396:, the wrong country could be targeted, and can cause a conflict to escalate. However, implementation of second strikes is crucial to deter a first strike. Countries with nuclear weapons make it their primary purpose to convince their opponents that a first strike is not worth facing a second strike. Such countries have many diverse launch mechanisms, prepared responses to various nuclear attack scenarios, launch mechanisms in many different areas of the country, and underground launch facilities that are specifically designed to withstand a nuclear attack.
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414:. In addition to the nuclear triad, nations deploy an early warning system that detects incoming nuclear missiles. This gives that nation the capability and option to launch a retaliatory second strike before the incoming nuclear first strike hits any of its targets. This is another method of solidifying second-strike capabilities and deterring a first strike from another nuclear power.
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mechanisms. These mechanisms create a threshold and guaranteed consequences if that threshold is breached. For instance, a threshold may be for an allied nation not to be attacked. If a rival nation then breaches this threshold by attacking the allied nation, then the predetermined consequences for
517:
Perimetr PTS dates back to 1974, in response to Soviet fears of devastating nuclear strikes from US ballistic missile submarines. It became operational in
January 1985, with SS-17 launch silos in Vypolzovo (Yedrovo) and Kostroma, each 100 and 150 miles north-west of Moscow respectively. The system
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was built with multiple layers of redundancy, in case multiple layers of communications were destroyed in the initial strike. Launch authorization would be transmitted by UHF radio, by transmitters buried deep underground. Development continued over the years with the system incorporating the new
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The crucial goal in maintaining second-strike capabilities is preventing first-strike attacks from taking out a nation's nuclear arsenal. In this manner, a country can carry out nuclear retaliation even after absorbing a nuclear attack. The United States and other countries have diversified their
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Despite the automated launch capabilities, Russian nuclear command and control could order missiles to self-destruct mid-flight in the event of an accidental launch. Russian ballistic missile submarines were reportedly never incorporated into
Perimetr-PTS, given the inherent communication issues
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Secondly, the
General Staff would have had to escalate the threat level sufficiently high so that a preauthorisation for launch had already been attained prior to loss of communications. If this had not been received, it was up to the missile operators within the silos to abort the automated
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are the traditional, but very expensive, method of providing a second strike capability, though they need to be supported by a reliable method of identifying who the attacker is. Using SLBMs as a second-strike capability has a serious problem, because in retaliation for a submarine-launched
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Third, the collective input of data from a variety of sensors fed into a central server. This included ground and infrared sensors designed to detect explosions around early-warning radar stations, command posts, and silos; missile signatures from radar stations, and data from the Oko
510:-PTS, otherwise known as "ะผัััะฒะฐั ััะบะฐ" (the Dead Hand) within Russia, is a Russian nuclear deterrence developed to automatically launch ballistic missiles as a retaliatory attack in the event that the Russian command and control system is destroyed in a surprise
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is a country's assured ability to respond to a nuclear attack with powerful nuclear retaliation against the attacker. To have such an ability (and to convince an opponent of its viability) is considered vital in
590:. In one episode, the US cabinet discusses the scenario of a Soviet surprise attack in which American cities would be destroyed, but the US armed forces would survive and launch a counter-attack.
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communications system must be interrupted. The simultaneous loss of both systems would indicate that the national command post has been destroyed and the political leadership killed.
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system. Perimetr-PTS was deliberately designed not to launch in the event of a smaller strike from US allies or an Asian nuclear power, given their inability to wage '
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this action go into effect. These predetermined consequences could include a wide range of responses, including a retaliatory nuclear second strike.
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Russian leadership was concerned that the system could trigger an accidental launch, so they incorporated numerous safeguards into its design.
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Second-strike capabilities can be further strengthened by implementing
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attacks against the opponent's hardened military facilities possible.
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nuclear command link to
Russian leadership and the secure
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December 1990, and further refinements in 1996.
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defence strategy, though one side may have a lower level
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in which he described a nuclear arms race between the
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in order to better ensure second-strike capability.
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677:"False Alarms in the Nuclear Age โ NOVA | PBS"
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475:. Unsourced material may be challenged and
320:against its opponent's own nuclear forces.
27:Response to a powerful first nuclear strike
708:Nuclear weapons: a very short introduction
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566:As early as 1940, science fiction writer
495:Learn how and when to remove this message
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610:1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident
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643:(first ed.). Osprey. p. 240.
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641:A Dictionary of Aviation
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305:second-strike capability
712:Oxford University Press
579:Solution Unsatisfactory
547:early warning satellite
419:circular error probable
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165:Nuclear-armed states
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512:decapitation strike
600:Minimal deterrence
568:Robert A. Heinlein
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362:Trident II missile
338:minimal deterrence
310:nuclear deterrence
301:retaliatory strike
683:. 6 November 2001
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231:North Korea
141:Disarmament
687:2016-10-04
621:References
570:wrote the
366:Royal Navy
340:response.
252:Kazakhstan
177:recognized
151:Opposition
49:Background
626:Citations
551:total war
456:does not
146:Terrorism
131:Espionage
126:Blackmail
121:Arms race
742:Category
594:See also
586:and the
508:Perimetr
485:May 2021
410:and the
404:Cold War
370:Vanguard
247:Belarus
226:Pakistan
111:Arsenals
82:Delivery
562:History
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477:removed
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257:Ukraine
99:Workers
94:Effects
77:Testing
67:Warfare
62:History
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535:Kazbek
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324:Theory
238:Former
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208:Others
196:France
186:Russia
156:Winter
104:Ethics
72:Design
531:Vyuga
212:India
201:China
87:Yield
724:ISBN
645:ISBN
460:any
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394:ICBM
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