Aircraft carrier operations during World War II

1091:

within both the Allies and Axis. However, the timing of mobilizing manufacturing, technological, and manpower responses was also very important. America and Russia mobilized men and industrial capacity to rebound from significant military setbacks more quickly than anticipated by the attacking Axis powers. Important technological advances achieved by the Allies during the war outpaced those of the Axis powers in both offensive and defensive weapons systems. The Allies had greater and more strategically significant successes with code-breaking. The Allies placed greater emphasis than Axis powers on logistical support for men fighting on the front, enabling them to fight more efficiently and effectively. Geographical configurations, namely the English Channel, Atlantic Ocean, and Pacific Ocean, helped isolate British and American home bases from attack. Significant strategic offensive decisions by Axis leaders proved unsound, creating opportunities that the Allies exploited to great effect. Finally, luck played an important part in some decisive battles. Many of these factors played important parts in enabling the Allies to dominate the seas, a central reason, according to historian

2296:

incidents for which damage was sustained by carriers from enemy weapon systems or causes such as extreme weather (storms, typhoons), collisions, aircraft landing accidents, etc. that resulted in lost operational time. Forty-one of these damage incidents resulted in a carrier sinking. Fourteen incidents of damage involved more than one cause such as a carrier being damaged by both bombs and aerial torpedoes during a single attack. Taking such multiple causes for the 229 "damage incidents" into account, the number of "damage involvements" due to the various causes totaled 243. Consequently, the total for percentages of damage involvements may equal more than 100% of damage incidents. The percentages shown in the tables below indicate the frequency that a given cause was involved in the 229 incidents of damage/sinkings.

3129:

carriers during the formative year of 1942. It reflects the industrial capacity of the United States, illustrating how she could make good her losses of 1942 while Japan could not. Finally, it reflects the shift of British carriers to the Pacific after the Allies prevailed in battles for Atlantic waters. Note also that, after the two carrier battles off Guadalcanal in 1942, the percentage of aircraft carriers afloat that were in fact available for combat operations was typically less than 70%. During the Guadalcanal campaign in 1942, that percentage fell below 50%. From then until mid-1944, Japan did not engage her carriers in a major operation. When at last she did, the rest of her carriers were sunk or damaged.

1155:, acted as a unit and roamed virtually at will for the first six months of the war. It made destructive raids against enemy positions from Hawaii in the east to India in the west and effectively supported Japanese invasions of the American Philippines, British Malaya and Burma, and the Dutch East Indies. Between May and October 1942, however, Japan and America fought four major battles between fleets centered around their aircraft carriers. During these battles, opposing warships never came within sight of each other nor fired their guns at other warships. Aircraft alone did the attacking. The first of these battles thwarted the Japanese attempt in the 2313:, even during the final year of the war after kamikazes had been introduced. Torpedoes were also more efficient in sinking carriers as indicated by the higher percentage of damage involvements that resulted in sinking (59% when submarine-launched and 64% when aircraft-launched). The percentage of damage involvements resulting in sinkings also indicates that surface weapons were more efficient in sinking carriers than aerial-delivered weapons even though aerial weapons resulted in more carriers sunk. Causes other than weapon systems were responsible for 39% of lost time incidents, but accounted for only one carrier sank, an escort carrier. 1167:. These four engagements were costly for both sides. At the time Pearl Harbor was attacked, Japan had a total of nine fleet and light carriers in the Pacific Theater. America had four in the Pacific with another two far away in the Atlantic. At the end of October 1942, after battle attrition from sinkings and damages, Japan had only three such carriers operational in the Pacific Theater and America, for a two-week period, had none. Though costly, the battles were strategically advantageous for the Americans, contributing significantly to the shift of strategic initiative in the Pacific Theater from Japan to America. 2207:(an escort carrier) built in the US, experienced one of the longest periods between commissioning and combat action. She was built at Seattle on the US West Coast and then transferred to a Royal Canadian Dockyard Vancounver where she was commissioned in August 1943. She remained there until February 1944 undergoing modifications to meet Britain's requirements for deployment to defend convoys. She then sailed via the Panama Canal to the Atlantic and participated in exercises with other escort carriers in the Caribbean before heading north to Norfolk. Aircraft were embarked for transport to Britain, where 1115:

support for troops during the invasion of North Africa, and by helping prevent Japanese troops and supplies from reaching Guadalcanal. Beginning in 1943, the extensive mobilization of American production capability for war resulted in dramatic increases in the number of carriers available for even more strategic initiatives. Overall, aircraft carriers contributed greatly to making 1942 the pivotal, turning point of the war, 1944 the decisive year, and 1945 one for essentially finishing up, albeit at great cost.

1480:, only seven (47%) of the fifteen fleet and light carriers the combatants had afloat worldwide were operational. Japan had six such carriers afloat but only three were operational. America had three afloat, but one was in the Atlantic and the other two were damaged, leaving no operational carriers in the Pacific. Britain had six afloat, all in the Atlantic, but only three were operational. In the Pacific for a short period, there were no Allied carriers that could oppose Japan's three operational carriers. 391:

carrier-launched fighters provided protection in those ocean areas that could not be protected by land-based planes. In the Pacific Theater, Japan's successful expansion was typically achieved by progressively using land-based aircraft to support invasions of new areas that were within striking distance of airbases that they had established on previously conquered areas. For the Allies, land-based aircraft at local airfields contributed significantly to America's defense of

1416: 1643:

overhauls, refits for carriers to perform specific functions, and upgrades for older carriers. Short-term naval capabilities, plans, and outcomes were determined by the number of carriers that were operational during any given month. The impact of the relative number of operational, combat-ready carriers available was particularly felt during 1942, when the strategic initiative in the Pacific Theater passed from Japan to America.

2239: 444: 403:

Pearl Harbor sank or damaged eight of America's eighteen battleships. The aircraft carriers were at sea and escaped destruction. Six of the eight were repaired and returned to service and eight new battleships were commissioned during the rest of the war. During the period September 1939 to August 1945, America commissioned ten new battleships while Japan commissioned only two and converted two existing ones to

4080: 647:

33 fleet and light carriers during the war. Seventy-three per cent of these carriers participated in naval battles at one time or another. Eighty-five per cent were involved in support of invasions, etc. Escort carriers, although initially envisioned by many to perform only in support roles, ultimately performed all of the functions that the fleet and light carriers did.

517:, during which carrier aircraft provided support for amphibious landings and for occupying enemy-held positions by bombing those positions before, during, and after landings; spotting for warship guns, sometimes even controlling the firing; delivering replacement aircraft and aircrews to other carriers and to airfields after successful landings, as during the American 46:'s decisive victories on land could not have been won without decisive victories at sea. Naval battles to keep shipping lanes open for combatants' movement of troops, guns, ammunition, tanks, warships, aircraft, raw materials, and food largely determined the outcome of land battles. Without the Allied victory in keeping shipping lanes open during the 4208:. Allied operations in the Atlantic and Pacific war theaters were interconnected because they frequently competed for scarce naval resources for everything from aircraft carriers to transports and landing craft. Effective transport of troops and military supplies between the two war theaters required naval protection for shipping routes around the 4037:. Allied operations in the Atlantic and Pacific war theaters were interconnected because they frequently competed for scarce naval resources for everything from aircraft carriers to transports and landing craft. Effective transport of troops and military supplies between the two war theaters required naval protection for shipping routes around the 1675:, Japan had almost as many such carriers afloat as Britain and America combined. Moreover, since the western Allies deployed half of their carriers in the Atlantic and Mediterranean) to oppose Germany and Italy, Japan had almost twice the Allies' number of carriers in the Pacific Theater (including the Indian Ocean) when she initiated hostilities. 374:

ship hulls available for conversion to aircraft carriers or the available capacity of commercial shipyards to build them. While these carriers made contributions to the war efforts, their relatively small size made them operationally inefficient. The measure of naval power in the Pacific Theater was the number of fleet carriers a navy had.

130:

North Africa, the Soviet Union, western Europe and the Pacific. These operations also crippled similar efforts by Italy and Japan to sustain the empires they built by conquest. By 1942, aircraft carriers with the striking power provided by hundreds of warplanes delivering bombs and torpedoes to targets hundreds of miles away supplanted

4349:, the first US aircraft carrier, that was reclassified as a seaplane tender before World War II began. She was used during the early months of the war to conduct anti-submarine patrols and ferry aircraft, just as an escort carrier would do. Because she still had a flight deck and could still transport, launch, and retrieve aircraft, 5144:(CV), all of which at war's end were damaged and/or stripped of aircraft and air crews, stationary, and camouflaged in Japanese ports and in use principally as anti-aircraft platforms. Such carriers are not included as operational in the counts for the table, "Number Of Aircraft Carriers In Service At The End Of Each Month". 430:, however, Japan changed naval tactics and began leaving battleships out of major naval engagements. America began primary reliance upon its aircraft carriers for offensive operations early in the Pacific war out of necessity after the destruction of its Pacific battleship fleet during the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. 2697:

Notes: A very high percentage of IJN lost-time incidents included above involved damage by weapon systems and may reflect under-reporting of damage to IJN carriers from other causes. "Other causes" include storms & typhoons, collisions, aircraft accidents during carrier launchings and landings,

4148:

decisive victories on land could not have been won without decisive victories at sea. Naval battles to keep shipping lanes open for combatant's movement of troops, guns, ammunition, tanks, warships, aircraft, raw materials, and food largely determined the outcome of land battles. Without the Allied

4055:

Aircraft carriers played a major role in winning decisive naval battles, supporting key amphibious landings, and keeping critical merchant shipping lanes open for transporting military personnel and their equipment to land battle zones. This article is part of a series that covers World War II from

3985:

646:

The combatants differed in the functions they emphasized for carrier use, in part as a result of the challenges presented by their principal theater of operations. The table below indicates the percentage of carriers each combatant used for each function. For example, the US Navy operated a total of

425:

During the entire war, battleship guns sank only a single fleet carrier and a single battleship. In comparison, carrier-launched aircraft damaged, sank, or took part in sinking 19 battleships. Although Japan was first to recognize and exploit the greater effective striking power of aircraft carriers

366:

typically displaced 20,000 to 35,000 tons and could sail at 30 to 35 knots. Japanese and American fleet carriers were typically capable of carrying 50 to 90 aircraft into combat. British carriers were designed with armored decks, a measure that provided significantly greater protection against bombs

129:

It became apparent early in the war that control of the air was prerequisite for successful surface action both on land and at sea. For much of the war, Britain and America fought mainly on the seas, where successful Allied naval operations permitted effective support and reinforcement of troops in

2960:

Taking into account all the factors that kept aircraft carriers out of combat after commissioning, carriers were typically operational 80% to 90% of the time. They were typically out of service 5% to 15% for combat-related damage repair and 5% to 10% for delivery and refitting to otherwise improve

2721:

In the early years of the war, the combatants risked and lost a high percentage of their carriers. By October 1942, after the carrier battles for the year, America, Britain, and Japan had, in both theaters, lost a combined total of 15 fleet and light carriers. With new commissionings, they then had

1678:

Beginning in December 1942, the effects of America's industrial strength became evident as she began commissioning either a fleet carrier or a light carrier almost every month for the next two years. From November 1942, after the losses that year from four carrier battles, until the end of the war,

4379:

Includes as CVs both Hiyo and Junyo that are classified by some as CVEs. The displacements, length, speed, and number of aircraft for these carriers are intermediate between typical Japanese CVs and CVLs. Also, they were engaged in naval battles and supported invasions, unlike Japan's five CVEs,

2215:

Escort carriers constructed in American shipyards and transferred to Britain spent more time being delivered because of the distance from America's west coast and Britain. In addition, modifications made in some cases because of concerns over onboard safety increased the elapsed time between CVE's

402:

At the same time that America, Britain, and Japan began emphasizing aircraft carrier construction, they de-emphasized construction of battleships. Before the war, the number of battleships a country operated was universally regarded as the principal indicator of naval power. The Japanese attack on

373:

were fast enough to keep up with the fleet carriers but their smaller size typically reduced their aircraft load to between 30 and 50. The design of those commissioned immediately after the war began typically reflected the immediate need for fast carriers and took advantage either of having other

4943:

Only the Soviet Union produced more tanks and artillery pieces than the United States. Convoys to the Soviet Union protected in part by aircraft carriers provided a significant portion of the industrial equipment to manufacture those tanks and artillery pieces and provided food to sustain Soviet

2299:

Enemy bombs were the leading cause of lost operational time for aircraft carriers during the war. They were involved in 25% of the 229 damage incidents. In addition, bombs were involved in sinking 44% of carriers sunk. The second largest cause for carriers' lost operational time was attacks by

1090:

points out that statistics demonstrating material superiority are not by themselves sufficient for explaining why the Allies won the war. Less easily quantifiable factors also played a significant part. The political will to fight and willingness of individual combatants to sacrifice was present

3128:

The table capsulizes the course of the war for aircraft carrier operations. It reflects how Japan more than doubled the number of her carriers between leaving the Washington/London naval treaties in 1936 and the time she attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941. It also reflects the attrition for

2224:

in March 1943. In addition, some elapsed time was due to modifications to make some carriers suitable for specific combat functions. As lessons were learned during combat, carriers were refitted to change armament or otherwise reconfigure systems. Such modifications removed carriers from combat

2211:

arrived in April. There, through November, she underwent repairs for defects and modifications considered necessary based upon experience with other operational escort carriers. Further preparations took place in December. In January 1945, still without aircrew aboard, she sailed for the Indian

1170:

America was better able make good on their losses from these battles. From October 1942 until the end of the Pacific war, America commissioned 26 new fleet and light carriers. Japan commissioned eight. Over the entire war, the Allies commissioned a total of 181 carriers of all types compared to

1114:

in November 1942 marked strategic shifts for World War II. Aircraft carriers contributed to the success of these operations by protecting convoys of armaments and other supplies to Egypt and Russia, keeping Malta supplied and able to disrupt Axis supply operations to North Africa, providing air

3124:

The number of operational carriers available to the combatants at any point in time affected the capability, plans, and outcomes of military operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters throughout the war. Taking into consideration the time for construction, shakedown trials, delivery,

3125:

refitting, combat damage, and sinkings, the table below shows the number of fleet and light carriers that were operational for each combatant in each combat theater at the end of each month. The Pacific Theater includes the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic Theater includes the Mediterranean Sea.

390:

Land-based aircraft as well as carrier-launched aircraft fought at sea. In the Atlantic Theater, German and Italian aircraft attacked Allied convoys that were protected by fighter aircraft from Allied airfields as long as convoys were within fighter range. As carriers became available, Allied

2295:

Damage to carriers due to weapons systems, collisions, weather, and other causes also reduced the number of carriers available for operations at any given time. Not every incident resulted in significant loss of combat effectiveness or retirement from combat. However, there were at least 229

1642:

As the war progressed, the relative number of operational carriers available for combat by each side depended upon 1)construction rates for new carriers, 2)losses due to sinkings, 3)how quickly carriers damaged in combat could be brought back into service, and 4)the time required for routine

2308:

were involved in 19% of the total damage incidents. They were less effective for inflicting sufficient damage to sink carriers, however, and were involved in only 7% of carrier sinkings. Torpedoes launched by submarines and by aircraft were both involved in sinking more carriers than

399:. Naval fighters and bombers that operated from land-based airfields were typically delivered to battle zones by aircraft carriers. In both theaters, carrier-launched aircraft played significant roles in dominating the air, and construction of aircraft carriers received priority. 4461:

was initially a French seaplane carrier but later used as a training ship. She could carry twenty-six seaplanes but did not have a flight deck, instead launching planes by catapult and recovering them by crane. She was scuttled on 27 November 1942 to prevent her capture by the

4380:

whose functions were limited to convoy escort, transportation, and training. After the losses at Midway, the IJN reorganized carriers into just two divisions, each consisting of two fleet carriers and one light carrier. Hiyo and Junyo were the fleet carriers for the IJN

1122:, successful transportation of troops, aircraft, tanks, oil, and food from or routed through North America or up the West African coast to Britain, Russia, North Africa, and continental Europe was essential for ultimate Allied victory. Allied aircraft carriers screened by 955:

lists three key factors enabling the Allies to win the war: British "grit", Russian manpower, and American industrial strength. Specifically, the British Empire and Dominions continued for a year after the fall of France, stubbornly and successfully resisting the Axis.

367:

and kamikazes. The additional weight of the armor, however, reduced their typical carrying capability to 35 to 55 aircraft. Thus their additional defensive measures limited their offensive striking power until Britain introduced a new carrier class late in the war.

1663:(battleships, battle cruisers, aircraft carriers) be less than the number operated by either America or Britain. The agreed upon ratio was 5:5:3 for Britain, America, and Japan respectively. Dissatisfied with these limitations, Japan discontinued participation in 5273:(CV), all of which were "afloat" at the end of the war but not "operational" as aircraft carriers. They were damaged, stripped of aircraft and air crews, stationary, and camouflaged in Japanese ports in use principally as anti-aircraft platforms. 120:

380:

were smaller, slower, lightly armored, and carried 20 to 30 aircraft. They were not typically included with naval battle fleets, but before the war was over, escort carriers had performed every function that the larger carriers did.

4226:

3998:. Without Britain's survival and without Allied shipments of food and industrial equipment to the Soviet Union, her military and economic power would likely not have rebounded in time for Russian soldiers to prevail at 58:. Without Britain's survival and without Allied shipments of food and industrial equipment to the Soviet Union, her military and economic power would likely not have rebounded in time for Russian soldiers to prevail at 387:(MACs) transported grain and oil in the holds below the flight deck and carried 3 or 4 aircraft to protect themselves and other ships in convoys in which they traveled. None were used for offensive operations. 1095:, for their emerging victorious in the war. Nonetheless, while statistics relating to industrial capacity to produce arms and planes and ships do not tell the whole story, they remain an important part of it. 2216:

commissioning and becoming operational. Britain made major changes to many American-made escort carriers due to concerns over fuel handling facilities after the unexplained explosion and sinking of

2195:. Within seven weeks of commissioning, her aircraft were bombing airfields, spotting for warship's guns, patrolling for enemy cruisers and submarines, and refueling other ships in support of the 426:

over battleships, she was slow to abandon employment of the latter. She commissioned battleships in 1941 and 1942 that were the largest and most heavily armed ever built. After the losses at the

5119:, commissioned 30 Nov 1941 and assigned to the Fourth Carrier Division of the 1st Air Fleet 22 December 1941. Its air group began training 4 January 1942. (See Kido Butai at combinedfleet.com) 4436:

but there were no flight decks. Neither ship ultimately launched aircraft in combat during the war due to shortages of aircraft and pilots. Both were part of the Japanese decoy fleet during the

2164:

The time from building to entering operational service included sea trials to test the ship's systems and to train personnel. Only then did carriers move to intended war zones. Construction of

7174: 4404:

are not included in the counts for this table. They could carry twenty-four seaplanes but did not have flight decks. They used catapults to launch aircraft and cranes to bring them back aboard.

157:

aircraft at sea, and that was operational sometime between July 1937 and August 1945. The counts include carriers in service before the war began as well as those commissioned during the war.

1476:

The number of aircraft carriers operational for combat missions at any time was typically less than the total number of carriers afloat. For example, at the end of October 1942 following the

6598: 4237: 3866: 1437: 4242: 3899: 4953:

Examples include Germany's shifting priorities during its Russian offenses of 1941 and 1942 and Japan's uncoordinated priorities leading to the attack on Midway Island in 1942.

4780:

during the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal 14 November 1942. USN cruiser gunfire may have contributed, along with bombing by carrier aircraft, to the sinking of IJN light carriers

4252: 4067: 3874:

The US defined the Atlantic theater as including the North Atlantic, South Atlantic, and Arctic Oceans along with the Mediterranean and Caribbean Seas and the Gulf of Mexico.

149:

made significant use of aircraft carriers during the war. The following table shows the number of each type of carrier the principal combatants operated that had at least one

3933:

Over 700 different aircraft models were used during World War II. At least 135 of these models were developed for naval use, including about 50 fighters and 38 bombers.

4217: 4046: 110: 101:

to transports and landing craft. Effective transport of troops and military supplies between the two war theaters required naval protection for shipping routes around the

7167: 1142:, and land-based aircraft. By mid-1943, the Axis threat of cutting essential Allied supply lines had passed. By this time, however, six British carriers had been sunk. 4257: 3949: 2947: 946: 357: 225: 203: 527:, during which carrier aircraft attacked enemy positions to degrade them but without the intention of landing and occupying those positions, as during the Japanese 4262: 4090: 3962: 7160: 8137: 97:. Allied operations in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters were interconnected because they frequently competed for scarce naval resources for everything from 4209: 4038: 3935:

Only about 25 carrier-launched aircraft models were used extensively for combat operations. Of these, nine were introduced during the war years after the

4220:. In both theaters, maritime dominance enabled combatants to use the sea for their own purposes and deprive its use by adversaries. As naval historian 4049:. In both theaters, maritime dominance enabled combatants to use the sea for their own purposes and deprive its use by adversaries. As naval historian 414:

battleships but the need for smaller vessels precluded building any more Germany, Italy, and France together commissioned a total of six. All together,

113:. In both theaters, maritime dominance enabled combatants to use the sea for their own purposes and deprive its use by adversaries. As naval historian 3939:

brought United States into the war, four by the United States Navy (USN) and three by the Royal Navy (RN) and two by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN).

6590: 6379: 6621: 6406: 5373: 6811: 1667:

and invested in a construction program that within five years doubled the number of her fleet and light carriers. At the time of Japan's raid on

4101: 269: 5200:

was in Noumea, New Caledonia, undergoing repair for extensive bomb damage sustained at the Battle of Santa Cruz Island. (See www.hazegray.org)

541:, during which carrier aircraft blockaded enemy ports or attacked enemy shipping and shipping facilities, as during the Allied attacks around 4853:

were sunk (then refloated) during the British raid on Taranto in 1940. An additional seven battleships were sunk by land based aircraft. HMS

2212:

Ocean, where she took on an air squadron and participated in reconnaissance flights in February about 18 months after initial commissioning.

612:, during which carriers were dedicated to training pilots and/or conducting operating trials to improve carrier tactics and procedures. IJN 551:, in which carrier aircraft searched for and attacked enemy surface ships engaged in raiding enemy merchant shipping, as during the British 4841:

was damaged in repeated attacks British carrier aircraft and finally sunk in 1945 by British land based aircraft. Italian battleships RMS

4797:

Carrier launched aircraft sank or damaged 19 battleships during World War II. These included nine American battleships, including the USS

638:, during which carriers, after the war, participated in returning military personnel to their home countries, as was done under America's 7209: 4247: 4165:, food and industrial equipment to the Soviet Union, her military and economic power would likely not have rebounded in time for the 3926: 2722:

15 such carriers afloat compared with the 18 they had in August 1939 at the opening of the European war and 24 in December 1941 when

419: 4456: 965: 4056:

the vantage point of aircraft carrier operations and is focused upon names and dates for operations involving aircraft carriers.

4801:

that was being used as a target ship, that were sunk or damaged during the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor in 1941. All but USS

7199: 6894: 6847: 6496: 6317: 4181: 4010: 408: 70: 7770: 7204: 4267: 4197: 4026: 2171:

began in 1937 but she did not become combat operational until mid-1941 when rushed into the hunt for the German battleship

613: 86: 4603: 4097: 2256: 461: 415: 4930:

transported replacement aircraft and pilots to the fleet carriers and to combat-focused escort carriers. (See Y'Blood,

500:

Aircraft carriers were used for a wide variety of combat and combat support functions during the war. These included:

8109: 7043: 7024: 6951: 6932: 6913: 6866: 6828: 6743: 6655: 6555: 6530: 6440: 4393: 4119: 2282: 1463: 581:, carrier aircraft searched for and attacked enemy aircraft and submarines that threatened a convoy's merchant ships. 487: 3114:

Source: World War II Database Detailed information for each carrier is available for US, UK, and Japanese carriers.

2264: 1445: 469: 5012: 4399: 4154: 3991: 1477: 51: 4450: 7975: 7281: 5008: 4292: 2961:

performance. Royal Navy escort carriers were typically out of service for refitting more than other carriers.

2698:

mechanical failures, groundings, friendly fire, nearby explosions, and accidents during ship-to-ship refueling.

2249: 2182:

began in April 1941 and she was operational in mid-1943, in a raid on Rabaul eight months after commissioning.

1441: 454: 6787:"Service Histories of 1,000 Royal and Dominion Navy Warships, including British Ships manned by Allied Navies" 595: 7667: 968:

than all Axis countries combined, including over 70% of the aircraft carriers commissioned during the war.

4419: 2185:

The elapsed time between commissioning and combat action could also be short or long for escort carriers.

7950: 7796: 6256: 4902: 4370:

Thirty-eight of these escort carriers were launched in the US and transferred to the UK under Lend-Lease.

3881: 1159:

to isolate Australia. The second halted the expansion of Japanese control eastward in the Pacific toward

1099: 131: 6282: 3904:

The US Pacific theater included the Pacific and Indian oceans along with adjacent sea areas such as the

8132: 7997: 7379: 4898: 2726:. The following table shows the number of such carriers sunk each year of the war. The total number of 2172: 1664: 552: 134:

with big guns as the principal warships around which navies assembled task forces for major campaigns.

7152: 4747:) were commissioned. Construction of most of these had begun before the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. 7892: 7561: 7437: 7336: 7326: 995: 384: 247: 191: 154: 4833:

were damaged or sunk by American carrier aircraft, some with assistance by American submarines. KMS

960:

during the war, as many as the United States, Germany, and Japan combined. The Soviet Union lost an

7970: 7960: 7887: 7530: 7388: 5813: 3877:

The UK defined the Mediterranean as a separate theatre together with North Africa and Middle East.

1426: 7136: 5077:, after being hit by a torpedo, was written off as a total loss. Four Merchant Aircraft Carriers ( 4094:

that states a Knowledge editor's personal feelings or presents an original argument about a topic.

7760: 7566: 7276: 6230: 5903: 5000: 4413: 4381: 2260: 1652: 1430: 1156: 961: 957: 588: 465: 5929: 7755: 7642: 7606: 7601: 7427: 7331: 4317: 4158: 4150: 3995: 3987: 3936: 2723: 1668: 1119: 985: 639: 572: 528: 507:, during which carrier aircraft attacked each other and enemy warships, as they did during the 370: 181: 55: 47: 7104: 4333:

As of 2020, only nine countries have ever constructed aircraft carriers. (See Pike, p. ?)

7842: 7791: 7687: 7591: 7586: 7306: 5955:"Summary Table For Causes Of Lost Operational Time For Aircraft Carriers During World War II" 4213: 4042: 106: 7384: 6204: 587:, during which carriers delivered aircraft and aircrews to land bases or other carriers, as 8068: 7672: 7621: 7364: 7246: 4437: 4185: 4170: 4014: 3999: 2165: 1164: 1111: 1103: 599: 404: 396: 74: 59: 1149:, a force of six Japanese fleet carriers with their combined aircraft striking power, the 8: 8104: 7922: 7611: 7474: 7316: 4189: 4018: 2186: 1656: 564: 78: 5347: 4312:

The effectiveness of carrier-launched aircraft against warships was demonstrated at the

4184:, the Allies could not have mounted amphibious assaults on or maintained land forces on 4013:, the Allies could not have mounted amphibious assaults on or maintained land forces on 73:, the Allies could not have mounted amphibious assaults on or maintained land forces on 8038: 7902: 7857: 7750: 7652: 7616: 7596: 7495: 7321: 7216: 4987: 4788:

25–26 October 1944 during the Battle off Cape Engaño, part of the Battle of Layte Gulf.

4428:

rebuilt as hybrid aircraft carriers following Japanese fleet carrier losses during the

4343: 4201: 4030: 2191:(CVE), a converted oil tanker rushed into service, still had workmen aboard during her 532: 518: 90: 4999:

The four carrier battles fought between American and Japanese fleets in 1942 were the

4342:

Excludes thirty-eight CVEs constructed in the US and transferred to Britain. Includes

8073: 8023: 7965: 7955: 7722: 7576: 7454: 7394: 7241: 7039: 7020: 6947: 6928: 6909: 6890: 6862: 6843: 6824: 6805: 6739: 6651: 6622:"Did Russia Really Go It Alone- How Lend-Lease Helped The Soviets Defeat The Germans" 6551: 6526: 6492: 6436: 6407:"Did Russia Really Go It Alone- How Lend-Lease Helped The Soviets Defeat The Germans" 6313: 5374:"Did Russia Really Go It Alone- How Lend-Lease Helped The Soviets Defeat The Germans" 5319: 4313: 4205: 4034: 2200: 1679:

America commissioned 26 new such carriers compared to 8 for Japan and 9 for Britain.

626: 603: 102: 94: 6821:

The Two-Ocean War- A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War

407:. Starting the war with 15 battleships and battlecruisers, the UK commissioned five 8058: 7992: 7945: 7927: 7877: 7707: 7571: 7515: 7510: 7505: 7412: 7268: 7226: 7221: 5004: 4429: 4296: 4221: 4193: 4050: 4022: 2217: 2192: 2176: 1160: 1139: 1131: 619: 542: 508: 427: 392: 196: 114: 98: 82: 7982: 7912: 7837: 7735: 7469: 7449: 7417: 7374: 7341: 7286: 7231: 6786: 4358: 4174: 4003: 3905: 2196: 1107: 63: 7069: 5838: 5236:

was undergoing repair in America for bomb damage sustained in the Mediterranean.

7852: 7847: 7832: 7702: 7464: 7301: 7010:. New York, New York: Curtis Books- Modern Library Editions Publishing Company. 5864: 5287: 4986:

was sunk by German battleships during evacuation of aircraft at the end of the

4865:, in use as a target ship, was sunk by British land based bombers in 1944. RMS 4354: 3909: 3887: 2750: 2727: 1672: 990: 377: 186: 142: 4224:

stated, "Sea power did not win the war itself: it enabled the war to be won".

4053:

stated, "Sea power did not win the war itself: it enabled the war to be won".

1484:

Losses of fleet and light aircraft carriers, 31 August 1939 – 31 October 1942

117:

stated, "Sea power did not win the war itself: it enabled the war to be won."

8126: 8088: 8083: 8048: 8033: 7987: 7897: 7882: 7740: 7682: 7677: 7581: 7459: 7444: 7432: 7422: 7311: 7291: 6770: 5348:"Campaign Summaries of World War 2, German U-Boats at War, Part 5 of 6, 1944" 4300: 4141: 4137: 4133: 3978: 3974: 3970: 3133:

Number of aircraft carriers afloat and operational at the end of each month:

2745: 1151: 1092: 1087: 980: 952: 363: 176: 138: 39: 35: 31: 7088: 5180:

were undergoing repair for combat damage. (See Tully, www.combinedfleet.com)

3948:

Lists of aircraft carriers by carrier type for each country may be found at

2946:

Source: World War II Database Information for each carrier is available at

8043: 8028: 7867: 7862: 7801: 7745: 7712: 7545: 7540: 7346: 4145: 3982: 3913: 1660: 568: 43: 6991: 6104: 6004: 5979: 5691: 5567: 5482: 4885:) were sunk by German land based aircraft in 1941. The Russian battleship 1651:

Prior to 1936, international naval arms limitation treaties negotiated in

8078: 7917: 7816: 7692: 7647: 7369: 4425: 4291:

Britain and America shipped war-sustaining goods to the Soviet Union via

1146: 150: 7535: 5196:

was at Pearl Harbor undergoing repair for submarine torpedo damage, and

4153:, Britain could not have fed her people or withstood Axis offensives in 3990:, Britain could not have fed her people or withstood Axis offensives in 2300:

Japan's Special Attack Units, i.e., suicide planes that became known as

50:, Britain could not have fed her people or withstood Axis offensives in 8063: 7872: 7806: 7356: 7256: 7183: 7182: 6946:. New York, New York & Toronto, Canada: Bantam Books. p. 102. 6992:"Kido Butai!- Stories and Battle Histories of the IJN's Carrier Fleet" 6963:

The Rising Sun – The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936–1945

6591:"Lend-Lease: How American supplies aided the USSR in its darkest hour" 6380:"Lend-Lease: How American supplies aided the USSR in its darkest hour" 4512:

Sixteen American battleships were commissioned between 1912 and 1923 (

7937: 7811: 7626: 7520: 7500: 1127: 4638:

were commissioned between 20 March 1942 and 16 April 1944. Carriers

2267:. Statements consisting only of original research should be removed. 1415: 472:. Statements consisting only of original research should be removed. 8053: 7786: 7657: 7296: 7251: 4837:

was sunk by gunfire after being crippled by an aerial torpedo. KMS

4433: 4166: 4162: 1123: 124: 6179: 6154: 6129: 6079: 6054: 6029: 5954: 5642: 5617: 5592: 966:

America produced more artillery pieces, tanks, ships, and aircraft

940: 8007: 7907: 7765: 7662: 7525: 7404: 7187: 7089:"NavSource Naval History – U.S. Naval Chronology of World War II" 6650:. New York, NY & Toronto, Canada: Bantam Books. p. 102. 6435:. New York, NY & Toronto, Canada: Bantam Books. p. 102. 5248:

The USA and Japan did not begin hostilities until 7 December 1941

5132:(CVL) in use after October 1942 only for training. Also includes 4861:

were sunk by Japanese land based bombers in 1941. The German SMS

4321: 1135: 602:

and as the "CVE Plane Transport Unit" did during the invasion of

7053: 4974:(both in Malta convoy operations), and the escort carriers HMS 4889:

was sunk (later reflected) by German land based bombers in 1941.

4809:

were salvaged and returned to service. Japanese battleships IJN

4238:

Atlantic Theater aircraft carrier operations during World War II

3867:

Atlantic Theater aircraft carrier operations during World War II

3119: 8002: 7730: 7697: 6736:

Japanese Naval Air Force Fighter Units And Their Aces 1932-1945

5500: 5225: 4243:

Pacific Theater aircraft carrier operations during World War II

3900:

Pacific Theater aircraft carrier operations during World War II

7105:"Pocket Sized Aircraft Carriers- Merchant hulls into Warships" 7017:

Hunter-Killer US Escort Carriers in the Battle of the Atlantic

4432:. Rear guns were removed to make room for catapults to launch 4253:

Design and capability of aircraft carriers during World War II

4068:

Design and capability of aircraft carriers during World War II

1134:

proved more successful and cost-effective than battleships or

972:

Production of aircraft carriers, September 1939 – August 1945

7490: 5403: 4161:. Without Britain's survival and without Allied shipments of 4060: 2755: 1683:

Commissioning of aircraft carriers, March 1918 – August 1945

146: 5883: 5738: 5736: 4869:

was sunk by German land based aircraft in 1943. Greek ships

3919: 6971: 6734:

Hata, Ikuhiko; Izawa, Yashuho; Shores, Christopher (2011).

5930:"HMS Dasher (D 32) – Avenger-class Escort Aircraft Carrier" 5814:"HMS Victorious – Illustrious-class Fleet Aircraft Carrier" 5772: 5660: 5512: 5463: 5427: 4091:

personal reflection, personal essay, or argumentative essay

433: 6727:

GuadalCanal- The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle

6718:

A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–1945)

5904:"HMS Empress (D 42) – Ruler-class Escort Aircraft Carrier" 5760: 5548: 4258: