243:, showing that the United States was allowing for Israel to push people out of Lebanon and Palestine. The TASS went on to explain that the blame should not only be placed upon Israel for the violence that ensued, but the United States as well. Without the support of Washington "Israel would not have dared to commit such atrocities". The Soviet Union was painting a picture of violent aggressor (those being the United States and Israel) whilst presenting the Palestinian people as a unified group of oppressed people. This was presented in a package—radio and print, with visual aids as support. Any visual presentations of pro-Palestinian propaganda reinforced the fact that Israel was viewed as the aggressor and Palestine as the innocent.
288:, the United States found ways to combat communism and the Soviet Union, but it was during the 1950s that the United States became very active in propaganda as a tool. The purpose of American propaganda was to control and prevent the spread of communism as well as to warn of its dangers. In addition, American propaganda was meant to create a "reversal of anti-American trends of Arab opinion". Some the means in which the United States exerted its influence in the Middle East was through pamphlets and brochures, newspapers and media as well as through exchange programs and other cultural exchanges.
210:(TASS) blamed the attack on Israeli Arabs—this gave the attack legitimacy, presenting a partisan resistance and placing the blame on unknown persons or on Israel itself. This was a pattern that was developing with Radio Moscow, consistent patterns of denial and deception in the case of terrorism in the Middle East, specifically relating to the PLO. Much of the propaganda was pushed through Radio Moscow, but there were some instances where
22:
134:
understanding Islam on an ideological level. Pan-Arabism was the least important of the movements during the period, but it had the most potential for growth and support in the future. This understanding would help the
Soviets to realize the need to support the pan-Arab movement, especially when it came to developing relations with Egypt and Palestine.
306:
the United States. In Iraq, there was an effort to "change the general prevailing public attitude in Iraq which is either unaware or apathetic toward the dangers of Soviet imperialism". This was an effort made through press for print media. There was also an instance in the 1950s that the United States government considered the idea of having
268:
Although Soviet propaganda spread throughout Egypt, the
Egyptians never really became close with the Soviets. There was a sense of Soviet hospitality towards Egyptians, but "they seem to be afraid of getting into close contact with the Soviets". This could be due to the fact that Soviet propaganda was more pro-communism than pro-Arab in their
322:
Cultural influence was a way for the United States to shape opinion that was anti-communist and pro-Western through literary, educational and personal means. This was a means to reach the masses on a more personal level, a way to allow Arab persons to feel connected with the United States. An example
305:
Efforts were made to produce information for the press that gave the United States a sense of neutrality in the
Palestinian issue. There was also a campaign with the Arab press to help them to focus on their own problems and move away from outside influences, all while maintaining a relationship with
197:
stated that "the 'resistance movement had become a part of the general struggle of the Arab people against the
Israeli aggression' and that it was therefore 'natural' that the Palestinian refugees should carry arms to defend their rights usurped by the aggressors". At this point, the Soviet Union was
188:
Pro-Palestine propaganda was produced by the
Soviets through print journalism and radio. A campaign began in 1968 in the media for a partisan struggle against the occupier (Israel). The Soviet Union discreetly showed that they were in support of violence, providing justification for future violence
296:
In Iraq, there was a lack of radio access, minimal communist films and an unsympathetic press. This left the United States with the option of producing pamphlets. They targeted the educated and semi-educated masses that find themselves in the urban middle class. In Iran, the United States created
267:
In 1945, propaganda was covertly communist with the pro-Arab appeal. Print and oral media was focused on pushing out the
British for the good of the Arab nation. The Soviets had their own radio station in Egyptian dialect to broadcast to the people. They also were approved for their own newspaper.
133:
was seen in a negative light as the
Soviets saw all other religions, but a tactical approach had to be taken with Islam due to the relationship that was to develop between the Middle East and the Soviet Union. While there was a string of Soviet anti-Islamic propaganda, there was also an attempt at
280:
The Middle East was a strategic location for the United States to claim allies. This location being the underbelly of the Soviet Union, the weak spot. It was because of this that the United States and the Soviet Union were constantly at battle for support in the Middle East region. There was also
205:
As violence by the PLO became more consistent throughout the early 1970s, the
Soviets put up a cloak of denial. There was minimal coverage in their newspapers about the PLO terrorist attacks. When they did comment, it was directed away from Palestine. In 1974, the PLO laid an attack on Israel,
246:
In the summer of 1967, the Soviet Union's unconditional support of the Arab cause resulted in a frenzied anti-Israeli campaign which made abundant use of traditional antisemitic stereotypes, particularly in cartoons that usually accompanied articles in Soviet newspapers and magazines. This
198:
cautious of their support of the organization, but it was clear that they were justifying the terrorist action that they supposedly openly oppose. This Radio Moscow broadcast laid out the groundwork for the future campaign to present the
Palestinian people as oppressed and the
141:'s death in 1953. Evidence points to the fact that the Soviet Union developed an interest in the Middle East because of American efforts forge alliances within the region. The prestige in which the Soviet's gained the title as protectors against
255:
In the 1940s and 1950s, it was important to convey a vision of pro-Arab/anti-imperialist propaganda. The
Soviets realized the way to build a relationship with the Egyptians was to demonize the British. It is also important to note that
247:
anti-Israeli campaign that was waged starting in the 1960s was meant as an extension of the pro-Arab propaganda, using this as a means to not only bring up their allies, but to demonize the enemy as well.
314:
film with characters that looked like Mickey Mouse, Pluto, Goofy and so forth. This was used as an effort to reach the masses, and enhance the reception of the information.
281:
importance in maintain ties with Arab nations to ensure the lastly existence of Israel as well as to hold onto the flow of oil from the Middle East to the United States.
347:
32:
167:
To further demonize the United States and Israel as well as to create a split between all imperialist countries with Middle Eastern countries (especially
106:
43:
808:
774:
717:
688:
641:
342:
152:
There were several reasons that developing pro-Arab propaganda was important for the Soviet Union and creating an Arab alliance, including:
456:
323:
of this can be seen in the fact that new reading rooms were built in Arab universities, with books favorable to the United States.
156:
The weakness that could develop if the United States had strong alliances in the Middle East, especially in the Northern Tier (
207:
577:
550:
466:
436:
199:
61:
78:
843:
137:
The Soviet Union began to develop interest in the Middle East in the early-1950s, intensifying after
789:
755:
735:
39:
36:
that states a Knowledge editor's personal feelings or presents an original argument about a topic.
542:
411:
149:. Many nations in the Middle East strengthened their diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union.
297:
Iranian government sponsored posters that were to be displayed in urban and rural schools.
257:
8:
269:
142:
802:
768:
711:
682:
635:
535:
404:
573:
546:
462:
432:
146:
567:
426:
337:
332:
224:
The overt methods of propaganda and the support the Soviets gathered through the
110:
311:
225:
837:
660:
NSC 5428, United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East
352:
138:
94:
824:
NSC 5428 United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East
261:
236:
190:
126:
118:
82:
307:
194:
157:
122:
114:
86:
231:
There were several reports of the United States providing Israel with
240:
89:
which would commonly involve expressing contempt for the actions of
285:
161:
232:
212:
90:
168:
130:
517:
The Soviet Union and the Palestinian Liberation Organization
502:
The Soviet Union and the Palestinian Liberation Organization
487:
The Soviet Union and the Palestinian Liberation Organization
219:
428:
Soviet Propaganda: a case study of the Middle East conflict
174:
To spread communist ideals into other regions of the world.
33:
personal reflection, personal essay, or argumentative essay
821:
657:
348:
Soviet Middle Eastern foreign policy during the Cold War
672:
264:. The Soviet Union began information warfare in Egypt.
183:
272:
during a period of growth for the pan-Arab movement.
228:
were meant to isolate the United States and Israel.
81:
initiated as a means of developing support from the
701:
291:
534:
431:. Jerusalem: Transaction Publishers. p. 192.
410:. London: Central Asian Research Centre. pp.
403:
202:(PLO) as a legitimate government with no country.
391:. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. p. 56.
376:. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. p. 36.
275:
835:
787:
733:
753:
625:
300:
216:provided written propaganda and visual aid.
129:saw all of the pan-movements as a problem.
807:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
773:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
716:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
687:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
640:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
343:Soviet Union and the Arab–Israeli conflict
569:Soviet Communism and the Socialist Vision
220:Israel as the aggressor against Palestine
62:Learn how and when to remove this message
729:
727:
653:
651:
628:Conference of Middle East Chiefs Mission
591:
589:
565:
178:
109:discussed solutions to dealing with the
528:
526:
480:
478:
386:
371:
836:
675:Arabic Anti-Communist Pamphlet Program
572:. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
461:. Tel Aviv: Transaction. p. 279.
454:
450:
448:
401:
260:was building during this period under
189:by the organization. For example, the
757:Proposed Information Program for Iraq
724:
648:
613:The Middle East and the United States
610:
598:The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955
595:
586:
532:
514:
499:
484:
424:
317:
105:As early as the 1920s and 1930s, the
615:. Oxford: Westview Press. p. 5.
523:
475:
389:The Soviet Union and the Middle East
374:The Soviet Union and the Middle East
208:Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union
15:
791:Motion Pictures the Film TWO CITIES
541:. New York: Crane Russak. pp.
445:
184:Palestinian Liberation Organization
13:
822:National Security Council (1954).
704:Notes on Expanded Program for Iran
658:National Security Council (1954).
458:Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror
193:broadcast in Arabic following the
145:happened during the period of the
107:All-Union Communist Party Congress
14:
855:
519:. New York: Praeger. p. 117.
504:. New York: Praeger. p. 110.
489:. New York: Praeger. p. 107.
200:Palestine Liberation Organization
673:The Department of State (1952).
537:Terrorism: The Soviet Connection
292:Pamphlets, brochures and posters
20:
815:
781:
747:
695:
666:
619:
604:
559:
508:
493:
418:
395:
380:
365:
276:United States counter measures
1:
358:
100:
702:Department of State (1951).
406:Soviet-Middle East Relations
7:
600:. London: Psychology Press.
326:
10:
860:
301:Newspapers and other media
75:Soviet pro-Arab propaganda
566:Jacobson, Julius (1972).
206:killing 18 Israelis. The
402:McLane, Charles (1973).
387:Laqueur, Walter (1959).
372:Laqueur, Walter (1959).
250:
77:describes a campaign of
788:Dept. of State (1950).
734:Dept. Of State (1950).
754:Dept of State (1952).
626:Dept of State (1951).
455:Yodfat, Aryeh (1973).
425:Ḥazan, Barukh (1976).
42:by rewriting it in an
763:. AMEMBASSY, Baghdad.
677:. AMEMBASSY, Baghdad.
611:Lesch, David (1996).
515:Golan, Galia (1980).
500:Golan, Galia (1980).
485:Golan, Galia (1980).
179:Propaganda operations
797:. AMEMBASSY, Tehran.
706:. AMEMBASSY, Tehran.
596:Ginat, Rami (1993).
258:pan-Arab nationalism
844:Cold War propaganda
533:Cline, Ray (1984).
270:information warfare
143:Western imperialism
318:Cultural influence
241:ball bearing bombs
44:encyclopedic style
31:is written like a
147:Suez Canal Crisis
79:Soviet propaganda
72:
71:
64:
851:
828:
827:
819:
813:
812:
806:
798:
796:
785:
779:
778:
772:
764:
762:
751:
745:
744:
742:
737:Circular Airgram
731:
722:
721:
715:
707:
699:
693:
692:
686:
678:
670:
664:
663:
655:
646:
645:
639:
631:
623:
617:
616:
608:
602:
601:
593:
584:
583:
563:
557:
556:
540:
530:
521:
520:
512:
506:
505:
497:
491:
490:
482:
473:
472:
452:
443:
442:
422:
416:
415:
409:
399:
393:
392:
384:
378:
377:
369:
67:
60:
56:
53:
47:
24:
23:
16:
859:
858:
854:
853:
852:
850:
849:
848:
834:
833:
832:
831:
820:
816:
800:
799:
794:
786:
782:
766:
765:
760:
752:
748:
740:
732:
725:
709:
708:
700:
696:
680:
679:
671:
667:
656:
649:
633:
632:
624:
620:
609:
605:
594:
587:
580:
564:
560:
553:
531:
524:
513:
509:
498:
494:
483:
476:
469:
453:
446:
439:
423:
419:
400:
396:
385:
381:
370:
366:
361:
338:Islam in Russia
333:Active measures
329:
320:
303:
294:
284:Throughout the
278:
253:
222:
186:
181:
103:
68:
57:
51:
48:
40:help improve it
37:
25:
21:
12:
11:
5:
857:
847:
846:
830:
829:
814:
780:
746:
723:
694:
665:
647:
618:
603:
585:
578:
558:
551:
522:
507:
492:
474:
467:
444:
437:
417:
394:
379:
363:
362:
360:
357:
356:
355:
350:
345:
340:
335:
328:
325:
319:
316:
312:anti-communist
302:
299:
293:
290:
277:
274:
252:
249:
226:United Nations
221:
218:
185:
182:
180:
177:
176:
175:
172:
165:
102:
99:
70:
69:
28:
26:
19:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
856:
845:
842:
841:
839:
825:
818:
810:
804:
793:
792:
784:
776:
770:
759:
758:
750:
739:
738:
730:
728:
719:
713:
705:
698:
690:
684:
676:
669:
661:
654:
652:
643:
637:
629:
622:
614:
607:
599:
592:
590:
581:
579:9781412834865
575:
571:
570:
562:
554:
552:9780844814711
548:
544:
539:
538:
529:
527:
518:
511:
503:
496:
488:
481:
479:
470:
468:9780706512687
464:
460:
459:
451:
449:
440:
438:9780470150009
434:
430:
429:
421:
413:
408:
407:
398:
390:
383:
375:
368:
364:
354:
353:Arab Cold War
351:
349:
346:
344:
341:
339:
336:
334:
331:
330:
324:
315:
313:
309:
298:
289:
287:
282:
273:
271:
265:
263:
259:
248:
244:
242:
238:
237:cluster bombs
234:
229:
227:
217:
215:
214:
209:
203:
201:
196:
192:
173:
170:
166:
163:
159:
155:
154:
153:
150:
148:
144:
140:
139:Joseph Stalin
135:
132:
128:
124:
120:
116:
112:
111:pan-movements
108:
98:
96:
95:United States
92:
88:
84:
80:
76:
66:
63:
55:
45:
41:
35:
34:
29:This article
27:
18:
17:
823:
817:
790:
783:
756:
749:
736:
703:
697:
674:
668:
659:
627:
621:
612:
606:
597:
568:
561:
536:
516:
510:
501:
495:
486:
457:
427:
420:
405:
397:
388:
382:
373:
367:
321:
304:
295:
283:
279:
266:
262:Gamal Nasser
254:
245:
230:
223:
211:
204:
191:Radio Moscow
187:
151:
136:
127:Soviet Union
119:pan-Islamism
104:
83:Arab nations
74:
73:
58:
52:October 2017
49:
30:
630:. Istanbul.
310:develop an
308:Walt Disney
195:Six-Day War
158:Afghanistan
123:pan-Turkism
115:pan-Arabism
113:—including
87:Middle East
359:References
101:Background
803:cite book
769:cite book
712:cite book
683:cite book
636:cite book
838:Category
327:See also
286:Cold War
162:Pakistan
93:and the
85:in the
38:Please
576:
549:
465:
435:
233:napalm
213:Pravda
125:. The
91:Israel
795:(PDF)
761:(PDF)
741:(PDF)
251:Egypt
169:Egypt
131:Islam
809:link
775:link
718:link
689:link
642:link
574:ISBN
547:ISBN
463:ISBN
433:ISBN
239:and
160:and
121:and
412:8–9
840::
805:}}
801:{{
771:}}
767:{{
726:^
714:}}
710:{{
685:}}
681:{{
650:^
638:}}
634:{{
588:^
545:.
543:39
525:^
477:^
447:^
235:,
171:).
164:).
117:,
97:.
826:.
811:)
777:)
743:.
720:)
691:)
662:.
644:)
582:.
555:.
471:.
441:.
414:.
65:)
59:(
54:)
50:(
46:.
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.