351:
based entirely on experience and not on any other belief. Of course other possibilities exist, such as that the white canopy bed is entirely an illusion or that one is hallucinating, but the belief remains well-justified. Coherentists might respond that the belief which supports the belief that there is a white canopy bed in this room is that one saw the bed, however briefly. This appears to be an immediate qualifier which does not depend on other beliefs, and thus seems to prove that
Coherentism is not true because beliefs can be justified by concepts other than beliefs. But others have argued that the experience of seeing the bed is indeed dependent on other beliefs, about what a bed, a canopy and so on, actually look like.
31:
402:"Common sense" here does not mean old adages like "Chicken soup is good for colds" but statements about the background in which our experiences occur. Examples would be "Human beings typically have two eyes, two ears, two hands, two feet", or "The world has a ground and a sky" or "Plants and animals come in a wide variety of sizes and colors" or "I am
413:
This view can be seen as either a version of foundationalism, with common sense statements taking the role of basic statements, or as a version of
Coherentism. In this case, commonsense statements are statements that are so crucial to keeping the account coherent that they are all but impossible to
294:
Foundationalism can be compared to a building. Ordinary individual beliefs occupy the upper stories of the building; basic, or foundational beliefs are down in the basement, in the foundation of the building, holding everything else up. In a similar way, individual beliefs, say about economics or
376:
reject the three above responses and argue that beliefs cannot be justified as beyond doubt. Note that many skeptics do not deny that things may appear in a certain way. However, such sense impressions cannot, in the skeptical view, be used to find beliefs that cannot be doubted. Also, skeptics do
350:
A third objection is that some beliefs arise from experience and not from other beliefs. An example is that one is looking into a room which is totally dark. The lights turn on momentarily and one sees a white canopy bed in the room. The belief that there is a white canopy bed in this room is
474:
suggests that, ultimately, everyone settles at some level of explanation based on one's personal preferences that fit the particular individual's psychological needs. People select whatever level of explanation fits their needs, and things other than logic and reason determine those needs. In
417:
If the method of common sense is correct, then philosophers may take the principles of common sense for granted. They do not need criteria in order to judge whether a proposition is true or not. They can also take some justifications for granted, according to common sense. They can get around
398:
points out that whenever we investigate anything at all, whenever we start thinking about some subject, we have to make assumptions. When one tries to support one's assumptions with reasons, one must make yet more assumptions. Since it is inevitable that we will make some assumptions, why not
377:
not deny that, for example, many laws of nature give the appearance of working or that doing certain things give the appearance of producing pleasure/pain or even that reason and logic seem to be useful tools. Skepticism is in this view valuable since it encourages continued investigation.
346:
being true. Instead, Coherentists might say that it is very unlikely that the whole system would be both untrue and consistent, and that if some part of the system was untrue, it would almost certainly be inconsistent with some other part of the system.
295:
ethics, rest on more basic beliefs, say about the nature of human beings; and those rest on still more basic beliefs, say about the mind; and in the end the entire system rests on a set of basic beliefs which are not justified by other beliefs.
319:
it is part of a coherent system of mutually supporting beliefs (i.e., beliefs that support each other). In effect
Coherentism denies that justification can only take the form of a chain. Coherentism replaces the chain with a holistic web.
303:
Alternatively, the chain of reasoning may loop around on itself, forming a circle. In this case, the justification of any statement is used, perhaps after a long chain of reasoning, in justifying itself, and the argument is
442:, attempting to discredit them rather than justifying them. Then, these philosophers say, it is rational to act on those beliefs that have best withstood criticism, whether or not they meet any specific criterion of truth.
483:
The philosopher's logical tranquillity is thus in essence no other than the boor's. They differ only as to the point at which each refuses to let further considerations upset the absoluteness of the data he
267:, all beliefs are justified by basic beliefs. Foundationalism seeks to escape the regress argument by claiming that there are some beliefs for which it is improper to ask for a justification. (See also
276:
Foundationalism is the belief that a chain of justification begins with a belief that is justified, but which is not justified by another belief. Thus, a belief is justified
406:
and alive right now". These are all the absolutely most obvious sorts of claims that one could possibly make; and, said Reid and Moore, these are the claims that make up
323:
The most common objection to naĂŻve
Coherentism is that it relies on the idea that circular justification is acceptable. In this view, P ultimately supports P,
54:. However, any justification itself requires support. This means that any proposition whatsoever can be endlessly (infinitely) questioned, resulting in
327:. Coherentists reply that it is not just P that is supporting P, but P along with the totality of the other statements in the whole system of belief.
479:, James compares the philosopher, who insists on a high degree of justification, and the boor, who accepts or rejects ideals without much thought:
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argues that the chain can go on forever. Critics argue that this means there is never adequate justification for any statement in the chain.
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Perhaps the chain begins with a belief that is justified, but which is not justified by another belief. Such beliefs are called
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Another objection is that the rule demanding "coherence" in a system of ideas seems to be an unjustified belief.
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at all. Rather, the job of philosophers is to subject all beliefs (including beliefs about truth criteria) to
330:
Coherentism accepts any belief that is part of a coherent system of beliefs. In contrast, P can cohere with P
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assume those things that are most obvious: the matters of common sense that no one ever seriously doubts.
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compare the verisimilitude of two competing claims by criticism to judge which is superior to the other.
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Throughout history many responses to this problem have been generated. The major counter-arguments are
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or circle of reasoning, because the principles of common sense ground the entire chain of reasoning.
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it is justified by a chain of beliefs that is ultimately justified by a basic belief or beliefs.
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637:"What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is that it Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem"
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The only thing that can justify P is another statement – let's call it P
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Problem in epistemology that any proposition can be endlessly questioned
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527: – Socratic dialogue by Plato concerning the nature of knowledge
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and in any general situation where a statement has to be justified.
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533: – Philosophical problem about the starting point of knowledge
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justification will in turn be another statement - let's call it P
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The method of common sense espoused by such philosophers as
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is to be a satisfactory justification for P, then we must
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justification will be another statement - let's call it P
619:
112:
Suppose that P is some piece of knowledge. Then P is a
575:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2018.
503: – Philosophical statement made by René Descartes
569:"Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification"
418:
Sextus' problem of the criterion because there is no
315:
Coherentism is the belief that an idea is justified
1692:
88:"through or by means of one another" and as the
545: – Allegorical dialogue by Lewis Carroll
1058:
701:
244:the chain of reasoning loops back on itself,
434:, which denies that beliefs should ever be
250:belief cannot be justified as beyond doubt.
197:to count as knowledge, it must itself be a
178:is to be a satisfactory justification for P
1065:
1051:
708:
694:
241:some statements do not need justification,
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642:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
634:
497: – Philosophical study of knowledge
29:
14:
1693:
425:
1046:
689:
539: – Statement of infinite regress
430:Another escape from the diallelus is
284:it is a basic/foundational belief, or
263:. In this solution, which is called
678:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
573:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
446:expanded on this idea to include a
24:
655:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00332.x
543:What the Tortoise Said to Achilles
254:
25:
1727:
287:it is justified by a basic belief
1072:
1027:List of skeptical organizations
385:
149:to be known, it must also be a
1489:Analytic–synthetic distinction
1007:List of books about skepticism
715:
667:
628:
607:
593:
579:
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65:The argument is also known as
13:
1:
1017:List of skeptical conferences
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509: – Philosophical problem
461:
368:
357:
1706:Justification (epistemology)
549:Justification (epistemology)
477:The Sentiment of Rationality
247:the sequence never finishes,
232:
99:
7:
1534:Internalism and externalism
1022:List of skeptical magazines
1012:List of scientific skeptics
488:
104:Assuming that knowledge is
10:
1732:
1032:List of skeptical podcasts
92:. It is an element of the
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1609:
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1365:Evolutionary epistemology
1335:
1080:
997:
956:
895:
814:
768:
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90:epistemic regress problem
46:is the argument that any
1701:Concepts in epistemology
1637:Philosophy of perception
1440:Representational realism
1410:Naturalized epistemology
933:Problem of the criterion
635:D. Klein, Peter (2004).
537:Turtles all the way down
531:Problem of the criterion
308:. This is a version of
1711:Philosophical arguments
1617:Outline of epistemology
1450:Transcendental idealism
601:"University of Reading"
1716:Philosophical problems
1564:Problem of other minds
923:Five-minute hypothesis
815:Skeptical philosophers
769:Skeptical philosophies
486:
450:measurement he called
381:Synthesized approaches
35:
1642:Philosophy of science
1622:Faith and rationality
1504:Descriptive knowledge
1375:Feminist epistemology
1315:Nicholas Wolterstorff
943:Simulation hypothesis
587:"Theory of Knowledge"
481:
106:justified true belief
58:. It is a problem in
33:
1574:Procedural knowledge
1559:Problem of induction
969:Semantic externalism
938:Problem of induction
928:MĂĽnchhausen trilemma
513:MĂĽnchhausen trilemma
325:begging the question
94:MĂĽnchhausen trilemma
1652:Virtue epistemology
1647:Social epistemology
1627:Formal epistemology
1514:Epistemic injustice
1509:Exploratory thought
1310:Ludwig Wittgenstein
974:Process reliabilism
896:Skeptical scenarios
776:Academic Skepticism
724:Types of skepticism
432:critical philosophy
426:Critical philosophy
1305:Timothy Williamson
1095:Augustine of Hippo
36:
1688:
1687:
1554:Privileged access
1190:Søren Kierkegaard
1040:
1039:
979:Epistemic closure
18:Epistemic regress
16:(Redirected from
1723:
1632:Metaepistemology
1610:Related articles
1584:Regress argument
1519:Epistemic virtue
1270:Bertrand Russell
1245:Duncan Pritchard
1205:Hilary Kornblith
1120:Laurence BonJour
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964:Here is one hand
872:Sextus Empiricus
852:Philo of Larissa
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501:Cogito, ergo sum
420:infinite regress
56:infinite regress
44:regress argument
34:Infinite regress
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1235:Alvin Plantinga
1115:George Berkeley
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1405:NaĂŻve realism
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1355:Contextualism
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1320:Vienna Circle
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984:Contextualism
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1598:
1499:Common sense
1477:A posteriori
1476:
1468:
1430:Reductionism
1324:
1275:Gilbert Ryle
1145:Fred Dretske
1130:Keith DeRose
1074:Epistemology
948:Wax argument
677:
669:
658:. Retrieved
646:
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624:Google Books
622:, p. 22, at
617:
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495:Epistemology
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386:Common sense
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338:without P, P
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225:ad infinitum
223:
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201:true belief.
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127:justifies P.
116:true belief.
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60:epistemology
43:
40:epistemology
37:
1579:Proposition
1549:Objectivity
1435:Reliabilism
1425:Rationalism
1370:Fallibilism
1345:Coherentism
1290:Ernest Sosa
1265:Thomas Reid
1250:James Pryor
1220:G. E. Moore
1210:David Lewis
1200:Saul Kripke
1195:Peter Klein
1175:Susan Haack
1105:Robert Audi
918:Evil genius
862:Aenesidemus
847:Clitomachus
649:: 166–171.
444:Karl Popper
396:G. E. Moore
392:Thomas Reid
310:coherentism
299:Coherentism
222:and so on,
215:justifies P
167:justifies P
86:di' allelon
50:requires a
48:proposition
1695:Categories
1680:Discussion
1670:Task Force
1589:Simplicity
1569:Perception
1445:Skepticism
1420:Positivism
1395:Infinitism
1360:Empiricism
1215:John Locke
1180:David Hume
1170:Anil Gupta
1165:Paul Grice
1140:John Dewey
1110:A. J. Ayer
989:Relativism
903:Acatalepsy
887:David Hume
832:Arcesilaus
801:Pyrrhonism
753:Scientific
717:Skepticism
674:skepticism
660:2019-12-25
555:References
524:Theaetetus
468:pragmatist
462:Pragmatism
369:Skepticism
363:Infinitism
358:Infinitism
1544:Knowledge
1529:Induction
1479:knowledge
1471:knowledge
957:Responses
877:Montaigne
842:Carneades
806:Solipsism
796:Humeanism
786:Cartesian
758:Religious
440:criticism
436:justified
404:conscious
233:Responses
199:justified
193:But for P
151:justified
145:But for P
114:justified
100:Structure
78:diallelon
68:diallelus
1665:Category
1484:Analysis
1469:A priori
1460:Concepts
1400:Innatism
1337:Theories
791:Charvaka
489:See also
484:assumes.
374:Skeptics
306:circular
270:a priori
174:But if P
142:is true.
130:But if P
108:, then:
1600:more...
1380:Fideism
1326:more...
867:Agrippa
837:Lacydes
736:Radical
190:is true
81:, from
1494:Belief
1390:Holism
857:Cicero
822:Pyrrho
781:Ajñana
414:deny.
211:; so P
186:that P
163:; so P
138:that P
123:; so P
42:, the
1675:Stubs
1594:Truth
1240:Plato
999:Lists
827:Timon
748:Moral
743:Local
519:Plato
334:and P
83:Greek
75:) or
73:Latin
466:The
394:and
342:or P
205:That
184:know
157:That
136:know
676:on
651:doi
616:,
521:'s
456:can
273:.)
38:In
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