495:, argues that the Team B exercise made sense in theory because scrutiny from outside of the intelligence bureaucracy can pressure analysts to be forthright regarding their assumptions and methodology. Providing Team B the opportunity to create an alternative assessment could have shed light on any institutional baggage, group-think, and inefficiency. "The competition turned ugly, however, when Team B turned its attention away from Moscow and leveled a blistering attack on the NIE process itself." It excoriated intelligence agencies for "persistent flaws" in past estimates and took it upon itself to "determine what methodological misperceptions cause their most serious errors of judgment." The intelligence community was furious, Rovner maintains, because they believed that the exercise was motivated by an ideological desire to frame the Soviet Union as more belligerent than the intelligence community was leading on. The NIE that emerged from the debacle was strongly influenced by Team B's contributions. Rovner believes that Team B was a case of indirect politicization. "The administration did not try to determine the membership of Team B nor the process of the exercise, but it gave de facto control over these pivotal issues to a group of outspoken critics of
588:
advocates, saying that "no doubt exists about the capabilities of the Soviet armed forces" and that those capabilities "indicate a tendency toward war fighting ... rather than the more modish
Western models of deterrence through mutual vulnerability." Team B's efforts not only were effective in undermining the incoming Carter administration's disarmament efforts but also laid the foundation for the unnecessary explosion of the defense budget in the Reagan years. And it was during those years that virtually all of Rumsfeld's compatriots were elevated to positions of power in the executive branch.
71:
479:, 1977–1980), Team B's analysis of weapons systems was later proven to be false. "I would say that all of it was fantasy. ... if you go through most of Team B's specific allegations about weapons systems, and you just examine them one by one, they were all wrong." The CIA director at the time, George H. W. Bush, concluded that the Team B approach set "in motion a process that lends itself to manipulation for purposes other than estimative accuracy."
335:
of the Soviet military budget as being only half of its actual value, and that this number was still being used as a baseline for current estimates. Using these numbers, the report concluded, greatly underestimated the resources available to the Soviet military and consequentially, underestimated potential capability, The report argued that the
Soviets did not have the same financial constraints as the West,
577:. Although he agrees that "Team B's alternative National Intelligence Estimate contained its own mistakes", he claims that "Russian sources now show that the Team B analysts were fundamentally correct on all the key issues." He further says that when Team B and the CIA debated their reports in 1976, the CIA "conceded all essential points on Soviet nuclear war strategy to its harshest critics."
320:
the threat posed by Soviet strategic weapons programs, and that the development and deployment of several new weapons platforms and advancements in existing technologies would drastically alter the advantages that the United States and NATO had over the Warsaw Pact. The report cited these specific areas to reinforce its assessment:
327:
The report cited the recent development of Soviet MIRV missile technology, coupled with a rapid modernization of ICBM and SLBM targeting capabilities to argue that the NIE was underestimating the impact of the sophistication, effectiveness and threat of numerical superiority that the Soviet strategic
303:
The first section of the report dealt with the team's criticisms of the NIE's assessment of Soviet strategic objectives. It was the conclusion of the report, that the NIE was mostly wrong to view Soviet strategic actions as primarily a response to its history of being invaded and that the NIE ignored
546:
Whatever might be said for evaluation of strategic capabilities by a group of outside experts, the impracticality of achieving useful results by 'independent' analysis of strategic objectives should have been self-evident. Moreover, the futility of the Team B enterprise was assured by the selection
399:
The report argued that despite the NIE's assessment in its 10-year forecast that the Soviet Navy was not aggressively developing more accurate ASW detection tools and would not be able to deploy new more advanced ASW capabilities in the next 10 years, the evidence in the NIE suggested that they had
334:
The NIE viewed Soviet military expenditures as being limited to economic activity in a similar manner as in the west. The report also took exception to this conclusion, arguing that, in retrospect, prior estimates of Soviet military budgets were far from accurate. They cited the 1970 NIE's estimate
319:
The second section of the report was primarily a criticism of the NIE's conclusions regarding Soviet strategic weapons programs, and how they are integrated into conventional Soviet forces and what impacts they have on Soviet strategic goals and plans. The report argued that the NIE underestimated
182:
to approve a project that would result in comparative assessments of the Soviet threat. Colby refused, stating it was hard "to envisage how an ad hoc independent group of analysts could prepare a more thorough, comprehensive assessment of Soviet strategic capabilities than could the intelligence
483:
Scholar
Raymond Garthoff concurred, writing that in "retrospect, and with the Team B report and records now largely declassified, it is possible to see that virtually all of Team B's criticisms... proved to be wrong. On several important specific points it wrongly criticized and 'corrected' the
466:
were wildly off the mark. Describing the Soviet Union, in 1976, as having 'a large and expanding Gross
National Product,' it predicted that it would modernize and expand its military at an awesome pace. For example, it predicted that the Backfire bomber 'probably will be produced in substantial
587:
Despite
Kissinger's condemnation of Team B's assessment, Rumsfeld was effusive in promoting it as a credible study—and thereby undermining arms control efforts for the next four years. Two days before Jimmy Carter's inauguration, Rumsfeld fired parting shots at Kissinger and other disarmament
345:
Both the NIE and the Team B report noted that the level of sophistication, scope and expansion of nuclear civil defense was unmatched. And although the Soviet hardening of military and governmental facilities was covered by the NIE the report argued that this was a significant factor in their
198:, obtained a go-ahead, and by May 26 had signed off on the experiment. A team of 16 "outside experts" were to take an independent look at highly classified data used by the intelligence community to assess Soviet strategic forces in the yearly National Intelligence Estimates.
304:
or misinterpreted evidence that most Soviet strategic actions were offensive rather than defensive in nature. The report also rejected the NIE's conclusion that as the Soviet Union grew more powerful and capable its foreign policy would also become less aggressive.
558:
We dealt with one problem only: What is the Soviet strategy for nuclear weapons? Team B was appointed to look at the evidence and to see if we could conclude that the actual Soviet strategy is different from ours. It's now demonstrated totally, completely, that it
426:. The report argued that since the NIE conceded that Soviet ABM research and development was continuing at a pace similar in size and scope it was before the ABM Treaty in 1972, it was likely that Soviet ABM technology was greater than the NIE concluded it was.
513:
At the level of what might be called strategic intent (how to approach war if it came), Soviet military doctrine was indeed clearly offensive and aimed at securing maximum advantage. Virtually no one challenged this point. Team B and
Harvard University's
383:, in capabilities. The report argued that the potential of the bomber, both in range and armaments, meant that it was more appropriate to classify the bomber as a long-range strategic platform, thereby impacting the total Soviet strategic nuclear threat.
518:
focused on this but did not distinguish the military strategic orientation clearly from political intent (objectives to be achieved), on which there were many more indications of Soviet commitment to avoiding nuclear war at nearly all costs. Team A and
452:'d nuclear missiles of high yield and high accuracy—appropriate for attacking hardened missile silos, but not needed for such large and vulnerable 'hostage' sites as cities). This was shocking to many at the time, but Pipes argues that later, after the
74:
United States and Soviet Union/Russia nuclear stockpiles. The
Soviets strove for "nuclear superiority", especially in terms of numbers of ICBMs beginning in the 1970s, which in an oral history project conducted years later, was intended to overtake
400:
significantly ramped up ASW R&D, including non acoustic methods of detection. The report cautioned that to determine the real extent of Soviet ASW development would require significantly more research and access to classified materials, as the
443:
article—argued that CIA suffered from "mirror-imaging" (i.e., from assuming that the other side had to—and did—think and evaluate exactly the same way); Pipes further wrote that Team B showed Soviet thinking to be based on winning a
170:
wanted to create a much less charitable picture of the Soviet Union, its intentions, and its views about fighting and winning a nuclear war. The organization chosen by the Ford administration to challenge the CIA's analysis was the
79:
Team B concluded that the NIE on the Soviet Union, compiled and produced annually by the CIA, chronically underestimated Soviet military power and misinterpreted Soviet strategic intentions. Its findings were leaked to the
67:, was composed of "outside experts" who attempted to counter the arguments of intelligence officials within the CIA. The intelligence community was in the process of putting together its own assessment at the same time.
379:, was also addressed. As with the mobile ICBMs, the NIE was said to have underestimated the current and potential performance of the Backfire, and as such, designated it as a short range bomber similar to the
360:
platform (an intermediate range nuclear missile), it was argued that the SS-20 could be quickly and covertly converted into the longer range SS-16 in times of crisis, and would be a backdoor around the
166:'s treaties and secretly building up their weapons so that they could eventually attack the United States. Rumsfeld used his influence to persuade Ford to set up an independent inquiry. Rumsfeld and
547:
of the panel's members. Rather than including a diversity of views ... the
Strategic Objectives Panel was composed entirely of individuals who made careers of viewing the Soviet menace with alarm.
187:; Ford has stated that he had made the decision alone, but the historiography of the "Halloween Massacre" appears to support the allegations that Rumsfeld had successfully lobbied for this.
352:
The report also complained that the NIE did not adequately address the issues surrounding the planned Soviet deployment of the SS-X-16 mobile missile system. The SS-X-16, deployed as the
144:
article, "Is There a
Strategic Arms Race?" Wohlstetter concluded that the United States was allowing the Soviet Union to achieve military superiority by not closing a perceived
509:
argues that the underlying problem was confusion about what level of analysis was at issue—an implicit blurring together of Soviet political objectives and military strategy.
92:
in an attempt to appeal to staunch anticommunists in both parties and also not to appear partisan. The Team B reports became the intellectual foundation for the idea of "the
404:
would not release its data to either Team B, or the CIA, they stressed that the probability of advanced Soviet ASW research was greater than zero, as the NIE implied it was.
791:
531:—American political intent with Soviet strategic intent, and American public rhetoric (emphasizing mutual assured destruction) with Soviet operational doctrine.
248:
283:(CPD) in 1950. Its objectives were to raise awareness about the Soviets' alleged nuclear dominance and to pressure American leaders to close the missile gap.
453:
60:
began the Team B project in May 1976, inviting a group of outside experts to evaluate classified intelligence on the Soviet Union. Team B, approved by then-
626:
993:
172:
1015:(November 2, 2003). "The Mind Of The Administration A Continuing Series On The Thinkers Who Have Shaped The Bush Administration's View Of The World".
449:
1498:
1450:
268:
126:
A number of conservative foreign policy intellectuals worried that the U.S. was sacrificing strategic position in the early 1970s by embracing
346:
determination that the
Soviets strategic planning was more focused on an offensive nuclear war rather than a defensive stance or deterrence.
1595:
The problems of accurately gauging the extent of the Soviet nuclear buildup in the 1960s and the politics of the fictitious "missile gap".
1397:
580:
1337:
1225:
1539:
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of 1972 put a halt to further development and deployment of most ABM technology, there were exceptions for ABM systems surrounding
184:
89:
484:
official estimates, always in the direction of enlarging the impression of danger and threat." A top CIA analyst called Team B "a
1447:
813:
761:
1611:
190:
When George H. W. Bush became the Director of Central Intelligence in 1976, the PFIAB renewed its request for comparative
118:, later criticized the Team B project's findings. Many of these experts argued that the findings were grossly inaccurate.
539:
476:
115:
667:"Previously Classified Interviews with Former Soviet Officials Reveal U.S. Strategic Intelligence Failure Over Decades"
209:
1588:
1487:
1465:
1437:
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was the first mobile intercontinental ballistic missile deployed by the Soviet Union. Because it was built off the
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61:
1616:
280:
640:
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101:
50:
990:
1197:
1029:
910:
411:
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and that despite the NIE judgment contrary, the Soviets were combining directed energy research to this end.
389:
The report argued that there was stronger evidence than presented by the NIE of a Soviet intent to develop
1418:"Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis- Soviet Strategic Objectives: Report of Team B"
843:
34:
1506:
436:
419:
97:
869:
467:
numbers, with perhaps 500 aircraft off the line by early 1984.' In fact, the Soviets had 235 in 1984.
1596:
1338:"The B Team: Paul C. Warnke reviews Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA: Cahn, Anne Hessing"
336:
264:
911:"Bush team sought to snuff CIA doubts Differences over Iraq WMD latest attempt to override agency"
896:
598:
93:
1049:
1043:
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492:
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who argued publicly that the United States was seriously underestimating the Soviet threat."
480:
390:
135:
1567:
1417:
1276:
1551:
1444:
138:, accused the CIA of systematically underestimating Soviet missile deployment in his 1974
49:, who accused the CIA of chronically underestimating Soviet military capability. Years of
8:
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631:
506:
376:
30:
1555:
653:
1045:
Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment
979:
956:
564:
528:
256:
220:
131:
46:
573:, professor of government at Georgetown University, supported Team B in his 2002 book
448:(i.e., not avoiding such war due to MAD, because, he wrote, the Soviets were building
194:. Although his top analysts argued against such an undertaking, Bush checked with the
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1483:
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53:(NIE) that were later demonstrated to be very wrong were another motivating factor.
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746:
742:
520:
502:
244:
817:
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339:, because as a dictatorship, the Soviet Union was less accountable for its budget.
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then began concerted attacks on the CIA's annual assessment of the Soviet threat.
1309:
1250:
1229:
997:
666:
445:
163:
156:
70:
1277:"Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis, Report of Team 'B,'"
298:
Judgments of Soviet Strategic Objectives Underlying NIE's and their Shortcomings
227:, that ultimately received the most publicity. It is now referred to as Team B.
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The Soviet estimate: U.S. intelligence analysis & Russian military strength
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20:
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A critique of the NIE interpretation of certain Soviet Strategic Developments
260:
236:
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104:
42:
1311:
Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge & Power in American National Security
423:
149:
85:
38:
655:
Multimegaton Weapons — The Largest Nuclear Weapons by Wm. Robert Johnston
535:
435:
Team B concluded that the Soviet Union did not adhere to the doctrine of
195:
145:
57:
567:
offered that Team B had been a useful exercise in competitive analysis.
439:, but rather believed it could win a nuclear war outright. Pipes—in his
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276:
81:
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496:
127:
1386:
The Fifty Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Shapes Our World
575:
The Fifty Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Shapes Our World
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community." Colby was removed from his position in the November 1975
1530:
1252:
Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence
929:
96:" and of the massive arms buildup that began toward the end of the
665:
Burr, William; Savranskaya, Svetlana, eds. (September 11, 2009).
401:
1523:"As a CIA analyst, I've seen distortions of intelligence before"
708:
Cold War Illusions: America, Europe, and Soviet Power, 1969-1989
1480:
Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Analysis and Estimates
1361:"Did Team B do more than "second guess" the CIA professionals?"
415:
362:
159:
started making speeches arguing that the Soviets were ignoring
741:(3). Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc.: 22–27.
215:
The third investigated Soviet strategic policy and objectives.
462:
notes, however, that the specific conclusions of the report
380:
505:, the Arnold Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies at
1255:. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. pp. 113–114.
205:
One studied Soviet low-altitude air defense capabilities,
45:. It was created, in part, due to a 1974 publication by
488:
of outside critics all picked from one point of view."
16:
CIA group that analyzed the strategic goals of the USSR
989:
Blumenthal, Sidney, "The Long March of Dick Cheney,"
1314:. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 87.
279:, who had been instrumental in the creation of the
1520:
1358:
789:
728:
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1603:
1284:Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View
1537:
1335:
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371:The recent deployment, and capabilities of the
173:President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
1195:
1011:
974:Goldman, Peter, "Ford Shakes Up His Cabinet,"
1427:
811:
759:
583:assessed the lasting implications of Team B:
1574:
1455:
1191:
1189:
554:has defended the project, and in 2003 said:
1477:
952:"Anatomy of a Neo-Conservative White House"
899:, 0h25m55s Part 1 - Baby It's Cold Outside]
814:"Hyping Terror For Fun, Profit - And Power"
762:"Hyping Terror For Fun, Profit - And Power"
110:Some scholars and policy-makers, including
1538:Husain, Khurram (November–December 2003).
1430:Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA
945:
943:
927:
867:
841:
785:
783:
542:(ACDA) at the time of the Team B, wrote:
491:Joshua Rovner, Associate Professor at the
178:In 1975, PFIAB members asked CIA Director
1336:Warnke, Paul C. (January–February 1999).
1328:
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861:
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790:Goodman, Melvin A. (November 19, 2004).
731:"Team B: The trillion-dollar experiment"
239:, a Harvard historian and specialist in
69:
1432:. Pennsylvania State University Press.
1352:
1041:
1035:
1007:
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928:Blumenthal, Sidney (28 November 2005).
780:
753:
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1248:
1239:
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921:
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890:
844:"Bush team sought to snuff CIA doubts"
713:
658:
527:focused on this point. Pipes compared
1540:"Neocons: The men behind the curtain"
1497:Korb, Lawrence J. (August 18, 2004).
1458:The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy
1307:
1298:
908:
902:
832:
627:"Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth"
621:
1521:Goodman, Melvin A. (July 23, 2003).
1196:Tanenhaus, Sam (November 11, 2003).
1002:
807:
805:
610:
286:
1269:
887:
540:Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
477:Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
116:Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
13:
1410:
816:. Commondreams.org. Archived from
812:Thom Hartmann (December 7, 2004).
764:. Commondreams.org. Archived from
760:Thom Hartmann (December 7, 2004).
219:It was the third team, chaired by
210:intercontinental ballistic missile
14:
1628:
1544:Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
1342:Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
1030:Team B Strategic Objectives Panel
802:
735:Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
729:Cahn, Anne Hessing (April 1993).
377:designated the "Backfire" by NATO
1428:Cahn, Anne H. (September 1998).
868:Barry, Tom (February 12, 2004).
155:President Ford's Chief of Staff
62:Director of Central Intelligence
19:For the sub-group of AKB48, see
1391:
1378:
1215:
1174:
1162:
1150:
1138:
1126:
1114:
1102:
1090:
1078:
1023:
983:
968:
930:"The Long March of Dick Cheney"
909:Stein, Jeff (26 October 2005).
842:Jeff Stein (October 28, 2005).
281:Committee on the Present Danger
51:National Intelligence Estimates
874:International Relations Center
747:10.1080/00963402.1993.11456328
700:
684:
647:
325:Soviet ICBM and SLBM Programs:
1:
1499:"It's Time to Bench 'Team B'"
1456:Gervasi, Tom (October 1986).
1042:Sanders, Jerry Wayne (1983).
695:For the President's Eyes Only
604:
412:Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
235:PFIAB's Team B was headed by
41:posed to the security of the
37:(CIA) to analyze threats the
33:exercise commissioned by the
1503:Center for American Progress
456:, it was proven to be true.
454:collapse of the Soviet Union
430:
243:. Team B's members included
7:
1612:Central Intelligence Agency
1359:Edward Jay Epstein (2003).
1048:. South End Press. p.
592:
328:missile program was posing.
307:
291:
121:
35:Central Intelligence Agency
10:
1633:
1482:. Transaction Publishers.
1404:12:4 (Feb 26, 2001) p. 20.
437:mutual assured destruction
420:Grand Forks Air Force Base
387:Anti Satellite Capability:
230:
18:
1460:. W. W. Norton & Co.
950:Guy Caron (May 1, 2005).
391:Anti Satellite Capability
201:There were three teams:
90:presidential election win
1223:Exaggerating The Threats
408:Anti-Ballistic Missiles:
208:Another examined Soviet
1308:Betts, Richard (2007).
1286:: iii–iv. December 1976
1249:Rovner, Joshua (2011).
1032:rightweb.irc-online.org
915:San Francisco Chronicle
897:The Power of Nightmares
848:San Francisco Chronicle
599:Office of Special Plans
397:Anti-Submarine Warfare:
94:window of vulnerability
1617:Cold War organizations
1533:on September 30, 2007.
590:
561:
549:
533:
493:U.S. Naval War College
469:
100:and accelerated under
76:
1575:Prados, John (1982).
1402:The American Prospect
585:
556:
544:
538:, an official at the
525:Brookings Institution
511:
481:Brookings Institution
464:
136:University of Chicago
134:, a professor at the
98:Carter administration
73:
1570:on 12 November 2004.
1478:Godson, Roy (1980).
1448:Excerpts of the book
1423:. National Archives.
1400:, "Darth Rumsfeld",
870:"Remembering Team B"
259:. Advisers included
212:(ICBM) accuracy, and
31:competitive analysis
1556:2003BuAtS..59f..62H
1365:Question of the Day
1334:See Barry (above),
639:(4). Archived from
632:Commentary Magazine
507:Columbia University
1228:2010-02-04 at the
996:2007-12-19 at the
957:Canadian Dimension
792:"Righting the CIA"
691:Christopher Andrew
565:Edward Jay Epstein
529:apples and oranges
257:William Van Cleave
221:Harvard University
192:threat assessments
185:Halloween Massacre
161:Secretary of State
132:Albert Wohlstetter
77:
47:Albert Wohlstetter
1564:10.2968/059006013
1221:Fareed Zakaria, "
820:on April 19, 2006
796:The Baltimore Sun
768:on April 19, 2006
473:Anne Hessing Cahn
332:Economic Factors:
287:Detailed sections
112:Anne Hessing Cahn
65:George H. W. Bush
1624:
1594:
1571:
1566:. Archived from
1534:
1529:. Archived from
1517:
1515:
1514:
1505:. Archived from
1493:
1471:
1443:
1424:
1422:
1405:
1395:
1389:
1384:Derek Leebaert.
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1202:The Boston Globe
1198:"The Hard Liner"
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521:Raymond Garthoff
503:Richard K. Betts
369:Backfire Bomber:
350:Mobile Missiles:
245:Daniel O. Graham
1632:
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1591:
1527:The Progressive
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1411:Further reading
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1236:(16 June 2003).
1230:Wayback Machine
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241:Russian history
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164:Henry Kissinger
157:Donald Rumsfeld
130:. In response,
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623:Pipes, Richard
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486:kangaroo court
460:Fareed Zakaria
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141:Foreign Policy
123:
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84:shortly after
21:Team B (AKB48)
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536:Paul Warnke
446:nuclear war
249:Thomas Wolf
196:White House
146:missile gap
75:Washington.
58:Gerald Ford
1606:Categories
1581:Dial Press
1513:2007-09-18
1398:Jason Vest
1290:3 December
1087:. Page 15.
605:References
581:Jason Vest
441:Commentary
277:Paul Nitze
223:professor
56:President
1597:2 reviews
1473:2 Reviews
1445:3 Reviews
1075:. Page 6.
991:Salon.com
879:5 January
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676:April 21,
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418:and the
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292:Part One
122:Creation
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523:of the
497:détente
402:US Navy
365:Treaty.
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148:. Many
128:détente
114:of the
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363:SALT I
275:, and
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