157:", which had previously authorized automatic full nuclear attacks against both the Soviet Union and China in the event an attack left the president dead or unavailable, regardless of whether the attack used conventional weapons or who it was perpetrated by. The new plan directed commanders to "avoid a nuclear holocaust" in favor of a "limited response against the appropriate country".
148:
Because of the aspects of our early nuclear capabilities and our great concern for the Soviet capabilities, we built warning systems, which have already been mentioned, such as . We were concerned about our ability to respond. We did not have as good warning systems then as good as we have now. There
218:
conducted a hearing titled "First Use of
Nuclear Weapons: Preserving Responsible Control" in which Miller testified about pre-delegation to NORAD. Miller also testified that he was "unable to confirm the allegations" that Eisenhower had pre-delegated his authority, stating that he had "serious doubt
94:
30) concluded that, "The decision as to the employment of atomic weapons in the event of war is to be made by the Chief
Executive when he considers such decision to be required." That policy would be overruled in 1956 by a new "Basic National Security Policy" (NSC 5602/1), which introduced the idea
199:
described pre-delegation authority as "one of the most closely kept secrets." Ellsberg however considered it paradoxical that it was kept so secret, explaining that it is more important for deterrence that the enemy knows about pre-delegation so they would believed that a decapitating attack would
25:
in various circumstances. This authority is typically kept classified, so the
American public has always been told that the president has the sole and exclusive authority to start nuclear war. It is not publicly known to what extent, if at all, the current U.S. president has pre-delegated their
103:
President
Eisenhower issued secret pre-delegation instructions in 1957 in a memo titled "Authorization for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons", which allowed some commanders to use nuclear weapons in specific circumstances if he could not be reached. For example, this meant Admiral
33:
and would continue through at least the administration of Jimmy Carter. It was only officially revealed to the public in 1998 when his instructions enacting the practice were declassified. Similar practices exist in other nuclear states, such as the Soviet Union and now Russia's
69:
pointed out that aside from the
Secretaries of Defense and State, the potential successors were "almost completely unacquainted" with nuclear command and control. Having pre-delegated to explicit people would allow for them to be specially protected and given
123:
described
Eisenhower as playing a "central role in the review process" to avoid "reckless or accidental use of nuclear weapons". After taking office, President Kennedy declined to override Eisenhower's instructions, leaving them in place during the
95:
of pre-delegation authority. It stated, "Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the
President. Such authorization as may be given in advance will be determined by the President."
81:
testified to
Congress in 2017 that pre-delegation authority "may thwart an enemy's first-strike planning, for example, but, it would raise the risk that a weapon might be used in an unauthorized fashion or by someone confused in the fog of battle."
704:
112:(CINCPAC), had such authority for some part of every day as communications were regularly out between CINCPAC headquarters in Hawaii and Washington, D.C. Felt further delegated this authority to the next level of command (typically a
211:, the government partially declassified some memos from the Eisenhower and Johnson administrations in 1998, officially confirming pre-delegation authority publicly for the first time. More documents were released in 2001.
676:"First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Preserving Responsible Control; Hearings of the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations; House of Representatives"
712:
65:, given that many of them would also be in Washington D.C., it is possible that many of them would also die in a decapitating attack, leaving it unclear who the new president was. In 1981,
187:
Specific details about pre-delegation authority are largely kept classified, though the public occasionally received hints about pre-delegation. When asked about the topic in 1985 by
54:
described "the most compelling and legitimate purpose" of pre-delegation authority to be "to assure that the
Soviets (or now, Russians) could not paralyze our retaliatory forces by a
346:
455:
778:
421:
154:
816:
62:
116:) under similar conditions, which included ships and bases in the West Pacific that also regularly had communications outages with Hawaii.
204:
128:. In 1964, President Johnson approved redrafted instructions that were "basically the same as those approved by President Eisenhower".
140:(NORAD) "only under severe restrictions and specific conditions of attack". In 1976 Congressional testimony, retired Vice Admiral
675:
215:
91:
307:
583:
322:
262:
735:"U.S. Had Plans for "Full Nuclear Response" In Event President Killed or Disappeared during an Attack on the United States"
647:
308:""When the Urgency of Time and Circumstances Clearly Does Not Permit . . .": Pre-delegation in Nuclear and Cyber Scenarios"
422:"Authority to Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons; Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations; United States Senate"
223:
240:
539:"First Declassification of Eisenhower's Instructions to Commanders Predelegating Nuclear Weapons Use, 1959-1960"
739:
109:
235:
119:
The instructions were drafted by the
Defense and State Departments, but based on declassified memos, the
481:"Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 2, pp. 628"
113:
480:
208:
120:
774:
618:
505:
705:"Furtherance: The Cold War Plan to Launch a Full-On Nuclear Assault If the President Were Killed"
273:
214:
Congress has also conducted public oversight hearings on the topic. In March 1976, the then-
451:
125:
30:
8:
175:
55:
648:"The Finger on the Button: The Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear-Armed States"
149:
was concern about being able to respond rapidly enough, and the authority was delegated.
203:
Since the end of the Cold War, some of those policies have been made public. Following
21:
is the practice by United States presidents to empower military commanders to initiate
786:
623:
Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, United States Department of State
510:
Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, United States Department of State
485:
Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, United States Department of State
354:
318:
258:
170:
141:
90:
In the 1940s under President Truman, the "United States Policy on Atomic Warfare" (
700:
66:
51:
22:
734:
579:
278:
179:
reported that sources told them "some elements of pre-delegation still exist".
166:
538:
810:
790:
456:"Constraining Overkill: Contending Approaches to Nuclear Strategy, 1955-1965"
358:
195:
said, "There are contingency plans. I just really can't discuss them," while
192:
105:
303:
226:
held a hearing following President Trump's threats to use nuclear weapons.
78:
58:
on Washington, D.C., or by attacking the president wherever he might be."
71:
35:
619:"Memorandum From President Johnson to Secretary of Defense McNamara"
169:
said that around 1993, President Clinton and his defense secretary,
196:
153:
In October 1968, Johnson approved changes to a plan known as "
137:
317:. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. p. 214.
173:, "rolled back" pre-delegation authority. However in 1998,
255:
The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner
584:"Loose cannons: The president and US nuclear posture"
646:
Lewis, Jeffrey G.; Tertrais, Bruno (February 2019).
347:"MILITARY GOT AUTHORITY TO USE NUCLEAR ARMS IN 1957"
136:Starting in 1965, authority was delegated to the
808:
29:The practice began in the 1950s under President
645:
182:
144:explained the rationale for this delegation:
98:
302:
315:Understanding Cyber Conflict: 14 Analogies
131:
817:United States nuclear command and control
450:
699:
252:
616:
216:House International Relations Committee
160:
809:
773:
344:
769:
767:
670:
668:
641:
639:
617:Johnson, Lyndon B. (March 26, 1964).
578:
574:
572:
562:
560:
533:
531:
529:
527:
61:While the United States has a formal
446:
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398:
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340:
338:
336:
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271:
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63:line of succession to the president
13:
764:
665:
636:
569:
557:
524:
460:Naval History and Heritage Command
224:Senate Foreign Relations Committee
219:that such delegations were made".
138:North American Air Defense Command
14:
828:
588:Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
439:
393:
381:
345:Pincus, Walter (March 21, 1998).
331:
506:"Basic National Security Policy"
241:Civilian control of the military
727:
693:
610:
601:
498:
427:. November 14, 2017. p. 11
222:Forty years later in 2017, the
473:
414:
405:
372:
296:
272:Ford, Daniel (April 8, 1985).
191:, Assistant Defense Secretary
1:
740:The National Security Archive
681:. March 1976. pp. 56, 76
543:The National Security Archive
246:
607:Ellsberg (2017, pp. 108-111)
41:
7:
236:Nuclear command and control
229:
10:
833:
779:"The Finger on the Button"
566:Ellsberg (2017, pp. 67-73)
205:Freedom of Information Act
183:Transparency and oversight
85:
306:; Geers, Kenneth (2017).
253:Ellsberg, Daniel (2017).
209:National Security Archive
121:National Security Archive
99:Eisenhower's instructions
74:and plans ahead of time.
390:Ellsberg (2017), pp. 298
165:Nuclear security expert
108:, commander in chief of
19:Pre-delegation authority
378:Ellsberg (2017, pp. 15)
132:Johnson's modifications
411:Ford (1985, pp. 64-69)
151:
777:(November 13, 2017).
703:(December 14, 2012).
146:
56:'decapitating' attack
655:CNS Occasional Paper
454:(January 12, 1994).
161:Roll back by Clinton
126:Cuban Missile Crisis
48:The Doomsday Machine
31:Dwight D. Eisenhower
761:Ford (1985, pp. 69)
743:. December 12, 2012
701:Madrigal, Alexis C.
582:(January 1, 2020).
452:Rosenberg, David A.
402:Ford (1985, pp. 64)
351:The Washington Post
176:The Washington Post
26:nuclear authority.
715:on August 12, 2020
207:requests from the
46:In his 2017 book,
324:978-1-62616-498-7
274:"II - The Button"
264:978-1-60819-670-8
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711:. Archived from
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512:. March 15, 1956
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171:William J. Perry
142:Gerald E. Miller
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580:Blair, Bruce G.
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249:
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185:
163:
134:
110:Pacific Command
101:
88:
67:Brent Scowcroft
52:Daniel Ellsberg
44:
23:nuclear attacks
12:
11:
5:
830:
820:
819:
804:
803:
763:
754:
726:
692:
664:
635:
609:
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568:
556:
545:. May 18, 2001
523:
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413:
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380:
371:
330:
323:
294:
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279:The New Yorker
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263:
257:. Bloomsbury.
248:
245:
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231:
228:
189:The New Yorker
184:
181:
167:Bruce G. Blair
162:
159:
133:
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100:
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84:
43:
40:
9:
6:
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3:
2:
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304:Feaver, Peter
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193:Donald Latham
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114:two-star rank
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106:Harry D. Felt
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72:nuclear codes
68:
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39:
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27:
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20:
16:
794:. Retrieved
782:
775:Kaplan, Fred
757:
745:. Retrieved
738:
729:
717:. Retrieved
713:the original
709:The Atlantic
708:
695:
683:. Retrieved
658:
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626:. Retrieved
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603:
591:. Retrieved
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547:. Retrieved
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514:. Retrieved
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362:. Retrieved
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284:. Retrieved
282:. p. 64
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221:
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197:Desmond Ball
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89:
79:Peter Feaver
76:
60:
47:
45:
28:
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155:Furtherance
247:References
796:August 4,
791:1091-2339
747:August 4,
719:August 4,
685:August 4,
628:August 4,
593:August 4,
549:August 3,
516:August 4,
490:August 4,
465:August 4,
431:August 4,
364:August 3,
359:0190-8286
286:August 6,
77:Academic
42:Rationale
36:Dead Hand
811:Category
230:See also
38:system.
86:History
789:
357:
321:
261:
200:fail.
783:Slate
679:(PDF)
651:(PDF)
425:(PDF)
311:(PDF)
798:2023
787:ISSN
749:2023
721:2023
687:2023
630:2023
595:2023
551:2023
518:2023
492:2023
467:2023
433:2023
366:2023
355:ISSN
319:ISBN
288:2023
259:ISBN
92:NSC
813::
785:.
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