Western Front tactics, 1917

4576:) in March was found particularly useful. Tanks were no longer unusual and their presence in large numbers, left artillery free for counter-battery neutralisation rather than destruction of barbed wire and other field fortifications, which made the surprise attack feasible, given the secret deployment of artillery reinforcements. The attempt to surprise the German defence precluded extensive work on transport and supply infrastructure behind the front, which caused the same sort of difficulties in maintaining momentum that crater fields did elsewhere in 1917. After the first couple of days, the battle became another wearing-out operation, using up German reinforcements as they arrived, which when suspended on 28 November, gave the Germans time to mass for a counter-offensive on 30 November. More German forces were available due to the closure of the eastern front and the end of the period when German forces were pinned down by the battle in Flanders. The course of the German counter-offensive, which was the biggest German attack in the west since Verdun in 1916, demonstrated that the constraints on advances encountered by the British and French armies were not unique. The ground gained in the German attack of 30 November, was much less than intended and part of it was then lost to British counter-attacks. After this limited success, attrition tactics resumed, until the British abandoned the salient at Bourlon Wood. 4566:(26 September) and their reversal after the Battle of Broodseinde on 4 October, to Loßberg. The other German commanders were exculpated and a false impression created that OHL was operating in a rational manner, when Ludendorff imposed another defensive scheme on 7 October. Boff called this narrative facile, because it avoided the problem faced by the Germans in late 1917. OHL sent orders to change tactics again days before Loßberg had issued orders to the 4th Army but he was blamed for them. Boff also doubted that all of the divisions in Flanders could act quickly on top-down demands for changes. The tempo of British attacks and attrition led to an increase of six divisions in the 4th Army by 10 October but that they were either novice divisions deficient in training or veteran divisions with low morale. The Germans were seeking tactical changes for an operational dilemma, because no operational answer existed. On 2 October, Rupprecht ordered the 4th Army HQ to avoid over-centralising command only to find that Loßberg had issued an artillery plan detailing the deployment of individual batteries. The British retained the strategic initiative but failed to capture the Belgian coast and the U-boat bases, although this was due more to the difficulties of wet weather than the effectiveness of German resistance. 4580:

possibility of having large sections of the front broken, and of having to repair those breaches by considerable counter offensives....", which caused the German command to divert resources into anti-tank defences and end the skimping of artillery and ammunition in some areas to reinforce others. After the battle Rupprecht wrote "Wherever the ground offers suitable going for tanks, surprise attacks like this may be expected... there can be no more mention of quiet fronts.", which led to a belief among many German commanders that a defensive strategy in 1918 would be futile. The German commanders concluded that the speed of the Cambrai counter-offensive had contributed to surprise but that last-minute changes to plans, had diverted planning staffs from important details. Lack of time to study the ground and rehearse, had slowed the tempo of the attack and forced junior officers and NCO's to exercise conspicuous leadership, causing them heavy losses. The physical demands made on troops and horses to arrive in time for the offensive, lessened the energy of their attack, which rapidly broke down and many horses died of exhaustion, which contributed to local ammunition shortages. The organisational feat of moving thirteen divisions to Cambrai from

3675:"Instruction No. 4" comprised intelligence instructions for the questioning of prisoners and the gleaning and dissemination of useful information. Men identified by armbands were to scour the battlefield for German documents, using maps of German headquarters, signals offices and dugouts; information was to be sent to a divisional collecting point. "Instruction No. 5" was devoted to liaison, with officers attached to brigades, to report to the divisional commander. Brigades liaised with the other Australian brigades and those of neighbouring divisions, battalions liaising in the same manner. Artillery liaison officers were appointed down to infantry brigades and battalion and company officers were told to keep close to artillery Forward Observation Officers. "Instruction no. 6" covered engineer and pioneer work for the building of strong points, at the places determined in "Divisional Order 31". An Engineer Field Company was attached to each brigade and the Pioneer Battalion was made responsible for the maintenance and extension of communications, including tramways, mule and duckboard tracks and communication trenches. Two supply routes were defined and next day, engineer officers were added to the liaison system within brigade headquarters. 2402: 4553:. Research over the last 25 years suggests that British and German commanders thought carefully about what they were doing, learned quickly and had efficient forces capable of quick changes of method. The capture of Passchendaele Ridge was extremely difficult, due to the skill and determination of the German army and the huge problem of waging war without great advantages in technology or tactics. The course of the Nivelle Offensive earlier in the year, suggest that a campaign of this nature was unavoidable. Limited operations like the Battle of Messines, the Battle of Hill 70, the Second Offensive Battle of Verdun and the Battle of Malmaison, were strikingly successful but were insufficient to force the German army out of France; this was not because of poor leadership but due a form of warfare conducted with means made available by industrialisation, fought by closely matched opponents, who made mistakes but mostly fought with determination, using all the skill and technical measures they could find. The defensive methods used by the German army at Arras after 9 April were not superseded until changes were imposed by Ludendorff after the defeat at Broodseinde on 4 October. 2735:

some cavalry were attached. Divisions were to build strongpoints and organise liaison with neighbouring divisions, with these groups given special training over model trenches. Ten days before zero, divisions were to send liaison officers to Corps Headquarters. Machine-gun units were to be under corps control, until the black line was reached then devolve to divisions, ready to sweep the Steenbeek valley and cover the advance to the green line by the 51st and 39th divisions. Tanks were attached to the divisions, under arrangements decided by the divisions and some wireless tanks were made available. Gas units remained under corps control, a model of the ground was built for all ranks to inspect and it was arranged that two maps per platoon would be issued. Plans for air-ground communication went into considerable detail. Aircraft recognition markings were given and the flares to be lit by the infantry when called for by contact aeroplanes was laid down, as were recognition marks for battalion and brigade headquarters; dropping stations were created to receive information from aircraft. Ground communication arrangements were made according to the manual

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Corps since April and amendments were issued on 10 November. The Third Army HQ issued two "Notes" on 30 October, covering tank-infantry training and operations. In "Tank and Infantry Operations Without Methodical Artillery Preparation" of 30 October, each corps was told to keep the instructions secret to ensure surprise, that tank sections should attack specific areas, objectives should be reserved for an echelon of tanks each, that an advanced tank should keep German heads down, while the main body and infantry crossed German trenches, that the main body of tanks should stay on the British side of the German line being attacked, that tanks would be allotted according to the number of German positions in the area and work in threes to cover 100–200 yd (91–183 m) of front. Only a platoon of infantry should work with each tank, to avoid bunching when moving through lanes in barbed wire made by the tanks and that infantry should move in section files. Further sections described the care needed when tanks crossed barbed wire, so that following tanks would not pull up the wire, the use and marking of trenches filled by

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added a machine-gun barrage, to be fired by the attacking divisions and coordinated by the Corps Machine-Gun Officer and the Second Army artillery commander. Artillery details covered eight pages and signalling another seven. A Corps Intelligence balloon was arranged to receive light signals and messenger pigeons were issued to corps observers, reporting to a Corps Advanced Intelligence Report Centre, so that information could be collected and circulated swiftly. Delegation forward was demonstrated by the next "Instructions" on 10 September, which gave a framework for the creeping barrage fired by the divisional artillery, the details being left to the divisions, as was harassing fire on German positions. Double bombardment groups, which had been used by X Corps at Messines, were affiliated with divisional headquarters. The X Corps report on the attack of 20 September, stated that success was due to the artillery and machine-gun barrages, the ease of moving troops over rebuilt roads and tracks behind the front and the much better co-operation of infantry, artillery and

2693:(XIV Corps), felt that the range of their artillery would determine the extent of their advance and that it would need to be moved forward for the next attack. Gough drew a distinction between advancing against disorganised enemy forces, which required bold action and attacks on organised forces, which needed careful preparation, particularly of the artillery which would take three to seven days. Maxse's preference for a later beginning for the attack was agreed, except by Lieutenant-General Herbert Watts, the XIX Corps commander. A memorandum was issued summarising the conference, in which Gough stressed his belief in the need for front-line commanders to use initiative and advance into vacant or lightly occupied ground beyond the objectives laid down, without waiting for orders. Relieving tired troops, gave time to the enemy, so a return to deliberate methods would be necessary afterwards. Judging the time for this was reserved for the army commander, who would rely on the reports of subordinates. 4093:) issued its draft plan on 31 October, giving the concept of the plan, the three stages and the troops allotted, with the measures needed to prepare the area and plan the assembly of troops. Administrative, intelligence and signalling instructions, were issued by the respective corps staff branches. During planning, IV Corps issued more instructions regarding the role of its divisions, particularly for the period after the Hindenburg Support Trench system was captured, laid down that the Tank Corps was to use all its tanks on the first day and that the troops involved in the attack, would move to the front immediately before the attack, rather than a few days previous, to be fresh and to prevent the Germans making deductions from prisoners. This decision gave the infantry more time for training with the tanks and responsibility for this was delegated to infantry division commanders and the tank brigade attached to IV Corps. Further instructions were issued from 3812:(hasty counter-attacks). The period of dry weather and clear skies which began in early September, had greatly increased the effectiveness of British air observation and the accuracy of artillery fire. German counter-attacks had been costly defeats, after arriving too late to take advantage of the disorganisation of the British infantry. The changes in British tactics meant that they had swiftly established a defence in depth on reverse slopes, protected by standing barrages, in dry, clear, weather with specialist counter-attack reconnaissance aircraft for the observation of German troop movements and improved contact-patrol and ground-attack operations by the RFC. Such German artillery that was able to fire, despite British counter-battery bombardment, became unsystematic and inaccurate due to uncertainty over the whereabouts of German infantry, just when British infantry benefited from the opposite. On 28 September Albrecht von Thaer, Staff Officer at 4180:

of the 6th and 2nd armies were possible, if the British had ended their operations in Flanders. The attack at Cambrai came "as a complete surprise" and Ludendorff criticised the Army Group for being too distracted by the Flanders front. The Army Group and OHL could only react to the British attack on 20 November, by issuing orders for reinforcements to rush to the 2nd Army, although Rupprecht pointed out that the system of rapid relief of divisions in Flanders would break down, if many divisions were removed and that the rail network was overloaded, so that rapid reinforcement of the Cambrai front was not guaranteed. Ludendorff responded by taking additional divisions from Army Group German Crown Prince in the central section of the western front. The next day Rupprecht ordered all of the truck-mounted anti-aircraft guns in the 4th and 6th armies to the 2nd Army for use as anti-tank guns.

4479:) permanently. The division improved its positions by building elaborate barbed wire obstacles and dug more trenches and dugouts, despite the frequency with which British artillery destroyed them. Vigorous patrolling and prisoner snatches, challenged British dominance of no-man's-land. The 54th Division had engaged French tanks during the Nivelle Offensive and afterwards had more anti-tank training. The 9th Reserve Division moved to the Cambrai front from Flanders, at the end of September, having been depleted in the fighting around Zandvoorde and adopted the same raiding policy of the 54th Division, which led to the discovery in no-man's-land of a dead British Tank Corps soldier on 28 October. The news was passed on to intelligence staffs who discounted it. Demand for ammunition in Flanders was so great that larger more revealing raids on the Cambrai front were not possible. 100: 2727:, was written up as the operation order for the attack of 31 July, in which the final objective for the first day, was moved forward from the black to the green line and infiltration envisaged from it towards the red line. Responsibility delegated to the divisions for the attack, would revert to corps and Fifth Army headquarters, when the green line was reached. In Gough's Instruction of 27 June, he alluded to Davidson's concern about a ragged front line, by reminding the Corps commanders that a "clearly defined" line was needed for the next advance and that control of artillery would be devolved to the corps. Gough issued another memorandum on 30 June, summarising the plan and referring to the possibility that the attack would move to open warfare after 36 hours, noting that this might take several set-piece battles to achieve. 4118:

offensive, was restricted (along with the quantity of artillery and ammunition expenditure) to the usual amount to maintain secrecy, leaving no time before the battle for artillery registration. The positions of active German artillery batteries were to be observed once the battle began and prompt corrections to the artillery were to be given for counter-battery neutralisation and for destructive fire against groups of German infantry. Four squadrons of fighters were reserved for ground attacks against artillery, machine-gun nests and troops, according to a plan using lists of the most dangerous German artillery positions. Ground attack squadrons were given three groups of ground targets, to be patrolled all day and a forward aerodrome was established at Bapaume to allow aircraft to resume patrols and attacks quickly.

2479:(Hindenburg line). He confirmed the decision made to withdraw from the Wancourt salient and the foot of Vimy Ridge, accepting that a rigid forward defence was impossible given British observation from the ridge. North of the Scarpe, the front garrison was given permission to withdraw during British attacks, from the battle zone to its rear edge, where it would counter-attack with the reserves held back there and mingle with retreating British infantry, to evade British observed artillery fire; after dark the German infantry would be redeployed in depth under cover. South of the Scarpe, the loss of Monchy-le-Preux also gave the British observation over German positions. Loßberg mapped a new line beyond the range of British field artillery, to be the back of a new battle zone (the 2756:

green and dotted green lines, bypassing isolated German posts, which were to be dealt with by reserves. Depending on the state of the German defence, ground was to be taken up to the red line by patrols. Captured German trench lines were to be consolidated and advanced posts established beyond them. Parties were to be detailed for liaison with neighbouring units and divisions. Six brigades of field artillery were available for the creeping barrage and the division's three machine-gun companies were reinforced by a company from the 29th Division for the machine-gun barrage. Times when contact patrol aircraft were to fly overhead observing progress were given. The only light signals allowed were the flares for contact aircraft and the rifle grenade SOS signal.

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principles of the artillery component. Each corps was to allot tasks to divisions, which would then select objectives and devise infantry plans subject to corps approval. Artillery planning was controlled by corps with consultation of divisions by the corps General Officer Commanding, Royal Artillery (GOCRA) which became the title of the officer at each level of command who devised the bombardment plan, which was coordinated with neighbouring corps artillery commanders by the army GOCRA. Specific parts of the bombardment were nominated by divisions, using their local knowledge and the results of air reconnaissance. The corps artillery commander was to co-ordinate counter-battery fire and the howitzer bombardment for zero hour. Corps controlled the

3720:, which followed the same pattern of planning and organisation. The warning order was issued on 3 September and the divisional plan issued on 6 September. Appendices followed from 9 to 15 September, with some amendments on 17 September. On 8 September X Corps instructed that divisional commanders were to take over their fronts on 13 September, before the divisions there were relieved by the attacking divisions and that brigade headquarters were to be taken over on 16 September. Intelligence gathering continued until the attack to amend plans. When aerial photographs showed that ground around Dumbarton Lakes, south of Inverness Copse was far muddier than expected, the plan was changed so that the infantry battalions sidestepped the marsh. 2671:, Director of Operations at GHQ, wrote a memorandum to Haig, in which he wrote that there was "ambiguity as to what was meant by a step-by-step attack with limited objectives" and advocated advances of no more than 1,500–3,000 yd (0.85–1.70 mi; 1.4–2.7 km), to increase the concentration of British artillery and operational pauses, to allow for roads to be repaired and artillery to be moved forward. A rolling offensive would need fewer periods of intense artillery fire, which would allow guns to be moved forward ready for the next stage. Gough stressed the need to plan for opportunities to take ground left temporarily undefended and that this was more likely in the first attack, 3727:, pointed out to the X Corps commander, Lieutenant-General Thomas Morland, that he was leaving the arrangements to deal with German counter-attacks to his brigade commanders but that the area suggested by X Corps HQ was on a forward slope and he wanted to put the reserve behind the blue (second) line. Morland reiterated his intent to ensure that the counter-attack reserve was ready to intervene while German troops were reorganising, though the means to achieve this were left to Babington's discretion and that the 23rd Division reserve brigade would conduct any prepared counter-attacks. A "Final Order" was issued on 17 September as a summary, adding information about the 220: 4109:

infantry co-operation, portage of ammunition, wire and trench crossing, signalling, counter-battery work, staff liaison and reporting and stated that success depended on the mechanical fitness of the tanks, efficient assembly on the battlefield, the selection of obvious objectives, the use of prepared and concealed approaches and thorough briefing of all tank and infantry officers. Third Army HQ delegated operational control of the tanks to III and IV Corps, which allocated tanks to their divisions for division commanders to arrange training. Each corps sent a staff liaison officer to the tank brigade headquarters attached.

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by field artillery, using at least half of the heavy artillery ammunition for observed fire on infantry positions in captured pillboxes, command posts, machine-gun nests and on duckboard tracks and field railways. Gas bombardment was to be increased on forward positions and artillery emplacements, when the wind allowed. Every effort was to be made to induce the British to reinforce their forward positions, where the German artillery could engage them, by making spoiling attacks to recapture pillboxes, improve defensive positions and harass the British infantry with patrols and diversionary bombardments. From

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attacking brigades on a front of one battalion each, with a battalion advancing to the first objective, one moving through it to the second objective and two more to the final objective, 1,500 yd (1,400 m) beyond the original front line. A map was appended to the Order showing the red, blue and green lines to be captured. A creeping barrage by the five field artillery brigades in the division and bombardments from artillery under corps and army command was described. Special attention was given to mopping-up procedures and the detailing of particular units, to capture selected German strong points.

140: 4022:

containing the objectives and the achievement of surprise by dispensing with a preliminary bombardment. Infantry were to advance behind a mass of tanks, to the first two objective lines (blue and brown) by leapfrogging. An advance to the red line and beyond was to be undertaken by cavalry, a novel feature intended to be made possible by the surprise and swift initial advance, with the details to be decided by the Corps. The third part of the plan required the cavalry to envelop Cambrai, followed up by infantry, beginning in the south with III Corps then successively to the north by

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shortages of labour and the long winter, which affected the setting of concrete. The 6th Army commanders had also been reluctant to encourage the British to change their plans, if they detected a thinning of the front line. The commanders were inhibited by the extent of British air reconnaissance, which observed new field works and promptly directed artillery fire on them. The 6th Army failed to redeploy its artillery, which remained in lines easy to see and bombard. Work on defences was also divided between maintaining the front line, strengthening the third line and the new

192: 153: 2847: 2316:, drew attention to two of his divisions, which were holding a four-division front and Horne explained the vital nature of the attack on the ridge, by I Corps and the Canadian Corps further south. Conferences with the corps commanders on 29 March and 15 April, discussed the corps commanders' opinions on the possibility of a German withdrawal, road allocations and catering arrangements for the troops in the line, the vital importance of troops communicating with contact aeroplanes and artillery and the dates by which the corps commanders felt able to attack. 3591:

process of arranging the attack involved the divisions soon afterwards. New infantry formations were introduced by both armies, to counter the German irregular pillbox defence and the impossibility of maintaining line formations on ground full of flooded shell-craters. Waves of infantry were replaced by a thin line of skirmishers leading small columns. Maxse the XVIII Corps commander, called this one of the "distinguishing features" of the attack, along with the revival of the use of the rifle as the primary infantry weapon, the addition of

3995: 3443:. The British had such a mass of artillery and the infrastructure to supply it with huge amounts of ammunition, much of which had been built after the attack at Messines in early June. Loßberg ordered that the front line be fought for at all costs and immediate counter-attacks delivered to recapture lost sectors. Loßberg reiterated his belief that a trench garrison which retired in a zone of fire quickly became disorganised and could not counter-attack, losing the sector and creating difficulties for troops on the flanks. 4672:

Ypres–Roulers railway. The green line from the southern flank of XIX Corps to the northern flank of XIV Corps required an advance of 2,500–3,500 yd (1.4–2.0 mi; 2.3–3.2 km). An advance of 5,000 yd (2.8 mi; 4.6 km) to the red line, was not fundamental to the plan and discretion to attempt it was left with the divisional commanders, based on the extent of local German resistance, according to the requirements of SS 135. Had the German defence collapsed and the red line been reached, the German

1284:(Alberich manoeuvre) was ordered to begin on 16 March 1917, although a withdrawal of 3 mi (4.8 km) on a 15 mi (24 km) front had already been carried out from 22 to 23 February, in the salient between Bapaume and Arras, formed by the Allied advance on the Somme in 1916. The local retirements had been caused by the renewal of pressure by the British Fifth Army, as soon as weather permitted in January 1917, which had advanced 5 mi (8.0 km) on a 4 mi (6.4 km) front up the Ancre valley. 2188:, which covered an area 100 yd (91 m) wide and 50 yd (46 m) deep, with the four sections in a diamond pattern, the rifle section ahead, rifle grenade and bombing sections to the sides and the Lewis gun section behind, until resistance was met. German defenders were to be suppressed by fire from the Lewis-gun and rifle-grenade sections, while the riflemen and hand-grenade sections moved forward, preferably by infiltrating round the flanks of the resistance, to overwhelm the defenders from the rear. 2023: 1782:), who would join the sentries to recapture sentry-posts by immediate counter-attack. Defensive procedures in the battle zone were similar but with greater numbers. The front trench system was the sentry line for the battle zone garrison, which was allowed to move away from concentrations of enemy fire and then counter-attack to recover the battle and outpost zones; such withdrawals were envisaged as occurring on small parts of the battlefield which had been made untenable by Allied artillery fire, as the prelude to 1317:. Hindenburg and Ludendorff had demanded reinforcements from Falkenhayn to fight a decisive campaign against Russia and intrigued against Falkenhayn over his refusals. Falkenhayn held that decisive military victory against Russia was impossible and that the Western Front was the main theatre of the war. Soon after taking over from Falkenhayn, Hindenburg and Ludendorff had no choice but to recognise the wisdom of Falkenhayn's judgement that the Western Front was decisive, despite the crisis in the east caused by the 129: 4080: 1611:, to synthesise nitrates from atmospheric nitrogen, enabled Germany to continue the war; developing the Haber process and building factories to exploit it took time. Under Falkenhayn, the procurement of ammunition and the guns to fire it, had been based on the output of propellants, since the manufacture of ammunition without sufficient propellant fillings, was as wasteful of resources as it was pointless but Hindenburg and Ludendorff wanted firepower to replace manpower and ignored the principle. 117: 3195: 2664:

planned the attack in the framework given by the army commander and planning in the Second Army followed the same system. In mid-June, the corps in the Second Army corps were asked to submit their attack plans and requirements to carry them out. When the II Corps boundary was moved south in early July, the Second Army attack became mainly a decoy, except for the 41st Division (X Corps), for which special liaison arrangements were made with II Corps and the covering artillery.

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dissent between army, corps and division was tolerated, although it was not uniformly evident. Staffs were more experienced and were able to use a formula for set-piece attacks, although the means for a higher tempo of operations had not been achieved, because of the artillery's reliance on observed fire, which took time to complete. The loss of communication with troops once they advanced, still left their commanders ignorant of events when their decisions were most needed.

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aircraft, lorries, chemicals, concrete and steel, photography, wireless and advances in medical science increased in importance in all of the armies, as did the influence of the material constraints of geography, climate, demography and economics. The armies encountered growing manpower shortages, caused by the need to replace the losses of 1916 and by the competing demands for labour by civilian industry and agriculture. Dwindling manpower was particularly marked in the

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to follow 150–200 yd (140–180 m) behind, to attack trenches as soon as they were engaged by the tanks and mark gaps in the wire; each tank carried spare ammunition for the infantry. Training in the 51st and 62nd divisions departed from the "Notes" issued by the Tank Corps, by having infantry keep a greater distance from the tanks and moving in lines rather than files, along with the use of Rovers ahead of the Fighting Tanks.

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August, Plumer issued "Notes on Training and Preparation for Offensive Operations" on 31 August, which expanded on his reply to GHQ, describing the need for attacks with more depth and more scope for local initiative, enabled by unit commanders down to the infantry company keeping a reserve ready to meet counter-attacks. Communication was stressed but the standardisation achieved since 1916 allowed this to be reduced to a reference to

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Ludendorff could be found by combing out rear-area units but most would have to be drawn from the pool of replacements, which had been depleted by the losses of 1916 and although new classes of conscripts would top up the pool, casualty replacement would become much more difficult once the pool had to maintain a larger number of divisions. By calling up the 1898 class of recruits early in November 1916, the pool was increased to

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conferences with his corps commanders, Allenby used a consultative style at first, encouraging the corps commanders to solicit suggestions from subordinates (26 February) but later changed bombardment and counter-battery plans without discussion (2 March), although his instructions to the Cavalry Corps gave the commander freedom of action in liaison with the other corps. During the course of the battle Allenby (

4067:). The artillery plan for the first part of the attack was decided by Third Army HQ and no discretion was allowed to Corps to make changes, until German resistance after the commencement of the operation, required Corps to resume tactical control. The use of silent registration and the need for secrecy and uniformity of practice, led to the Third Army HQ issuing detailed instructions (Third Army Artillery 1788:(immediate counter-attack within the position). Such a decentralised battle by large numbers of small infantry detachments would present the attacker with unforeseen obstructions. Resistance from troops equipped with automatic weapons, supported by observed artillery fire, would increase the further the advance progressed. A school was opened in January 1917 to teach infantry commanders the new methods. 2760:

plans of the 2nd and 3rd Guards Brigades and their liaison arrangements, with 38th Division to the right and the French 1st Division on the left. The divisional reserve of the 1st Guards Brigade, was to exploit success by forcing a crossing of the Steenbeek and consolidating a bridgehead on the far bank. If the Germans collapsed, it was to advance to a line east of Langemarck and Wijdendreft.

3969:. The German defensive system had evolved into two divisions holding a front 2,500 yd (2,300 m) wide and 8,000 yd (7,300 m) deep, half the area that two divisions previously were expected to hold. The necessity of such reinforcement was caused by the weather, devastating British artillery-fire and the decline in the numbers and quality of German infantry. Concealment ( 2743:, prisoners, returning wounded, neighbouring formations and wireless eavesdropping. Corps Observers were attached to brigades, to patrol forward once the black line was reached, to observe the area up to the green line, judge the morale of the Germans opposite and see if they were preparing to counter-attack or retire, passing the information to a divisional Advanced Report Centre. 1880:), with the reinforcements from Verdun, which began to arrive in greater numbers in September. In his analysis of the battle, Loßberg opposed the granting of discretion to front trench garrisons to retire, as he believed that manoeuvre did not allow the garrisons to evade Allied artillery fire, which could blanket the forward area and invited enemy infantry to occupy vacant areas. 1733:. Defending infantry would fight in areas, with the front divisions in an outpost zone up to 3,000 yd (1.7 mi; 2.7 km) deep behind listening posts, with the main line of resistance placed on a reverse slope, in front of artillery observation posts, which were kept far enough back to retain observation over the outpost zone. Behind the main line of resistance was a 2485:). At the front of the battle zone he chose the old third line from Méricourt to Oppy, then a new line along reverse slopes from Oppy to the Hindenburg Position at Moulin-sans-Souci, creating a battle zone 2,500 yd (1.4 mi; 2.3 km) deep. A rearward battle zone 3,000 yd (1.7 mi; 2.7 km) backed on to the Wotan line, which was nearing completion. 2099:

the Hindenburg line. The three regiments held sectors with two battalions in the outpost and battle zones and one in reserve, several miles to the rear (this deployment was reversed later in the year). The two battalions were side by side, with three companies in the outpost zone and front trenches, one in the battle zone and four or five fortified areas within it (

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infantry units, pauses on objectives and plans to meet German counter-attacks. Mortar and gas units were delegated to divisional control. Tank operations remained a corps responsibility, as they were to conform to an army plan against selected objectives. A Corps Signals Officer was appointed, to co-ordinate artillery communications on lines later elaborated in

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to pass through to the black line; four tanks were attached to each brigade. The 25th Brigade would then attack the green line, assisted by twelve tanks. One battalion with tanks and cavalry would then be ready to advance to the red line, depending on the state of German resistance and the 25th Division would be in reserve, ready to attack beyond the red line.

2246:, in command of the Third Army proposed to use Corps mounted troops and infantry to press ahead beyond the main body, which was accepted by Haig, since the new dispersed German defensive organisation gave more scope to cavalry. Third Army's claims on manpower, aircraft, tanks and gas were agreed and its corps were instructed to make their plans according to 1483:

difference to the lack of numbers and the growing Franco-British superiority in weapons and ammunition. New divisions were needed and the manpower for them and the replacement of the losses of 1916 had to be found. The superiority in manpower enjoyed by the Entente and its allies could not be surpassed but Hindenburg and Ludendorff drew on ideas from

1699:(MGA, machine-gun sharpshooter detachments) to be increased. The increased output was insufficient to equip the new divisions and divisions which still had two artillery brigades with two regiments lost a regiment and the brigade headquarters, leaving three regiments. Against the new scales of equipment, British divisions in early 1917 had 2199:

the leading platoons to the next objective. The new organisations and equipment gave the infantry platoon the capacity for fire and manoeuvre, even in the absence of adequate artillery support. To bring uniformity in adoption of the methods laid down in the revised manuals and others produced over the winter, Haig established a

1833:). If the immediate counter-attack failed, the counter-attack divisions would take their time to prepare a methodical attack if the lost ground was essential to the retention of the main position. Such methods required large numbers of reserve divisions ready to move to the battlefront. The reserve was obtained by creating 3672:

counter-attacks. Compasses were issued to officers and white tape was to be used to mark approach routes, jumping-off points and unit boundaries, to help the infantry keep direction. Troops attacking the first objective, were ordered not to fix bayonets until the barrage commenced, to increase the possibility of surprise.

2393:. Third Army Headquarters also gave its corps permission to delegate command of tanks to divisions for the Second Battle of the Scarpe (23–24 April), discretion over local matters being increasingly left to divisional commanders, with corps retaining control over matters affecting the conduct of the battle in general. 3975:) was emphasised, to protect the divisions from British fire power, by avoiding anything resembling a trench system in favour of dispersal in crater fields. Such a method was only made feasible by the rapid rotation of units; battalions of the front-divisions were relieved after two days and divisions every six days. 2289:, 19 April 1917) recommended that artillery batteries should be set aside to deal with German counter-attacks, which had become more effective as the Germans recovered from the initial shock of the attack, to be linked to the front by wireless and registered on probable German forming-up places. On 19 April, 3732:

afterwards. Both divisions reached all their objectives on 20 September and the 23rd Division "Comment on Operations" was published as a Second Army document. The pattern for subsequent British attacks was established and Second Army orders and artillery instructions became formulaic, usually beginning with

3637:, the X Corps and I Anzac Corps commanders, at the conference of 27 August. The attacking corps made their plans within the framework of the Second Army plan, using "General Principles on Which the Artillery Plan Will be Drawn" of 29 August, which described the multi-layer creeping barrage and the use of 2340:

supporting a neighbouring division was to come under the command of that division. For the first time all artillery was integrated into one plan. Planning for the Battle of Arras showed that command relationships, especially within the artillery (which had evolved a parallel system of command, so that

4545:

of 9 April, contained British attacks for the remainder of the Battles of Arras, inflicting heavy infantry losses on the British. The calamitous losses endured by the seven German front-holding divisions on 9 April were not repeated, although the defensive operations in later April and May were still

4160:

tanks, were to deal with the Germans in trenches up to the blue line. All remaining tanks were to form a third wave and reinforce the first two waves, for the attack on Flesquières Ridge. Three tanks were allotted to each platoon front of about 150 yd (140 m), so that two tanks could attack

3956:

The revised defensive scheme was promulgated on 13 October, despite the reluctance of Rupprecht to accept the changes. Artillery-fire was to replace the machine-gun defence of the forward zone as far as possible and Rupprecht believed that the reduction in counter-battery fire would allow the British

3645:

More details came from X Corps in a new "Instruction" on 7 September, giving the green line as the final objective for the attack and the black line for the next attack, which was expected to follow about six days later, reduced the depth of the barrage from 2,000–1,000 yd (1,830–910 m) and

3595:

to creeping barrages and "draw net" barrages, where field guns began a barrage 1,500 yd (1,400 m) behind the German front line then crept towards it, which were fired several times before the attack began. The pattern of organisation established before the Battle of Menin Road Ridge, became

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was able to persuade Gough to cancel a preliminary operation and include it in the main attack. On 12 July, the Germans conducted their first mustard gas attack on the divisional rear areas and artillery lines. Two brigades were to advance to the blue line with two battalions each, with the other two

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from each brigade as relay runners, additional to the other means of tactical communication. Major-General Fielding held a conference on 10 June, to discuss the division's place in the XIV Corps scheme, for the attack east and north-east of Boesinghe. Four "bounds" were to be made to the blue, black,

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Haig arranged a meeting with Davidson, Gough and Plumer on 28 June, where Plumer supported the Gough plan. Maxse the XVIII Corps commander, left numerous sarcastic comments in the margins of his copy of the Davidson memo, to the effect that he was being too pessimistic. Davidson advocated views which

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fought the Battle of the Somme, without the benefit of the decades of staff officer experience that continental conscript armies could take for granted. Rather than the elaborate plans, made to compensate for the limited experience of many staff officers and commanders common in 1916, (the XIII Corps

2253:

of December 1916. Behind the lines (defined as the area not subject to German artillery fire) improvements in infrastructure and supply organisation made in 1916, had led to the creation of a Directorate-General of Transportation (10 October 1916) and a Directorate of Roads (1 December) allowing army

1413:

enemy against eight German on the battlefield) for our infantry feel completely the superiority of the English and French in close battle. The most difficult factor in the battle is the enemy's superiority in munitions. This allows their artillery, which is excellently supported by aircraft, to level

1246:

shells had been fired) and the anticipated increase in artillery use by the Allies in 1917. It was intended that the new defensive positions would contain any Allied breakthrough and give the German army the choice of a deliberate withdrawal, to dislocate an expected Allied offensive in the new year.

4164:

Due to the number of German communication trenches, sap heads, crater posts, detached posts and subsidiary trenches in the area, the second wave tanks were given specific German positions, routes and positions in villages to deal with, as well as attacking the main Hindenburg trenches. Infantry were

4130:

in 1917. To inflict a similar surprise on the Germans, the division stayed at Hermaville and a replica of the German defences, was laid out to the west of Arras. To mislead the Germans, the division did not occupy the front line trenches before the attack and observation parties visited the trenches

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originated on 23 August 1917, with a proposal from Brigadier-General H. D. Du Pree of the IV Corps of the Third Army, for a surprise attack with tank support near Flesquières, to exploit the lack of German artillery in the area and the relatively good going for tanks. The Third Army HQ (commanded by

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On 7 September, the 1st Australian Division commander announced the attack to his staff and next day the ground was studied. "Divisional Order 31" was issued on 9 September, giving the intent of the operation and listed neighbouring formations, the placement of brigades and the deployment of the two

3641:

to avoid adding more craters to the ground. Decisions over practice barrages and machine-gun barrages were left to the corps commanders. The Second Army and both corps did visibility tests, to decide when zero hour should be set and discussed the use of wireless and gun-carrying tanks with Plumer on

3616:

rounds, which created a density of fire four times greater than for the attack of 31 July. Heavy and medium howitzers were to make two layers of the creeping barrage, each 200 yd (180 m) deep, ahead of two field artillery belts equally deep, plus a machine-gun barrage in the middle. Beyond

3590:

Plumer issued a "Preliminary Operations Order" on 1 September, defining an area of operations from Broodseinde southwards. Four corps with fourteen divisions, were to be involved in the attack. Five of the thirteen Fifth Army divisions, extended the attack northwards to the Ypres–Staden railway; the

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divisions. Plumer replied on 12 August, placing more emphasis on mopping up captured ground, making local reserves available to deal with hasty local counter-attacks and having larger numbers of reserves available to crush organised counter-attacks. After a conference with the Corps commanders on 27

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On 12 June, the 2nd Guards Brigade began the march to the front line and on 15 June, the relief of 38th Division commenced and preparations were begun to cross the Yser canal, which was 23 yd (21 m) wide, empty and with deep mud in the bed. A divisional conference on 18 June, discussed the

2409:

After 12 April, Haig decided that the advantage gained by the Third and First armies since 9 April, had run its course and that further attacks must resume a methodical character. British intelligence estimated that nine German divisions had been relieved with nine fresh ones. On 20 April, after the

2198:

of February 1917, which recommended that the leading troops should push on to the final objective, when only one or two were involved but that for a greater number of objectives, when artillery covering fire was available for the depth of the intended advance, fresh platoons should leap-frog through

1482:

On 29 August, Hindenburg and Ludendorff reorganised the army groups on the Western Front, by incorporating all but the 4th Army in Flanders into the army group structure on the active part of the Western Front. The administrative reorganisation eased the distribution of men and equipment but made no

1087:

continued to change their fighting methods, due to the consequences of increased firepower, more automatic weapons, decentralisation of authority and the integration of specialised branches, equipment and techniques into the traditional structures of infantry, artillery and cavalry. Tanks, railways,

4569:

The Battle of Cambrai showed continuity with the previous Franco-British offensives in 1917. Novel features, mainly in the use of artillery, tank-infantry co-operation, air power over the battlefield and the holding back of the assault divisions until just before the attack, came from the evolution

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from 6 to 10 November. That the British offensive at Ypres had ended was considered possible but there was no anticipation of an attack elsewhere and planning had begun for operations in 1918. On 17 November, Rupprecht concluded that large attacks were improbable and that small attacks on the areas

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The Tank Corps also followed this routine, by sending recommendations about the distribution of its units, the training of tanks and affiliated infantry for approval by the Third Army HQ. The proposals were based on the "Notes" issued on 4 October, which summarised the experience gained by the Tank

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A 4th Army operation order of 30 September pointed out that the German position in Flanders was restricted by the local topography, the proximity of the coast and the Dutch frontier, which made local withdrawals impossible. The instructions of 22 September were to be followed, with more bombardment

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Ludendorff later wrote that he had regularly discussed the situation with Kuhl and Loßberg, to try to find a remedy for the overwhelming British attacks. Ludendorff ordered a strengthening of the forward garrisons by the ground holding divisions, all machine-guns, including those of the support and

3805:

divisions had engaged in "an advance to contact during mobile operations", which had achieved several costly defensive successes during August. German counter-attacks in September had been "assaults on reinforced field positions", due to the short British infantry advances and emphasis on defeating

3759:

on 20 September, German defensive tactics were changed. In August, German front-line divisions had two regiments in the front line with the third regiment in reserve. The front battalions had been relieved much more frequently than expected, due to constant British bombardments, the wet weather and

3688:

were to be part of the creeping barrage, from machine-gun companies attached to each brigade. The Divisional Machine-Gun Officer was to keep close touch with brigade headquarters, to be ready to act on SOS calls from the infantry. "Instruction No. 10" was a "Summary of Arrangements for Co-operation

3683:

with infantry battalions provided with panels to signal from the ground. "Instruction No. 8" covered medical arrangements from Regimental Aid Posts, (with a medical officer and four squads of stretcher-bearers each) back to Casualty Clearing Stations along marked evacuation routes. "Instruction No.

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to the south. Such a withdrawal would avoid a hasty retreat from Pilckem Ridge and also force the British into a time-consuming redeployment. Loßberg disagreed, believing that the British would launch a broad front offensive, that the ground east of the Oosttaverne line was easy to defend, that the

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on 30 June, describing the intention to conduct a rolling offensive, where each corps would have four divisions, two for the attack and two in reserve, ready to move through the attacking divisions for the next attack. Separate units were detailed for patrolling, once the green line was reached and

2719:

lay 10,000–12,000 yd (5.7–6.8 mi; 9.1–11.0 km) behind the front line and would not be attacked on the first day but it was more ambitious than Plumer's plan, which had involved an advance of 1,000–1,750 yd (910–1,600 m). Notes were later sent to the divisions, from the next

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units. Artillery was concealed in the same manner, lines of guns were abolished and guns were placed in folds of ground and frequently moved, to mislead British air observation, which was made easier by a period of poor weather. The new deployment was ready by 13 April; the remnants of the original

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Intelligence Officers were added to divisions, to liaise with headquarters as their units moved forward and to report on progress, increasing the means by which commanders could respond to events. Training for the attack had begun in the 56th (1/1st London) Division in late March, mainly practising

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at corps and division were much more closely integrated) and standardisation, had become more evident between armies, corps and divisions. Analysis and codification of the lessons of the Somme and the process of supplying the armies, made the BEF much less dependent on improvisation. Discussion and

2327:

issued a 56-page plan of "Instructions on which Divisional Commanders are to work out their own plans in detail...", which incorporated experience gained on the Somme and stressed the importance of co-ordinated machine-gun fire, counter-battery artillery fire, creeping barrages, the leapfrogging of

2211:

provided British infantry with "off-the-peg" tactics, devised from the experience of the Somme and from French Army operations, to go with the new equipment made available by increasing British and Allied war production and better understanding of the organisation necessary to exploit it in battle.

2098:

Using the new defensive system, the 18th Division in the German 1st Army, held an area of the Hindenburg Position with an outpost zone along a ridge near La Vacquerie and a main line of resistance 600 yd (550 m) behind. The battle zone was 2,000 yd (1,800 m) deep and backed onto

1511:

The new programme was intended to create a trebling of artillery and machine-gun output and a doubling of munitions and trench mortar production. Expansion of the army and output of war materials caused increased competition for manpower between the army and industry. In early 1916, the German army

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occasion when the division operated with tanks, the nature of the ground in the 51st (Highland) Division area and the methods chosen had been tested in training; the changes were not the cause of the check at Flesquières on the first day but by the presence in the German 54th Division opposite, of

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met at the 2nd Army headquarters in Le Cateau. Delays in transporting reinforcements and artillery ammunition were reported by Marwitz and Ludendorff agreed to the postponement of a counter-offensive until 30 November. A more ambitious plan, to cut off the British troops in the Bourlon salient and

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of 25 October, was arranged by Army conferences at which the objectives were given by Byng, who left the means to achieve them to be decided by the Corps commanders. Third Army Headquarters then issued memoranda, drawing attention to certain aspects of the plan. "Third Army Instructions To Cavalry

3798:

Following the costly defeats on 20 September and at Polygon Wood on 26 September, the German commanders made more changes to the defensive organisation and altered their counter-attack tactics, which had been negated by the British combination of limited attack and much greater artillery firepower

2663:

Great emphasis was placed on getting information back to headquarters and making troops independent within the plan, to allow a higher tempo ("The rate or rhythm of activity relative to the enemy".) of operations, by freeing attacking troops from the need to refer back for orders. Corps commanders

2366:

forwarded to Allenby a report that a conference of the commanders of the 17th (Northern) Division, 29th Division and the 50th (Northumbrian) Division and the corps Brigadier-General General Staff (BGGS), had resolved that the recent piecemeal attacks should stop and that larger coordinated actions

1989:

could be brought forward, to relieve the front divisions on the evening of the second day. On 6 April, General von Nagel, the 6th Army Chief of Staff, accepted that some of the front divisions might need to be relieved on the first evening of battle but that any penetrations would be repulsed with

1883:

Loßberg considered that spontaneous withdrawals would disrupt the counter-attack reserves as they deployed and further deprive battalion and division commanders of the ability to conduct an organised defence, which the dispersal of infantry over a wider area had already made difficult. Loßberg and

1615:

demand and the extra 2,000 long tons (2,000 t) of output demanded by Hindenburg and Ludendorff could never match the doubling and trebling of artillery, machine-guns and trench mortars. The industrial mobilisation needed to fulfil the Hindenburg Programme increased demand for skilled workers,

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fronts. Hindenburg and Ludendorff visited the Western front and held a meeting at Cambrai on 8 September with the army group and other commanders, at which the gravity of the situation in France and the grim prospects for the new year were debated. Hindenburg and Ludendorff had already announced a

4760:

I Anzac Corps had 1st Australian and 2nd Australian divisions with the 4th Australian and 5th Australian divisions in reserve, X Corps had the 23rd Division, 39th Division and the 41st Division with the 21st Division and 33rd Division in reserve. II Anzac Corps with the New Zealand Division, 3rd

4538:

The new German area defence system failed badly at Verdun 15 December 1916 and again at Arras 9 April 1917, when troops had been kept in obsolete defences and by the belated commitment of the counter-attacking divisions, which were held too far back, against Allied attacking methods and equipment

4490:

in April 1915. Similar methods to those used by the British to obtain surprise were used, artillery ranging was minimal, a one-hour bombardment before the attack was planned, with a rolling bombardment moving at a rate of 110 yd (100 m) in five minutes to precede the infantry, while the

4108:

In "Notes on Infantry and Tank Operations" 30 October, Third Army HQ described the characteristics of the tanks and the Tank Corps organisation, how to identify individual tanks, the frontage per tank, formations, assembly, concealment, the method of moving forward to the attack, tank objectives,

3776:

divisions were to deliver an organised attack with artillery support later in the day, before the British could consolidate their new line. The change was intended to remedy the neutralisation of the front division reserves which had been achieved by the British artillery on 20 September, so that

3599:

The plan relied on the use of more medium and heavy artillery, which was brought into the area of the Gheluvelt Plateau from VIII Corps on the right of the Second Army and by removing more guns from the Third and 4th armies further south. The heavy artillery reinforcements were to be used destroy

2429:

similar to that at Verdun on 15 December 1916, despite an analysis of that failure being issued swiftly, which concluded that deep dug-outs in the front line and an absence of reserves for immediate counter-attacks, were the cause of the defeat. At Arras similarly obsolete defences over-manned by

1664:

1917. Steel production in February 1917 was 252,000 long tons (256,000 t) short of expectations and explosives production was 1,100 long tons (1,100 t) below the target, which added to the pressure on Ludendorff to retreat to the Hindenburg Line. Despite the shortfalls, by the summer of

1557:

The men for the divisions created by Falkenhayn had come from reducing square divisions with four infantry regiments to triangular divisions with three regiments, rather than a net increase in the number of men in the army. Troops for the extra divisions of the expansion ordered by Hindenburg and

4272:

per day arrived at Cambrai stations. The delivery of reinforcements and ammunition was not sufficient for an early counter-attack and 30 November was set for the counter-offensive, after several delays requested by the 2nd Army staff. A more ambitious counter-offensive than originally envisaged,

3783:

divisions arrived. On 22 September, new tactical requirements were laid down by the 4th Army, more artillery counter-bombardment was to be used between British attacks, half counter-battery and half against infantry, increased raiding was ordered, to induce the British to hold their positions in

2696:

Communication by the Fifth Army corps to their divisions, reflected the experience of Vimy and Messines, the value of aerial photography for counter-battery operations, raiding and the construction of scale models of the ground to be covered, the divisional infantry plans, machine-gun positions,

2675:

It is important to recognise that the results to be looked for from a well-organised attack which has taken weeks and months to prepare are great, much ground can be gained and prisoners and guns captured during the first day or two. I think we should certainly aim at the definite capture of the

1614:

To meet existing demand and to feed new weapons, Hindenburg and Ludendorff wanted a big increase in propellant output to 12,000 long tons (12,000 t) a month. In July 1916, the output target had been raised from 7,900–9,800 long tons (8,000–10,000 t) which was expected to cover existing

2635:

objecting to dawn attacks, since a later time gave troops more rest before the attack. Maxse also wanted to go beyond the black line (second objective) to the Steenbeek stream, to avoid stopping on a forward slope. Gough replied that he had to consider the wishes of all the corps commanders but

2414:

divisions but that thirteen tired divisions were recovering and that there were ten new divisions available for the Western Front. With the reliefs due on the French front, only about eleven fresh divisions would remain to oppose further British operations, which were conducted until early May.

2277:. Guns and howitzers were allotted according to their calibre and the nature of the targets to be engaged. Several barrages were planned for the attack, which deepened the area under bombardment. Great stress was laid on counter-battery fire under a Counter-Battery Staff Officer with the use of 1999:

On 7 April, Nagel viewed the imminent British attack as a limited effort against Vimy Ridge, preparatory to a bigger attack later, perhaps combined with the French attack expected in mid-April. Construction of positions to fulfil the new policy of area defence, had been drastically curtailed by

1330: 4579:

The significance of the Battle of Cambrai, lay in the confounding of German defensive assumptions by the achievement of operational surprise, for the first time since 1915. In 1919 McPherson wrote that in the aftermath of the battle, "it was plain that the defensive must always contemplate the

4117:

in August. The smaller area of operations at Cambrai and the growth of the RFC meant that more aircraft could be allotted to each task than in Flanders. The most notable difference in the air plan for the battle was in artillery co-operation, since air activity over the Cambrai area before the

4021:

did much to expand the proposal, which was then planned in the systematic manner of the British offensives earlier in the year, founded on the Stationery Section (S.S.) manuals which had derived from analysis of the Battle of the Somme and French experience. Draft schemes were issued to Corps,

3678:

Communication within the division was addressed by "Instruction No. 7" on 16 September, which discussed telegraph, telephones and cable burying; visual communication via six reporting stations; wireless and power buzzers. Motorcycle despatch riders were linked to runners established forward of

3446:

Counter-attack was to be the main defensive tactic, since local withdrawals would only disorganise the troops moving forward to their assistance. Front line troops were not expected to cling to shelters, which were man traps but leave them as soon as the battle began, moving forward and to the

2712:

in planning the offensive. Discussion followed on the means by which the Guards Division and 38th Division were to meet the army commander's intent. The decision to patrol towards the red line, was left to the discretion of divisional commanders. An attack of this nature was not a breakthrough

2358:

Instructions from the corps headquarters restricted light signals to the artillery to green for "open fire" and white for "increase the range" and laid down the strength of battalions, the number of officers and men to be left out of battle and formed into a Divisional Depot Battalion. The two

2339:

Much of the corps planning covered artillery, detailing the guns to move forward behind the infantry and their new positions. Artillery liaison officers were appointed to infantry units and field guns and howitzers were reserved to engage German counter-attacks. It was laid down that artillery

4671:

being engaged on 31 July, compared to four divisions with two engaged in each of the other corps. The green line for II Corps varied from a depth of 1,000 yd (910 m) on the southern flank at Klein Zillibeke, to 2,500 yd (1.4 mi; 2.3 km) on the northern flank along the

3671:

with an amendment that the battalions on the final objective would carry more ammunition. Coloured patches corresponding to the objective lines were to be worn on helmets and the 1st Australian Infantry Brigade was to be held back, ready to reinforce the attacking brigades or to defeat German

3662:

On 11 September "Divisional Order 32", detailed the march to the divisional assembly area near Ypres and on 14 September "Instruction No. 2" of Order 31, added details of the artillery plan and laid down routes for the approach march. The front line was reconnoitred again on 15 September and

2775:

After a night raid on 11 July, the division was relieved by the 25th Division and began training intensively for trench-to-trench attacks, on ground marked to represent German positions on the objective. A large model was built and a large-scale map produced for officers and men to study and

2157:

of 8 May 1916 and marked a significant step in the evolution of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) into a homogeneous force, well adapted to its role on the Western Front. The duties of army, corps and divisions in planning attacks were standardised. Armies were to devise the plan and the

4329:(Hindenburg line) and that a big attack would be preceded by a long bombardment, giving the Germans time to move forces to the area, "Absolutely everything which could be stripped out of the Cambrai front was taken to Flanders", (Adjutant, 108 Brigade, 9th Reserve Division) to reinforce the 1177:

The new line across the base of the Noyon salient would be about 30 mi (48 km) shorter and was to be completed in three months. These defences were planned with the experience gained on the Somme, which showed a need for much greater defensive depth and many small shallow concrete

3731:

opposite and possible German counter-attack routes. It stressed that observation was needed over the Reutelbeek and Kronnebeek valleys when the final objective was consolidated and that situation reports were to be sent when brigades had reached their objectives and at two-hourly intervals

2284:

A short bombardment was over-ruled by Haig and Allenby's artillery commander was promoted out of the way and replaced by Major-General R. St. C. Lecky, who wanted a longer bombardment, as did Major-General Herbert Uniacke, loaned by the Fifth Army during Lecky's absence through illness. In

4055:

and Royal Artillery, arranged their plans through Third Army HQ, rather than direct with corps headquarters, to ensure that the new artillery techniques, the role of the tanks in creating gaps in the German wire ahead of the infantry and organised air operations over the battlefield, were

3766:

divisions arrived, some hours after the commencement of the British attack. The deployment was changed to increase the number of troops in the front zone. By 26 September, all three regiments of the front-line division were forward, each holding an area 1,000 yd (910 m) wide and

3575:

Staff at GHQ of the BEF, quickly studied the results of the attack of 31 July and on 7 August sent questions to the army headquarters, on how to attack in the new conditions produced by German defence-in-depth using strong points, pillboxes and rapid counter-attacks by local reserves and

4279:

Arras to participate despite the tiredness of its divisions, which had been made worse by the delay in preparing the counter-offensive. Metz en Couture and the higher ground around Flesquières were 6.2 mi (10 km) behind the British front line and doubts about the divisions in

4491:

British in Bourlon Wood were to be neutralised by a gas and high-explosive bombardment. Built-up areas were to be bombarded by howitzers and by-passed by the foremost infantry and then attacked from all sides by following troops. Troops moving beyond by-passed British positions in the

2178:

of February 1917 marked the end of attacks made by lines of infantry with a few detached specialists. The platoon was divided into a small headquarters and four sections, one with two trained grenade-throwers and assistants, the second with a Lewis gunner and nine assistants carrying

4523:

Caudry, the 107th Division was ordered to conform to the advances of its neighbouring divisions and occupy higher ground near Marcoing. The 9th Reserve Division was only to advance to the Trescault heights, after the 28th Division and 220th Division had made the initial break-in. In

2630:

It was decided to have four divisions per corps, two for the attack and two in reserve, with staff from the reserve division headquarters taking over before the original divisions were relieved. On 31 May Gough, dealt with a letter from the XVIII Corps commander Lieutenant-General

3712:

18 September and the start of the attack, covered late changes, such as reserving the use of telephones to unit commanders and the provision of two wireless tanks, for the south-east corner of Glencorse Wood for local use and as an emergency station for both Australian divisions.

2828:

mortars were added. On 23 July, the division returned to the front line and commenced raiding, to take prisoners and to watch for a local withdrawal, while tunnelling companies prepared large underground chambers, to shelter the attacking infantry before the offensive began.

2430:

infantry, were devastated by artillery and swiftly overrun, leaving the local reserves with little choice but to try to contain further British advances and wait for the relief divisions, which were too far away to counter-attack. Seven German divisions were defeated, losing

4155:

supplied a battalion to each of the two attacking infantry brigades. Twelve "Rovers" were to move forward at zero, to crush barbed wire and engage any machine-gun nests found between the German trench lines. About 150 yd (140 m) behind the Rovers, a second wave of

2183:

of ammunition, the third section comprised a sniper, scout and nine riflemen and the fourth section had nine men with four rifle-grenade launchers. The rifle and hand-grenade sections were to advance in front of the Lewis-gun and rifle-grenade sections, in two waves or in

2697:

mortar plans and positions, trench tramways, places chosen for supply dumps and headquarters, signals and medical arrangements and camouflage plans. The Corps was responsible for heavy weapons, infrastructure and communication. In XIV Corps, divisions were to liaise with

2466:. A more practical change, was the despatch of Loßberg from his post as Chief of Staff of the German 1st Army, (due to move south to join the armies on the Aisne) to the 6th Army, replacing Nagel on 11 April. Falkenhausen was sacked on 23 April and replaced by General 3679:

brigade headquarters, with five marked posts for runners, pairs of runners to be no more than 50 yd (46 m) apart and messenger pigeons were issued to brigades and artillery observers. Separate lines were laid for artillery use and aircraft liaison followed

1983:, which extended the Hindenburg position, was built around 4 mi (6.4 km) further back and not entirely mapped by the Allies until the battle had begun. Just before the battle, Falkenhausen had written that parts of the front line might be lost but the five 2367:

should be conducted after a pause to reorganise, which Allenby accepted. On 17 April, the 56th (1/1st London) Division commander objected to an operation planned for 20 April, due to the exhaustion of his troops. The division was withdrawn instead, when the VI and

1729:(Principles of Command for Defensive Battle), the policy of unyielding defence of ground regardless of its tactical value, was replaced by the defence of positions suitable for artillery observation and communication with the rear, where an attacking force would 2495:) on the British front line, at the commencement of a British attack, followed by direct and indirect machine-gun fire on the British infantry, as they tried to advance through the German battle zone, followed by infantry counter-attacks by local reserves and 1129:

armies since 1914 and left the German army resorting to expedients to counter the development of its increasingly skilful use of fire-power and technology. During 1917 the BEF also encountered the manpower shortages affecting the French and Germans and at the

4690:

for 1 mi (1.6 km) south of Broodseinde. On 10 August, II Corps was required to reach the black line of 31 July, an advance of 400–900 yd (370–820 m) and at the Battle of Langemarck on 16 August, the Fifth Army was to advance 1,500 yd

3784:

greater strength, to give the German artillery a denser target; better artillery observation was demanded in the battle zone, to increase the accuracy of German artillery fire when British troops advanced into it and quicker counter-attacks were to be made.

2335:

of March 1917, going into the details of telephone line planning, to link units with each other, neighbours and their artillery, along with telegraph, visual signalling, pigeons, power buzzers, wireless, codes and liaison with the Royal Flying Corps (RFC).

1890:) from behind the battle zone. The sceptics wanted the Somme practice of fighting in the front line to be retained and authority devolved no further than battalion, so as to maintain organizational coherence, in anticipation of a methodical counter-attack ( 4235:) held the western front from just south of Arras, to the Oise north of Barisis. Many of the 2nd Army divisions had been exchanged for exhausted divisions from Flanders. On 17 November, the 2nd Army estimated that it would be another fortnight before 3242:

Menin Road Ridge could be held and that Pilckem Ridge deprived the British of ground observation over the Steenbeek valley, while German observation of the area from Passchendaele Ridge allowed the infantry to be supported by observed artillery fire.

3963:(thirteen men and a light machine-gun in each) in company sectors proved inadequate, as the British were easily able to attack them and lift prisoners. At the end of October, the sentry line was replaced by a conventional outpost system of double 1465:

I spoke...with Ludendorff alone (about the overall situation). We were in agreement that a large-scale, positive outcome is now no longer possible. We can only hold on and take the best opportunity for peace. We made too many serious errors this

4112:

The RFC continued its development of ground attack operations, with a more systematic organisation of duties and coverage of the battlefield, drawing on the lessons of the Third Battle of Ypres and the pioneering work done during the capture of

2261:

bombardment based on the experience of the Somme, apart from its relatively short duration, after which the infantry were to advance deep into the German defences, then move sideways to envelop areas where the Germans had held their ground. The

1449:

fresh. The French manpower situation was not as buoyant but by combing out rear areas and recruiting more troops from the colonies, the French could replace losses until the 1918 conscription class became available in the summer of 1917. Of the

2125:

companies remained in each front battalion area for mobile defence; during attacks the reserve battalion was to advance and occupy the Hindenburg line. The new dispositions doubled the area held by a unit, compared to July 1916 on the Somme.

2776:

reconnaissance was conducted by officers and staffs to see the ground up to the objective. The divisional artillery was reinforced with the 25th Divisional artillery, three army field brigades, a counter-battery double-group, (one with

1305:(OHL, supreme army command) of the German army, after the sacking of Falkenhayn, who had commanded the armies of Germany since September 1914. The new commanders, who became known as the Third OHL, had spent two years in command of 4516:

tactics on 28 November. German air units were concentrated in the area but poor weather hampered air reconnaissance by both sides. Some German divisions had such casualties in the earlier fighting that their role was reduced. In

3946:

division was to be placed behind each front-line division, with instructions to ensure that it reached the British before they could consolidate. If a swift counter-attack was not possible, there was to be a delay to organise a

7411:. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. I (Imperial War Museum and Naval & Military Press ed.). London: Macmillan. 4135:

beforehand, the Commander Royal Engineers (CRE) with three companies of engineers and an infantry battalion, began to prepare hidden shelters in the IV Corps area in early November, providing camouflaged accommodation for

4503:, light and field artillery accompanying the infantry for the first time, each battery having a platoon of pioneers and a light machine-gun crew; communication was to be assisted by the use of colour-coded light signals. 1739:(battle zone), a second defensive area 1,500–2,500 yd (0.85–1.42 mi; 1.4–2.3 km) deep, also placed as far as possible on ground hidden from enemy observation, while in view of German artillery observers. A 2488:

Despite Loßberg's doubts about elastic defence, the circumstances he found on the 6th Army front made resort to it unavoidable. With artillery reinforcements arriving, the first line of defence was to be a heavy barrage

4286:

Arras, despite the need for them to participate in the bigger operation, led to a compromise, in which an experimental deployment for the attack behind a smokescreen and a delay of the advance until after the attack by

4539:

which were much improved from 1916. The new system was made to work in time for the French part of the Nivelle Offensive in April. Reinforcements and changes brought about in the German 6th Army by Loßberg, after the

4071:) governing the use of artillery before the offensive and the combination of suppressive, rather than destructive artillery-fire with tank action, to clear the way for the infantry advance and cavalry exploitation. 1353:

as part of a tour of inspection of the Western Front. Both men were dismayed at the nature of trench warfare that they found, in such contrast to the conditions on the Eastern Front and the dilapidated state of the

2626:. As early decisions were subject to change, detail was avoided, planners were to draw on "Preparatory measures to be taken by Armies and Corps before undertaking operations on a large scale" of February 1916 and 2374:

VI Corps delegated the barrage arrangements for the attack on 23 April to the divisions involved, which included variations in the speed of the barrage determined by the state of the ground. Reference was made in

2501:

divisions (if needed) to regain the front position. As the British might try to capture ground north of the Scarpe, using their observation from Vimy ridge over the German positions, Loßberg requested that a new

4206:

Arras was to attack southwards west of Bourlon Wood, after the main attack had begun. Fresh divisions from Rupprecht and OHL Reserve were to be ready to exploit success. Rupprecht wrote that the recovery of the

4379:

In the rush to prepare for the original counter-attack and then the bigger counter-offensive for 30 November, after the success of the defensive battles around Bourlon Wood and rapid arrival of reinforcements,

7668:. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. II (Imperial War Museum and Battery Press ed.). London: HMSO. 3663:

signallers began to bury cables 6 ft (1.8 m) deep. "Instruction No. 3" detailed the strong points to be built on captured ground, to accommodate a platoon each, equipment and clothing to conform to

4751:

Bidwell and Graham wrote that since Plumer had described the new German system after the Battle of Messines, this was already known and lay behind doubts about the Fifth Army plan for the attack of 31 July.

3120:

line in the area east of Messines. Construction of defences began but were terminated after Loßberg was appointed as the new Chief of Staff of the 4th Army. Loßberg rejected the proposed withdrawal to the

4335:(point of main effort) in Flanders. The unconventional British attack on 20 November obtained strategic, operational and a measure of tactical surprise, inflicting heavy losses and taking ground quickly. 1202:

shelters), rather than elaborate entrenchments and deep dug-outs, which had become man-traps. Work began on 23 September; two trench lines about 200 yd (180 m) apart were dug as an outpost line

4434:

Caudry, some of the artillery and mortars arrived too late to be well placed, the attacking infantry lacked time to study the plan and rehearse and some flame throwers had no fuel until the last minute.

7455:. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. I (Imperial War Museum and Battery Press ed.). London: 3903:

divisions organised to intervene as swiftly as possible, despite the risk of being devastated by the British artillery. Counter-battery fire against British artillery was to be increased to protect the

2460:, to avoid the impression that they were replacement divisions standing by, rather than reinforcements fundamental to the defence of the battle zones, by operating support of the local garrisons of the 3608:

guns and howitzers were allocated to Plumer for the battle, an equivalent of one artillery piece for every 5 yd (4.6 m) of the attack front, which was more than double the proportion for the

7433:. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. II. Nashville: Imperial War Museum and The Battery Press. 1160:

on 19 August 1916, during "the most serious crisis of the war". On 2 September the new leadership ordered a strict defensive at Verdun and the dispatch of forces from there to reinforce the Somme and

4653:

The information given in the Official History demonstrates that far from neglecting the Gheluvelt plateau, Gough put a disproportionate amount of the Fifth Army artillery at the disposal of II Corps

3262:, about 200 yd (180 m) apart, garrisoned by the four companies of each front battalion with listening-posts in no-man's-land. About 2,000 yd (1,800 m) behind these works, was the 2767:

and joined XIV Corps in Second Army reserve. On 11 June, the division came under II Corps and began to relieve parts of 33rd Division and the 55th Division on the Menin Road at Hooge. Major-General

7687:. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. III. Nashville: Imperial War Museum and Battery Press. 4033:

Corps" were sent by Byng to its commander Lieutenant-General C. T. Mc M. Kavanagh on 13 November, covering liaison with tanks and infantry and describing the role of the cavalry, to advance about

3940:

divisions, would gain time to move up to the main line of resistance where the main defensive battle would be fought, if the artillery bombardment had not stopped the British infantry advance. An

4588:

and the achievement of surprise, brought the German army a considerable local success. The methods used by the Germans at Cambrai, were incorporated into the new manual for offensive operations,

4376:

Arras were exhausted from the defensive battles around Bourlon Wood. The 79th Reserve Division was in 2nd Army reserve and eight more divisions were available in the Army Group and OHL reserves.

2701:

RFC for training and to conduct frequent rehearsals of infantry operations, to give commanders experience in dealing with unexpected occurrences, which were more prevalent in semi-open warfare.

3736:

the stages of the attack being described in relation to it. Orders were terse statements of the timetable, which corps were involved, any corps movements and when the attack would take place.

1791:

Given the Allies' growing superiority in munitions and manpower, attackers might still penetrate to the second (artillery protection) line, leaving in their wake German garrisons isolated in

2401: 1441:

on 27 January 1916 and that despite the huge losses on the Somme, there would be no shortage of reinforcements. At the end of August, German military intelligence calculated that of the

2689:

At the conference on 6 June, Gough took the view that if the Germans were thoroughly demoralised, it might be possible to advance to parts of the red line on the first day. Maxse and

1601:

trains a day to continue the battle. The Battle of the Somme further reduced the German reserve of ammunition and when the infantry was forced out of the front position, the need for

3437:(the instant-immediate counter-thrust). Loßberg rejected elastic defence tactics in Flanders, because there was little prospect of operational pauses between British attacks towards 4161:

the Germans in the trench to their front as the centre tank advanced to the trench beyond. The first two tanks were to follow up as soon as their infantry reached the first trench.

1117:) but ended the year recovering from the disastrous result. The German army attempted to avoid the high infantry losses of 1916 by withdrawing to new deeper and dispersed defences. 301: 9753: 4370:

Arras. Eighteen divisions were massed on the Cambrai front, for the 30 November counter-offensive. Ten divisions were considered battle worthy, although most of the divisions in

3916:) 500–1,000 yd (460–910 m) deep, to be occupied by a thin line of sentries with a few machine-guns. The sentries were quickly to retire on the main line of resistance ( 9768: 4447:, exhausted German divisions had been moved into the 2nd Army area to rest and absorb replacements; the 54th Division had arrived at the end of August, severely depleted by the 2086:) from Croisilles to Mœuvres. Divisions would move into the area and come under the authority of the group for the duration of their term, then be replaced by fresh divisions. 1121:

was intended to nullify the growing material strength of the Allies, particularly in artillery and succeeded in slowing the growth of Anglo-French battlefield superiority. The

9952: 1536:

The costly battles at Verdun and the Somme had been much more demanding on German divisions and they had to be relieved after only a few days in the front line, lasting about

4026:, VI and XVII Corps. If it occurred, the cavalry advance would be about 10 mi (16 km) deep, two more than that planned for the Arras offensive earlier in the year. 3600:

German strong points, pillboxes and machine-gun nests, which were more numerous beyond the German outpost zones already captured and to engage in more counter-battery fire.

3305:, to provide a framework for the re-establishment of defence in depth, once the enemy attack had been repulsed. Dispersed in front of the line were divisional Sharpshooter ( 2590:, commander of the Fifth Army to lead the offensive from the Ypres salient. Gough held the first conference in late 24 May, before he moved his headquarters to the Salient. 1414:

our trenches and to wear down our infantry systematically.... The destruction of our positions is so thorough that our foremost line merely consists of occupied shell-holes.

10425: 2162:

but divisions were given authority over extra batteries added to the barrage, which could be switched to other targets by the divisional commander and brigade commanders.

2032:

Corps were detached from their component divisions and given permanent areas to hold, named after the commander and then under a geographical title from 3 April 1917. The

1607:(barrage fire), to compensate for the lack of obstacles, increased. Before the war, Germany had imported nitrates for propellant manufacture and only the discovery of the 1055: 2751:

Training for the northern attack (31 July) began in early June, with emphasis on musketry and attacks on fortified positions. The Guards Division Signals Company trained

2676:

Green line, and that, should the situation admit of our infantry advancing without much opposition to the Red line, it would be of the greatest advantage to us to do so.

4546:

costly in infantry casualties. Most of the ground behind the new front position chosen by Loßberg and made ready by 13 April, was held for the remainder of the battle.

1649:

being kv. The demands of the Hindenburg Programme exacerbated the manpower crisis and constraints on the availability of raw materials meant that targets were not met.

4833:

Arras (Moser) had the 20th Division, 21st Reserve Division, 3rd Guards Division and 119th Division in line and the 214th Division and 221st Division in reserve, with

9850: 3793: 1924:, arranged his infantry in the Arras area according to Loßberg and Hoen's preference for a rigid defence of the front-line, supported by methodical counter-attacks ( 4097:

on concentration and assembly, secrecy, preliminary movements, communication of orders, codes and ciphers, signals, later stages of the attack and cavalry liaison.

2681:

were little different from those of Gough, except for Gough wanting to make additional arrangements, to allow undefended ground to be captured by local initiative.

9487: 9311: 8651: 3390:... they will have done their duty so long as they compel the enemy to use up his supports, delay his entry into the position, and disorganise his waves of attack. 1065: 3689:

between Infantry and Artillery on Forthcoming Operations" and detailed artillery liaison down to battalions. A brigade of field artillery with three batteries of

3157:

east of Menin, northwards to Moorslede, was also begun. From mid-1917, the area east of Ypres was defended by six German defensive positions: the front line, the

9929: 3708:, the Divisional commander, to carry orders and restrictions on the use of telephones in the front line, intended to obstruct German eavesdropping. Instructions 1384:(Army Group German Crown Prince) reported that conditions at Verdun were little better and that the recruit depots behind the army group front could supply only 4775:

Field Artillery Regiment 108, specially trained in anti-tank tactics and the reluctance of the 51st (Highland) Division commander to commit his reserve brigade.

3885:

BEF military intelligence predicted the German changes in an intelligence summary of 1 October and foresaw the big German counter-attack planned for 4 October.

10420: 9957: 8464: 4770:

In 2008, Hammond wrote that the effect of the changes had been exaggerated by the official historian, C. Baker-Carr and other writers. The attack would be the

4463:

The division found that their new positions were overlooked by the British front line, 600–700 yd (550–640 m) beyond the outposts, behind which were

1125:(BEF) continued its evolution into a mass army, capable of imposing itself on a continental power, took on much of the military burden borne by the French and 968: 2297:), was circulated as far as battalions, showing the increased effort being made to address the chronic difficulty in communication once operations commenced. 10415: 10145: 9872: 9564: 8522: 3419:

divisions were accommodated 10,000–12,000 yd (5.7–6.8 mi; 9.1–11.0 km) behind the front line and began their advance to assembly areas in the

1586:

section responsible for raising new units), had grave doubts about the wisdom of the increase in the expansion of the army but was over-ruled by Ludendorff.

1050: 294: 3770:

The battalions were to move forward successively, to engage fresh enemy battalions which had leapfrogged through those that had delivered the first attack.

10252: 3822:

reserve battalions of the front line regiments, were sent into the forward zone to form a cordon of four to eight guns every 250 yd (230 m). The

3704:"Instruction No. 12" was issued on 17 September and covered equipment to be carried into action, the attachment of a troop of Light Horse to Major-General 3621:

and howitzers, covered a 7,000 yd (4.0 mi; 6.4 km) front, ready to engage German guns which opened fire, with gas and high-explosive shell.

1567: 1165:

reconnaissance on 6 September for a new, shorter line behind the Noyon salient. On 15 September a defensive strategy was announced except for Romania and

1096:

armies, which made considerable changes in their methods during the year, simultaneously to pursue military-strategic objectives and to limit casualties.

10430: 10395: 10160: 9915: 4090: 1597:

heavy artillery shells for the beginning of the Battle of Verdun but four million rounds were fired in the first fortnight and the 5th Army needed about

10155: 9845: 9796: 9711: 4047:

after zero hour, through the infantry at Masnières and Marcoing to surround Cambrai. On 14 November, III Corps was told when to move its reserve, the

3897:, the "black day" of 4 October. Front line regiments were dispersed again with reserve battalions moved back behind the artillery protective line and 10410: 9999: 4126:

The 51st (Highly) Division moved from the Ypres front in early October and received a surprise, when warned of another operation, having already had

2304:

further north, which had responsibility for the capture of Vimy Ridge, to form a flank guard to the Third Army. The commander Lieutenant-General Sir

804: 2739:

Appendices covered Engineer work on roads, rail, tramways and water supply; intelligence arrangements covered the use balloons, contact aeroplanes,

10405: 10400: 2273:

massed in the Third and First armies, were deployed in relation to the length of front, the quantity of wire to be cut and availability of the new

531: 287: 9840: 9198: 593: 8629: 4549:

In 1996, Prior and Wilson wrote that the Third Battle of Ypres was called a British failure by many writers. Harris and Sheffield called it a

3374:

had been overrun during both offensives and the garrisons lost. It was anticipated that the main defensive engagement would take place in the

1862:) was published on 30 January 1917. Ludendorff's new defensive methods had been controversial; during the Battle of the Somme in 1916 Colonel 1264:

Ludendorff continued to vacillate but in the end, the manpower crisis and the prospect of releasing thirteen divisions by a withdrawal on the

1247:

Over the winter of 1916–1917, the wisdom of a deliberate withdrawal was debated and at a meeting on 19 December, called after the 15 December

8691: 4486:

the divisions had to prepare hurriedly for the counter-offensive of 30 November, which was the first offensive against the British since the

3834:

division was placed behind each front division, in the artillery protective line behind the forward battle zone which increased the ratio of

3760:

units becoming mixed up. The regiments in reserve had not been able to intervene quickly and the front battalions had been unsupported until

2242:, Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, studied this draft and made amendments, resulting in a more cautious plan for the infantry advance. General 1060: 1884:

others had severe doubts as to the ability of relief divisions to arrive on the battlefield in time to conduct an immediate counter-attack (

9900: 9830: 9469: 8681: 8592: 4812: 3697:

howitzers was added to the barrage and made available to artillery liaison officers at brigades as needed. Divisional headquarters had two

3642:

15 September. X Corps issued its first "Instruction" on 1 September, giving times and boundaries to its divisions, with details to follow.

1040: 3767:

3,000 yd (1.7 mi; 2.7 km) deep with one battalion in the front-line, the second in support and the third in close reserve.

9924: 8815: 8269: 3329:) which was about 2,000 yd (1,800 m) deep, containing most of the field artillery of the front divisions, behind which was the 3056: 2639:

In 1915, the biggest operation of the BEF had been by one army, with three corps and nine divisions. In 1916, two armies, nine corps and

7706: 2636:

agreed with the wisdom of trying to gain as much ground as possible, which Gough felt had not been achieved by the Third Army at Arras.

8492: 4213:

positions was necessary. A subsidiary attack was to be prepared by the 2nd Army north of St. Quentin, if a great success was achieved.

1011: 7346:

Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action, Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action (1917)

1174:(commander of the northern army group on the Western front) was instructed to prepare a new line, Arras–St. Quentin–Laon–Aisne river. 8822: 4245:

Division had been so damaged at Ypres that it was to be sent to the eastern front as soon the 107th Division arrived from Russia. In

4173:

Rupprecht and Kuhl were still anxious about the situation in Flanders during November, having lost Passchendaele village and more of

2200: 1122: 514: 3114:

with an advance to the Tower Hamlets spur, beyond the north end of Messines Ridge. On 9 June, Rupprecht proposed withdrawing to the

8474: 3750: 2581: 994: 10150: 3368:

divisions. The failures at Verdun in December 1916 and at Arras in April 1917 had given more importance to these areas, since the

1520:

in March when the 1897 class of conscripts was called up. The army was so flush with men that plans were made to demobilise older

10082: 9920: 9907: 9864: 9773: 9499: 9301: 9208: 9110: 8868: 8515: 8195: 4311:

Arras had been transferred from the 6th Army further north, holding the area from Inchy to the Arras–Cambrai road near Guémappe.

4256: 3036: 2359:

attacking brigades returned to the line on 1 April, giving them plenty of time to study the ground before the attack on 9 April.

1045: 4059:

Artillery planning for the attack saw the greatest change in technique, which was intended to exploit the tactical potential of

1950:

and Tilloy lez Mofflaines, from whence the original system of four lines 75–150 yd (69–137 m) apart, ran north to the

1458:

in reserve and another 10 to 11 divisions could be obtained by swapping tired units for fresh ones on quiet parts of the front.

10274: 10264: 10132: 4236: 4428:

Busigny reported that transport difficulties, had made it impossible to distribute sufficient ammunition to its divisions. In

10046: 9980: 9817: 9696: 9369: 8388: 8244: 8144: 8125: 7930: 7911: 7889: 7870: 7851: 7832: 7813: 7791: 7772: 7753: 7692: 7673: 7633: 7614: 7595: 7573: 7554: 7535: 7502: 7483: 7464: 7438: 7416: 7394: 7375: 7353: 7334: 7315: 7296: 7256: 7237: 7218: 3066: 3046: 2704:

XIV Corps held a conference of divisional commanders on 14 June and Cavan emphasised the importance of using the new manuals

885: 797: 170: 3413:

division, was to advance into the zone of the front division, with its other two regiments moving forward in close support.

10221: 9641: 8426: 4239:

and 183rd Division would be battle-worthy, the 9th Reserve Division was only capable of holding a quiet front and the 20th

4200:

Caudry and Busigny, attacking west towards the village of Metz, capturing Flesquières and Havrincourt Wood from the south.

3088: 3070: 3025:(Relief Division) had been dropped before the French offensive in mid-April, to avoid confusion over its purpose, the word 2473:

Loßberg made a swift reconnaissance of the 6th Army area, as the British were attacking Bullecourt at the north end of the

927: 133: 4089:

Corps planning for the Cambrai operation followed the routine established in early 1917. IV Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir

3447:

flanks, to avoid enemy fire and to counter-attack. German infantry equipment had recently been improved by the arrival of

2555:

front-line divisions had been withdrawn and replaced by nine fresh divisions, with six more brought into the area, as new

1837:

by internal reorganisation of the army, bringing divisions from the eastern front and by shortening the western front, in

9992: 9316: 8944: 8449: 8186:(Report). Leavenworth Papers. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College. 4339: 2690: 963: 10206: 4151:

Training was conducted on the replica, with the tanks allotted to the division. The 1st Brigade of the Tank Corps, with

4144:

in Havrincourt Wood by 19 November. Supply dumps, infantry and artillery tracks, dressing stations and water points for

10191: 9481: 8883: 8641: 3855:

regiment was to be available to counter-attack much sooner while the British were consolidating; the remainder of each

2033: 1171: 1016: 7712:. Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War. Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery. 1227:

shelters were built either side of the main line, with artillery observation posts built farther back to overlook it.

379: 10066: 9760: 9576: 8848: 8319: 8167: 7583: 4594:(The Attack in Position War) of January 1918, which laid down German offensive methods for the remainder of the war. 2998:

divisions were placed behind the Menin and Passchendaele Ridges; 5 mi (8.0 km) further back were four more

2861: 2083: 332: 3386:

divisions, against attackers who had been slowed and depleted by the forward garrisons before these were destroyed.

10390: 9246: 8284: 2864: 2410:

commencement of the French attacks of the Nivelle offensive, Haig believed that the German reserve had fallen from

2066: 1379: 790: 748: 7976:

A Planned Massacre? British Intelligence Analysis and the German Army at the Battle of Broodseinde, 4 October 1917

4570:

of technique. The experience of trying to move heavy artillery forward during the advance to the Hindenburg line (

10317: 10122: 10102: 9889: 9825: 9648: 9517: 8421: 8341: 8279: 922: 827: 450: 8982: 4194:

defences, when Rupprecht was able to offer two more divisions from Flanders. The main effort was to be made by

1546:

and realise a surplus for offensives on other fronts. Hindenburg and Ludendorff ordered the creation of another

10117: 10112: 10107: 10097: 9791: 8436: 8411: 8309: 7453:

Military Operations France and Belgium 1917: The German Retreat to the Hindenburg line and the Battles of Arras

4562:

official historians, many of whom were former staff officers, ascribed the tactical changes in the wake of the

4048: 3717: 2308:, maintained a consultative style in contrast to Allenby's move towards prescriptive control. On 18 March, the 2043: 1503:(battle of equipment/battle of attrition) being inflicted on it in France, which would only intensify in 1917. 934: 912: 243: 10092: 10087: 10051: 9985: 9877: 9723: 9306: 9158: 8696: 8624: 8555: 8324: 8294: 8289: 7765:

Landrecies to Cambrai: Case Studies of German Offensive and Defensive Operations on the Western Front 1914–17

4816: 4794: 4790: 4259:

was questioned and lack of equipment meant that the division could not be assessed. None of the divisions in

3084: 3032: 472: 1946:, 15 mi (24 km) away from the front line. The new Hindenburg line ended at Telegraph Hill between 1900:

by the relief divisions. Ludendorff was sufficiently impressed by Loßberg's memorandum to add it to the new

1134:

in December, received its biggest German attack since 1915, as German reinforcements began to flow from the

396: 10041: 9668: 9608: 9505: 9410: 9173: 8959: 8663: 8502: 8401: 2623: 2599: 2305: 1028: 1021: 902: 571: 401: 4632:

A munitions train was an accounting term for a standard delivery of ammunition. A field gun train carried

4482:

By 29 November the German 2nd Army had eighteen divisions around Cambrai. After the defensive fighting of

4268:

As soon as the British offensive began on 20 November, reserves were rushed to the area and an average of

4183:

On 27 November, Ludendorff, Rupprecht and the Chiefs of Staff of Army Group "German Crown Prince" and the

4148:

per hour were built, with no increase in movement of lorries by day and no work in forward areas allowed.

1409:

The complications of the entire battle lay only in part with the superiority in number of enemy divisions

10279: 9716: 9701: 9559: 9511: 9276: 8827: 8701: 8614: 8609: 8378: 8366: 8361: 7431:

Military Operations France and Belgium 1917: 7 June–10 November. Messines and Third Ypres (Passchendaele)

4603: 4448: 4361: 4273:

discussed at the meeting on 27 November by Ludendorff, Rupprecht and Marwitz with their staffs, required

3100: 2856:

Northern France and Flanders was held by Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht, which by the end of July had

2607: 2324: 2301: 2231: 1314: 1265: 1135: 1093: 1084: 856: 839: 834: 743: 723: 556: 311: 43: 8888: 5762: 1764:) held by sentries, had been built along the Western Front. Sentries could retreat to larger positions ( 1685:

guns, many being newer models of superior performance. Machine-gun output enabled each division to have

1238:, necessary to meet demand after the vast expenditure of ammunition in 1916 (on the Somme in September, 413: 10380: 10259: 10216: 9493: 9251: 9236: 9138: 9007: 8575: 8487: 8444: 8026: 7948: 7801: 7609:. Vol. IV (Imperial War Museum and Naval & Military Press ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2603: 2595: 2368: 1161: 1089: 1006: 941: 718: 708: 686: 620: 536: 526: 499: 327: 4338:

By 23 November, reinforcements reaching the 2nd Army were sufficient for two new groups, based on the

2660:

1909. Details had become routine, as more staff officers gained experience, allowing more delegation.

2532:

but to be moved among shell-holes and improvised emplacements, as the situation demanded. Specialist (

1803:) still inflicting losses and disorganisation on the attackers. As the attackers tried to capture the 10201: 9969: 9553: 9541: 9296: 9281: 9002: 8893: 8587: 8565: 8314: 8304: 8237: 4608: 4023: 3111: 2927: 2860:

The defence of the Ypres Salient was the responsibility of the German 4th Army, under the command of

2611: 2591: 2363: 2309: 2070: 1494: 1438: 766: 738: 693: 676: 632: 546: 467: 423: 418: 183: 9148: 4530:

Arras, the 214th Division was left out of the attack and other tired divisions given limited tasks.

4188:

roll up the British line northwards, replaced the original plan to push the British back behind the

3213:

Debate among the German commanders continued and on 25 June, Ludendorff suggested to Rupprecht that

3004:

divisions and 7 mi (11 km) beyond them another two in "Group of Northern Armies" reserve.

2438:

on 9 April. Given the two failures and the imminence of the French offensive on the Aisne, the term

1461:

Ludendorff admitted privately to Kuhl that victory appeared impossible, who wrote in his diary that

10176: 9663: 9653: 9582: 9535: 9523: 9463: 9271: 9266: 9188: 8597: 8570: 8274: 7666:

Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1916: 2nd July 1916 to the End of the Battles of the Somme

4398:

and their divisions, had to amend their plans twice before the attack could commence. The original

4226: 4184: 4005: 3984: 3728: 2986:

Wytschaete held a similar length of front south of Menin Road with three front divisions and three

2937: 2615: 2520:, Loßberg ordered that digging-in was to be avoided, in favour of the maximum use of invisibility ( 1921: 1867: 1731:"fight itself to a standstill and use up its resources while the defenders conserve their strength" 1583: 1335: 1131: 1107:

in December 1916, to break through the German defences on the Western front and return to a war of

733: 671: 647: 551: 477: 197: 3612:. The ammunition requirements for a seven-day bombardment before to the assault, was estimated at 2974:

Ypres held 6 mi (9.7 km) from Pilckem to Menin Road, with three front divisions and two

1221:) behind fields of barbed wire up to 100 yd (91 m) deep. Concrete machine-gun nests and 10375: 10247: 10239: 10181: 9941: 9636: 9399: 9226: 9221: 9153: 9012: 8997: 8992: 8972: 8853: 8730: 4613: 4444: 4018: 3705: 3609: 2575: 1955: 1917: 698: 659: 637: 487: 428: 354: 9193: 8085: 2007: 1758:(Principles of Field Fortification) was published in January 1917 and by April an outpost zone ( 10385: 10014: 9738: 9673: 9529: 9256: 9183: 9133: 9118: 9100: 9073: 8987: 8954: 8619: 8580: 8560: 8371: 8264: 7363: 4563: 4487: 2668: 2235: 2221: 844: 713: 681: 642: 610: 541: 509: 482: 455: 364: 110: 1745:(rear battle zone) further back was to be occupied by the reserve battalion of each regiment. 1589:

The German army had begun 1916 equally well-provided for in artillery and ammunition, massing

492: 10004: 9658: 9547: 9323: 9286: 9216: 9163: 9085: 9053: 9027: 8977: 8908: 8810: 8763: 8547: 8416: 8299: 8139:. Cambridge Military Histories (pbk. repr. ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7745: 7721: 3894: 1300: 1126: 907: 728: 703: 561: 443: 347: 105: 8180:

The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine during the First World War

7784:

Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies 1888–1918

3893:

On 7 October, the 4th Army abandoned the reinforcement of the front defence zone, after the

10354: 10269: 8949: 8923: 8873: 8230: 8217: 7426: 7404: 4513: 3867:(methodical counter-attack) on the next day or the one after. Between British attacks, the 3254:

The 4th Army operation order for the defensive battle was issued on 27 June. The system of

2953: 2542:

per division, were moved back to the artillery protective line, to act as rallying points (

1951: 1368:

casualties had been suffered from 24 June to 28 August. The battle had required the use of

1235: 1157: 1154: 615: 247: 8898: 4506:

Poor weather and lack of time inhibited training but some rehearsals were possible, using

3237:

along Passchendaele Ridge, meeting the old front line in the north near Langemarck and at

1863: 8: 10336: 9475: 9339: 9291: 9168: 9128: 9123: 9068: 8751: 8745: 8646: 7645: 4052: 3559: 2846: 2053: 1361: 1146: 980: 625: 581: 576: 391: 369: 251: 10289: 8002:

The Infantry cannot do with a Gun Less: The Place of the Artillery in the BEF, 1914–1918

4131:

wearing trousers rather than kilts. To concentrate the division in the battle area only

10296: 10211: 9570: 9434: 9416: 9381: 9345: 9178: 9143: 9095: 9080: 8967: 8918: 8757: 8716: 8396: 8179: 7702: 3922:) at the back of this advanced zone when attacked and the artillery was to barrage the 3647: 3341:

were reserve battalions of the front-line regiments, held back as divisional reserves.

3187:(under construction). Between the German defence positions lay the Belgian villages of 3127:

line and ordered that the front line east of the Oosttaverne line be held rigidly. The

2913: 2740: 2698: 1838: 1318: 897: 598: 438: 359: 4451:

and took over responsibility for 6 mi (9.7 km) of trench line, supported by

3818:

Wytschaete wrote that the experience was "awful" and that he did not know what to do.

1261:

expected to be available by March 1917, a decisive success was considered impossible.

337: 10329: 10323: 10284: 10186: 10019: 9602: 9457: 9440: 9241: 9063: 9043: 8878: 8863: 8793: 8781: 8482: 8459: 8406: 8187: 8163: 8140: 8121: 8097: 8072: 8032: 8006: 7980: 7954: 7926: 7907: 7885: 7866: 7847: 7828: 7809: 7787: 7768: 7749: 7713: 7688: 7669: 7652: 7629: 7610: 7591: 7569: 7550: 7531: 7498: 7479: 7460: 7434: 7412: 7390: 7371: 7349: 7330: 7311: 7292: 7275: 7268: 7252: 7233: 7214: 3487: 3268:(second or artillery protective line), the rear boundary of the forward battle zone ( 3206: 2447: 2225: 1421: 1257:, the possibility of a return to the offensive was also discussed. With a maximum of 1100: 1001: 953: 892: 849: 664: 605: 408: 3994: 9387: 9357: 9351: 9261: 9090: 9058: 9048: 8787: 8711: 8706: 8634: 8454: 8354: 8212: 4761:

Australian Division, 7th Division and the 49th Division was in Second Army reserve.

4014: 3756: 3634: 3255: 2239: 2159: 1947: 1373: 1254: 1150: 1118: 1108: 1104: 985: 973: 958: 946: 871: 866: 566: 342: 255: 158: 8061: 2851:

The British front line and the German defences in the area east of Ypres, mid-1917

2763:

The 8th Division moved to Flanders a few days before the Battle of Messines Ridge

2022: 1278:), overcame his desire to avoid the tacit admission of defeat it represented. The 10196: 10036: 9375: 8928: 8903: 8602: 8510: 8349: 7607:

The War in the Air: Being the Part played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force

4550: 4079: 3724: 3629:

The three-week operational pause in September originated from Lieutenant-General

3110:

The Germans were apprehensive of a British attempt to exploit the victory at the

2768: 2371:

commanders and General Horne, the First Army commander also pressed for a delay.

1275: 1080: 1035: 876: 861: 761: 433: 259: 225: 29: 7904:

The Road to Passchendaele: The Flanders Offensive 1917, A Study in Inevitability

3031:("interlock", "dovetail" or "intervene") being substituted. The 207th Division, 2354:

for open warfare ("greeted with hilarity") with platoons organised according to

1841:. By the spring of 1917, the German army in the west had a strategic reserve of 1372:

and by September, one division a day had to be replaced by a fresh one. General

10029: 10009: 9680: 9393: 9231: 9022: 8913: 8769: 8673: 8656: 7825:

Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army's Experience 1914–18

7528:

Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack 1916–1918

7523: 7213:] (in German) (pbk. facs. repr. Kessinger ed.). Berlin: Eisenschmidt. 4797:

and the 220th Division for the attack and 9th Reserve Division in support with

4497:, were to overcome centres of resistance by infiltration and envelopment, with 4060: 3957:

artillery too much freedom to operate. The thin line of sentries of one or two

3630: 2619: 2526:). Machine-guns were not to be placed in special defended localities as in the 2467: 2313: 2243: 1967: 1230:

On 31 August, Hindenburg and Ludendorff had begun the expansion of the army to

504: 374: 237: 165: 122: 7046: 3238: 2386:

and an Army memo, regarding low flying German aeroplanes, called attention to

2238:

on 28 December, beginning a process of consultation and negotiation with GHQ.

2139: 10369: 10140: 9428: 9422: 8858: 8775: 8686: 8101: 8036: 7984: 7958: 7899: 7717: 7656: 7279: 7062: 3592: 3400: 2514:(Hindenburg Support line). In the battle zone between the front line and the 2278: 2203:

Training Directorate in January 1917, to issue manuals and oversee training.

2166:

provided the basis for the BEF's operational technique for the rest of 1917.

1608: 386: 212: 145: 8010: 8000: 4293:

Caudry and Busigny had taken effect were substituted for the original plan.

4051:

forward, to capture the canal crossings at Masnières and Marcoing. The RFC,

2423:

The first days of the British Arras offensive, saw another German defensive

9590: 9017: 8191: 8076: 7590:. Vol. II (Naval & Military Press ed.). London: John Murray. 7308:

Haig's Enemy: Crown Prince Rupprecht and Germany's War on the Western Front

3194: 2587: 2274: 8028:

The Operational Role of British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914–18

2656:

long and concerned principles and the commander's intent, as laid down in

1540:

on the Somme. A larger number of divisions might reduce the strain on the

1321:(4 June – 20 September) and the Rumanian declaration of war on 28 August. 782: 9801: 9706: 9404: 8832: 8253: 7448: 7348:(pbk. repr. Military Press, Milton Keynes ed.). London: War Office. 4387: 4010: 2902: 2105:), built of concrete and sited for all-round-defence, held by one or two 917: 815: 6691: 3617:

the "creeper", four heavy artillery counter-battery double groups, with

2962:

Dixmude held 12 mi (19 km), with four front divisions and two

2191:

The changes in equipment, organisation and formation were elaborated in

1405:

The 1st Army on the north side of the Somme reported on 28 August that,

8120:. Cambridge Military Histories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7512:

Foley, R. T. "The Other Side of the Wire: The German Army in 1917". In

6746: 5750: 4317:

Caudry held the area south of Guémappe to Bellicourt, beyond which was

2632: 2548:) for the front garrison and as the fire power to cover the advance of 2405:

A British raiding party, heading for the German frontline (early 1917).

1297:

On 29 August 1916, Hindenburg and Ludendorff had been appointed to the

3910:

divisions as they advanced. Ludendorff insisted on an advanced zone, (

1621:(recalled from the army) or exempted from conscription. The number of 9596: 9363: 4729: 3455: 3188: 1528:

classes and in the summer, Falkenhayn ordered the raising of another

1490: 37: 7387:

The Fifty-Sixth Division 1914–1918 (1st London Territorial Division)

7289:

Fire Power: The British Army, Weapons and Theories of War, 1904–1945

6130: 6128: 3151:

would run west of Menin and north to Passchendaele. Construction of

2644:

Plan of Operations and Operational Order 14 for 1 July 1916 covered

2079: 1343:

On 8 September 1916, Hindenburg and Ludendorff held a conference at

9856: 8063:

Die deutsche artillerie in den durchbruchschlachten des weltkrieges

6340: 6328: 6304: 6292: 2880: 1959: 1523: 1497:, for a further industrial mobilisation, to equip the army for the 1329: 1308: 7974: 7685:

Military Operations France and Belgium 1917: The Battle of Cambrai

6171: 6169: 6167: 4265:

Arras were considered battle-worthy after their time in Flanders.

3554:

positions. The essence of all of these defensive preparations was

2391:

Notes on Firing at Aircraft with Machine Guns and Other Small Arms

1726:

Grundsätze für die Führung in der Abwehrschlacht im Stellungskrieg

8201:

from the original on 4 March 2017 – via Archive Foundation.

8069:

The German Artillery in the Breakthrough Battles of the World War

6814: 6812: 6125: 5771:, pp. 180, 186, App XVII, map 17, 190, App XVII, map 18, 19. 4737: 4721: 4114: 4102: 3555: 3450: 3104: 3074: 1344: 128: 67: 6707: 6140: 4512:

personnel as instructors; the 34th Division managed to rehearse

3953:(methodical counter-attack), after ample artillery preparation. 2832: 279: 8086:"The Introduction of New German Defensive Tactics in 1916–1917" 7249:

Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action

7232:(Naval & Military Press ed.). London: Medici Society. 7034: 6532: 6316: 6280: 6164: 6152: 5726: 5606: 4473:). The outpost line was manned at night and the strong points ( 3133:(Flanders Position), along Passchendaele Ridge in front of the 3096: 2251:

Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action

1963: 71: 8222: 7478:(repr. Berg ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. 6916: 6914: 6809: 6799: 6797: 5912: 5900: 5888: 5630: 5447: 10024: 5779: 5777: 3092: 2062: 2027:

Modern map of Vimy and vicinity (commune FR insee code 62861)

1943: 1563: 1388:

of the casualty replacements needed. From July to August the

8118:

Holding Out: The German Army and Operational Command in 1917

7389:(Naval & Military Press ed.). London: John Murray. 6829: 6827: 6724: 6722: 6424: 6193: 5816: 5702: 5318: 4819:

and 183rd Division with 208th Division in reserve backed by

4384:

batteries were emplaced in seven days in one area and sixty

3486:. The extra firepower gave the German unit better means for 3258:

began with a front system (first line) of three breastworks

2920:

The 4th Army defended 25 mi (40 km) of front with

1562:

in February 1917 but the larger army would become a wasting

1287: 1099:

The French returned to a strategy of decisive battle in the

7925:(Greenwood Press, NY ed.). London: Faber & Faber. 7456: 7165: 7153: 7141: 7117: 7105: 7010: 6938: 6911: 6839: 6794: 6580: 6472: 6460: 6412: 6232: 6181: 5956: 5954: 5185: 5183: 5035: 5033: 3723:

On 11 September the 23rd Division commander, Major-General

3506:, based in the forward battle zone. Eighty per cent of the 2129: 1971: 1966:

and to the north the Point du Jour lines, running from the

1645:

men in October 1917 and more than two million by November,

7083: 7081: 6597: 6595: 6222: 6220: 5978: 5929: 5927: 5876: 5864: 5852: 5828: 5789: 5774: 5714: 5642: 5582: 5459: 5399: 4871: 4869: 3565: 2867:. The divisions of the 4th Army were organised in groups ( 2111:, each with eleven men and an NCO with a machine-gun and; 7588:

History of the Guards Division in the Great War 1915–1918

7497:. Loftus, NSW: Australian History Military Publications. 7129: 7022: 6986: 6863: 6824: 6719: 6655: 6643: 6607: 6556: 6508: 6436: 5806: 5804: 5738: 5488: 5486: 5168: 3701:

howitzer batteries with eight guns for the same purpose.

2564: 8137:

Foch in Command: The Making of a First World War General

7251:(repr. ed.). London: Military Press International. 7093: 6974: 6484: 6079: 6077: 6014: 5990: 5966: 5951: 5570: 5558: 5522: 5377: 5375: 5350: 5348: 5335: 5333: 5270: 5258: 5234: 5210: 5180: 5141: 5129: 5105: 5093: 5057: 5045: 5030: 5018: 4994: 3362:) containing support and reserve assembly areas for the 2384:

Instructions on the Use of Lethal and Lachrymatory Shell

1641:(kv, fit for front line service), at the end of 1916 to 1437:

It was known in Germany that the British had introduced

7626:

Passchendaele in Perspective: The Third Battle of Ypres

7409:

Military Operations France and Belgium 1916: Appendices

7177: 7078: 6998: 6962: 6950: 6887: 6875: 6851: 6782: 6770: 6758: 6734: 6667: 6631: 6619: 6592: 6568: 6496: 6400: 6388: 6352: 6268: 6256: 6244: 6217: 6205: 6089: 5924: 5200: 5198: 5158: 5156: 4984: 4982: 4980: 4953: 4929: 4866: 1827:

into the battle zone, in an immediate counter-attack, (

1821:

of the counter-attack divisions would advance from the

6899: 6376: 6364: 6026: 5840: 5801: 5690: 5678: 5666: 5654: 5618: 5483: 5423: 5387: 5360: 5294: 5282: 5246: 5117: 5081: 5069: 3978: 3739: 1854:

Experience of the German 1st Army in the Somme Battles

7547:

Cambrai 1917: The Myth of the First Great Tank Battle

7270:

The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914–1918

6926: 6679: 6544: 6520: 6448: 6113: 6101: 6074: 6062: 5939: 5471: 5435: 5411: 5372: 5345: 5330: 5222: 4941: 3794:

German counter-attacks, 30 September – 4 October 1917

3293:

to counter-attack towards them, from the back of the

2901:

Dixmude held the ground from north of the railway to

2723:

At a conference held by Gough on 26 June, the record

1958:

road. About 3 mi (4.8 km) behind, were the

8218:

Passchendaele – Canada's other Vimy Ridge, Leach, N.

6050: 6038: 6002: 5594: 5546: 5534: 5510: 5498: 5195: 5153: 5006: 4977: 4965: 4556:

In 2018, Jonathan Boff wrote that after the war the

4422:

and divisional boundaries adapted to their arrival.

4168: 3684:

9" laid down the use of machine-guns in the attack;

2230:

Planning for operations in 1917 began in late 1916.

10426:

Battles of World War I involving the United Kingdom

7923:

If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West

4917: 4905: 4893: 4881: 4854: 4636:field gun rounds, a light field howitzer train had 3881:the Germans attacked and counter-attacked at least 3274:). Companies of the support battalions were split, 3107:, in case of a British landing in the Netherlands. 2837: 8178: 8162:] (in German). Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe. 8060: 7950:British Intelligence and the German Army 1914–1918 7644: 7327:Look To Your Front: Studies in the First World War 7267: 5306: 4105:and the principles of tank-infantry co-operation. 3231:. On 30 June, Kuhl, suggested a withdrawal to the 2069:) was responsible for the line from the Scarpe to 1364:had been extraordinarily costly and on the Somme, 8213:Collectors' Guide to the British Official History 7310:(1st ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3490:. Sixty per cent of the front line garrison were 2895:Ypres held the line to the Ypres–Staden railway, 2796:guns) a double bombardment group (one group with 2576:Third Battle of Ypres, 31 July – 10 November 1917 2215: 10367: 3985:Battle of Cambrai, 20 November – 8 December 1917 3716:To the right of 1st Australian Division was the 2889:Wytschaete continued north to Bellewaarde Lake, 2648:excluding maps and appendices), the XVIII Corps 9199:Armistice between Russia and the Central Powers 7822: 7274:(online scan ed.). London: Wm. Blackwood. 6346: 6334: 6322: 6310: 6298: 6286: 6175: 6158: 5636: 4718:, analogous with the Roman legion formation of 4364:), which took over the right hand divisions of 3323:also marked the front of the main battle zone ( 2234:staff made their proposals for what became the 4700:The support and reserve assembly areas in the 3873:divisions were to make more spoiling attacks. 2257:Allenby and his artillery commander planned a 1347:with the chiefs of staff of the armies of the 10421:Battles of World War I involving South Africa 8238: 7476:Army, Industry and Labor in Germany 1914–1918 7286: 6134: 4392:batteries in three days. The three attacking 4323:St Quentin. Confident in the strength of the 2879:Lille ran from the southern army boundary to 2833:German defensive preparations, June–July 1917 2396: 1398:of field gun shells, for the receipt of only 798: 295: 10416:Battles of World War I involving New Zealand 8005:(PhD). New York: Columbia University Press. 7806:The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army 7403: 6146: 5612: 4828: 4806: 4784: 4713: 4707: 4701: 4685: 4679: 4673: 4640:shells and a heavy howitzer train contained 4589: 4571: 4557: 4540: 4525: 4518: 4507: 4498: 4492: 4474: 4468: 4429: 4423: 4417: 4416:as more divisions were added to the attack; 4411: 4405: 4399: 4393: 4385: 4371: 4365: 4355: 4349: 4343: 4330: 4324: 4318: 4312: 4306: 4297: 4288: 4281: 4274: 4260: 4246: 4240: 4230: 4217: 4208: 4201: 4195: 4189: 4174: 3970: 3964: 3958: 3948: 3941: 3935: 3929: 3923: 3917: 3911: 3905: 3898: 3868: 3862: 3856: 3850: 3841: 3835: 3829: 3823: 3813: 3807: 3800: 3778: 3771: 3761: 3577: 3537: 3531: 3525: 3519: 3513: 3507: 3501: 3491: 3481: 3475: 3469: 3459: 3438: 3432: 3426: 3420: 3414: 3408: 3395: 3381: 3375: 3369: 3363: 3357: 3351: 3345: 3336: 3330: 3324: 3318: 3312: 3306: 3300: 3294: 3288: 3279: 3269: 3263: 3246: 3232: 3226: 3220: 3214: 3200: 3182: 3176: 3170: 3164: 3158: 3152: 3146: 3140: 3134: 3128: 3122: 3115: 3078: 3060: 3050: 3040: 3026: 3020: 3014: 3008: 2999: 2993: 2987: 2981: 2975: 2969: 2963: 2957: 2947: 2941: 2931: 2921: 2906: 2896: 2890: 2884: 2874: 2873:) based on the existing corps organisation. 2868: 2838: 2714: 2556: 2549: 2543: 2533: 2527: 2521: 2515: 2509: 2503: 2496: 2490: 2480: 2474: 2461: 2445: 2439: 2424: 2342:General Officers Commanding, Royal Artillery 2106: 2100: 2090: 2074: 2057: 2047: 2037: 2014: 2001: 1991: 1984: 1978: 1937: 1931: 1925: 1908: 1891: 1885: 1875: 1859:Erfahrungen der I Armee in der Sommeschlacht 1857: 1828: 1822: 1816: 1810: 1804: 1798: 1792: 1783: 1777: 1771: 1765: 1759: 1753: 1740: 1734: 1724: 1694: 1666: 1636: 1622: 1616: 1602: 1577: 1571: 1541: 1521: 1498: 1484: 1472: 1427: 1419: 1389: 1377: 1355: 1348: 1306: 1298: 1279: 1269: 1248: 1222: 1216: 1210: 1204: 1197: 1191: 1185: 1179: 1166: 1112: 9689: 8058: 7739: 7384: 7291:(pbk. repr. ed.). London: Leo Cooper. 7227: 7040: 6538: 5918: 5906: 5894: 5822: 5708: 5465: 5453: 4735: 4727: 4719: 4354:Caudry, opposite the British VII Corps and 4121: 3549: 3543: 2418: 2281:to find the positions of German artillery. 2254:headquarters to concentrate on operations. 2134: 812: 10431:Battles of the Western Front (World War I) 10396:Battles of World War I involving Australia 8245: 8231: 8153: 8134: 7513: 7492: 3799:than had been available in August. German 3653: 2169: 2056:to the Scarpe river with three divisions, 2036:holding the area north of Givenchy became 1696:Maschinengewehr-Scharfschützen-Abteilungen 1579:kaiserlicher Oberst und Landsknechtsführer 805: 791: 302: 288: 174: 7800: 7701: 7642: 7135: 7056: 5324: 4959: 4935: 4017:, Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) of the 2713:operation; the German defensive position 2362:On 15 April, during the Battle of Arras, 1288:German defensive preparations, early 1917 1103:in April, using methods pioneered at the 203: 10411:Battles of World War I involving Germany 9488:Revolutions and interventions in Hungary 7898: 7707:"Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914–1919" 7522: 7362: 7343: 7228:Bax, C. E. O.; Boraston, J. H. (2001) . 7087: 6490: 6430: 5696: 5660: 5366: 5300: 5288: 4410:(Operation Twilight of the Gods) became 4078: 3993: 3928:. Support and reserve battalions of the 3751:German counter-attack, 25 September 1917 3596:the standard method of the Second Army. 3454:machine-guns (equivalent to the British 3193: 2845: 2582:Planning the Third Battle of Ypres, 1917 2400: 2138: 2130:The British set-piece attack, early 1917 2021: 1809:and dig in near the German second line, 1656:workers to the war economy and exempted 1402:Germany, creating a munitions shortage. 1328: 188: 96: 10406:Battles of World War I involving France 10401:Battles of World War I involving Canada 9865:Occupied Enemy Territory Administration 8024: 7972: 7879: 7863:The German Army on Vimy Ridge 1914–1917 7860: 7841: 7781: 7582: 7544: 7473: 7425: 7265: 7183: 7171: 7159: 7147: 7123: 7111: 7072: 7068: 7016: 7004: 6980: 6968: 6944: 6920: 6905: 6893: 6881: 6857: 6845: 6833: 6818: 6803: 6788: 6776: 6764: 6740: 6701: 6697: 6673: 6637: 6625: 6601: 6586: 6574: 6514: 6502: 6478: 6466: 6418: 6406: 6394: 6358: 6274: 6262: 6250: 6238: 6226: 6211: 6199: 6187: 6095: 6032: 5984: 5945: 5882: 5870: 5858: 5846: 5834: 5810: 5795: 5783: 5768: 5756: 5744: 5732: 5720: 5684: 5672: 5648: 5624: 5588: 5492: 5477: 5441: 5429: 5417: 5405: 5393: 5381: 5354: 5339: 5264: 5228: 5123: 5087: 5075: 4923: 4911: 4899: 4657:that II Corps had five divisions, with 3566:The British set-piece attack, late 1917 2377:Third Army Artillery Instructions No.12 2287:Third Army Artillery Instructions No.13 1870:) had been able to establish a line of 1506: 1493:of the Operations Section at OHL HQ in 149: 10368: 8176: 7998: 7762: 7623: 7563: 7495:1917: Tactics, Training and Technology 7370:. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military. 7246: 7052: 6382: 6370: 5933: 5600: 5276: 5252: 2565:The British set-piece attack, mid-1917 2300:Matters were similarly settled in the 2291:Notes on Points of Instructional Value 2149:In December 1916, the training manual 1748: 9818:Austro-Hungarian occupation of Serbia 9154:Third Battle of Ypres (Passchendaele) 8226: 8115: 8083: 7946: 7920: 7682: 7663: 7604: 7549:. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 7530:(pbk. repr. ed.). London: Yale. 7511: 7447: 7207:Entwickelung der Taktik im Weltkriege 7204: 7028: 6992: 6956: 6932: 6869: 6752: 6728: 6713: 6685: 6661: 6649: 6613: 6562: 6550: 6526: 6454: 6442: 6119: 6107: 6083: 6068: 6056: 6044: 6020: 6008: 5996: 5972: 5960: 5576: 5564: 5552: 5540: 5528: 5516: 5504: 5240: 5216: 5204: 5189: 5174: 5162: 5147: 5135: 5111: 5099: 5063: 5051: 5039: 5024: 5012: 5000: 4988: 4971: 4947: 4887: 4875: 4860: 4789:Caudry (Watter) with 107th Division, 3299:, half based in the pillboxes of the 2333:Forward Inter-Communication in Battle 1324: 786: 283: 10222:Agreement of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne 8160:From Single Shot to Creeping Barrage 8090:British Journal for Military History 8071:] (in German). Berlin: Mittler. 7566:Douglas Haig and the First World War 7324: 7305: 7099: 5312: 2606:were to be under the command of the 1970:river north along the east slope of 1723:In a new manual of 1 December 1916, 10151:Ottomans against the Triple Entente 8945:Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes 7493:Dennis, P.; Grey, G., eds. (2007). 4684:would have been intact, except for 4467:and then an intermediate position ( 3979:Operational surprise, Cambrai, 1917 3740:German defensive changes, late 1917 3562:, that defence foreshadows attack. 3045:Wytschaete, the 221st Division and 2196:The Normal Formation For the Attack 1936:) on the second or third day. Five 1902:Manual of Infantry Training for War 1718: 1693:machine-guns and for the number of 1234:and of munitions production in the 13: 8884:First Battle of the Masurian Lakes 8052: 8031:(PhD). London: London University. 7953:(PhD). London: London University. 7823:Sheffield, G.; Todman, D. (2004). 4584:and another four by 2 December in 4459:per battery and a reserve of only 4438: 3861:division was to be withheld for a 3335:(third line). In pillboxes of the 2746: 2667:At the end of June, Major-General 1671:artillery park had increased from 14: 10442: 8206: 7846:. Barnsley: Pen and Sword Books. 7287:Bidwell, S.; Graham, D. (2004) . 7211:Development of Tactics, World War 6755:, pp. 227–231, sketch map 8. 4169:Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht 3558:, in accordance with the view of 3524:in divisional reserve (all being 3007:Behind ground-holding divisions ( 2720:army conference held on 19 June. 2508:be built from Douai south to the 1990:local immediate counter-attacks ( 1848: 1209:) and a main line of resistance ( 309: 9247:Second Battle of the Piave River 8869:Russian invasion of East Prussia 7844:The German Army at Passchendaele 7230:Eighth Division in War 1914–1918 4778: 4764: 4754: 4745: 4694: 3777:they could intervene before the 3464:of eight men was augmented by a 3311:) machine-gun nests, called the 2865:Friedrich Bertram Sixt von Armin 2840:Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht 1380:Heeresgruppe Deutscher Kronprinz 218: 205: 190: 176: 164: 151: 138: 127: 115: 98: 58:4 August 1914 – 11 November 1918 36: 10318:Arrest of a Suspect in Sarajevo 9518:Lithuanian Wars of Independence 8252: 8156:Vom Einzelschuss zur Feuerwalze 8135:Greenhalgh, Elizabeth (2013) . 8079:– via Archive Foundation. 7742:Passchendaele: The Untold Story 7659:– via Archive Foundation. 7282:– via Archive Foundation. 5759:, p. 127, maps 10, 12, 15. 4647: 4626: 3999:Battle of Cambrai – front lines 3888: 3787: 3744: 3225:, leaving only outposts in the 2946:Wytschaete (IX Reserve Corps); 2586:Sir Douglas Haig chose General 2207:and its companion manuals like 2089: 1360:. The Battle of Verdun and the 10141:Austria-Hungary against Serbia 10000:Deportations from East Prussia 9797:1915 typhus epidemic in Serbia 7979:(PhD). Birmingham University. 7740:Prior, R.; Wilson, T. (1996). 4084:British Mark IV tank at Wailly 3542:formations), was based in the 3468:crew of four men, to become a 2452:, a term with connotations of 2312:commander, Lieutenant-General 2216:British offensive preparations 2013: 1930:), by the "relief" divisions ( 1516:in recruit depots and another 244:Helmuth von Moltke the Younger 1: 10052:Ukrainian Canadian internment 7884:. Barnsley: Pen & Sword. 7865:. Barnsley: Pen & Sword. 7647:The Strategy of the Great War 7192: 4591:Der Angriff im Stellungskrieg 4455:field artillery pieces, with 3380:by the reserve regiments and 2816:howitzers). Six batteries of 2319: 2052:Vimy and held the front from 1993:Gegenangriffe in der Stellung 1755:Allgemeines über Stellungsbau 1141: 10207:Sazonov–Paléologue Agreement 9506:Estonian War of Independence 9174:Southern Palestine offensive 7385:Dudley Ward, C. H. (2001) . 4848: 4407:Unternehmung Götterdämmerung 4255:from Alsace-Lorraine in the 3972:die Leere des Gefechtsfeldes 3425:, ready to intervene in the 3407:The leading regiment of the 3356:was a rearward battle zone ( 2926:Dixmude based on the German 2741:Forward Observation Officers 2684: 2523:die Leere des Gefechtsfeldes 1707:machine-guns and the French 1394:had fired the equivalent of 1313:, the German section of the 1292: 7: 10161:USA against Austria-Hungary 9560:Turkish War of Independence 9512:Latvian War of Independence 9237:Treaty of Bucharest of 1918 8828:Anti-Serb riots in Sarajevo 7827:. Staplehurst: Spellmount. 7628:. London: Pen & Sword. 7344:Corkerry, S., ed. (2001) . 7329:. Staplehurst: Spellmount. 6347:Sheffield & Todman 2004 6335:Sheffield & Todman 2004 6323:Sheffield & Todman 2004 6311:Sheffield & Todman 2004 6299:Sheffield & Todman 2004 6287:Sheffield & Todman 2004 6176:Sheffield & Todman 2004 6159:Sheffield & Todman 2004 5637:Sheffield & Todman 2004 4604:Western Front (World War I) 4597: 4533: 4216: 4074: 3989: 3570: 2569: 2348: 2144:Battle of Arras, April 1917 2008:Drocourt–Quéant switch line 1123:British Expeditionary Force 772:Western Front tactics, 1917 10: 10447: 10244:Treaties of Brest-Litovsk 9792:1899–1923 cholera pandemic 9252:Second Battle of the Marne 9139:Second battle of the Aisne 9008:Second Battle of Champagne 8849:German invasion of Belgium 7882:The German Army at Cambrai 6716:, pp. 32–35, 348–358. 3982: 3791: 3748: 3624: 3284:to hold strong-points and 3245: 3219:Ypres be withdrawn to the 3057:2nd Guard Reserve Division 2804:howitzers, the other with 2788:howitzers, the other with 2579: 2573: 2397:British methodical attacks 2219: 1996:) by the front divisions. 1907: 1155:Chief of the General Staff 10350: 10309: 10230: 10169: 10131: 10075: 10064: 10025:Assyrian genocide (Sayfo) 9968: 9940: 9888: 9810: 9784: 9736: 9629: 9622: 9554:Irish War of Independence 9450: 9332: 9297:Armistice of Villa Giusti 9282:Battle of Vittorio Veneto 9207: 9109: 9036: 8937: 8894:First Battle of the Marne 8841: 8803: 8738: 8729: 8672: 8546: 8535: 8501: 8473: 8435: 8387: 8340: 8333: 8260: 8154:Linnenkohl, Hans (1990). 7643:McPherson, W. L. (1919). 7368:Haig: Master of the Field 6135:Bidwell & Graham 2004 4811:Busigny (Kathen) had the 4609:Brazil during World War I 4348:Busigny) to the south of 4296: 3879:26 September – 3 October, 3530:formations) and then the 3077:, in Army Group reserve. 2911:Nord held the coast with 2658:Field Service Regulations 2538:) machine-gun units with 2444:was dropped in favour of 1785:Gegenstoß in der Stellung 1776:(five men and an NCO per 1652:The German army returned 1477:(diary), 8 September 1916 823: 319: 265: 231: 90: 50: 35: 27: 22: 10177:Constantinople Agreement 9470:Armenian–Azerbaijani War 9333:Co-belligerent conflicts 9302:Second Romanian campaign 9272:Third Transjordan attack 8983:Gorlice–Tarnów offensive 8889:Battle of Grand Couronné 8059:Bruchmüller, G. (1922). 7763:Rogers, D., ed. (2010). 7514:Dennis & Grey (2007) 7474:Feldman, G. D. (1992) . 7407:; Wynne, G. C. (2010) . 6147:Edmonds & Wynne 2010 5735:, pp. 153, 433–436. 5613:Edmonds & Wynne 2010 4619: 4122:51st (Highland) Division 4013:) and Brigadier-General 3729:Bavarian Ersatz Division 3434:den sofortigen Gegenstoß 3091:was concentrated around 2419:German defensive changes 2135:Division attack training 2044:I Bavarian Reserve Corps 1660:from conscription, from 1584:Prussian Ministry of War 1066:Indian and Pacific Ocean 10391:Battle of Passchendaele 10240:Modus vivendi of Acroma 10192:Bulgaria–Germany treaty 9500:Greater Poland Uprising 9400:National Protection War 9277:Meuse–Argonne offensive 9227:German spring offensive 9222:Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 8998:Siege of Novogeorgievsk 8973:Second Battle of Artois 8854:Battle of the Frontiers 7808:. London: Aurum Press. 7266:Bewsher, F. W. (1921). 7041:Prior & Wilson 1996 6539:Bax & Boraston 2001 5919:Bax & Boraston 2001 5907:Bax & Boraston 2001 5895:Bax & Boraston 2001 5823:Prior & Wilson 1996 5709:Prior & Wilson 1996 4614:Portugal in World War I 4443:During the fighting at 4251:Caudry, the loyalty of 4019:9th (Scottish) Division 3654:1st Australian Division 3633:and Lieutenant-General 3610:Battle of Pilckem Ridge 2725:(Fifth Army S.G.657 44) 2170:Platoon attack training 1918:Ludwig von Falkenhausen 1866:(Chief of Staff of the 1830:Gegenstoß aus der Tiefe 1662:September 1916 to July 1215:) on a reverse slope, ( 1212:Hauptverteidigungslinie 660:German spring offensive 10265:Paris Peace Conference 10253:Ukraine–Central Powers 10047:Massacres of Albanians 10015:Late Ottoman genocides 9822:Bulgarian occupations 9530:Third Anglo-Afghan War 9494:Hungarian–Romanian War 9312:Naval Victory Bulletin 9307:Armistice with Germany 9257:Hundred Days Offensive 9184:Battle of La Malmaison 9134:Second battle of Arras 9101:Battle of Transylvania 8955:Second Battle of Ypres 8823:Sarajevo assassination 8712:South African Republic 8177:Lupfer, T. T. (1981). 7921:Wynne, G. C. (1976) . 7906:. London: Leo Cooper. 7786:. London: Frank Cass. 7624:Liddle, P. H. (1997). 7605:Jones, H. A. (2002) . 7564:Harris, J. P. (2008). 7325:Bond, B., ed. (1999). 6821:, pp. 83–86, 435. 4829: 4807: 4785: 4736: 4728: 4720: 4714: 4708: 4702: 4686: 4680: 4674: 4590: 4572: 4564:Battle of Polygon Wood 4558: 4541: 4526: 4519: 4508: 4499: 4493: 4488:Second Battle of Ypres 4475: 4469: 4430: 4424: 4418: 4412: 4406: 4400: 4394: 4386: 4372: 4366: 4356: 4350: 4344: 4331: 4325: 4319: 4313: 4307: 4298: 4289: 4282: 4275: 4261: 4247: 4241: 4231: 4218: 4209: 4202: 4196: 4190: 4175: 4086: 4001: 3971: 3965: 3959: 3949: 3942: 3936: 3930: 3924: 3918: 3912: 3906: 3899: 3869: 3863: 3857: 3851: 3842: 3836: 3830: 3824: 3814: 3808: 3801: 3779: 3772: 3762: 3693:field guns and one of 3578: 3550: 3544: 3538: 3532: 3526: 3520: 3514: 3508: 3502: 3492: 3482: 3476: 3470: 3460: 3439: 3433: 3427: 3422:rückwärtiges Kampffeld 3421: 3415: 3409: 3405: 3396: 3382: 3376: 3370: 3364: 3359:rückwärtiges Kampffeld 3358: 3352: 3346: 3337: 3331: 3325: 3319: 3313: 3307: 3301: 3295: 3289: 3280: 3270: 3264: 3247: 3233: 3227: 3221: 3215: 3210: 3201: 3183: 3177: 3171: 3165: 3159: 3153: 3147: 3141: 3135: 3129: 3123: 3116: 3079: 3061: 3051: 3041: 3027: 3021: 3015: 3009: 3000: 2994: 2988: 2982: 2976: 2970: 2964: 2958: 2948: 2942: 2932: 2922: 2907: 2897: 2891: 2885: 2875: 2869: 2853: 2839: 2715: 2678: 2557: 2550: 2544: 2534: 2528: 2522: 2516: 2510: 2504: 2497: 2491: 2481: 2475: 2462: 2446: 2440: 2425: 2406: 2222:Battle of Arras (1917) 2146: 2107: 2101: 2091: 2075: 2058: 2048: 2038: 2029: 2015: 2002: 1992: 1985: 1979: 1938: 1932: 1926: 1909: 1892: 1886: 1876: 1858: 1829: 1823: 1817: 1811: 1805: 1799: 1793: 1784: 1778: 1772: 1766: 1760: 1754: 1741: 1735: 1725: 1695: 1667: 1638:kriegsverwendungsfähig 1637: 1623: 1617: 1603: 1578: 1572: 1542: 1522: 1499: 1485: 1480: 1473: 1435: 1428: 1420: 1390: 1378: 1376:the Chief of Staff of 1356: 1349: 1340: 1307: 1299: 1280: 1270: 1249: 1223: 1217: 1211: 1205: 1198: 1192: 1186: 1180: 1167: 1113: 232:Commanders and leaders 111:French Overseas Empire 10275:Treaty of St. Germain 10248:Russia–Central Powers 10202:Sykes–Picot Agreement 10030:Pontic Greek genocide 10005:Destruction of Kalisz 9981:Eastern Mediterranean 9542:Polish–Lithuanian War 9324:Armistice of Belgrade 9287:Armistice of Salonica 9217:Operation Faustschlag 9164:Third Battle of Oituz 9086:Baranovichi offensive 9054:Lake Naroch offensive 9028:Battle of Robat Karim 9003:Vistula–Bug offensive 8978:Battles of the Isonzo 8909:First Battle of Ypres 7746:Yale University Press 4082: 3997: 3934:(ground holding) and 3919:Hauptwiderstandslinie 3895:Battle of Broodseinde 3388: 3197: 3184:Flandern III Stellung 3181:(fifth position) and 3154:Flandern III Stellung 3101:5th Bavarian Division 3067:79th Reserve Division 3047:50th Reserve Division 2849: 2673: 2511:Siegfried II Stellung 2404: 2142: 2025: 1824:rückwärtige Kampfzone 1797:, (resistance nests, 1742:rückwärtige Kampfzone 1489:(Lieutenant-Colonel) 1463: 1454:divisions in France, 1445:divisions in France, 1407: 1332: 1301:Oberste Heeresleitung 1242:artillery shells and 903:Sinai & Palestine 266:Casualties and losses 10270:Treaty of Versailles 9986:Mount Lebanon famine 9901:in the United States 9869:Russian occupations 9583:Turkish–Armenian War 9524:Polish–Ukrainian War 9464:Ukrainian–Soviet War 9411:Central Asian Revolt 9194:Armistice of Focșani 8924:Battle of Sarikamish 8874:Battle of Tannenberg 8270:Military engagements 8116:Cowan, Tony (2023). 8084:Cowan, Tony (2019). 8025:Simpson, A. (2001). 7973:Freeman, J. (2011). 7880:Sheldon, J. (2009). 7861:Sheldon, J. (2008). 7842:Sheldon, J. (2007). 7782:Samuels, M. (1995). 7767:. Solihull: Helion. 7651:. New York: Putnam. 7545:Hammond, B. (2008). 7247:Bellis, M. (1996) . 7071:, pp. 113–144; 7055:, pp. 381–382; 6700:, pp. 319–322; 6202:, pp. 238, 244. 4449:Battle of Langemarck 4210:Siegfried I Stellung 4191:Siegfried I Stellung 4176:Flandern II Stellung 3755:After the defeat of 3458:) per regiment. The 3281:Sicherheitsbesatzung 3178:Flandern II Stellung 3148:Flandern II Stellung 3089:9th Reserve Division 3071:3rd Reserve Division 3019:divisions. The term 2954:Guards Reserve Corps 2914:Marinekorps Flandern 2708:Fifth Army document 2517:Boiry–Fresnes Riegel 2482:Boiry–Fresnes Riegel 2174:The training manual 1507:Hindenburg Programme 1429:Beurteilung der Lage 1236:Hindenburg Programme 1206:Sicherheitsbesatzung 1168:Generalfeldmarschall 1158:Erich von Falkenhayn 1083:, the armies on the 1079:In 1917, during the 767:French Army mutinies 762:1914 Christmas truce 532:Hohenzollern Redoubt 248:Erich von Falkenhayn 72:north-eastern France 10337:They shall not pass 10260:Treaty of Bucharest 10217:Treaty of Bucharest 10156:USA against Germany 10133:Declarations of war 9837:German occupations 9750:British casualties 9609:Soviet–Georgian War 9536:Egyptian Revolution 9476:Armeno-Georgian War 9340:Somaliland campaign 9292:Armistice of Mudros 9169:Battle of Caporetto 9159:Battle of Mărășești 9129:Zimmermann telegram 9124:February Revolution 9069:Battle of the Somme 8993:Bug-Narew Offensive 8968:Battle of Gallipoli 8960:Sinking of the RMS 8752:Scramble for Africa 8746:Franco-Prussian War 8402:Sinai and Palestine 7999:Marble, S. (1998). 7703:Nicholson, G. W. L. 7683:Miles, W. (1991) . 7664:Miles, W. (1992) . 7205:Balck, W. (2008) . 7174:, pp. 306–307. 7162:, pp. 307–308. 7150:, pp. 308–312. 7126:, pp. 157–158. 7114:, pp. 297–298. 7102:, pp. 181–182. 7075:, pp. 308–320. 7059:, pp. 247–248. 7043:, pp. 194–201. 7031:, pp. 208–257. 7019:, pp. 206–212. 6995:, pp. 106–107. 6947:, pp. 216–217. 6923:, pp. 207–208. 6872:, pp. 173–175. 6848:, pp. 130–131. 6806:, pp. 238–239. 6731:, pp. 348–354. 6664:, pp. 311–322. 6652:, pp. 322–339. 6616:, pp. 309–311. 6589:, pp. 145–146. 6565:, pp. 311–312. 6541:, pp. 162–163. 6481:, pp. 184–186. 6469:, pp. 190–191. 6445:, pp. 307–308. 6433:, pp. 278–279. 6421:, pp. 294–295. 6349:, pp. 132–133. 6337:, pp. 131–132. 6313:, pp. 129–130. 6301:, pp. 128–129. 6241:, pp. 253–254. 6190:, pp. 138–139. 6149:, pp. 456–459. 6137:, pp. 127–128. 6023:, pp. 286–287. 5999:, pp. 282–283. 5987:, pp. 145–146. 5975:, pp. 128–129. 5963:, pp. 297–298. 5921:, pp. 124–126. 5909:, pp. 127–128. 5897:, pp. 122–123. 5885:, pp. 222–238. 5873:, pp. 289–299. 5861:, pp. 124–127. 5837:, pp. 127–128. 5798:, pp. 120–121. 5786:, pp. 117–120. 5723:, pp. 122–123. 5651:, pp. 127–130. 5615:, pp. 152–183. 5591:, pp. 116–117. 5579:, pp. 205–210. 5567:, pp. 204–205. 5531:, pp. 182–183. 5456:, pp. 119–120. 5408:, pp. 101–102. 5327:, pp. 209–211. 5243:, pp. 150–152. 5219:, pp. 353–354. 5192:, pp. 175–176. 5177:, p. 240, map. 5150:, pp. 156–158. 5138:, pp. 152–156. 5114:, pp. 149–151. 5102:, pp. 161–162. 5066:, pp. 160–161. 5054:, pp. 159–160. 5042:, pp. 158–159. 5027:, pp. 157–158. 5003:, pp. 156–157. 4878:, pp. 138–139. 4813:5th Guards Division 4709:Fredericus Rex Raum 4687:Flandern I Stellung 4413:Götterdämmerung III 4340:XXIII Reserve Corps 4069:Instructions, 18–20 4065:silent registration 3931:Stellungsdivisionen 3843:Stellungsdivisionen 3734:"Ref. 'Attack Map'" 3560:Carl von Clausewitz 3440:Flandern I Stellung 3353:Flandern I Stellung 3234:Flandern I Stellung 3202:Flandern I Stellung 3191:and Passchendaele. 3175:(fourth position), 3172:Flandern I Stellung 3163:(second position), 3142:Flandern I Stellung 3139:line, would become 3010:Stellungsdivisionen 2956:) was added later. 2730:XVIII Corps issued 2716:Flandern I Stellung 2706:(SS 135, SS 143 and 2545:Anklammerungspunkte 2463:Stellungsdivisionen 2186:artillery formation 1986:Ablösungsdivisionen 1942:were placed behind 1939:Ablösungsdivisionen 1933:Ablösungsdivisionen 1920:, commander of the 1877:Ablösungsdivisionen 1749:Field fortification 1362:Battle of the Somme 1147:Paul von Hindenburg 1017:North-West Frontier 756:Associated articles 473:Hartmannswillerkopf 333:Invasion of Belgium 252:Paul von Hindenburg 10297:Treaty of Lausanne 10212:Paris Economy Pact 10146:UK against Germany 10076:Entry into the war 10042:Urkun (Kyrgyzstan) 9761:Ottoman casualties 9571:Franco-Turkish War 9451:Post-War conflicts 9435:Russian Revolution 9417:Invasion of Darfur 9382:Kelantan rebellion 9370:Kurdish rebellions 9346:Mexican Revolution 9179:October Revolution 9144:Kerensky offensive 9119:Capture of Baghdad 9096:Monastir offensive 9081:Brusilov offensive 8919:Battle of Kolubara 8758:Russo-Japanese War 7947:Beach, J. (2004). 7568:. Cambridge: CUP. 5279:, pp. 83–107. 4457:1,000–1,500 rounds 4087: 4002: 3648:Royal Flying Corps 3488:fire and manoeuvre 3211: 3205:in the grounds of 3169:(third position), 3112:Battle of Messines 2938:III Bavarian Corps 2854: 2407: 2147: 2034:VIII Reserve Corps 2030: 1952:Neuville St. Vaast 1839:Operation Alberich 1568:Ernst von Wrisberg 1341: 1325:Cambrai conference 1319:Brusilov Offensive 1218:Hinterhangstellung 918:Hejaz & Levant 10381:Conflicts in 1917 10363: 10362: 10346: 10345: 10330:The Golden Virgin 10324:Mutilated victory 10305: 10304: 10285:Treaty of Trianon 10280:Treaty of Neuilly 10187:Damascus Protocol 10060: 10059: 10020:Armenian genocide 9977:Allied blockades 9949:Belgian refugees 9732: 9731: 9642:Strategic bombing 9618: 9617: 9603:Franco-Syrian War 9577:Greco-Turkish War 9565:Anglo-Turkish War 9548:Polish–Soviet War 9482:German Revolution 9458:Russian Civil War 9441:Finnish Civil War 9267:Battle of Megiddo 9242:Battle of Goychay 9189:Battle of Cambrai 9149:Battle of Mărăști 9064:Battle of Jutland 9044:Erzurum offensive 8899:Siege of Przemyśl 8879:Siege of Tsingtao 8864:Battle of Galicia 8794:Second Balkan War 8782:Italo-Turkish War 8739:Pre-War conflicts 8725: 8724: 8615:Portuguese Empire 8531: 8530: 8493:German New Guinea 8475:Asian and Pacific 8146:978-1-107-63385-8 8127:978-1-108-83023-2 7932:978-0-8371-5029-1 7913:978-0-436-51732-7 7891:978-1-84415-944-4 7872:978-1-84415-680-1 7853:978-1-84415-564-4 7834:978-1-86227-083-1 7815:978-1-84513-691-8 7793:978-0-7146-4214-7 7774:978-1-90603-376-7 7755:978-0-300-07227-3 7727:on 26 August 2011 7694:978-0-89839-162-6 7675:978-0-901627-76-6 7635:978-0-85052-588-5 7616:978-1-84342-415-4 7597:978-1-84342-124-5 7575:978-0-521-89802-7 7556:978-0-297-84553-9 7537:978-0-300-06663-0 7504:978-0-9803-7967-9 7485:978-0-85496-764-3 7466:978-0-89839-180-0 7440:978-0-89839-166-4 7418:978-1-84574-730-5 7396:978-1-84342-111-5 7377:978-1-84884-362-2 7355:978-0-85420-250-8 7336:978-1-86227-065-7 7317:978-0-19-967046-8 7306:Boff, J. (2018). 7298:978-1-84415-216-2 7258:978-0-85420-195-2 7239:978-1-897632-67-3 7220:978-1-4368-2099-8 6959:, pp. 47–48. 6836:, pp. 35–36. 6517:, pp. 70–71. 5936:, pp. 45–58. 5825:, pp. 72–75. 5747:, p. map 10. 5711:, pp. 76–77. 5267:, pp. 86–89. 4950:, pp. 65–87. 4703:Flandern Stellung 4655:(43 per cent) and 4573:Siegfriedstellung 4494:Siegfriedstellung 4326:Siegfriedstellung 4128:10,523 casualties 4091:Charles Woolcombe 4006:Battle of Cambrai 4004:The plan for the 3828:regiment of each 3515:Albrecht Stellung 3228:Albrecht Stellung 3207:Tyne Cot Cemetery 3022:Ablösungsdivision 2732:Instruction No. 1 2650:Instruction No.1, 2529:Siegfriedstellung 2505:Wotan II Stellung 2492:Vernichtungsfeuer 2476:Siegfriedstellung 2448:Eingreif division 2441:Ablösungsdivision 2226:Nivelle Offensive 2102:Widerstandsnester 2084:XIV Reserve Corps 1864:Fritz von Loßberg 1794:Widerstandsnester 1432:, 28 August 1916. 1422:Armeeoberkommando 1281:Alberich Bewegung 1271:Siegfriedstellung 1132:Battle of Cambrai 1101:Nivelle Offensive 1074: 1073: 942:South West Africa 780: 779: 606:Nivelle offensive 380:Trouée de Charmes 278: 277: 258:→ Hindenburg and 86: 85: 10438: 10290:Treaty of Sèvres 10182:Treaty of London 10073: 10072: 9851:Northeast France 9782: 9781: 9754:Parliamentarians 9687: 9686: 9649:Chemical weapons 9627: 9626: 9388:Senussi campaign 9358:Muscat rebellion 9352:Maritz rebellion 9320: 9262:Vardar offensive 9091:Battle of Romani 9059:Battle of Asiago 9049:Battle of Verdun 9013:Kosovo offensive 8788:First Balkan War 8736: 8735: 8635:Russian Republic 8544: 8543: 8338: 8337: 8280:Economic history 8247: 8240: 8233: 8224: 8223: 8202: 8200: 8185: 8182: 8173: 8150: 8131: 8112: 8110: 8108: 8080: 8066: 8047: 8045: 8043: 8021: 8019: 8017: 7995: 7993: 7991: 7969: 7967: 7965: 7936: 7917: 7895: 7876: 7857: 7838: 7819: 7797: 7778: 7759: 7736: 7734: 7732: 7726: 7720:. Archived from 7711: 7698: 7679: 7660: 7650: 7639: 7620: 7601: 7579: 7560: 7541: 7517: 7508: 7489: 7470: 7444: 7422: 7400: 7381: 7359: 7340: 7321: 7302: 7283: 7273: 7262: 7243: 7224: 7187: 7181: 7175: 7169: 7163: 7157: 7151: 7145: 7139: 7133: 7127: 7121: 7115: 7109: 7103: 7097: 7091: 7085: 7076: 7066: 7060: 7050: 7044: 7038: 7032: 7026: 7020: 7014: 7008: 7002: 6996: 6990: 6984: 6983:, pp. 8–18. 6978: 6972: 6966: 6960: 6954: 6948: 6942: 6936: 6930: 6924: 6918: 6909: 6903: 6897: 6891: 6885: 6879: 6873: 6867: 6861: 6855: 6849: 6843: 6837: 6831: 6822: 6816: 6807: 6801: 6792: 6786: 6780: 6774: 6768: 6762: 6756: 6750: 6744: 6738: 6732: 6726: 6717: 6711: 6705: 6695: 6689: 6683: 6677: 6671: 6665: 6659: 6653: 6647: 6641: 6635: 6629: 6623: 6617: 6611: 6605: 6599: 6590: 6584: 6578: 6572: 6566: 6560: 6554: 6548: 6542: 6536: 6530: 6524: 6518: 6512: 6506: 6500: 6494: 6488: 6482: 6476: 6470: 6464: 6458: 6452: 6446: 6440: 6434: 6428: 6422: 6416: 6410: 6404: 6398: 6392: 6386: 6380: 6374: 6368: 6362: 6356: 6350: 6344: 6338: 6332: 6326: 6320: 6314: 6308: 6302: 6296: 6290: 6284: 6278: 6272: 6266: 6260: 6254: 6248: 6242: 6236: 6230: 6224: 6215: 6209: 6203: 6197: 6191: 6185: 6179: 6173: 6162: 6156: 6150: 6144: 6138: 6132: 6123: 6117: 6111: 6105: 6099: 6093: 6087: 6081: 6072: 6066: 6060: 6054: 6048: 6042: 6036: 6030: 6024: 6018: 6012: 6006: 6000: 5994: 5988: 5982: 5976: 5970: 5964: 5958: 5949: 5943: 5937: 5931: 5922: 5916: 5910: 5904: 5898: 5892: 5886: 5880: 5874: 5868: 5862: 5856: 5850: 5844: 5838: 5832: 5826: 5820: 5814: 5808: 5799: 5793: 5787: 5781: 5772: 5766: 5760: 5754: 5748: 5742: 5736: 5730: 5724: 5718: 5712: 5706: 5700: 5694: 5688: 5682: 5676: 5670: 5664: 5658: 5652: 5646: 5640: 5634: 5628: 5622: 5616: 5610: 5604: 5598: 5592: 5586: 5580: 5574: 5568: 5562: 5556: 5550: 5544: 5538: 5532: 5526: 5520: 5514: 5508: 5502: 5496: 5490: 5481: 5475: 5469: 5466:Dudley Ward 2001 5463: 5457: 5454:Dudley Ward 2001 5451: 5445: 5439: 5433: 5427: 5421: 5415: 5409: 5403: 5397: 5391: 5385: 5379: 5370: 5364: 5358: 5352: 5343: 5337: 5328: 5322: 5316: 5310: 5304: 5298: 5292: 5286: 5280: 5274: 5268: 5262: 5256: 5255:, pp. 1–81. 5250: 5244: 5238: 5232: 5226: 5220: 5214: 5208: 5202: 5193: 5187: 5178: 5172: 5166: 5160: 5151: 5145: 5139: 5133: 5127: 5121: 5115: 5109: 5103: 5097: 5091: 5085: 5079: 5073: 5067: 5061: 5055: 5049: 5043: 5037: 5028: 5022: 5016: 5010: 5004: 4998: 4992: 4986: 4975: 4969: 4963: 4957: 4951: 4945: 4939: 4933: 4927: 4921: 4915: 4909: 4903: 4897: 4891: 4885: 4879: 4873: 4864: 4858: 4842: 4840: 4836: 4832: 4826: 4822: 4810: 4804: 4800: 4788: 4782: 4776: 4768: 4762: 4758: 4752: 4749: 4743: 4741: 4733: 4725: 4717: 4711: 4705: 4698: 4692: 4689: 4683: 4677: 4670: 4669: 4665: 4662: 4656: 4651: 4645: 4643: 4639: 4635: 4630: 4593: 4587: 4583: 4575: 4561: 4544: 4529: 4522: 4511: 4502: 4496: 4485: 4478: 4476:Widerstandnester 4472: 4470:Zwischenstellung 4466: 4462: 4458: 4454: 4433: 4427: 4421: 4415: 4409: 4403: 4397: 4391: 4383: 4375: 4369: 4359: 4353: 4347: 4334: 4328: 4322: 4316: 4310: 4301: 4292: 4285: 4278: 4271: 4264: 4254: 4250: 4244: 4234: 4221: 4212: 4205: 4199: 4193: 4178: 4159: 4154: 4147: 4143: 4140:at Metz and for 4139: 4134: 4129: 4096: 4070: 4046: 4045: 4041: 4038: 4031: 3974: 3968: 3962: 3952: 3945: 3939: 3933: 3927: 3921: 3915: 3909: 3902: 3884: 3880: 3872: 3866: 3860: 3854: 3848: 3845: 3839: 3833: 3827: 3817: 3811: 3804: 3782: 3775: 3765: 3757:Menin Road Ridge 3735: 3711: 3700: 3696: 3692: 3687: 3682: 3670: 3666: 3640: 3635:William Birdwood 3620: 3615: 3607: 3603: 3586: 3581: 3553: 3547: 3541: 3535: 3529: 3523: 3517: 3511: 3505: 3499: 3495: 3485: 3479: 3473: 3467: 3463: 3453: 3442: 3436: 3430: 3424: 3418: 3412: 3403: 3399: 3385: 3379: 3373: 3367: 3361: 3355: 3349: 3347:Wilhelm Stellung 3340: 3334: 3328: 3322: 3320:Albrechtstellung 3316: 3310: 3304: 3302:Albrechtstellung 3298: 3292: 3287: 3286:75 per cent were 3283: 3277: 3273: 3267: 3265:Albrechtstellung 3261: 3256:defence in depth 3250: 3236: 3230: 3224: 3222:Wilhelm Stellung 3218: 3204: 3186: 3180: 3174: 3168: 3162: 3160:Albrechtstellung 3156: 3150: 3144: 3138: 3132: 3130:Flandernstellung 3126: 3119: 3083:Ghent, with the 3082: 3064: 3054: 3044: 3030: 3024: 3018: 3013:) was a line of 3012: 3003: 2997: 2991: 2985: 2979: 2973: 2967: 2961: 2951: 2945: 2935: 2925: 2910: 2900: 2894: 2888: 2878: 2872: 2859: 2842: 2827: 2823: 2819: 2815: 2811: 2807: 2803: 2799: 2795: 2791: 2787: 2783: 2779: 2766: 2754: 2738: 2726: 2718: 2711: 2707: 2655: 2651: 2647: 2642: 2629: 2560: 2553: 2547: 2541: 2537: 2531: 2525: 2519: 2513: 2507: 2500: 2494: 2484: 2478: 2465: 2451: 2443: 2437: 2433: 2428: 2413: 2389: 2382: 2357: 2331: 2296: 2272: 2268: 2265: 2260: 2249: 2240:Sir Douglas Haig 2210: 2206: 2194: 2182: 2177: 2165: 2160:creeping barrage 2156: 2152: 2124: 2123: 2119: 2116: 2110: 2104: 2094: 2078: 2067:IX Reserve Corps 2061: 2051: 2041: 2018: 2010:) further back. 2005: 1995: 1988: 1982: 1948:Neuville-Vitasse 1941: 1935: 1929: 1912: 1899: 1895: 1889: 1879: 1861: 1844: 1836: 1832: 1826: 1820: 1814: 1808: 1802: 1796: 1787: 1781: 1775: 1769: 1763: 1757: 1744: 1738: 1728: 1719:Defensive battle 1714: 1710: 1706: 1702: 1698: 1692: 1688: 1684: 1681: 1677: 1674: 1670: 1663: 1659: 1655: 1648: 1644: 1640: 1634: 1630: 1626: 1620: 1606: 1600: 1596: 1592: 1581: 1575: 1561: 1553: 1549: 1545: 1539: 1535: 1531: 1527: 1519: 1515: 1502: 1500:materialschlacht 1488: 1478: 1476: 1457: 1453: 1448: 1444: 1433: 1431: 1425: 1412: 1401: 1397: 1393: 1387: 1383: 1374:Hermann von Kuhl 1371: 1367: 1359: 1352: 1312: 1304: 1283: 1273: 1260: 1255:Battle of Verdun 1252: 1245: 1241: 1233: 1226: 1220: 1214: 1208: 1201: 1195: 1189: 1183: 1170: 1151:Erich Ludendorff 1119:Defence in depth 1116: 1105:Battle of Verdun 818: 807: 800: 793: 784: 783: 719:St Quentin Canal 314: 304: 297: 290: 281: 280: 256:Erich Ludendorff 224: 222: 221: 215: 211: 209: 208: 200: 196: 194: 193: 186: 182: 180: 179: 169: 168: 161: 157: 155: 154: 144: 142: 141: 132: 131: 121: 119: 118: 108: 104: 102: 101: 52: 51: 40: 20: 19: 10446: 10445: 10441: 10440: 10439: 10437: 10436: 10435: 10366: 10365: 10364: 10359: 10342: 10301: 10233: 10226: 10197:Treaty of Darin 10165: 10127: 10083:Austria-Hungary 10069: 10056: 10037:Rape of Belgium 9964: 9936: 9884: 9878:Western Armenia 9873:Eastern Galicia 9806: 9780: 9744: 9743:Civilian impact 9742: 9728: 9685: 9614: 9446: 9376:Ovambo Uprising 9328: 9314: 9203: 9105: 9032: 8950:Battle of Łomża 8933: 8929:Christmas truce 8904:Race to the Sea 8837: 8799: 8721: 8692:Austria-Hungary 8668: 8603:Empire of Japan 8540: 8538: 8527: 8511:U-boat campaign 8497: 8469: 8431: 8383: 8329: 8310:Popular culture 8256: 8251: 8209: 8198: 8183: 8170: 8147: 8128: 8106: 8104: 8055: 8053:Further reading 8050: 8041: 8039: 8015: 8013: 7989: 7987: 7963: 7961: 7933: 7914: 7892: 7873: 7854: 7835: 7816: 7794: 7775: 7756: 7730: 7728: 7724: 7709: 7695: 7676: 7636: 7617: 7598: 7576: 7557: 7538: 7505: 7486: 7467: 7441: 7419: 7397: 7378: 7364:Davidson, J. H. 7356: 7337: 7318: 7299: 7259: 7240: 7221: 7195: 7190: 7182: 7178: 7170: 7166: 7158: 7154: 7146: 7142: 7134: 7130: 7122: 7118: 7110: 7106: 7098: 7094: 7086: 7079: 7067: 7063: 7051: 7047: 7039: 7035: 7027: 7023: 7015: 7011: 7003: 6999: 6991: 6987: 6979: 6975: 6967: 6963: 6955: 6951: 6943: 6939: 6931: 6927: 6919: 6912: 6904: 6900: 6892: 6888: 6880: 6876: 6868: 6864: 6856: 6852: 6844: 6840: 6832: 6825: 6817: 6810: 6802: 6795: 6787: 6783: 6775: 6771: 6763: 6759: 6751: 6747: 6739: 6735: 6727: 6720: 6712: 6708: 6696: 6692: 6684: 6680: 6672: 6668: 6660: 6656: 6648: 6644: 6636: 6632: 6624: 6620: 6612: 6608: 6600: 6593: 6585: 6581: 6573: 6569: 6561: 6557: 6549: 6545: 6537: 6533: 6525: 6521: 6513: 6509: 6501: 6497: 6489: 6485: 6477: 6473: 6465: 6461: 6453: 6449: 6441: 6437: 6429: 6425: 6417: 6413: 6405: 6401: 6393: 6389: 6381: 6377: 6369: 6365: 6357: 6353: 6345: 6341: 6333: 6329: 6321: 6317: 6309: 6305: 6297: 6293: 6285: 6281: 6273: 6269: 6261: 6257: 6249: 6245: 6237: 6233: 6225: 6218: 6210: 6206: 6198: 6194: 6186: 6182: 6174: 6165: 6157: 6153: 6145: 6141: 6133: 6126: 6118: 6114: 6106: 6102: 6094: 6090: 6082: 6075: 6067: 6063: 6055: 6051: 6043: 6039: 6031: 6027: 6019: 6015: 6007: 6003: 5995: 5991: 5983: 5979: 5971: 5967: 5959: 5952: 5944: 5940: 5932: 5925: 5917: 5913: 5905: 5901: 5893: 5889: 5881: 5877: 5869: 5865: 5857: 5853: 5845: 5841: 5833: 5829: 5821: 5817: 5809: 5802: 5794: 5790: 5782: 5775: 5767: 5763: 5755: 5751: 5743: 5739: 5731: 5727: 5719: 5715: 5707: 5703: 5695: 5691: 5683: 5679: 5671: 5667: 5659: 5655: 5647: 5643: 5635: 5631: 5623: 5619: 5611: 5607: 5599: 5595: 5587: 5583: 5575: 5571: 5563: 5559: 5551: 5547: 5539: 5535: 5527: 5523: 5515: 5511: 5503: 5499: 5491: 5484: 5476: 5472: 5464: 5460: 5452: 5448: 5440: 5436: 5428: 5424: 5416: 5412: 5404: 5400: 5392: 5388: 5380: 5373: 5365: 5361: 5353: 5346: 5338: 5331: 5323: 5319: 5311: 5307: 5299: 5295: 5287: 5283: 5275: 5271: 5263: 5259: 5251: 5247: 5239: 5235: 5227: 5223: 5215: 5211: 5203: 5196: 5188: 5181: 5173: 5169: 5161: 5154: 5146: 5142: 5134: 5130: 5122: 5118: 5110: 5106: 5098: 5094: 5086: 5082: 5074: 5070: 5062: 5058: 5050: 5046: 5038: 5031: 5023: 5019: 5011: 5007: 4999: 4995: 4987: 4978: 4970: 4966: 4958: 4954: 4946: 4942: 4934: 4930: 4922: 4918: 4910: 4906: 4898: 4894: 4886: 4882: 4874: 4867: 4859: 4855: 4851: 4846: 4845: 4838: 4834: 4824: 4820: 4802: 4798: 4783: 4779: 4769: 4765: 4759: 4755: 4750: 4746: 4699: 4695: 4691:(1,400 m). 4667: 4663: 4660: 4658: 4654: 4652: 4648: 4641: 4637: 4633: 4631: 4627: 4622: 4600: 4585: 4581: 4551:Pyrrhic victory 4536: 4484:20–27 November, 4483: 4464: 4460: 4456: 4452: 4441: 4439:German Division 4381: 4303: 4269: 4252: 4223: 4171: 4157: 4152: 4145: 4141: 4137: 4132: 4127: 4124: 4094: 4085: 4077: 4068: 4043: 4039: 4036: 4034: 4029: 4000: 3992: 3987: 3981: 3891: 3882: 3878: 3846: 3796: 3790: 3753: 3747: 3742: 3733: 3725:James Babington 3709: 3698: 3694: 3690: 3686:72 machine-guns 3685: 3680: 3668: 3664: 3656: 3638: 3627: 3618: 3613: 3605: 3604:and medium and 3601: 3584: 3573: 3568: 3521:Stoß-batallione 3497: 3465: 3448: 3404: 3397:Generalleutnant 3394: 3338:Wilhelmstellung 3332:Wilhelmstellung 3314:Stützpunktlinie 3285: 3275: 3259: 3252: 3209: 3166:Wilhelmstellung 2992:divisions. The 2857: 2852: 2844: 2835: 2825: 2821: 2817: 2813: 2809: 2805: 2801: 2797: 2793: 2789: 2785: 2781: 2777: 2769:William Heneker 2764: 2752: 2749: 2747:Guards Division 2736: 2724: 2709: 2705: 2687: 2653: 2649: 2645: 2640: 2627: 2584: 2578: 2572: 2567: 2539: 2435: 2431: 2421: 2411: 2399: 2387: 2380: 2355: 2351: 2329: 2322: 2294: 2270: 2269:projectors and 2266: 2263: 2258: 2247: 2236:Battle of Arras 2228: 2220:Main articles: 2218: 2208: 2204: 2192: 2180: 2175: 2172: 2163: 2154: 2150: 2145: 2137: 2132: 2121: 2117: 2114: 2112: 2096: 2028: 2020: 1914: 1897: 1851: 1842: 1834: 1818:Sturmregimenter 1812:Sturmbattalions 1751: 1721: 1712: 1708: 1704: 1700: 1690: 1686: 1682: 1679: 1675: 1672: 1661: 1658:800,000 workers 1657: 1654:125,000 skilled 1653: 1646: 1642: 1632: 1628: 1627:increased from 1624:Zurückgestellte 1618:Zurückgestellte 1598: 1594: 1590: 1559: 1554:by early 1917. 1551: 1547: 1537: 1533: 1532:for an army of 1529: 1517: 1513: 1509: 1479: 1470: 1455: 1451: 1446: 1442: 1434: 1418: 1410: 1399: 1395: 1385: 1369: 1365: 1339: 1336:Nord department 1334:Cambrai in the 1327: 1295: 1290: 1276:Hindenburg line 1258: 1244:1,302,000 heavy 1243: 1240:5,725,440 field 1239: 1231: 1144: 1081:First World War 1077: 1076: 1075: 1070: 819: 813: 811: 781: 776: 753: 557:Vimy Ridge 1916 434:Race to the Sea 402:1st St. Quentin 324: 315: 310: 308: 260:Wilhelm Groener 240:from early 1918 226:Austria-Hungary 219: 217: 216: 206: 204: 191: 189: 187: 177: 175: 173: 163: 162: 152: 150: 148: 139: 137: 136: 126: 125: 116: 114: 113: 99: 97: 74: 41: 30:First World War 12: 11: 5: 10444: 10434: 10433: 10428: 10423: 10418: 10413: 10408: 10403: 10398: 10393: 10388: 10383: 10378: 10376:1917 in France 10361: 10360: 10358: 10357: 10351: 10348: 10347: 10344: 10343: 10341: 10340: 10333: 10326: 10321: 10313: 10311: 10307: 10306: 10303: 10302: 10300: 10299: 10294: 10293: 10292: 10287: 10282: 10277: 10272: 10262: 10257: 10256: 10255: 10250: 10242: 10236: 10234: 10232:Peace treaties 10231: 10228: 10227: 10225: 10224: 10219: 10214: 10209: 10204: 10199: 10194: 10189: 10184: 10179: 10173: 10171: 10167: 10166: 10164: 10163: 10158: 10153: 10148: 10143: 10137: 10135: 10129: 10128: 10126: 10125: 10120: 10118:United Kingdom 10115: 10110: 10108:Ottoman Empire 10105: 10100: 10095: 10090: 10085: 10079: 10077: 10070: 10065: 10062: 10061: 10058: 10057: 10055: 10054: 10049: 10044: 10039: 10034: 10033: 10032: 10027: 10022: 10012: 10010:Sack of Dinant 10007: 10002: 9997: 9996: 9995: 9990: 9989: 9988: 9974: 9972: 9966: 9965: 9963: 9962: 9961: 9960: 9958:United Kingdom 9955: 9946: 9944: 9938: 9937: 9935: 9934: 9933: 9932: 9927: 9918: 9912:POW locations 9910: 9905: 9904: 9903: 9894: 9892: 9886: 9885: 9883: 9882: 9881: 9880: 9875: 9867: 9862: 9861: 9860: 9853: 9848: 9843: 9835: 9834: 9833: 9828: 9820: 9814: 9812: 9808: 9807: 9805: 9804: 9799: 9794: 9788: 9786: 9779: 9778: 9777: 9776: 9771: 9763: 9758: 9757: 9756: 9747: 9745: 9737: 9734: 9733: 9730: 9729: 9727: 9726: 9721: 9720: 9719: 9712:United Kingdom 9709: 9707:Ottoman Empire 9704: 9699: 9693: 9691: 9684: 9683: 9681:Trench warfare 9678: 9677: 9676: 9666: 9661: 9656: 9651: 9646: 9645: 9644: 9633: 9631: 9624: 9620: 9619: 9616: 9615: 9613: 9612: 9606: 9600: 9594: 9588: 9587: 9586: 9580: 9574: 9568: 9557: 9551: 9545: 9539: 9533: 9527: 9521: 9515: 9509: 9503: 9497: 9491: 9485: 9479: 9473: 9467: 9461: 9454: 9452: 9448: 9447: 9445: 9444: 9438: 9432: 9426: 9420: 9414: 9408: 9402: 9397: 9394:Volta-Bani War 9391: 9385: 9379: 9373: 9367: 9361: 9355: 9349: 9343: 9336: 9334: 9330: 9329: 9327: 9326: 9321: 9309: 9304: 9299: 9294: 9289: 9284: 9279: 9274: 9269: 9264: 9259: 9254: 9249: 9244: 9239: 9234: 9232:Zeebrugge Raid 9229: 9224: 9219: 9213: 9211: 9205: 9204: 9202: 9201: 9196: 9191: 9186: 9181: 9176: 9171: 9166: 9161: 9156: 9151: 9146: 9141: 9136: 9131: 9126: 9121: 9115: 9113: 9107: 9106: 9104: 9103: 9098: 9093: 9088: 9083: 9078: 9077: 9076: 9066: 9061: 9056: 9051: 9046: 9040: 9038: 9034: 9033: 9031: 9030: 9025: 9023:Battle of Loos 9020: 9015: 9010: 9005: 9000: 8995: 8990: 8985: 8980: 8975: 8970: 8965: 8957: 8952: 8947: 8941: 8939: 8935: 8934: 8932: 8931: 8926: 8921: 8916: 8914:Black Sea raid 8911: 8906: 8901: 8896: 8891: 8886: 8881: 8876: 8871: 8866: 8861: 8856: 8851: 8845: 8843: 8839: 8838: 8836: 8835: 8830: 8825: 8820: 8819: 8818: 8816:Historiography 8807: 8805: 8801: 8800: 8798: 8797: 8791: 8785: 8779: 8773: 8770:Bosnian Crisis 8767: 8764:Tangier Crisis 8761: 8755: 8749: 8742: 8740: 8733: 8727: 8726: 8723: 8722: 8720: 8719: 8714: 8709: 8704: 8699: 8697:Ottoman Empire 8694: 8689: 8684: 8678: 8676: 8674:Central Powers 8670: 8669: 8667: 8666: 8661: 8660: 8659: 8657:British Empire 8652:United Kingdom 8649: 8644: 8639: 8638: 8637: 8632: 8630:Russian Empire 8622: 8617: 8612: 8607: 8606: 8605: 8595: 8590: 8585: 8584: 8583: 8573: 8568: 8563: 8558: 8552: 8550: 8548:Entente Powers 8541: 8536: 8533: 8532: 8529: 8528: 8526: 8525: 8520: 8519: 8518: 8516:North Atlantic 8507: 8505: 8499: 8498: 8496: 8495: 8490: 8485: 8479: 8477: 8471: 8470: 8468: 8467: 8462: 8457: 8452: 8447: 8441: 8439: 8433: 8432: 8430: 8429: 8427:Central Arabia 8424: 8419: 8414: 8409: 8404: 8399: 8393: 8391: 8389:Middle Eastern 8385: 8384: 8382: 8381: 8376: 8375: 8374: 8364: 8359: 8358: 8357: 8346: 8344: 8335: 8331: 8330: 8328: 8327: 8322: 8317: 8312: 8307: 8302: 8297: 8292: 8290:Historiography 8287: 8282: 8277: 8272: 8267: 8261: 8258: 8257: 8250: 8249: 8242: 8235: 8227: 8221: 8220: 8215: 8208: 8207:External links 8205: 8204: 8203: 8174: 8168: 8151: 8145: 8132: 8126: 8113: 8081: 8054: 8051: 8049: 8048: 8022: 7996: 7970: 7938: 7937: 7931: 7918: 7912: 7896: 7890: 7877: 7871: 7858: 7852: 7839: 7833: 7820: 7814: 7798: 7792: 7779: 7773: 7760: 7754: 7744:. Cumberland: 7737: 7699: 7693: 7680: 7674: 7661: 7640: 7634: 7621: 7615: 7602: 7596: 7580: 7574: 7561: 7555: 7542: 7536: 7520: 7519: 7518: 7503: 7490: 7484: 7471: 7465: 7445: 7439: 7427:Edmonds, J. E. 7423: 7417: 7405:Edmonds, J. E. 7401: 7395: 7382: 7376: 7360: 7354: 7341: 7335: 7322: 7316: 7303: 7297: 7284: 7263: 7257: 7244: 7238: 7225: 7219: 7196: 7194: 7191: 7189: 7188: 7186:, p. 242. 7176: 7164: 7152: 7140: 7138:, p. 342. 7136:McPherson 1919 7128: 7116: 7104: 7092: 7077: 7061: 7057:Sheffield 2011 7045: 7033: 7021: 7009: 7007:, p. 331. 6997: 6985: 6973: 6971:, p. 157. 6961: 6949: 6937: 6935:, p. 106. 6925: 6910: 6898: 6896:, p. 206. 6886: 6884:, p. 214. 6874: 6862: 6860:, p. 222. 6850: 6838: 6823: 6808: 6793: 6791:, p. 237. 6781: 6779:, p. 236. 6769: 6767:, p. 235. 6757: 6745: 6743:, p. 148. 6733: 6718: 6706: 6690: 6688:, p. 315. 6678: 6676:, p. 147. 6666: 6654: 6642: 6640:, p. 150. 6630: 6628:, p. 149. 6618: 6606: 6604:, p. 146. 6591: 6579: 6577:, p. 145. 6567: 6555: 6553:, p. 310. 6543: 6531: 6529:, p. 309. 6519: 6507: 6505:, p. 318. 6495: 6493:, p. 278. 6483: 6471: 6459: 6457:, p. 307. 6447: 6435: 6423: 6411: 6409:, p. 184. 6399: 6397:, p. 295. 6387: 6385:, p. 170. 6375: 6373:, p. 168. 6363: 6361:, p. 139. 6351: 6339: 6327: 6325:, p. 130. 6315: 6303: 6291: 6289:, p. 128. 6279: 6277:, p. 138. 6267: 6265:, p. 137. 6255: 6253:, p. 136. 6243: 6231: 6229:, p. 239. 6216: 6214:, p. 238. 6204: 6192: 6180: 6178:, p. 127. 6163: 6161:, p. 126. 6151: 6139: 6124: 6122:, p. 296. 6112: 6110:, p. 291. 6100: 6098:, p. 193. 6088: 6086:, p. 290. 6073: 6071:, p. 289. 6061: 6059:, p. 288. 6049: 6047:, p. 292. 6037: 6035:, p. 143. 6025: 6013: 6011:, p. 284. 6001: 5989: 5977: 5965: 5950: 5938: 5923: 5911: 5899: 5887: 5875: 5863: 5851: 5849:, p. 124. 5839: 5827: 5815: 5813:, p. 432. 5800: 5788: 5773: 5761: 5749: 5737: 5725: 5713: 5701: 5689: 5687:, p. 441. 5677: 5675:, p. 440. 5665: 5653: 5641: 5639:, p. 100. 5629: 5627:, p. 127. 5617: 5605: 5593: 5581: 5569: 5557: 5555:, p. 255. 5545: 5543:, p. 200. 5533: 5521: 5519:, p. 168. 5509: 5507:, p. 200. 5497: 5495:, p. 105. 5482: 5470: 5468:, p. 120. 5458: 5446: 5434: 5432:, p. 104. 5422: 5410: 5398: 5396:, p. 100. 5386: 5371: 5359: 5344: 5329: 5325:Sheffield 2011 5317: 5305: 5293: 5281: 5269: 5257: 5245: 5233: 5221: 5209: 5207:, p. 180. 5194: 5179: 5167: 5165:, p. 161. 5152: 5140: 5128: 5126:, p. 181. 5116: 5104: 5092: 5090:, p. 271. 5080: 5078:, p. 301. 5068: 5056: 5044: 5029: 5017: 5015:, p. 157. 5005: 4993: 4991:, p. 156. 4976: 4974:, p. 155. 4964: 4962:, p. 211. 4960:Sheffield 2011 4952: 4940: 4938:, p. 241. 4936:Nicholson 1962 4928: 4916: 4904: 4892: 4890:, p. 425. 4880: 4865: 4863:, p. 423. 4852: 4850: 4847: 4844: 4843: 4803:284 field guns 4777: 4763: 4753: 4744: 4693: 4678:I, II and III 4646: 4624: 4623: 4621: 4618: 4617: 4616: 4611: 4606: 4599: 4596: 4582:20–30 November 4535: 4532: 4440: 4437: 4302: 4295: 4257:107th Division 4222: 4215: 4170: 4167: 4123: 4120: 4095:10–17 November 4083: 4076: 4073: 4061:Predicted fire 4056:co-ordinated. 3998: 3991: 3988: 3983:Main article: 3980: 3977: 3890: 3887: 3789: 3786: 3746: 3743: 3741: 3738: 3710:13–15, between 3655: 3652: 3631:Thomas Morland 3626: 3623: 3593:Stokes mortars 3572: 3569: 3567: 3564: 3545:Fredericus Rex 3536:division (all 3428:Grosskampffeld 3392: 3377:Grosskampffeld 3326:Grosskampffeld 3308:Scharfschützen 3276:25 per cent of 3251: 3244: 3198: 3073:were based at 3037:119th Division 2980:divisions and 2930:headquarters, 2850: 2843: 2836: 2834: 2831: 2748: 2745: 2686: 2683: 2620:II Anzac Corps 2574:Main article: 2571: 2568: 2566: 2563: 2535:Scharfschützen 2468:Otto von Below 2420: 2417: 2398: 2395: 2379:(18 April) to 2350: 2347: 2321: 2318: 2314:Richard Haking 2244:Edmund Allenby 2217: 2214: 2171: 2168: 2143: 2136: 2133: 2131: 2128: 2095: 2088: 2026: 2019: 2012: 1913: 1906: 1850: 1849:Somme analysis 1847: 1750: 1747: 1736:Grosskampfzone 1720: 1717: 1715:machine-guns. 1678:guns and from 1573:Abteilungschef 1534:175 divisions. 1508: 1505: 1486:Oberstleutnant 1474:Kriegstagebuch 1468: 1416: 1396:587 trainloads 1386:50–60 per cent 1366:122,908 German 1333: 1326: 1323: 1294: 1291: 1289: 1286: 1143: 1140: 1114:Bewegungskrieg 1072: 1071: 1069: 1068: 1063: 1058: 1053: 1048: 1043: 1038: 1032: 1031: 1029:Naval theatres 1025: 1024: 1019: 1014: 1009: 1004: 998: 997: 991: 990: 989: 988: 978: 977: 976: 966: 961: 956: 951: 950: 949: 938: 937: 931: 930: 928:Central Arabia 925: 920: 915: 910: 905: 900: 895: 889: 888: 882: 881: 880: 879: 874: 869: 859: 854: 853: 852: 847: 837: 831: 830: 824: 821: 820: 810: 809: 802: 795: 787: 778: 777: 775: 774: 769: 764: 752: 751: 749:Lys and Escaut 746: 741: 736: 731: 726: 721: 716: 711: 706: 701: 696: 691: 690: 689: 684: 679: 674: 669: 651: 650: 645: 640: 635: 630: 629: 628: 623: 618: 613: 603: 596: 585: 584: 579: 574: 569: 564: 559: 554: 549: 544: 539: 534: 529: 518: 517: 512: 507: 502: 497: 496: 495: 485: 480: 478:Neuve Chapelle 475: 470: 459: 458: 453: 451:Winter actions 448: 447: 446: 441: 431: 426: 421: 416: 414:Grand Couronné 411: 406: 405: 404: 399: 394: 384: 383: 382: 377: 372: 367: 362: 352: 351: 350: 345: 340: 330: 320: 317: 316: 307: 306: 299: 292: 284: 276: 275: 272: 268: 267: 263: 262: 241: 238:Ferdinand Foch 234: 233: 229: 228: 201: 123:British Empire 93: 92: 88: 87: 84: 83: 82:Allied victory 80: 76: 75: 66: 64: 60: 59: 56: 48: 47: 33: 32: 25: 24: 18: 17: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 10443: 10432: 10429: 10427: 10424: 10422: 10419: 10417: 10414: 10412: 10409: 10407: 10404: 10402: 10399: 10397: 10394: 10392: 10389: 10387: 10386:Ypres Salient 10384: 10382: 10379: 10377: 10374: 10373: 10371: 10356: 10353: 10352: 10349: 10339: 10338: 10334: 10332: 10331: 10327: 10325: 10322: 10320: 10319: 10315: 10314: 10312: 10308: 10298: 10295: 10291: 10288: 10286: 10283: 10281: 10278: 10276: 10273: 10271: 10268: 10267: 10266: 10263: 10261: 10258: 10254: 10251: 10249: 10246: 10245: 10243: 10241: 10238: 10237: 10235: 10229: 10223: 10220: 10218: 10215: 10213: 10210: 10208: 10205: 10203: 10200: 10198: 10195: 10193: 10190: 10188: 10185: 10183: 10180: 10178: 10175: 10174: 10172: 10168: 10162: 10159: 10157: 10154: 10152: 10149: 10147: 10144: 10142: 10139: 10138: 10136: 10134: 10130: 10124: 10123:United States 10121: 10119: 10116: 10114: 10111: 10109: 10106: 10104: 10101: 10099: 10096: 10094: 10091: 10089: 10086: 10084: 10081: 10080: 10078: 10074: 10071: 10068: 10063: 10053: 10050: 10048: 10045: 10043: 10040: 10038: 10035: 10031: 10028: 10026: 10023: 10021: 10018: 10017: 10016: 10013: 10011: 10008: 10006: 10003: 10001: 9998: 9994: 9991: 9987: 9984: 9983: 9982: 9979: 9978: 9976: 9975: 9973: 9971: 9967: 9959: 9956: 9954: 9951: 9950: 9948: 9947: 9945: 9943: 9939: 9931: 9928: 9926: 9922: 9919: 9917: 9914: 9913: 9911: 9909: 9906: 9902: 9899: 9898: 9896: 9895: 9893: 9891: 9887: 9879: 9876: 9874: 9871: 9870: 9868: 9866: 9863: 9859: 9858: 9854: 9852: 9849: 9847: 9844: 9842: 9839: 9838: 9836: 9832: 9829: 9827: 9824: 9823: 9821: 9819: 9816: 9815: 9813: 9809: 9803: 9800: 9798: 9795: 9793: 9790: 9789: 9787: 9783: 9775: 9772: 9770: 9767: 9766: 9764: 9762: 9759: 9755: 9752: 9751: 9749: 9748: 9746: 9740: 9735: 9725: 9724:United States 9722: 9718: 9715: 9714: 9713: 9710: 9708: 9705: 9703: 9700: 9698: 9695: 9694: 9692: 9688: 9682: 9679: 9675: 9674:Convoy system 9672: 9671: 9670: 9669:Naval warfare 9667: 9665: 9662: 9660: 9657: 9655: 9652: 9650: 9647: 9643: 9640: 9639: 9638: 9635: 9634: 9632: 9628: 9625: 9621: 9610: 9607: 9604: 9601: 9598: 9595: 9592: 9589: 9584: 9581: 9578: 9575: 9572: 9569: 9566: 9563: 9562: 9561: 9558: 9555: 9552: 9549: 9546: 9543: 9540: 9537: 9534: 9531: 9528: 9525: 9522: 9519: 9516: 9513: 9510: 9507: 9504: 9501: 9498: 9495: 9492: 9489: 9486: 9483: 9480: 9477: 9474: 9471: 9468: 9465: 9462: 9459: 9456: 9455: 9453: 9449: 9442: 9439: 9436: 9433: 9430: 9429:Kaocen revolt 9427: 9424: 9423:Easter Rising 9421: 9418: 9415: 9412: 9409: 9406: 9403: 9401: 9398: 9395: 9392: 9389: 9386: 9383: 9380: 9377: 9374: 9371: 9368: 9365: 9362: 9359: 9356: 9353: 9350: 9347: 9344: 9341: 9338: 9337: 9335: 9331: 9325: 9322: 9318: 9313: 9310: 9308: 9305: 9303: 9300: 9298: 9295: 9293: 9290: 9288: 9285: 9283: 9280: 9278: 9275: 9273: 9270: 9268: 9265: 9263: 9260: 9258: 9255: 9253: 9250: 9248: 9245: 9243: 9240: 9238: 9235: 9233: 9230: 9228: 9225: 9223: 9220: 9218: 9215: 9214: 9212: 9210: 9206: 9200: 9197: 9195: 9192: 9190: 9187: 9185: 9182: 9180: 9177: 9175: 9172: 9170: 9167: 9165: 9162: 9160: 9157: 9155: 9152: 9150: 9147: 9145: 9142: 9140: 9137: 9135: 9132: 9130: 9127: 9125: 9122: 9120: 9117: 9116: 9114: 9112: 9108: 9102: 9099: 9097: 9094: 9092: 9089: 9087: 9084: 9082: 9079: 9075: 9072: 9071: 9070: 9067: 9065: 9062: 9060: 9057: 9055: 9052: 9050: 9047: 9045: 9042: 9041: 9039: 9035: 9029: 9026: 9024: 9021: 9019: 9016: 9014: 9011: 9009: 9006: 9004: 9001: 8999: 8996: 8994: 8991: 8989: 8988:Great Retreat 8986: 8984: 8981: 8979: 8976: 8974: 8971: 8969: 8966: 8964: 8963: 8958: 8956: 8953: 8951: 8948: 8946: 8943: 8942: 8940: 8936: 8930: 8927: 8925: 8922: 8920: 8917: 8915: 8912: 8910: 8907: 8905: 8902: 8900: 8897: 8895: 8892: 8890: 8887: 8885: 8882: 8880: 8877: 8875: 8872: 8870: 8867: 8865: 8862: 8860: 8859:Battle of Cer 8857: 8855: 8852: 8850: 8847: 8846: 8844: 8840: 8834: 8831: 8829: 8826: 8824: 8821: 8817: 8814: 8813: 8812: 8809: 8808: 8806: 8802: 8795: 8792: 8789: 8786: 8783: 8780: 8777: 8776:Agadir Crisis 8774: 8771: 8768: 8765: 8762: 8759: 8756: 8753: 8750: 8747: 8744: 8743: 8741: 8737: 8734: 8732: 8728: 8718: 8715: 8713: 8710: 8708: 8705: 8703: 8700: 8698: 8695: 8693: 8690: 8688: 8685: 8683: 8680: 8679: 8677: 8675: 8671: 8665: 8664:United States 8662: 8658: 8655: 8654: 8653: 8650: 8648: 8645: 8643: 8640: 8636: 8633: 8631: 8628: 8627: 8626: 8623: 8621: 8618: 8616: 8613: 8611: 8608: 8604: 8601: 8600: 8599: 8596: 8594: 8591: 8589: 8586: 8582: 8581:French Empire 8579: 8578: 8577: 8574: 8572: 8569: 8567: 8564: 8562: 8559: 8557: 8554: 8553: 8551: 8549: 8545: 8542: 8534: 8524: 8523:Mediterranean 8521: 8517: 8514: 8513: 8512: 8509: 8508: 8506: 8504: 8503:Naval warfare 8500: 8494: 8491: 8489: 8486: 8484: 8481: 8480: 8478: 8476: 8472: 8466: 8463: 8461: 8458: 8456: 8453: 8451: 8448: 8446: 8443: 8442: 8440: 8438: 8434: 8428: 8425: 8423: 8420: 8418: 8415: 8413: 8410: 8408: 8405: 8403: 8400: 8398: 8395: 8394: 8392: 8390: 8386: 8380: 8379:Italian Front 8377: 8373: 8370: 8369: 8368: 8367:Eastern Front 8365: 8363: 8362:Western Front 8360: 8356: 8353: 8352: 8351: 8348: 8347: 8345: 8343: 8339: 8336: 8332: 8326: 8323: 8321: 8320:Puppet states 8318: 8316: 8313: 8311: 8308: 8306: 8303: 8301: 8298: 8296: 8293: 8291: 8288: 8286: 8283: 8281: 8278: 8276: 8273: 8271: 8268: 8266: 8263: 8262: 8259: 8255: 8248: 8243: 8241: 8236: 8234: 8229: 8228: 8225: 8219: 8216: 8214: 8211: 8210: 8197: 8193: 8189: 8181: 8175: 8171: 8169:3-7637-5866-6 8165: 8161: 8157: 8152: 8148: 8142: 8138: 8133: 8129: 8123: 8119: 8114: 8103: 8099: 8095: 8091: 8087: 8082: 8078: 8074: 8070: 8065: 8064: 8057: 8056: 8038: 8034: 8030: 8029: 8023: 8012: 8008: 8004: 8003: 7997: 7986: 7982: 7978: 7977: 7971: 7960: 7956: 7952: 7951: 7945: 7944: 7943: 7942: 7934: 7928: 7924: 7919: 7915: 7909: 7905: 7901: 7897: 7893: 7887: 7883: 7878: 7874: 7868: 7864: 7859: 7855: 7849: 7845: 7840: 7836: 7830: 7826: 7821: 7817: 7811: 7807: 7803: 7802:Sheffield, G. 7799: 7795: 7789: 7785: 7780: 7776: 7770: 7766: 7761: 7757: 7751: 7747: 7743: 7738: 7723: 7719: 7715: 7708: 7704: 7700: 7696: 7690: 7686: 7681: 7677: 7671: 7667: 7662: 7658: 7654: 7649: 7648: 7641: 7637: 7631: 7627: 7622: 7618: 7612: 7608: 7603: 7599: 7593: 7589: 7585: 7581: 7577: 7571: 7567: 7562: 7558: 7552: 7548: 7543: 7539: 7533: 7529: 7525: 7521: 7515: 7510: 7509: 7506: 7500: 7496: 7491: 7487: 7481: 7477: 7472: 7468: 7462: 7458: 7454: 7450: 7446: 7442: 7436: 7432: 7428: 7424: 7420: 7414: 7410: 7406: 7402: 7398: 7392: 7388: 7383: 7379: 7373: 7369: 7365: 7361: 7357: 7351: 7347: 7342: 7338: 7332: 7328: 7323: 7319: 7313: 7309: 7304: 7300: 7294: 7290: 7285: 7281: 7277: 7272: 7271: 7264: 7260: 7254: 7250: 7245: 7241: 7235: 7231: 7226: 7222: 7216: 7212: 7208: 7203: 7202: 7201: 7200: 7185: 7180: 7173: 7168: 7161: 7156: 7149: 7144: 7137: 7132: 7125: 7120: 7113: 7108: 7101: 7096: 7090:, p. 88. 7089: 7088:Griffith 1996 7084: 7082: 7074: 7070: 7065: 7058: 7054: 7049: 7042: 7037: 7030: 7025: 7018: 7013: 7006: 7001: 6994: 6989: 6982: 6977: 6970: 6965: 6958: 6953: 6946: 6941: 6934: 6929: 6922: 6917: 6915: 6908:, p. 18. 6907: 6902: 6895: 6890: 6883: 6878: 6871: 6866: 6859: 6854: 6847: 6842: 6835: 6830: 6828: 6820: 6815: 6813: 6805: 6800: 6798: 6790: 6785: 6778: 6773: 6766: 6761: 6754: 6749: 6742: 6737: 6730: 6725: 6723: 6715: 6710: 6704:, p. 84. 6703: 6699: 6694: 6687: 6682: 6675: 6670: 6663: 6658: 6651: 6646: 6639: 6634: 6627: 6622: 6615: 6610: 6603: 6598: 6596: 6588: 6583: 6576: 6571: 6564: 6559: 6552: 6547: 6540: 6535: 6528: 6523: 6516: 6511: 6504: 6499: 6492: 6491:Terraine 1977 6487: 6480: 6475: 6468: 6463: 6456: 6451: 6444: 6439: 6432: 6431:Terraine 1977 6427: 6420: 6415: 6408: 6403: 6396: 6391: 6384: 6379: 6372: 6367: 6360: 6355: 6348: 6343: 6336: 6331: 6324: 6319: 6312: 6307: 6300: 6295: 6288: 6283: 6276: 6271: 6264: 6259: 6252: 6247: 6240: 6235: 6228: 6223: 6221: 6213: 6208: 6201: 6196: 6189: 6184: 6177: 6172: 6170: 6168: 6160: 6155: 6148: 6143: 6136: 6131: 6129: 6121: 6116: 6109: 6104: 6097: 6092: 6085: 6080: 6078: 6070: 6065: 6058: 6053: 6046: 6041: 6034: 6029: 6022: 6017: 6010: 6005: 5998: 5993: 5986: 5981: 5974: 5969: 5962: 5957: 5955: 5948:, p. 36. 5947: 5942: 5935: 5930: 5928: 5920: 5915: 5908: 5903: 5896: 5891: 5884: 5879: 5872: 5867: 5860: 5855: 5848: 5843: 5836: 5831: 5824: 5819: 5812: 5807: 5805: 5797: 5792: 5785: 5780: 5778: 5770: 5765: 5758: 5753: 5746: 5741: 5734: 5729: 5722: 5717: 5710: 5705: 5699:, p. 32. 5698: 5697:Davidson 2010 5693: 5686: 5681: 5674: 5669: 5663:, p. 29. 5662: 5661:Davidson 2010 5657: 5650: 5645: 5638: 5633: 5626: 5621: 5614: 5609: 5603:, p. 59. 5602: 5597: 5590: 5585: 5578: 5573: 5566: 5561: 5554: 5549: 5542: 5537: 5530: 5525: 5518: 5513: 5506: 5501: 5494: 5489: 5487: 5480:, p. 98. 5479: 5474: 5467: 5462: 5455: 5450: 5444:, p. 94. 5443: 5438: 5431: 5426: 5420:, p. 90. 5419: 5414: 5407: 5402: 5395: 5390: 5384:, p. 93. 5383: 5378: 5376: 5369:, p. 85. 5368: 5367:Griffith 1996 5363: 5357:, p. 92. 5356: 5351: 5349: 5342:, p. 86. 5341: 5336: 5334: 5326: 5321: 5315:, p. 86. 5314: 5309: 5303:, p. 88. 5302: 5301:Corkerry 2001 5297: 5291:, p. 77. 5290: 5289:Griffith 1996 5285: 5278: 5273: 5266: 5261: 5254: 5249: 5242: 5237: 5231:, p. 40. 5230: 5225: 5218: 5213: 5206: 5201: 5199: 5191: 5186: 5184: 5176: 5171: 5164: 5159: 5157: 5149: 5144: 5137: 5132: 5125: 5120: 5113: 5108: 5101: 5096: 5089: 5084: 5077: 5072: 5065: 5060: 5053: 5048: 5041: 5036: 5034: 5026: 5021: 5014: 5009: 5002: 4997: 4990: 4985: 4983: 4981: 4973: 4968: 4961: 4956: 4949: 4944: 4937: 4932: 4925: 4920: 4913: 4908: 4901: 4896: 4889: 4884: 4877: 4872: 4870: 4862: 4857: 4853: 4831: 4818: 4817:34th Division 4814: 4809: 4796: 4795:28th Division 4792: 4791:30th Division 4787: 4781: 4773: 4767: 4757: 4748: 4740: 4739: 4732: 4731: 4724: 4723: 4716: 4715:Triarier Raum 4710: 4704: 4697: 4688: 4682: 4676: 4650: 4638:12,000 105 mm 4629: 4625: 4615: 4612: 4610: 4607: 4605: 4602: 4601: 4595: 4592: 4577: 4574: 4567: 4565: 4560: 4554: 4552: 4547: 4543: 4531: 4528: 4521: 4515: 4510: 4504: 4501: 4495: 4489: 4480: 4477: 4471: 4461:4,600 shells. 4450: 4446: 4436: 4432: 4426: 4420: 4414: 4408: 4402: 4396: 4390: 4389: 4377: 4374: 4368: 4363: 4358: 4352: 4346: 4341: 4336: 4333: 4327: 4321: 4315: 4309: 4305:In November, 4300: 4294: 4291: 4284: 4277: 4266: 4263: 4258: 4249: 4243: 4238: 4237:54th Division 4233: 4228: 4220: 4214: 4211: 4204: 4198: 4192: 4186: 4181: 4177: 4166: 4162: 4158:36 "Fighting" 4149: 4119: 4116: 4110: 4106: 4104: 4098: 4092: 4081: 4072: 4066: 4062: 4057: 4054: 4050: 4049:29th Division 4027: 4025: 4020: 4016: 4012: 4007: 3996: 3986: 3976: 3973: 3967: 3961: 3954: 3951: 3944: 3938: 3932: 3926: 3920: 3914: 3908: 3901: 3896: 3886: 3874: 3871: 3865: 3859: 3853: 3844: 3840:divisions to 3838: 3832: 3826: 3819: 3816: 3810: 3803: 3795: 3785: 3781: 3774: 3768: 3764: 3758: 3752: 3737: 3730: 3726: 3721: 3719: 3718:23rd Division 3714: 3707: 3706:Harold Walker 3702: 3676: 3673: 3660: 3651: 3649: 3643: 3636: 3632: 3622: 3611: 3597: 3594: 3588: 3580: 3563: 3561: 3557: 3552: 3546: 3540: 3534: 3528: 3522: 3516: 3512:occupied the 3510: 3509:Stoßkompanien 3504: 3494: 3489: 3484: 3478: 3472: 3462: 3457: 3452: 3444: 3441: 3435: 3429: 3423: 3417: 3411: 3402: 3401:William Balck 3398: 3391: 3387: 3384: 3378: 3372: 3366: 3360: 3354: 3348: 3342: 3339: 3333: 3327: 3321: 3315: 3309: 3303: 3297: 3291: 3282: 3272: 3266: 3260:Ia, Ib and Ic 3257: 3249: 3243: 3240: 3235: 3229: 3223: 3217: 3208: 3203: 3196: 3192: 3190: 3185: 3179: 3173: 3167: 3161: 3155: 3149: 3143: 3137: 3131: 3125: 3118: 3113: 3108: 3106: 3102: 3098: 3094: 3090: 3086: 3085:23rd Division 3081: 3076: 3072: 3068: 3065:Dixmude. The 3063: 3058: 3053: 3048: 3043: 3038: 3034: 3033:12th Division 3029: 3023: 3017: 3011: 3005: 3002: 2996: 2990: 2984: 2978: 2972: 2966: 2960: 2955: 2950: 2944: 2939: 2934: 2929: 2924: 2918: 2916: 2915: 2909: 2904: 2899: 2893: 2887: 2882: 2877: 2871: 2866: 2863: 2858:65 divisions. 2848: 2841: 2830: 2773: 2770: 2761: 2757: 2744: 2742: 2733: 2728: 2721: 2717: 2702: 2700: 2694: 2692: 2691:Rudolph Cavan 2682: 2677: 2672: 2670: 2669:John Davidson 2665: 2661: 2659: 2641:47 divisions, 2637: 2634: 2625: 2621: 2617: 2613: 2609: 2605: 2601: 2597: 2593: 2589: 2583: 2577: 2562: 2559: 2552: 2546: 2536: 2530: 2524: 2518: 2512: 2506: 2499: 2493: 2486: 2483: 2477: 2471: 2469: 2464: 2459: 2455: 2450: 2449: 2442: 2427: 2416: 2403: 2394: 2392: 2385: 2378: 2372: 2370: 2365: 2360: 2346: 2343: 2337: 2334: 2326: 2317: 2315: 2311: 2307: 2303: 2298: 2292: 2288: 2282: 2280: 2279:sound ranging 2276: 2255: 2252: 2245: 2241: 2237: 2233: 2227: 2223: 2213: 2202: 2197: 2189: 2187: 2167: 2161: 2141: 2127: 2109: 2103: 2093: 2087: 2085: 2081: 2077: 2072: 2068: 2064: 2060: 2055: 2050: 2045: 2040: 2035: 2024: 2017: 2011: 2009: 2004: 2003:Wotanstellung 1997: 1994: 1987: 1981: 1980:Wotanstellung 1975: 1973: 1969: 1965: 1961: 1957: 1953: 1949: 1945: 1940: 1934: 1928: 1927:Gegenangriffe 1923: 1919: 1911: 1905: 1903: 1894: 1888: 1881: 1878: 1873: 1869: 1865: 1860: 1855: 1846: 1840: 1831: 1825: 1819: 1813: 1807: 1801: 1795: 1789: 1786: 1780: 1774: 1768: 1767:Gruppennester 1762: 1761:Vorpostenfeld 1756: 1746: 1743: 1737: 1732: 1727: 1716: 1697: 1669: 1650: 1639: 1631:men, of whom 1625: 1619: 1612: 1610: 1609:Haber process 1605: 1599:34 ammunition 1587: 1585: 1582:(head of the 1580: 1574: 1569: 1565: 1555: 1552:179 divisions 1548:22 divisions, 1544: 1530:18 divisions, 1526: 1525: 1504: 1501: 1496: 1492: 1487: 1475: 1467: 1462: 1459: 1440: 1430: 1424: 1423: 1415: 1406: 1403: 1392: 1382: 1381: 1375: 1363: 1358: 1351: 1346: 1337: 1331: 1322: 1320: 1316: 1315:Eastern Front 1311: 1310: 1303: 1302: 1285: 1282: 1277: 1272: 1268:, to the new 1267: 1266:Western Front 1262: 1256: 1251: 1237: 1232:197 divisions 1228: 1225: 1219: 1213: 1207: 1200: 1194: 1188: 1182: 1175: 1173: 1169: 1163: 1159: 1156: 1152: 1148: 1139: 1137: 1136:Eastern Front 1133: 1128: 1124: 1120: 1115: 1110: 1106: 1102: 1097: 1095: 1091: 1086: 1085:Western Front 1082: 1067: 1064: 1062: 1059: 1057: 1054: 1052: 1051:Mediterranean 1049: 1047: 1044: 1042: 1039: 1037: 1034: 1033: 1030: 1027: 1026: 1023: 1020: 1018: 1015: 1013: 1010: 1008: 1005: 1003: 1000: 999: 996: 993: 992: 987: 984: 983: 982: 979: 975: 972: 971: 970: 967: 965: 962: 960: 957: 955: 952: 948: 945: 944: 943: 940: 939: 936: 933: 932: 929: 926: 924: 921: 919: 916: 914: 911: 909: 906: 904: 901: 899: 896: 894: 891: 890: 887: 884: 883: 878: 875: 873: 870: 868: 865: 864: 863: 860: 858: 855: 851: 848: 846: 843: 842: 841: 840:Eastern Front 838: 836: 835:Western Front 833: 832: 829: 826: 825: 822: 817: 808: 803: 801: 796: 794: 789: 788: 785: 773: 770: 768: 765: 763: 760: 759: 758: 757: 750: 747: 745: 742: 740: 737: 735: 732: 730: 727: 725: 724:Meuse-Argonne 722: 720: 717: 715: 712: 710: 707: 705: 702: 700: 697: 695: 692: 688: 685: 683: 680: 678: 675: 673: 670: 668: 667: 663: 662: 661: 658: 657: 656: 655: 649: 646: 644: 641: 639: 638:Passchendaele 636: 634: 631: 627: 624: 622: 619: 617: 614: 612: 609: 608: 607: 604: 602: 601: 597: 595: 592: 591: 590: 589: 583: 580: 578: 575: 573: 570: 568: 565: 563: 560: 558: 555: 553: 550: 548: 545: 543: 540: 538: 535: 533: 530: 528: 525: 524: 523: 522: 516: 513: 511: 508: 506: 503: 501: 500:2nd Champagne 498: 494: 491: 490: 489: 486: 484: 481: 479: 476: 474: 471: 469: 468:1st Champagne 466: 465: 464: 463: 457: 454: 452: 449: 445: 442: 440: 437: 436: 435: 432: 430: 427: 425: 422: 420: 417: 415: 412: 410: 407: 403: 400: 398: 395: 393: 390: 389: 388: 387:Great Retreat 385: 381: 378: 376: 373: 371: 368: 366: 363: 361: 358: 357: 356: 353: 349: 346: 344: 341: 339: 336: 335: 334: 331: 329: 326: 325: 323: 318: 313: 312:Western Front 305: 300: 298: 293: 291: 286: 285: 282: 273: 270: 269: 264: 261: 257: 253: 249: 245: 242: 239: 236: 235: 230: 227: 214: 202: 199: 185: 172: 167: 160: 147: 146:United States 135: 130: 124: 112: 107: 95: 94: 89: 81: 78: 77: 73: 69: 65: 62: 61: 57: 54: 53: 49: 45: 44:Western Front 39: 34: 31: 26: 23:Western Front 21: 16: 10335: 10328: 10316: 9923: / 9855: 9690:Conscription 9654:Cryptography 9591:Iraqi Revolt 9018:Siege of Kut 8961: 8539:participants 8488:German Samoa 8422:South Arabia 8159: 8155: 8136: 8117: 8105:. Retrieved 8096:(2): 81–99. 8093: 8089: 8068: 8062: 8040:. Retrieved 8027: 8014:. Retrieved 8001: 7988:. Retrieved 7975: 7962:. Retrieved 7949: 7940: 7939: 7922: 7903: 7900:Terraine, J. 7881: 7862: 7843: 7824: 7805: 7783: 7764: 7741: 7729:. Retrieved 7722:the original 7684: 7665: 7646: 7625: 7606: 7587: 7565: 7546: 7527: 7524:Griffith, P. 7494: 7475: 7452: 7430: 7408: 7386: 7367: 7345: 7326: 7307: 7288: 7269: 7248: 7229: 7210: 7206: 7198: 7197: 7184:Samuels 1995 7179: 7172:Sheldon 2009 7167: 7160:Sheldon 2009 7155: 7148:Sheldon 2009 7143: 7131: 7124:Simpson 2001 7119: 7112:Sheldon 2009 7107: 7095: 7073:Sheldon 2007 7069:Simpson 2001 7064: 7048: 7036: 7024: 7017:Sheldon 2009 7012: 7005:Hammond 2008 7000: 6988: 6981:Sheldon 2009 6976: 6969:Hammond 2008 6964: 6952: 6945:Sheldon 2009 6940: 6928: 6921:Sheldon 2009 6906:Sheldon 2009 6901: 6894:Sheldon 2009 6889: 6882:Sheldon 2009 6877: 6865: 6858:Sheldon 2009 6853: 6846:Sheldon 2009 6841: 6834:Sheldon 2009 6819:Hammond 2008 6804:Bewsher 1921 6789:Bewsher 1921 6784: 6777:Bewsher 1921 6772: 6765:Bewsher 1921 6760: 6748: 6741:Simpson 2001 6736: 6709: 6702:Hammond 2008 6698:Edmonds 1991 6693: 6681: 6674:Simpson 2001 6669: 6657: 6645: 6638:Simpson 2001 6633: 6626:Simpson 2001 6621: 6609: 6602:Simpson 2001 6587:Simpson 2001 6582: 6575:Simpson 2001 6570: 6558: 6546: 6534: 6522: 6515:Freeman 2011 6510: 6503:Edmonds 1991 6498: 6486: 6479:Sheldon 2007 6474: 6467:Sheldon 2007 6462: 6450: 6438: 6426: 6419:Edmonds 1991 6414: 6407:Sheldon 2007 6402: 6395:Edmonds 1991 6390: 6378: 6366: 6359:Simpson 2001 6354: 6342: 6330: 6318: 6306: 6294: 6282: 6275:Simpson 2001 6270: 6263:Simpson 2001 6258: 6251:Simpson 2001 6246: 6239:Edmonds 1991 6234: 6227:Edmonds 1991 6212:Edmonds 1991 6207: 6200:Edmonds 1991 6195: 6188:Simpson 2001 6183: 6154: 6142: 6115: 6103: 6096:Samuels 1995 6091: 6064: 6052: 6040: 6033:Edmonds 1991 6028: 6016: 6004: 5992: 5985:Edmonds 1991 5980: 5968: 5946:Sheldon 2007 5941: 5914: 5902: 5890: 5883:Headlam 2010 5878: 5871:Headlam 2010 5866: 5859:Simpson 2001 5854: 5847:Simpson 2001 5842: 5835:Simpson 2001 5830: 5818: 5811:Edmonds 1991 5796:Simpson 2001 5791: 5784:Simpson 2001 5769:Edmonds 1991 5764: 5757:Edmonds 1991 5752: 5745:Edmonds 1991 5740: 5733:Edmonds 1991 5728: 5721:Simpson 2001 5716: 5704: 5692: 5685:Edmonds 1991 5680: 5673:Edmonds 1991 5668: 5656: 5649:Simpson 2001 5644: 5632: 5625:Simpson 2001 5620: 5608: 5596: 5589:Simpson 2001 5584: 5572: 5560: 5548: 5536: 5524: 5512: 5500: 5493:Simpson 2001 5478:Simpson 2001 5473: 5461: 5449: 5442:Simpson 2001 5437: 5430:Simpson 2001 5425: 5418:Simpson 2001 5413: 5406:Simpson 2001 5401: 5394:Simpson 2001 5389: 5382:Simpson 2001 5362: 5355:Simpson 2001 5340:Simpson 2001 5320: 5308: 5296: 5284: 5272: 5265:Simpson 2001 5260: 5248: 5236: 5229:Sheldon 2008 5224: 5212: 5170: 5143: 5131: 5124:Samuels 1995 5119: 5107: 5095: 5088:Feldman 1992 5083: 5076:Feldman 1992 5071: 5059: 5047: 5020: 5008: 4996: 4967: 4955: 4943: 4931: 4926:, p. 5. 4924:Sheldon 2009 4919: 4914:, p. 3. 4912:Sheldon 2009 4907: 4902:, p. 1. 4900:Sheldon 2009 4895: 4883: 4856: 4780: 4771: 4766: 4756: 4747: 4706:were termed 4696: 4649: 4642:6,000 150 mm 4634:26,000 77 mm 4628: 4586:1,163 trains 4578: 4568: 4559:Reichsarchiv 4555: 4548: 4537: 4514:infiltration 4505: 4481: 4442: 4404:Caudry plan 4382:33 artillery 4378: 4337: 4304: 4267: 4224: 4185:Seventh Army 4182: 4172: 4163: 4150: 4146:7,000 horses 4125: 4111: 4107: 4099: 4088: 4064: 4058: 4028: 4003: 3955: 3950:Gegenangriff 3892: 3889:7–13 October 3875: 3864:Gegenangriff 3820: 3797: 3788:30 September 3769: 3754: 3745:22 September 3722: 3715: 3703: 3677: 3674: 3661: 3657: 3644: 3628: 3598: 3589: 3574: 3445: 3406: 3389: 3343: 3253: 3212: 3109: 3006: 2919: 2912: 2903:Noordschoote 2855: 2824:and four of 2774: 2762: 2758: 2750: 2731: 2729: 2722: 2703: 2695: 2688: 2679: 2674: 2666: 2662: 2657: 2638: 2588:Hubert Gough 2585: 2487: 2472: 2457: 2454:interlocking 2453: 2422: 2408: 2390: 2383: 2376: 2373: 2361: 2352: 2341: 2338: 2332: 2323: 2299: 2295:No. G.14 66. 2290: 2286: 2283: 2267:2,340 Livens 2256: 2250: 2229: 2195: 2190: 2185: 2173: 2148: 2097: 2092:18. Division 2031: 1998: 1976: 1915: 1901: 1898:24–48 hours, 1893:Gegenangriff 1882: 1871: 1853: 1852: 1843:40 divisions 1835:22 divisions 1790: 1752: 1730: 1722: 1651: 1647:1.16 million 1643:1.64 million 1633:740,000 were 1613: 1588: 1556: 1510: 1481: 1464: 1460: 1439:conscription 1436: 1408: 1404: 1370:29 divisions 1342: 1296: 1263: 1259:21 divisions 1229: 1176: 1145: 1098: 1078: 1022:Central Asia 995:Asia-Pacific 969:North Africa 947:South Africa 923:South Arabia 814:Theatres of 771: 755: 754: 714:Saint-Mihiel 682:Belleau Wood 665: 653: 652: 643:La Malmaison 599: 587: 586: 552:Kink Salient 520: 519: 515:Gas: Wieltje 461: 460: 321: 91:Belligerents 28:Part of The 15: 9953:Netherlands 9930:Switzerland 9811:Occupations 9802:Spanish flu 9579:(1919–1922) 9573:(1918–1921) 9567:(1918–1923) 9556:(1919–1921) 9550:(1919–1921) 9544:(1919–1920) 9520:(1918–1920) 9514:(1918–1920) 9508:(1918–1920) 9490:(1918–1920) 9472:(1918–1920) 9466:(1917–1921) 9460:(1917–1921) 9407:(1916-1918) 9405:Arab Revolt 9396:(1915–1917) 9390:(1915–1917) 9378:(1914-1917) 9372:(1914–1917) 9366:(1914–1921) 9360:(1913–1920) 9348:(1910–1920) 9342:(1900–1920) 9315: [ 8833:July Crisis 8754:(1880–1914) 8417:Mesopotamia 8295:Home fronts 8254:World War I 7731:27 December 7584:Headlam, C. 7053:Harris 2008 6383:Rogers 2010 6371:Rogers 2010 5934:Liddle 1997 5601:Marble 1998 5277:Bellis 1996 5253:Bellis 1996 4500:minenwerfer 4465:lines K1–K3 4453:34 captured 4388:minenwerfer 4362:XVIII Corps 4332:Schwerpunkt 4133:36–48 hours 4030:"Scheme GY" 4015:Henry Tudor 4011:Julian Byng 3614:3.5 million 3503:Stoßgruppen 3498:40 per cent 3493:Stoßtruppen 3480:becoming a 3474:, with the 3290:Stoßtruppen 3278:which were 3239:Armentières 3199:Pillbox of 3099:, with the 2968:divisions; 2820:, three of 2765:(7–17 June) 2710:S.G. 671 1) 2624:Second Army 2600:XVIII Corps 2561:divisions. 2458:dovetailing 2412:40–26 fresh 2306:Henry Horne 2264:2,817 guns, 2016:Armee-Korps 1874:divisions ( 1683:4,300 heavy 1676:6,700 field 1629:1.2 million 1595:2.7 million 1591:8.5 million 1560:763,000 men 1518:300,000 due 1514:900,000 men 1253:during the 1193:Unterstände 1181:Mannschafts 964:East Africa 908:Mesopotamia 886:Middle East 816:World War I 734:2nd Cambrai 572:Boar's Head 562:Mont Sorrel 42:Map of the 10370:Categories 10170:Agreements 9970:War crimes 9846:Luxembourg 9739:Casualties 8610:Montenegro 8445:South West 8325:Technology 8315:Propaganda 8305:Opposition 7193:References 7029:Wynne 1976 6993:Balck 2008 6957:Miles 1991 6933:Balck 2008 6870:Miles 1991 6753:Jones 2002 6729:Miles 1991 6714:Miles 1991 6686:Miles 1991 6662:Miles 1991 6650:Miles 1991 6614:Miles 1991 6563:Wynne 1976 6551:Wynne 1976 6527:Wynne 1976 6455:Wynne 1976 6443:Wynne 1976 6120:Wynne 1976 6108:Wynne 1976 6084:Wynne 1976 6069:Wynne 1976 6057:Wynne 1976 6045:Wynne 1976 6021:Wynne 1976 6009:Wynne 1976 5997:Wynne 1976 5973:Wynne 1976 5961:Wynne 1976 5577:Wynne 1976 5565:Wynne 1976 5553:Wynne 1976 5541:Wynne 1976 5529:Wynne 1976 5517:Wynne 1976 5505:Beach 2004 5241:Wynne 1976 5217:Falls 1992 5205:Wynne 1976 5190:Falls 1992 5175:Falls 1992 5163:Wynne 1976 5148:Wynne 1976 5136:Wynne 1976 5112:Wynne 1976 5100:Foley 2007 5064:Foley 2007 5052:Foley 2007 5040:Foley 2007 5025:Foley 2007 5013:Foley 2007 5001:Foley 2007 4989:Foley 2007 4972:Foley 2007 4948:Falls 1992 4888:Miles 1992 4876:Wynne 1976 4861:Miles 1992 4681:Stellungen 4270:160 trains 4253:350 troops 4053:Tank Corps 3809:Gegenstoße 3792:See also: 3749:See also: 3691:18-pounder 3665:Section 31 3145:and a new 3059:supported 3055:Ypres and 3039:supported 2790:60-pounder 2699:9 Squadron 2633:Ivor Maxse 2608:Fifth Army 2580:See also: 2540:15–20 guns 2432:15,948 men 2325:XVII Corps 2320:XVII Corps 2302:First Army 2232:Third Army 2071:Croisilles 1773:Stoßtrupps 1770:) held by 1665:1917, the 1604:Sperrfeuer 1593:field and 1452:110 French 1443:58 British 1187:Eisenbeton 1142:Background 1061:Baltic Sea 1012:New Guinea 981:Somaliland 547:Wulverghem 510:3rd Artois 488:2nd Artois 456:1st Artois 10067:Diplomacy 9774:Olympians 9697:Australia 9664:Logistics 9597:Vlora War 9526:(1918–19) 9502:(1918–19) 9496:(1918–19) 9484:(1918–19) 9431:(1916–17) 9413:(1916–17) 9364:Zaian War 9354:(1914–15) 9074:first day 8962:Lusitania 8790:(1912–13) 8784:(1911–12) 8772:(1908–09) 8766:(1905–06) 8748:(1870–71) 8537:Principal 8397:Gallipoli 8300:Memorials 8285:Geography 8275:Aftermath 8102:2057-0422 8037:557496951 7985:767827490 7959:500051492 7718:557523890 7657:669195339 7586:(2010) . 7451:(1992) . 7449:Falls, C. 7429:(1991) . 7366:(2010) . 7280:565337512 7100:Boff 2018 5313:Bond 1999 4849:Footnotes 4839:390 field 4835:118 heavy 4825:216 field 4821:121 heavy 4799:111 heavy 4730:principes 4509:Stoßtrupp 4360:Lewarde ( 4153:72 tanks, 4142:4,000 men 4138:5,500 men 3883:24 times. 3639:fuze 106, 3606:720 field 3602:575 heavy 3483:Stoßtrupp 3456:Lewis gun 3371:Kampffeld 3344:From the 3296:Kampffeld 3271:Kampffeld 3189:Zonnebeke 3103:based at 2928:XIV Corps 2826:9.45-inch 2685:XIV Corps 2652:was only 2646:31 pages, 2604:XIV Corps 2596:XIX Corps 2369:VII corps 2153:replaced 2042:Souchez, 1887:Gegenstoß 1713:432 light 1705:192 light 1691:108 light 1550:to reach 1491:Max Bauer 1411:(12 or 13 1293:Third OHL 1172:Rupprecht 1153:replaced 1109:manoeuvre 1056:Black Sea 1041:North Sea 898:Gallipoli 872:Macedonia 729:5th Ypres 709:2nd Somme 687:2nd Marne 677:3rd Aisne 626:The Hills 621:2nd Aisne 582:Fromelles 577:1st Somme 527:The Bluff 493:Hébuterne 483:2nd Ypres 444:1st Ypres 424:1st Aisne 419:1st Marne 392:Le Cateau 370:Charleroi 355:Frontiers 274:5,603,000 271:7,947,000 10355:Category 9942:Refugees 9908:Italians 9897:Germans 9857:Ober Ost 9637:Aviation 8731:Timeline 8702:Bulgaria 8483:Tsingtao 8460:Togoland 8407:Caucasus 8342:European 8334:Theatres 8196:Archived 8016:24 March 8011:54403431 7990:24 March 7902:(1977). 7804:(2011). 7705:(1962). 7526:(1996). 4675:Flandern 4598:See also 4534:Analysis 4242:Landwehr 4232:2. Armee 4227:2nd Army 4219:2. Armee 4103:fascines 4075:IV Corps 4009:General 3990:3rd Army 3943:Eingreif 3937:Eingreif 3907:Eingreif 3900:Eingreif 3870:Eingreif 3858:Eingreif 3837:Eingreif 3831:Eingreif 3802:Eingreif 3780:Eingreif 3773:Eingreif 3763:Eingreif 3695:4.5-inch 3619:222 guns 3579:Eingreif 3571:2nd Army 3533:Eingreif 3416:Eingreif 3410:Eingreif 3393:— 3383:Eingreif 3365:Eingreif 3136:Flandern 3124:Flandern 3117:Flandern 3049:were in 3028:Eingreif 3016:Eingreif 3001:Eingreif 2995:Eingreif 2989:Eingreif 2977:Eingreif 2965:Eingreif 2952:Staden ( 2881:Warneton 2810:9.2-inch 2654:23 pages 2612:IX Corps 2592:II Corps 2570:5th Army 2558:Eingreif 2551:Eingreif 2498:Eingreif 2436:230 guns 2364:VI Corps 2349:Division 2310:XI Corps 2275:fuze 106 2271:60 tanks 2181:30 drums 2054:Givenchy 1977:The new 1960:Wancourt 1956:Bailleul 1922:6th Army 1916:General 1896:) after 1868:1st Army 1709:88 heavy 1701:64 heavy 1687:54 heavy 1680:3,700 to 1673:5,300 to 1668:Westheer 1543:Westheer 1524:Landwehr 1495:Mézières 1469:— 1417:— 1400:470 from 1391:Westheer 1357:Westheer 1350:Westheer 1338:, France 1309:Ober Ost 1162:Romanian 1046:Atlantic 1002:Tsingtao 986:Ethiopia 959:Cameroon 954:Togoland 893:Caucasus 739:Courtrai 694:Soissons 633:Messines 600:Alberich 409:Maubeuge 365:Ardennes 360:Lorraine 328:Moresnet 184:Portugal 109:and the 63:Location 10093:Germany 9993:Germany 9921:Germany 9841:Belgium 9826:Albania 9785:Disease 9765:Sports 9717:Ireland 9630:Warfare 9623:Aspects 8811:Origins 8804:Prelude 8707:Senussi 8687:Germany 8682:Leaders 8620:Romania 8561:Belgium 8556:Leaders 8455:Kamerun 8437:African 8372:Romania 8350:Balkans 8265:Outline 8192:8189258 8107:5 April 8077:8181991 8042:19 July 7964:19 July 4738:triarii 4722:hastati 4666:⁄ 4644:rounds. 4542:débâcle 4419:Gruppen 4395:Gruppen 4290:Gruppen 4197:Gruppen 4115:Hill 70 4042:⁄ 3966:Gruppen 3960:Gruppen 3925:Vorfeld 3913:Vorfeld 3847:to 1:1. 3681:SS 148, 3669:SS 135, 3625:X Corps 3556:riposte 3551:Triarii 3466:MG08/15 3451:MG08/15 3350:to the 3248:4. Army 3105:Antwerp 3075:Roulers 2936:Ypres ( 2870:Gruppen 2862:General 2814:15-inch 2786:12-inch 2737:SS 148. 2628:SS 135. 2622:in the 2616:X Corps 2426:debacle 2356:SS 143. 2259:48-hour 2209:SS 144, 2120:⁄ 2108:Gruppen 2046:became 1974:ridge. 1910:6. Army 1635:deemed 1576:of the 1538:14 days 1456:16 were 1447:18 were 1345:Cambrai 1250:debacle 1127:Russian 862:Balkans 850:Finland 845:Romania 704:Ailette 672:The Lys 666:Michael 648:Cambrai 542:Hulluch 537:St Eloi 429:Antwerp 213:Germany 134:Belgium 68:Belgium 10113:Russia 10088:France 9916:Canada 9831:Serbia 9702:Canada 9659:Horses 9611:(1921) 9605:(1920) 9599:(1920) 9593:(1920) 9585:(1920) 9538:(1919) 9532:(1919) 9478:(1918) 9443:(1918) 9437:(1917) 9425:(1916) 9419:(1916) 9384:(1915) 8796:(1913) 8778:(1911) 8760:(1905) 8717:Darfur 8642:Serbia 8625:Russia 8588:Greece 8576:France 8566:Brazil 8412:Persia 8355:Serbia 8190: 8166: 8143: 8124: 8100: 8075: 8035: 8009: 7983: 7957: 7941:Theses 7929: 7910: 7888: 7869: 7850: 7831: 7812: 7790: 7771: 7752: 7716: 7691: 7672: 7655: 7632: 7613: 7594: 7572: 7553: 7534: 7501: 7482: 7463: 7437: 7415: 7393: 7374: 7352: 7333: 7314: 7295: 7278: 7255: 7236: 7217: 4830:Gruppe 4827:guns. 4808:Gruppe 4786:Gruppe 4527:Gruppe 4520:Gruppe 4431:Gruppe 4425:Gruppe 4401:Gruppe 4373:Gruppe 4367:Gruppe 4357:Gruppe 4351:Gruppe 4345:Gruppe 4320:Gruppe 4314:Gruppe 4308:Gruppe 4299:Gruppe 4283:Gruppe 4276:Gruppe 4262:Gruppe 4248:Gruppe 4203:Gruppe 3815:Gruppe 3699:6-inch 3585:SS 148 3471:Gruppe 3431:, for 3317:. The 3216:Gruppe 3097:Bruges 3080:Gruppe 3062:Gruppe 3052:Gruppe 3042:Gruppe 2983:Gruppe 2971:Gruppe 2959:Gruppe 2949:Gruppe 2943:Gruppe 2940:) and 2933:Gruppe 2923:Gruppe 2908:Gruppe 2898:Gruppe 2892:Gruppe 2886:Gruppe 2876:Gruppe 2822:6-inch 2818:2-inch 2806:6-inch 2802:8-inch 2798:6-inch 2794:6-inch 2782:8-inch 2778:6-inch 2753:28 men 2388:SS 142 2381:SS 134 2330:SS 148 2248:SS 135 2205:SS 143 2193:SS 144 2176:SS 143 2164:SS 135 2155:SS 109 2151:SS 135 2080:Quéant 2076:Gruppe 2059:Gruppe 2049:Gruppe 2039:Gruppe 1968:Scarpe 1964:Feuchy 1872:relief 1471:Kuhl, 1094:German 1090:French 1036:U-boat 935:Africa 913:Persia 877:Greece 867:Serbia 828:Europe 744:Sambre 699:Amiens 567:Verdun 397:Étreux 343:Dinant 223: 210: 198:Brazil 195: 181: 171:Russia 156: 143: 120: 106:France 103: 79:Result 46:, 1917 10310:Other 10103:Japan 10098:Italy 9925:camps 9769:Rugby 9319:] 8598:Japan 8593:Italy 8571:China 8465:North 8199:(PDF) 8184:(PDF) 8158:[ 8067:[ 7725:(PDF) 7710:(PDF) 7209:[ 7199:Books 4841:guns. 4772:sixth 4620:Notes 4445:Ypres 3500:were 3477:Trupp 3461:Trupp 3093:Ghent 2063:Arras 1944:Douai 1806:Widas 1800:Widas 1779:Trupp 1564:asset 1466:year. 1007:Samoa 974:Libya 857:Italy 611:Arras 594:Ancre 348:Namur 338:Liège 159:Italy 9890:POWs 9209:1918 9111:1917 9037:1916 8938:1915 8842:1914 8647:Siam 8450:East 8188:OCLC 8164:ISBN 8141:ISBN 8122:ISBN 8109:2024 8098:ISSN 8073:OCLC 8044:2014 8033:OCLC 8018:2014 8007:OCLC 7992:2014 7981:OCLC 7966:2014 7955:OCLC 7927:ISBN 7908:ISBN 7886:ISBN 7867:ISBN 7848:ISBN 7829:ISBN 7810:ISBN 7788:ISBN 7769:ISBN 7750:ISBN 7733:2012 7714:OCLC 7689:ISBN 7670:ISBN 7653:OCLC 7630:ISBN 7611:ISBN 7592:ISBN 7570:ISBN 7551:ISBN 7532:ISBN 7499:ISBN 7480:ISBN 7461:ISBN 7457:HMSO 7435:ISBN 7413:ISBN 7391:ISBN 7372:ISBN 7350:ISBN 7331:ISBN 7312:ISBN 7293:ISBN 7276:OCLC 7253:ISBN 7234:ISBN 7215:ISBN 4837:and 4823:and 4801:and 4734:and 4712:and 4225:The 3852:Stoß 3849:The 3825:Stoß 3548:and 3539:Stoß 3527:Stoß 3518:and 3496:and 3095:and 3087:and 3069:and 3035:and 2905:and 2812:and 2800:and 2792:and 2784:and 2618:and 2610:and 2602:and 2456:and 2434:and 2224:and 2073:and 1972:Vimy 1815:and 1711:and 1703:and 1689:and 1512:had 1224:Mebu 1199:Mebu 1149:and 1092:and 654:1918 616:Vimy 588:1917 521:1916 505:Loos 462:1915 439:Yser 375:Mons 322:1914 254:and 70:and 55:Date 3667:of 3449:36 2201:BEF 1856:, ( 10372:: 9317:It 8194:. 8092:. 8088:. 7748:. 7459:. 7080:^ 6913:^ 6826:^ 6811:^ 6796:^ 6721:^ 6594:^ 6219:^ 6166:^ 6127:^ 6076:^ 5953:^ 5926:^ 5803:^ 5776:^ 5485:^ 5374:^ 5347:^ 5332:^ 5197:^ 5182:^ 5155:^ 5032:^ 4979:^ 4868:^ 4815:, 4805:. 4793:, 4726:, 4024:IV 3650:. 3587:. 2917:. 2883:. 2808:, 2780:, 2614:, 2598:, 2594:, 2470:. 1904:. 1845:. 1570:, 1566:. 1426:1 1138:. 250:→ 246:→ 9741:/ 8246:e 8239:t 8232:v 8172:. 8149:. 8130:. 8111:. 8094:5 8046:. 8020:. 7994:. 7968:. 7935:. 7916:. 7894:. 7875:. 7856:. 7837:. 7818:. 7796:. 7777:. 7758:. 7735:. 7697:. 7678:. 7638:. 7619:. 7600:. 7578:. 7559:. 7540:. 7516:. 7507:. 7488:. 7469:. 7443:. 7421:. 7399:. 7380:. 7358:. 7339:. 7320:. 7301:. 7261:. 7242:. 7223:. 4742:. 4668:3 4664:1 4661:+ 4659:3 4342:( 4229:( 4063:( 4044:2 4040:1 4037:+ 4035:4 2489:( 2293:( 2122:2 2118:1 2115:+ 2113:3 2082:( 2065:( 2006:( 1962:– 1954:– 1274:( 1203:( 1196:( 1190:- 1184:- 1111:( 806:e 799:t 792:v 303:e 296:t 289:v

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Knowledge

Western Front tactics, 1917

Index