungary. However, Bethmann Hollweg put great faith in the private promises he received from SPD leaders that they would support the government if Germany were

1432:

Sazonov sent a message to all of the great powers asking them to pressure Austria-Hungary to extend the deadline of the ultimatum. Sazonov asked the Austro-Hungarian government to back its claims of Serbian complicity in the killing of Franz Ferdinand by releasing the results of its official inquiry,

1397:

recalled that when the German government heard a misleading report that Serbia had accepted the ultimatum, there was "disappointment", but "tremendous joy" when it learned that the Serbs had not accepted all of the Austro-Hungarian terms. When Ballin suggested Wilhelm end his North Sea cruise to deal

1358:

Instructions were given to the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade, Baron von Gieslingen, whereby if "no unconditionally positive answer" was received from the Serbian government within "the 48-hour deadline" of the ultimatum ("as measured from the day and hour of your announcing it"), the Minister

1276:

argues from this episode that the Germans believed Russia were expressing greater verbal support for Serbia than they would actually provide, in order to pressure Germany and Austria-Hungary to accept some Russian demands in negotiation. Meanwhile, Berlin was downplaying its actual strong support for

1271:

On 21 July, the Russian Foreign Minister warned the German ambassador to Russia that "Russia would not be able to tolerate Austria-Hungary's using threatening language to Serbia or taking military measures". The leaders in Berlin discounted this threat of war. Jagow noted "there is certain to be some

1207:

On 22 July, before the ultimatum was delivered, the Austro-Hungarian government asked that the German government deliver the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war when the ultimatum expired on 25 July. Jagow refused, stating: "Our standpoint has to be that the quarrel with Serbia is an Austro-Hungarian

1148:

Due to Austria-Hungary's delay in writing the ultimatum, the element of surprise that Germany had counted upon in the war against Serbia was lost. Instead, the strategy of "localisation" was adopted, which meant that when the Austro-Serbian war began, Germany would pressure other powers not to become

1062:

Jagow's belief that the summer of 1914 was the best time for Germany to go to war was widely shared in the German government. Many German officials believed that the "Teuton race" and "Slav race" were destined to fight each other in a terrible "race war" for the domination of Europe, and that now was

1054:

Jagow described a war against Serbia as Austria-Hungary's last chance at "political rehabilitation". He stated that under no circumstances did he want a peaceful solution, and though he did not want a preventive war, he would not "jib at the post" if such a war came, because Germany was ready for it,

929:

On the other hand, the military thought that if Russia did intervene then St Petersburg clearly desired war and now would be a better time to fight, when Germany had a guaranteed ally in Austria-Hungary, Russia was not ready and Europe was sympathetic to them. On balance, at this point in the crisis,

825:

After meeting with Szögyény on 5 July, the German Emperor informed him that his state could "count on Germany's full support", even if "grave European complications" ensued, and that Austria-Hungary "ought to march at once" against Serbia. He added that "in any case, as things stood today, Russia was

583:

Léon Descos, French Ambassador to Belgrade, on 1 July reported that a Serbian military party was involved in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, that Serbia was in the wrong, and that Russian Ambassador Hartwig was in constant conversations with Regent Alexander to guide Serbia through this crisis.

2144:

At the same time as the invasion of Luxembourg, on 1 August 1914 Germany declared war on Russia. When presenting his declaration of war, the German ambassador accidentally gave the Russians both copies of the declaration of war, one which claimed that Russia refused to reply to Germany and the other

1858:

In London, Churchill wrote to George V that the Royal Navy had been placed "upon a preparatory precautionary basis". Churchill went on to write that "it is needless to emphasise that these measures in no way prejudice an intervention or take for granted that the peace of the great powers will not be

1722:

for war falls to the ground". Wilhelm noted that Serbia had made "a capitulation of the most humiliating kind", that "the few reservations Serbia has made with respect to certain points can in my opinion surely be cleared up by negotiation", and acting independently of Grey, made a similar "Stop in

1705:

On 27 July, Grey sent another peace proposal through Prince Lichnowsky asking for Germany to use its influence on Austria-Hungary to save the peace. Grey warned Lichnowsky that if Austria-Hungary continued with its aggression against Serbia, and Germany with its policy of supporting Austria-Hungary,

1489:

Also on 24 July, after Berchtold met with the Russian chargé d'affaires, furious complaints were prompted from Berlin, warning that Austria-Hungary should not engage in talks with any other powers in case a compromise might be worked out. That same day, Wilhelm wrote on the margin of a dispatch from

1385:

visited the Russian legation to "express his despair over the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, compliance with which he regards as an absolute impossibility for a state which had the slightest regard for its dignity". Both the Regent and Pašić asked for Russian support, which was refused. Sazonov offered

1144:

On 19 July, the Crown Council in Vienna decided upon the wording of the ultimatum to be presented to Serbia on 23 July. The extent of German influence was evident when Jagow ordered Berchtold to delay the ultimatum by an hour to make sure that the French President and Premier were at sea after their

1055:

and that Russia "fundamentally was not". Believing that Russia and Germany were destined to fight each other, Jagow believed that now was the best time for this inevitable war, because "in a few years Russia... will be ready. Then she will crush us on land by weight of numbers, and she will have her

962:

On 7 July, the Council of Joint Ministers debated Austria-Hungary's course of action. The most hawkish on the Council considered a surprise attack on Serbia. Tisza persuaded the Council that demands should be placed on Serbia before mobilisation to provide a proper "juridical basis for a declaration

921:

to the world. Unlike the three earlier cases dating from 1912 when Austria-Hungary had asked for German diplomatic support for a war against Serbia, this time it was felt that political conditions for such a war now existed. At this time, the German military supported the idea of an Austro-Hungarian

579:

was unwilling to court unpopularity by being seen to bow down to Austria-Hungary. If he had actually warned the Austro-Hungarians in advance of the plot against Franz Ferdinand, Pašić was probably concerned about his chances at the polls and perhaps his life being endangered if such news leaked out.

2760:

If therefore, Austria should reject all mediation, we are faced with a conflagration in which Britain would be against us, Italy and Romania in all probability not with us. We should be two Powers against Four. With Britain an enemy, the weight of the operations would fall on Germany ... Under

2219:

Goschen's telegrams on 4 August to Grey never reached London, so it was unclear whether a state of war existed between Britain and Germany until the expiry of the ultimatum at midnight, Berlin time. On 4 August 1914 Britain declared war on Germany. The British government expected a limited conflict

2215:

At 7 p.m. on 4 August, Goschen delivered Britain's ultimatum to Jagow, demanding a commitment by midnight that evening (within five hours) to go no further with Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality. Jagow rejected the British ultimatum and Goschen demanded his passports and requested a private

1957:

After learning of the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia, Bethmann Hollweg sent off the Kaiser's 'pledge plan' to Vienna on the evening of 28 July, with instructions to Tschirschky (the German ambassador in Vienna) to express himself "emphatically" to Berchtold and to "wire reply". After

1752:

Later, on 27 July, Austria-Hungary started to complete the preparations for war. That same day, Jagow informed Szögyény that he was only pretending to take up the British offers of mediation in order to ensure British neutrality, but had no intention of stopping the war. Szögyény reported "in order

1743:

On 27 July, Wilhelm ended his cruise in the North Sea and returned to Germany. Wilhelm landed at Cuxhaven (Kiel) departing on 25 July at 6 p.m. despite the objections of his chancellor. The next afternoon, the order to disperse the British Fleet and dismiss British reservists was rescinded, putting

1734:

Bethmann Hollweg mentioned two favourable conditions for war in his telegram to Vienna: that Russia be made to appear the aggressor forcing a reluctant Germany into war, and that Britain be kept neutral. The necessity of making Russia appear the aggressor was the greater concern to Bethmann Hollweg

1683:

told Sazonov to reject Grey's offer of a summit in London, stating that the proposed conference was "too unwieldy", and if Russia were serious about saving the peace, they would negotiate directly with the Austro-Hungarians. Sazonov replied that he was willing to see Serbia accept almost all of the

1389:

Confronted with the ultimatum and the lack of support from other European powers, the Serbian Cabinet worked out a compromise. Historians disagree on the extent to which the Serbs genuinely compromised. Some historians argue Serbia accepted all of the terms of the ultimatum except for the demand in

1293:

The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum demanded that Serbia formally and publicly condemn the "dangerous propaganda" against Austria-Hungary, the ultimate aim of which, it claimed, is to "detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it". Moreover, Belgrade should "suppress by every means this criminal

1006:

that "action against Serbia can lead to a world war" and that such a "leap in the dark" was justified by the international situation. Bethmann Hollweg explained to Riezler that Germany was "completely paralysed" and that the "future belongs to Russia which is growing and growing, and is becoming an

925:

The thinking was that, as Austria-Hungary was Germany's only ally, if its prestige was not restored then its position in the Balkans might be irreparably damaged, encouraging further irredentism by Serbia and Romania. The benefits were clear, but there were risks, namely that Russia would intervene

833:

After his meeting, Szögyény reported to Vienna that Wilhelm "would regret it if we let this present chance, which was so favourable for us, go by without utilising it". This so-called "blank cheque" of German support up to and including war was to be the main determining factor in Austro-Hungarian

768:

Ambassador in Berlin wrote back to his king that the German Army wanted Austria-Hungary to attack Serbia as quickly as possible because the time was right for a general war since Germany was more prepared for war than either Russia or France. On 3 July, the Saxon military attaché in Berlin reported

710:

Opinion in Vienna was divided; Berchtold now agreed with Conrad and supported war, as did Franz Joseph, although he insisted German support was a prerequisite, while Tisza was opposed; he correctly predicted war with Serbia would trigger one with Russia and hence a general European war. The pro-war

2725:

deceptions were revealed. The Kaiser's first words to him were suitably brusque: "How did it all happen?" Rather than attempt to explain, the Chancellor offered his resignation by way of apology. Wilhelm refused to accept it, muttering furiously, "You've made this stew, Now you're going to eat it!"

2059:

On 31 July, the Austro-Hungarian Crown Council continued the war against Serbia, despite the Russian mobilisation at their border. Wilhelm cabled his concerns to Nicholas about the Russian mobilisation, which was threatening Austria-Hungary. Nicholas responded that Russian general mobilisation was

2029:

In the evening of Thursday, 30 July, with Berlin's strenuous efforts to persuade Vienna to some form of negotiation, and with Bethmann Hollweg still awaiting a response from Berchtold, Russia gave the order for full mobilisation. When Wilhelm learned that, were Germany to attack France and Russia,

1974:

On 30 July, Nicholas sent a message to Wilhelm informing him that he had ordered partial mobilisation against Austria-Hungary, and asking him to do his utmost for a peaceful solution. Upon hearing of Russia's partial mobilisation, Wilhelm wrote: "Then I must mobilise too." The German ambassador in

1913:

commented that Germany had "made up her mind" to go to war. Germany's policy was to reveal to Britain her war aims in hope that a statement might be reached that would ensure British neutrality. Instead, Bethmann Hollweg's move had the opposite effect, since it was now clear to London that Germany

1877:

At a meeting with Bethmann Hollweg late on 29 July, Falkenhayn and Moltke both again demanded that Germany use Russian partial mobilisation as an excuse to go to war. Bethmann Hollweg again insisted that Germany must wait for Russian general mobilisation as it was the only way of ensuring that the

1757:

opposed to consideration of them and is only passing them on out of deference to the British request" (emphasis in the original). Jagow went on to state he was "absolutely against taking account of the British wish", because "the German government point of view was that it was at the moment of the

1701:

In Vienna, Conrad von Hötzendorf and Berchtold disagreed about when Austria-Hungary should begin operations. Conrad wanted to wait until a military offensive was ready, which he estimated at 12 August, while Berchtold thought that the diplomatic window for a retaliatory strike would have passed by

1675:

On 26 July, Berchtold rejected Grey's mediation offer, and wrote that if a localisation should not prove possible, then the Dual Monarchy was counting, "with gratitude", on Germany's support "if a struggle against another adversary is forced on us". That same day, General Helmuth von Moltke sent a

1537:

On 24 July, the Serbian government, expecting an Austro-Hungarian declaration of war the next day, mobilised while Austria-Hungary broke off diplomatic relations. The British ambassador to Austria-Hungary reported to London: "War is thought imminent. Wildest enthusiasm prevails in Vienna." Asquith

1481:

On 24 July, Zimmermann sent out a dispatch to all German ambassadors (except for Austria-Hungary) telling them to inform their host governments that Germany had no advance knowledge whatsoever of the ultimatum. That same day, Grey, who was worried by the tone of the ultimatum (which he felt seemed

1354:

The Austro-Hungarian government, concluding the document, was expecting the reply of the Serbian government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, 25 July 1914. An appendix listed various details from "the crime investigation undertaken at court in Sarajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his

1188:

On 21 July, the German government told Cambon, the French Ambassador in Berlin, and Bronewski, the Russian chargé d'affaires, that Germany had no knowledge of what Austro-Hungarian policy was towards Serbia. In private, Zimmermann wrote that the German government "entirely agreed that Austria must

1070:

On 13 July, Austro-Hungarian investigators into the assassination of Franz Ferdinand reported to Berchtold that there was little evidence that the Serbian government had abetted the murders. This report disappointed Berchtold, as it meant there was little evidence to support his pretext of Serbian

1022:

On 9 July, Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, was told by British Foreign Secretary Grey that he "saw no reason for taking a pessimistic view of the situation". Despite Tisza's opposition, Berchtold had ordered his officials to start drafting an ultimatum to Serbia on 10 July. The

994:

At that meeting of the Crown Council, all involved were in full favour of war except Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister. Tisza warned that any attack on Serbia "would, as far as can humanly be foreseen, lead to an intervention by Russia and hence a world war". The rest of the participants debated

977:

Nevertheless, having decided upon war with German support, Austria-Hungary was slow to act publicly, and did not deliver the ultimatum until 23 July, some three weeks after the assassinations on 28 June. Thus Austria-Hungary lost the reflex sympathies attendant to the Sarajevo murders and gave the

714:

Conrad continued to push for war, but worried what attitude Germany would take; Berchtold replied that he planned to inquire of Germany what its position was. Berchtold used his memo of 14 June 1914, proposing Serbia's destruction, as the basis for the document that would be used to solicit German

2055:

Upon arriving back in France, the French Premier Viviani sent a message to St. Petersburg asking that Russia not take any action that would offer Germany an excuse to mobilise. French troops were ordered to pull back 10 km (6.2 mi) from the German frontier as a sign of France's peaceful

2042:

Russia as the guilty party" behind the war. In the same meeting, the Chancellor stated that if it appeared to public opinion that Russian mobilisation had forced Germany into a war, then there was "nothing to fear" from the Social Democrats. Bethmann Hollweg added, "There will be no question of a

2033:

At 9:00 p.m. on 30 July, Bethmann Hollweg gave in to Moltke and Falkenhayn's repeated demands and promised them that Germany would issue a proclamation of "imminent danger of war" at noon the next day regardless of whether Russia began a general mobilisation or not. Bethmann Hollweg was overjoyed

1604:

Despite the fact that it had no alliance with Serbia, the Council agreed to a secret partial mobilisation of over one million men of the Russian Army and the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. It is worth stressing, since this is a cause of some confusion in general narratives of the war, that this was

1469:

Starting 23 July, all of Germany's leaders returned secretly to Berlin to deal with the crisis. A division opened between those led by Bethmann Hollweg who wanted to see what would happen following an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia, and the military led by Moltke and Falkenhayn, who urged that

1445:

At the same time, Grey met with opposition from the Russian ambassador who warned that a conference with Germany, Italy, France, and Britain serving as the mediators between Austria-Hungary and Russia would break apart the informal Triple Entente. Sazonov accepted Grey's proposal for a conference

1123:

of the German Embassy that though he thought his ultimatum would probably be rejected, he was still worried that it was possible for the Serbs to accept it, and wanted more time to re-phrase the document. Stolberg reported back to Berlin that he had told Berchtold that a lack of action would make

981:

The Council agreed on putting harsh demands on Serbia, but could not reach consensus on how harsh. Except for Tisza, the Council intended to make such harsh demands that their rejection would be very probable. Tisza held out for demands that, while harsh, would not appear impossible to meet. Both

969:

has emphasised the role of Austria-Hungary in starting the war. Convinced Serbian nationalism and Russian Balkan ambitions were disintegrating the Empire, Austria-Hungary hoped for a limited war against Serbia and that strong German support would force Russia to keep out of the war and weaken its

871:

On 6 July, Bethmann Hollweg and Zimmermann further repeated the promise of Wilhelm's "blank cheque" at a conference with Szögyény. Although Bethmann Hollweg stated that the decision for war or peace was in Austria's hands, he strongly advised that Austria-Hungary choose the former. That same day,

1761:

In London, Grey told a meeting of the British Cabinet that they now had to decide whether to choose neutrality if war did come or to enter the conflict. While the Cabinet was still undecided about what course to choose, Churchill put the British fleet on alert. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador in

1753:

to avoid a misunderstanding" that Jagow had promised him that "the German government assured Austria in the most binding fashion that it in no way identifies itself with the proposal , which may very shortly be brought to Your Excellency 's notice by the German government: it is, on the contrary

1550:

On 25 July, Emperor Franz Joseph signed a mobilisation order for eight army corps to begin operations against Serbia on 28 July; the Austro-Hungarian ambassador Giesl left Belgrade. The caretaker government in Paris cancelled all leave for French troops as of 26 July, and ordered the majority of

1441:

On 23 July, Grey made a mediation offer with a promise that his government would attempt to influence Russia to influence Serbia, and Germany to influence Austria-Hungary as the best way of stopping a general war. Wilhelm wrote on the margins of Lichnowsky's dispatch containing Grey's offer that

1035:

On 12 July, Szögyény reported from Berlin that everyone in the German government wanted to see Austria-Hungary declare war on Serbia at once, and were tired of Austro-Hungarian indecision about whether to choose war or peace. On 12 July, Berchtold showed Tschirschky the contents of his ultimatum

694:

Between 29 June to 1 July, Berchtold and Conrad debated an appropriate response to the events in Sarajevo; Conrad wanted to declare war on Serbia as soon as possible, stating: "If you have a poisonous adder at your heel, you stamp on its head, you don't wait for the bite." He advocated immediate

562:

Austria-Hungary immediately undertook a criminal investigation. Ilić and five of the assassins were promptly arrested and interviewed by an investigating judge. The three young Bosnian assassins who had travelled to Serbia stated that Tankosić had directly and indirectly supported them. In fact,

2131:

would have given me a different answer!" Instead, it was decided to mobilise as planned and cancel the planned invasion of Luxembourg. Once mobilisation was complete, the army would redeploy to the east. In response to Wilhelm's order, a dejected Moltke complained that "Now, it only remains for

2046:

Later that day, Bethmann Hollweg sent a message to the German ambassador to Vienna increasing pressure to accept the halt-in-Belgrade proposal. Bethmann Hollweg could not go to war in support of Austro-Hungarian intransigence under such circumstances. But shortly afterwards, "as soon as news of

1917:

After Goschen left the meeting, Bethmann Hollweg received a message from Prince Lichnowsky saying that Grey was most anxious for a four power conference, but that if Germany attacked France, then Britain would have no other choice but to intervene in the war. In response to the British warning,

1671:

that in his opinion "neither London, nor Paris, nor St. Petersburg wants a war". On the same day, Russia announced that it could not remain "uninterested" if Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia. Both the French and Russian ambassadors rejected four-power mediation, and instead proposed direct talks

1592:

stated that Russia was not ready for a war against either Austria-Hungary or Germany, but that a firmer diplomatic stance was necessary. The Russian government again asked Austria-Hungary to extend the deadline, and advised the Serbs to offer as little resistance as possible to the terms of the

1160:

Though Jagow's pretence was not widely believed, it was still believed at the time that Germany was aiming for peace, and could restrain Austria-Hungary. General von Moltke of the German General Staff again strongly approved of the idea of an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia as the best way of

1010:

On 9 July, Berchtold advised the Emperor that he would present Belgrade with an ultimatum containing demands that were designed to be rejected. This would ensure a war without the "odium of attacking Serbia without warning, put her in the wrong", and ensure that Britain and Romania would remain

998:

Starting 7 July, the German Ambassador to Austria-Hungary, Heinrich von Tschirschky, and Berchtold held almost daily meetings about how to co-ordinate the diplomatic action to justify a war against Serbia. On 8 July, Tschirschky presented Berchtold with a message from Wilhelm II who declared he

985:

On 7 July, on his return to Vienna, Hoyos reported to the Austro-Hungarian Crown Council that Austria-Hungary had Germany's full support even if "measures against Serbia should bring about a big war". At the Crown Council, Berchtold strongly urged that a war against Serbia must begin as soon as

826:

not at all ready for war, and would certainly think long before appealing to arms". Even if Russia were to act in defence of Serbia, Wilhelm promised that Germany would do everything in its power, including war, to support Austria-Hungary. Wilhelm added that he needed to consult with Chancellor

501:

threw a hand grenade at Ferdinand's motorcade damaging the following car and injuring its occupants. Later that morning, Gavrilo Princip managed to shoot and kill Franz Ferdinand and Sophie as they drove back to visit the wounded in the hospital. Čabrinović and Princip took cyanide, but it only

2508:

insistence on a war against Serbia was based on the two considerations already mentioned; firstly that Russia and France were 'not yet ready' and secondly that Britain will not at this juncture intervene in a war which breaks out over a Balkan state, even if this should lead to a conflict with

2126:

On 1 August 1914, a British offer to guarantee French neutrality was sent out and promptly accepted by Wilhelm. At 4:23 p.m. a telegram from the German ambassador to Britain, Prince Lichnowsky, arrived. Lichnowsky repeated assurances that he erroneously thought Grey had given to him: a planned

2095:

When the word reached Berlin of Russian general mobilisation, Wilhelm agreed to sign the orders for German mobilisation, and German troops began preparations to enter Luxembourg and Belgium as a preliminary towards invading France. As historian Fritz Fischer noted, Bethmann Hollweg's gamble in

1961:

After receiving information from Rome that Serbia was now ready "on condition of certain interpretations, to swallow even Articles 5 and 6, that is, the whole Austrian ultimatum", Bethmann Hollweg forwarded this information to Vienna at 12:30 a.m., 30 July, adding that Serbia's response to the

1893:

In a meeting in London, Grey warned Prince Lichnowsky in veiled terms that if Germany attacked France, then Britain would consider going to war with Germany. Grey repeated his "Stop in Belgrade" peace plan, and strongly urged that Germany accept it. Grey ended his meeting with the warning that

1873:

To ensure acceptance of his peace plan, Grey proposed a "Stop in Belgrade" offer, in which Austria-Hungary would occupy Belgrade and go no further. Since this was the same proposal as Wilhelm had made, Bethmann Hollweg regarded this as a particular threat as it would have made it difficult for

1646:

Russian policy was to pressure the Serbs to accept the ultimatum as much as possible without being humiliated too much. Russia was anxious to avoid a war because the Great Military Programme was not to be completed until 1917, and Russia was otherwise not ready for war. Because all of France's

1634:

In addition, Sazonov believed that war was inevitable and refused to acknowledge that Austria-Hungary had a right to counter measures in the face of Serbian irredentism. On the contrary, Sazonov had aligned himself with the irredentism, and expected the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

1506:

24 July marked the true beginning of the July Crisis. Until that point, the vast majority of the people in the world were ignorant of the machinations of the leaders in Berlin and Vienna, and there was no sense of crisis. A case in point was the British Cabinet, which had not discussed foreign

806:

In order to ensure Germany's full support, Hoyos visited Berlin on 5 July. On 24 June, Austria-Hungary had prepared a letter for its ally outlining the challenges in the Balkans and how to address them, but Franz Ferdinand was assassinated before it could be delivered. According to the letter,

571:

group to which Princip was primarily loyal, had members who came from all three major Bosnian ethnic groups. A total of twenty-five people were indicted as a result of the investigation, while the group was dominated by Bosnian Serbs, four of the indictees were Bosnian Croats, all of them were

1726:

Wilhelm's sudden change of mind about war enraged Bethmann Hollweg, the military, and the diplomatic service, who proceeded to sabotage Wilhelm's offer. A German general wrote: "unfortunately... peaceful news. The Kaiser wants peace... He even wants to influence Austria and to stop continuing

1802:

At 11:00 a.m. on 28 July, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Following instructions from Bethmann Hollweg, Tschirschky did not present Wilhelm's "Stop in Belgrade" proposal until noon. At 1:00 a.m. on 29 July 1914 the first shots of the First World War were fired by the Austro-Hungarian

1192:

On 23 July, the whole German military and political leadership ostentatiously went on vacation. Count Schoen, the Bavarian chargé d'affaires in Berlin reported to Munich that Germany would act surprised by the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. However, on 19 July—four days before the ultimatum was

2724:

When Wilhelm arrived at the Potsdam station late in the evening of July 26, he was met by a pale, agitated, and somewhat fearful Chancellor. Bethmann Hollweg's apprehension stemmed not from the dangers of the looming war, but rather from his fear of the Kaiser's wrath when the extent of his

2689:

Berchtold: "We should like to deliver the declaration of war on Serbia as soon as possible so as to put an end to diverse influences. When do you want the declaration of war?" Conrad: "Only when we have progressed far enough for operations to begin immediately—on approximately August 12th."

1854:

pretended that King George V had promised him that Britain would remain neutral, the Kaiser rejected Bethmann Hollweg's offer of a naval agreement with Britain, stating that Germany did not have to offer Britain anything now that King George had apparently promised his country's neutrality.

2135:

In Berlin, Bethmann Hollweg announced that Germany had mobilised and delivered an ultimatum to France telling that country to renounce its alliance with Russia or face a German attack. In response to reports of German troops invading Luxembourg and Belgium plus the German ultimatum, French

546:

put out statements claiming that Serbia had warned Austria-Hungary of the impending assassination. Serbia soon thereafter denied making warnings and denied knowledge of the plot. By 30 June, Austro-Hungarian and German diplomats were requesting investigations from their Serbian and Russian

1982:

Christopher Clark states: "The Russian general mobilization was one of the most momentous decisions of the July crisis. This was the first of the general mobilizations. It came at the moment when the German government had not yet even declared the State of Impending War, the last stage of

2648:"...ur rearmament programme had not been completed and it seemed doubtful whether our Army and Fleet would ever be able to compete with those of Germany and Austria-Hungary as regards modern technical efficiency ... No one in Russia desired a war. The disastrous consequences of the 1958:

waiting all day Wednesday (29 July) for a reply, Bethmann Hollweg sent off three more telegrams urgently demanding an "immediate" answer to his 'pledge plan' and the plan for "direct conversations" between Austria-Hungary and Russia and added in severe disapproval of Austria-Hungary.

2652:

had shown the grave danger which Russia would run in case of hostilities. Consequently our policy should aim at reducing the possibility of a European war, but if we remained passive we would attain our objectives ... In his view stronger language than we had used hitherto was

2761:

these circumstances we must urgently and emphatically suggest to the Vienna Cabinet acceptance of mediation under the present honourable conditions. The responsibility falling on us and Austria for the consequences which would ensure in case of refusal would be uncommonly heavy."

1600:

at which Nicholas decided to intervene in the Austro-Serbian conflict, a step toward general war. He put the Russian Army on alert on 25 July. Although this was not mobilisation, it threatened the German and Austro-Hungarian borders and looked like a military declaration of war.

2087:. Germany believed that, in the event of war with France and Russia, the German path to victory would be to quickly defeat France before turning to fight Russia. The need for a quick resolution in the Western Front prompted German plans to avoid French defensive fortifications 2263:

aside, one of two things must happen. (a) Either Germany and Austria win, crush France and humiliate Russia. What will be the position of a friendless England? (b) Or France and Russia win. What would be their attitude towards England? What about India and the Mediterranean?"

2621:"I know what it is. You mean to make war on Serbia ...? You are setting fire to Europe ... Why was Serbia given no chance to speak and why the form of an ultimatum? The fact is you mean war and you have burnt your bridges ... One sees how peace-loving you are." 1272:

blustering in St. Petersburg". German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg told his assistant that Britain and France did not realize that Germany would go to war if Russia mobilised. He thought London saw a German "bluff" and was responding with a "counterbluff". Political scientist

780:. Now or never!". In response, Tschirschky told the Austro-Hungarian government that next day that "Germany would support the Monarchy through thick and thin, whatever action it decided to take against Serbia. The sooner Austria-Hungary struck, the better". On 5 July 1914, 2266:

In the event that Britain abandoned its Entente allies, Britain feared that if Germany won the war, or the Entente won without British support, then, either way, it would be left without any allies. This would have left both Britain and her Empire vulnerable to attack.

2136:

mobilisation was authorized on 1 August; that same afternoon, Wilhelm signed the mobilisation orders. Bethmann Hollweg was angry with Moltke for having had Wilhelm sign the orders without informing him first. By 7:00 pm on 1 August, German troops invaded Luxembourg.

2099:

Asquith wrote to Stanley in London that "the general opinion at present—particularly strong in the City—is to keep out at all costs". The British Cabinet was badly divided with many ministers strongly opposed to Britain becoming involved in a war; a key figure was

1605:

done prior to the Serbian rejection of the ultimatum, the Austro-Hungary declaration of war on 28 July or any military measures taken by Germany. As a diplomatic move this had limited value since the Russians did not make this mobilisation public until 28 July.

2518:"There is nothing to prove or even to suppose that the Serbian government is accessory to the inducement for the crime, its preparations, or the furnishing of weapons. On the contrary, there are reasons to believe that this is altogether out of the question." 2167:

of Belgium refused the German request to violate his country's neutrality. On 3 August, Germany declared war on France, and on Belgium on 4 August. This act violated Belgian neutrality, the status to which Germany, France, and Britain were all committed by

2835:"Although the Russian mobilization had been declared, her mobilization measures cannot be compared with those of the West European states ... Moreover, Russia does not intend to wage war, but has been forced to take these measures because of Austria." 2486:"He would declare war at once, if Russia mobilized. This time people would see that he was not "falling out". The Emperor's repeated protestations that in this case no one would ever again be able to reproach him with indecision were almost comic to hear" 1135:

Zimmermann told Schoen that a powerful and successful move against Serbia would save Austria-Hungary from internal disintegration, and that was why Germany had given Austria-Hungary "a blank power of full authority, even at the risk of a war with Russia".

973:

At this stage in the crisis, the possibility of determined Russian support for Serbia, and its attendant risks, was never properly weighed up. The Austro-Hungarians remained fixated on Serbia but did not decide on their precise objectives other than war.

2224:, in which Britain would primarily use its great naval strength. Goschen's account of the "scrap of paper" conversation dated 6 August was later edited and published by the British government and outraged public opinion in Britain and the United States. 1149:

involved even at the risk of war. On 19 July, Jagow published a note in the semi-official North German Gazette warning other powers "that the settlement of differences which may arise between Austria-Hungary and Serbia should remain localized". Asked by

1131:

that Austria-Hungary was only making a pretence "of being peacefully inclined". Commenting on the draft text of the ultimatum shown to him by German diplomats, Schoen noted that Serbia would not be able to accept the demands, so the result would be war.

1906:

any promises about French colonies). During the same meeting, Bethmann Hollweg all but announced that Germany would soon violate Belgium's neutrality, though Bethmann Hollweg said that, if Belgium did not resist, Germany would not annex that kingdom.

1770:

wrote in his diary that "Germany should remain calm to allow Russia to put herself in the wrong but then not to shrink from war if it were inevitable". Bethmann Hollweg told Wilhelm that "In all events Russia must ruthlessly be put in the wrong".

1642:

Christopher Clark states, "It would be difficult to overstate the historical importance of the meetings of 24 and 25 July", as it emboldened Serbia and raised the stakes for Germany, which was still hoping for a conflict localised to the Balkans.

2104:, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who initially favoured keeping Britain's options open, then appeared likely to resign at the start of August, only in the end to remain in post as he regarded the German aggression against Belgium as sufficient 2853:"n the precautionary measures and defensive measures to which Russia believes herself obliged to resort, she should not immediately proceed to any measure which might offer Germany the pretext for a total or partial mobilization of her forces." 867:

of the Naval State Secretariat all endorsed Wilhelm's "blank cheque" as Germany's best policy. On 6 July, Hoyos, Zimmerman, Bethmann Hollweg, and Szögyény met and Germany gave its "blank cheque" commitment to Austria-Hungary of firm support.

2630:"I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Serbian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it." 2253:

Britain's reasons for declaring war were complex. After the war began the propaganda reason given was that Britain was required to safeguard Belgium's neutrality under the Treaty of London. The German invasion of Belgium was, therefore, the

1666:

On 25 July, Grey suggested again that Germany inform Austria-Hungary that the Serbian reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was "satisfactory". Jagow passed on Grey's offer to Vienna without comment. The same day, Jagow told reporter

2037:

At a meeting of the Prussian State Council held on 30 July, Bethmann Hollweg noted Russian mobilisation was not a source of worry for Germany: Bethmann Hollweg stated that his only interest now was, for domestic political reasons, to

2563:

If the Austro-Hungarian government is not going to abdicate forever as a great power, she has no choice but to enforce acceptance by the Serbian government of her demands by strong pressure and, if necessary, by resort to military

1878:

German public and that Britain would remain neutral in the "imminent war" against France and Russia. In order to "make Russia appear the aggressor", Moltke asked for Austro-Hungarian mobilisation against Russia so as to provide a

1108:

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg falsely told the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov, that Austria-Hungary was not planning on any measure that might cause a war in the Balkans, so no Russian complaints were made.

481:

ordered Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne, to attend military exercises due to be held in Bosnia. After the exercises, on 28 June, Ferdinand toured Sarajevo with his wife, Sophie. Six armed

2258:

and, importantly, legitimised and galvanised popular support for the war among the antiwar Liberal Party constituency. However, the Treaty of London of 1839 had not committed Britain on her own to safeguard Belgium's neutrality.

6931: 906:

wrote that the Emperor said that we would not waver in declaring war if Russia mobilised. In the same way, Berchtold suggested that Austro-Hungarian leaders go on vacation "to prevent any disquiet" about what had been decided.

711:

party saw it as a reactionary means of re-invigorating the Habsburg monarchy, restoring it to the vigour and virility of an imagined past, and that Serbia must be dealt with before it became too powerful to defeat militarily.

1172:

shipping companies that Austria-Hungary would soon present an ultimatum that might cause a general European war, and they should start withdrawing their ships from foreign waters back to the Reich at once. That same day, the

1294:

and terrorist propaganda". Most European foreign ministries recognised that the ultimatum was formulated in terms so harsh that the Serbs would be unable to accept it. Additionally, Serbia was only given 48 hours to comply.

1723:

Belgrade" offer. Wilhelm stated that because "the Serbs are Orientals, therefore liars, tricksters, and masters of evasion", a temporary Austro-Hungarian occupation of Belgrade was required until Serbia kept its word.

1446:

despite his reservations about the dangers of splitting the Triple Entente, Grey wrote to Sazonov that Britain did not have a cause to war with Serbia, but subsequent developments might drag Britain into the conflict.

1894:"unless Austria is willing to enter upon a discussion of the Serbian question a world war is inevitable". To support Grey's warnings, the British government ordered a general alert for its armed forces. In Paris, 2495:"As Vienna has so far inaugurated no action of any sort against Belgrade, the omission of the customary telegram would be too noticeable and might be the cause of premature uneasiness ... It should be sent." 642:

While few mourned Franz Ferdinand himself, many ministers argued the assassination of the heir to the throne was a challenge to Austria-Hungary that must be avenged. This was especially true of Foreign Minister

1542:

that he was worried that Russia was trying to entangle Britain in what he described as "the most dangerous situation of the last 40 years". To stop a war, the Permanent Secretary of the British Foreign Office,

2788:"Please show this to Berchtold immediately and add that we regard such a yielding on Serbia's part as a suitable basis for negotiations along with an occupation of a part of Serbian territory as a pledge." 2155:

On 2 August, the British government promised that the Royal Navy would protect France's coast from German attack. Grey gave Britain's firm assurance of protecting France with its navy to French Ambassador

5504: 364:," but urged Austria-Hungary to attack quickly to localise the war and avoid drawing in Russia. However, Austro-Hungarian leaders would deliberate into mid-July before deciding to give Serbia a harsh 2815:"Berchtold listened pale and silent while they {the Bethmann telegrams} were read through twice; Count Forgach took notes. Finally, Berchtold said he would at once lay the matter before the Emperor." 1658:

took no line on the ultimatum. In addition, the Germans jammed the radio messages, at least garbling contacts between the ship-borne French leaders and Paris, and possibly blocking them completely.

1996:

because of Sazonov's conviction that Austro-Hungarian intransigence was Germany's policy and, if Germany was directing Austria-Hungary, there was no point in mobilising against Austria-Hungary only

402:

with Russia and France, many British leaders saw no compelling reason to get involved militarily; the UK made repeated offers to mediate, and Germany made various promises to try to ensure British

1113: 410:

to galvanise popular support. By early August, the ostensible reason for armed conflict—the assassination of an Austro-Hungarian archduke—had already become a side-note to a larger European war.

1850:

In a meeting with the British ambassador, Goschen, Bethmann Hollweg made the flagrantly false statement that Germany was trying to pressure Austria-Hungary to abandon the war against Serbia. As

1145:

summit in St. Petersburg. The first draft of the ultimatum had been shown to the German Embassy in Vienna on 12 July and the final text was provided in advance to the German Embassy on 22 July.

772:

Wilhelm II came to share the views of the German General Staff and declared on 4 July that he was entirely for "settling accounts with Serbia". He ordered the German ambassador in Vienna, Count

1347:

Provide "explanations" to the Austro-Hungarian government regarding "Serbian officials" who have expressed themselves in interviews "in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government".

2123:

On 31 July, Wilhelm wrote that the Triple Entente had conspired to entrap Germany in its treaty obligations with Austria-Hungary "as a pretext for waging a war of annihilation against us".

880:, of the dangerous situation in the Balkans. Grey felt that Anglo-German co-operation could resolve any Austro-Serbian dispute, and he "believed that a peaceful solution would be reached". 982:

views were sent to the Emperor on 8 July. The Emperor's opinion was that the gap in opinion could most likely be bridged. An initial set of demands was drafted during the Council meeting.

1153:, the French ambassador to Germany, how he knew about the contents of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum as he had revealed in the North German Gazette, Jagow pretended to be ignorant of it. 682:

Emperor Franz Joseph was 84 years old in 1914. Though disturbed by the murder of his heir and nephew, Franz Joseph largely left decision-making during the July Crisis to foreign minister

741:

was known for his impetuous personality, described by one scholar as "not lacking in intelligence, but he did lack stability, disguising his deep insecurities by swagger and tough talk."

2473:

had predicted that Russian mobilization in the east would be slower than that of France, Russia's ally to the west; they anticipated that any conflict with Russia would involve first

2193: 2826:"I have the impression that they the Russians have mobilized here from a dread of coming events without aggressive intentions and are now frightened at what they have brought about." 1064: 8943: 592:. Their acts led to the installation of the dynasty ruled by King Peter and Regent Alexander. Serbia requested and France arranged the replacement of Descos with the more hawkish 8958: 1525:

in May 1913 to be implemented in the event of a war between France and Germany. It envisioned an all-out counter-offensive to meet a German attack. The actual implementation of

9142: 2185:

that the German invasions of Belgium and Luxembourg were in violation of international law, but argued that Germany was "in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law".

1474:

by surprise. The longer the diplomatic action continued, the less likely Moltke thought that Liège could be stormed by surprise, and if Liège were not taken, then the entire

2603:

The text of the ultimatum describes a deadline of 5 o'clock, but it was shifted forward one hour owing to tardiness on the part of the Austro-Hungarian minister in Belgrade.

2671:"esitation was no longer appropriate as far as the Imperial government was concerned. They saw no objection to a display of greater firmness in our diplomatic negotiations" 2662:"Germany looked upon our concessions as so many proofs of our weakness and far from having prevented our neighbours from using aggressive methods, we had encouraged them." 2003:

Nicholas wanted neither to abandon Serbia to the ultimatum of Austria-Hungary, nor to provoke a general war. In a series of letters exchanged with Wilhelm (the so-called "

91: 9040: 1950:

At the start of the July Crisis, Germany had given her full support to Austria-Hungary. This stratagem had earlier served to keep Russia on the sidelines during the

1265: 1322:

Bring to trial all accessories to the Archduke's assassination and allow "Austro-Hungarian delegates" (law enforcement officers) to take part in the investigations.

8677: 8501: 7841: 4439: 1204:

pointed out, this could be proven by Jagow's request to know the full itinerary of Wilhelm's North Sea cruise before the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was presented.

1090:

On 14 July, the Austro-Hungarians assured the Germans that the ultimatum to be delivered to Serbia "is being composed so that the possibility of its acceptance is

1355:

comrades on account of the assassination", which allegedly demonstrated the culpability and assistance provided to the conspirators by various Serbian officials.

902:

As Wilhelm himself stated in private "in order not to alarm world opinion", the Kaiser left on his annual North Sea cruise. Shortly after, Wilhelm's close friend

9119: 5514: 1593:

Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. Finally, to deter Austria-Hungary from war, the Russian Council of Ministers ordered a partial mobilisation against Austria-Hungary.

277: 1547:, suggested again that a conference be held in London chaired by Britain, Germany, Italy, and France to resolve the dispute between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. 9147: 7654: 1226:

At the same time, and having a strong expectation of Serbian rejection, the Austro-Hungarian Army opened its war book, and began preparations for hostilities.

6203: 1264:

The French and the Russians agreed their alliance extended to supporting Serbia against Austria-Hungary, confirming the already established policy behind the

9335: 9062: 8754: 7712: 2884:"I run to the War Ministry. Beaming faces everywhere. Everyone is shaking hands in the corridors: people congratulate one another for being over the hurdle." 575:

Within Serbia, there was popular rejoicing over the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Because Serbian elections were scheduled for 14 August, Prime Minister

9442: 2395:(4) Austria manhandles Serbia; an alarmed Germany looks to an angry Russia and presumably makes an agreement with Turkey; France tries to talk to Britain. 9350: 9105: 4394: 1898:, the leader of the French Socialist Party and an outspoken pacifist, was assassinated by a right-wing fanatic. In St. Petersburg, the French Ambassador 1086:, Chief of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army from 1906 to 1917, determined the earliest that Austria-Hungary could declare war was 25 July. 9345: 9035: 8986: 8901: 2149: 2108:. The Conservatives promised the government if the anti-war Liberal ministers were to resign, they would enter the government to support going to war. 753:. Naumann's advice was that it was time to annihilate Serbia and that Germany could be expected to stand by her ally. The next day, German Ambassador 9189: 2034:

upon learning of Russian general mobilisation at 9:00 am on 31 July, as it allowed him to present the war as something forced on Germany by Russia.

2398:(5) The lights go out, and general brawl erupts, with Germany and France confronting each other. To the right, another potential combatant appears. 1691: 1336:

Cease the cooperation of the Serbian authorities in the "traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier"; dismiss and punish the officials of

1316:

Remove from the Serbian military and civil administration all officers and functionaries whose names the Austro-Hungarian government will provide.

1301:

Suppress all publications that "incite hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy" and are "directed against its territorial integrity".

387:

Austria-Hungary made its ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July; before Serbia replied, Russia ordered a secret, but noticed, partial mobilisation of its

9721: 9577: 9030: 8388: 454: 883:

When asked if Germany was ready for a war against Russia and France, Falkenhayn replied with a "curt affirmative". Later on 17 July, the Army's

10200: 7819: 7881: 2071:

Near midnight the German ambassador to Russia delivered an ultimatum to stop the mobilisation within 12 hours or Germany would mobilise too.

1118: 547:

counterparts, but were rebuffed. On 5 July, based on interrogations of the accused assassins, Potiorek telegraphed Vienna that Serbian Major

2392:(3) Austria demands satisfaction from Serbia, while a relaxed Germany does not notice Russia and France come to agreement in the background. 9635: 9090: 9020: 8659: 7871: 7782: 2747:

His order read: "Secret. European political situation makes war between Triple Alliance and Triple Entente by no means impossible. This is

494:, seeking to free Bosnia of Austria-Hungarian rule and unite all Southern Slavs, lay in wait along Ferdinand's announced motorcade route. 54: 9630: 9114: 8005: 7459: 2348: 1820:

Though as late as 27 July, Jagow expressed the view that Russian partial mobilisation against the frontiers of Austria-Hungary was not a

1421:

outlined the sequence of events that might lead to a general war, but noted that there was no reason for Britain to become involved. The

395: 270: 10190: 7682: 6368: 4486: 2457: 873: 2163:

A German ultimatum was delivered, this time to Belgium on 2 August, requesting free passage for the German Army on the way to France.

9731: 8012: 419: 315: 241: 10185: 7664: 9340: 1999:

because France reiterated her support for Russia, and there was significant cause to think that Britain would also support Russia

9586: 9272: 9110: 9097: 9054: 8963: 8689: 8491: 8398: 8300: 8058: 7705: 2360: 1851: 837:

At another meeting held on 5 July, this one at Potsdam palace, Bethmann Hollweg, the Foreign Ministry's Under Secretary of State

605: 406:. However, fearing the possibility of Germany overrunning France, Britain entered the war against them on 4 August, and used the 1909:

The Goschen–Bethmann Hollweg meeting did much to galvanise the British government into deciding to ally with France and Russia.

9464: 9454: 9322: 7350:

Vasquez, John A. (2014). "The First World War and International Relations Theory: A Review of Books on the 100th Anniversary".

6335: 2145:

that said Russia's replies were unacceptable. Grey warned Lichnowsky that if Germany invaded Belgium, Britain would go to war.

978:

further impression to the Entente powers that Austria-Hungary was merely using the assassinations as a pretext for aggression.

892: 263: 2227:

At the outbreak of the war, Wilhelm is reported to have said: "To think that George and Nicky should have played me false! If

776:, to stop advising restraint, writing that "Tschirschky will be so good to drop this nonsense. We must finish with the Serbs, 9926: 9236: 9170: 9007: 8886: 8559: 7578: 7434: 7315: 7271: 7248: 7229: 7156: 7123: 7053: 7031: 6983: 6921: 6890: 6863: 6821: 6802: 6776: 6754: 6732: 6710: 6648: 6622: 6603: 6581: 4928: 3322: 2734:"As we have already rejected one British proposal for a conference, it is not possible for us to refuse this suggestion also 1036:

containing "unacceptable demands", and promised to present it to the Serbs after the Franco-Russian summit between President

103: 7336: 1763: 9411: 8831: 7616: 1902:, upon learning belatedly on the night of 29/30 July of Russia's partial mobilisation, protested against the Russian move. 1843: 1835: 1213: 815: 1212:, presented the ultimatum to the Serbian government. In the absence of Nikola Pašić, the secretary-general of the Serbian 360:, that Berlin would support Austria in any conflict. Germany guaranteed its support through what came to be known as the " 9570: 9182: 8506: 8134: 7639: 2386:(1st panel) The Central Powers hold their noses in distaste as tiny Serbia joins the table, while Russia reacts with joy. 2109: 903: 318: 109: 9396: 1922:

to put Russia in the wrong, we must urgently wish Vienna to begin and continue conversations with Russia." As historian

1698:, the German ambassador in Paris that "to my simple mind Germany’s attitude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war". 1157:

of the British Embassy in Berlin reported that it was likely that Austria-Hungary was operating with German assurances.

10007: 9883: 9381: 8671: 8073: 7831: 1779: 1736: 1544: 2751:

the Warning Telegram, but be prepared to shadow possible hostile men of war ... Measure is purely precautionary."

10062: 9990: 9956: 9256: 8950: 8766: 8038: 7509: 7005: 2343: 559:

that the instigators of the plot against Ferdinand needed to be investigated within Serbia, but he too was rebuffed.

443: 407: 6195: 1319:

Accept in Serbia "representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government" for the "suppression of subversive movements".

8436: 7474: 2713:

should this after all prove unavoidable, to improve as far as possible the conditions under which it is to be waged

1350:

Notify the Austro-Hungarian Government "without delay" of the execution of the measures comprised in the ultimatum.

127: 563:

Princip had received a few days of training and some weapons through renegade intelligence officers in Serbia and

9507: 9312: 9292: 9079: 9015: 8838: 8707: 7611: 7531: 7469: 1783: 1539: 1414: 1154: 614:

Austro-Hungarian propaganda after the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand depicting an Austrian fist crushing an

311: 8172: 2460:

between the two nations, that a war was inevitable, and that Germany would be better off if a war happened soon.

1047:

By 14 July, Tisza agreed to support war out of fear that a policy of peace would lead to Germany renouncing the

10195: 9900: 9895: 9563: 9307: 9302: 9297: 9287: 8981: 7626: 7601: 7499: 7169:(Feb. 2014) 12#1 pp 5–27; "Recent Historiography of the First World War (Part II)", (May 2014) 12#2 pp 155–174. 3505:"The 'Blank Check': Ladislaus Count von Szögyény-Marich (Berlin) to Leopold Count von Berchtold (July 5, 1914)" 2338: 2210: 2004: 1840: 1560: 1239: 802:

European diplomatic alignments before the war. Germany and the Ottoman Empire allied after the outbreak of war.

781: 659: 450: 2389:(2) Serbia stabs Austria-Hungary, to everyone's apparent shock. Germany immediately offers support to Austria. 1083: 687: 655: 9910: 9282: 9277: 9241: 9175: 9067: 8913: 8496: 8348: 7886: 7814: 7745: 7514: 7484: 7479: 7287:

Mulligan, William. "The Trial Continues: New Directions in the Study of the Origins of the First World War."

6543: 1774:

On 28 July at 11:49 a.m. Prince Lichnowsky sent the fourth British offer of mediation, this time coming from

1655: 1235: 1209: 827: 729: 348:, viewing it as a threat to the unity of its multi-national empire. However, Vienna, wary of the reaction of 2064:

did not demobilise immediately. Viviani did not know of the Russian mobilisation until that point. General

1767: 1079: 9971: 9816: 9690: 9231: 8858: 8798: 8695: 8600: 8363: 8149: 7853: 7692: 7591: 2198: 2128: 1728: 1182: 330: 151: 2115: 2050: 10087: 9846: 9777: 9469: 8906: 8891: 8749: 8701: 8466: 8017: 7891: 7804: 7799: 7568: 7556: 7551: 6521: 1422: 877: 568: 8078: 9878: 9851: 9449: 9406: 8683: 8441: 8426: 8328: 8197: 7765: 7677: 7634: 7140: 3504: 1993:

because the previously ordered partial mobilisation was incompatible with a future general mobilisation

1313:

Eliminate without delay from schoolbooks and public documents all "propaganda against Austria-Hungary".

846: 807:

Romania was no longer a reliable ally especially since the Russo-Romanian summit meeting of 14 June in

758: 738: 2477:(to avoid French fixed defenses), quickly defeating them, and then turning to face Russia in the east. 1680: 1197: 707:, Prime Minister of Austria, hoped that the criminal inquiry would provide a proper basis for action. 10205: 10180: 9716: 9391: 9159: 8743: 8731: 8486: 8471: 8192: 8083: 7777: 7755: 7504: 7494: 7427: 7041: 6694: 2180: 1923: 1462: 1382: 1201: 1018:

Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza and Chief of the Army General Staff Hötzendorf in Vienna, 15 July 1914

700: 478: 26: 8338: 7280:

Mombauer, Annika. "Guilt or Responsibility? The Hundred-Year Debate on the Origins of World War I."

2119:

A Berlin crowd listens as a German officer reads Wilhelm II's order for mobilisation, 1 August 1914.

670:, a terrorist event charged with historic meaning, transforming the political chemistry in Vienna". 539: 10077: 9743: 9678: 9366: 8853: 8843: 8772: 8725: 8713: 8653: 8461: 8456: 8378: 7787: 7760: 7464: 7148: 2355: 2148:

In the morning of 2 August, while French troops were still at a distance from the German frontier,

1648: 1569: 1510: 1375: 1014: 966: 773: 754: 750: 519: 498: 430: 199: 2295: 2249:

depicted Belgium as a scrappy youth blocking the passage of elderly, bullying Germany, August 1914

2068:

of the French Army asked for permission to order a general mobilisation. His request was refused.

1620:

Acceptance of the ultimatum would mean that Serbia would become a protectorate of Austria-Hungary.

1359:

should proceed to leave the Austro-Hungarian Embassy of Belgrade together with all its personnel.

1044:

was over. Wilhelm expressed disappointment that the ultimatum would be presented so late in July.

585: 79: 10175: 10140: 10130: 10072: 10012: 9858: 9685: 9668: 9437: 9429: 9371: 9131: 8826: 8589: 8416: 8411: 8343: 8202: 8187: 8182: 8162: 8043: 7920: 7377:

Williamson Jr, Samuel R., and Ernest R. May. "An identity of opinion: Historians and July 1914."

2169: 1829: 1530: 458: 381: 193: 163: 145: 139: 8383: 2112:

told Churchill that the Conservatives would support a war against Germany were France attacked.

543: 9931: 9868: 9651: 9204: 8928: 8863: 8719: 8446: 8373: 8323: 8308: 8290: 8263: 8177: 8144: 7809: 7770: 7750: 7561: 7454: 1935: 1127:

On 18 July, Hans Schoen, a Bavarian diplomat in Berlin, told the Bavarian Prime Minister Count

819: 647:; in October 1913, his ultimatum to Serbia made them back down over the occupation of Northern 552: 353: 115: 67: 6513: 3312: 2239: 10017: 9873: 9695: 9605: 9194: 8848: 8737: 8513: 8476: 8406: 8353: 8275: 8243: 8217: 8167: 8098: 8000: 7953: 7737: 7606: 7489: 2328: 2323: 1807: 1573: 1251: 1102: 1041: 884: 818:

with two documents, one of which was a memo by Tisza, advising that Bulgaria should join the

388: 377: 373: 299: 205: 187: 6360: 2314:

On 6 August, Emperor Franz Joseph signed the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Russia.

1899: 38:" on 9 August 1914, depicting the July Crisis via the countries of Europe sitting at a table 10170: 10022: 9941: 9936: 9656: 9544: 9459: 8139: 8113: 8063: 7420: 2470: 2365: 1976: 1939: 1585: 1581: 1458: 1367: 1174: 1169: 1048: 842: 667: 531: 97: 85: 8088: 1326: 1063:

the best time for such a war to come. The Chief of the German General Staff, Moltke, told

761:

would support resolute, well-thought-out action by Austria-Hungary with regard to Serbia.

548: 19:

For the armed demonstrations against the Russian Provisional Government in July 1917, see

8: 10002: 9811: 9765: 9736: 9526: 8665: 8529: 8481: 8358: 8318: 8313: 8258: 7941: 7935: 7836: 7102: 6547: 2221: 2164: 1930: 1888: 1654:, returning from the summit in St. Petersburg, the acting head of the French government, 1165: 73: 9479: 6572:

Foundations of World Order: The Legalist Approach to International Relations (1898–1922)

6327: 4494: 1623:

Russia had backed down in the past —for example in the Liman von Sanders affair and the

1037: 942:

Map of ethnic groups in Austria-Hungary in 1910. Austro-Hungarian leaders believed that

704: 10215: 10135: 10102: 10067: 9946: 9863: 9841: 9821: 9787: 9486: 9401: 8760: 8624: 8606: 8571: 8535: 8368: 8333: 8285: 8270: 8157: 8108: 7947: 7906: 7586: 7217: 7198: 7190: 7015: 6959: 6699: 4969: 4961: 4462: 4417: 4395:"The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914" 2948: 2649: 2425: 2101: 2051:

Austria-Hungary pursues the Serbian war, France and Britain urge restraint (30–31 July)

2021: 1867: 1695: 1687: 1128: 888: 864: 746: 439: 175: 133: 9555: 7372:

A Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire

6971: 2205:

to Britain on 21 August 1914, less than two months after the assassination in Sarajevo

1330: 1261:

departed for Saint Petersburg on 15 July, arrived on 20 July and departed on 23 July.

745:

On 1 July, Viktor Naumann, a German journalist and friend of German Foreign Secretary

734: 384:, and agreed they would support Serbia against Austria-Hungary in the event of a war. 10210: 10122: 10107: 9983: 9951: 9905: 9519: 9513: 9474: 9376: 9209: 8792: 8647: 8630: 8431: 8253: 8233: 8068: 8053: 7983: 7971: 7672: 7649: 7596: 7311: 7267: 7244: 7225: 7202: 7152: 7119: 7049: 7027: 7020: 7001: 6979: 6951: 6917: 6886: 6869: 6859: 6851: 6839: 6817: 6798: 6772: 6750: 6728: 6706: 6682: 6654: 6644: 6632: 6618: 6599: 6577: 6570: 6553: 6531: 6502: 4973: 4924: 4421: 3318: 2928: 2598: 2015: 1580:

On 24–25 July the Russian Council of Ministers met. The Russian Agriculture Minister

1426: 1406: 1371: 1344:

frontier service, "guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Sarajevo crime".

1277:

Vienna so as to not appear the aggressor, for that would alienate German socialists.

1024: 955: 849: 838: 765: 683: 663: 644: 589: 576: 341: 229: 217: 169: 121: 7304: 4466: 10117: 9997: 9792: 9726: 9673: 9615: 8577: 8547: 8541: 8451: 8280: 8248: 8238: 7977: 7901: 7896: 7824: 7644: 7544: 7382: 7359: 7182: 7173:

Levy, Jack S. (Winter 1991). "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914".

7086: 6943: 6674: 6525: 4953: 4916: 4454: 4409: 2940: 2931:(Summer 1984). "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War". 2441: 2433: 2244: 2139: 1589: 1285: 915:

Germany's policy was to support a swift war to destroy Serbia that would present a

856: 853: 784:, the Chief of the German General Staff, wrote that "Austria must beat the Serbs". 593: 322: 181: 157: 6856:

Western Civilization: Vol 2: The struggle for Empire to Europe in the Modern World

2456:

Some German leaders believed that growing Russian economic power would change the

1494:, and opening military operations. We are advised... to confront the world with a 1216: 515: 10097: 10092: 9760: 9620: 9600: 9386: 9226: 8565: 8118: 8093: 7792: 7700: 7539: 7407:

Folly and Malice: The Habsburg Empire, the Balkans and the Start of World War One

6662: 6494: 5509: 4390: 2474: 2417: 2409: 2084: 1475: 1454: 1306: 1178: 618:

caricature of a Serbian holding a bomb and dropping a knife, and stating "Serbia

599: 523: 403: 337: 326: 307: 1511:

Serbia and Austria-Hungary mobilise, France takes preparatory steps (24–25 July)

1258: 769:

that the German General Staff "would be pleased if war were to come about now".

696: 584:

The "military party" was a reference to Chief of Serbian Military Intelligence,

477:, a military commander, became governor of the province. In the summer of 1914, 424: 10041: 9888: 9770: 9755: 9663: 9625: 9219: 9199: 8870: 8583: 8421: 8212: 8103: 7959: 7863: 7846: 6786: 4957: 4251: 3953: 2333: 2228: 1951: 1943: 1880: 1798:

Austria-Hungary's telegram to the Kingdom of Serbia declaring war, 28 July 1914

1624: 757:

spoke to Emperor Franz Joseph and stated that it was his estimate that Emperor

556: 474: 466: 447: 399: 349: 211: 35: 6615:

The Burden of Guilt: How Germany Shattered the Last Days of Peace, Summer 1914

6535: 5326: 4458: 4413: 2079: 1895: 1617:

The crisis was being used as a pretext by the Germans to increase their power.

527: 491: 10164: 10034: 10029: 9700: 9610: 9330: 8618: 8612: 8048: 7965: 7876: 7211:

The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making

6955: 6909: 6790: 6742: 6720: 6686: 6640: 6565: 6506: 6328:"First World War.com – Primary Documents – The Scrap of Paper, 4 August 1914" 2065: 1804: 1747: 1668: 1597: 1418: 1394: 917: 793: 551:

had directed the assassins. The next day, Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires

357: 223: 6666: 6557: 3239: 1661: 1482:

designed to be rejected), warned Lichnowsky of the dangers of "European war

1220: 1027:

on his birthday; Wilhelm replied that not doing so might attract attention.

8780: 8207: 7326:

A Call to Arms: Propaganda, Public Opinion, and Newspapers in the Great War

6993: 6932:"Austro-Hungarian Red Book: Official English Edition, with an Introduction" 6873: 6843: 6831: 6764: 4435: 1990:

in response to the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia on 28 July

1273: 1150: 1059:

and her strategic railroads ready. Our group meanwhile is getting weaker".

1056: 1003: 723: 564: 369: 361: 294:

was a series of interrelated diplomatic and military escalations among the

6269: 1613:

The arguments used to support this move in the Council of Ministers were:

808: 510: 10149: 10112: 10082: 9977: 9962: 9806: 8991: 8896: 8594: 7443: 6591: 2271:

power. The Liberal Party might never recover—as indeed happened in 1916.

2157: 2056:

intentions. Asquith wrote to Stanley noting the deteriorating situation.

1822: 1208:

internal affair." On 23 July, the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade,

943: 938: 860: 678: 615: 483: 345: 303: 295: 235: 46: 7393:

The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present

3904: 3902: 2584: 2283: 1244: 1095: 610: 9782: 9748: 7363: 7194: 7165:

Kramer, Alan. "Recent Historiography of the First World War – Part I",

6963: 6902:

Twilight of the Habsburgs: the Life and Times of Emperor Francis Joseph

5500: 3426: 2952: 1927:

to think about the German offer, and until then, events would proceed.

1910: 1630:

Russian arms had recovered sufficiently since the disasters of 1904–06.

1098:, would not be delivered until 23 July with an expiry date of 25 July. 4965: 1931:

Germany urges Austria-Hungary to accept the Serbian offer (28–30 July)

1889:

Britain rejects German attempts to ensure British neutrality (29 July)

413: 9797: 8786: 8553: 6395: 6125: 6113: 5456: 5454: 5452: 5427: 5425: 4944:

Turner, L. C. F. (January 1968). "The Russian Mobilization in 1914".

4923:. Vol. 2 (3 ed.). W. W. Norton & Company. p. 967. 3899: 1521: 933: 365: 20: 7186: 7079:

The lost history of 1914: Reconsidering the year the Great War began

6947: 6383: 2944: 2690:

Berchtold: "The diplomatic situation will not hold as long as that."

2274: 1449: 1139: 1074: 344:, to demonstrate its own strength and to dampen Serbian support for 34:" ("The Troublemaker"), published in the German satirical magazine " 9046: 7386: 7344:

Five Weeks: The Surge of Public Opinion on the Eve of the Great War

5865: 4061: 4059: 1789: 1775: 1636: 487: 470: 6658: 5466: 5449: 5437: 5422: 5207: 5195: 2699:"You must most carefully avoid giving any impression that we want 1554: 1471: 1337: 538:

Immediately following the assassinations, Serbian envoy to France

6747:

July 1914 The Outbreak of the First World War: selected Documents

4212: 1341: 718: 648: 462: 4071: 4056: 2140:

Germany declares war on Russia, France, and Belgium (1–4 August)

1310:("The People's Defence") and all other such societies in Serbia. 1164:

On 20 July, the German government informed the directors of the

895:: "I can move at a moment's notice. We in the General Staff are 6278:, Vol III, pp. 406–407, referencing Recouly p. 55 for the quote 4921:

A History of Modern Europe: From the Renaissance to the Present

4487:"Primary Documents: Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia, 23 July 1914" 3887: 3467: 3465: 3365: 3363: 2202: 1627:—and this had encouraged the Germans rather than appeased them. 947: 7412: 7331:

Powel, Meilyr. "The Welsh press and the July Crisis of 1914."

6795:

The Outbreak of World War I : causes and responsibilities

6769:

The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804–2011

6596:

The Trigger: Hunting the Assassin Who Brought the World to War

4562: 4560: 4558: 1794: 600:

Austria-Hungary edges towards war with Serbia (29 June–1 July)

9214: 2188: 2025:

depicting "War Menace" threatening the people of Europe, 1914

1714:

On 26 July, after reading Serbia's reply, Wilhelm commented "

1401: 951: 631: 6749:. The Norton Library. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 3708: 3462: 3438: 3360: 3154: 3079: 3031: 1946:, insisted a partial mobilisation was impossible for Russia. 1647:

leaders, including Poincaré and Viviani, were at sea on the

1515: 798: 7072:

A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna

6173: 6101: 6070: 5133: 4897: 4849: 4742: 4715: 4651: 4555: 4299: 3725: 3723: 3277: 3275: 1839:

on 29 July 1914 depicting "General War Scare" running from

1333:, who were named as participants in the assassination plot. 1248: 1071:

government involvement in Franz Ferdinand's assassination.

1002:

On 7 July, Bethmann Hollweg told his aide and close friend

428:

Illustration of the assassination in the Italian newspaper

352:(a major supporter of Serbia), sought a guarantee from its 6407: 6223: 6221: 6163: 6161: 6148: 6146: 6144: 6091: 6089: 6087: 6085: 6048: 6046: 6044: 6042: 6029: 6027: 6025: 6023: 5998: 5996: 5994: 5855: 5853: 5851: 5849: 5847: 5742: 5740: 5727: 5725: 5689: 5687: 5685: 5683: 5681: 5668: 5666: 5664: 5662: 5649: 5647: 5622: 5620: 5534: 5532: 5483: 5481: 5412: 5410: 5408: 5395: 5393: 5391: 5378: 5376: 5374: 5316: 5314: 5312: 5310: 5297: 5295: 5293: 5291: 5249: 5247: 5245: 5243: 5241: 5185: 5183: 5181: 5179: 5177: 5175: 5162: 5160: 5033: 5031: 4839: 4837: 4835: 4833: 4831: 4818: 4816: 4814: 4812: 4810: 4797: 4795: 4793: 4761: 4759: 4757: 4732: 4730: 4670: 4668: 4666: 4641: 4639: 4637: 4624: 4622: 4620: 4607: 4605: 4603: 4601: 4599: 4533: 4531: 4518: 4516: 4289: 4287: 4285: 4181: 4137: 4013: 3612: 3600: 2010: 1748:

Austria-Hungary makes final preparations for war (27 July)

6305: 5979: 5957: 5955: 5953: 5951: 5926: 5924: 5922: 5920: 5918: 5916: 5889: 5810: 5808: 5795: 5793: 5791: 5778: 5776: 5774: 5761: 5759: 5757: 5755: 5712: 5710: 5708: 5706: 5704: 5702: 5607: 5605: 5603: 5601: 5588: 5586: 5571: 5561: 5559: 5361: 5359: 5357: 5355: 5353: 5278: 5276: 5274: 5259: 5228: 5226: 5224: 5222: 5123: 5121: 5119: 5117: 5115: 5100: 5090: 5088: 5075: 5073: 5071: 5069: 5056: 5054: 5052: 5050: 5048: 5046: 4780: 4778: 4776: 4774: 4693: 4691: 4689: 4687: 4685: 4683: 4371: 4272: 4270: 4268: 4266: 4171: 4169: 4156: 4154: 4152: 4090: 4088: 4086: 4034: 4032: 4030: 4028: 3991: 3989: 3987: 3846: 3844: 3842: 3817: 3815: 3813: 3756: 3754: 3752: 3750: 3566: 3564: 3551: 3549: 3397: 3395: 3382: 3380: 3378: 3338: 3336: 3334: 3233: 3231: 3229: 3144: 3142: 1969: 1662:

Diplomatic maneuvering to avoid or localise war (26 July)

6460: 6458: 5967: 4980: 4202: 4200: 4198: 4196: 4115: 4113: 4111: 4109: 4107: 4105: 4103: 4044: 3974: 3972: 3970: 3968: 3929: 3919: 3917: 3877: 3875: 3873: 3871: 3800: 3798: 3796: 3794: 3792: 3779: 3777: 3775: 3773: 3771: 3769: 3735: 3720: 3696: 3672: 3536: 3534: 3532: 3530: 3528: 3526: 3486: 3484: 3482: 3480: 3416: 3414: 3412: 3410: 3294: 3292: 3290: 3272: 3260: 3202: 3190: 3166: 3055: 2152:

as a preliminary to the invasion of Belgium and France.

1709: 1030: 899:: there is nothing more for us to do at this juncture". 724:

German officials reassure Austria-Hungary of its support

9585: 6725:

Europe's Last Summer: Why the World Went to War in 1914

6443: 6431: 6293: 6281: 6257: 6218: 6158: 6141: 6082: 6058: 6039: 6020: 6008: 5991: 5936: 5844: 5820: 5737: 5722: 5678: 5659: 5644: 5632: 5617: 5529: 5478: 5405: 5388: 5371: 5307: 5288: 5238: 5172: 5157: 5145: 5028: 4828: 4807: 4790: 4754: 4727: 4703: 4663: 4634: 4617: 4596: 4528: 4513: 4323: 4282: 3067: 3043: 3019: 2361:

International relations of the Great Powers (1814–1919)

1551:

French troops in Morocco to begin returning to France.

1280: 446:

in 1878, Austria-Hungary was given the right to occupy

7046:

Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War

6883:

July Crisis, The World's Descent into War, Summer 1914

5948: 5913: 5901: 5832: 5805: 5788: 5771: 5752: 5699: 5598: 5583: 5556: 5544: 5350: 5338: 5271: 5219: 5112: 5085: 5066: 5043: 4885: 4873: 4861: 4771: 4680: 4543: 4501: 4263: 4239: 4229: 4227: 4166: 4149: 4125: 4083: 4025: 4001: 3984: 3941: 3856: 3839: 3810: 3747: 3684: 3588: 3576: 3561: 3546: 3450: 3392: 3375: 3331: 3314:

The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire: 1815–1918

3226: 3139: 3127: 3115: 3007: 2995: 2983: 2172:; German violation of Belgian neutrality provided the 2091:

by maneuvering north and violating Belgian neutrality.

1596:

On 25 July 1914, the council of ministers was held in

1436: 989: 6470: 6455: 6419: 5877: 5016: 5004: 4992: 4584: 4572: 4359: 4347: 4335: 4311: 4193: 4100: 3965: 3914: 3868: 3789: 3766: 3648: 3636: 3624: 3523: 3477: 3407: 3348: 3287: 3248: 3214: 3103: 3091: 2971: 2959: 1833:

Cartoon titled "The Globe Trotter" in U.S. newspaper

1679:

On 26 July, in St. Petersburg, the German ambassador

6361:"World War I, Origin of the Term "A Scrap of Paper"" 6245: 6233: 6196:"Declarations of War from Around the World: Germany" 3660: 3178: 4224: 2707:to enable the realisation of Austria-Hungary’s aim 2074: 2019:Cartoon titled "The Army Worm" in the US newspaper 1529:in five phases begun on 7 August, now known as the 1229: 830:, who he was quite sure would have a similar view. 414:

Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (28 June)

7303: 7260:Die Julikrise: Europas Weg in den Ersten Weltkrieg 7019: 6698: 6569: 3827: 2231:had been alive, she would never have allowed it." 934:Austria-Hungary considers an ultimatum (7–23 July) 461:and upsetting the fragile balance of power in the 2275:Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia (6 August) 1450:Germany considers military scenarios (23–24 July) 1140:Austria-Hungary finalises the ultimatum (19 July) 1075:Austria-Hungary delays war until at least 25 July 814:Hoyos provided Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Count 787: 651:, which gave him confidence it would work again. 10162: 7114:Hamilton, Richard F.; Herwig, Holger H. (2004). 6637:The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 6542: 6389: 1790:Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia (28 July) 1219:and the acting prime minister, finance minister 505: 8389:Armistice between Russia and the Central Powers 7264:The July Crisis: Europe's Path into World War I 2709:without at the same time unleashing a world war 1555:Russia orders partial mobilisation (24–25 July) 876:was warned by the German Ambassador in London, 514:The accused in court. Front row, from left: 1. 453:. Thirty years later, Austria-Hungary formally 7145:The First World War: A Very Short Introduction 7113: 6914:Thirteen Days: The Road to the First World War 5505:"Church to mark centenary of the start of WWI" 2586:A Concise Chronicle of Events of the Great War 2220:of rapid movement on the battlefield like the 1866:At a meeting in Potsdam, according to Admiral 1304:Dissolve the Serbian nationalist organisation 9571: 7428: 7310:. Chapel Hill, NC: Documentary Publications. 7087:"The Greatest Catastrophe the World Has Seen" 6814:Germany and the Causes of the First World War 3511:. German Historical Institute, Washington, DC 2179:Later on 4 August, Bethmann Hollweg told the 1465:from 1913 to 1914, urged an attack on Russia. 1257:French President Poincaré and Prime Minister 572:Austro-Hungarian citizens, none from Serbia. 271: 2875:action. I give you my solemn word for this." 8879: 7400:The games of July: explaining the Great War 7109:. Vol. 2. Macmillan. pp. 183–668. 6836:Outbreak of the World War: German Documents 6789:(1997). "Russia Accepts a General War". In 6355: 6353: 6190: 6188: 4909: 2349:Historiography of the causes of World War I 2043:general or partial strike or of sabotage." 1297:In addition, the Serbian government should 749:, approached Berchtold's chief of cabinet, 590:1903 murder of the King and Queen of Serbia 9578: 9564: 7435: 7421: 7222:The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914 7040: 6797:(6th ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 6322: 6320: 6136:Die Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch 3690: 2589:. London: Philip Allan and Co. p. 259 2576: 2189:Britain declares war on Germany (4 August) 958:, was an existential threat to the Empire. 278: 264: 7294:Neilson, Keith. "1914: The German War?." 7216: 7209:Levy, Jack S., and John A. Vasquez, eds. 6493: 6401: 6311: 6275: 6131: 6119: 5332: 3741: 3729: 3714: 3678: 3471: 3444: 3432: 3369: 3281: 3172: 3160: 3097: 3085: 3073: 3061: 3049: 3037: 3025: 3001: 2989: 2927: 420:Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand 306:. The crisis began on 28 June 1914, when 8678:Revolutions and interventions in Hungary 7257: 7243:(2014 ed.). New York: Basic Books. 7238: 6992: 6930: 6811: 6413: 6350: 6185: 5973: 4915: 4389: 3666: 2238: 2192: 2150:German troops took control of Luxembourg 2114: 2078: 2014: 1934: 1828: 1793: 1718:that eliminates any reason for war" or " 1564: 1514: 1453: 1400: 1381:On the night of 23 July, Serbian Regent 1366: 1284: 1243: 1078: 1013: 937: 863:of the Naval General Staff, and Admiral 797: 733: 677: 609: 509: 423: 25: 9055:Occupied Enemy Territory Administration 7349: 7014: 6908: 6830: 6719: 6693: 6673: 6590: 6520: 6449: 6437: 6317: 6299: 6287: 6263: 6227: 6179: 6167: 6152: 6107: 6095: 6076: 6064: 6052: 6033: 6014: 6002: 5985: 5961: 5942: 5930: 5907: 5859: 5838: 5826: 5814: 5799: 5782: 5765: 5746: 5731: 5716: 5693: 5672: 5653: 5638: 5626: 5611: 5592: 5577: 5565: 5550: 5538: 5487: 5472: 5460: 5443: 5431: 5416: 5399: 5382: 5365: 5320: 5301: 5282: 5265: 5253: 5232: 5213: 5201: 5189: 5166: 5151: 5139: 5127: 5106: 5094: 5079: 5060: 5037: 4903: 4855: 4843: 4822: 4801: 4784: 4765: 4748: 4736: 4721: 4709: 4697: 4674: 4657: 4645: 4628: 4611: 4566: 4537: 4522: 4480: 4478: 4476: 4329: 4305: 4293: 4276: 4257: 4245: 4218: 4206: 4187: 4175: 4160: 4143: 4131: 4119: 4094: 4077: 4065: 4050: 4038: 4019: 4007: 3995: 3978: 3959: 3947: 3935: 3923: 3908: 3893: 3881: 3862: 3850: 3821: 3804: 3783: 3760: 3654: 3642: 3630: 3618: 3606: 3594: 3582: 3570: 3555: 3540: 3490: 3456: 3420: 3401: 3386: 3342: 3317:. Addison-Wesley Longman. p. 254. 3298: 3266: 3220: 3148: 3133: 3121: 3109: 3013: 2977: 2965: 2011:German response to Russian mobilisation 1492:we shall at once reply by declaring war 606:Austro-Hungarian entry into World War I 10163: 7301: 7266:] (in German). Munich: C.H. Beck. 7139: 6899: 6850: 6785: 6763: 6612: 5344: 4986: 4943: 4891: 4879: 4867: 4549: 4507: 4434: 3509:German History in Documents and Images 3354: 3254: 1970:Russian general mobilisation (30 July) 1161:bringing about the desired world war. 368:, and would not attack without a full 10201:Diplomatic crises of the 20th century 9559: 9008:Austro-Hungarian occupation of Serbia 8344:Third Battle of Ypres (Passchendaele) 7416: 7084: 6998:The First World War: Volume I To Arms 6936:American Journal of International Law 6741: 6701:Germany's Aims in the First World War 6631: 6598:. Vintage Books. Vintage Publishing. 6564: 6476: 6464: 6425: 5895: 5883: 5871: 5022: 5010: 4998: 4590: 4578: 4484: 4377: 4365: 4353: 4341: 4317: 3702: 3237: 3208: 3196: 3184: 1731:, if he continued to work for peace. 1710:Wilhelm has second thoughts (26 July) 1185:who "had always said we must fight". 1031:Impatience from the German leadership 555:proposed to Russian Foreign Minister 340:sought to inflict a military blow on 9412:Agreement of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne 7391:Winter, Jay. and Antoine Prost eds. 7172: 6970: 6880: 6552:. London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd. 6338:from the original on 7 November 2017 6251: 6239: 5499: 4473: 4233: 3833: 3310: 3304: 2582: 2278: 1501: 1281:Austro-Hungarian ultimatum (23 July) 1112:On 17 July, Berchtold complained to 719:The German "Blank Cheque" (1–6 July) 9587:International relations (1814–1919) 9341:Ottomans against the Triple Entente 8135:Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes 7213:(Cambridge University Press, 2014). 7101: 7085:Evans, R. J. W. (6 February 2014). 6501:. London: Oxford University Press. 3238:Clark, Christopher (25 June 2014). 2234: 1983:preparedness before mobilization." 1744:the British Navy on a war footing. 1608: 1437:Britain offers to mediate (23 July) 990:Tisza alone opposes war with Serbia 673: 13: 8074:First Battle of the Masurian Lakes 7224:(Kindle ed.). Penguin Books. 7167:Journal of Modern European History 7081:(Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2012). 7064: 6681:. New York: Simon & Schuster. 6371:from the original on 22 March 2018 4440:"Rationalist Explanations for War" 2703:. We are concerned only to find a 2176:for Britain's declaration of war. 1764:Count Nikolaus Szécsen von Temerin 1101:On 16 July, Bethmann Hollweg told 910: 473:became the provincial capital and 16:1914 events leading to World War I 14: 10227: 10191:Politics of the Kingdom of Serbia 4485:Duffy, Michael (22 August 2009). 2344:Diplomatic history of World War I 954:, abetted by their co-ethnics in 654:Members of the "War Party", like 298:of Europe in the summer of 1914, 8437:Second Battle of the Piave River 8059:Russian invasion of East Prussia 6206:from the original on 14 May 2017 5493: 4937: 4428: 4383: 2896: 2887: 2878: 2865: 2856: 2847: 2838: 2829: 2820: 2809: 2800: 2791: 2782: 2773: 2764: 2754: 2741: 2728: 2718: 2693: 2683: 2674: 2665: 2656: 2642: 2633: 2624: 2615: 2606: 2567: 2557: 2548: 2475:attacking France through Belgium 2282: 2075:German mobilisation (1–3 August) 1690:, the political director of the 1519:French strategists had approved 1362: 1230:France backs Russia (20–23 July) 847:German Imperial Military Cabinet 242:Assassination of Franz Ferdinand 53: 10186:1914 in international relations 9508:Arrest of a Suspect in Sarajevo 8708:Lithuanian Wars of Independence 7442: 7151:. US: Oxford University Press. 6134:, Vol III, p. 172, referencing 4946:Journal of Contemporary History 3962:, Supplement IV, No 27, p. 635. 3496: 2539: 2530: 2521: 2512: 2498: 2489: 2480: 2060:not aimed as a prelude to war. 1289:Ciganović and Tankosić, Point 7 1177:was ordered to concentrate the 841:, the Prussian Minister of War 703:, was opposed to war, and that 588:and the officers he led in the 9331:Austria-Hungary against Serbia 9190:Deportations from East Prussia 8987:1915 typhus epidemic in Serbia 7118:. Cambridge University Press. 6544:Bethmann Hollweg, Theobald von 6486: 4260:, Supplement IV, No 2, p. 617. 2921: 2463: 2450: 2403: 2378: 2339:Commission of Responsibilities 2211:British entry into World War I 1588:and the Navy Minister Admiral 1561:Russian entry into World War I 1533:, resulted in a French defeat. 1507:affairs at all until 24 July. 1240:Russian entry into World War I 788:Hoyos visits Berlin (5–6 July) 660:Austro-Hungarian General Staff 1: 9957:Kronstadt–Toulon naval visits 9911:1917 Franco-Russian agreement 9901:Japan–Korea Annexation Treaty 9242:Ukrainian Canadian internment 6942:(S4): 309–413. October 1915. 6576:. US: Duke University Press. 5874:, pp. 245, 253, 266–267. 2914: 2089:(depicted here as blue areas) 1740:faced with a Russian attack. 1656:Jean-Baptiste Bienvenu-Martin 1236:French entry into World War I 828:Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg 730:German entry into World War I 506:Investigation and accusations 486:, five Bosnian Serbs and one 9817:Second Industrial Revolution 9691:League of the Three Emperors 9397:Sazonov–Paléologue Agreement 8696:Estonian War of Independence 8364:Southern Palestine offensive 7352:International Studies Review 7116:Decisions for War, 1914–1917 7107:The origins of the world war 7091:The New York Review of Books 6613:Butler, David Allen (2010). 6549:Reflections on the World War 6530:. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 2199:Canadian Expeditionary Force 1952:Annexationist Crisis of 1908 1183:Alfred von Kiderlen-Waechter 816:Ladislaus de Szögyény-Marich 542:and Serbian envoy to Russia 380:met with Russia, reaffirmed 331:Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg 152:Anglo-German naval arms race 7: 9847:Treaty of Versailles (1871) 9351:USA against Austria-Hungary 8750:Turkish War of Independence 8702:Latvian War of Independence 8427:Treaty of Bucharest of 1918 8018:Anti-Serb riots in Sarajevo 7402:(U of Michigan Press, 2011) 7302:Owings, W.A. Dolph (1984). 7291:(2014) 129#538 pp: 639–666. 7241:July 1914: Countdown to War 7000:. Oxford University Press. 6838:. Oxford University Press. 5335:, Vol II pp. 428n, 434–435. 2317: 2243:British satirical magazine 1425:and future Prime Minister, 1423:First Lord of the Admiralty 1214:Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1084:Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf 688:Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf 626:purposefully misspelled as 442:that brought an end to the 10: 10232: 9896:Japan–Korea Treaty of 1905 9434:Treaties of Brest-Litovsk 8982:1899–1923 cholera pandemic 8442:Second Battle of the Marne 8329:Second battle of the Aisne 8198:Second Battle of Champagne 8039:German invasion of Belgium 7296:European History Quarterly 7134:A Companion to World War I 6514:Volume 2 covers July 1914. 6499:Origins of the War of 1914 4958:10.1177/002200946800300104 4447:International Organization 2909: 2208: 2005:Willy–Nicky correspondence 1914:had no interest in peace. 1558: 1233: 1210:Baron Giesl von Gieslingen 872:British Foreign Secretary 791: 727: 690:, and the other ministers. 603: 417: 408:German invasion of Belgium 30:Political cartoon titled " 18: 10055: 9919: 9832: 9717:European balance of power 9709: 9644: 9593: 9540: 9499: 9420: 9359: 9321: 9265: 9254: 9215:Assyrian genocide (Sayfo) 9158: 9130: 9078: 9000: 8974: 8926: 8819: 8812: 8744:Irish War of Independence 8640: 8522: 8487:Armistice of Villa Giusti 8472:Battle of Vittorio Veneto 8397: 8299: 8226: 8127: 8084:First Battle of the Marne 8031: 7993: 7928: 7919: 7862: 7736: 7725: 7691: 7663: 7625: 7577: 7530: 7523: 7450: 7379:Journal of Modern History 7289:English Historical Review 7258:Mombauer, Annika (2014). 6904:. Atlantic Monthly Press. 6705:. New York: W.W. Norton. 4459:10.1017/S0020818300033324 4414:10.1017/S0008938900015041 2445: 2437: 1942:, Minister of War of the 1846:to "all points in Europe" 1570:Non-commissioned officers 1417:, British Prime Minister 1266:Balkan inception scenario 967:Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. 887:Count Waldersee wrote to 751:Alexander, Count of Hoyos 701:Prime Minister of Hungary 300:which led to the outbreak 10008:Venezuela Naval Blockade 9679:Anglo-Russian Convention 9367:Constantinople Agreement 8660:Armenian–Azerbaijani War 8523:Co-belligerent conflicts 8492:Second Romanian campaign 8462:Third Transjordan attack 8173:Gorlice–Tarnów offensive 8079:Battle of Grand Couronné 7342:Scott, Jonathan French. 7282:Central European History 6976:1914: Delusion or Design 6527:The Kaiser and His Times 4402:Central European History 2371: 2356:Financial crisis of 1914 1768:Admiral Georg von Müller 1463:Prussian Minister of War 1376:Prime Minister of Serbia 774:Heinrich von Tschirschky 755:Heinrich von Tschirschky 596:who arrived on 25 July. 431:La Domenica del Corriere 319:Archduke Franz Ferdinand 200:Anglo-Russian Convention 80:Second Concert of Europe 10013:Alaska boundary dispute 9686:Anglo-Japanese Alliance 9669:Franco-Russian Alliance 9430:Modus vivendi of Acroma 9382:Bulgaria–Germany treaty 8690:Greater Poland Uprising 8590:National Protection War 8467:Meuse–Argonne offensive 8417:German spring offensive 8412:Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 8188:Siege of Novogeorgievsk 8163:Second Battle of Artois 8044:Battle of the Frontiers 7333:First World War Studies 7239:McMeekin, Sean (2013). 7070:Albrecht-Carrié, René. 6916:. Chatto & Windus. 6812:Hewitson, Mark (2004). 6200:Law Library of Congress 2583:Rowe, Reginald (1920). 1852:Prince Henry of Prussia 1737:Social Democratic Party 1681:Friedrich von Pourtalès 1531:Battle of the Frontiers 1393:German shipping tycoon 1198:Friedrich von Pourtalès 904:Gustav Krupp von Bohlen 164:Anglo-Japanese Alliance 146:First Sino-Japanese War 140:Franco-Russian Alliance 110:Austro–Serbian Alliance 9932:Unification of Germany 9879:Taft–Katsura agreement 9455:Paris Peace Conference 9443:Ukraine–Central Powers 9237:Massacres of Albanians 9205:Late Ottoman genocides 9012:Bulgarian occupations 8720:Third Anglo-Afghan War 8684:Hungarian–Romanian War 8502:Naval Victory Bulletin 8497:Armistice with Germany 8447:Hundred Days Offensive 8374:Battle of La Malmaison 8324:Second battle of Arras 8291:Battle of Transylvania 8145:Second Battle of Ypres 8013:Sarajevo assassination 7902:South African Republic 7381:79.2 (2007): 335–387. 7335:8.2-3 (2017): 133–152 7175:International Security 7048:. St. Martin's Press. 7026:. US: Presidio Press. 6566:Boyle, Francis Anthony 2933:International Security 2429: 2421: 2413: 2250: 2206: 2120: 2092: 2026: 1947: 1847: 1799: 1577: 1534: 1466: 1410: 1383:Crown Prince Alexander 1378: 1290: 1254: 1087: 1019: 959: 803: 742: 691: 686:, army chief of staff 639: 553:Count Otto von Czernin 535: 451:Bosnia and Herzegovina 435: 336:Following the murder, 224:Second Moroccan Crisis 68:Unification of Germany 39: 10196:Causes of World War I 10018:First Moroccan Crisis 9732:Spread of nationalism 9696:Eight-Nation Alliance 9465:Treaty of St. Germain 9438:Russia–Central Powers 9392:Sykes–Picot Agreement 9220:Pontic Greek genocide 9195:Destruction of Kalisz 9171:Eastern Mediterranean 8732:Polish–Lithuanian War 8514:Armistice of Belgrade 8477:Armistice of Salonica 8407:Operation Faustschlag 8354:Third Battle of Oituz 8276:Baranovichi offensive 8244:Lake Naroch offensive 8218:Battle of Robat Karim 8193:Vistula–Bug offensive 8168:Battles of the Isonzo 8099:First Battle of Ypres 7298:44.3 (2014): 395–418. 7284:48.4 (2015): 541–564. 7042:Williamson, Samuel R. 6900:Palmer, Alan (1994). 6881:Otte, Thomas (2014). 6633:Clark, Christopher M. 6390:Bethmann Hollweg 1920 6332:www.firstworldwar.com 3911:, No 72, pp. 131–132. 3435:, Vol 1, pp. 534–539. 2329:Causes of World War I 2324:Allies of World War I 2242: 2196: 2118: 2082: 2018: 1938: 1832: 1797: 1574:Imperial Russian Army 1568: 1538:wrote in a letter to 1518: 1457: 1404: 1370: 1288: 1252:Nicholas II of Russia 1247: 1103:Siegfried von Roedern 1082: 1049:Dual Alliance of 1879 1017: 941: 885:Quartermaster general 834:policy in July 1914. 801: 739:Wilhelm II of Germany 737: 681: 656:Conrad von Hötzendorf 613: 586:Dragutin Dimitrijević 513: 455:annexed the territory 427: 400:semi-formally aligned 329:throne, and his wife 206:Young Turk Revolution 188:First Moroccan Crisis 29: 10023:Algeciras Conference 10003:Annexation of Hawaii 9942:Great Eastern Crisis 9937:Unification of Italy 9927:Formation of Romania 9744:French–German enmity 9460:Treaty of Versailles 9176:Mount Lebanon famine 9091:in the United States 9059:Russian occupations 8773:Turkish–Armenian War 8714:Polish–Ukrainian War 8654:Ukrainian–Soviet War 8601:Central Asian Revolt 8384:Armistice of Focșani 8114:Battle of Sarikamish 8064:Battle of Tannenberg 7460:Military engagements 7324:Paddock, Troy R. E. 7103:Fay, Sidney Bradshaw 7074:(1958), pp. 321–334. 6858:. Harper & Row. 6679:The Road to Sarajevo 2701:to hold Austria back 2471:German General Staff 2366:Powder keg of Europe 2201:before sailing from 1977:Vladimir Sukhomlinov 1940:Vladimir Sukhomlinov 1729:Crown Prince Wilhelm 1586:Vladimir Sukhomlinov 1582:Alexander Krivoshein 1459:Erich von Falkenhayn 1170:Hamburg America Line 1092:practically excluded 1025:King Peter of Serbia 843:Erich von Falkenhayn 544:Miroslav Spalajković 479:Emperor Franz Joseph 346:Yugoslav nationalism 86:Great Eastern Crisis 10088:Philippine–American 10073:First Sino-Japanese 9906:Racconigi agreement 9852:Treaty of Frankfurt 9812:Great Rapprochement 9766:Scramble for Africa 9527:They shall not pass 9450:Treaty of Bucharest 9407:Treaty of Bucharest 9346:USA against Germany 9323:Declarations of war 9027:German occupations 8940:British casualties 8799:Soviet–Georgian War 8726:Egyptian Revolution 8666:Armeno-Georgian War 8530:Somaliland campaign 8482:Armistice of Mudros 8359:Battle of Caporetto 8349:Battle of Mărășești 8319:Zimmermann telegram 8314:February Revolution 8259:Battle of the Somme 8183:Bug-Narew Offensive 8158:Battle of Gallipoli 8150:Sinking of the RMS 7942:Scramble for Africa 7936:Franco-Prussian War 7592:Sinai and Palestine 7218:MacMillan, Margaret 6392:, pp. 158–159. 6182:, pp. 239–240. 6110:, pp. 350–351. 6079:, pp. 233–239. 5898:, pp. 510–511. 5517:on 8 September 2017 5142:, pp. 210–211. 4906:, pp. 190–191. 4858:, pp. 206–207. 4751:, pp. 204–205. 4724:, pp. 202–203. 4660:, pp. 189–190. 4569:, pp. 196–197. 4497:on 30 October 2004. 4380:, pp. 449–450. 4308:, pp. 186–187. 4190:, pp. 180–181. 4146:, pp. 178–179. 4022:, pp. 168–169. 3717:, pp. 164–171. 3705:, pp. 402–403. 3621:, pp. 160–161. 3609:, pp. 159–160. 3474:, pp. 145–146. 3447:, pp. 133–134. 3372:, pp. 131–132. 3311:Sked, Alan (1989). 3211:, pp. 286–288. 3199:, pp. 391–392. 3163:, pp. 67, 271. 3088:, pp. 189–190. 3040:, pp. 100–101. 2222:Franco-Prussian War 1735:because the German 1478:would be unhinged. 1166:Norddeutscher Lloyd 520:Nedeljko Čabrinović 499:Nedeljko Čabrinović 376:. In the meantime, 74:Franco-Prussian War 9947:Congress of Berlin 9864:Reinsurance Treaty 9842:Congress of Vienna 9822:Industrial warfare 9788:Scramble for China 9487:Treaty of Lausanne 9402:Paris Economy Pact 9336:UK against Germany 9266:Entry into the war 9232:Urkun (Kyrgyzstan) 8951:Ottoman casualties 8761:Franco-Turkish War 8641:Post-War conflicts 8625:Russian Revolution 8607:Invasion of Darfur 8572:Kelantan rebellion 8560:Kurdish rebellions 8536:Mexican Revolution 8369:October Revolution 8334:Kerensky offensive 8309:Capture of Baghdad 8286:Monastir offensive 8271:Brusilov offensive 8109:Battle of Kolubara 7948:Russo-Japanese War 7364:10.1111/misr.12182 7306:The Sarajevo Trial 7022:The Guns of August 6404:, Vol III, p. 500. 6122:, Vol III, p. 381. 2929:Van Evera, Stephen 2650:Russo-Japanese War 2294:. You can help by 2251: 2207: 2121: 2102:David Lloyd George 2093: 2083:Map depicting the 2027: 2022:Chicago Daily News 1948: 1900:Maurice Paléologue 1868:Alfred von Tirpitz 1848: 1800: 1696:Wilhelm von Schoen 1688:Philippe Berthelot 1578: 1535: 1467: 1411: 1379: 1329:and civil servant 1291: 1255: 1129:Georg von Hertling 1088: 1020: 960: 889:Gottlieb von Jagow 865:Eduard von Capelle 845:, the head of the 804: 782:Helmuth von Moltke 747:Gottlieb von Jagow 743: 692: 640: 536: 465:, precipitating a 440:Congress of Berlin 436: 176:Russo-Japanese War 134:Reinsurance Treaty 92:Campaign in Bosnia 45:Events leading to 40: 10158: 10157: 10127:Albanian Revolts 9984:German Naval Laws 9968:Naval arms races 9952:Berlin Conference 9884:Hague Conventions 9553: 9552: 9536: 9535: 9520:The Golden Virgin 9514:Mutilated victory 9495: 9494: 9475:Treaty of Trianon 9470:Treaty of Neuilly 9377:Damascus Protocol 9250: 9249: 9210:Armenian genocide 9167:Allied blockades 9139:Belgian refugees 8922: 8921: 8832:Strategic bombing 8808: 8807: 8793:Franco-Syrian War 8767:Greco-Turkish War 8755:Anglo-Turkish War 8738:Polish–Soviet War 8672:German Revolution 8648:Russian Civil War 8631:Finnish Civil War 8457:Battle of Megiddo 8432:Battle of Goychay 8379:Battle of Cambrai 8339:Battle of Mărăști 8254:Battle of Jutland 8234:Erzurum offensive 8089:Siege of Przemyśl 8069:Siege of Tsingtao 8054:Battle of Galicia 7984:Second Balkan War 7972:Italo-Turkish War 7929:Pre-War conflicts 7915: 7914: 7805:Portuguese Empire 7721: 7720: 7683:German New Guinea 7665:Asian and Pacific 7398:Zagare, Frank C. 7370:Wawro, Geoffrey. 7317:978-0-8971-2122-4 7273:978-3-4066-6108-2 7250:978-0-4650-6074-0 7231:978-0-8129-9470-4 7158:978-0-1992-0559-2 7132:Horne, John, ed. 7125:978-0-5218-3679-1 7055:978-0-3120-5283-6 7033:978-0-3454-7609-8 6985:978-0-2361-5466-1 6923:978-0-7011-7293-0 6892:978-1-1070-6490-4 6865:978-0-0604-3844-9 6852:Langer, William L 6823:978-1-8597-3870-2 6804:978-0-6694-1692-3 6778:978-0-1424-2256-4 6771:. Penguin Books. 6756:978-0-3930-0722-0 6734:978-0-4340-0858-2 6712:978-0-3930-9798-6 6675:Dedijer, Vladimir 6650:978-0-0611-4665-7 6624:978-1-9351-4927-9 6605:978-0-0995-8133-8 6583:978-0-8223-2364-8 6416:, pp. 97–98. 6138:, Vol III, p. 562 5988:, pp. 81–82. 5580:, pp. 75–76. 5475:, No 248, p. 237. 5463:, No 236, p. 230. 5446:, No 218, p. 221. 5434:, No 201, p. 210. 5268:, pp. 71–72. 5216:, No 265, p. 247. 5204:, No 258, p. 243. 5109:, pp. 72–73. 4989:, pp. 65–88. 4930:978-0-3939-3433-5 4491:FirstWorldWar.com 4053:, pp. 58–59. 3938:, pp. 59–60. 3502:Original text at 3324:978-0-5820-2530-1 3269:, pp. 51–52. 2599:Project Gutenberg 2312: 2311: 2197:A soldier of the 1986:Russia did this: 1844:US-Mexico tension 1836:Rock Island Argus 1502:Full-blown crisis 1427:Winston Churchill 1407:Kingdom of Serbia 1327:Vojislav Tankosić 1065:Count Lerchenfeld 970:Balkan prestige. 878:Prince Lichnowsky 850:Moriz von Lyncker 839:Arthur Zimmermann 684:Leopold Berchtold 664:Christopher Clark 645:Leopold Berchtold 490:, coordinated by 467:diplomatic crisis 444:Russo-Turkish War 288: 287: 230:Italo-Turkish War 218:Racconigi Bargain 122:Berlin Conference 10223: 10206:July 1914 events 10181:1914 in politics 10078:Spanish–American 9998:Fashoda Incident 9874:Treaty of Björkö 9859:Treaty of Berlin 9793:Open Door Policy 9727:Eastern question 9674:Entente Cordiale 9580: 9573: 9566: 9557: 9556: 9480:Treaty of Sèvres 9372:Treaty of London 9263: 9262: 9041:Northeast France 8972: 8971: 8944:Parliamentarians 8877: 8876: 8839:Chemical weapons 8817: 8816: 8578:Senussi campaign 8548:Muscat rebellion 8542:Maritz rebellion 8510: 8452:Vardar offensive 8281:Battle of Romani 8249:Battle of Asiago 8239:Battle of Verdun 8203:Kosovo offensive 7978:First Balkan War 7926: 7925: 7825:Russian Republic 7734: 7733: 7528: 7527: 7470:Economic history 7437: 7430: 7423: 7414: 7413: 7405:Zametica, John. 7367: 7321: 7309: 7277: 7254: 7235: 7206: 7162: 7129: 7110: 7098: 7059: 7037: 7025: 7016:Tuchman, Barbara 7011: 6989: 6978:. London: Elek. 6972:Röhl, John C. G. 6967: 6927: 6905: 6896: 6877: 6847: 6827: 6816:. Berg: Oxford. 6808: 6782: 6760: 6738: 6716: 6704: 6690: 6670: 6628: 6609: 6587: 6575: 6561: 6539: 6522:Balfour, Michael 6510: 6495:Albertini, Luigi 6480: 6474: 6468: 6462: 6453: 6447: 6441: 6435: 6429: 6423: 6417: 6411: 6405: 6399: 6393: 6387: 6381: 6380: 6378: 6376: 6357: 6348: 6347: 6345: 6343: 6324: 6315: 6309: 6303: 6297: 6291: 6285: 6279: 6273: 6267: 6261: 6255: 6249: 6243: 6237: 6231: 6225: 6216: 6215: 6213: 6211: 6192: 6183: 6177: 6171: 6165: 6156: 6150: 6139: 6129: 6123: 6117: 6111: 6105: 6099: 6093: 6080: 6074: 6068: 6062: 6056: 6050: 6037: 6031: 6018: 6012: 6006: 6000: 5989: 5983: 5977: 5971: 5965: 5959: 5946: 5940: 5934: 5928: 5911: 5905: 5899: 5893: 5887: 5881: 5875: 5869: 5863: 5857: 5842: 5836: 5830: 5824: 5818: 5812: 5803: 5797: 5786: 5780: 5769: 5763: 5750: 5744: 5735: 5729: 5720: 5714: 5697: 5691: 5676: 5670: 5657: 5651: 5642: 5636: 5630: 5624: 5615: 5609: 5596: 5590: 5581: 5575: 5569: 5563: 5554: 5548: 5542: 5536: 5527: 5526: 5524: 5522: 5513:. Archived from 5503:(27 July 2014). 5497: 5491: 5485: 5476: 5470: 5464: 5458: 5447: 5441: 5435: 5429: 5420: 5414: 5403: 5397: 5386: 5380: 5369: 5363: 5348: 5342: 5336: 5330: 5324: 5318: 5305: 5299: 5286: 5280: 5269: 5263: 5257: 5251: 5236: 5230: 5217: 5211: 5205: 5199: 5193: 5187: 5170: 5164: 5155: 5149: 5143: 5137: 5131: 5125: 5110: 5104: 5098: 5092: 5083: 5077: 5064: 5058: 5041: 5035: 5026: 5020: 5014: 5008: 5002: 4996: 4990: 4984: 4978: 4977: 4941: 4935: 4934: 4913: 4907: 4901: 4895: 4889: 4883: 4877: 4871: 4865: 4859: 4853: 4847: 4841: 4826: 4820: 4805: 4799: 4788: 4782: 4769: 4763: 4752: 4746: 4740: 4734: 4725: 4719: 4713: 4707: 4701: 4695: 4678: 4672: 4661: 4655: 4649: 4643: 4632: 4626: 4615: 4609: 4594: 4588: 4582: 4576: 4570: 4564: 4553: 4547: 4541: 4535: 4526: 4520: 4511: 4505: 4499: 4498: 4493:. Archived from 4482: 4471: 4470: 4444: 4436:Fearon, James D. 4432: 4426: 4425: 4399: 4391:Jarausch, Konrad 4387: 4381: 4375: 4369: 4363: 4357: 4351: 4345: 4339: 4333: 4327: 4321: 4315: 4309: 4303: 4297: 4291: 4280: 4274: 4261: 4255: 4249: 4243: 4237: 4231: 4222: 4221:, No 82, p. 137. 4216: 4210: 4204: 4191: 4185: 4179: 4173: 4164: 4158: 4147: 4141: 4135: 4129: 4123: 4117: 4098: 4092: 4081: 4080:, No 87, p. 142. 4075: 4069: 4068:, No 87, p. 141. 4063: 4054: 4048: 4042: 4036: 4023: 4017: 4011: 4005: 3999: 3993: 3982: 3976: 3963: 3957: 3951: 3945: 3939: 3933: 3927: 3921: 3912: 3906: 3897: 3891: 3885: 3879: 3866: 3860: 3854: 3848: 3837: 3831: 3825: 3819: 3808: 3802: 3787: 3781: 3764: 3758: 3745: 3739: 3733: 3727: 3718: 3712: 3706: 3700: 3694: 3688: 3682: 3676: 3670: 3664: 3658: 3652: 3646: 3640: 3634: 3628: 3622: 3616: 3610: 3604: 3598: 3592: 3586: 3580: 3574: 3568: 3559: 3553: 3544: 3538: 3521: 3520: 3518: 3516: 3500: 3494: 3488: 3475: 3469: 3460: 3454: 3448: 3442: 3436: 3430: 3424: 3418: 3405: 3399: 3390: 3384: 3373: 3367: 3358: 3352: 3346: 3340: 3329: 3328: 3308: 3302: 3296: 3285: 3279: 3270: 3264: 3258: 3252: 3246: 3245: 3241:Month of Madness 3235: 3224: 3218: 3212: 3206: 3200: 3194: 3188: 3182: 3176: 3170: 3164: 3158: 3152: 3146: 3137: 3131: 3125: 3119: 3113: 3107: 3101: 3095: 3089: 3083: 3077: 3071: 3065: 3059: 3053: 3047: 3041: 3035: 3029: 3023: 3017: 3011: 3005: 2999: 2993: 2987: 2981: 2975: 2969: 2963: 2957: 2956: 2925: 2903: 2900: 2894: 2891: 2885: 2882: 2876: 2869: 2863: 2860: 2854: 2851: 2845: 2842: 2836: 2833: 2827: 2824: 2818: 2813: 2807: 2804: 2798: 2795: 2789: 2786: 2780: 2777: 2771: 2768: 2762: 2758: 2752: 2745: 2739: 2732: 2726: 2722: 2716: 2697: 2691: 2687: 2681: 2678: 2672: 2669: 2663: 2660: 2654: 2646: 2640: 2637: 2631: 2628: 2622: 2619: 2613: 2610: 2604: 2602: 2596: 2594: 2580: 2574: 2571: 2565: 2561: 2555: 2552: 2546: 2543: 2537: 2534: 2528: 2525: 2519: 2516: 2510: 2502: 2496: 2493: 2487: 2484: 2478: 2469:Previously, the 2467: 2461: 2458:balance of power 2454: 2448: 2447: 2439: 2414:Crise de juillet 2407: 2401: 2382: 2307: 2304: 2286: 2279: 2235:British thinking 1609:Russian thinking 1590:Ivan Grigorovich 1122: 1038:Raymond Poincaré 893:Foreign Minister 857:Hans von Plessen 854:Adjutant general 705:Karl von Stürgkh 674:Debate in Vienna 569:freedom fighting 457:, violating the 327:Austro-Hungarian 323:heir presumptive 280: 273: 266: 182:Entente Cordiale 158:Fashoda Incident 128:Bulgarian Crisis 57: 42: 41: 10231: 10230: 10226: 10225: 10224: 10222: 10221: 10220: 10161: 10160: 10159: 10154: 10093:Boxer Rebellion 10051: 9915: 9869:Treaty of Paris 9834: 9828: 9761:New Imperialism 9722:Ottoman decline 9705: 9652:Triple Alliance 9640: 9601:Austria-Hungary 9589: 9584: 9554: 9549: 9532: 9491: 9423: 9416: 9387:Treaty of Darin 9355: 9317: 9273:Austria-Hungary 9259: 9246: 9227:Rape of Belgium 9154: 9126: 9074: 9068:Western Armenia 9063:Eastern Galicia 8996: 8970: 8934: 8933:Civilian impact 8932: 8918: 8875: 8804: 8636: 8566:Ovambo Uprising 8518: 8504: 8393: 8295: 8222: 8140:Battle of Łomża 8123: 8119:Christmas truce 8094:Race to the Sea 8027: 7989: 7911: 7882:Austria-Hungary 7858: 7793:Empire of Japan 7730: 7728: 7717: 7701:U-boat campaign 7687: 7659: 7621: 7573: 7519: 7500:Popular culture 7446: 7441: 7318: 7274: 7251: 7232: 7187:10.2307/2538910 7159: 7141:Howard, Michael 7126: 7067: 7065:Further reading 7062: 7056: 7034: 7008: 6986: 6948:10.2307/2212216 6924: 6893: 6866: 6824: 6805: 6787:Lieven, D. C. B 6779: 6757: 6735: 6713: 6651: 6625: 6606: 6584: 6489: 6484: 6483: 6475: 6471: 6463: 6456: 6448: 6444: 6436: 6432: 6424: 6420: 6412: 6408: 6400: 6396: 6388: 6384: 6374: 6372: 6365:net.lib.byu.edu 6359: 6358: 6351: 6341: 6339: 6326: 6325: 6318: 6310: 6306: 6298: 6294: 6286: 6282: 6274: 6270: 6262: 6258: 6250: 6246: 6238: 6234: 6226: 6219: 6209: 6207: 6194: 6193: 6186: 6178: 6174: 6166: 6159: 6151: 6142: 6130: 6126: 6118: 6114: 6106: 6102: 6094: 6083: 6075: 6071: 6063: 6059: 6051: 6040: 6032: 6021: 6013: 6009: 6001: 5992: 5984: 5980: 5972: 5968: 5960: 5949: 5941: 5937: 5929: 5914: 5906: 5902: 5894: 5890: 5882: 5878: 5870: 5866: 5858: 5845: 5837: 5833: 5825: 5821: 5813: 5806: 5798: 5789: 5781: 5772: 5764: 5753: 5745: 5738: 5730: 5723: 5715: 5700: 5692: 5679: 5671: 5660: 5652: 5645: 5637: 5633: 5625: 5618: 5610: 5599: 5591: 5584: 5576: 5572: 5564: 5557: 5549: 5545: 5537: 5530: 5520: 5518: 5510:The Independent 5498: 5494: 5486: 5479: 5471: 5467: 5459: 5450: 5442: 5438: 5430: 5423: 5415: 5406: 5398: 5389: 5381: 5372: 5364: 5351: 5343: 5339: 5331: 5327: 5319: 5308: 5300: 5289: 5281: 5272: 5264: 5260: 5252: 5239: 5231: 5220: 5212: 5208: 5200: 5196: 5188: 5173: 5165: 5158: 5150: 5146: 5138: 5134: 5126: 5113: 5105: 5101: 5093: 5086: 5078: 5067: 5059: 5044: 5036: 5029: 5021: 5017: 5009: 5005: 4997: 4993: 4985: 4981: 4942: 4938: 4931: 4914: 4910: 4902: 4898: 4890: 4886: 4878: 4874: 4866: 4862: 4854: 4850: 4842: 4829: 4821: 4808: 4800: 4791: 4783: 4772: 4764: 4755: 4747: 4743: 4735: 4728: 4720: 4716: 4708: 4704: 4696: 4681: 4673: 4664: 4656: 4652: 4644: 4635: 4627: 4618: 4610: 4597: 4589: 4585: 4577: 4573: 4565: 4556: 4548: 4544: 4536: 4529: 4521: 4514: 4506: 4502: 4483: 4474: 4442: 4438:(Summer 1995). 4433: 4429: 4397: 4388: 4384: 4376: 4372: 4364: 4360: 4352: 4348: 4340: 4336: 4328: 4324: 4316: 4312: 4304: 4300: 4292: 4283: 4275: 4264: 4256: 4252: 4244: 4240: 4232: 4225: 4217: 4213: 4205: 4194: 4186: 4182: 4174: 4167: 4159: 4150: 4142: 4138: 4130: 4126: 4118: 4101: 4093: 4084: 4076: 4072: 4064: 4057: 4049: 4045: 4037: 4026: 4018: 4014: 4006: 4002: 3994: 3985: 3977: 3966: 3958: 3954: 3946: 3942: 3934: 3930: 3922: 3915: 3907: 3900: 3896:, No 36, p. 99. 3892: 3888: 3880: 3869: 3861: 3857: 3849: 3840: 3832: 3828: 3820: 3811: 3803: 3790: 3782: 3767: 3759: 3748: 3740: 3736: 3728: 3721: 3713: 3709: 3701: 3697: 3691:Williamson 1991 3689: 3685: 3677: 3673: 3665: 3661: 3653: 3649: 3641: 3637: 3629: 3625: 3617: 3613: 3605: 3601: 3593: 3589: 3581: 3577: 3569: 3562: 3554: 3547: 3539: 3524: 3514: 3512: 3503: 3501: 3497: 3489: 3478: 3470: 3463: 3455: 3451: 3443: 3439: 3431: 3427: 3419: 3408: 3400: 3393: 3385: 3376: 3368: 3361: 3353: 3349: 3341: 3332: 3325: 3309: 3305: 3297: 3288: 3280: 3273: 3265: 3261: 3253: 3249: 3236: 3227: 3219: 3215: 3207: 3203: 3195: 3191: 3183: 3179: 3171: 3167: 3159: 3155: 3147: 3140: 3132: 3128: 3120: 3116: 3108: 3104: 3096: 3092: 3084: 3080: 3072: 3068: 3060: 3056: 3048: 3044: 3036: 3032: 3024: 3020: 3012: 3008: 3000: 2996: 2988: 2984: 2976: 2972: 2964: 2960: 2945:10.2307/2538636 2926: 2922: 2917: 2912: 2907: 2906: 2901: 2897: 2892: 2888: 2883: 2879: 2870: 2866: 2861: 2857: 2852: 2848: 2843: 2839: 2834: 2830: 2825: 2821: 2814: 2810: 2805: 2801: 2796: 2792: 2787: 2783: 2778: 2774: 2769: 2765: 2759: 2755: 2746: 2742: 2733: 2729: 2723: 2719: 2698: 2694: 2688: 2684: 2679: 2675: 2670: 2666: 2661: 2657: 2647: 2643: 2638: 2634: 2629: 2625: 2620: 2616: 2611: 2607: 2592: 2590: 2581: 2577: 2572: 2568: 2562: 2558: 2553: 2549: 2544: 2540: 2535: 2531: 2526: 2522: 2517: 2513: 2503: 2499: 2494: 2490: 2485: 2481: 2468: 2464: 2455: 2451: 2438:Июльский кризис 2408: 2404: 2383: 2379: 2374: 2320: 2308: 2302: 2299: 2292:needs expansion 2277: 2237: 2213: 2191: 2142: 2085:Schlieffen Plan 2077: 2053: 2013: 1972: 1933: 1891: 1792: 1780:William Tyrrell 1750: 1712: 1664: 1611: 1563: 1557: 1545:Arthur Nicolson 1540:Venetia Stanley 1513: 1504: 1476:Schlieffen Plan 1452: 1439: 1415:Venetia Stanley 1413:In a letter to 1365: 1331:Milan Ciganović 1307:Narodna Odbrana 1283: 1242: 1234:Main articles: 1232: 1223:, received it. 1179:High Seas Fleet 1142: 1116: 1114:Prince Stolberg 1077: 1033: 992: 936: 913: 911:German thinking 820:Triple Alliance 796: 790: 764:On 2 July, the 732: 726: 721: 676: 658:, Chief of the 608: 602: 532:Miško Jovanović 524:Gavrilo Princip 508: 497:At 10:10 a.m., 422: 416: 338:Austria-Hungary 308:Gavrilo Princip 284: 255: 116:Triple Alliance 24: 17: 12: 11: 5: 10229: 10219: 10218: 10213: 10208: 10203: 10198: 10193: 10188: 10183: 10178: 10176:1914 in Europe 10173: 10156: 10155: 10153: 10152: 10147: 10146: 10145: 10144: 10143: 10138: 10133: 10125: 10120: 10110: 10105: 10103:Russo-Japanese 10100: 10095: 10090: 10085: 10080: 10075: 10070: 10068:Anglo-Egyptian 10065: 10059: 10057: 10053: 10052: 10050: 10049: 10044: 10042:Bosnian Crisis 10039: 10038: 10037: 10027: 10026: 10025: 10015: 10010: 10005: 10000: 9995: 9994: 9993: 9991:Austro-Italian 9988: 9987: 9986: 9981: 9966: 9959: 9954: 9949: 9944: 9939: 9934: 9929: 9923: 9921: 9917: 9916: 9914: 9913: 9908: 9903: 9898: 9893: 9892: 9891: 9889:Martens Clause 9881: 9876: 9871: 9866: 9861: 9856: 9855: 9854: 9844: 9838: 9836: 9830: 9829: 9827: 9826: 9825: 9824: 9814: 9809: 9804: 9803: 9802: 9801: 9800: 9795: 9790: 9785: 9775: 9774: 9773: 9771:Egyptian Lever 9758: 9756:Pax Britannica 9753: 9752: 9751: 9741: 9740: 9739: 9737:Sovereign debt 9734: 9729: 9719: 9713: 9711: 9707: 9706: 9704: 9703: 9698: 9693: 9688: 9683: 9682: 9681: 9676: 9671: 9664:Triple Entente 9661: 9660: 9659: 9648: 9646: 9642: 9641: 9639: 9638: 9633: 9631:United Kingdom 9628: 9623: 9618: 9613: 9608: 9603: 9597: 9595: 9591: 9590: 9583: 9582: 9575: 9568: 9560: 9551: 9550: 9548: 9547: 9541: 9538: 9537: 9534: 9533: 9531: 9530: 9523: 9516: 9511: 9503: 9501: 9497: 9496: 9493: 9492: 9490: 9489: 9484: 9483: 9482: 9477: 9472: 9467: 9462: 9452: 9447: 9446: 9445: 9440: 9432: 9426: 9424: 9422:Peace treaties 9421: 9418: 9417: 9415: 9414: 9409: 9404: 9399: 9394: 9389: 9384: 9379: 9374: 9369: 9363: 9361: 9357: 9356: 9354: 9353: 9348: 9343: 9338: 9333: 9327: 9325: 9319: 9318: 9316: 9315: 9310: 9308:United Kingdom 9305: 9300: 9298:Ottoman Empire 9295: 9290: 9285: 9280: 9275: 9269: 9267: 9260: 9255: 9252: 9251: 9248: 9247: 9245: 9244: 9239: 9234: 9229: 9224: 9223: 9222: 9217: 9212: 9202: 9200:Sack of Dinant 9197: 9192: 9187: 9186: 9185: 9180: 9179: 9178: 9164: 9162: 9156: 9155: 9153: 9152: 9151: 9150: 9148:United Kingdom 9145: 9136: 9134: 9128: 9127: 9125: 9124: 9123: 9122: 9117: 9108: 9102:POW locations 9100: 9095: 9094: 9093: 9084: 9082: 9076: 9075: 9073: 9072: 9071: 9070: 9065: 9057: 9052: 9051: 9050: 9043: 9038: 9033: 9025: 9024: 9023: 9018: 9010: 9004: 9002: 8998: 8997: 8995: 8994: 8989: 8984: 8978: 8976: 8969: 8968: 8967: 8966: 8961: 8953: 8948: 8947: 8946: 8937: 8935: 8927: 8924: 8923: 8920: 8919: 8917: 8916: 8911: 8910: 8909: 8902:United Kingdom 8899: 8897:Ottoman Empire 8894: 8889: 8883: 8881: 8874: 8873: 8871:Trench warfare 8868: 8867: 8866: 8856: 8851: 8846: 8841: 8836: 8835: 8834: 8823: 8821: 8814: 8810: 8809: 8806: 8805: 8803: 8802: 8796: 8790: 8784: 8778: 8777: 8776: 8770: 8764: 8758: 8747: 8741: 8735: 8729: 8723: 8717: 8711: 8705: 8699: 8693: 8687: 8681: 8675: 8669: 8663: 8657: 8651: 8644: 8642: 8638: 8637: 8635: 8634: 8628: 8622: 8616: 8610: 8604: 8598: 8592: 8587: 8584:Volta-Bani War 8581: 8575: 8569: 8563: 8557: 8551: 8545: 8539: 8533: 8526: 8524: 8520: 8519: 8517: 8516: 8511: 8499: 8494: 8489: 8484: 8479: 8474: 8469: 8464: 8459: 8454: 8449: 8444: 8439: 8434: 8429: 8424: 8422:Zeebrugge Raid 8419: 8414: 8409: 8403: 8401: 8395: 8394: 8392: 8391: 8386: 8381: 8376: 8371: 8366: 8361: 8356: 8351: 8346: 8341: 8336: 8331: 8326: 8321: 8316: 8311: 8305: 8303: 8297: 8296: 8294: 8293: 8288: 8283: 8278: 8273: 8268: 8267: 8266: 8256: 8251: 8246: 8241: 8236: 8230: 8228: 8224: 8223: 8221: 8220: 8215: 8213:Battle of Loos 8210: 8205: 8200: 8195: 8190: 8185: 8180: 8175: 8170: 8165: 8160: 8155: 8147: 8142: 8137: 8131: 8129: 8125: 8124: 8122: 8121: 8116: 8111: 8106: 8104:Black Sea raid 8101: 8096: 8091: 8086: 8081: 8076: 8071: 8066: 8061: 8056: 8051: 8046: 8041: 8035: 8033: 8029: 8028: 8026: 8025: 8020: 8015: 8010: 8009: 8008: 8006:Historiography 7997: 7995: 7991: 7990: 7988: 7987: 7981: 7975: 7969: 7963: 7960:Bosnian Crisis 7957: 7954:Tangier Crisis 7951: 7945: 7939: 7932: 7930: 7923: 7917: 7916: 7913: 7912: 7910: 7909: 7904: 7899: 7894: 7889: 7887:Ottoman Empire 7884: 7879: 7874: 7868: 7866: 7864:Central Powers 7860: 7859: 7857: 7856: 7851: 7850: 7849: 7847:British Empire 7842:United Kingdom 7839: 7834: 7829: 7828: 7827: 7822: 7820:Russian Empire 7812: 7807: 7802: 7797: 7796: 7795: 7785: 7780: 7775: 7774: 7773: 7763: 7758: 7753: 7748: 7742: 7740: 7738:Entente Powers 7731: 7726: 7723: 7722: 7719: 7718: 7716: 7715: 7710: 7709: 7708: 7706:North Atlantic 7697: 7695: 7689: 7688: 7686: 7685: 7680: 7675: 7669: 7667: 7661: 7660: 7658: 7657: 7652: 7647: 7642: 7637: 7631: 7629: 7623: 7622: 7620: 7619: 7617:Central Arabia 7614: 7609: 7604: 7599: 7594: 7589: 7583: 7581: 7579:Middle Eastern 7575: 7574: 7572: 7571: 7566: 7565: 7564: 7554: 7549: 7548: 7547: 7536: 7534: 7525: 7521: 7520: 7518: 7517: 7512: 7507: 7502: 7497: 7492: 7487: 7482: 7480:Historiography 7477: 7472: 7467: 7462: 7457: 7451: 7448: 7447: 7440: 7439: 7432: 7425: 7417: 7411: 7410: 7403: 7396: 7389: 7387:10.1086/519317 7375: 7368: 7358:(4): 623–644. 7347: 7340: 7329: 7322: 7316: 7299: 7292: 7285: 7278: 7272: 7255: 7249: 7236: 7230: 7214: 7207: 7181:(3): 151–186. 7170: 7163: 7157: 7137: 7130: 7124: 7111: 7099: 7082: 7077:Beatty, Jack. 7075: 7066: 7063: 7061: 7060: 7054: 7038: 7032: 7012: 7006: 6990: 6984: 6968: 6928: 6922: 6910:Ponting, Clive 6906: 6897: 6891: 6878: 6864: 6854:, ed. (1968). 6848: 6834:, ed. (1924). 6828: 6822: 6809: 6803: 6791:Herwig, Holger 6783: 6777: 6761: 6755: 6743:Geiss, Imanuel 6739: 6733: 6721:Fromkin, David 6717: 6711: 6695:Fischer, Fritz 6691: 6671: 6649: 6629: 6623: 6610: 6604: 6588: 6582: 6562: 6540: 6518: 6517: 6516: 6490: 6488: 6485: 6482: 6481: 6479:, p. 545. 6469: 6467:, p. 544. 6454: 6452:, p. 355. 6442: 6440:, p. 153. 6430: 6428:, p. 134. 6418: 6406: 6402:Albertini 1953 6394: 6382: 6349: 6316: 6314:, p. 504. 6312:Albertini 1953 6304: 6302:, p. 247. 6292: 6290:, p. 244. 6280: 6276:Albertini 1953 6268: 6266:, p. 243. 6256: 6254:, p. 477. 6244: 6242:, p. 487. 6232: 6230:, p. 241. 6217: 6184: 6172: 6170:, p. 237. 6157: 6155:, p. 240. 6140: 6132:Albertini 1953 6124: 6120:Albertini 1953 6112: 6100: 6098:, p. 239. 6081: 6069: 6067:, p. 242. 6057: 6055:, p. 236. 6038: 6036:, p. 235. 6019: 6017:, p. 234. 6007: 6005:, p. 233. 5990: 5978: 5976:, p. 202. 5966: 5947: 5945:, p. 232. 5935: 5912: 5900: 5888: 5886:, p. 509. 5876: 5864: 5862:, p. 231. 5843: 5831: 5829:, p. 230. 5819: 5804: 5787: 5770: 5751: 5749:, p. 229. 5736: 5734:, p. 227. 5721: 5698: 5696:, p. 226. 5677: 5675:, p. 225. 5658: 5656:, p. 224. 5643: 5641:, p. 223. 5631: 5629:, p. 222. 5616: 5597: 5582: 5570: 5555: 5543: 5541:, p. 220. 5528: 5492: 5490:, p. 217. 5477: 5465: 5448: 5436: 5421: 5419:, p. 216. 5404: 5402:, p. 215. 5387: 5385:, p. 214. 5370: 5349: 5347:, p. 103. 5337: 5333:Albertini 1953 5325: 5323:, p. 221. 5306: 5304:, p. 219. 5287: 5270: 5258: 5256:, p. 218. 5237: 5218: 5206: 5194: 5192:, p. 209. 5171: 5169:, p. 210. 5156: 5154:, p. 211. 5144: 5132: 5111: 5099: 5084: 5065: 5042: 5040:, p. 191. 5027: 5025:, p. 480. 5015: 5013:, p. 475. 5003: 5001:, p. 486. 4991: 4979: 4936: 4929: 4917:Merriman, John 4908: 4896: 4894:, p. 109. 4884: 4882:, p. 107. 4872: 4870:, p. 108. 4860: 4848: 4846:, p. 208. 4827: 4825:, p. 207. 4806: 4804:, p. 198. 4789: 4770: 4768:, p. 193. 4753: 4741: 4739:, p. 203. 4726: 4714: 4712:, p. 201. 4702: 4679: 4677:, p. 190. 4662: 4650: 4648:, p. 189. 4633: 4631:, p. 188. 4616: 4614:, p. 197. 4595: 4593:, p. 504. 4583: 4581:, p. 466. 4571: 4554: 4552:, p. 106. 4542: 4540:, p. 196. 4527: 4525:, p. 195. 4512: 4510:, p. 305. 4500: 4472: 4427: 4393:(March 1969). 4382: 4370: 4368:, p. 448. 4358: 4356:, p. 444. 4346: 4344:, p. 438. 4334: 4332:, p. 187. 4322: 4320:, p. 520. 4310: 4298: 4296:, p. 194. 4281: 4262: 4250: 4238: 4223: 4211: 4192: 4180: 4178:, p. 180. 4165: 4163:, p. 179. 4148: 4136: 4134:, p. 178. 4124: 4099: 4097:, p. 176. 4082: 4070: 4055: 4043: 4041:, p. 175. 4024: 4012: 4010:, p. 168. 4000: 3998:, p. 169. 3983: 3964: 3952: 3950:, p. 171. 3940: 3928: 3913: 3898: 3886: 3867: 3865:, p. 166. 3855: 3853:, p. 177. 3838: 3826: 3824:, p. 181. 3809: 3788: 3765: 3763:, p. 165. 3746: 3744:, p. 172. 3742:Albertini 1953 3734: 3732:, p. 171. 3730:Albertini 1953 3719: 3715:Albertini 1953 3707: 3695: 3683: 3681:, p. 168. 3679:Albertini 1953 3671: 3659: 3655:Ponting (2002) 3647: 3643:Ponting (2002) 3635: 3631:Ponting (2002) 3623: 3611: 3599: 3597:, p. 159. 3587: 3585:, p. 158. 3575: 3573:, p. 161. 3560: 3558:, p. 183. 3545: 3522: 3495: 3476: 3472:Albertini 1953 3461: 3459:, p. 157. 3449: 3445:Albertini 1953 3437: 3433:Albertini 1953 3425: 3406: 3404:, p. 202. 3391: 3389:, p. 156. 3374: 3370:Albertini 1953 3359: 3357:, p. 528. 3347: 3345:, p. 155. 3330: 3323: 3303: 3286: 3284:, p. 124. 3282:Albertini 1953 3271: 3259: 3257:, p. 328. 3247: 3244:. BBC Radio 4. 3225: 3213: 3201: 3189: 3187:, p. 379. 3177: 3175:, p. 272. 3173:Albertini 1953 3165: 3161:Albertini 1953 3153: 3151:, p. 186. 3138: 3136:, p. 185. 3126: 3124:, p. 279. 3114: 3102: 3098:Albertini 1953 3090: 3086:Albertini 1953 3078: 3074:Albertini 1953 3066: 3064:, p. 273. 3062:Albertini 1953 3054: 3050:Albertini 1953 3042: 3038:Albertini 1953 3030: 3026:Albertini 1953 3018: 3016:, p. 321. 3006: 3002:Albertini 1953 2994: 2990:Albertini 1953 2982: 2980:, p. 263. 2970: 2968:, p. 196. 2958: 2919: 2918: 2916: 2913: 2911: 2908: 2905: 2904: 2895: 2886: 2877: 2864: 2855: 2846: 2837: 2828: 2819: 2808: 2799: 2790: 2781: 2772: 2763: 2753: 2740: 2727: 2717: 2692: 2682: 2673: 2664: 2655: 2641: 2632: 2623: 2614: 2605: 2575: 2566: 2556: 2547: 2538: 2529: 2520: 2511: 2497: 2488: 2479: 2462: 2449: 2430:Júliusi válság 2402: 2400: 2399: 2396: 2393: 2390: 2387: 2376: 2375: 2373: 2370: 2369: 2368: 2363: 2358: 2353: 2352: 2351: 2341: 2336: 2334:Central Powers 2331: 2326: 2319: 2316: 2310: 2309: 2289: 2287: 2276: 2273: 2236: 2233: 2229:my grandmother 2209:Main article: 2190: 2187: 2141: 2138: 2076: 2073: 2052: 2049: 2012: 2009: 2001: 2000: 1997: 1994: 1991: 1971: 1968: 1944:Russian Empire 1932: 1929: 1890: 1887: 1881:casus foederis 1791: 1788: 1784:Edward Goschen 1749: 1746: 1711: 1708: 1663: 1660: 1632: 1631: 1628: 1625:Bosnian Crisis 1621: 1618: 1610: 1607: 1576:, 24 July 1914 1556: 1553: 1512: 1509: 1503: 1500: 1451: 1448: 1438: 1435: 1364: 1361: 1352: 1351: 1348: 1345: 1334: 1323: 1320: 1317: 1314: 1311: 1302: 1282: 1279: 1231: 1228: 1155:Horace Rumbold 1141: 1138: 1076: 1073: 1032: 1029: 991: 988: 935: 932: 912: 909: 792:Main article: 789: 786: 728:Main article: 725: 722: 720: 717: 675: 672: 604:Main article: 601: 598: 557:Sergey Sazonov 540:Milenko Vesnić 507: 504: 488:Bosnian Muslim 475:Oskar Potiorek 434:, 12 July 1914 418:Main article: 415: 412: 396:United Kingdom 382:their alliance 286: 285: 283: 282: 275: 268: 260: 257: 256: 254: 253: 252: 251: 245: 239: 233: 227: 221: 215: 212:Bosnian Crisis 209: 203: 197: 191: 185: 179: 173: 167: 161: 155: 149: 143: 137: 131: 125: 119: 113: 107: 101: 95: 89: 83: 77: 71: 62: 59: 58: 50: 49: 36:Kladderadatsch 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 10228: 10217: 10214: 10212: 10209: 10207: 10204: 10202: 10199: 10197: 10194: 10192: 10189: 10187: 10184: 10182: 10179: 10177: 10174: 10172: 10169: 10168: 10166: 10151: 10148: 10142: 10139: 10137: 10134: 10132: 10129: 10128: 10126: 10124: 10121: 10119: 10116: 10115: 10114: 10111: 10109: 10108:Italo-Turkish 10106: 10104: 10101: 10099: 10096: 10094: 10091: 10089: 10086: 10084: 10081: 10079: 10076: 10074: 10071: 10069: 10066: 10064: 10063:Russo-Turkish 10061: 10060: 10058: 10054: 10048: 10045: 10043: 10040: 10036: 10035:Treaty of Fes 10033: 10032: 10031: 10030:Agadir Crisis 10028: 10024: 10021: 10020: 10019: 10016: 10014: 10011: 10009: 10006: 10004: 10001: 9999: 9996: 9992: 9989: 9985: 9982: 9980: 9979: 9975: 9974: 9973: 9970: 9969: 9967: 9965: 9964: 9960: 9958: 9955: 9953: 9950: 9948: 9945: 9943: 9940: 9938: 9935: 9933: 9930: 9928: 9925: 9924: 9922: 9918: 9912: 9909: 9907: 9904: 9902: 9899: 9897: 9894: 9890: 9887: 9886: 9885: 9882: 9880: 9877: 9875: 9872: 9870: 9867: 9865: 9862: 9860: 9857: 9853: 9850: 9849: 9848: 9845: 9843: 9840: 9839: 9837: 9831: 9823: 9820: 9819: 9818: 9815: 9813: 9810: 9808: 9805: 9799: 9796: 9794: 9791: 9789: 9786: 9784: 9781: 9780: 9779: 9776: 9772: 9769: 9768: 9767: 9764: 9763: 9762: 9759: 9757: 9754: 9750: 9747: 9746: 9745: 9742: 9738: 9735: 9733: 9730: 9728: 9725: 9724: 9723: 9720: 9718: 9715: 9714: 9712: 9708: 9702: 9701:Balkan League 9699: 9697: 9694: 9692: 9689: 9687: 9684: 9680: 9677: 9675: 9672: 9670: 9667: 9666: 9665: 9662: 9658: 9657:Dual Alliance 9655: 9654: 9653: 9650: 9649: 9647: 9643: 9637: 9636:United States 9634: 9632: 9629: 9627: 9624: 9622: 9619: 9617: 9614: 9612: 9609: 9607: 9604: 9602: 9599: 9598: 9596: 9592: 9588: 9581: 9576: 9574: 9569: 9567: 9562: 9561: 9558: 9546: 9543: 9542: 9539: 9529: 9528: 9524: 9522: 9521: 9517: 9515: 9512: 9510: 9509: 9505: 9504: 9502: 9498: 9488: 9485: 9481: 9478: 9476: 9473: 9471: 9468: 9466: 9463: 9461: 9458: 9457: 9456: 9453: 9451: 9448: 9444: 9441: 9439: 9436: 9435: 9433: 9431: 9428: 9427: 9425: 9419: 9413: 9410: 9408: 9405: 9403: 9400: 9398: 9395: 9393: 9390: 9388: 9385: 9383: 9380: 9378: 9375: 9373: 9370: 9368: 9365: 9364: 9362: 9358: 9352: 9349: 9347: 9344: 9342: 9339: 9337: 9334: 9332: 9329: 9328: 9326: 9324: 9320: 9314: 9313:United States 9311: 9309: 9306: 9304: 9301: 9299: 9296: 9294: 9291: 9289: 9286: 9284: 9281: 9279: 9276: 9274: 9271: 9270: 9268: 9264: 9261: 9258: 9253: 9243: 9240: 9238: 9235: 9233: 9230: 9228: 9225: 9221: 9218: 9216: 9213: 9211: 9208: 9207: 9206: 9203: 9201: 9198: 9196: 9193: 9191: 9188: 9184: 9181: 9177: 9174: 9173: 9172: 9169: 9168: 9166: 9165: 9163: 9161: 9157: 9149: 9146: 9144: 9141: 9140: 9138: 9137: 9135: 9133: 9129: 9121: 9118: 9116: 9112: 9109: 9107: 9104: 9103: 9101: 9099: 9096: 9092: 9089: 9088: 9086: 9085: 9083: 9081: 9077: 9069: 9066: 9064: 9061: 9060: 9058: 9056: 9053: 9049: 9048: 9044: 9042: 9039: 9037: 9034: 9032: 9029: 9028: 9026: 9022: 9019: 9017: 9014: 9013: 9011: 9009: 9006: 9005: 9003: 8999: 8993: 8990: 8988: 8985: 8983: 8980: 8979: 8977: 8973: 8965: 8962: 8960: 8957: 8956: 8954: 8952: 8949: 8945: 8942: 8941: 8939: 8938: 8936: 8930: 8925: 8915: 8914:United States 8912: 8908: 8905: 8904: 8903: 8900: 8898: 8895: 8893: 8890: 8888: 8885: 8884: 8882: 8878: 8872: 8869: 8865: 8864:Convoy system 8862: 8861: 8860: 8859:Naval warfare 8857: 8855: 8852: 8850: 8847: 8845: 8842: 8840: 8837: 8833: 8830: 8829: 8828: 8825: 8824: 8822: 8818: 8815: 8811: 8800: 8797: 8794: 8791: 8788: 8785: 8782: 8779: 8774: 8771: 8768: 8765: 8762: 8759: 8756: 8753: 8752: 8751: 8748: 8745: 8742: 8739: 8736: 8733: 8730: 8727: 8724: 8721: 8718: 8715: 8712: 8709: 8706: 8703: 8700: 8697: 8694: 8691: 8688: 8685: 8682: 8679: 8676: 8673: 8670: 8667: 8664: 8661: 8658: 8655: 8652: 8649: 8646: 8645: 8643: 8639: 8632: 8629: 8626: 8623: 8620: 8619:Kaocen revolt 8617: 8614: 8613:Easter Rising 8611: 8608: 8605: 8602: 8599: 8596: 8593: 8591: 8588: 8585: 8582: 8579: 8576: 8573: 8570: 8567: 8564: 8561: 8558: 8555: 8552: 8549: 8546: 8543: 8540: 8537: 8534: 8531: 8528: 8527: 8525: 8521: 8515: 8512: 8508: 8503: 8500: 8498: 8495: 8493: 8490: 8488: 8485: 8483: 8480: 8478: 8475: 8473: 8470: 8468: 8465: 8463: 8460: 8458: 8455: 8453: 8450: 8448: 8445: 8443: 8440: 8438: 8435: 8433: 8430: 8428: 8425: 8423: 8420: 8418: 8415: 8413: 8410: 8408: 8405: 8404: 8402: 8400: 8396: 8390: 8387: 8385: 8382: 8380: 8377: 8375: 8372: 8370: 8367: 8365: 8362: 8360: 8357: 8355: 8352: 8350: 8347: 8345: 8342: 8340: 8337: 8335: 8332: 8330: 8327: 8325: 8322: 8320: 8317: 8315: 8312: 8310: 8307: 8306: 8304: 8302: 8298: 8292: 8289: 8287: 8284: 8282: 8279: 8277: 8274: 8272: 8269: 8265: 8262: 8261: 8260: 8257: 8255: 8252: 8250: 8247: 8245: 8242: 8240: 8237: 8235: 8232: 8231: 8229: 8225: 8219: 8216: 8214: 8211: 8209: 8206: 8204: 8201: 8199: 8196: 8194: 8191: 8189: 8186: 8184: 8181: 8179: 8178:Great Retreat 8176: 8174: 8171: 8169: 8166: 8164: 8161: 8159: 8156: 8154: 8153: 8148: 8146: 8143: 8141: 8138: 8136: 8133: 8132: 8130: 8126: 8120: 8117: 8115: 8112: 8110: 8107: 8105: 8102: 8100: 8097: 8095: 8092: 8090: 8087: 8085: 8082: 8080: 8077: 8075: 8072: 8070: 8067: 8065: 8062: 8060: 8057: 8055: 8052: 8050: 8049:Battle of Cer 8047: 8045: 8042: 8040: 8037: 8036: 8034: 8030: 8024: 8021: 8019: 8016: 8014: 8011: 8007: 8004: 8003: 8002: 7999: 7998: 7996: 7992: 7985: 7982: 7979: 7976: 7973: 7970: 7967: 7966:Agadir Crisis 7964: 7961: 7958: 7955: 7952: 7949: 7946: 7943: 7940: 7937: 7934: 7933: 7931: 7927: 7924: 7922: 7918: 7908: 7905: 7903: 7900: 7898: 7895: 7893: 7890: 7888: 7885: 7883: 7880: 7878: 7875: 7873: 7870: 7869: 7867: 7865: 7861: 7855: 7854:United States 7852: 7848: 7845: 7844: 7843: 7840: 7838: 7835: 7833: 7830: 7826: 7823: 7821: 7818: 7817: 7816: 7813: 7811: 7808: 7806: 7803: 7801: 7798: 7794: 7791: 7790: 7789: 7786: 7784: 7781: 7779: 7776: 7772: 7771:French Empire 7769: 7768: 7767: 7764: 7762: 7759: 7757: 7754: 7752: 7749: 7747: 7744: 7743: 7741: 7739: 7735: 7732: 7724: 7714: 7713:Mediterranean 7711: 7707: 7704: 7703: 7702: 7699: 7698: 7696: 7694: 7693:Naval warfare 7690: 7684: 7681: 7679: 7676: 7674: 7671: 7670: 7668: 7666: 7662: 7656: 7653: 7651: 7648: 7646: 7643: 7641: 7638: 7636: 7633: 7632: 7630: 7628: 7624: 7618: 7615: 7613: 7610: 7608: 7605: 7603: 7600: 7598: 7595: 7593: 7590: 7588: 7585: 7584: 7582: 7580: 7576: 7570: 7569:Italian Front 7567: 7563: 7560: 7559: 7558: 7557:Eastern Front 7555: 7553: 7552:Western Front 7550: 7546: 7543: 7542: 7541: 7538: 7537: 7535: 7533: 7529: 7526: 7522: 7516: 7513: 7511: 7510:Puppet states 7508: 7506: 7503: 7501: 7498: 7496: 7493: 7491: 7488: 7486: 7483: 7481: 7478: 7476: 7473: 7471: 7468: 7466: 7463: 7461: 7458: 7456: 7453: 7452: 7449: 7445: 7438: 7433: 7431: 7426: 7424: 7419: 7418: 7415: 7408: 7404: 7401: 7397: 7394: 7390: 7388: 7384: 7380: 7376: 7373: 7369: 7365: 7361: 7357: 7353: 7348: 7345: 7341: 7338: 7334: 7330: 7327: 7323: 7319: 7313: 7308: 7307: 7300: 7297: 7293: 7290: 7286: 7283: 7279: 7275: 7269: 7265: 7261: 7256: 7252: 7246: 7242: 7237: 7233: 7227: 7223: 7219: 7215: 7212: 7208: 7204: 7200: 7196: 7192: 7188: 7184: 7180: 7176: 7171: 7168: 7164: 7160: 7154: 7150: 7146: 7142: 7138: 7135: 7131: 7127: 7121: 7117: 7112: 7108: 7104: 7100: 7096: 7092: 7088: 7083: 7080: 7076: 7073: 7069: 7068: 7057: 7051: 7047: 7043: 7039: 7035: 7029: 7024: 7023: 7017: 7013: 7009: 7007:0-1982-0877-4 7003: 6999: 6995: 6994:Strachan, Hew 6991: 6987: 6981: 6977: 6973: 6969: 6965: 6961: 6957: 6953: 6949: 6945: 6941: 6937: 6933: 6929: 6925: 6919: 6915: 6911: 6907: 6903: 6898: 6894: 6888: 6885:. Cambridge. 6884: 6879: 6875: 6871: 6867: 6861: 6857: 6853: 6849: 6845: 6841: 6837: 6833: 6832:Kautsky, Karl 6829: 6825: 6819: 6815: 6810: 6806: 6800: 6796: 6792: 6788: 6784: 6780: 6774: 6770: 6766: 6765:Glenny, Misha 6762: 6758: 6752: 6748: 6744: 6740: 6736: 6730: 6727:. Heinemann. 6726: 6722: 6718: 6714: 6708: 6703: 6702: 6696: 6692: 6688: 6684: 6680: 6676: 6672: 6668: 6664: 6660: 6656: 6652: 6646: 6642: 6641:Penguin Books 6638: 6634: 6630: 6626: 6620: 6616: 6611: 6607: 6601: 6597: 6593: 6589: 6585: 6579: 6574: 6573: 6567: 6563: 6559: 6555: 6551: 6550: 6545: 6541: 6537: 6533: 6529: 6528: 6523: 6519: 6515: 6512: 6511: 6508: 6504: 6500: 6497:(1952–1953). 6496: 6492: 6491: 6478: 6473: 6466: 6461: 6459: 6451: 6446: 6439: 6434: 6427: 6422: 6415: 6414:Strachan 2001 6410: 6403: 6398: 6391: 6386: 6370: 6366: 6362: 6356: 6354: 6337: 6333: 6329: 6323: 6321: 6313: 6308: 6301: 6296: 6289: 6284: 6277: 6272: 6265: 6260: 6253: 6248: 6241: 6236: 6229: 6224: 6222: 6205: 6201: 6197: 6191: 6189: 6181: 6176: 6169: 6164: 6162: 6154: 6149: 6147: 6145: 6137: 6133: 6128: 6121: 6116: 6109: 6104: 6097: 6092: 6090: 6088: 6086: 6078: 6073: 6066: 6061: 6054: 6049: 6047: 6045: 6043: 6035: 6030: 6028: 6026: 6024: 6016: 6011: 6004: 5999: 5997: 5995: 5987: 5982: 5975: 5974:Hewitson 2004 5970: 5964:, p. 81. 5963: 5958: 5956: 5954: 5952: 5944: 5939: 5933:, p. 86. 5932: 5927: 5925: 5923: 5921: 5919: 5917: 5910:, p. 83. 5909: 5904: 5897: 5892: 5885: 5880: 5873: 5868: 5861: 5856: 5854: 5852: 5850: 5848: 5841:, p. 82. 5840: 5835: 5828: 5823: 5817:, p. 80. 5816: 5811: 5809: 5802:, p. 79. 5801: 5796: 5794: 5792: 5785:, p. 78. 5784: 5779: 5777: 5775: 5768:, p. 77. 5767: 5762: 5760: 5758: 5756: 5748: 5743: 5741: 5733: 5728: 5726: 5719:, p. 85. 5718: 5713: 5711: 5709: 5707: 5705: 5703: 5695: 5690: 5688: 5686: 5684: 5682: 5674: 5669: 5667: 5665: 5663: 5655: 5650: 5648: 5640: 5635: 5628: 5623: 5621: 5614:, p. 76. 5613: 5608: 5606: 5604: 5602: 5595:, p. 84. 5594: 5589: 5587: 5579: 5574: 5568:, p. 75. 5567: 5562: 5560: 5553:, p. 74. 5552: 5547: 5540: 5535: 5533: 5516: 5512: 5511: 5506: 5502: 5496: 5489: 5484: 5482: 5474: 5469: 5462: 5457: 5455: 5453: 5445: 5440: 5433: 5428: 5426: 5418: 5413: 5411: 5409: 5401: 5396: 5394: 5392: 5384: 5379: 5377: 5375: 5368:, p. 70. 5367: 5362: 5360: 5358: 5356: 5354: 5346: 5341: 5334: 5329: 5322: 5317: 5315: 5313: 5311: 5303: 5298: 5296: 5294: 5292: 5285:, p. 72. 5284: 5279: 5277: 5275: 5267: 5262: 5255: 5250: 5248: 5246: 5244: 5242: 5235:, p. 71. 5234: 5229: 5227: 5225: 5223: 5215: 5210: 5203: 5198: 5191: 5186: 5184: 5182: 5180: 5178: 5176: 5168: 5163: 5161: 5153: 5148: 5141: 5136: 5130:, p. 73. 5129: 5124: 5122: 5120: 5118: 5116: 5108: 5103: 5097:, p. 68. 5096: 5091: 5089: 5082:, p. 69. 5081: 5076: 5074: 5072: 5070: 5063:, p. 66. 5062: 5057: 5055: 5053: 5051: 5049: 5047: 5039: 5034: 5032: 5024: 5019: 5012: 5007: 5000: 4995: 4988: 4983: 4975: 4971: 4967: 4963: 4959: 4955: 4951: 4947: 4940: 4932: 4926: 4922: 4918: 4912: 4905: 4900: 4893: 4888: 4881: 4876: 4869: 4864: 4857: 4852: 4845: 4840: 4838: 4836: 4834: 4832: 4824: 4819: 4817: 4815: 4813: 4811: 4803: 4798: 4796: 4794: 4787:, p. 67. 4786: 4781: 4779: 4777: 4775: 4767: 4762: 4760: 4758: 4750: 4745: 4738: 4733: 4731: 4723: 4718: 4711: 4706: 4700:, p. 65. 4699: 4694: 4692: 4690: 4688: 4686: 4684: 4676: 4671: 4669: 4667: 4659: 4654: 4647: 4642: 4640: 4638: 4630: 4625: 4623: 4621: 4613: 4608: 4606: 4604: 4602: 4600: 4592: 4587: 4580: 4575: 4568: 4563: 4561: 4559: 4551: 4546: 4539: 4534: 4532: 4524: 4519: 4517: 4509: 4504: 4496: 4492: 4488: 4481: 4479: 4477: 4468: 4464: 4460: 4456: 4453:(3): 397–98. 4452: 4448: 4441: 4437: 4431: 4423: 4419: 4415: 4411: 4407: 4403: 4396: 4392: 4386: 4379: 4374: 4367: 4362: 4355: 4350: 4343: 4338: 4331: 4326: 4319: 4314: 4307: 4302: 4295: 4290: 4288: 4286: 4279:, p. 63. 4278: 4273: 4271: 4269: 4267: 4259: 4254: 4248:, p. 62. 4247: 4242: 4236:, p. 25. 4235: 4230: 4228: 4220: 4215: 4209:, p. 64. 4208: 4203: 4201: 4199: 4197: 4189: 4184: 4177: 4172: 4170: 4162: 4157: 4155: 4153: 4145: 4140: 4133: 4128: 4122:, p. 61. 4121: 4116: 4114: 4112: 4110: 4108: 4106: 4104: 4096: 4091: 4089: 4087: 4079: 4074: 4067: 4062: 4060: 4052: 4047: 4040: 4035: 4033: 4031: 4029: 4021: 4016: 4009: 4004: 3997: 3992: 3990: 3988: 3981:, p. 60. 3980: 3975: 3973: 3971: 3969: 3961: 3956: 3949: 3944: 3937: 3932: 3926:, p. 59. 3925: 3920: 3918: 3910: 3905: 3903: 3895: 3890: 3884:, p. 58. 3883: 3878: 3876: 3874: 3872: 3864: 3859: 3852: 3847: 3845: 3843: 3836:, p. 24. 3835: 3830: 3823: 3818: 3816: 3814: 3807:, p. 57. 3806: 3801: 3799: 3797: 3795: 3793: 3786:, p. 56. 3785: 3780: 3778: 3776: 3774: 3772: 3770: 3762: 3757: 3755: 3753: 3751: 3743: 3738: 3731: 3726: 3724: 3716: 3711: 3704: 3699: 3692: 3687: 3680: 3675: 3668: 3667:Red Book 1915 3663: 3657:, p. 74. 3656: 3651: 3645:, p. 73. 3644: 3639: 3633:, p. 70. 3632: 3627: 3620: 3615: 3608: 3603: 3596: 3591: 3584: 3579: 3572: 3567: 3565: 3557: 3552: 3550: 3543:, p. 55. 3542: 3537: 3535: 3533: 3531: 3529: 3527: 3510: 3506: 3499: 3493:, p. 54. 3492: 3487: 3485: 3483: 3481: 3473: 3468: 3466: 3458: 3453: 3446: 3441: 3434: 3429: 3423:, p. 53. 3422: 3417: 3415: 3413: 3411: 3403: 3398: 3396: 3388: 3383: 3381: 3379: 3371: 3366: 3364: 3356: 3351: 3344: 3339: 3337: 3335: 3326: 3320: 3316: 3315: 3307: 3301:, p. 52. 3300: 3295: 3293: 3291: 3283: 3278: 3276: 3268: 3263: 3256: 3251: 3243: 3242: 3234: 3232: 3230: 3223:, p. 51. 3222: 3217: 3210: 3205: 3198: 3193: 3186: 3181: 3174: 3169: 3162: 3157: 3150: 3145: 3143: 3135: 3130: 3123: 3118: 3112:, p. 18. 3111: 3106: 3099: 3094: 3087: 3082: 3076:, p. 44. 3075: 3070: 3063: 3058: 3052:, p. 99. 3051: 3046: 3039: 3034: 3028:, p. 43. 3027: 3022: 3015: 3010: 3004:, p. 41. 3003: 2998: 2992:, p. 35. 2991: 2986: 2979: 2974: 2967: 2962: 2954: 2950: 2946: 2942: 2938: 2934: 2930: 2924: 2920: 2899: 2890: 2881: 2874: 2868: 2859: 2850: 2841: 2832: 2823: 2817: 2812: 2803: 2794: 2785: 2776: 2767: 2757: 2750: 2744: 2737: 2731: 2721: 2714: 2710: 2706: 2702: 2696: 2686: 2677: 2668: 2659: 2651: 2645: 2636: 2627: 2618: 2609: 2600: 2588: 2587: 2579: 2570: 2560: 2551: 2542: 2533: 2524: 2515: 2507: 2501: 2492: 2483: 2476: 2472: 2466: 2459: 2453: 2443: 2435: 2431: 2427: 2423: 2419: 2415: 2411: 2406: 2397: 2394: 2391: 2388: 2385: 2384: 2381: 2377: 2367: 2364: 2362: 2359: 2357: 2354: 2350: 2347: 2346: 2345: 2342: 2340: 2337: 2335: 2332: 2330: 2327: 2325: 2322: 2321: 2315: 2306: 2303:November 2021 2297: 2293: 2290:This section 2288: 2285: 2281: 2280: 2272: 2268: 2264: 2260: 2257: 2248: 2247: 2241: 2232: 2230: 2225: 2223: 2217: 2212: 2204: 2200: 2195: 2186: 2184: 2183: 2177: 2175: 2171: 2166: 2161: 2159: 2153: 2151: 2146: 2137: 2133: 2130: 2124: 2117: 2113: 2111: 2107: 2103: 2097: 2090: 2086: 2081: 2072: 2069: 2067: 2066:Joseph Joffre 2061: 2057: 2048: 2044: 2041: 2035: 2031: 2024: 2023: 2017: 2008: 2006: 1998: 1995: 1992: 1989: 1988: 1987: 1984: 1980: 1978: 1967: 1963: 1959: 1955: 1953: 1945: 1941: 1937: 1928: 1925: 1924:Fritz Fischer 1921: 1915: 1912: 1907: 1903: 1901: 1897: 1886: 1883: 1882: 1875: 1871: 1869: 1864: 1860: 1856: 1853: 1845: 1842: 1838: 1837: 1831: 1827: 1825: 1824: 1818: 1814: 1812: 1811: 1806: 1796: 1787: 1785: 1781: 1777: 1776:King George V 1772: 1769: 1765: 1759: 1756: 1745: 1741: 1738: 1732: 1730: 1724: 1721: 1717: 1707: 1703: 1699: 1697: 1693: 1689: 1685: 1682: 1677: 1673: 1670: 1669:Theodor Wolff 1659: 1657: 1653: 1652: 1644: 1640: 1638: 1629: 1626: 1622: 1619: 1616: 1615: 1614: 1606: 1602: 1599: 1598:Krasnoye Selo 1594: 1591: 1587: 1583: 1575: 1571: 1567: 1562: 1552: 1548: 1546: 1541: 1532: 1528: 1524: 1523: 1517: 1508: 1499: 1497: 1496:fait accompli 1493: 1487: 1485: 1479: 1477: 1473: 1464: 1460: 1456: 1447: 1443: 1434: 1430: 1428: 1424: 1420: 1419:H. H. Asquith 1416: 1408: 1403: 1399: 1396: 1395:Albert Ballin 1391: 1387: 1384: 1377: 1373: 1369: 1363:Serbian reply 1360: 1356: 1349: 1346: 1343: 1339: 1335: 1332: 1328: 1325:Arrest Major 1324: 1321: 1318: 1315: 1312: 1309: 1308: 1303: 1300: 1299: 1298: 1295: 1287: 1278: 1275: 1269: 1267: 1262: 1260: 1253: 1250: 1246: 1241: 1237: 1227: 1224: 1222: 1218: 1217:Slavko Grujić 1215: 1211: 1205: 1203: 1202:Fritz Fischer 1199: 1194: 1190: 1186: 1184: 1180: 1176: 1171: 1167: 1162: 1158: 1156: 1152: 1146: 1137: 1133: 1130: 1125: 1120: 1115: 1110: 1106: 1104: 1099: 1097: 1093: 1085: 1081: 1072: 1068: 1066: 1060: 1058: 1052: 1050: 1045: 1043: 1039: 1028: 1026: 1016: 1012: 1008: 1005: 1000: 996: 987: 983: 979: 975: 971: 968: 964: 957: 953: 949: 945: 940: 931: 927: 923: 920: 919: 918:fait accompli 908: 905: 900: 898: 894: 890: 886: 881: 879: 875: 869: 866: 862: 858: 855: 851: 848: 844: 840: 835: 831: 829: 823: 821: 817: 812: 810: 800: 795: 794:Hoyos Mission 785: 783: 779: 775: 770: 767: 762: 760: 756: 752: 748: 740: 736: 731: 716: 712: 708: 706: 702: 698: 689: 685: 680: 671: 669: 665: 661: 657: 652: 650: 646: 637: 633: 629: 625: 621: 617: 612: 607: 597: 595: 591: 587: 581: 578: 573: 570: 566: 560: 558: 554: 550: 549:Voja Tankosić 545: 541: 533: 529: 525: 521: 517: 516:Trifko Grabež 512: 503: 500: 495: 493: 489: 485: 480: 476: 472: 468: 464: 460: 459:Berlin treaty 456: 452: 449: 445: 441: 433: 432: 426: 421: 411: 409: 405: 401: 397: 392: 390: 385: 383: 379: 375: 371: 367: 363: 359: 355: 351: 347: 343: 339: 334: 332: 328: 324: 320: 317: 314:nationalist, 313: 309: 305: 301: 297: 293: 281: 276: 274: 269: 267: 262: 261: 259: 258: 249: 246: 243: 240: 237: 234: 231: 228: 225: 222: 219: 216: 213: 210: 207: 204: 201: 198: 195: 192: 189: 186: 183: 180: 177: 174: 171: 168: 165: 162: 159: 156: 153: 150: 147: 144: 141: 138: 135: 132: 129: 126: 123: 120: 117: 114: 111: 108: 105: 102: 99: 98:Dual Alliance 96: 93: 90: 87: 84: 81: 78: 75: 72: 69: 66: 65: 64: 63: 61: 60: 56: 52: 51: 48: 44: 43: 37: 33: 28: 22: 10046: 9976: 9972:Anglo-German 9961: 9833:Treaties and 9594:Great powers 9525: 9518: 9506: 9113: / 9045: 8880:Conscription 8844:Cryptography 8781:Iraqi Revolt 8208:Siege of Kut 8151: 8022: 7729:participants 7678:German Samoa 7612:South Arabia 7406: 7399: 7392: 7378: 7371: 7355: 7351: 7343: 7332: 7325: 7305: 7295: 7288: 7281: 7263: 7259: 7240: 7221: 7210: 7178: 7174: 7166: 7144: 7133: 7115: 7106: 7094: 7090: 7078: 7071: 7045: 7021: 6997: 6975: 6939: 6935: 6913: 6901: 6882: 6855: 6835: 6813: 6794: 6768: 6746: 6724: 6700: 6678: 6636: 6617:. Casemate. 6614: 6595: 6592:Butcher, Tim 6571: 6548: 6526: 6498: 6472: 6450:Balfour 1964 6445: 6438:Tuchman 2004 6433: 6421: 6409: 6397: 6385: 6373:. Retrieved 6364: 6340:. Retrieved 6331: 6307: 6300:Fromkin 2004 6295: 6288:Fromkin 2004 6283: 6271: 6264:Fromkin 2004 6259: 6247: 6235: 6228:Fromkin 2004 6208:. Retrieved 6199: 6180:Fromkin 2004 6175: 6168:Fromkin 2004 6153:Fromkin 2004 6135: 6127: 6115: 6108:Balfour 1964 6103: 6096:Fromkin 2004 6077:Fromkin 2004 6072: 6065:Fromkin 2004 6060: 6053:Fromkin 2004 6034:Fromkin 2004 6015:Fromkin 2004 6010: 6003:Fromkin 2004 5986:Fischer 1967 5981: 5969: 5962:Fischer 1967 5943:Fromkin 2004 5938: 5931:Fischer 1967 5908:Fischer 1967 5903: 5891: 5879: 5867: 5860:Fromkin 2004 5839:Fischer 1967 5834: 5827:Fromkin 2004 5822: 5815:Fischer 1967 5800:Fischer 1967 5783:Fischer 1967 5766:Fischer 1967 5747:Fromkin 2004 5732:Fromkin 2004 5717:Fischer 1967 5694:Fromkin 2004 5673:Fromkin 2004 5654:Fromkin 2004 5639:Fromkin 2004 5634: 5627:Fromkin 2004 5612:Fischer 1967 5593:Fischer 1967 5578:Fischer 1967 5573: 5566:Fischer 1967 5551:Fischer 1967 5546: 5539:Fromkin 2004 5519:. Retrieved 5515:the original 5508: 5495: 5488:Fromkin 2004 5473:Kautsky 1924 5468: 5461:Kautsky 1924 5444:Kautsky 1924 5439: 5432:Kautsky 1924 5417:Fromkin 2004 5400:Fromkin 2004 5383:Fromkin 2004 5366:Fischer 1967 5340: 5328: 5321:Fromkin 2004 5302:Fromkin 2004 5283:Fischer 1967 5266:Fischer 1967 5261: 5254:Fromkin 2004 5233:Fischer 1967 5214:Kautsky 1924 5209: 5202:Kautsky 1924 5197: 5190:Fromkin 2004 5167:Fromkin 2004 5152:Fromkin 2004 5147: 5140:Fromkin 2004 5135: 5128:Fischer 1967 5107:Fischer 1967 5102: 5095:Fischer 1967 5080:Fischer 1967 5061:Fischer 1967 5038:Fromkin 2004 5018: 5006: 4994: 4982: 4952:(1): 65–88. 4949: 4945: 4939: 4920: 4911: 4904:Fromkin 2004 4899: 4887: 4875: 4863: 4856:Fromkin 2004 4851: 4844:Fromkin 2004 4823:Fromkin 2004 4802:Fromkin 2004 4785:Fischer 1967 4766:Fromkin 2004 4749:Fromkin 2004 4744: 4737:Fromkin 2004 4722:Fromkin 2004 4717: 4710:Fromkin 2004 4705: 4698:Fischer 1967 4675:Fromkin 2004 4658:Fromkin 2004 4653: 4646:Fromkin 2004 4629:Fromkin 2004 4612:Fromkin 2004 4586: 4574: 4567:Fromkin 2004 4545: 4538:Fromkin 2004 4523:Fromkin 2004 4503: 4495:the original 4490: 4450: 4446: 4430: 4405: 4401: 4385: 4373: 4361: 4349: 4337: 4330:Fromkin 2004 4325: 4313: 4306:Fromkin 2004 4301: 4294:Fromkin 2004 4277:Fischer 1967 4258:Kautsky 1924 4253: 4246:Fischer 1967 4241: 4219:Fromkin 2004 4214: 4207:Fischer 1967 4188:Fromkin 2004 4183: 4176:Fromkin 2004 4161:Fromkin 2004 4144:Fromkin 2004 4139: 4132:Fromkin 2004 4127: 4120:Fischer 1967 4095:Fromkin 2004 4078:Kautsky 1924 4073: 4066:Kautsky 1924 4051:Fischer 1967 4046: 4039:Fromkin 2004 4020:Fromkin 2004 4015: 4008:Fromkin 2004 4003: 3996:Fromkin 2004 3979:Fischer 1967 3960:Kautsky 1924 3955: 3948:Fromkin 2004 3943: 3936:Fischer 1967 3931: 3924:Fischer 1967 3909:Kautsky 1924 3894:Kautsky 1924 3889: 3882:Fischer 1967 3863:Fromkin 2004 3858: 3851:Fromkin 2004 3829: 3822:Fromkin 2004 3805:Fischer 1967 3784:Fischer 1967 3761:Fromkin 2004 3737: 3710: 3698: 3686: 3674: 3662: 3650: 3638: 3626: 3619:Fromkin 2004 3614: 3607:Fromkin 2004 3602: 3595:Fromkin 2004 3590: 3583:Fromkin 2004 3578: 3571:Fromkin 2004 3556:Fromkin 2004 3541:Fischer 1967 3513:. Retrieved 3508: 3498: 3491:Fischer 1967 3457:Fromkin 2004 3452: 3440: 3428: 3421:Fischer 1967 3402:Fromkin 2004 3387:Fromkin 2004 3350: 3343:Fromkin 2004 3313: 3306: 3299:Fischer 1967 3267:Fischer 1967 3262: 3250: 3240: 3221:Fischer 1967 3216: 3204: 3192: 3180: 3168: 3156: 3149:Fromkin 2004 3134:Fromkin 2004 3129: 3122:Butcher 2015 3117: 3110:Butcher 2015 3105: 3093: 3081: 3069: 3057: 3045: 3033: 3021: 3014:Dedijer 1966 3009: 2997: 2985: 2978:Butcher 2015 2973: 2966:Butcher 2015 2961: 2939:(1): 80–82. 2936: 2932: 2923: 2898: 2889: 2880: 2872: 2867: 2858: 2849: 2840: 2831: 2822: 2816: 2811: 2802: 2793: 2784: 2775: 2766: 2756: 2748: 2743: 2735: 2730: 2720: 2712: 2708: 2704: 2700: 2695: 2685: 2676: 2667: 2658: 2644: 2635: 2626: 2617: 2608: 2597:– via 2591:. Retrieved 2585: 2578: 2569: 2559: 2550: 2541: 2532: 2523: 2514: 2505: 2500: 2491: 2482: 2465: 2452: 2446:Јулска криза 2405: 2380: 2313: 2300: 2296:adding to it 2291: 2269: 2265: 2261: 2255: 2252: 2245: 2226: 2218: 2214: 2181: 2178: 2173: 2162: 2154: 2147: 2143: 2134: 2125: 2122: 2105: 2098: 2094: 2088: 2070: 2062: 2058: 2054: 2045: 2039: 2036: 2032: 2028: 2020: 2002: 1985: 1981: 1973: 1964: 1960: 1956: 1949: 1919: 1916: 1908: 1904: 1892: 1879: 1876: 1872: 1865: 1861: 1859:preserved". 1857: 1849: 1834: 1821: 1819: 1815: 1809: 1801: 1773: 1760: 1754: 1751: 1742: 1733: 1725: 1719: 1715: 1713: 1704: 1700: 1692:Quai d'Orsay 1686: 1678: 1674: 1665: 1650: 1645: 1641: 1633: 1612: 1603: 1595: 1579: 1549: 1536: 1526: 1520: 1505: 1495: 1491: 1488: 1483: 1480: 1468: 1444: 1440: 1431: 1412: 1392: 1388: 1380: 1372:Nikola Pašić 1357: 1353: 1305: 1296: 1292: 1274:James Fearon 1270: 1263: 1259:René Viviani 1256: 1225: 1206: 1195: 1191: 1187: 1163: 1159: 1151:Jules Cambon 1147: 1143: 1134: 1126: 1111: 1107: 1100: 1091: 1089: 1069: 1061: 1057:Baltic Fleet 1053: 1046: 1034: 1021: 1009: 1004:Kurt Riezler 1001: 997: 993: 984: 980: 976: 972: 965: 961: 928: 924: 916: 914: 901: 896: 882: 870: 836: 832: 824: 813: 805: 777: 771: 763: 744: 713: 709: 697:István Tisza 693: 653: 641: 635: 627: 623: 619: 582: 577:Nikola Pašić 574: 561: 537: 496: 484:irredentists 437: 429: 393: 389:armed forces 386: 370:mobilisation 362:blank cheque 335: 316:assassinated 312:Bosnian Serb 296:major powers 291: 289: 247: 31: 10171:July Crisis 10150:World War I 10113:Balkan Wars 10098:Second Boer 10083:Banana Wars 10047:July Crisis 9978:Dreadnought 9963:Weltpolitik 9807:Pan-Slavism 9143:Netherlands 9120:Switzerland 9001:Occupations 8992:Spanish flu 8769:(1919–1922) 8763:(1918–1921) 8757:(1918–1923) 8746:(1919–1921) 8740:(1919–1921) 8734:(1919–1920) 8710:(1918–1920) 8704:(1918–1920) 8698:(1918–1920) 8680:(1918–1920) 8662:(1918–1920) 8656:(1917–1921) 8650:(1917–1921) 8597:(1916-1918) 8595:Arab Revolt 8586:(1915–1917) 8580:(1915–1917) 8568:(1914-1917) 8562:(1914–1917) 8556:(1914–1921) 8550:(1913–1920) 8538:(1910–1920) 8532:(1900–1920) 8505: [ 8023:July Crisis 7944:(1880–1914) 7607:Mesopotamia 7485:Home fronts 7444:World War I 6487:Works cited 5501:Keys, David 5345:Butler 2010 4987:Turner 1968 4892:Lieven 1997 4880:Lieven 1997 4868:Lieven 1997 4550:Lieven 1997 4508:Glenny 2012 3355:Langer 1968 3255:Palmer 1994 2873:provocative 2653:desirable." 2256:casus belli 2174:casus belli 2165:King Albert 2158:Paul Cambon 2110:F. E. Smith 2106:casus belli 1920:in any case 1896:Jean Jaurès 1823:casus belli 1720:every cause 1649:battleship 1405:Map of the 1175:German Navy 1117: [ 1042:Nicholas II 944:irredentism 874:Edward Grey 861:Hans Zenker 668:9/11 effect 630:to make it 565:Mlada Bosna 528:Danilo Ilić 492:Danilo Ilić 304:World War I 292:July Crisis 248:July Crisis 236:Balkan Wars 47:World War I 32:Der Stänker 10165:Categories 9835:agreements 9783:Great Game 9749:Revanchism 9360:Agreements 9160:War crimes 9036:Luxembourg 8929:Casualties 7800:Montenegro 7635:South West 7515:Technology 7505:Propaganda 7495:Opposition 7149:VSI series 6659:2012515665 6536:1035915119 6477:Clark 2013 6465:Clark 2013 6426:Boyle 1999 5896:Clark 2013 5884:Clark 2013 5872:Geiss 1967 5023:Clark 2013 5011:Clark 2013 4999:Clark 2013 4591:Clark 2013 4579:Clark 2013 4378:Clark 2013 4366:Clark 2013 4354:Clark 2013 4342:Clark 2013 4318:Clark 2013 3703:Clark 2013 3209:Clark 2013 3197:Clark 2013 3185:Clark 2013 2915:References 2564:measures." 1911:Eyre Crowe 1559:See also: 1221:Lazar Paču 986:possible. 946:by ethnic 859:, Captain 759:Wilhelm II 404:neutrality 394:While the 10216:War scare 9798:Meiji era 9645:Alliances 9257:Diplomacy 8964:Olympians 8887:Australia 8854:Logistics 8787:Vlora War 8716:(1918–19) 8692:(1918–19) 8686:(1918–19) 8674:(1918–19) 8621:(1916–17) 8603:(1916–17) 8554:Zaian War 8544:(1914–15) 8264:first day 8152:Lusitania 7980:(1912–13) 7974:(1911–12) 7962:(1908–09) 7956:(1905–06) 7938:(1870–71) 7727:Principal 7587:Gallipoli 7490:Memorials 7475:Geography 7465:Aftermath 7203:153335986 7018:(2004) . 6956:0002-9300 6687:954608737 6667:26399151M 6635:(2013) . 6507:443476100 6252:Otte 2014 6240:Otte 2014 4974:161629020 4422:143510092 4408:(1): 65. 4234:Röhl 1973 3834:Röhl 1973 2426:Hungarian 2422:Julikrise 2182:Reichstag 2040:represent 1755:decidedly 1637:Bosphorus 1527:Plan XVII 1522:Plan XVII 1040:and Tsar 963:of war". 809:Constanța 715:support. 366:ultimatum 238:1912–1913 232:1911–1912 214:1908–1909 196:1906–1908 190:1905–1906 178:1904–1905 154:1898–1912 148:1894-1895 136:1887–1890 130:1885–1888 112:1881–1903 106:1880–1902 104:Boer Wars 88:1875–1878 76:1870–1871 70:1866–1871 21:July Days 10211:Ultimata 9545:Category 9132:Refugees 9098:Italians 9087:Germans 9047:Ober Ost 8827:Aviation 7921:Timeline 7892:Bulgaria 7673:Tsingtao 7650:Togoland 7597:Caucasus 7532:European 7524:Theatres 7220:(2013). 7143:(2007). 7105:(1929). 7044:(1991). 6996:(2001). 6974:(1973). 6912:(2002). 6767:(2012). 6745:(1967). 6723:(2004). 6697:(1967). 6677:(1966). 6594:(2015). 6568:(1999). 6558:39131741 6546:(1920). 6524:(1964). 6369:Archived 6336:Archived 6204:Archived 4919:(2009). 4467:38573183 2736:a limine 2593:30 March 2318:See also 1841:resolved 1484:à quatre 1096:démarche 628:sterbien 616:ape-like 471:Sarajevo 170:May Coup 9778:In Asia 9611:Germany 9283:Germany 9183:Germany 9111:Germany 9031:Belgium 9016:Albania 8975:Disease 8955:Sports 8907:Ireland 8820:Warfare 8813:Aspects 8001:Origins 7994:Prelude 7897:Senussi 7877:Germany 7872:Leaders 7810:Romania 7751:Belgium 7746:Leaders 7645:Kamerun 7627:African 7562:Romania 7540:Balkans 7455:Outline 7195:2538910 6964:2212216 6874:1345956 6844:1181368 6793:(ed.). 5521:28 June 2953:2538636 2910:Sources 2506:bsolute 2442:Serbian 2434:Russian 1805:monitor 1762:Paris, 1694:, told 1572:of the 1409:in 1913 1342:Loznica 778:quickly 649:Albania 636:Serbien 624:Sterben 622:die!" ( 463:Balkans 448:Ottoman 438:At the 372:of the 358:Germany 325:to the 194:Pig War 10136:Second 10123:Second 9920:Events 9710:Trends 9626:Russia 9606:France 9303:Russia 9278:France 9106:Canada 9021:Serbia 8892:Canada 8849:Horses 8801:(1921) 8795:(1920) 8789:(1920) 8783:(1920) 8775:(1920) 8728:(1919) 8722:(1919) 8668:(1918) 8633:(1918) 8627:(1917) 8615:(1916) 8609:(1916) 8574:(1915) 7986:(1913) 7968:(1911) 7950:(1905) 7907:Darfur 7832:Serbia 7815:Russia 7778:Greece 7766:France 7756:Brazil 7602:Persia 7545:Serbia 7409:(2017) 7395:(2005) 7374:(2014) 7346:(1927) 7337:online 7328:(2004) 7314: 7270: 7247: 7228: 7201: 7193: 7155: 7136:(2012) 7122: 7052: 7030: 7004: 6982: 6962: 6954: 6920: 6889: 6872: 6862: 6842: 6820: 6801: 6775: 6753: 6731: 6709: 6685: 6665: 6657: 6647: 6621: 6602: 6580: 6556: 6534: 6505: 4972: 4966:259967 4964: 4927: 4465: 4420: 3515:16 May 3321: 2951: 2711:, and 2418:German 2410:French 2203:Quebec 2170:treaty 1810:Bodrog 1702:then. 1651:France 956:Serbia 948:Croats 852:, the 666:as a " 567:, the 378:France 350:Russia 342:Serbia 10141:Third 10131:First 10118:First 9621:Japan 9616:Italy 9500:Other 9293:Japan 9288:Italy 9115:camps 8959:Rugby 8509:] 7788:Japan 7783:Italy 7761:China 7655:North 7262:[ 7199:S2CID 7191:JSTOR 6960:JSTOR 6375:3 May 6342:3 May 6210:9 May 4970:S2CID 4962:JSTOR 4463:S2CID 4443:(PDF) 4418:S2CID 4398:(PDF) 2949:JSTOR 2705:modus 2372:Notes 2246:Punch 2129:uncle 1472:Liège 1338:Šabac 1196:When 1121:] 952:Serbs 897:ready 766:Saxon 634:with 632:rhyme 594:Boppe 530:, 5. 526:, 4. 522:, 3. 518:, 2. 10056:Wars 9080:POWs 8399:1918 8301:1917 8227:1916 8128:1915 8032:1914 7837:Siam 7640:East 7312:ISBN 7268:ISBN 7245:ISBN 7226:ISBN 7153:ISBN 7120:ISBN 7097:(2). 7050:ISBN 7028:ISBN 7002:ISBN 6980:ISBN 6952:ISSN 6918:ISBN 6887:ISBN 6870:OCLC 6860:ISBN 6840:OCLC 6818:ISBN 6799:ISBN 6773:ISBN 6751:ISBN 6729:ISBN 6707:ISBN 6683:OCLC 6655:LCCN 6645:ISBN 6619:ISBN 6600:ISBN 6578:ISBN 6554:OCLC 6532:OCLC 6503:OCLC 6377:2018 6344:2018 6212:2017 5523:2015 4925:ISBN 3517:2018 3319:ISBN 2595:2020 1808:SMS 1340:and 1249:Tsar 1238:and 1168:and 950:and 620:must 398:was 374:army 354:ally 310:, a 290:The 250:1914 244:1914 226:1911 220:1909 208:1908 202:1907 184:1904 172:1903 166:1902 160:1898 142:1894 124:1884 118:1882 100:1879 94:1878 82:1871 7383:doi 7360:doi 7183:doi 6944:doi 4954:doi 4455:doi 4410:doi 2941:doi 2749:not 2298:. 1716:But 1639:”. 302:of 10167:: 8507:It 7356:16 7354:. 7197:. 7189:. 7179:15 7177:. 7147:. 7095:61 7093:. 7089:. 6958:. 6950:. 6938:. 6934:. 6868:. 6663:OL 6661:. 6653:. 6643:. 6639:. 6457:^ 6367:. 6363:. 6352:^ 6334:. 6330:. 6319:^ 6220:^ 6202:. 6198:. 6187:^ 6160:^ 6143:^ 6084:^ 6041:^ 6022:^ 5993:^ 5950:^ 5915:^ 5846:^ 5807:^ 5790:^ 5773:^ 5754:^ 5739:^ 5724:^ 5701:^ 5680:^ 5661:^ 5646:^ 5619:^ 5600:^ 5585:^ 5558:^ 5531:^ 5507:. 5480:^ 5451:^ 5424:^ 5407:^ 5390:^ 5373:^ 5352:^ 5309:^ 5290:^ 5273:^ 5240:^ 5221:^ 5174:^ 5159:^ 5114:^ 5087:^ 5068:^ 5045:^ 5030:^ 4968:. 4960:. 4948:. 4830:^ 4809:^ 4792:^ 4773:^ 4756:^ 4729:^ 4682:^ 4665:^ 4636:^ 4619:^ 4598:^ 4557:^ 4530:^ 4515:^ 4489:. 4475:^ 4461:. 4451:49 4449:. 4445:. 4416:. 4404:. 4400:. 4284:^ 4265:^ 4226:^ 4195:^ 4168:^ 4151:^ 4102:^ 4085:^ 4058:^ 4027:^ 3986:^ 3967:^ 3916:^ 3901:^ 3870:^ 3841:^ 3812:^ 3791:^ 3768:^ 3749:^ 3722:^ 3563:^ 3548:^ 3525:^ 3507:. 3479:^ 3464:^ 3409:^ 3394:^ 3377:^ 3362:^ 3333:^ 3289:^ 3274:^ 3228:^ 3141:^ 2947:. 2935:. 2715:." 2444:: 2440:; 2436:: 2432:; 2428:: 2424:; 2420:: 2416:; 2412:: 1461:, 1374:, 1119:de 891:, 699:, 638:.) 469:. 356:, 321:, 9579:e 9572:t 9565:v 8931:/ 7436:e 7429:t 7422:v 7385:: 7366:. 7362:: 7339:. 7320:. 7276:. 7253:. 7234:. 7205:. 7185:: 7161:. 7128:. 7058:. 7036:. 7010:. 6988:. 6966:. 6946:: 6940:9 6926:. 6895:. 6876:. 6846:. 6826:. 6807:. 6781:. 6759:. 6737:. 6715:. 6689:. 6669:. 6627:. 6608:. 6586:. 6560:. 6538:. 6509:. 6379:. 6346:. 6214:. 5525:. 4976:. 4956:: 4950:3 4933:. 4469:. 4457:: 4424:. 4412:: 4406:2 3693:. 3669:. 3519:. 3327:. 3100:. 2955:. 2943:: 2937:9 2601:. 2504:" 2305:) 2301:( 2038:" 534:. 279:e 272:t 265:v 23:.

Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.

Index