148:
1258:. However, with a Royalist casualty list that outnumbered the PAVN opposition, it was a dubious victory. Eight Royalist battalions had been rendered unfit for service. The CIA's Chief of Station in MR 4 believed that the failure of Sayasila resulted from several Royalist weaknesses. He blamed the Royalist regulars for poor battle performance. He believed the new commanding general did not yet have a strong command relationship with his subordinates. He also noted that the extensive slow-paced movements by the Royalists gave the PAVN a lot of time to scout out intelligence about the Royalists.
103:
135:
1141:
failed to synchronize their actions. As a result, the PAVN 9th
Regiment could fight them in turn. First, it scattered the four Royalist battalions south of them into the bush, and pushed the two Thai battalions back toward Ban Phakkout. Then it intercepted the four guerrilla battalions five kilometers northwest of Paksong. It struck them so hard the four battalions were evacuated for refitting. By 1 September, the failure of this Royalist offensive was evident.
123:
1167:
the Phou
Theveda high ground athwart Route 232, four kilometers east of Paksong. The following day, 12 September, a levy of 670 reinforcements cobbled together from three different commands were flown into a landing zone seven kilometers southeast of Paksong. They attacked northwards to back up GM 32. On 13 September, GM 32 repelled PAVN counterattacks.
935:. The plan was for a two phase operation involving not just troops from Pakse's (MR 4), but also from adjoining Military Region 3 (MR 3). As projected, the Royalist force of 11 battalions numbered 4,000 strong; the opposing three Communist battalions could muster barely 1,100 troops. In phase one, MR 3's
1049:(PAVN) by 08:30. At noon, the Royalists controlled the town. Phase one had been accomplished by the afternoon of 28 July 1971. The PAVN troops had slipped away to attack the Royalist contingent that had landed northwest of Pak Song. They would return on 25 August to defeat this contingent of Royalists.
1170:
At 2330 hours 14 September, forward elements of GM 32 captured
Paksong. The PAVN 9th Regiment, threatened from the south, east, and west, withdrew to the northeast along Route 23 on the 15th. A few PAVN soldiers still remained secreted in Paksong for GM 32 to grub out. Seven kilometers from town they
1127:
regulars. The FAN battalions moved up to help the
Royalists. There followed a ten-day standoff, ended when the communists brought heavy weapons on line. On 18 August, under heavy weapons fire, the two Neutralist and two Royalist battalions scattered to the southwest. With both prongs of the Royalist
1085:
By 6 August, the
Royalists were within six kilometers of their objective. On 11 August, they then ran into determined communist counterattacks that drove the monarchists almost back to their landing zone. On 25 August, the Royalists made another attempt at taking Paksong. They were counterattacked by
790:
in an attack on 1,100 Vietnamese
Communist soldiers. When the assault stalled in mid-August, it was elaborated upon with two additional helilifts of Royalist troops behind the PAVN's mobile garrison. When the Royalist command failed to coordinate tactical movements among its various columns, the PAVN
1265:
was a defensive one, the
American ambassador had run counter to policy by approving an offensive drive. This provoked a reaction from his superiors. The short notice request for additional USAF tactical air support had brought about a directive on 18 August that requests for tactical air support for
1224:
The pincer movement of the original
Sayasila plan had bogged down after GM 32 took Paksong. It would not progress until 18 October, when the regiment advanced westward from Paksong in response to Communist shelling of the Paksong airstrip. Thai mercenary troops further east on Route 23 pushed toward
1144:
Presented with the choice of making another try at capturing
Paksong quickly before the rainy season closed down military activities, or waiting until next dry season, the planners of Sayasila decided to ask for help with the former. They garnered a commitment of 40 or more daily sorties of tactical
1208:
on 2 September. BV 41 occupied the vicinity for more than three weeks, but uncovered few enemy supply caches. At about the time BV 41 was due to be withdrawn, the 927th PAVN Battalion moved in close enough to begin mortaring GM 31. When BV 41 received orders for a fresh offensive instead of relief,
1166:
unit of
Commando Raiders secured a landing zone six kilometers east of Paksong. GM 32 landed to be greeted by sniper fire. The Royalist regiment advanced despite a glancing engagement with the PAVN 9th Regiment that caused 33 Royalist casualties. By the next morning GM 32 had secured a position on
1249:
Operation Sayasila ended on 31 October 1971. The Royal Lao Armed Forces suffered 136 of its troops killed during the offensive, and 302 wounded. PAVN losses were estimated at 170. However, the Royalists had won the airstrips at Salavan and Paksong. This cleared the way for two follow-up offensive
1140:
The revamped offensive restarted on 21 August. The drive up Route 23 came up against a PAVN bunker complex blocking the road. While most of the tactical air sorties assigned to the operation struck the bunkers, they failed to dislodge the Communists. The two Royalist columns converging on Paksong
1136:
The original plan of attack was elaborated upon. The new plan called for three Royalist and two Thai mercenary battalions to push down Route 23 toward Vietnam. The push on Paksong would be carried out by a pair of converging columns. Two battalions each of Thai mercenaries, Royalist regulars, and
1195:
clearing the way. By the 13th, all five of the Thai howitzers had been shifted forward to more effective firing positions at Ban Phakkout. Four Thai mercenary infantry battalions pushed toward an agricultural research station along Route 23. They just missed intercepting the retreating 9th PAVN
1086:
three PAVN battalions at 1330 hours. By dark, the scattered Royalist forces had suffered 32 dead, 39 wounded, and 192 missing in action. PAVN casualties were estimated at 100 killed. After this thrashing, the three Royal Lao Army battalions were then ordered south to Ban Phakkout.
963:
sorties daily. Belatedly, the planners realized that RLAF support would be insufficient. Three days before the operation's scheduled start, they requested and received a commitment for 12 daily sorties of tactical air for the next month. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) would fly
806:(RLG) troops had finally gained their objective, their casualties outnumbered the enemy force they evicted from their objectives. The U.S. government, which was supporting the RLG, placed restrictions on U.S. support aimed at limiting the RLG to defensive efforts.
1082:(BI 4) joined them, bringing the Royalist roster to 1,250 troops available. On 30 July, the combined units moved out to the east; their objective was Paksong at UTM XB3377. Nine kilometers northwest of Paksong, they were halted by a PAVN battalion.
1137:
Neutralists were helicoptered to a landing zone south of Paksong, with orders to capture it. Four battalions of Royalist guerrillas were lifted to another landing zone to assault Paksong from the northwest for a coordinated attack.
1290:
By New Year's Day 1972, although Pak Song remained in Royalist hands, Salavan had been recaptured by the PAVN. The Communists still controlled the eastern Bolovens Plateau as a territorial shield protecting the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
984:
under contract. Not taken into account was the fact that the Royalist columns were not mutually supportive. General Minh, commander of the PAVN battalions, would use this flaw to defeat the Royalists in detail by using his
1149:
target boxes containing no friendly forces were delineated so radar-directed bombing in them could occur despite unfavorable weather. They also managed to persuade neighboring MR 3 to loan them another guerrilla regiment,
1191:
On 11 September, the Thai mercenary artillery battery opened fire from Ban Gnik, immobilizing the Communists further east on Route 23 with a barrage of 500 shells. GM 32 moved east along the road with
1216:
convinced them to hold their position until 6 October. He promised relief by FAN battalions. When on the day only four FAN companies showed up, the remainder of GM 31 abandoned their positions.
1196:
Regiment. On the 20th, the Thais began a three-day struggle to gain possession of the agricultural research station alongside Route 23. Once it was gained on the 23rd, howitzers were moved in.
1026:'s wishes, the helilift was re-approved. The plea that diversionary operations were already being launched, and that failure to follow through would prejudice Lao military efforts against the
980:
by night. However, USAF support would not be on a dedicated basis; instead it would be diverted as needed. Logistical air support would come from USAF helicopters, RLAF transports, and
1123:
MR 4 had a Thai mercenary task force assigned; it now forwarded four battalions to Ban Phakkout. On 8 August, BI 7 and BI 9 moved further east until they came up against entrenched
947:
XC5237. Phase two would be a squeeze play; a mobile force would be airlifted to a position northwest of Paksong, while a column probed eastward toward it along Route 23. The
1109:
artillery battery. With tactical air strikes and howitzer fire clearing the way, the Neutralists were in Ban Gnik by evening. However, there they met opposition and halted.
1089:
Three battalions of guerrillas were pulled from training to plug the gap left by the retreating Royalist regulars; a fourth battalion was posted to fill the force out to
1654:
235:
798:, the Operation Sayasila offensive was renewed on 10 September 1971. It took until 20 October for the Royalists to finally capture their objectives of
1266:
a planned operation had to be submitted at least ten days in advance. In reality, the process would take 20 to 30 days. The directive, issued by the
1204:
On 28 August, GM 31 were replaced at Salavan by BV 41. This freed GM 31 to advance 20 kilometers west along Route 16 before moving south to capture
944:
908:
786:(PAVN) garrison, Sayasila was planned as a rather complex two phase operation dependent on coordinating two columns containing 4,400 troops with
888:
center for the communists. Its importance can be measured by the fact that among the many attempts to cut the Trail, the multi-divisional
1022:
to ground the U.S. helicopters. After vigorous protests from the CIA concerning the humiliation of failing to fulfill the King's and the
228:
1154:(GM 32) to continue the assault. Once again, the two objectives were taking Paksong and opening Route 23 towards the Vietnamese border.
221:
669:
1636:
1614:
1225:
GM 32, and the pincers finally met on 20 October. Leaving the Thais in charge of Route 23, GM 32 returned to occupy Paksong.
928:
791:
9th Regiment moved to defeat Royalist aggressor columns one at a time. By 1 September, this Royalist attack had also failed.
794:
Bolstered by a fresh regiment of guerrillas as reinforcements, plus support by a minimum of 40 daily U.S. Air Force strike
1105:(FAN) battalions moved east along Route 23 for the squeeze play. They were supported by four armored cars and backed by a
1620:
Hukle, Donald G.; Melvin F. Porter; Paul T. Ringenbach; Richard R. Sexton; Judith A. Skipworth; Adolph H. Zabka. (1974).
1019:
911:
was hesitant to try another attack because of the poor fighting qualities of his troops. However, on 1 July 1971, King
1599:
1233:
On 26 October, a Thai mercenary battalion swept south and east of Paksong, reoccupying the Phou Thevada high ground.
258:
1037:
team secured the Salavan airfield in 12 minutes. At 07:00 hours, a 13 helicopter air armada picked up the 1,290 man
565:
364:
1179:. Political pressure from Vientiane was being brought to bear on the operation's commanding officer, as the
1102:
112:
927:
designed to block one of the supply arteries of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Route 23. It would also retake two
1172:
1046:
920:
865:
819:
783:
404:
1106:
960:
827:
467:
336:
663:
1175:
the road. Leaving another contingent in the agricultural research station, the 9th retreated toward
1251:
1011:
904:
642:
635:
572:
386:
1241:
Another Thai battalion swept northwards from Paksong, occupying the high ground at Phou Nongkin.
1146:
843:
831:
738:
502:
446:
1120:(BI 9) from MR 3, the Royalists pushed on down the road, gaining Ban Phakkout on 6 August 1971.
1041:
for the half-hour flight to the airfield. Tactical air cover found no worthwhile targets as the
213:
1180:
969:
717:
689:
481:
391:
285:
264:
1078:(BV 43) joined them later that day. After a patch of ill weather delays in flight operations,
1659:
1267:
1163:
981:
889:
872:. Over the next seven years, the Trail expanded to 4,000 miles of road, trail, and waterway.
724:
710:
703:
614:
516:
425:
348:
280:
900:
855:
847:
803:
681:
656:
628:
607:
544:
530:
523:
453:
298:
8:
948:
745:
411:
274:
1592:
At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government 1955–1975
1622:
The Bolovens Campaign, 28 July – 28 December 1971 (Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report)
1042:
835:
823:
815:
696:
488:
474:
460:
418:
359:
342:
329:
323:
310:
291:
270:
1632:
1610:
1595:
1580:
1282:. These requirements were meant to limit offensives under the guise of coordination.
1262:
1255:
1192:
1176:
1027:
952:
912:
861:
851:
787:
779:
775:
771:
674:
621:
593:
579:
537:
354:
304:
246:
165:
27:
1271:
1124:
1034:
932:
924:
600:
397:
877:
169:
108:
70:
66:
1023:
1007:
986:
973:
940:
839:
799:
770:(26 July 1971—31 October 1971) was a major offensive military operation of the
752:
558:
495:
374:
369:
83:
1648:
1275:
915:
paid a royal visit to Pakse and demanded another offensive. Thus it was that
885:
869:
380:
153:
140:
1062:
Phase two fell to MR 4 troops with support via surveillance overflights by
1015:
965:
649:
509:
439:
317:
1584:
1572:. Center for the Study of Intelligence. Classified control no. C05303949.
903:
had ended in an indecisive standoff, despite heavy Communist casualties.
731:
31:
1145:
air support from the U.S. Air Force for Sayasila through 25 September.
1063:
586:
1629:
The War Against Trucks: Aerial Interdiction In Southern Laos 1968–1972
1183:
had suffered almost 1,000 casualties in the past two months in MR 4.
936:
881:
1205:
1090:
1074:
and deposited 34 kilometers northeastward to the Bolovens Plateau.
1038:
923:(CIA) planned an offensive into communist territory on the eastern
873:
432:
128:
1279:
1213:
977:
939:
would be airlifted to capture the Pakse 47 airfield southwest of
243:
173:
1212:
GM 31 was moved to a quiet village ten kilometers away. General
795:
1071:
956:
916:
1006:(GM 31) stood down from a planned heliborne insertion into
55:
1274:, required coordination of planned operations with both
1624:. Pacific Air Force CHECO Division. ASIN: B00B65VIOU.
892:
was launched on 8 February 1971 to capture Tchepone.
1570:
Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos
860:Beginning in 1964, the strategic importance of the
1171:posted a rear guard to fortify a hilltop position
1575:Anthony, Victor B. and Richard R. Sexton (1993).
1646:
1655:Battles and operations of the Laotian Civil War
1057:
1498:
1496:
1401:
1399:
1397:
1395:
1393:
1209:130 soldiers deserted and returned to Pakse.
229:
1516:
1514:
1512:
1510:
1508:
1463:
1461:
1421:
1419:
1417:
1415:
1413:
1411:
1261:Given that the American plan for waging the
1128:offensive thwarted, it was time to regroup.
1605:Conboy, Kenneth and James Morrison (1995).
1486:
1484:
1482:
1493:
1390:
236:
222:
1631:. Air Force History and Museums Program.
1505:
1458:
1408:
1372:
1607:Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos
1479:
1327:
1045:regiment occupied a town vacated by the
1451:
1449:
1363:
778:. Launched on 26 July 1971 against the
1647:
1270:and agreed to by both the CIA and the
1236:
1228:
1199:
1131:
1096:
1014:. It seems that Secretary of Defense
907:'s (MR 4) Commanding Officer General
217:
1446:
1018:had sent an order down through the
774:. It was staged by command of King
13:
14:
1671:
1579:. Command for Air Force History.
670:1973 Laotian coup d'état attempt
146:
133:
121:
101:
1550:
1541:
1532:
1523:
1470:
1437:
1428:
1381:
1529:Conboy, Morrison, pp. 307–308.
1502:Conboy, Morrison, pp. 306—307.
1455:Conboy, Morrison, pp. 305–306.
1378:Conboy, Morrison, pp. 304–305.
1354:
1345:
1336:
1318:
1309:
1300:
1070:(BV 41) was helilifted out of
1:
1568:Ahern, Thomas L. Jr. (2006),
1562:
1556:Anthony, Sexton, pp. 347–348.
1360:Anthony, Sexton, pp. 346–347.
1219:
1066:. At 09:20 hours on 29 July,
992:
895:
1285:
1058:Heliborne assault on Paksong
1052:
997:
245:Military engagements of the
45:26 July 1971—31 October 1971
7:
1590:Castle, Timothy N. (1993).
1186:
921:Central Intelligence Agency
820:Operation Junction City Jr.
809:
802:and Pak Song. Although the
10:
1676:
1627:Nalty, Bernard C. (2005).
1434:Hukle, et al, pp. 5, 9–10.
1244:
1157:
1103:Forces Armées Neutralistes
1101:Meanwhile, on 30 July two
828:Operation Honorable Dragon
813:
113:Forces Armées Neutralistes
1520:Conboy, Morrison, p. 307.
1467:Conboy, Morrison, p. 306.
1425:Conboy, Morrison, p. 305.
1333:Conboy, Morrison, p. 304.
968:strikes on the communist
868:as its key to conquering
259:North Vietnamese invasion
256:
197:
184:
159:
94:
82:Kingdom of Laos captures
37:
25:
20:
1577:The War in Northern Laos
1405:Anthony, Sexton, p. 347.
1351:Anthony, Sexton, p. 346.
1306:Nalty, pp. 5–7; 149–154.
1294:
1076:Batillion Volontaires 43
1068:Bataillon Volontaires 41
1047:People's Army of Vietnam
1033:Before the next dawn, a
1002:On 26 July 1971, MR 3's
866:People's Army of Vietnam
864:became paramount to the
784:People's Army of Vietnam
387:Battle of Ban Houei Sane
365:1966 Laotian coup d'état
1147:Instrument flight rules
844:Operation Silver Buckle
832:Operation Diamond Arrow
1342:Hukle, et al, pp. 1–5.
1181:Royal Lao Armed Forces
1118:Bataillon Infanterie 9
1114:Bataillon Infanterie 7
1080:Bataillon Infanterie 4
970:lines of communication
392:Battle of Lima Site 85
286:Battle of Luang Namtha
160:Commanders and leaders
1268:Joint Chiefs of Staff
1116:(BI 7) from MR 4 and
1020:Department of Defense
890:Operation Lam Son 719
281:Battle of Ban Pa Dong
198:Casualties and losses
1476:Hukle, et al, p. 13.
1443:Hukle, et al, p. 10.
1315:Castle, pp. 108–109.
1152:Groupement Mobile 32
1004:Groupement Mobile 31
951:(RLAF) would supply
931:while occupying the
901:Operation Phiboonpol
856:Operation Phiboonpol
848:Operation Desert Rat
804:Royal Lao Government
566:Sourisak Montry VIII
1387:Hukle, et al, p. 5.
1237:Operation Phou Xang
1229:Operation Red Arrow
1200:Phase one revisited
1162:On 10 September, a
1132:Regroup and restart
1097:Push along Route 23
955:at the rate of two
949:Royal Lao Air Force
275:Battle of Vientiane
1547:Castle, pp. 2, 55.
989:of communication.
836:Tchepone Operation
824:Operation Maeng Da
816:Operation Left Jab
768:Operation Sayasila
360:Battles of Nakhang
343:1965 Laotian coups
324:1964 Laotian coups
271:1960 Laotian coups
21:Operation Sayasila
1637:978-1-47755-007-6
1615:978-1-58160-535-8
1609:. Paladin Press.
1263:Laotian Civil War
1256:Operation Thao La
1252:Operation Bedrock
1193:close air support
1030:carried the day.
1028:Ho Chi Minh Trail
1012:Military Region 4
953:close air support
913:Sisavang Vatthana
905:Military Region 4
862:Ho Chi Minh Trail
852:Operation Phoutah
788:close air support
780:Ho Chi Minh Trail
776:Sisavang Vatthana
772:Laotian Civil War
762:
761:
405:Junction City Jr.
355:Battle of Nam Bac
305:Battle of Lak Sao
248:Laotian Civil War
212:
211:
166:Sisavang Vatthana
90:
89:
28:Laotian Civil War
1667:
1557:
1554:
1548:
1545:
1539:
1536:
1530:
1527:
1521:
1518:
1503:
1500:
1491:
1488:
1477:
1474:
1468:
1465:
1456:
1453:
1444:
1441:
1435:
1432:
1426:
1423:
1406:
1403:
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1385:
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1367:
1361:
1358:
1352:
1349:
1343:
1340:
1334:
1331:
1325:
1322:
1316:
1313:
1307:
1304:
1272:State Department
1125:North Vietnamese
1035:Commando Raiders
933:Bolovens Plateau
925:Bolovens Plateau
782:complex and its
468:Honorable Dragon
251:
249:
238:
231:
224:
215:
214:
152:
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139:
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127:
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39:
38:
18:
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1337:
1332:
1328:
1323:
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1314:
1310:
1305:
1301:
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1288:
1247:
1239:
1231:
1222:
1202:
1189:
1160:
1134:
1099:
1060:
1055:
1000:
995:
974:fighter-bombers
945:UTM coordinates
898:
878:Kingdom of Laos
858:
812:
765:
764:
763:
758:
664:Phou Phiang III
252:
247:
244:
242:
204:
176:
172:
170:Souvanna Phouma
168:
147:
145:
134:
132:
131:
122:
120:
119:
115:
111:
109:Kingdom of Laos
102:
100:
78:
71:Kingdom of Laos
67:Pyrrhic victory
58:
12:
11:
5:
1673:
1663:
1662:
1657:
1641:
1640:
1625:
1618:
1603:
1588:
1573:
1564:
1561:
1559:
1558:
1549:
1540:
1538:Ahern, p. 418.
1531:
1522:
1504:
1492:
1490:Ahern, p. 419.
1478:
1469:
1457:
1445:
1436:
1427:
1407:
1389:
1380:
1371:
1369:Ahern, p. 417.
1362:
1353:
1344:
1335:
1326:
1324:Ahern, p. 416.
1317:
1308:
1298:
1296:
1293:
1287:
1284:
1246:
1243:
1238:
1235:
1230:
1227:
1221:
1218:
1201:
1198:
1188:
1185:
1159:
1156:
1133:
1130:
1112:Reinforced by
1107:Thai mercenary
1098:
1095:
1059:
1056:
1054:
1051:
1024:Prime Minister
999:
996:
994:
991:
987:interior lines
897:
894:
840:Project Copper
811:
808:
760:
759:
757:
756:
749:
742:
735:
728:
721:
714:
707:
700:
693:
682:Air operations
678:
677:
672:
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660:
653:
646:
643:Black Lion III
639:
636:Phou Phiang II
632:
625:
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611:
604:
597:
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583:
576:
569:
562:
559:Phou Khao Kham
555:
548:
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471:
464:
457:
450:
443:
436:
429:
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415:
408:
401:
394:
389:
384:
377:
375:1967 Opium War
372:
370:Ban Naden raid
367:
362:
357:
352:
345:
340:
333:
326:
321:
314:
307:
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739:Commando Hunt
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1016:Melvin Laird
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966:interdiction
919:Unit of the
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718:Pony Express
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482:Counterpunch
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117:Supported by
116:
95:Belligerents
86:and Pak Song
982:Air America
976:by day and
732:Project 404
725:Tiger Hound
711:Steel Tiger
704:Barrel Roll
615:Strength II
517:Lam Son 719
426:Off Balance
205:302 wounded
77:Territorial
32:Vietnam War
1649:Categories
1563:References
1220:Denouement
1164:pathfinder
1091:regimental
1064:Raven FACs
993:Activities
937:guerrillas
896:Background
814:See also:
657:Maharat II
629:Black Lion
608:Strength I
545:Phiboonpol
524:Desert Rat
454:Snake Eyes
433:About Face
412:Toan Thang
299:Pincushion
203:136 killed
190:Over 4,000
1585:232549943
1286:Aftermath
1053:Phase two
1043:irregular
998:Phase one
929:airstrips
882:logistics
746:Raindance
531:Xien Dong
54:Southern
1206:Lao Ngam
1187:Route 23
1039:regiment
978:gunships
874:Tchepone
810:Overview
697:Millpond
675:Hin Heup
552:Sayasila
489:Tchepone
475:Tailwind
461:Maeng Da
419:Left Jab
381:Sone Pet
330:Triangle
311:Hardnose
292:Momentum
185:Strength
129:Thailand
50:Location
26:Part of
1280:CINCPAC
1250:moves,
1245:Results
1214:Thao Ty
1177:Thateng
1158:Paksong
1008:Salavan
959:and 35
941:Salavan
876:in the
800:Salavan
796:sorties
622:Fa Ngum
594:Maharat
580:Thao La
573:Bedrock
538:Phoutah
265:Hotfoot
174:Thao Ty
84:Salavan
79:changes
1635:
1613:
1598:
1583:
1093:size.
854:, and
601:Sinsay
496:Copper
398:Pigfat
151:
138:
126:
106:
63:Result
1295:Notes
1072:Pakse
972:with
957:AC-47
917:Pakse
337:Unity
193:1,100
1633:ISBN
1611:ISBN
1596:ISBN
1581:OCLC
1278:and
1254:and
961:T-28
884:and
753:Menu
349:Star
318:Wapi
208:~170
69:for
56:Laos
42:Date
1010:in
943:at
650:972
510:74B
440:139
180:N/A
1651::
1594:.
1507:^
1495:^
1481:^
1460:^
1448:^
1410:^
1392:^
850:,
846:,
842:,
838:,
834:,
830:,
826:,
822:,
818:,
30:;
1639:.
1617:.
1602:.
1587:.
587:Z
277:)
273:(
237:e
230:t
223:v
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