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implications of the analysis. Changes or reversals in NIE assessments over time cause some legislators to question whether the change resulted from newly collected intelligence or whether analysts changed their position to support a specific political agenda. For example, the IC accusation of politicization surfaced after the key judgments of NIEs on the ballistic missile threat to the United States changed between 1993 and 1995. Some
Republicans claimed the IC politicized the findings to support President Clinton's policy against missile defense systems.
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Democrats accused the IC of politicization after the release of the NIE on Iraq's WMD programs because they believed they supported the policy decision to invade Iraq. Congress has investigated the issue of politicization within the IC numerous times, as have independent commissions. To date, these
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Senior civilian and military policymakers, including congressional leaders, typically request NIEs. Before a NIE is drafted, the relevant
National Intelligence Officer (NIO) produces a concept paper or 'terms of reference' (TOR) and circulates it throughout the IC for comment. The TOR defines the
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Several IC analysts from different agencies produce the initial text of the estimate. The NIC then meets to critique the draft before it is circulated to the broader IC. Representatives from the relevant IC agencies meet to hone and coordinate line-by-line the full text of the NIE. Working with
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Throughout the past several decades, the release of a NIE on a controversial policy have usually resulted in charges that the IC politicized its key findings. Charges of politicization come from both
Democrats and Republicans, but normally emerge from the side that does not agree with the policy
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Urgent requests vs. lengthy process: The process of interagency coordination and an insistence on analytic rigor normally push the completion of NIEs to several months or even more than a year. Per
Congress's request in the fall of 2002, the IC rushed to complete the NIE on
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their agencies, representatives also assign the confidence levels to each key judgment. IC representatives discuss the quality of sources with intelligence collectors to ensure the draft does not contain erroneous information.
235:(which turned out to be incorrect) in less than a month. Since a rushed product can result in poor or inaccurate assessments, the IC must balance the urgency for a requested assessment with a commitment to analytical rigor.
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in 2002 highlights the role
Congress plays in promoting the analytic rigor and utility of strategic intelligence assessments, such as National Intelligence Estimates.
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Interagency collaboration: Because NIEs represent the consensus view of the IC, all 17 agencies have input on each NIE. Such collaboration can lead to:
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estimate may be the course of future events. Coordination of NIEs involves not only trying to resolve any inter-agency differences, but also assigning
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Spy
Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terror Threat - National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States"
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Iraq
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) - "Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead" Unclassified Key Judgments
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to the key judgments and rigorously evaluating the sourcing for them. Each NIE is reviewed and approved for dissemination by the
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The IC must overcome several challenges to produce accurate and useful strategic intelligence assessments, including:
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key estimative questions, determines drafting responsibilities, and sets the drafting and publication schedule.
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198:; however, in 2005, the Director of National Intelligence became the head of the Intelligence Community.
186:. This office was superseded in 1973 by National Intelligence Officers. This group of experts became the
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396:, a wholly theoretical example of what might have been published prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
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405:, a reevaluation of a 1962 NIE proclaiming the Soviet Union would not put offensive weapons in Cuba.
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179:(NIB), which comprises the DNI and other senior leaders within the Intelligence Community.
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Compromise, where the estimates contain only "lowest common denominator" language.
387:- Declassified version from The Office of the Director of National Intelligence
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in 1979. In the early years, the
National Intelligence Council reported to the
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Report on sensitive state and military matters commonly used by US policymakers
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NIEs are considered to be "estimative" products, in that they present what
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related to a particular national security issue. NIEs are produced by the
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investigations have never found evidence of politicization by analysts.
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344:- October 2002 NIE on "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs"
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Gridlock, where many different interests slow the analytic process.
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National
Intelligence Estimates were first produced in 1950 by the
385:"Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States"
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Groupthink, where opposing views are subconsciously discouraged.
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356:- NIE: Iran halted a covert nuclear weapons program in 2003
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Iraq’s
Continuing Program for Weapons of Mass Destruction
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documents that are the authoritative assessment of the
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Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
201:The Intelligence Community's faulty assessments on
308:Rosenbach, Eric; Peritz, Aki J. (June 12, 2009).
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366:Intelligence Estimate Warns Iraq Could Get Worse
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137:and express the coordinated judgments of the
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392:The Primary Purpose of National Estimating
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41:Relevant discussion may be found on the
429:Reports of the United States government
381:- Released on Friday, February 2, 2007.
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254:Potential issues with politicization
233:Iraq and weapons of mass destruction
222:Challenges to the production of NIEs
139:United States Intelligence Community
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419:United States intelligence agencies
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360:New York Times September 24, 2006
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127:Director of National Intelligence
354:Washington Post December 5, 2007
192:Director of Central Intelligence
123:United States federal government
62:"National Intelligence Estimate"
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194:in his role as the head of the
115:National Intelligence Estimates
348:Washington Post August 2, 2005
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188:National Intelligence Council
135:National Intelligence Council
342:Council on Foreign Relations
184:Office of National Estimates
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177:National Intelligence Board
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401:A Crucial Estimate Relived
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278:National Security Archive
319:. Harvard Kennedy School
141:, the group of 18 U.S.
196:Intelligence Community
424:Intelligence analysis
169:intelligence analysts
143:intelligence agencies
147:classified documents
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209:Production of NIEs
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145:. NIEs are
413:Categories
284:References
161:See also:
73:newspapers
203:Iraqi WMD
129:(DNI) on
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323:July 21,
267:See also
87:scholar
163:Team B
121:) are
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