853:, which is an improved version of the "Emotions Bad, Reasoning Good" argument. It is claimed that emotion-driven processes tend to involve fast heuristics, which makes them unreliable. It follows that deontological intuitions, being an emotional form or reasoning themselves, should not be trusted. According to Berker this line of thought is also flawed. This is so because forms of reasoning that consist in heuristics are usually those in which we have a clear notion of what is right and wrong. Hence, in the moral domain, where these notions are highly disputed, "it is question begging to assume that the emotional processes underwriting deontological intuitions consist in heuristics". Berker also challenges the very assumption that heuristics lead to unreliable judgements. Additionally, he argues that, as far as we know, consequentialist judgements may also rely on heuristics, given that it is highly unlikely that they could always be the product of accurate and comprehensive mental calculations of all the possible outcomes.
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removing time pressure leads to an increase in consequentialist response. Being under cognitive load while making a moral judgement decreases consequentialist responses. In contrast, solving a difficult math problem before making a moral judgement (meant to make participants more skeptical of their intuitions) increases the number of consequentialist responses. When asked to explain or justify their responses, subjects preferentially chose consequentialist principles – even for explaining characteristically deontological responses. Further evidence shows that consequentialist responses to trolley-problem-like dilemmas are associated with deficits in emotional awareness in people with alexithymia or psychopathic tendencies. On the other hand, subjects being primed to be more emotional or empathetic give more characteristically deontological answers.
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is presented to people, but instead of flicking a switch, subjects are asked whether they would push a fat man onto the rails in order to stop the trolley, intuitions usually have it that pushing the fat man is the wrong choice. Given that both actions lead to the saving of five people, why is one judged to be right, whereas the other one wrong? According to Greene, there is no moral justification for this difference of intuitions between the 'switch' and the 'fat man' trolley-case. Instead, what leads to such difference is the morally irrelevant fact that the 'fat man' case involves the use of personal force (thus leading most people to judge that pushing the fat man is the wrong action), whereas the 'switch' case doesn't (thus leading most people to judge that flicking the switch is the right action).
605:"push the bystander." On the other hand, System 1 activates an "alarm bell" emotion: "do not harm the bystander." Greene and colleagues claim that the prohibition to harm is "nonnegotiable": It cannot be weighed against other values, including utilitarian considerations. They argue that "ntractable dilemmas arise when psychological systems produce outputs that are... non-negotiable because their outputs are processed as absolute demands, rather than fungible preferences." The dual-process model predicts that subtle changes in context will cause people to flip between extreme judgments: deontic and utilitarian. Moral compromises will be infrequent "trembling hand mistakes."
369:, he was involved in an accident: an "iron rod used to cram down the explosive powder shot into Gage's cheek, went through the front of his brain, and exited via the top of his head". Surprisingly, not only Gage survived, but he also went back to his normal life just in less than two months. Although his physical capacities were restored, however, his personality and his character radically changed. He became vulgar and anti-social: "Where he had once been responsible and self-controlled, now he was impulsive, capricious, and unreliable". Damasio wrote: "Gage was no longer Gage." Moreover, also his moral intuitions were transformed. Further studies by means of
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unlike consequentialist intuitions, emotion-based deontological intuitions are the side effects of this evolutionary adaption to the pre-existing environment. Therefore, "deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist intuitions, do not have any normative force". Berker states that this is an incorrect conclusion because there is no reason to think that consequentialist intuitions are not also by-products of evolution. Moreover, he argues that the invitation, advanced by Singer, to separate evolutionary-based moral judgements (allegedly unreliable) from those that are based on reason, is misleading because it is based on a
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556:– appears to be activated for characteristically consequentialist judgements. While it is not clear how crucial a role this region plays in moral judgements, one can argue that all moral judgements seem to involve at least some emotional processing. This would disprove the simplest version of the dual-process hypothesis. Greene responded to this argument by proposing that emotions that drive deontological judgements are "alarmlike", whereas those that are present during consequentialist judgements are "more like currency." A response which Berker regards to be without empirical backing.
548:, in particular, has argued that a multitude of attitudes towards the agents involved is important in evaluating an individual's moral stance, as well as evaluating the motivations that may inform those decisions. Kahane and Shackel scrutinize the questions and dilemmas Greene et al. use, and claim that the methodology used in the neuroscientific study of intuitions needs to be improved. However, after Kahane and colleagues engineered a set of moral dilemmas specifically meant to falsify Greene's theory, their moral dilemmas turned out to confirm it instead.
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that this is morally wrong, but Greene suggests that this intuition is the result of incest historically being evolutionary disadvantageous. However, if the siblings take extreme precautions, such as vasectomy, in order to avoid the risk of genetic mutation in their offspring, the cause of the moral intuition is no longer relevant. In such cases, scientific findings have given us reason to ignore some of our moral intuitions, and in turn revise the moral judgements which are based upon these intuitions.
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satisfying three conditions: a) The action in question could reasonably be expected to lead to bodily harm, b) The harm is inflicted in particular persons or members of a particular group and c) The harm is not a result of diverting a previously existing threat onto another party. All other dilemmas were classed as 'impersonal'. It was observed that when responding to personal dilemmas, the subjects displayed increased activity in regions of the brain associated with emotion (the medial
621:> 1 people are saved for each one sacrificed. Their experimental results show that people make many compromise judgments, which respect the axioms of rational choice. These results contradict the dual-process model, which claims that only deontic judgments are the product of moral rationality. The results indicate the existence of a moral tradeoff system that weighs competing moral considerations and finds a solution that is most right, which can be a compromise judgment.
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personal and close interactions with others. In the past century, our social organizations were altered and so these types of interactions have become less frequent. Therefore, Singer argues that we should rely on more sophisticated consequentialist judgements that fit better in our modern times than the deontological judgements that were useful for more rudimentary interactions.
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Susan Case", where the only way to save five people who sit on a Lazy Susan is to push the lazy Susan into an innocent bystander, killing him. so that serves as a counter-example. Although this thought experiment involves personal harm, the philosopher
Francis Kamm arrives at an intuitive consequentialist judgement, thinking it is permissible to kill one to save five.
572:"inappropriate" responses. Because of this way of calculating, the differences from question to question significantly skewed the results, Berker points out that some questions involved "easy" cases that should not be classified as dilemmas. This is because of the way these cases were framed, people found one of the choices to be obviously inappropriate.
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happens to be very large. The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push this stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below where his large body will stop the trolley. The stranger will die if you do this, but the five workmen will be saved. Is it appropriate for you to push the stranger onto the tracks in order to save the five workmen?
171:. We often rely on our "automatic settings" and allow intuitions to guide our behaviour and judgement. In "manual mode", judgments draw from both general knowledge about "how the world works" and explicit understanding of special situational features. The operations of this "manual mode" system requires effortful conscious deliberation.
765:, even if there's no disagreement about the underlying moral principles that govern the disputes. "If indeed we're wired for tribalism," Wright explains, "then maybe much of the problem has less to do with differing moral visions than with the simple fact that my tribe is my tribe and your tribe is your tribe. Both Greene and
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causing the deaths of the five workmen. The only way to avoid the deaths of these workmen is to hit a switch on your dashboard that will cause the trolley to proceed to the right, causing the death of the single workman. Is it appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to avoid the deaths of the five workmen?
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Berker criticises both premises and the move from C1 to C2. Regarding P1, Berker is not convinced that deontological judgments are correctly characterized as merely appealing to factors that make the dilemma personal. For example, Kamm's 'Lazy Susan' trolley case is an example of a 'personal' dilemma
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that differ across the dimension of personal force. When people are asked whether it would be right or wrong to flick a switch in order to divert a trolley from killing five people, their intuitions usually indicate that flicking the switch is the morally right choice. However, when the same scenario
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Third, Berker argues Greene's criteria to classify impersonal and personal moral dilemmas do not map onto the distinction of deontological and consequentialist moral judgements. It is not the case consequentialist judgements only arise if cases involve impersonal factors. Berkner highlights the "Lazy
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judgements. According to him, moral constructivism searches for reasonable grounds whereas deontological judgements rely on hasty and emotional responses. Singer argues our most immediate moral intuitions should be challenged. A normative ethic must not be evaluated by the extent to which it matches
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gives a better descriptive process for how these moral norms are derived from evolutionary processes and natural selection. For example, selective pressures favour self-sacrifice for the benefit of the group and punish those who do not. This provides a better explanation of the cost-benefit ratio for
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research, some scientists have argued that serial and parallel models fail to capture the true nature of the interaction between dual process systems. They contend that some operations that are commonly said to belong to the deliberative system can in fact also be cued by the intuitive system, and we
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Serial models assume that there is initially an exclusive focus on the intuitive system to make judgements but that this default processing might be followed by deliberative processing at a later stage. Greene et al.'s model is usually placed within this category. In contrast, in a parallel model, it
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There is lack of agreement on whether and how the two processes interact with one another. It is unclear whether deontological responders, for example, rely blindly on the intuitively cued response without any thought of utilitarian considerations or whether they recognise the alternative utilitarian
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Greene then states that the evidence for dual-process theory might give us reason to question judgements which are based upon moral intuitions, in cases where those moral intuitions might be based upon morally irrelevant factors. He gives the example of incestuous siblings. Intuition might tell us
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also points to a possible dissociation between emotional and rational decision processes. Damage to this area is typically associated with antisocial personality traits and impairments of moral decision making. Patients with these lesions tend to show a more frequent endorsement of the "utilitarian"
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cite studies in which people were randomly divided into two groups and immediately favored members of their own group in allocating resources -- even when they knew the assignment was random." Instead, Wright proposes that "nourishing the seeds of enlightenment indigenous to the world's tribes is a
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The dual process model, however, rules out the possibility of moral compromises. According to Greene and colleagues, people experience the footbridge problem as a dilemma because "two processes yield different answers to the same question". On the one hand, System 2 outputs a utilitarian judgment:
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brain regions when presented with situations involving the use of personal force (e.g. the 'footbridge' case). The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the parietal lobe are 'cognitive' brain regions; subjects show increased activity in these two regions when presented with impersonal moral dilemmas.
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In addition, Greene's results show that some brain areas, such as the medial prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate/precuneus, the posterior superior temporal sulcus/inferior parietal lobe, and the amygdala, are associated with emotional processes. Subjects exhibited increased activity in these
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The
Footbridge Case: "A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you on this footbridge is a stranger who
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Greene takes such observations as point of departure to argue that judgments produced by automatic-emotional processes lack normative force in comparison to those produced by conscious-controlled processes. Relying on automatic, emotional responses when dealing with unfamiliar moral dilemmas would
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utilitarian and deontological inclinations, but only by dissociating these moral inclinations with a more advanced protocol that was not used in early dual process theoretic research. Further, there is evidence that utilitarian decisions are associated with more emotional regret than deontological
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ignores the motivational aspect of decision making in human social contexts. A more specific example of this criticism focuses on the ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesion data. Although patients with this damage display characteristically "cold-blooded" behaviour in the trolley problem, they show
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Singer relies on evolutionary theories to justify his claim. For most of our evolutionary history, human beings have lived in small groups where violence was ubiquitous. Deontological judgements linked to emotional and intuitive responses were developed by human beings as they were confronted with
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Greene points to a large body of evidence from cognitive science suggesting that inclination to deontological or consequentialist judgment depends on whether emotional-intuitive reactions or more calculated ones were involved in the judgment-making process. For example, encouraging deliberation or
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in order to adapt, handle and promptly respond to such situations of violence within their groups. Cases of impersonal violence, instead, do not raise the same innate alarm and therefore they leave room for more accurate and analytical judgement of the situation. Thus, according to this argument,
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Greene's 2008 article "The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul" argues that
Kantian/deontological ethics tends to be driven by emotional respondes and is best understood as rationalization rather than rationalism—an attempt to justify intuitive moral judgments post-hoc, although the author states that his
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Greene and his colleagues carried out fMRI experiments in order to investigate which regions of the brain were activated in subjects while responding to 'personal dilemmas' such as the footbridge dilemma and 'impersonal dilemmas' such as the switch dilemma. 'Personal dilemmas' were defined as any
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Models of the former category lend support to the view that humans, in an effort to minimise cognitive effort, will choose to refrain from the more demanding deliberative system where possible. Only utilitarian responders will have opted into it. This further implies that deontological responders
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pointed out that moral dilemmas were a recurrent adaptive problem for ancestral humans, whose social life created multiple responsibilities to others (siblings, parents and offspring, cooperative partners, coalitional allies, and so on). Intermediate solutions, ones that strike a balance between
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in "personal" dilemmas, while those choosing the "deontological" path remained unaffected. Cognitive load, in general, is also found to increase the likelihood of "deontological" judgment These laboratory findings are supplemented by work that looks at the decision-making processes of real-world
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Greene concedes that his analogy has limited force. While a photographer can switch back-and-forth between automatic and manual mode, the automatic-intuitive processes of human reasoning are always active: conscious deliberations needs to "override" our intuitions. In addition to that, automatic
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The Switch Case "You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a fork in the tracks. On the tracks extending to the left is a group of five railway workmen. On the tracks extending to the right is a single railway workman. If you do nothing the trolley will proceed to the left,
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The appropriateness of applying our intuitive and automatic mode of reasoning to a given moral problem thus hinges on how the process was formed in the first place. Shaped by trial-and-error experience, automatic settings will only function well when one has sufficient experience of the
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as deriving from natural phenomena common to all humans. For instance, he mentions the "common or natural cause of our passions" and the generation of love for others represented through self-sacrifice for the greater good of the group. Hume's work is sometimes cited as an inspiration for
921:, or the belief that a widespread common negative intuition towards something is evidence that there is something morally wrong about it. This opposes Greene's conclusion that intuitions should not be expected to "perform well" or give us good ethical reasoning for some ethical problems.
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argument is speculative and will not be conclusive. Several philosophers have written critical responses, mainly criticising the necessary linking between process, automatic or controlled, intuitive or counterintuitive/rational, with containt, respectively, deontological or utilitarian.
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that focus on "best results" can be explained by the dual-process organisation of the human mind. Ethical decisions that fall under 'right action' correspond to automatic-emotional (system 1) processing, whereas 'best results' correspond to conscious-controlled reasoning (system 2).
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Berker's second methodological worry is that Greene et al. presented the response-time data to moral dilemmas in a statistically invalid way. Rather than calculating the average difference in response time between the "appropriate" responses and "inappropriate responses for
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involves slow and deliberative reasoning. Moral judgments of this type are less influenced by the immediate emotional features of decision-making. Instead, they may draw from general knowledge and abstract moral conceptions, combined with a more controlled analysis of situational
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response. Regarding P2, he argues that factors that make a dilemma personal or impersonal are not necessarily morally irrelevant. Moreover, he adds, P2 is 'armchair philosophizing': it cannot be deduced from neuroscientific results that the closeness of a dilemma is bears on its
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path in trolley problem dilemmas. Greene et al. claim that this shows that when emotional information is removed through context or damage to brain regions necessary to render such information, the process associated with rational, controlled reasoning dominates decision making.
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camera which operates in two complementary modes: automatic and manual. A photographer can either employ the automatic "point-and-shoot" setting, which is fast and highly efficient, or adjust and refine settings in manual mode, which gives the photographer greater flexibility.
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Trolley problems cannot be used to test for non-negotiability, because they force extreme responses (e.g., push or do not push). So, to test the prediction, Guzmán and colleagues designed a sacrificial moral dilemma that permits compromise judgments, of the form "sacrifice
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Other criticisms focus on the methodology of using moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem. These criticisms note the lack of affective realism in contrived moral dilemmas and their tendency to use the actions of strangers to offer a view of human moral sentiments.
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This has implications for philosophical discussion of what Greene calls "unfamiliar problems", or ethical problems ones with which we have inadequate evolutionary, cultural, or personal experience. We might have to attentively revise our intuitions for topics like
674:. For example, he considers the normative statement "capital juries make good judgements". Scientific findings could lead us to revise this judgement if it were found that capital juries were, in fact, sensitive to race if we accept the uncontroversial normative
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as morally wrong. However, a consequentialist judgement brings another conclusion. As the brother and sister did not tell anyone and they used contraceptives, the incest did not have any harmful consequences. Thus, in that case, incest is not necessarily wrong.
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Goldstein-Greenwood, J., Conway, P., Summerville, A., & Johnson, B. N. (2020). (How) Do You Regret
Killing One to Save Five? Affective and Cognitive Regret Differ After Utilitarian and Deontological Decisions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.
319:: "Characteristically deontological judgements are preferentially supported by automatic emotional responses, while characteristically consequentialist judgments are preferentially supported by conscious reasoning and allied processes of cognitive control".
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Berker has raised three methodological worries about Greene's empirical findings. First It is not the case that only deontological judgements are tied to cognitive processes. In fact, one region of the brain traditionally associated with the emotions –
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for two reasons. First, because there is no support for the claim that emotionally driven intuitions are less reliable than those guided by reason. Secondly, because the argument seems to rely on the assumption that deontological intuitions involve
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Another critical piece of evidence supporting the dual process account comes from reaction time data associated with moral dilemma experiments. Subjects who choose the "utilitarian" path in moral dilemmas showed increased reaction times under high
728:, global terrorism, global poverty, etc. As Greene states, this doesn't mean that our intuitions will always be wrong, but it means we need to pay attention as to where they come from and how they fare compared to more rational argument.
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With regards to automatic settings, Greene says we should only rely on these when faced with a moral problem that is sufficiently "familiar" to us. Familiarity, on Greene's conception, can arise from three sources - evolutionary history,
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and personal experience. It is possible that fear of snakes, for instance, can be traced to genetic dispositions, whereas a reluctance to place one's hand on a stove is caused by previous experience on burning one's hand on a hot stove.
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It draws on the idea that our different moral responses towards personal and impersonal harms are evolutionarily based. In fact, since personal violence has been known since ancient age, human developed emotional responses as innate
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levels will likely be ineffective in improving their overall moral agency, because such a disposition relies heavily on psychological, social and situational contexts, as well as their deeply held convictions and beliefs. Rather,
658:. Greene subsequently proposes that this vindicates consequentialism. He rejects deontology as a moral framework as holds that deontological theories may be reduced to "post-hoc" rationalisations of arbitrary emotional responses.
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More recent methodological concerns stem from new evidence suggesting that deontological inclinations are not necessarily more emotional or less rational than utilitarian inclinations. For example, cognitive reflection predicts
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will not experience any conflict from the "utilitarian pull" of the dilemma: they have not engaged in the processing that gives rise to these considerations in the first place. In contrast, in a parallel model both utilitarian
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Byrd, N., & Conway, P. (2019). Not all who ponder count costs: Arithmetic reflection predicts utilitarian tendencies, but logical reflection predicts both deontological and utilitarian tendencies. Cognition, 192, 103995.
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victim, as opposed to the weaker emotional response experienced when responding to the suffering of a large-scale, anonymous group (even though the benefit conferred by the subject would be of equal utility in both cases).
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conflicting moral values, would have often promoted fitness better than neglecting one value to fully satisfy others. A capacity to make intermediate or "compromise" judgments would have been favored by natural selection.
933:. Kass attempts to make a case against human cloning on the basis of the widespread strong feelings of repugnance at cloning. He lists examples of the various unpalatable consequences of cloning and appeals to notions of
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is responsible for weighing up the consequentialist response against the emotional response. Thus, three brain regions are primarily implicated in the making of moral judgements. This gives way to what Greene calls the
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explains justice from the evolutionary perspective by stating the instinct of reciprocity improved fitness for survival, therefore those who did not reciprocate were considered cheaters and cast-off from the group.
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When we are dealing with unfamiliar* moral problems, we ought to rely less on automatic settings (automatic emotional responses) and more on manual mode (conscious, controlled reasoning), lest we bank on cognitive
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primarily due to the deleterious effects that can arise when entrusting emotional, un-reasoned responses to tackling complex ethical issues, which can only be adequately addressed via rationality and reflection.
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of Greene's dual processes model of moral judgement.This figure describes the processes underlying individuals' judgement about (a) the
Trolley dilemma and (b) the Footbridge
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Conway, P., & Gawronski, B. (2013). Deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral decision making: A process dissociation approach. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 104(2), 216–235.
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that is associated with emotional processes. Hence, the claim that deontological judgements are less reliable than consequentialist judgements because they are influenced by emotions cannot be justified.
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A diagram depicting how Greene supposes the affective (automatic) response would override the consequentialist (manual) response in the footbridge case (below), but not in the switch case (above).
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response but, on consideration, decide against it. These alternative interpretations point to different models of interaction: a serial (or "default-interventionist") model, and a parallel model.
527:. It is argued that moral decisions are better understood as integrating emotional, rational, and motivational information, the last of which has been shown to involve areas of the brain in the
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models in light of this evidence. Hybrid models would lend support to the notion of a "utilitarian intuition" - a utilitarian response cued by the automatic, "emotion-driven" cognitive system.
83:. The original fMRI investigation proposing the dual process account has been cited in excess of 2000 scholarly articles, generating extensive use of similar methodology as well as criticism.
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Greene is not making the claim that moral judgements based on emotion are categorically bad. His position is that the different "settings" are appropriate for different scenarios.
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has called Joshua Greene's proposal for global harmony ambitious adding, "I like ambition!" But he also claims that people have a tendency to see facts in a way that serves their
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that they face conflicting responses, but they do not engage in deliberative processing to a sufficient extent to enable them to override the intuitive (deontological) response.
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one's moral responses in a flexible, reason-sensitive, and context-dependent way would be a more reliable, and in most cases more desirable, means to agential moral enhancement.
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relevance. Eventually, Berker concludes that even if we accept P1 and P2, C1 doesn't necessarily entail C2. This is because it may be the case that consequentialist intuitions
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intuitions imply abstract reasoning. Therefore, deontological intuitions don't have any normative force, whereas consequentialist intuitions do. Berker claims that this is
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decisions. Evidence like this complicates dual process theorists' claims that utilitarian thinking is more rational or that deontological thinking is more emotional.
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834:. As a matter of fact, Greene's research itself shows that consequentialist responses to personal moral dilemmas involve at least one brain region - the
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altruists in life-or-death situations. These heroes overwhelming described their actions as fast, intuitive, and virtually never as carefully reasoned.
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Białek, Michał; De Neys, Wim (2016-03-02). "Conflict detection during moral decision-making: evidence for deontic reasoners' utilitarian sensitivity".
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Białek, Michał; De Neys, Wim (2016-07-03). "Conflict detection during moral decision-making: evidence for deontic reasoners' utilitarian sensitivity".
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While the three bad arguments identified by Berker are not explicitly made by Greene and Singer, Berker considers them as implicit in their reasoning.
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Cushman F, Young L, Hauser M (December 2006). "The role of conscious reasoning and intuition in moral judgment: testing three principles of harm".
882:"P1. The emotional processing that gives rise to deontological intuitions responds to factors that make a dilemma personal rather than impersonal.
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382:, commenting on Phineas Gage case, Damasio said that after the accident the railroad worker was able "To know, but not to feel." As explained by
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Greene JD, Sommerville RB, Nystrom LE, Darley JM, Cohen JD (September 2001). "An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment".
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Handley, Simon J.; Trippas, Dries (2015). "Dual
Processes and the Interplay between Knowledge and Structure: A New Parallel Processing Model".
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Greene JD, Nystrom LE, Engell AD, Darley JM, Cohen JD (October 2004). "The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment".
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representation of a two proposal ultimatum game. Player 1 can offer a fair (F) or unfair (U) proposal; player 2 can accept (A) or reject (R).
2866:"A moral trade-off system produces intuitive judgments that are rational and coherent and strike a balance between conflicting moral values"
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Trémolière B, Neys WD, Bonnefon JF (September 2012). "Mortality salience and morality: thinking about death makes people less utilitarian".
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Greene ties the two processes to two existing classes of ethical theories in moral philosophy. He argues that the existing tension between
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is too quick to conclude utilitarianism specifically from the general goal of constructing an impartial morality; for example, he says,
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The dual-process theory of moral judgement asserts that moral decisions are the product of either one of two distinct mental processes.
386:, Joshua Greene thought that this could explain the difference in moral intuitions in different versions of the trolley problem: "We
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Greene J (October 2003). "From neural 'is' to moral 'ought': what are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology?".
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better bet than trying to convert all the tribes to utilitarianism -- both more likely to succeed, and more effective if it does."
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critically analyzed four arguments that might be inferred from Greene and Singer's conclusion. He labels three of them as merely
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Kleingeld, Pauline (2014). "Debunking
Confabulation: Emotions and the Significance of Empirical Psychology for Kantian Ethics".
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debate that more is required than the amplification of certain emotions. Increasing an agent's empathy by artificially raising
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Several scientific criticisms have been leveled against the dual process account. One asserts that the dual emotional/rational
294:), while when they responded to impersonal dilemmas, they displayed increased activity in regions of the brain associated with
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C1. So, the emotional processing that gives rise to deontological intuitions responds to factors that are morally irrelevant.
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respond to morally irrelevant factors. Unless we can show that this is not the case, the inference from C1 to C2 is invalid.
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showed a correlation between such "moral" and character transformations and injuries to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
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Moll J, De
Oliveira-Souza R, Zahn R (March 2008). "The neural basis of moral cognition: sentiments, concepts, and values".
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those moral intuitions. He gives the example of a brother and sister who secretly decide to have sex with each other using
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Meyers, C. D. (May 19, 2015). "Brains, trolleys, and intuitions: Defending deontology from the Greene/Singer argument".
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As an illustration of his dual-process theory of moral reasoning, Greene compares the dual-process in human brains to a
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Klein, Colin (5 June 2010). "The Dual Track Theory of Moral
Decision-Making: a Critique of the Neuroimaging Evidence".
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Greene JD (August 2007). "Why are VMPFC patients more utilitarian? A dual-process theory of moral judgment explains".
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There are 2 versions of trolley problem. They are trolley driver dilemma and footbridge dilemma presented as follows.
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Following neuroscientific experiments, in which subjects were confronted with ethical dilemmas following the logic of
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or "bad arguments", and the last one as "the argument from irrelevant factors". According to Berker, all of them are
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Gürçay, Burcu; Baron, Jonathan (2017-01-02). "Challenges for the sequential two-system model of moral judgement".
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judgments, on the other hand, seem to be supported by conscious-controlled processes and deliberative reasoning.
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Moll J, de Oliveira-Souza R (August 2007). "Response to Greene: Moral sentiments and reason: friends or foes?".
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Greene JD (November 2015). "Beyond point-and-shoot morality: Why cognitive (neuro) science matters for ethics".
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Greene JD (October 2017). "The rat-a-gorical imperative: Moral intuition and the limits of affective learning".
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C2. So, deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist intuitions, do not have any genuine normative force."
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Arguments for the dual process theory relying on neuroimaging data have been criticized for their reliance on
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A diagram showing the three main regions of the brain which Greene thinks are responsible for moral judgments.
2621:"Irrational economic decision-making after ventromedial prefrontal damage: evidence from the Ultimatum Game"
1712:"Dual processes and moral conflict: Evidence for deontological reasoners' intuitive utilitarian sensitivity"
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Greene JD (2014-07-01). "Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics".
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In particular, the role of empathy in morality has recently been heavily criticized by commentators such as
112:
behaviours and judgments. The factors affecting moral judgment of this type may be consciously inaccessible.
778:
In a widely cited critique of Greene's work and the philosophical implications of the dual process theory,
133:
39:
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to evaluate the brain activities and responses of people confronted with different variants of the famous
996:
This exemplifies the potential for empathy to 'misfire' and motivates the widely shared consensus in the
383:
175:
settings of our brains are not necessarily "hard-wired", but can be changed through (cultural) learning.
1885:"Tell Us What You Really Think: A Think Aloud Protocol Analysis of the Verbal Cognitive Reflection Test"
985:
836:
758:
553:
436:
2056:
3487:
965:
766:
545:
2334:
Would You Kill the Fat Man? The Trolley Problem and What Your Answer Tells Us about Right and Wrong
941:
to show that our disgust is the emotional expression of deep wisdom that is not fully articulable.
878:
Berker argued that the most promising argument from neural "is" to moral "ought" is the following.
287:
283:
2937:
964:, who describes it as "prone to biases that render moral judgment potentially harmful." Similarly
421:
147:
are preferentially supported by automatic-emotional processes and intuitions. Characteristically
86:
64:
1958:
Greene, J. D. (2001-09-14). "An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment".
762:
2864:
Guzmán, Ricardo AndrĂ©s; Barbato, MarĂa Teresa; Sznycer, Daniel; Cosmides, Leda (2022-10-18).
1489:
196:
deontological responders will have engaged both processing systems. Deontological responders
136:
claims that the two processes can be linked to two classes of ethical theories respectively.
2779:
Greene, Joshua (2007). "The secret joke of Kant's Soul". In Sinnott-Amstrong, Walter (ed.).
2476:"Risking your life without a second thought: intuitive decision-making and extreme altruism"
1325:
Railton P (July 2014). "The Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale: Intuition and Attunement".
885:
P2. The factors that make a dilemma personal rather than impersonal are morally irrelevant.
394:
it better to save five rather than one life. And the feeling and the thought are distinct."
2877:
2703:
Bloom P (2011). "Family, community, trolley problems, and the crisis in moral psychology".
2542:
2487:
2204:
1967:
1043:
818:
810:
671:
630:
519:
482:
420:
is often given an evolutionary rationale (in this basic sense, the theory is an example of
144:
8:
3303:
Kamm FM (September 2009). "Neuroscience and Moral Reasoning: A Note on Recent Research".
3000:
Moral psychology: The neuroscience of morality: emotion, brain disorders, and development
725:
511:
417:
378:
204:
51:
2881:
2546:
2491:
2208:
1971:
1911:
1884:
1047:
26:
that posits that human beings possess two distinct cognitive subsystems that compete in
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3173:
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3129:
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3059:
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1999:
1941:
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1555:
1512:
1470:
1400:
1350:
1307:
1209:
1166:
1123:
1067:
831:
779:
3002:. Moral psychology. Vol. 3. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. pp. 35–80.
2191:
Koenigs M, Young L, Adolphs R, Tranel D, Cushman F, Hauser M, Damasio A (April 2007).
3463:
3455:
3407:
3357:
3347:
3320:
3316:
3226:
3178:
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3098:
3063:
3011:
3007:
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2515:
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2300:
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2126:
2079:
2041:
1991:
1983:
1916:
1857:
1849:
1812:
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1602:
1590:
1547:
1543:
1462:
1458:
1442:
1354:
1342:
1299:
1201:
1158:
1115:
1059:
997:
271:
258:(Most people judge that it is not appropriate to push the stranger onto the tracks.)
47:
3248:"You Can't Learn About Morality from Brain Scans: The problem with moral psychology"
2689:
2605:
2570:
2460:
2444:
2399:
2368:
2091:
1869:
1785:
1737:
1689:
1645:
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1404:
1213:
1170:
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3086:
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3003:
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2632:
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2505:
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2440:
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2153:
2114:
2071:
2029:
2003:
1975:
1906:
1896:
1841:
1804:
1765:
1723:
1675:
1625:
1582:
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1504:
1474:
1454:
1392:
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1311:
1291:
1193:
1150:
1127:
1105:
1097:
1071:
1051:
814:
478:
275:
80:
69:
3090:
2821:
1901:
1769:
1629:
1586:
988:, where subjects exhibit a much stronger emotional reaction to the suffering of a
3125:
2953:
2500:
2140:
Boes AD, Grafft AH, Joshi C, Chuang NA, Nopoulos P, Anderson SW (December 2011).
1101:
969:
945:
930:
646:
358:
342:
238:
129:
59:
27:
23:
2584:
Sun R (December 2013). "Moral judgment, human motivation, and neural networks".
507:
50:
and others, the theory can be seen as a domain-specific example of more general
2681:
2261:
2075:
1808:
1234:
Greene JD (2008). Sinnott-Armstrong W (ed.). "The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul".
721:
636:
564:
moral dilemma, Greene et al. calculated the average response time of the
524:
447:
404:
295:
148:
43:
35:
3459:
2597:
2360:
2142:"Behavioral effects of congenital ventromedial prefrontal cortex malformation"
2118:
1728:
1680:
1663:
1508:
1396:
579:
Notwithstanding the above, the later criticism has been considered by Greene.
188:
is assumed that both processes are simultaneously engaged from the beginning.
3481:
3324:
3279:"Why Can't We All Just Get Along? The Uncertain Biological Basis of Morality"
2961:
2899:
2158:
1987:
1853:
1845:
1777:
1637:
1594:
1466:
1346:
1303:
867:
748:
666:
Greene firstly argues that scientific findings can help us reach interesting
597:
528:
487:
303:
125:
3361:
3222:
2890:
2554:
1979:
1055:
783:
3467:
3182:
2969:
2917:
2847:
2765:
2654:
2562:
2519:
2452:
2417:
2269:
2234:
2177:
2083:
2033:
1995:
1920:
1861:
1551:
1205:
1162:
1119:
1063:
934:
740:
470:
370:
362:
251:(Most people judge that it is appropriate to hit the switch in this case.)
2796:"Notes on 'The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience' by Selim Berker"
1883:
Byrd, Nick; Joseph, Brianna; Gongora, Gabriela; Sirota, Miroslav (2023).
961:
918:
462:
2216:
2193:"Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements"
3164:
2384:"Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment"
1711:
1110:
752:
455:
432:
55:
2382:
Greene JD, Morelli SA, Lowenberg K, Nystrom LE, Cohen JD (June 2008).
3212:
3039:
922:
848:
667:
532:
450:
428:
365:. On the 13th of September 1848, while working on a railway track in
279:
261:
109:
79:
The dual-process theory has had significant influence on research in
72:
implications of the theory, which has started an extensive debate in
1197:
952:
and their role in philosophy, and intuitions' relationship to them.
944:
There is a widespread debate on the role of moral emotions, such as
225:
3077:
Königs, Peter (April 3, 2018). "Two types of debunking arguments".
3055:
2938:"Finding faults: How moral dilemmas illuminate cognitive structure"
2834:
1338:
1295:
1001:
787:
523:
more likelihood of endorsement of emotionally laden choices in the
440:
307:
291:
167:
Dual-process moral reasoning is an effective response to a similar
3040:"Moral Implications from Cognitive (Neuro)Science? No Clear Route"
949:
938:
791:
695:
675:
466:
366:
31:
826:
emotional processes whereas consequentialist intuitions involve
357:
A popular medical case, studied in particular by neuroscientist
310:
is primarily responsible for the emotional response, whilst the
34:, the other slow, requiring conscious deliberation and a higher
873:
491:
346:
73:
2732:"Methodological Issues in the Neuroscience of Moral Judgement"
2336:. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. pp. 137–139.
1943:
Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them
1033:
917:
Many philosophers appeal to what is colloquially known as the
591:
469:, which is born out of the ability to detect those who cheat.
3149:"On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology"
2381:
2057:"Can cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging data?"
454:
the generation of love for others as originally mentioned by
2863:
929:
presents a prime example of a feelings-based response to an
1664:"An assessment of the temporal dynamics of moral decisions"
830:
abstract reasoning. For Berker, this assumption also lacks
62:"system1"/"system 2" distinction popularised in his book,
22:
within moral psychology is an influential theory of human
2532:
2190:
1087:
706:
In light of these considerations, Greene formulates the "
490:. Our first intuitive reaction is a firm condemnation of
1490:"The Science of Morality and its Normative Implications"
1009:
it is likely that augmenting higher-order capacities to
1882:
755:
offer other impartial approaches to ethical questions.
678:
that capital juries ought not to be sensitive to race.
2430:
2302:
Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain
685:
645:
One illustration of this tension are intuitions about
2667:
2139:
3423:"Why Paul Bloom Is Wrong About Empathy and Morality"
1029:
1027:
661:
3374:
3339:
2299:
1940:
1832:De Neys, Wim (January 2012). "Bias and Conflict".
1529:
1383:Singer P (October 2005). "Ethics and Intuitions".
1024:
3479:
2870:Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
2822:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.06.007
2327:
2325:
2323:
2293:
2291:
2289:
2287:
1487:
845:The second bad argument presented by Berker is
624:
306:). In recent work, Greene has stated that the
2936:Cushman, Fiery; Greene, Joshua D. (May 2012).
2015:
2013:
1798:
1443:"The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience"
1436:
1434:
1277:
1275:
1273:
1271:
1269:
1267:
1265:
1236:Moral Psychology: The Neuroscience of Morality
1083:
1081:
178:
3272:
3270:
3268:
2935:
2729:
2618:
1755:
1709:
1615:
1432:
1430:
1428:
1426:
1424:
1422:
1420:
1418:
1416:
1414:
1378:
1376:
1374:
1372:
1370:
1368:
1366:
1364:
1263:
1261:
1259:
1257:
1255:
1253:
1251:
1249:
1247:
1245:
1229:
1227:
1225:
1223:
461:Another example of an evolutionarily derived
143:Moral judgments that can be characterised as
42:along with Brian Sommerville, Leigh Nystrom,
2612:
2526:
2467:
2424:
2375:
2320:
2284:
2241:
2184:
2133:
2048:
1523:
874:The Argument from Morally Irrelevant Factors
439:' we find speculations about the origins of
108:is fast and unconscious, which gives way to
3198:"The Secret Emptiness of Greene's Argument"
2473:
2010:
1572:
1078:
978:"narrow-minded, parochial, and innumerate",
743:has argued that Joshua Greene, in his book
731:
635:of ethics that focus on "right action" and
592:Failure of the non-negotiability hypothesis
390:that we shouldn't push the fat man. But we
3265:
2535:Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
2347:Singer P (2005). "Ethics and Intuitions".
1411:
1361:
1242:
1220:
3239:
3210:
3172:
2907:
2889:
2755:
2644:
2509:
2499:
2407:
2224:
2167:
2157:
2098:
1910:
1900:
1727:
1679:
1488:Bruni T, Mameli M, Rini RA (2013-08-25).
1109:
858:"The Argument from Evolutionary History".
813:intuitions are driven by emotions, while
538:
411:
3394:Prinz, Jesse (2011). "Against empathy".
2848:https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167219897662
2054:
506:
502:
349:focusing on patients with damage to the
260:
224:
85:
3420:
3375:Scarantino A, de Sousa R (2018-09-25).
2331:
2297:
1831:
1324:
361:, was that of American railroad worker
3480:
3276:
3146:
3111:
3076:
2998:. In Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (ed.).
2990:
2793:
2778:
2346:
2247:
2019:
1957:
1938:
1440:
1382:
1281:
1233:
1183:
1140:
955:
912:
797:
773:
215:
3445:
3443:
3393:
3245:
2931:
2929:
2927:
2859:
2857:
2855:
2730:Kahane G, Shackel N (November 2010).
2702:
2104:
1934:
1932:
1930:
1834:Perspectives on Psychological Science
1801:Psychology of Learning and Motivation
1751:
1749:
1747:
1710:Białek, Michał; De Neys, Wim (2017).
1705:
1703:
1701:
1699:
1657:
1655:
477:Peter Singer agrees with Greene that
3449:
3337:
3302:
3037:
2619:Koenigs M, Tranel D (January 2007).
2022:The Law & Ethics of Human Rights
1661:
444:contemporary dual process theories.
3381:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2794:Greene, Joshua (14 December 2010).
2583:
896:which elicits a characteristically
95:
30:processes: one fast, intuitive and
13:
3440:
2924:
2852:
1927:
1744:
1696:
1652:
1238:. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 35–79.
972:: The Case for Rational Compassion
670:conclusions, without crossing the
481:judgements are to be favored over
68:. Greene has often emphasized the
14:
3504:
3195:
397:
154:
3421:Cummins, Denise (Oct 20, 2013).
3408:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00069.x
3317:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2009.01165.x
2993:"The secret joke of Kant's soul"
2835:https://doi.org/10.1037/a0031021
2748:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01401.x
2717:10.1111/j.1467-9736.2011.00701.x
2256:(8): 322–3, author reply 323–4.
1544:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01834.x
1459:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2009.01164.x
986:'The Identifiable victim effect'
337:
169:efficiency-flexibility trade-off
3414:
3387:
3368:
3331:
3305:Philosophy & Public Affairs
3296:
3204:
3189:
3140:
3105:
3070:
3031:
2984:
2839:
2826:
2813:
2787:
2772:
2723:
2696:
2661:
2577:
2445:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.05.011
2400:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004
2340:
1951:
1876:
1825:
1792:
1758:Journal of Cognitive Psychology
1618:Journal of Cognitive Psychology
1609:
1566:
1481:
1447:Philosophy & Public Affairs
1155:10.1016/j.cognition.2017.03.004
809:argument. According to it, our
708:No Cognitive Miracles Principle
220:
3396:Southern Journal of Philosophy
3008:10.7551/mitpress/7504.003.0004
2637:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4606-06.2007
1318:
1177:
1134:
807:"Emotions Bad, Reasoning Good"
596:Guzmán, Barbato, Sznycer, and
351:ventromedial prefrontal cortex
312:Ventromedial prefrontal cortex
300:Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
16:Theory of human moral judgment
1:
3091:10.1080/09515089.2018.1426100
2055:Poldrack, R (February 2006).
1902:10.3390/jintelligence11040076
1770:10.1080/20445911.2016.1156118
1630:10.1080/20445911.2016.1156118
1587:10.1080/13546783.2016.1216011
1017:
3277:Wright R (23 October 2013).
3126:10.1080/09515089.2013.849381
3038:Lott, Micah (October 2016).
2954:10.1080/17470919.2011.614000
2783:. MIT Press. pp. 35–80.
2670:Trends in Cognitive Sciences
2501:10.1371/journal.pone.0109687
2474:Rand DG, Epstein ZG (2014).
2306:. New York: Grosset/Putnam.
2250:Trends in Cognitive Sciences
2064:Trends in Cognitive Sciences
1803:. Elsevier. pp. 33–58.
1716:Judgment and Decision Making
1668:Judgment and Decision Making
1186:Nature Reviews. Neuroscience
1102:10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027
625:Alleged ethical implications
117:conscious-controlled process
7:
3342:The ethics of human cloning
2991:Greene, Joshuea D. (2007).
2625:The Journal of Neuroscience
1441:Berker S (September 2009).
179:Interaction between systems
106:automatic-emotional process
10:
3509:
2682:10.1016/j.tics.2007.06.011
2262:10.1016/j.tics.2007.06.004
2076:10.1016/j.tics.2005.12.004
1809:10.1016/bs.plm.2014.09.002
856:The third bad argument is
3214:Kant on Emotion and Value
2598:10.1007/s12559-012-9181-0
2361:10.1007/s10892-005-3508-y
2119:10.1007/s12152-010-9077-1
1729:10.1017/S1930297500005696
1681:10.1017/S1930297500003636
1662:Koop, Gregory. J (2013).
1509:10.1007/s12152-013-9191-y
1397:10.1007/s10892-005-3508-y
686:Greene's "indirect route"
317:Central Tension Principle
3114:Philosophical Psychology
3079:Philosophical Psychology
2159:10.1186/1471-2377-11-151
1846:10.1177/1745691611429354
1575:Thinking & Reasoning
732:Philosophical criticisms
437:Treatise of Human Nature
288:Inferior parietal lobule
284:Superior temporal sulcus
141:Central Tension Problem:
38:. Initially proposed by
3223:10.1057/9781137276650_8
2891:10.1073/pnas.2214005119
2555:10.1196/annals.1440.005
1980:10.1126/science.1062872
1939:Greene, Joshua (2014).
1889:Journal of Intelligence
1056:10.1126/science.1062872
662:Greene's "direct route"
554:the posterior cingulate
422:evolutionary psychology
65:Thinking, Fast and Slow
3493:Psychological theories
3452:Moral neuroenhancement
3246:Nagel T (2013-11-02).
2034:10.1515/lehr-2015-0011
1015:
984:An example of this is
893:
717:
632:deontological theories
568:"appropriate" and the
539:Methodological Worries
515:
412:Evolutionary rationale
266:
230:
92:
3379:. In Zalta EN (ed.).
2586:Cognitive Computation
2349:The Journal of Ethics
1532:Psychological Science
1385:The Journal of Ethics
1007:
880:
782:philosophy professor
712:
510:
503:Scientific criticisms
264:
228:
89:
52:dual process accounts
3450:Earp, Brian (2017).
3217:. pp. 146–165.
3147:Kahane, Guy (2012).
2781:Big Moral Psychology
927:Wisdom of Repugnance
638:utilitarian theories
208:need to think about
48:Jonathan David Cohen
3153:Mind & Language
2942:Social Neuroscience
2882:2022PNAS..11914005G
2876:(42): e2214005119.
2801:(Unpublished notes)
2736:Mind & Language
2547:2008NYASA1124..161M
2492:2014PLoSO...9j9687R
2217:10.1038/nature05631
2209:2007Natur.446..908K
1972:2001Sci...293.2105G
1966:(5537): 2105–2108.
1048:2001Sci...293.2105G
956:The role of empathy
913:Intuition as wisdom
847:"The Argument from
837:posterior cingulate
798:Three bad arguments
774:Berker's criticisms
726:genetic engineering
703:situation at hand.
656:cognitive miracles"
451:evolutionary theory
418:dual process theory
216:Scientific evidence
20:Dual process theory
3165:10.1111/mila.12001
2332:Edmonds D (2014).
2298:Damasio A (1994).
976:labels empathy as
832:empirical evidence
516:
431:thinking, such as
343:Neuropsychological
267:
231:
139:He calls this the
93:
32:emotionally-driven
3232:978-1-349-44676-6
3017:978-0-262-19564-5
998:moral enhancement
805:The first is the
654:mean to bank on "
332:reverse inference
272:Prefrontal cortex
60:Daniel Kahneman's
3500:
3488:Moral psychology
3472:
3471:
3447:
3438:
3437:
3435:
3433:
3427:Psychology Today
3418:
3412:
3411:
3391:
3385:
3384:
3372:
3366:
3365:
3345:
3335:
3329:
3328:
3300:
3294:
3293:
3291:
3289:
3274:
3263:
3262:
3260:
3258:
3243:
3237:
3236:
3208:
3202:
3201:
3193:
3187:
3186:
3176:
3144:
3138:
3137:
3109:
3103:
3102:
3074:
3068:
3067:
3035:
3029:
3028:
3026:
3020:. Archived from
2997:
2988:
2982:
2981:
2933:
2922:
2921:
2911:
2893:
2861:
2850:
2843:
2837:
2830:
2824:
2817:
2811:
2810:
2808:
2806:
2800:
2791:
2785:
2784:
2776:
2770:
2769:
2759:
2727:
2721:
2720:
2700:
2694:
2693:
2665:
2659:
2658:
2648:
2616:
2610:
2609:
2581:
2575:
2574:
2530:
2524:
2523:
2513:
2503:
2471:
2465:
2464:
2428:
2422:
2421:
2411:
2379:
2373:
2372:
2355:(3–4): 331–352.
2344:
2338:
2337:
2329:
2318:
2317:
2305:
2295:
2282:
2281:
2245:
2239:
2238:
2228:
2203:(7138): 908–11.
2188:
2182:
2181:
2171:
2161:
2137:
2131:
2130:
2102:
2096:
2095:
2061:
2052:
2046:
2045:
2017:
2008:
2007:
1955:
1949:
1948:
1946:
1936:
1925:
1924:
1914:
1904:
1880:
1874:
1873:
1829:
1823:
1822:
1796:
1790:
1789:
1753:
1742:
1741:
1731:
1707:
1694:
1693:
1683:
1659:
1650:
1649:
1613:
1607:
1606:
1570:
1564:
1563:
1527:
1521:
1520:
1494:
1485:
1479:
1478:
1438:
1409:
1408:
1391:(3–4): 331–352.
1380:
1359:
1358:
1322:
1316:
1315:
1279:
1240:
1239:
1231:
1218:
1217:
1181:
1175:
1174:
1138:
1132:
1131:
1113:
1085:
1076:
1075:
1042:(5537): 2105–8.
1031:
970:'Against Empathy
898:consequentialist
819:question begging
815:consequentialist
479:consequentialist
379:Descartes' Error
282:, the posterior
276:Cingulate cortex
274:, the posterior
132:(see Figure 1),
96:Core commitments
81:moral psychology
3508:
3507:
3503:
3502:
3501:
3499:
3498:
3497:
3478:
3477:
3476:
3475:
3448:
3441:
3431:
3429:
3419:
3415:
3402:(s1): 214–233.
3392:
3388:
3373:
3369:
3354:
3338:Kass L (1998).
3336:
3332:
3301:
3297:
3287:
3285:
3275:
3266:
3256:
3254:
3244:
3240:
3233:
3209:
3205:
3194:
3190:
3145:
3141:
3110:
3106:
3075:
3071:
3036:
3032:
3024:
3018:
2995:
2989:
2985:
2934:
2925:
2862:
2853:
2844:
2840:
2831:
2827:
2818:
2814:
2804:
2802:
2798:
2792:
2788:
2777:
2773:
2728:
2724:
2705:The Yale Review
2701:
2697:
2666:
2662:
2617:
2613:
2582:
2578:
2531:
2527:
2486:(10): e109687.
2472:
2468:
2429:
2425:
2380:
2376:
2345:
2341:
2330:
2321:
2314:
2296:
2285:
2246:
2242:
2189:
2185:
2138:
2134:
2103:
2099:
2059:
2053:
2049:
2018:
2011:
1956:
1952:
1937:
1928:
1881:
1877:
1830:
1826:
1819:
1797:
1793:
1754:
1745:
1708:
1697:
1660:
1653:
1614:
1610:
1571:
1567:
1528:
1524:
1492:
1486:
1482:
1439:
1412:
1381:
1362:
1323:
1319:
1280:
1243:
1232:
1221:
1198:10.1038/nrn1224
1182:
1178:
1139:
1135:
1086:
1079:
1032:
1025:
1020:
958:
931:ethical dilemma
915:
876:
868:false dichotomy
800:
776:
734:
688:
664:
627:
613:people to save
594:
541:
505:
414:
400:
359:Antonio Damasio
340:
239:Trolley problem
223:
218:
203:Within generic
181:
157:
126:Philippa Foot's
98:
28:moral reasoning
24:moral judgement
17:
12:
11:
5:
3506:
3496:
3495:
3490:
3474:
3473:
3439:
3413:
3386:
3367:
3353:978-0844740508
3352:
3330:
3311:(4): 330–345.
3295:
3264:
3238:
3231:
3203:
3196:Fiala, Brian.
3188:
3159:(5): 519–545.
3139:
3120:(4): 466–486.
3104:
3085:(3): 383–402.
3069:
3056:10.1086/687337
3050:(1): 241–256.
3030:
3027:on 2011-08-18.
3016:
2983:
2948:(3): 269–279.
2923:
2851:
2838:
2825:
2812:
2786:
2771:
2742:(5): 561–582.
2722:
2695:
2660:
2611:
2576:
2525:
2466:
2423:
2394:(3): 1144–54.
2374:
2339:
2319:
2312:
2283:
2240:
2183:
2132:
2113:(2): 143–162.
2097:
2047:
2009:
1950:
1926:
1875:
1824:
1817:
1791:
1764:(5): 631–639.
1743:
1722:(2): 148–167.
1695:
1674:(5): 527–539.
1651:
1624:(5): 631–639.
1608:
1565:
1538:(12): 1082–9.
1522:
1503:(2): 159–172.
1480:
1453:(4): 293–329.
1410:
1360:
1339:10.1086/675876
1333:(4): 813–859.
1317:
1296:10.1086/675875
1290:(4): 695–726.
1241:
1219:
1176:
1133:
1096:(2): 389–400.
1077:
1022:
1021:
1019:
1016:
957:
954:
914:
911:
875:
872:
799:
796:
775:
772:
733:
730:
722:climate change
687:
684:
663:
660:
626:
623:
593:
590:
540:
537:
525:Ultimatum Game
512:Extensive form
504:
501:
488:contraceptives
413:
410:
405:cognitive load
399:
398:Reaction times
396:
347:lesion studies
345:evidence from
339:
336:
296:working memory
222:
219:
217:
214:
180:
177:
156:
155:Camera analogy
153:
122:
121:
113:
97:
94:
36:cognitive load
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3505:
3494:
3491:
3489:
3486:
3485:
3483:
3469:
3465:
3461:
3457:
3454:. Routledge.
3453:
3446:
3444:
3428:
3424:
3417:
3409:
3405:
3401:
3397:
3390:
3382:
3378:
3371:
3363:
3359:
3355:
3349:
3346:. AEI Press.
3344:
3343:
3334:
3326:
3322:
3318:
3314:
3310:
3306:
3299:
3284:
3280:
3273:
3271:
3269:
3253:
3249:
3242:
3234:
3228:
3224:
3220:
3216:
3215:
3207:
3199:
3192:
3184:
3180:
3175:
3170:
3166:
3162:
3158:
3154:
3150:
3143:
3135:
3131:
3127:
3123:
3119:
3115:
3108:
3100:
3096:
3092:
3088:
3084:
3080:
3073:
3065:
3061:
3057:
3053:
3049:
3045:
3041:
3034:
3023:
3019:
3013:
3009:
3005:
3001:
2994:
2987:
2979:
2975:
2971:
2967:
2963:
2959:
2955:
2951:
2947:
2943:
2939:
2932:
2930:
2928:
2919:
2915:
2910:
2905:
2901:
2897:
2892:
2887:
2883:
2879:
2875:
2871:
2867:
2860:
2858:
2856:
2849:
2842:
2836:
2829:
2823:
2816:
2797:
2790:
2782:
2775:
2767:
2763:
2758:
2753:
2749:
2745:
2741:
2737:
2733:
2726:
2718:
2714:
2710:
2706:
2699:
2691:
2687:
2683:
2679:
2675:
2671:
2664:
2656:
2652:
2647:
2642:
2638:
2634:
2630:
2626:
2622:
2615:
2607:
2603:
2599:
2595:
2592:(4): 566–79.
2591:
2587:
2580:
2572:
2568:
2564:
2560:
2556:
2552:
2548:
2544:
2541:(1): 161–80.
2540:
2536:
2529:
2521:
2517:
2512:
2507:
2502:
2497:
2493:
2489:
2485:
2481:
2477:
2470:
2462:
2458:
2454:
2450:
2446:
2442:
2439:(3): 379–84.
2438:
2434:
2427:
2419:
2415:
2410:
2405:
2401:
2397:
2393:
2389:
2385:
2378:
2370:
2366:
2362:
2358:
2354:
2350:
2343:
2335:
2328:
2326:
2324:
2315:
2313:9780399138942
2309:
2304:
2303:
2294:
2292:
2290:
2288:
2279:
2275:
2271:
2267:
2263:
2259:
2255:
2251:
2244:
2236:
2232:
2227:
2222:
2218:
2214:
2210:
2206:
2202:
2198:
2194:
2187:
2179:
2175:
2170:
2165:
2160:
2155:
2151:
2147:
2146:BMC Neurology
2143:
2136:
2128:
2124:
2120:
2116:
2112:
2108:
2101:
2093:
2089:
2085:
2081:
2077:
2073:
2069:
2065:
2058:
2051:
2043:
2039:
2035:
2031:
2028:(2): 141–72.
2027:
2023:
2016:
2014:
2005:
2001:
1997:
1993:
1989:
1985:
1981:
1977:
1973:
1969:
1965:
1961:
1954:
1945:
1944:
1935:
1933:
1931:
1922:
1918:
1913:
1908:
1903:
1898:
1894:
1890:
1886:
1879:
1871:
1867:
1863:
1859:
1855:
1851:
1847:
1843:
1839:
1835:
1828:
1820:
1818:9780128022733
1814:
1810:
1806:
1802:
1795:
1787:
1783:
1779:
1775:
1771:
1767:
1763:
1759:
1752:
1750:
1748:
1739:
1735:
1730:
1725:
1721:
1717:
1713:
1706:
1704:
1702:
1700:
1691:
1687:
1682:
1677:
1673:
1669:
1665:
1658:
1656:
1647:
1643:
1639:
1635:
1631:
1627:
1623:
1619:
1612:
1604:
1600:
1596:
1592:
1588:
1584:
1580:
1576:
1569:
1561:
1557:
1553:
1549:
1545:
1541:
1537:
1533:
1526:
1518:
1514:
1510:
1506:
1502:
1498:
1491:
1484:
1476:
1472:
1468:
1464:
1460:
1456:
1452:
1448:
1444:
1437:
1435:
1433:
1431:
1429:
1427:
1425:
1423:
1421:
1419:
1417:
1415:
1406:
1402:
1398:
1394:
1390:
1386:
1379:
1377:
1375:
1373:
1371:
1369:
1367:
1365:
1356:
1352:
1348:
1344:
1340:
1336:
1332:
1328:
1321:
1313:
1309:
1305:
1301:
1297:
1293:
1289:
1285:
1278:
1276:
1274:
1272:
1270:
1268:
1266:
1264:
1262:
1260:
1258:
1256:
1254:
1252:
1250:
1248:
1246:
1237:
1230:
1228:
1226:
1224:
1215:
1211:
1207:
1203:
1199:
1195:
1192:(10): 846–9.
1191:
1187:
1180:
1172:
1168:
1164:
1160:
1156:
1152:
1148:
1144:
1137:
1129:
1125:
1121:
1117:
1112:
1107:
1103:
1099:
1095:
1091:
1084:
1082:
1073:
1069:
1065:
1061:
1057:
1053:
1049:
1045:
1041:
1037:
1030:
1028:
1023:
1014:
1012:
1006:
1003:
999:
994:
991:
987:
982:
979:
975:
973:
967:
963:
953:
951:
947:
942:
940:
936:
932:
928:
924:
920:
910:
908:
904:
899:
892:
889:
886:
883:
879:
871:
869:
864:
863:alarm systems
859:
854:
852:
850:
843:
840:
838:
833:
829:
825:
820:
816:
812:
811:deontological
808:
803:
795:
793:
789:
785:
781:
771:
768:
764:
760:
759:Robert Wright
756:
754:
750:
749:Immanuel Kant
746:
745:Moral Tribes,
742:
738:
729:
727:
723:
716:
711:
709:
704:
700:
697:
691:
683:
679:
677:
673:
669:
659:
657:
651:
648:
647:trolley-cases
643:
640:
639:
634:
633:
622:
620:
616:
612:
606:
602:
599:
589:
586:
580:
577:
573:
571:
567:
563:
557:
555:
549:
547:
536:
534:
530:
529:limbic system
526:
521:
513:
509:
500:
496:
493:
489:
484:
483:deontological
480:
475:
472:
468:
464:
459:
457:
452:
449:
445:
442:
438:
434:
430:
425:
423:
419:
409:
406:
395:
393:
389:
385:
384:David Edmonds
381:
380:
374:
372:
368:
364:
360:
355:
352:
348:
344:
338:Brain lesions
335:
333:
328:
324:
320:
318:
313:
309:
305:
304:Parietal lobe
301:
297:
293:
289:
285:
281:
277:
273:
263:
259:
257:
252:
250:
245:
242:
240:
236:
227:
213:
211:
206:
201:
199:
195:
189:
185:
176:
172:
170:
165:
162:
152:
150:
146:
145:deontological
142:
137:
135:
134:Joshua Greene
131:
127:
118:
114:
111:
107:
103:
102:
101:
88:
84:
82:
77:
75:
71:
67:
66:
61:
57:
53:
49:
45:
41:
40:Joshua Greene
37:
33:
29:
25:
21:
3451:
3430:. Retrieved
3426:
3416:
3399:
3395:
3389:
3380:
3370:
3341:
3333:
3308:
3304:
3298:
3286:. Retrieved
3283:The Atlantic
3282:
3255:. Retrieved
3252:New Republic
3251:
3241:
3213:
3206:
3191:
3156:
3152:
3142:
3117:
3113:
3107:
3082:
3078:
3072:
3047:
3043:
3033:
3022:the original
2999:
2986:
2945:
2941:
2873:
2869:
2841:
2828:
2815:
2805:20 September
2803:. Retrieved
2789:
2780:
2774:
2739:
2735:
2725:
2711:(2): 26–43.
2708:
2704:
2698:
2676:(8): 323–4.
2673:
2669:
2663:
2631:(4): 951–6.
2628:
2624:
2614:
2589:
2585:
2579:
2538:
2534:
2528:
2483:
2479:
2469:
2436:
2432:
2426:
2391:
2387:
2377:
2352:
2348:
2342:
2333:
2301:
2253:
2249:
2243:
2200:
2196:
2186:
2149:
2145:
2135:
2110:
2106:
2100:
2070:(2): 59–63.
2067:
2063:
2050:
2025:
2021:
1963:
1959:
1953:
1942:
1892:
1888:
1878:
1840:(1): 28–38.
1837:
1833:
1827:
1800:
1794:
1761:
1757:
1719:
1715:
1671:
1667:
1621:
1617:
1611:
1581:(1): 49–80.
1578:
1574:
1568:
1535:
1531:
1525:
1500:
1496:
1483:
1450:
1446:
1388:
1384:
1330:
1326:
1320:
1287:
1283:
1235:
1189:
1185:
1179:
1146:
1142:
1136:
1093:
1089:
1039:
1035:
1010:
1008:
995:
989:
983:
977:
971:
968:, author of
959:
943:
935:human nature
926:
916:
906:
902:
897:
894:
890:
887:
884:
881:
877:
862:
857:
855:
846:
844:
835:
827:
823:
806:
804:
801:
784:Selim Berker
777:
757:
744:
741:Thomas Nagel
739:
735:
718:
713:
707:
705:
701:
692:
689:
680:
672:is–ought gap
665:
655:
652:
644:
637:
631:
628:
618:
614:
610:
607:
603:
595:
584:
581:
578:
574:
569:
565:
561:
558:
550:
542:
517:
497:
476:
471:Peter Singer
460:
446:
426:
415:
401:
391:
387:
377:
376:In his book
375:
371:neuroimaging
363:Phineas Gage
356:
341:
329:
325:
321:
316:
268:
254:
253:
247:
246:
243:
233:Greene uses
232:
221:Neuroimaging
209:
205:dual process
202:
197:
193:
190:
186:
182:
173:
168:
166:
158:
140:
138:
130:Trolley Case
123:
116:
105:
99:
78:
63:
19:
18:
3288:24 November
3257:24 November
2107:Neuroethics
1497:Neuroethics
1111:10983/15961
919:yuck factor
241:in ethics.
161:digital SLR
149:utilitarian
44:John Darley
3482:Categories
3460:1027761018
1947:. Penguin.
1018:References
966:Paul Bloom
962:Jess Prinz
849:Heuristics
792:fallacious
767:Paul Bloom
753:John Rawls
546:Paul Bloom
533:brain stem
58:, such as
56:psychology
3377:"Emotion"
3325:0048-3915
3134:146547149
3099:148678250
3064:151940241
2962:1747-0919
2900:0027-8424
2433:Cognition
2388:Cognition
2127:143640307
2042:199486714
1988:0036-8075
1895:(4): 76.
1854:1745-6916
1778:2044-5911
1638:2044-5911
1603:148524895
1595:1354-6783
1467:0048-3915
1355:143579026
1347:0014-1704
1304:0014-1704
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110:intuitive
70:normative
3468:29630194
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1064:11557895
1011:modulate
1002:oxytocin
788:rhetoric
598:Cosmides
570:combined
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441:morality
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