343:
average 5.1% loss rate. The disparity in loss rates was reflected in the fact that at one point in the war, Bomber
Command considered making sorties over France count as only a third of an op towards the "tour" total. Furthermore, the official loss rate figures never included aircraft crashing in the UK on their return (usually by damage sustained during the operation) even if the machine was a write-off or some or all of the crew were killed, which added at least 15% to the official loss figures. Losses on that scale could be made good through increased production and training efforts but at a great cost. Indeed, the size of Bomber Command's offensive grew throughout the war. The
123:
than the enemy if you want to save yourselves... If the conscience of the young men should ever come to feel, with regard to this one instrument that it is evil and should go, the thing will be done; but if they do not feel like that – well, as I say, the future is in their hands. But when the next war comes, and
European civilisation is wiped out, as it will be, and by no force more than that force, then do not let them lay blame on the old men. Let them remember that they, principally, or they alone, are responsible for the terrors that have fallen upon the earth.
411:, who led the American bombing campaign against Japan, said three months after the Hiroshima bombing that "No air attack, once it is launched, can be completely stopped". After World War II, the major powers built heavy strategic bombers to carry nuclear weapons. By the 1960s advances in ground-based radar, guided missiles, radar-guided anti-aircraft guns, and fighter planes greatly decreased the odds that bombers could reach their targets, whether they used the traditional high-altitude or newer low-altitude approach. One 1964 study of British
22:
582:
206:
designs, those systems were marginally useful, but against 1930s aircraft flying at twice their speed or more, they did not provide enough time to arrange interception missions. The balance of force meant that bombs would be falling before the fighters were in position and there was little that could
122:
I think it is well also for the man in the street to realise that there is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through. The only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly
342:
lost a total of 8,325 aircraft on bombing missions during the war, during a total of 364,514 sorties. That represents 2.3% losses per mission on average. However, loss rates over
Germany were significantly higher: between November 1943 and March 1944, operations over that country resulted in an
68:
This state of affairs was relatively short-lived. By the mid-1930s the same techniques were being applied to fighter design, once again handing them a significant performance advantage that allowed them to chase down even the fastest bomber aircraft. During the same period, the introduction of
330:
with 291 bombers damaged ball bearing factories, halting production for six weeks, but resulted in the loss of 77 bombers, or approximately 26%, with damage to 121 more and 655 airmen killed or captured. Unescorted daylight bomber raids deep into
Germany were suspended until February 1944.
52:
campaign that would destroy a country's cities and there was little that could be done in response. It concluded that the conduct of future wars would require one to "kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves."
56:
At the time of the speech aircraft performance was rapidly improving and new techniques and construction methods were producing ever-larger aircraft. For a time, this resulted in a performance gap where multi-engine aircraft outperformed the single-engine
325:
with 376 B-17 bombers without long-range fighter escorts. The mission inflicted heavy damage on the
Regensburg target but lost 60 bombers, or 16% of the force, with another 58–95 heavily damaged and a loss of 564 airmen killed, missing or captured. A
347:
came to the same conclusion. Douhet's belief that a small number of bombs would be successful in forcing a country to surrender proved to be incorrect, and bombing alone did not cause the collapse he had expected in either
Britain or Germany.
77:
suggested
Baldwin was no longer entirely correct; many German bombers did get through, and did cause much destruction to British cities, but did not come close to destroying Britain's manufacturing or morale. Additionally, many bombers did
93:
such that enough got through that a fair part of
Germany's industrial production was hindered, albeit at high cost in bomber losses, and mostly only toward the end of the war, mainly because of the Allied development of long-range
419:
or other countermeasures would encounter an average of six missiles, each with a 75% chance of destroying its target. The study thus stated that "the bomber will not always get through", and advocated
Britain emphasize the
234:, published in early 1939, posited a surprise attack on British cities, and described the experiences of a family during the bombing campaign that followed. That same year, military expert
452:. Skybolt was cancelled in 1962 after testing failures. A 1963 study stated "Long-range technical considerations, of course, militate against the perpetuation of the manned bomber".
135:
Some theorists imagined that a future war would be won entirely by the destruction of the enemy's military and industrial capability from the air. The
Italian general
1046:
379:
installation based in Hawaii (it was used part-time as a training device) and visual spotters in the Philippines that should have provided an early warning to their
110:
but believed that "great armaments lead inevitably to war". However he came to believe that, as he put it on 9 November 1932, "the time has now come to an end when
977:
1003:
1051:
127:
This speech was often used against Baldwin as allegedly demonstrating the futility of rearmament or disarmament, depending on the critic.
157:
would destroy cities, fleets, and armies, but such would not bring military victory, only the collapse of human civilization. Likewise,
611:
396:
82:
get through, being destroyed in the air. The rate of losses forced the Germans to abandon the campaign after a few months. Use of
743:
344:
806:
779:
713:
287:
432:
away from delivering strategic nuclear weapons to a role suited for both general nuclear and limited non-nuclear wars. The
1036:
73:
created an early warning system that gave interceptors sufficient time to climb to altitude before bombers arrived. The
322:
1056:
685:
436:
found converting its large fleet of manned bombers to non-nuclear roles more difficult. It attempted to redesign the
86:
was not seriously considered by any nation, as immediate retaliation in kind would render this escalation pointless.
985:
41:
958:
355:, bombing missions were effectively conducted by both Japan and the Western Allies. Early in the war, Japanese
871:
290:
indicated that Baldwin's statement was essentially correct in that bombers would get through but at a cost in
230:
275:
1026:
490:
327:
208:
242:
wrote in 1956 that he and others around him "thought of air warfare in 1938 rather as people think of
267:
1041:
1031:
585:
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be done about it. For Britain, the answer was to concentrate on bomber production, primarily as a
433:
1021:
416:
356:
167:, depicts a very brief but devastating war in which fleets of bombers deliver huge payloads of
115:
615:
464:
and the inability of legislation or security to stop someone intent on blowing something up.
441:
202:, detection systems were visual or auditory, which gave only a few minutes' warning. Against
90:
931:
Hunter, R. E. (1963). "The Politics of U.S. Defence 1963: Manned Bombers versus Missiles".
421:
388:
191:
619:
298:, fighters directed by radar were able to disrupt the German daytime offensive during the
238:
speculated that 250,000 deaths and injuries could occur across Britain in the first week.
8:
380:
251:
61:
that would have to intercept them. This gap could be further widened through the use of
940:
913:
658:
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425:
384:
372:
339:
318:
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meant that was relatively unopposed, but the Blitz did not crush British civil morale.
271:
235:
163:
149:
224:, Wells scripted a war starting suddenly with devastating air attacks on "Everytown."
879:
802:
775:
709:
681:
662:
502:
392:
299:
278:, responsible for specifying American fighters that were capable of downing bombers.
255:
215:
74:
49:
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and destroyed the great majority of bombers and defensive aircraft there and in the
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445:
429:
364:
259:
239:
179:
168:
58:
796:
769:
532:
461:
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335:
183:
45:
37:
25:
633:
Field, G. (2002). "Nights Underground in Darkest London: The Blitz, 1940–1941".
187:
478:
295:
220:
158:
154:
111:
95:
21:
646:
1015:
883:
798:
The Dragon's Teeth?: The Creation of United States Air Power for World War II
701:
496:
437:
311:
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today". The most influential among the few who disagreed with such views was
136:
214:
Consequently, many in the 1930s envisaged hundreds of thousands of civilian
507:
408:
263:
247:
195:
62:
473:
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deployed Polaris submarines during that decade. At that time, it shifted
360:
352:
243:
225:
203:
190:
and so a successful interception would require careful planning to bring
144:
107:
944:
917:
654:
732:
USAF Historical Studies No. 89. Office of Air Force History, pp. 63–65.
678:
Half the Battle: Civilian Morale in Britain during the Second World War
612:"History of Aviation - Bomber Theory: Air Power Between Two World Wars"
484:
83:
512:
412:
402:
307:
303:
904:
Brown, N. (1964). "Britain's Strategic Weapons I. Manned Bombers".
194:
into a suitable defensive position in front of the bombers. Before
581:
291:
143:, was a seminal theorist of that school of thought. In contrast,
368:
172:
730:
The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917–1941
178:
In the 1930s, bombers had a slight performance advantage over
591:
376:
375:. The US military could not make effective use of the single
199:
70:
978:"The bomber will always get through, be he ETA or al-Qa'eda"
821:
Richard Humble, "War in the Air 1939–1945", Salamander 1975
680:. Manchester: Manchester University Press. pp. 39–41.
440:
high-altitude supersonic bomber project as a platform for
321:
launched strategic bombing raids on the German cities of
1007:
text of the 10 November 1932 debate and Baldwin's speech
566:"Mr Baldwin on Aerial Warfare – A Fear for the Future".
460:
In the 21st century, the phrase was reused to refer to
40:
in a 1932 speech "A Fear for the Future" given to the
89:
But later, Britain and the United States did produce
98:
capable of guarding bombers all the way to Germany.
65:, which made interception practically impossible.
16:1932 phrase by British politician Stanley Baldwin
1047:Speeches in the Parliament of the United Kingdom
1013:
387:effectively destroyed many Japanese cities with
597:
553:
531:
306:to turn to less accurate night-time bombing in
863:
281:
924:
897:
635:International Labor and Working-Class History
175:, leaving most of the continent uninhabited.
626:
549:
547:
48:had the performance necessary to conduct a
774:. Widewing Publications. pp. 16–17.
669:
544:
455:
415:estimated that a bomber that did not use
854:
830:
694:
539:, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 722
403:"The bomber will not always get through"
20:
570:. London: 7 column B. 11 November 1932.
359:successfully destroyed or disabled the
1052:Military history of the United Kingdom
1014:
975:
930:
869:
794:
675:
397:atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
345:United States Strategic Bombing Survey
44:. His speech stated that contemporary
903:
767:
735:
700:
632:
609:
288:strategic bombing during World War II
118:". On 10 November 1932 Baldwin said:
101:
959:"The bomber will always get through"
845:Yorkshire Airfields – P Otter p. 262
559:
262:, who argued against the so-called "
130:
976:Bishop, Patrick (3 December 2004).
274:, Fighter Projects Officer for the
13:
424:instead. For similar reasons, the
34:The bomber will always get through
14:
1068:
997:
801:. Smithsonian Institution Press.
741:
708:. HarperCollins. pp. 18–19.
258:. Others included American Major
870:Rhodes, Richard (11 June 1995).
580:
969:
951:
872:"The General and World War III"
848:
839:
824:
815:
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761:
722:
383:. In later stages, US bombers'
218:from bombing. In the 1936 film
106:Baldwin did not advocate total
603:
574:
525:
1:
518:
231:What Happened to the Corbetts
795:Kelsey, Benjamin S. (1982).
276:United States Army Air Corps
7:
771:The Lockheed P-38 Lightning
598:Middlemas & Barnes 1969
554:Middlemas & Barnes 1969
467:
282:Strategic bombing in combat
153:(1908), had predicted that
10:
1073:
1037:1932 in the United Kingdom
491:Mutual assured destruction
323:Schweinfurt and Regensburg
186:and streamlined but heavy
965:. London. 6 October 2005.
768:Bodie, Warren M. (1991).
728:Greer, Thomas H. (1985).
647:10.1017/S0147547902000194
422:Polaris submarine missile
328:second raid on 14 October
268:Air Corps Tactical School
1057:1932 in military history
984:. London. Archived from
859:. pp. 209, 460–461.
395:bombs before the use of
294:and aircraft. Using the
676:Mackay, Robert (2002).
535:; Barnes, John (1969),
434:United States Air Force
310:. The difficulties for
188:cantilever wing designs
36:" was a phrase used by
855:Hastings, Max (1979).
831:Hastings, Max (1979).
706:With Wings Like Eagles
456:Recent reuse of phrase
286:Later analysis of the
141:The Command of the Air
125:
116:unilateral disarmament
29:
744:"The Tactical School"
622:on 30 September 2007.
586:A Fear For The Future
198:and the invention of
120:
24:
616:Spartacus School net
537:Baldwin: A Biography
192:interceptor aircraft
161:, in his 1930 novel
982:The Daily Telegraph
317:On 17 August 1943,
252:RAF Fighter Command
182:by having multiple
426:United States Navy
385:air raids on Japan
373:Philippine Islands
319:US Army Air Forces
272:Benjamin S. Kelsey
236:Basil Liddell Hart
164:Last and First Men
150:The War in the Air
102:Baldwin's argument
42:British Parliament
30:
1027:Strategic bombing
808:978-0-87474-574-0
781:978-0-9629359-5-4
715:978-0-06-173603-2
503:Strategic bombing
446:standoff missiles
430:aircraft carriers
381:fighter squadrons
300:Battle of Britain
270:, and Lieutenant
256:Battle of Britain
171:to the cities of
131:Theoretical basis
114:can proceed with
75:Battle of Britain
50:strategic bombing
28:in the late 1920s
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618:. Archived from
610:Wilkinson, Alf.
607:
601:
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589:
584:
578:
572:
571:
563:
557:
551:
542:
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533:Middlemas, Keith
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365:US Pacific Fleet
357:carrier aircraft
260:Claire Chennault
240:Harold Macmillan
59:fighter aircraft
1072:
1071:
1067:
1066:
1065:
1063:
1062:
1061:
1042:Stanley Baldwin
1032:Military theory
1012:
1011:
1000:
995:
994:
988:on 18 May 2004.
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970:
957:
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933:The World Today
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906:The World Today
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742:Boyne, Walter.
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579:
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545:
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526:
521:
470:
462:suicide bombers
458:
405:
336:Royal Air Force
284:
209:deterrent force
133:
104:
96:escort fighters
46:bomber aircraft
38:Stanley Baldwin
26:Stanley Baldwin
17:
12:
11:
5:
1070:
1060:
1059:
1054:
1049:
1044:
1039:
1034:
1029:
1024:
1010:
1009:
999:
998:External links
996:
993:
992:
968:
950:
923:
912:(7): 293–298.
896:
876:The New Yorker
862:
857:Bomber Command
847:
838:
835:. p. 334.
833:Bomber Command
823:
814:
807:
787:
780:
760:
734:
721:
714:
702:Korda, Michael
693:
686:
668:
625:
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600:, p. 736.
590:
573:
558:
556:, p. 735.
543:
523:
522:
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517:
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515:
510:
505:
500:
493:
488:
481:
479:Carpet bombing
476:
469:
466:
457:
454:
444:and launch of
442:reconnaissance
404:
401:
340:Bomber Command
312:night fighters
302:, forcing the
296:Dowding system
283:
280:
221:Things to Come
159:Olaf Stapledon
155:aerial warfare
132:
129:
103:
100:
91:enough bombers
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
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1048:
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1035:
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1025:
1023:
1022:1932 speeches
1020:
1019:
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1008:
1006:
1002:
1001:
987:
983:
979:
972:
964:
963:The Economist
960:
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942:
939:(3): 98–107.
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717:
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707:
703:
697:
689:
687:0-7190-5893-7
683:
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672:
664:
660:
656:
652:
648:
644:
641:(62): 11–49.
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137:Giulio Douhet
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112:Great Britain
109:
99:
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92:
87:
85:
81:
76:
72:
66:
64:
63:night bombing
60:
54:
51:
47:
43:
39:
35:
27:
23:
19:
1004:
986:the original
981:
971:
962:
953:
936:
932:
926:
909:
905:
899:
887:. Retrieved
875:
865:
856:
850:
841:
832:
826:
817:
797:
790:
770:
763:
751:. Retrieved
747:
737:
729:
724:
705:
696:
677:
671:
638:
634:
628:
620:the original
605:
593:
576:
567:
561:
536:
527:
508:Roerich Pact
495:
483:
459:
448:such as the
409:Curtis LeMay
406:
389:conventional
350:
333:
316:
285:
264:Bomber Mafia
248:Hugh Dowding
229:
219:
213:
196:World War II
177:
162:
148:
140:
139:, author of
134:
126:
121:
105:
88:
79:
67:
55:
33:
31:
18:
889:30 November
474:Appeasement
361:battleships
353:Pacific War
254:during the
244:nuclear war
226:Nevil Shute
204:World War I
145:H. G. Wells
108:disarmament
1016:Categories
519:References
485:Guilty Men
393:incendiary
250:, who led
216:casualties
169:poison gas
84:poison gas
884:0028-792X
748:Air Force
663:145612491
568:The Times
513:Total war
413:V bombers
308:The Blitz
304:Luftwaffe
266:" at the
228:’s novel
945:40393479
918:40393629
704:(2009).
655:27672803
468:See also
407:General
180:fighters
1005:Hansard
753:27 July
450:Skybolt
363:of the
351:In the
292:aircrew
184:engines
943:
916:
882:
805:
778:
712:
684:
661:
653:
369:Hawaii
173:Europe
941:JSTOR
914:JSTOR
659:S2CID
651:JSTOR
417:chaff
377:radar
200:radar
147:, in
71:radar
891:2023
880:ISSN
803:ISBN
776:ISBN
755:2008
710:ISBN
682:ISBN
334:The
643:doi
391:or
338:'s
80:not
1018::
980:.
961:.
937:19
935:.
910:20
908:.
878:.
874:.
746:.
657:.
649:.
639:62
637:.
614:.
546:^
399:.
211:.
990:.
947:.
920:.
893:.
811:.
784:.
757:.
718:.
690:.
665:.
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588:.
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32:"
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