517:, the western ADC program, suffered numerous difficulties by 1969. The CIA discovery of the large number of "phantom troops" carried on payroll led to reforms, including arrest of corrupt commanders and retraining of existing ADC. In one case, only 45 of 300 troops were present in one base. As Hmong recruits became scarce, attempts were made to train other ethnic minorities. Animosity was aroused by this, and dissension arose even to the point of mutiny. As a result, 300 dissident Hmong ADC troopers were relocated to Military Region 2.
498:. To do this, in a break from prior practice, the Hmong general transferred some of his ADC troops away from their home villages. Some of these ADC troops were dispersed in a skirmish line forward of the troops. The end result was a force of 5,120 ADC troopers, backed by 5,500 ADO militia stationed in friendly villages. In a further blurring of the distinction between ADC guerrillas and Lao regulars, the RLA began to skim off promising militia men to beef up Royalist units.
201:
474:. In the northwest, Military Region 1 hosted 35 ADC units. In the northeast, around the Plain of Jars, MR 2 held 23 ADC units besides the independent Hmong companies. MR 3, the north end of the Lao panhandle, had 34 ADC units on strength. South of it, MR 4 contained 21 ADC units; that was not including the Pincushion dozen, which had disbanded. Military Region 5, around
311:
Building on that success, more ADC companies began training, while more
American support was poured into the ADC program. As ADC companies graduated, they dispersed and trained other troops. More training camps were opened, being located to surround the Plain of Jars and to interpose between the PDJ
439:
While
Operation White Star was concluded as part of the American military leaving Laos, Operation Momentum went into suspended animation. Nevertheless, the CIA tried to maintain contact with the 13,500 ADC troops it had trained in northern Laos. Much to the disgust of Vang Pao, the CIA's supply of
400:. They also lacked the physical strength to hand carry the 57 mm recoilless rifle from place to place. They also lacked the ethnic cohesiveness of the Hmong. Out of the 12 ADC companies trained in Pincushion, half of one deserted, and another was wracked to uselessness by internal dissension.
288:(PAVN) troops, a three-day curriculum was set up. On day one, three parachuted pre-packed loads were broken down and issued to recruits; they then learned to use rifles and light crew-served weapons. Day two saw the new soldiers learn the skills of ambushing the enemy; first they practiced setting
102:
battalions. In many cases, the village militia was transferred away from their home villages. They were assigned to such non-guerrilla tasks as defending or attacking fixed positions. They were conscripted into regular units of the RLA. Their numbers dwindled in the confusion of warmaking; the ADC
418:
began in 1959; it produced 1,765 militiamen for the RLG. In
December 1960, the CIA-sponsored PARU Team C took over training to revive the ADC program. After Team C was pressured out of the province by enemy activity in February 1962, CIA agent Mike Deuel was left with nine ADC companies. Based at
486:
in late July 1964, CIA-backed ADC units were attached to regular units of the RLA. On 29 July, elements of
Special Guerrilla Unit 1, as well as a Hmong ADC company, swooped in unexpectedly via helicopter to capture the road intersection that was the Royalist objective, thus ending the
352:
simply moved and started over, littering their line of retreat with booby traps. Within two months of their founding, by the end of March 1961, Momentum ADC companies ringed the PDJ; they mustered 5,000 troops. By that time, they were funded to raise a total of 7,000 irregulars.
316:
border. On 24 February 1961, 385 Thai technicians and specialists were authorized to be in Laos by the end of the month. PARU teams were rapidly infiltrated into Laos to serve as trainers. Six more CIA agents arrived to aid Bill Lair in supervising the PARU. Among them were
481:
In
January and February 1964, the ADC defended three of its sites from fixed positions as though they were light infantry. Four other sites were evacuated under attack. In April, the ADC suffered another setback as the PAVN finally overran Phou Nong. For
510:(RTA) instructors in late 1967 near Xieng Lom, it graduated its first three companies by 31 October 1967. They swept southwest, pushing communist guerrillas ahead of them. The RTA crossed the border into Laos and attacked the band of communists.
130:
force, the AD Corps, in 1955. They disbanded it in 1958, only to reconstitute it the following year. The AD Corps was supposed to be a nationwide network of 16,000 volunteers for local village self-defense. Assets from an earlier
395:
recruits were not as aggressive as the Hmong. Just as the Hmong were, the Hune were scorned by lowland Lao, and thus neglected by the
Royalist government. The new Hune soldiers had difficulty loading the
444:(SGU). From this time on, the ADC forces would dwindle in importance drained off its best troops into organized larger units; within a year, a third of the 30,000 ADC soldiers were serving in SGUs.
532:
oversaw junior agents assigned to work with various ethnic minorities. By the time Poe departed in 1970, ADC companies segregated by ethnicity had been trained and were being formed into makeshift
348:
aircraft could resupply ADC camps. Even as the ADC effort burgeoned, communist troops began to locate and attack some camps, though with no real result. Instead of defending the bases, the Lao
521:
533:
441:
427:
during May and June; then PAVN troops closing in forced an evacuation and closure of the base. Deuel would reconstitute his road watch program in
October 1963 as
514:
407:; the Green Berets left Laos. They left behind 12 subterranean caches stocked with ammunition, weapons cleaning supplies, rice, and grenades in the vicinity of
278:
221:
52:
494:
For the first few months of 1965, Vang Pao planned an expansion of the
Operation Momentum ADC program to the north and west of the Pathet Lao capital of
404:
440:
munitions to his Hmong guerrillas was suspended. To conserve his trained manpower, he gathered 500 of his ADC guerrillas into the first of his
189:
were training recruits: Military Region 1 had 5,000 trainees; MR 2 had 3,700; MR 3 had 3,000; MR 4 had another 3,000 recruits; MR 5 had 1,300.
213:
506:
As the war continued, the ADC program still ran as designed in
Military Region 1 in far western and northwestern Laos. Belatedly begun by
420:
273:. The first CIA-backed training session for ADC was at Padong, located back in the hills 17 kilometers south of the communist-occupied
304:. The first two ADC companies in Momentum graduated on 20 January 1961. The following day, 20 of the graduates ambushed and killed 15
258:
451:, Thailand. The Lao Special Operating Teams were modeled after the PARU, but consisted of 12 man teams. On 10 April 1963, President
35:
commander when trained. By 1 September 1959, 20 ADC companies were in training, and there were 16,000 ADC soldiers nationwide. When
525:
143:(Ordinary Self Defense) troops. However, some members of the new Corps were designated for full-time service against a burgeoning
571:. In one case, even the ADC militia used for home defense was pressed into regular offensive operations in Military Region 4 for
341:
939:
591:
414:
Another operation in the
Laotian panhandle was the road watch teams. The original ADC program in southern Laotian
391:. However, the Green Berets did not enjoy quite the training success as the PARU had. They found that their raw
281:. The ADC program was relatively inexpensive; for instance, the Lao soldiers were paid about ten cents per day.
984:
969:
954:
313:
253:
in early January 1961. The Hmong officer offered to raise and train a clandestine army of 10,000 hill tribes
90:. In 1967, Royal Thai Special Forces belatedly began their own ADC program along the Thai-Lao border. As the
322:
285:
242:
36:
1000:
568:
270:
185:
companies by month's end, with an additional 20 companies trained by the end of October. The various
170:. These companies contained four platoons. In turn, each platoon was supposed to have three assault
578:
As the end of hostilities neared, the Royal Lao Government still carried 6,000 ADC troopers in its
186:
119:
32:
601:
572:
611:
560:
552:
447:
Efforts also began to replace the foreign instructors with Lao; the new training took place at
24:
135:(National Guard) and some prior commando companies were rolled into the new organization. The
333:
139:(RLG) planned to use most of the AD Corps for part-time village self-defense; these were the
388:
376:
362:
136:
79:
75:
67:
8:
456:
415:
380:
115:
71:
308:
soldiers. By the 22nd, both companies cut Route 4 20 kilometers south of Xieng Khouang.
245:'s undercover entry into Laos would result in an American version of the ADC. CIA agent
564:
488:
483:
428:
366:
297:
266:
246:
236:
167:
156:
126:
with a trained military. As part of the Lao military establishment the French raised a
56:
44:
28:
174:
and one heavy weapons squad. AD Corps companies were under the command of their local
980:
965:
950:
935:
920:
606:
424:
225:
91:
40:
947:
Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942–1992
384:
277:. Key to the success of this ADC program was the pre-packed supplies that could be
171:
543:
being co-opted into regular service. In Military Region 2, they were stationed at
383:
A Teams. They founded one such ADC program apart from Momentum, placing it on the
579:
507:
471:
452:
403:
Operation White Star was closed out by 28 September 1962, in accordance with the
175:
123:
48:
51:
in the early 1960s, they instituted an American version of the ADC dependent on
467:
326:
262:
95:
994:
596:
274:
160:
87:
548:
544:
209:
152:
127:
83:
977:
Back Fire: The CIA's Secret War in Laos and Its Link to the War in Vietnam
924:
379:
training teams into the ADC program. The White Star teams were subsets of
912:. Center for the Study of Intelligence. Classified control no. C05303949.
448:
540:
392:
349:
305:
301:
144:
103:
faded in importance until only 6,000 remained in service by war's end.
371:
The successful ADC effort also attracted another sort of support. The
475:
397:
372:
254:
284:
Because the training was located a three-day march from the nearest
556:
529:
495:
318:
250:
60:
463:
408:
337:
293:
788:
786:
99:
462:
By this time, many non-CIA ADC units were assigned to work as
63:
to raise a guerrilla force of 5,000 troops in several months.
783:
344:
began to be carved out of the jungled ridges of Laos so that
289:
455:
ordered resumption of U.S. support by the newly established
356:
345:
94:
continued, ADC troops began to assume the role of regular
27:. Begun by a French military mission in 1955, its 100-man
200:
181:
On 1 September 1959, RLG plans called for creation of 20
16:
Militia training program for the Royal Lao Armed Forces
222:
Table of organization and equipment for an ADC company
910:
Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos
375:
pressured the CIA into allowing the introduction of
265:
standards, got permission from his seniors to staff
257:
via the ADC program. Lair, who had trained the Thai
192:
470:(RLA). They were spread out among all five Laotian
423:, he used them as road watch teams spying upon the
106:
915:Anthony, Victor B. and Richard R. Sexton (1993).
405:International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos
992:
279:parachuted into obscurely located training camps
166:The AD Corps was designed to consist of 100 man
66:The ADC concept's success helped it spread. The
98:. They were gathered into larger units such as
434:
23:(ADC) was a militia training program for the
838:
836:
834:
555:. Elsewhere in Laos, ADC units were part of
296:. The third day covered squad, platoon, and
930:Conboy, Kenneth and James Morrison (1995).
758:
756:
728:
726:
698:
696:
694:
692:
637:
635:
147:communist movement; these were designated
831:
357:Operation Pincushion and road watch teams
59:, Shackley, Lair and others, worked with
55:. Using a three-day training schedule in
932:Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos
753:
723:
199:
689:
632:
292:-size ambushes, then moved up to using
151:(Self-Defense Shock) troops. The 4,000
31:were placed under command of the local
993:
962:The Hidden History of the Vietnam War
547:as defensive light infantry to guard
230:
720:Conboy, Morrison, pp. 66–68, 85–88.
13:
14:
1012:
919:. Command for Air Force History.
592:North Vietnamese invasion of Laos
528:on the Chinese border. CIA agent
159:between the Pathet Lao and their
122:to provide the newly independent
520:Matters were somewhat better in
387:in southern Laos, and dubbed it
945:Hamilton-Merritt, Jane (1999).
890:
881:
872:
863:
854:
845:
828:Conboy, Morrison, pp. 131, 138.
822:
813:
804:
795:
774:
765:
744:
735:
714:
539:Nor were Nam Yu's the only ADC
501:
212:guerrilla company assembles at
878:Conboy, Morrison, pp. 276–278.
869:Conboy, Morrison, pp. 261–267.
860:Conboy, Morrison, pp. 215–216.
851:Conboy, Morrison, pp. 189–197.
842:Conboy, Morrison, pp. 316–317.
801:Conboy, Morrison, pp. 111–112.
792:Conboy, Morrison, pp. 125–126.
750:Conboy, Morrison, pp, 117–118.
705:
680:
671:
662:
653:
644:
623:
478:, contained only 9 ADC units.
332:With aerial support from both
314:Democratic Republic of Vietnam
70:(RLG) set up its own version.
53:pre-packed airdropped materiel
1:
908:Ahern, Thomas L. Jr. (2006),
902:
780:Conboy, Morrison, pp. 88, 97.
114:Although the French lost the
949:. Indiana University Press.
762:Conboy, Morrison, pp. 97–99.
732:Conboy, Morrison, pp. 95–96.
702:Conboy, Morrison, pp. 61–65.
47:and others slipped into the
7:
585:
435:Further developments of ADC
259:Police Aerial Resupply Unit
243:Central Intelligence Agency
37:Central Intelligence Agency
10:
1017:
569:Operation Honorable Dragon
522:Forces Guerrilla Northwest
360:
271:Programs Evaluation Office
234:
219:
74:(USSF) copied the ADC for
896:Conboy, Morrison, p. 403.
887:Conboy, Morrison, p. 223.
819:Conboy, Morrison, p. 131.
686:Hamilton-Merritt, p. 177.
346:short takeoff and landing
118:, they were bound by the
979:. Simon & Schuster.
917:The War in Northern Laos
741:Conboy, Morrison, p. 87.
668:Conboy, Morrison, p. 61.
650:Conboy, Morrison, p. 29.
641:Conboy, Morrison, p. 23.
617:
466:in conjunction with the
286:People's Army of Vietnam
187:military regions of Laos
629:Anthony, Sexton, p. 11.
602:Lao Veterans of America
573:Operation Diamond Arrow
534:Special Guerrilla Units
442:Special Guerrilla Units
269:and supply it from the
975:Warner, Roger (1995).
659:Warner, pp. 33–34, 47.
612:Royal Lao Armed Forces
561:Operation Counterpunch
553:Battle of Lima Site 85
217:
141:Auto-Defense Ordinaire
82:, and to organize the
25:Royal Lao Armed Forces
960:Prados, John (1995).
551:and took part in the
524:, which was based at
515:Forces Guerrilla West
361:Further information:
300:ambushes, as well as
235:Further information:
203:
120:1954 Geneva Agreement
389:Operation Pincushion
377:Operation White Star
363:Operation Pincushion
206:Auto Defense de Choc
195:Auto Defense de Choc
149:Auto Defense de Choc
137:Royal Lao Government
109:Auto Defense de Choc
80:Operation Pincushion
76:Operation White Star
68:Royal Lao Government
21:Auto Defense de Choc
810:Warner, p. 139-141.
457:Requirements Office
416:Khammouane Province
381:U.S. Special Forces
163:backers were such.
116:First Indochina War
72:U.S. Special Forces
565:Operation Maeng Da
536:(SGU) battalions.
484:Operation Triangle
429:Operation Hardnose
367:Operation Hardnose
267:Operation Momentum
237:Operation Momentum
231:Operation Momentum
218:
57:Operation Momentum
45:James William Lair
1001:Laotian Civil War
934:. Paladin Press.
607:Laotian Civil War
425:Ho Chi Minh Trail
226:Laotian Civil War
92:Laotian Civil War
41:Theodore Shackley
39:(CIA) operatives
1008:
897:
894:
888:
885:
879:
876:
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861:
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829:
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687:
684:
678:
675:
669:
666:
660:
657:
651:
648:
642:
639:
630:
627:
472:military regions
411:and Houei Kong.
385:Bolovens Plateau
161:North Vietnamese
1016:
1015:
1011:
1010:
1009:
1007:
1006:
1005:
991:
990:
964:. Ivan R. Dee.
905:
900:
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891:
886:
882:
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873:
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846:
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827:
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784:
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771:Prados, p. 231.
770:
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731:
724:
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663:
658:
654:
649:
645:
640:
633:
628:
624:
620:
588:
580:order of battle
508:Royal Thai Army
504:
453:John F. Kennedy
437:
369:
359:
239:
233:
228:
198:
176:military region
133:Garde Nationale
124:Kingdom of Laos
112:
49:Kingdom of Laos
33:Military Region
17:
12:
11:
5:
1014:
1004:
1003:
989:
988:
973:
958:
943:
928:
913:
904:
901:
899:
898:
889:
880:
871:
862:
853:
844:
830:
821:
812:
803:
794:
782:
773:
764:
752:
743:
734:
722:
713:
704:
688:
679:
677:Warner, p. 64.
670:
661:
652:
643:
631:
621:
619:
616:
615:
614:
609:
604:
599:
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587:
584:
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468:Royal Lao Army
436:
433:
358:
355:
263:Special Forces
232:
229:
216:, Spring 1961.
197:
191:
111:
105:
96:light infantry
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1013:
1002:
999:
998:
996:
986:
982:
978:
974:
971:
967:
963:
959:
956:
952:
948:
944:
941:
940:0-87364-825-0
937:
933:
929:
926:
922:
918:
914:
911:
907:
906:
893:
884:
875:
866:
857:
848:
839:
837:
835:
825:
816:
807:
798:
789:
787:
777:
768:
759:
757:
747:
738:
729:
727:
717:
711:Ahern, p. 53.
708:
699:
697:
695:
693:
683:
674:
665:
656:
647:
638:
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597:Laos Memorial
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497:
492:
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485:
479:
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473:
469:
465:
460:
459:to the ADCs.
458:
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445:
443:
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417:
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320:
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309:
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306:Lao communist
303:
299:
295:
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287:
282:
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276:
275:Plain of Jars
272:
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260:
256:
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193:The American
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97:
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88:South Vietnam
85:
81:
77:
73:
69:
64:
62:
58:
54:
50:
46:
42:
38:
34:
30:
26:
22:
976:
961:
946:
931:
916:
909:
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856:
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824:
815:
806:
797:
776:
767:
746:
737:
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707:
682:
673:
664:
655:
646:
625:
577:
549:Lima Site 85
545:Phou Pha Thi
538:
519:
512:
505:
502:ADC absorbed
493:
480:
461:
446:
438:
413:
402:
370:
331:
310:
298:company-size
283:
240:
205:
194:
183:Auto Defense
182:
180:
165:
148:
140:
132:
128:paramilitary
113:
108:
65:
20:
18:
449:Phitsanulok
334:Air America
327:Tom Fosmire
302:booby traps
155:located in
107:The French
985:0684802929
970:1566630797
955:0253207568
903:References
541:irregulars
350:irregulars
342:Lima sites
323:Bill Young
255:guerrillas
249:contacted
220:See also:
214:Phou Vieng
145:Pathet Lao
925:232549943
513:However,
476:Vientiane
421:Phou Sang
398:M1 Garand
373:U.S. Army
247:Bill Lair
168:companies
29:companies
995:Category
586:See also
557:Kou Kiet
530:Tony Poe
496:Xam Neua
319:Tony Poe
312:and the
294:platoons
251:Vang Pao
157:Xam Neua
61:Vang Pao
464:militia
409:Paksong
338:BirdAir
983:
968:
953:
938:
923:
567:, and
526:Nam Yu
489:battle
325:, and
208:(ADC)
172:squads
100:ad hoc
618:Notes
290:squad
210:Hmong
153:Hmong
84:Degar
981:ISBN
966:ISBN
951:ISBN
936:ISBN
921:OCLC
393:Hune
365:and
336:and
241:The
224:and
78:and
19:The
261:to
86:in
997::
833:^
785:^
755:^
725:^
691:^
634:^
582:.
575:.
563:,
559:,
491:.
431:.
340:,
329:.
321:,
204:A
178:.
43:,
987:.
972:.
957:.
942:.
927:.
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