Tet Offensive - Knowledge

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armed forces by the end of the year (a decree that had failed to pass only five months previously due to strong political opposition). This increase would bring South Vietnam's troop strength to more than 900,000 men. Military mobilization, anti-corruption campaigns, demonstrations of political unity, and administrative reforms were quickly carried out. Thiệu also established a National Recovery Committee to oversee food distribution, resettlement, and housing construction for the new refugees. Both the government and the Americans were encouraged by a new determination that was exhibited among the ordinary citizens of South Vietnam. Many urban dwellers were indignant that the communists had launched their attacks during Tet, and it drove many who had been previously apathetic into active support of the government. Journalists, political figures, and religious leaders alike—even the militant Buddhists—professed confidence in the government's plans.

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by sending troops to Vietnam had risen from 25 percent in 1965 to 45 percent by December 1967. This trend was fueled not by a belief that the struggle was not worthwhile, but by mounting casualty figures, rising taxes, and the feeling that there was no end to the war in sight. A poll taken in November indicated that 55 percent wanted a tougher war policy, exemplified by the public belief that "it was an error for us to have gotten involved in Vietnam in the first place. But now that we're there, let's win – or get out." This prompted the administration to launch a so-called "success offensive", a concerted effort to alter the widespread public perception that the war had reached a stalemate and to convince the American people that the administration's policies were succeeding. Under the leadership of National Security Advisor

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military failed to sustain a respectable argument for their position." Between the results of Tet and the meetings of the group that bore his name, he became convinced that deescalation was the only solution for the United States. He believed that the troop increase would lead only to a more violent stalemate and sought out others in the administration to assist him in convincing the President to reverse the escalation, cap force levels at 550,000 men, seek negotiations with Hanoi, and turn responsibility for the fighting over to the South Vietnamese. Clifford quietly sought allies and was assisted in his effort by the so-called "8:30 Group" – Nitze, Warnke, Phil G. Goulding (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs), George Elsey and Air Force Colonel Robert E. Pursely.

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the war but also to ensure that the nation's strategic reserve did not become depleted. By obliquely ordering Westmoreland to demand more forces, Wheeler was attempting to solve two pressing problems. In comparison with MACV's previous communications, which had been full of confidence, optimism, and resolve, Westmoreland's 12 February request for 10,500 troops was much more urgent: "which I desperately need ... time is of the essence". On 13 February, 10,500 previously authorized U.S. airborne troops and marines were dispatched to South Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs then played their hand, advising President Johnson to turn down MACV's requested division-sized reinforcement unless he called up some 1,234,001 marine and army reservists.

3772:, the new military head of COSVN, the offensive was to have three distinct phases: Phase I, scheduled to begin on 30 January, would be a countrywide assault on the cities, conducted primarily by VC forces. Concurrently, a propaganda offensive to induce ARVN troops to desert and the South Vietnamese population to rise up against the government would be launched. If outright victory was not achieved, the battle might still lead to the creation of a coalition government and the withdrawal of the Americans. If the general offensive failed to achieve these purposes, follow-up operations would be conducted to wear down the enemy and lead to a negotiated settlement; Phase II was scheduled to begin on 5 May and Phase III on 17 August. 3633:, there was a dawning realization that if current trends continued, Hanoi would eventually lack the resources necessary to affect the military situation in the South. As a result, there were more strident calls by the moderates for negotiations and a revision of strategy. They felt that a return to guerrilla tactics was more appropriate since the U.S. could not be defeated conventionally. They also complained that the policy of rejecting negotiations was in error. The Americans could only be worn down in a war of wills during a period of "fighting while talking". During 1967 things had become so bad on the battlefield that Lê Duẩn ordered Thanh to incorporate aspects of protracted guerrilla warfare into his strategy. 4030:, chief of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff, ordered his four Corps' commanders to place their troops on alert. Yet, there was still a lack of a sense of urgency on the part of the allies. If Westmoreland had a grasp of the potential for danger, he did not communicate it very well to others. On the evening of 30 January, 200 U.S. officers—all of whom served on the MACV intelligence staff—attended a pool party at their quarters in Saigon. According to James Meecham, an analyst at the Combined Intelligence Center who attended the party: "I had no conception Tet was coming, absolutely zero ... Of the 200-odd officers present, not one I talked to knew Tet was coming, without exception." 4507: 3853:

capabilities, not their intentions. Since, in the allied estimation, the communists hardly had the capability to launch such an ambitious enterprise: "There was little possibility that the enemy could initiate a general offensive, regardless of his intentions." The answer could also be partially explained by the lack of coordination and cooperation between competing intelligence branches, both South Vietnamese and American. The situation from the U.S. perspective was summed up by an MACV intelligence analyst: "If we'd gotten the whole battle plan, it wouldn't have been believed. It wouldn't have been credible to us." The Tet offensive would later be used in a textbook at

3728:. Since the Politburo had already approved the offensive, all he had to do was make it work. He combined guerrilla operations into what was basically a conventional military offensive and shifted the burden of sparking the popular uprising to the VC. If it worked, all would be well and good. If it failed, it would be a failure only for the Communist Party militants. For the moderates and centrists, it offered the prospect of negotiations and a possible end to the American bombing of the North. Only in the eyes of the militants, therefore, did the offensive become a "go for broke" effort. Others in the Politburo were willing to settle for a much less ambitious "victory". 4554:

official allied explanation was that during their initial occupation of the city, the PAVN had quickly begun to systematically round up (under the guise of re-education) and then execute as many as 2,800 South Vietnamese civilians that they believed to be potentially hostile to communist control. Those taken into custody included South Vietnamese military personnel, present and former government officials, local civil servants, teachers, policemen, and religious figures. Historian Gunther Lewy claimed that a captured VC document stated that the communists had "eliminated 1,892 administrative personnel, 38 policemen, 790 tyrants." The North Vietnamese officer,

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Annihilate a significant portion of the American military's troop strength and destroy a significant portion of his war equipment in order to prevent the American forces from being able to carry out their political and military missions; on the basis, crush the American will to commit aggression and force the United States to accept defeat in South Vietnam and end all hostile actions against North Vietnam. In addition, using this as the basis, they would achieve the immediate goals of the revolution, which were independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and then move toward achieving peace and national unification.

5041: 3753:. The Khe Sanh actions would draw PAVN forces away from the offensive into the cities, but Giáp considered them necessary to protect his supply lines and divert American attention. Attacks on other U.S. forces were of secondary, or even tertiary importance, since Giáp considered his main objective to be weakening or destroying the South Vietnamese military and government through popular revolt. The offensive, therefore, was aimed at influencing the South Vietnamese public, not that of the U.S. There is conflicting evidence as to whether, or to what extent, the offensive was intended to influence either the March primaries or the 338: 327: 316: 7161:, Washington, D.C.: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1983, p. 35. There are some extravagant but largely unfounded stories that Tra was severely punished. For example, "This public criticism of the Hanoi leadership led to Tra's removal from the Politburo and house arrest until his death in April 1994." Tra had never been a member of the Politburo. He was not placed under house arrest, even being allowed to travel abroad to attend a conference on the Vietnam War in 1990 and he was allowed to continue writing and publishing on the history of the war; the People's Army Publishing House released his next book in 1992. 227: 3357:

reported that defeating the PAVN/VC would require 200,000 more American soldiers and activation of the reserves, prompting even loyal supporters of the war to admit that the current war strategy required reevaluation. The offensive had a strong effect on the U.S. government and shocked the American public, which had been led to believe by its political and military leaders that the North Vietnamese were being defeated and incapable of launching such an ambitious military operation. American public support for the war declined as a result of the Tet casualties and the escalation of draft calls. Subsequently, the

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American terms while others pointed out that neither side could win militarily, that North Vietnam could match any troop increase, that the bombing of the North is halted, and that a change in strategy was required that would seek not victory, but the staying power required to reach a negotiated settlement. This would require a less aggressive strategy that was designed to protect the population of South Vietnam. The divided group's final report, issued on 4 March, "failed to seize the opportunity to change directions... and seemed to recommend that we continue rather haltingly down the same road."

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smaller-scale, quick attack and quick withdrawal operations to continually put pressure on the allied forces at the same time that mechanised and combined-arms capabilities were being built. The plan for a popular uprising or people's war was abandoned for a greater combination of guerrilla and conventional warfare. During this period, the PAVN would undergo a significant strategic re-structuring, being built into a combined-arms capable force while continually applying pressure on the U.S./ARVN with lighter infantry units. In line with the revamped strategy of Hanoi, on April 5, 1969, COSVN issued

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everywhere instead of concentrating their forces on a few specific targets, allowed their forces to be defeated piecemeal; the launching of massed attacks headlong into the teeth of vastly superior firepower; and last, but not least, the incorrect assumptions upon which the entire campaign was based. According to General Tran Van Tra: "We did not correctly evaluate the specific balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy, did not fully realize that the enemy still had considerable capabilities, and that our capabilities were limited, and set requirements that were beyond our actual strength."

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their present size, and instituting Rusk's bombing/negotiating proposal. To Clifford's surprise, both Rusk and Rostow (both of whom had previously been opposed to any form of de-escalation) offered no opposition to Clifford's suggestions. On 31 March, President Johnson announced the unilateral (although still partial) bombing halt during his television address. He then stunned the nation by declining to run for a second term in office. To Washington's surprise, on 3 April Hanoi announced that it would conduct negotiations, which were scheduled to begin on 13 May in Paris.

4767: 430: 4105:. During all of these operations, the PAVN/VC followed a similar pattern: mortar or rocket attacks were closely followed by massed ground assaults conducted by battalion-strength elements of the VC, sometimes supported by PAVN regulars. These forces would join with local cadres who served as guides to lead the regulars to the most senior South Vietnamese headquarters and the radio station. The operations, however, were not well coordinated at the local level. By daylight, almost all communist forces had been driven from their objectives. General 190: 3836: 4631:) launched by all three brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division reached Khe Sanh on 8 April, but PAVN forces were already withdrawing from the area. Both sides claimed that the battle had served its intended purpose. MACV estimated that 5,500 PAVN troops had been killed and considerably more wounded. During the entire battle from 1 November 1967 to 14 April 1968, 730 U.S. personnel were killed and another 2,642 wounded. Khe Sanh Base was later closed on 5 July 1968 because the base was seen as having less of a strategic importance than before. 3958:. Weyand, a former intelligence officer, was suspicious of the pattern of communist activities in his area of responsibility and notified Westmoreland of his concerns on 10 January. Westmoreland agreed with his estimate and ordered 15 U.S. battalions to redeploy from positions near the Cambodian border back to the outskirts of Saigon. When the offensive did begin, a total of 27 allied maneuver battalions defended the city and the surrounding area. This redeployment may have been one of the most critical tactical decisions of the war. 4786:

every twelve South Vietnamese was living in a refugee camp. More than 70,000 homes had been destroyed in the fighting and perhaps 30,000 more were heavily damaged and the nation's infrastructure had been virtually destroyed. The South Vietnamese military, although it had performed better than the Americans had expected, suffered from lowered morale, with desertion rates rising from 10.5 per thousand before Tet to 16.5 per thousand by July. 1968 became the deadliest year of the war to date for the ARVN with 27,915 men killed.

4482:, managed to hold their position, but the majority of the Citadel fell to the PAVN. On the south bank of the river, the PAVN 4th Regiment attempted to seize the local MACV headquarters, but was held at bay by a makeshift force of approximately 200 Americans. The rest of the city was overrun by PAVN forces that initially totaled approximately 7,500 men. Both sides then rushed to reinforce and resupply their forces. Lasting 25 days, the battle of Huế became one of the longest and bloodiest single battles of the Vietnam War. 3499:, the CIA members of the group believed that the number of VC guerrillas, irregulars, and cadre within the South could be as high as 430,000. The MACV Combined Intelligence Center, on the other hand, maintained that the number could be no more than 300,000. Westmoreland was deeply concerned about the possible perceptions of the American public to such an increased estimate since communist troop strength was routinely provided to reporters during press briefings. According to MACV's chief of intelligence, General 5057:

away the element of surprise. Most of the communist forces were intercepted by allied screening elements before they reached their targets. 13 VC battalions, however, managed to slip through the cordon and once again plunged the capital into chaos. Severe fighting occurred at Phu Lam, (where it took two days to root out the VC 267th Local Force Battalion), around the Y-Bridge and at Tan Son Nhut. By 12 May, however, it was all over. VC forces withdrew from the area leaving behind over 3,000 dead.

4327: 4681:, the VC "made pacification virtually inoperative. In the Mekong Delta, the Viet Cong was stronger now than ever and in other regions the countryside belongs to the VC." General Wheeler reported that the offensive had brought counterinsurgency programs to a halt and "that to a large extent, the VC now controlled the countryside". This state of affairs did not last; heavy casualties and the backlash of the South Vietnamese and Americans resulted in more territorial losses and heavy casualties. 4951:

opinion. Johnson, however, made few comments to the press during or immediately after the offensive, leaving an impression of indecision on the public. It was this lack of communication that caused a rising disapproval rating for his conduct in the war. By the end of February, his approval rating had fallen from 63 per cent to 47 per cent. By the end of March, the percentage of Americans that expressed confidence in U.S. military policies in Southeast Asia had fallen from 74 to 54 per cent.

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concerns were pressing. Throughout the fall of 1967 and the spring of 1968, the U.S. was struggling with "one of the most severe monetary crises" of the period. Without a new tax bill and budgetary cuts, the nation would face even higher inflation "and the possible collapse of the monetary system". Johnson's friend Clifford was concerned about what the American public would think of the escalation: "How do we avoid creating the feeling that we are pounding troops down a rathole?"

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the fighting at Tet, they were capable of replacing those lost with recruits from North Vietnam. In 1969, the year after the Tet battles, the US suffered 11,780 killed, the second highest annual total in the war. This was a clear indication that the North Vietnamese were capable of ongoing offensive actions, despite their losses at Tet. Most Americans were tired of suffering so many casualties without evidence that they were going to stop anytime in the foreseeable future.

437: 152: 423: 4208:"dispirited and deeply shaken." According to Clark Clifford, at the time of the initial attacks, the reaction of the U.S. military leadership "approached panic". Although Westmoreland's appraisal of the military situation was correct, he made himself look foolish by continuously maintaining his belief that Khe Sanh was the real objective of the North Vietnamese and that 155 attacks by 84,000 troops was a diversion (a position he maintained until at least 12 February). 5670:, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1991, p. 18. The second thesis (which was also supported by the majority of contemporary captured VC documents) was that the goal of the offensive was the immediate toppling of the Saigon government or, at the very least, the destruction of the government apparatus, the installation of a coalition government, or the occupation of large tracts of South Vietnamese territory. Historians supporting this view are Stanley Karnow in 4543: 360: 349: 239: 202: 4711:." Following the Tet offensive and subsequent U.S.–South Vietnamese "search and hold" operations in the countryside throughout the rest of 1968, the VC's recruiting base was more or less wiped out; the official Vietnamese war history later noted that "we could not maintain the level of local recruitment we had maintained in previous years. In 1969 we were only able to recruit 1,700 new soldiers in Region 5 (compared with 8,000 in 1968), and in the lowlands of 9653: 9643: 9689: 444: 4577:

to orchestrate." In Westmoreland's view, the purpose of the base was to provoke the North Vietnamese into a focused and prolonged confrontation in a confined geographic area, one that would allow the application of massive U.S. artillery and air strikes that would inflict heavy casualties in a relatively unpopulated region. By the end of 1967, MACV had moved nearly half of its manoeuvre battalions to I Corps in anticipation of just such a battle.

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demonstrated by the closure of the "strategic" Khe Sanh base and the ending of multi-division "search and destroy" operations. Also gone were discussions of victory over North Vietnam. Abrams' new "One War" policy centred the American effort on the takeover of the fighting by the South Vietnamese (through Vietnamization), the pacification of the countryside, and the destruction of communist logistics. The new administration of President

8967: 45: 3967: 4204:, usually drove the attackers out within two or three days, sometimes within hours; but heavy fighting continued several days longer in Kon Tum, Buôn Ma Thuột, Phan Thiết, Cần Thơ, and Bến Tre. The outcome in each instance was usually dictated by the ability of local commanders—some were outstanding, others were cowardly or incompetent. During this crucial crisis, however, no South Vietnamese unit broke or defected to the communists. 9758: 4959:". With few exceptions, all of the members of the group had formerly been accounted as hawks on the war. The group was joined by Rusk, Wheeler, Bundy, Rostow, and Clifford. The final assessment of the majority stupefied the group. According to Clifford, "few of them were thinking solely of Vietnam anymore". All but four members called for disengagement from the war, leaving the President "deeply shaken." According to the 3692:

would spark a spontaneous uprising of the population, which, if the offensive was successful, would enable the North Vietnamese to sweep to a quick, decisive victory. Their basis for this conclusion included: a belief that the South Vietnamese military was no longer combat-effective; the results of the 1967 presidential election (in which the Thiệu/Kỳ ticket had only received 24 percent of the popular vote); the

3427:, looked increasingly stable. Rivalries between South Vietnam's generals were becoming less chaotic, and Thiệu and Kỳ formed a joint ticket for the election. Despite efforts by North Vietnam to disrupt elections, higher than usual turnouts saw a political turning point towards a more democratic structure and ushered in a period of political stability after a series of coups had characterized the preceding years. 3594:, even decades after the event. In official Vietnamese literature, the decision to launch the Tet offensive was usually presented as the result of a perceived U.S. failure to win the war quickly, the failure of the American bombing campaign against North Vietnam, and the anti-war sentiment that pervaded the population of the U.S. The decision to launch the general offensive, however, was much more complicated. 3656:. They also resisted the idea of negotiating with the allies. Moscow, on the other hand, advocated negotiations, but simultaneously armed Hanoi's forces to conduct a conventional war on the Soviet model. North Vietnamese foreign policy therefore consisted of maintaining a critical balance between war policy, internal and external policies, domestic adversaries, and foreign allies with "self-serving agendas." 3566:

end of the year the administration's approval rating had indeed crept up by eight percent, but an early January Gallup poll indicated that forty-seven percent of the American public still disapproved of the President's handling of the war. The American public, "more confused than convinced, more doubtful than despairing ... adopted a 'wait and see' attitude." During a discussion with an interviewer from

9741: 9663: 4392:, southwest of the city center, which was being used as a staging area and command and control center by the PAVN/VC. Bitter and destructive house-to-house fighting erupted in the area. On 4 February, the residents were ordered to leave their homes and the area was declared a free fire zone. Fighting in the city came to a close only after a fierce battle between the ARVN Rangers and PAVN forces on 7 March. 4624:

upon the base continued even as the battle raged around him in Saigon. On 1 February, as the offensive reached its height, he wrote a memo for his staff—which was never delivered—stating: "The enemy is attempting to confuse the issue ... I suspect he is also trying to draw everyone's attention from the area of greatest threat, the northern part of I Corps. Let me caution everyone not to be confused."

3761: 3664:. All of the arrests were based on the individual's stance on the Politburo's choice of tactics and strategy for the proposed general offensive. This move cemented the position of the militants as Hanoi's strategy: the rejection of negotiations, the abandonment of protracted warfare, and the focus on the offensive in the towns and cities of South Vietnam. More arrests followed in November and December. 4903:, "A fork in the road had been reached and the alternatives stood out in stark reality." To meet Wheeler's request would mean a total U.S. military commitment to South Vietnam. "To deny it, or to attempt to cut it to a size which could be sustained by the thinly stretched active forces, would just as surely signify that an upper limit to the U.S. military commitment in South Vietnam had been reached." 4535:

vicinity of Khe Sanh to Huế to participate. During most of February, the allies gradually fought their way towards the Citadel, which was taken only after 25 days of intense struggle. The city was not declared recaptured by U.S. and ARVN forces until 25 February, when members of the ARVN 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 1st Division raised the South Vietnamese flag over the Palace of Perfect Peace.

3644:, who called for negotiations. From October 1966 through April 1967, a very public debate over military strategy took place in print and via radio between Thanh and his rival for military power, Giáp. Giáp had advocated a defensive, primarily guerrilla strategy against the U.S. and South Vietnam. Thanh's position was that Giáp and his adherents were centered on their experiences during the 7968: 6793: 3688:

Central Commission. At a meeting in July, Thanh briefed the plan to the Politburo. On the evening of 6 July, after receiving permission to begin preparations for the offensive, Thanh attended a party and died of a heart attack after drinking too much. An alternative account is that Thanh died of injuries sustained in a U.S. bombing raid on COSVN after having been evacuated from Cambodia.

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Johnson's unilateral decision on 31 March to curtail the bombing of North Vietnam only confirmed what Thiệu already feared, that the Americans were going to abandon South Vietnam to the communists. For Thiệu, the bombing halt and the beginning of negotiations with the North brought not the hope of an end to the war, but "an abiding fear of peace." He was only mollified after an 18 July

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where U.S. artillery and aerial firepower could be applied indiscriminately, which meant that tactically and strategically, these operations made no sense. What the North Vietnamese had done was carry out the first stage of their plan: to fix the attention of the U.S. command on the borders and draw the bulk of U.S. forces away from the heavily populated coastal lowlands and cities.

4109:, the new MACV chief of intelligence, notified Westmoreland that "This is going to happen in the rest of the country tonight and tomorrow morning." All U.S. forces were placed on maximum alert and similar orders were issued to all ARVN units. The allies, however, still responded without any real sense of urgency. Orders cancelling leaves either came too late or were disregarded. 4456: 4251: 4113: 5013: 3700:; well-publicized anti-war demonstrations in Saigon; and continuous criticism of the Thiệu government in the southern press. Launching such an offensive would also finally put an end to what had been described as "dovish calls for talks, criticism of military strategy, Chinese diatribes of Soviet perfidy, and Soviet pressure to negotiate—all of which needed to be silenced." 4654: 3507:

represented the CIA in the last stage of the negotiations. In September, Carver devised a compromise: The CIA would drop its insistence on including the irregulars in the final tally of forces and add a prose addendum to the estimate that would explain the agency's position. George Allen, Carver's deputy, laid responsibility for the agency's capitulation at the feet of

4928: 4730: 4581: 4608:, however, there was never a major ground assault on the base and the battle became largely a duel between American and North Vietnamese artillerists, combined with massive air strikes conducted by U.S. aircraft. By the end of the siege, U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy aircraft had dropped 39,179 tons of ordnance in the defense of the base. 4015:

for approximately half of its forces. General Westmoreland, who had already cancelled the truce in I Corps, requested that South Vietnam cancel the upcoming cease-fire, but President Thiệu (who had already reduced the cease-fire to 36 hours), refused to do so, claiming that it would damage troop morale and only benefit communist propagandists.

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initial attack and their attempt to gain access to the building having failed, the sappers simply occupied the chancery grounds until they were all killed or captured by U.S. reinforcements that were landed on the roof of the building six hours later. By 09:20 the embassy and grounds were secured, with the loss of five U.S. personnel.

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both in Vietnam and Washington, to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds" and added that, "we are mired in a stalemate that could only be ended by negotiation, not victory." Far from suffering a loss of morale, however, the majority of Americans had rallied to the side of the president. A

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VC, the PAVN had little difficulty making up the casualties inflicted by the offensive. Some Western historians have come to believe that one insidious ulterior motive for the campaign was the elimination of competing southern members of the Party, thereby allowing the northerners more control once the war was won.

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countryside. The violence and destruction witnessed during the offensive left a deep psychological scar on the South Vietnamese civilian population. Confidence in the government was shaken, since the offensive seemed to reveal that even with massive American support, the government could not protect its citizens.

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Major General Phillip Davidson, Westmoreland's chief of intelligence, reflected how the military men thought about Clifford's conversion in his memoir: "Clifford's use of the Wise Men to serve his dovish ends was a consummate stroke by a master of intrigue...what happened was that Johnson had fired a

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The first attacks may have been launched prematurely due to confusion over a changeover in the calendar date by North Vietnamese units. Hanoi had arbitrarily forwarded the date of the holiday to allow its citizens respite from the retaliatory airstrikes that were sure to follow the offensive. Whether

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Includes casualties incurred during the "Border Battles", Tet Mau Than and the second and third phases of the offensive. General Tran Van Tra claimed that from January through August 1968 the offensive had cost North Vietnam more than 75,000 dead and wounded. This is probably a low estimate. Tran Van

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The significant casualties and suffering endured by PAVN/VC units during these sustained operations were beginning to have a wider effect. The apparent lack of military gains made that could possibly justify the casualties and effort exacerbated the situation. During the first half of 1969, more than

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Regiment surrendered to ARVN forces, the largest communist surrender of the war. The actions also brought more death and suffering to the city's inhabitants. A further 87,000 were made homeless while more than 500 were killed and another 4,500 were wounded. During part of the second phase (5 May – 30

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in late April. U.S. intelligence sources estimated between February and May the North Vietnamese dispatched 50,000 men down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to replace losses incurred during the earlier fighting. Some of the most prolonged and vicious combat of the war opened on 29 April and lasted until 30 May

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might loosen restraints and allow operations in Laos, Cambodia, or possibly even North Vietnam itself. On 8 February, Westmoreland responded that he could use another division "if operations in Laos are authorized". Wheeler responded by challenging Westmoreland's assessment of the situation, pointing

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A political rivalry had also re-emerged after the 1967 South Vietnamese presidential election, when the coalition between Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Air Force commander Nguyễn Cao Kỳ re-emerged. Kỳ would be sidelined by Thiệu for the duration of the war afterwards, retaining his position as Vice President.

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The PAVN official history describes the first phase of the Tet offensive as a "great strategic victory" that "killed or dispersed 150,000 enemy soldiers including 43,000 Americans, destroyed 34 percent of the American war reserve supplies in Vietnam, destroyed 4,200 strategic hamlets and liberated an

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Except at Huế and mopping-up operations in and around Saigon, the first surge of the offensive was over by the second week of February. The U.S. estimated that during the first phase (30 January – 8 April) approximately 45,000 PAVN/VC soldiers were killed and an unknown number were wounded. For years

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According to Westmoreland, he responded to the news of the attacks with optimism, both in media presentations and in his reports to Washington. According to closer observers, however, the General was "stunned that the communists had been able to coordinate so many attacks in such secrecy", and he was

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In the days immediately preceding the offensive, the preparedness of allied forces was relatively relaxed. Hanoi had announced in October that it would observe a seven-day truce from 27 January to 3 February for the Tet holiday, and the South Vietnamese military made plans to allow recreational leave

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The decision signaled the end of a bitter, decade-long debate within the North Vietnamese Government between first two, and then three factions. The moderates believed that the economic viability of North Vietnam should come before support of a massive and conventional southern war and they generally

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on 21 November, he reported that, as of the end of 1967, the communists were "unable to mount a major offensive ... I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing...We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view." By the

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Hanoi had launched the offensive in the belief that it would trigger a popular uprising leading to the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. Although the initial attacks stunned the allies, causing them to lose control of several cities temporarily, they quickly regrouped, repelled the attacks

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On 9 June, President Johnson replaced Westmoreland as commander of MACV with General Creighton W. Abrams. Although the decision had been made in December 1967 and Westmoreland was made Army Chief of Staff, many saw his relief as punishment for the entire Tet debacle. Abrams' new strategy was quickly

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To evaluate Westmoreland's request and its possible impact on domestic politics, Johnson convened the "Clifford Group" on 28 February and tasked its members with a complete policy reassessment. Some of the members argued that the offensive represented an opportunity to defeat the North Vietnamese on

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During the first two weeks of February, Generals Westmoreland and Wheeler communicated as to the necessity for reinforcements or troop increases in Vietnam. Westmoreland insisted that he only needed those forces either in-country or already scheduled for deployment and he was puzzled by the sense of

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we recruited only 100 new soldiers (compared with 16,000 in 1968)." As also noted by the official history, "because our armed local forces had suffered severe losses, guerrilla operations had declined." However, this change had little effect on the overall result of the war, since in contrast to the

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In Long An province, for example, local guerrillas taking part in the May—June offensive had been divided into several sections. Only 775 out of 2,018 in one section survived; another lost all but 640 out of 1,430. The province itself was subjected to what one historian has called a "My Lai from the

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Hanoi had underestimated the strategic mobility of the allied forces, which allowed them to redeploy at will to threatened areas; their battle plan was too complex and difficult to coordinate, which was amply demonstrated by the 30 January attacks; their violation of the principle of mass, attacking

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claims he confirmed this figure in Hanoi in 1981. Westmoreland himself claimed a smaller number of enemies disabled, estimating that during the same period 32,000 PAVN troops were killed and another 5,800 captured. The South Vietnamese suffered 2,788 killed, 8,299 wounded, and 587 missing in action.

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The overland supply route to the base had been cut off, and airborne resupply by cargo aircraft became extremely dangerous due to heavy PAVN antiaircraft fire. Thanks to innovative high-speed "Super Gaggles", which used fighter-bombers in combination with large numbers of supply helicopters, and the

4553:

In the aftermath of the recapture of the city, the discovery of several mass graves (the last of which were uncovered in 1970) of South Vietnamese citizens of Huế sparked a controversy that has not diminished with time. The victims had either been clubbed or shot to death or simply buried alive. The

4485:

During the first days of the North Vietnamese occupation, U.S. intelligence vastly underestimated the number of PAVN troops and little appreciated the effort that was going to be necessary to evict them. General Westmoreland informed the Joint Chiefs that "the enemy has approximately three companies

4314:

The US Embassy in Saigon, a massive six-floor building situated within a four-acre compound, had been completed only in September. At 02:45 it was attacked by a 19-man sapper team that blew a hole in the 8-foot-high (2.4 m) surrounding wall and charged through. With their officers killed in the

4310:

One of the most important targets, from a symbolic and propagandistic point of view, was Radio Saigon. Its troops had brought along a tape recording of Hồ Chi Minh announcing the liberation of Saigon and calling for a "General Uprising" against the Thiệu government. They seized the building, held it

3946:

Westmoreland was more concerned with the situation at Khe Sanh, where, on 21 January 1968, a force estimated at 20,000–40,000 PAVN troops had besieged the U.S. Marine garrison. MACV was convinced that the PAVN planned to stage an attack and overrun the base as a prelude to an all-out effort to seize

3831:

on the Hồ Chí Minh Trail jumped from the previous monthly average of 480 to 1,116. By November this total reached 3,823 and, in December, 6,315. On 20 December, Westmoreland cabled Washington that he expected the PAVN/VC "to undertake an intensified countrywide effort, perhaps a maximum effort, over

3651:

The arguments over domestic and military strategy also carried a foreign policy element, as North Vietnam, like South Vietnam, was largely dependent on outside military and economic aid. The vast majority of North Vietnam's military equipment was provided by either the Soviet Union or China. Beijing

3514:

During the second half of 1967 the administration had become alarmed by criticism, both inside and outside the government, and by reports of declining public support for its Vietnam policies. According to public opinion polls, the percentage of Americans who believed that the U.S. had made a mistake

3336:

of South Vietnam. This early attack allowed allied forces some time to prepare defensive measures. When the main operation began during the early morning hours of 31 January, the offensive was countrywide; eventually more than 80,000 PAVN/VC troops struck more than 100 towns and cities, including 36

4880:

Wheeler's promptings were influenced by the severe strain imposed upon the U.S. military by the Vietnam commitment, which had been undertaken without mobilizing its reserve forces. The Joint Chiefs had repeatedly requested national mobilization, not only to prepare for a possible intensification of

4845:

At the time of the Tet Offensive, the majority of the American public perceived that the war was not being won by the United States and its allies, despite assurances from the President and military leaders that such was the case. No matter that the PAVN/VC lost about 30,000 of their best troops in

4797:

In the wake of the offensive, however, fresh determination was exhibited by the Thiệu government. On 1 February Thiệu declared a state of martial law, and on 15 June, the National Assembly passed his request for a general mobilization of the population and the induction of 200,000 draftees into the

4748:

The Lê Duẩn faction, which favoured quick, decisive offensives meant to paralyse South Vietnam-United States responses, was replaced by Giáp and Trường Chinh, who favoured a strategy of more protracted, drawn-out conventional warfare. High-intensity, conventional big-unit battles were replaced with

4623:

When the Tet offensive began, feelings ran high at MACV that the base was in for a serious attack. In I Corps, the Tet Truce had been cancelled in apprehension of a communist assault that never happened. The offensive passed Khe Sanh by and the intermittent battle continued. Westmoreland's fixation

4576:

The attack on Khe Sanh, which began on 21 January before the other offensives, probably served two purposes—as a real attempt to seize the position or as a diversion to draw American attention and forces away from the population centers in the lowlands, a deception that was "both plausible and easy

4387:

in halting the attack. A total of 35 PAVN/VC battalions, many of whose troops were undercover cadres who had lived and worked within the capital or its environs for years, had been committed to the Saigon objectives. By dawn most of the attacks within the city center had been eliminated, but severe

4196:

in IV Corps on 10 February. A total of approximately 84,000 PAVN/VC troops participated in the attacks while thousands of others stood by to act as reinforcements or as blocking forces. Palmer gave a figure of 70,000. PAVN/VC forces also mortared or rocketed every major allied airfield and attacked

3716:

was a major blow to domestic opposition and "foreign obstruction". Concessions had been made to the center group, however, by agreeing that negotiations were possible, but the document essentially centered on the creation of "a spontaneous uprising in order to win a decisive victory in the shortest

5083:

and "Mini-Tet" in that no U.S. installations were attacked. During this series of actions, VC forces occupied six Buddhist pagodas in the mistaken belief that they would be immune from artillery and air attack. The fiercest fighting once again took place in Cholon. One notable event occurred on 18

4945:

A great deal has been said by historians concerning how the news media made Tet the "turning point" in the public's perception of the war. Popular CBS anchor Walter Cronkite stated during a news broadcast on February 27, "We have been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders,

4923:

proposed that a partial bombing halt be implemented in North Vietnam and that an offer to negotiate be extended to Hanoi. On 4 March, Rusk reiterated the proposal, explaining that, during the rainy season in the North, the bombing was less effective and that no military sacrifice would thus occur.

4889:

in only eight days and that the military might finally obtain permission to widen the war. Wheeler's written report of the trip, however, contained no mention of any new contingencies, strategies, or the building up of the strategic reserve. It was couched in grave language that suggested that the

4857:

The shocks that reverberated from the battlefield continued to widen: On 18 February 1968 MACV posted the highest U.S. casualty figures for a single week during the entire war: 543 killed and 2,547 wounded. As a result of the heavy fighting, 1968 went on to become the deadliest year of the war for

4740:

On 5 May Trường Chinh rose to address a congress of Party members and proceeded to castigate the Party militants and their bid for quick victory. His "faction-bashing" tirade sparked a serious debate within the party leadership that lasted for four months. As the leader of the "main force war" and

4724:

In all honesty, we didn't achieve our main objective, which was to spur uprisings throughout the South. Still, we inflicted heavy casualties on the Americans and their puppets, and this was a big gain for us. As for making an impact in the United States, it had not been our intention—but it turned

4661:

The leadership in Hanoi was despondent at the outcome of their offensive. Their first and most ambitious goal, producing a general uprising, had ended in a dismal failure. In total, about 85,000–100,000 PAVN/VC troops had participated in the initial onslaught and in the follow-up phases. Overall,

4603:

Khe Sanh and its 6,000 U.S. Marine Corps, Army and ARVN defenders was surrounded by two to three PAVN divisions, totaling approximately 20,000 men. Throughout the siege, which lasted until 8 April, the allies were subjected to heavy mortar, rocket, and artillery bombardment, combined with sporadic

4518:

VC forces around Huế included six main-force battalions, while two PAVN regiments operated in the area. As the battle unfolded three more PAVN regiments redeployed from Khe Sanh arrived as reinforcements. The North Vietnamese plan of attack on Huế involved intensive preparation and reconnaissance.

3852:

Despite all the warning signs, however, the allies were still surprised by the scale and scope of the offensive. According to ARVN Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung the answer lay with the allied intelligence methodology itself, which tended to estimate the enemy's probable course of action based upon their

3739:

The PAVN official history states that the objectives of the Tet offensive were to: annihilate and cause the total disintegration of the bulk of the puppet army, overthrow the "puppet" (South Vietnamese) regime at all administrative levels, and place all government power in the hands of the people.

6230:

Hoang offered opposing viewpoints (pp. 22–23) while William Duiker (p. 289) and Clark Clifford (p. 475) believed that it was so intended. Stanley Karnow did not (p. 537), while William Westmoreland never even mentioned the prospect in his memoir. A study of North Vietnamese documentation by James

5666:, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979, pp. 333–334; and Schmitz p. 90. This thesis appeared logical in hindsight, but it "fails to account for any realistic North Vietnamese military objectives, the logical prerequisite for an effort to influence American opinion." James J. Wirtz in 5103:

Phase III of the offensive began on 17 August and involved attacks in I, II and III Corps. Significantly, during this series of actions only North Vietnamese forces participated and targets were military in nature, with less concise attacks against city-targets. The main offensive was preceded by

5056:

During the early morning hours of 4 May, PAVN/VC units initiated the second phase of the offensive (known by the South Vietnamese and Americans as "Mini-Tet") by striking 119 targets throughout South Vietnam, including Saigon. This time, however, allied intelligence was better prepared, stripping

4989:

The President was to make a televised address to the nation on Vietnam policy on 31 March and was deliberating on both the troop request and his response to the military situation. By 28 March Clifford was working hard to convince him to tone down his hard-line speech, maintaining force levels at

4954:

By 22 March, President Johnson had informed Kentrell to "forget the 100,000" men. The President and his staff were refining a lesser version of the troop increase – a planned call-up of 62,000 reservists, 13,000 of whom would be sent to Vietnam. Three days later, at Clifford's suggestion, Johnson

4941:

on 10 March. The article also revealed that the request had begun a serious debate within the administration. According to it, many high-level officials believed that the U.S. troop increase would be matched by the communists and would simply maintain a stalemate at a higher level of violence. It

4785:

The human and material cost to South Vietnam was staggering. The number of civilian dead was estimated by the government at 14,300 with an additional 24,000 wounded. 630,000 new refugees had been generated, joining the nearly 800,000 others already displaced by the war. By the end of 1968, one of

4286:

The defense of the Capital Military District was primarily a South Vietnamese responsibility and it was initially defended by eight ARVN infantry battalions and the local police force. By 3 February they had been reinforced by five ARVN Ranger Battalions, five Marine Corps, and five ARVN Airborne

3691:

After cementing their position during the Party crackdown, the militants sped up planning for a major conventional offensive to break the military deadlock. They concluded that the Saigon government and the U.S. presence were so unpopular with the population of the South that a broad-based attack

5068:, the last Special Forces border surveillance camp in I Corps. 1,800 U.S. and ARVN troops were isolated and under intense attack when MACV made the decision to avoid a situation reminiscent of that at Khe Sanh. Kham Duc was evacuated by air while under fire and abandoned to the North Vietnamese. 4893:

On 27 February, Johnson and McNamara discussed the proposed troop increase. To fulfil it would require an increase in the overall military strength of about 400,000 men and the expenditure of an additional $ 10 billion during fiscal 1969 and another $ 15 billion in 1970. These monetary

4801:

Thiệu saw an opportunity to consolidate his personal power and he took it. His only real political rival was Vice President Kỳ, the former Air Force commander, who had been outmaneuvered by Thiệu in the presidential election of 1967. In the aftermath of Tet, Kỳ supporters in the military and the

3942:

and ARVN infantry and Airborne elements, lasted for 22 days. By the time the fighting was over, between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN and 262 U.S. troops had been killed. MACV intelligence was confused by the possible motives of the North Vietnamese in prompting such large-scale actions in remote regions

4950:

in January 1968 revealed that 56 per cent polled considered themselves hawks on the war and 27 per cent doves, with 17 per cent offering no opinion. By early February, at the height of the offensive's first phase, 61 per cent declared themselves hawks, 23 per cent doves, and 16 per cent held no

4561:

General Trưởng believed that the captives had been executed by the communists to protect the identities of members of the local VC infrastructure, whose covers had been blown. The exact circumstances leading to the deaths of those citizens of Huế discovered in the mass graves may never be known

3356:

The offensive was a military defeat for North Vietnam, as neither uprisings nor ARVN unit defections occurred in South Vietnam. However, this offensive had far-reaching consequences for its effect on the views of the Vietnam War by the American public and the world broadly. General Westmoreland

4915:

On 1 March, Clifford succeeded McNamara as Secretary of Defense. During the month, Clifford, who had entered office as a staunch supporter of the Vietnam commitment and who had opposed McNamara's de-escalatory views, turned against the war. According to Clifford: "The simple truth was that the

4814:

Thiệu had also become very suspicious of his American allies, unwilling to believe (as did many South Vietnamese) that the U.S. had been caught by surprise by the offensive. "Now that it's all over", he queried a visiting Washington official, "you really knew it was coming, didn't you?" Lyndon

4599:

forces under the command of General Giáp during the First Indochina War. Westmoreland, who knew of Nguyen Chi Thanh's penchant for large-scale operations—but not of his death—believed that this was going to be an attempt to replicate that victory. He intended to stage his own "Dien Bien Phu in

4538:

During the intense action, the allies estimated that PAVN forces had between 1,042 and 5,000 killed and 89 captured in the city and in the surrounding area. 216 U.S. Marines and soldiers had been killed during the fighting and 1,609 were wounded. 421 ARVN troops were killed, another 2,123 were

4534:

fought to seal PAVN access and cut off their lines of supply and reinforcement. By this point in the battle 16 to 18 PAVN battalions (8,000–11,000 men) were taking part in the fighting for the city itself or the approaches to the city. Two of the PAVN regiments had made a forced march from the

3687:

The operational plan for the general offensive and uprising had its origin as the "COSVN proposal" at Thanh's southern headquarters in April 1967 and had then been relayed to Hanoi the following month. The General was then ordered to the capital to explain his concept in person to the Military

5123:

Saigon was struck again during this phase, but the attacks were less sustained and once again repulsed. As far as MACV was concerned, the August offensive "was a dismal failure". In five weeks of fighting and after the loss of 20,000 troops, the previous objectives of spurring an uprising and

4322:

and then advanced towards the base gate. The sound of gunfire alerted base sentries, who secured the gate and sounded the alarm. A .30-caliber machine gun on the second floor of the headquarters disabled both cars and killed or wounded several sappers while the Navy security force organized a

4053:

to his III Corps headquarters in the week before the Tet offensive to alert them that a major enemy attack was coming "just before or just after Tet." He said the Vietnamese had too much respect for the holiday to attack during Tet itself. Weyand said he had moved 30 U.S. and South Vietnamese

3804:

South Vietnamese and U.S. military intelligence estimated that PAVN/VC forces in South Vietnam during January 1968 totaled 323,000 men, including 130,000 PAVN regulars, 160,000 VC and members of the infrastructure, and 33,000 service and support troops. They were organized into nine divisions

3506:

In May, MACV attempted to obtain a compromise from the CIA by maintaining that VC militias did not constitute a fighting force but were essentially low-level fifth columnists used for information collection. With the groups deadlocked, George Carver, CIA Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs,

4777:

South Vietnam was a nation in turmoil both during and in the aftermath of the offensive. Tragedy had compounded tragedy as the conflict reached into the nation's cities for the first time. As government troops pulled back to defend the urban areas, the VC moved in to fill the vacuum in the

4486:

in the Huế Citadel and the marines have sent a battalion into the area to clear them out." A later assessment ultimately noted three Marine and 11 Vietnamese battalions engaged at least 8 PAVN/VC battalions of the PAVN 6th Regiment, not including the large number of forces outside the city.

4033:

Westmoreland also failed to communicate his concerns adequately to Washington. Although he had warned the President between 25 and 30 January that "widespread" communist attacks were in the offing, his admonitions had tended to be so oblique or so hedged with official optimism that even the

3822:

Signs of impending communist action were noticed among the allied intelligence collection apparatus in Saigon. During the late summer and fall of 1967 both South Vietnamese and U.S. intelligence agencies collected clues that indicated a significant shift in communist strategic planning. By

7147:

To a lesser extent characterised as mere disappointment in the official history (a heavy characterisation for an official history), Duiker, William J. (2002) "Foreword," in Military History Institute of Vietnam Victory in Vietnam: A History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975, p.

4502:

during the Korean War, and for which neither side were trained. Because of poor weather conditions, logistics problems and the historical and cultural significance of the city, American forces did not immediately apply air and artillery strikes as widely as they had in other cities.

4684:

The heavy losses inflicted on VC units struck into the heart of the infrastructure that had been built up for over a decade. MACV estimated that 181,149 PAVN/VC troops had been killed during 1968. According to General Tran Van Tra, 45,267 PAVN/VC troops had been killed during 1968.

4337:

Small squads of VC fanned out across the city to attack various officers and enlisted men's billets, homes of ARVN officers, and district police stations. Provided with "blacklists" of military officers and civil servants, they began to round up and execute any that could be found.

4311:

for six hours and, when running out of ammunition, the last eight attackers destroyed it and killed themselves using explosive charges, but they were unable to broadcast due to the cutting off of the audio lines from the main studio to the tower as soon as the station was seized.

3473:(CIA) concerning the strength of VC guerrilla forces within South Vietnam. In September, members of the MACV intelligence services and the CIA met to prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate that would be used by the administration to gauge U.S. success in the conflict. 4383:, in the northwestern part of the city, was attacked by three battalions. A combat-ready battalion of ARVN paratroopers, awaiting transport to Da Nang, went instead directly into action supporting the United States Air Force's 377th Security Police Squadron and the U.S. Army's 3823:

mid-December, mounting evidence convinced many in Washington and Saigon that something big was underway. During the last three months of the year intelligence agencies had observed signs of a major North Vietnamese military buildup. In addition to captured documents (a copy of

3558:, one of Westmoreland's three Field Force commanders, claimed that "the Viet Cong has been defeated" and that "He can't get food and he can't recruit. He has been forced to change his strategy from trying to control the people on the coast to try to survive in the mountains." 4427:, threatening Saigon. While most of these units had suffered heavy losses in the offensive, their continued presence applied pressure on Saigon and prevented the reestablishment of South Vietnamese Government control. From 11 March to 7 April, Allied forces launched 4833:

The Tet Offensive created a crisis within the Johnson administration, which became increasingly unable to convince the American public that it had been a major defeat for the communists. The optimistic assessments made before the offensive by the administration and

3465:(MACV), believed that if a "crossover point" could be reached by which the number of communist troops killed or captured during military operations exceeded those recruited or replaced, the Americans would win the war. There was a discrepancy, however, between the 3775:

Preparations for the offensive were already underway. The logistical build-up began in mid-year, and by January 1968, 81,000 tons of supplies and 200,000 troops, including seven complete infantry regiments and 20 independent battalions made the trip south on the

3589:

for a winter-spring offensive during 1968 had begun in early 1967 and continued until early the following year. According to American sources, there has been an extreme reluctance among Vietnamese historians to discuss the decision-making process that led to the

5946:

claimed, Johnson had discounted any "negative analysis" of U.S. strategy by the CIA and the Pentagon offices of International Security Affairs and System Analysis, and had instead "seized upon optimistic reports from General Westmoreland." Neil Sheehan, et al.

4719:

It was not until after the conclusion of the first phase of the offensive that Hanoi realized that its sacrifices might not have been in vain. General Tran Do, PAVN commander at the battle of Huế, gave some insight into how defeat was translated into victory:

4862:

announced a new draft call for 48,000 men, the second highest of the war. On 28 February Robert S. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense who had overseen the escalation of the war in 1964–1965, but who had eventually turned against it, stepped down from office.

4924:

This was purely a political ploy, however, since the North Vietnamese would probably again refuse to negotiate, casting the onus on them and "thus freeing our hand after a short period...putting the monkey firmly upon Hanoi's back for what was to follow."

3317:, with the offense chosen during a holiday period as most ARVN personnel were on leave. The purpose of the wide-scale offensive by the Hanoi Politburo was to trigger political instability in a belief that mass armed assault on urban centers would trigger 3659:

To "break the will of their domestic opponents and reaffirm their autonomy vis-à-vis their foreign allies", hundreds of pro-Soviet, party moderates, military officers, and intelligentsia were arrested on 27 July 1967, during what came to be called the

3788:

rocket-propelled grenade launchers, which granted them superior firepower over the ARVN. To pave the way and to confuse the allies as to its intentions, Hanoi launched a diplomatic offensive. Foreign Minister Trinh announced on 30 December that Hanoi

3622:(COSVN), headquarters for the South, was another prominent militant. The followers of the Chinese line centered their strategy against the U.S. and its allies on large-scale, main force actions rather than the protracted guerrilla war espoused by 4753:

to all of its subordinate units: "Never again and under no circumstances are we going to risk our entire military force for just such an offensive. On the contrary, we should endeavor to preserve our military potential for future campaigns."

4435:(8 April – 31 May), which expanded the security operation across III Corps and resulted in a further 7645 VC killed and 1708 captured for South Vietnamese losses of 708 killed, U.S. losses of 564 killed and other Allied losses of 23 killed. 5120:, in Quang Duc Province, five kilometers from the Cambodian border. The fighting lasted for two days before the PAVN broke contact; the combat resulted in US/ARVN claiming 776 PAVN/VC casualties, 114 South Vietnamese and two Americans. 4890:

206,756-man request it proposed was a matter of vital military necessity. Westmoreland wrote in his memoir that Wheeler had deliberately concealed the truth of the matter to force the issue of the strategic reserve upon the President.

4558:, later further muddied the waters by stating that their forces had indeed rounded up "reactionary" captives for transport to the North, but that local commanders, under battlefield exigencies, had executed them for expediency's sake. 4706:

said that the Tet offensive had wiped out half of the VC's strength, while the official Vietnamese war history notes that by the end of 1969, very little communist-held territory ("liberated zones") existed in "the rural lowlands of

3540:

show in mid-November. "We are on the offensive. The territory is being gained. We are making steady progress." At the end of November, the campaign reached its climax when Johnson summoned Westmoreland and the new U.S. Ambassador,

3711:

In October, the Politburo decided on the Tet holiday as the launch date and met again in December to reaffirm its decision and formalize it at the 14th Plenary session of the Party Central Committee in January 1968. The resultant

5649:

Ang, p. 351. Two interpretations of the offensive's goals have continued to dominate Western historical debate. The first maintained that the political consequences of the winter-spring offensive were an intended rather than an

4258:

Although Saigon was the focal point of the offensive, the PAVN/VC did not seek a total takeover of the city. Rather, they had six primary targets to strike in the downtown area: the headquarters of the ARVN Joint General Staff,

5037:, the PAVN clashed savagely with U.S. Marine, Army and ARVN forces before withdrawing. The PAVN lost an estimated 2,100 men according to US/ARVN claims, after inflicting casualties on the allies of 290 killed and 946 wounded. 4819:, where Johnson affirmed that Saigon would be a full partner in all negotiations and that the U.S. would not "support the imposition of a coalition government, or any other form of government, on the people of South Vietnam." 4519:

Over 190 targets, including every government and military installation on both sides of the river would be hit on January 31 by a force of five thousand. Other forces would block American and ARVN reinforcement routes, mainly

3748:

would then commence with simultaneous actions on major allied bases and most urban areas, and with particular emphasis on the cities of Saigon and Huế. Concurrently, a substantial threat would have to be made against the U.S.

4294:

At the Armored Command and Artillery Command headquarters on the northern edge of the city, the PAVN planned to use captured tanks and artillery pieces, but the tanks had been moved to another base two months earlier and the

4539:

wounded, and 31 were missing. More than 5,800 civilians had lost their lives during the battle and 116,000 were left homeless out of an original population of 140,000. 40–50% of Huế was destroyed by the end of the battle.

3553:

pacification program in the countryside was succeeding, and that sixty-eight percent of the South Vietnamese population was under the control of Saigon while only seventeen percent was under the control of the VC. General

3974:

By the beginning of January 1968, the U.S. had deployed 331,098 Army personnel and 78,013 Marines in nine divisions, an armoured cavalry regiment, and two separate brigades to South Vietnam. They were joined there by the

6458:

In their memoirs, both Johnson and Westmoreland stated that they had predicted the offensive. According to Clark Clifford, however, these later claims were rather "self serving". Clark Clifford, with Richard Holbrooke,

4810:

members to high positions in the government and military. By the summer of 1968, the President had earned a less exalted sobriquet among the South Vietnamese population, who had begun to call him "the little dictator."

4323:

counterattack. Simultaneously a U.S. Navy advisor contacted the U.S. military police who soon attacked the VC from adjoining streets, the resulting crossfire ended the attack, killing eight sappers with two captured.

3337:

of 44 provincial capitals, five of the six autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns and the southern capital. The offensive was the largest military operation conducted by either side up to that point in the war.

3438:

as signs that the population would embrace a 'general uprising' against the government of South Vietnam. The Politburo sought to exploit perceived instability and maintain political weakness in South Vietnam.

3313:. It was a campaign of surprise attacks against military and civilian command and control centers throughout South Vietnam. The name is the truncated version of the Lunar New Year festival name in Vietnamese, 7696:

pieced the story together from a variety of sources. Oberdorfer, pp. 266–270. Herbert Schindler concluded that the key sources included Senators who had been briefed by Johnson himself. Herbert Y. Schandler,

4497:

and soldiers of the 1st ARVN Division and Marine Corps cleared the city street by street and house by house, a deadly and destructive form of urban combat that the U.S. military had not engaged in since the

4884:

Johnson dispatched Wheeler to Saigon on 20 February to determine military requirements in response to the offensive. Both Wheeler and Westmoreland were elated that McNamara would be replaced by the hawkish

4419:

would describe this as "a classic example of a properly executed ambush." The following day as US troops swept the area they were engaged by VC forces in an 8-hour battle losing 3 dead while killing 10 VC.

3743:

The operation would involve a preliminary phase, during which diversionary attacks would be launched in the border areas of South Vietnam to draw American attention and forces away from the cities. The

6231:

Wirtz led him to conclude that Giáp believed that the American people would have to endure two more years of military stalemate (post-offensive) before turning decisively against the war. Wirtz, p. 61.

5459:

Does not include ARVN or U.S. casualties incurred during the "Border Battles"; ARVN killed, wounded, or missing from Phase III; U.S. wounded from Phase III; or U.S. missing during Phases II and III.

3610:

and called for the reunification of the nation by military means and that no negotiations should be undertaken with the Americans. This group was led by Communist Party First Secretary Lê Duẩn and

4349:, on accusations of assassinating South Vietnamese Lt. Col. Nguyen Tuan, his wife, six of his seven children, and his 80-year-old mother, captured in civilian clothing, in front of photographer 4403:

On the morning of 2 March 1968, while patrolling 4 miles (6.4 km) north of Tan Son Nhut Air Base near the small village of Quoi Xuan to locate VC rocket sites, Company C, 4th Battalion,

5441:

estimated that strength at 330,000. The CIA and the U.S. State Department concluded that the North Vietnamese force level lay somewhere between 435,000 and 595,000. Dougan and Weiss, p. 184.

3545:, to Washington, D.C., for what was billed as a "high-level policy review". Upon their arrival, the two men bolstered the administration's claims of success. From Saigon, pacification chief 3503:, the new figures "would create a political bombshell", since they were positive proof that the North Vietnamese "had the capability and the will to continue a protracted war of attrition". 9838: 9038: 359: 348: 238: 4669: 3453:

During late 1967, the question whether the U.S. strategy of attrition was working in South Vietnam weighed heavily on the minds of the American public and the administration of President

4478:, a three-square mile complex of palaces, parks, and residences, which were surrounded by a moat and a massive earth and masonry fortress. The undermanned ARVN defenders, led by General 4302: 7278:"Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975." University Press of Kansas, May 2002 (original 1995). Translation by Merle L. Pribbenow. Page 247. 7269:"Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975." University Press of Kansas, May 2002 (original 1995). Translation by Merle L. Pribbenow. Page 246. 6072:

Contrary to Western belief, Hồ Chí Minh had been sidelined politically since 1963 and took little part in the day-to-day policy decisions of the Politburo or Secretariat. Nguyen, p. 30.

3423:. Prior to 1967, the South Vietnamese constituent assembly was in the process of drafting a new constitution and eventual elections. The political situation in South Vietnam, after the 3260: 4201: 8047: 4279:. Elsewhere in the city or its outskirts, ten VC Local Force Battalions attacked the central police station and the Artillery Command and the Armored Command headquarters (both at 6922:

Shulimson, p. 213. A PAVN document allegedly captured by the ARVN stated that 1,042 troops had been killed in the city proper and that several times that number had been wounded.

4361:

for Spot News Photography and is widely seen as a defining moment in the Vietnam War for its influence on U.S. public opinion, even being called "the picture that lost the war".

3827:, for example, was captured by early October), observations of enemy logistical operations were also quite clear: in October, the number of trucks observed heading south through 9808: 4802:

administration were quickly removed from power, arrested, or exiled. A crack-down on the South Vietnamese press also ensued and there was a worrisome return of former President

3661: 4745:, published, and broadcast via Radio Hanoi. He had single-handedly shifted the nation's war strategy and restored himself to prominence as the Party's ideological conscience. 7200:

Nationalism and Imperialism in South and Southeast Asia: Essays Presented to Damodar R. SarDesai. Arnold P. Kaminsky, Roger D. Long. Routledge; 1 edition (September 7, 2016).

5511: 3720:

Contrary to Western belief, General Giáp did not plan or command the offensive himself. Thanh's original plan was elaborated on by a party committee headed by Thanh's deputy,

4562:

exactly, but most of the victims were killed as a result of PAVN and VC executions, considering evidence from captured documents and witness testimonies among other things.

8003: 7999: 9818: 3511:, the director of the CIA. He believed that "it was a political problem ... didn't want the agency ... contravening the policy interest of the administration." 3448: 3265: 3255: 3250: 3245: 3240: 3235: 3230: 3225: 3220: 3215: 7946: 3947:

the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. To deter any such possibility, he deployed 250,000 men, including half of MACV's U.S. maneuver battalions, to I Corps.

3801:, the bombing campaign against North Vietnam. This announcement provoked a flurry of diplomatic activity (which amounted to nothing) during the last weeks of the year. 9828: 9548: 8037: 2640: 9798: 9793: 4523:. Over half of the ARVN 1st Division was on holiday leave and PAVN commanders believed the population of Huế would join the fight as a part of the General Uprising. 4283:). The plan called for all these initial forces to capture and hold their positions for 48 hours, by which time reinforcements were to have arrived to relieve them. 6523:

this was connected to the mixup over the launch date is unknown. All eight of the attacks were controlled by the North Vietnamese headquarters of Military Region 5.

9788: 9803: 4986:

announced he would join the contest for the Democratic nomination, further emphasizing the plummeting support for Johnson's administration in the wake of Tet.

4431:

to pacify the area around Saigon. The operation was considered a success and the U.S. claimed 2,658 VC killed and 427 captured. It was followed immediately by

3885: 3641: 3550: 3208: 9428: 3652:

advocated that North Vietnam conduct a protracted war on the Maoist model, fearing that a conventional conflict might draw China in, as had happened in the

9073: 4389: 4241: 4233: 1839: 1829: 7795:

Shulimson, p. 307. Perhaps more indicative of PAVN losses were the 41 PAVN prisoners taken and the recovery of 500 weapons, 132 of which were crew-served.

3857:

as an example of "an allied intelligence failure to rank with Pearl Harbor in 1941 or the Ardennes offensive in 1944." Lieutenant Colonel Dave R. Palmer:

5766: 3345:, intense fighting lasted for a month, resulting in the destruction of the city. During its occupation, the PAVN/VC executed thousands of people in the 86: 9823: 9656: 3864:

From early to late 1967, the U.S. command in Saigon was perplexed by a series of actions initiated by the PAVN/VC in the border regions. On 24 April a

746: 9219: 7242:

According to one estimate by late 1968, of a total of 125,000 main force troops in the South, 85,000 were of North Vietnamese origin. Duiker, p. 303.

646: 587: 4591:

Westmoreland—and the American media, which covered the action extensively—often made inevitable comparisons between the actions at Khe Sanh and the

8083: 7994: 4942:

went on to state that officials were saying in private that "widespread and deep changes in attitudes, a sense that a watershed has been reached."

1220: 5740: 8011: 4318:

At 03:00 on 31 January, twelve VC sappers approached the Vietnamese Navy Headquarters in two civilian cars, killing two guards at a barricade at

4245: 1844: 7252: 4073:

Whether by accident or design, the first wave of attacks began shortly after midnight on 30 January as five provincial capitals in II Corps and

736: 597: 9058: 5437:

The South Vietnamese government estimated North Vietnamese forces at 323,000, including 130,000 regulars and 160,000 guerrillas. Hoang, p. 10.

9265: 7909: 4380: 4237: 1834: 768: 4068:

Message to North Vietnamese forces who were informed that they were "about to inaugurate the greatest battle in the history of our country".

9560: 5112:, and Loc Ninh, which were initiated to draw defensive forces from the cities. A thrust against Da Nang was preempted by the U.S. Marines' 5020:

To further enhance their political posture at the Paris talks, which opened on 13 May, the North Vietnamese opened the second phase of the

6810: 5079:

The PAVN/VC returned to Saigon on 25 May and launched a second wave of attacks on the city. The fighting during this phase differed from

4816: 3629:

By 1966–1967, however, after suffering massive casualties, stalemate on the battlefield, and destruction of the northern economy by U.S.

3598:

followed the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence by reunifying Vietnam through political means. Heading this faction were party theorist

3431: 3424: 4854:, argued for negotiations as an honourable way out in a Special Report based on his journalism in Vietnam broadcast on CBS TV in March. 4384: 4877:

out dangers that his on-the-spot commander did not consider palpable, concluding: "In summary, if you need more troops, ask for them."

3899:, came under attack by an entire PAVN regiment. Two days later, another PAVN regiment attacked a U.S. Special Forces border outpost at 3522:

Every statistical indicator of progress, from "kill ratios" and "body counts" to village pacification, was fed to the press and to the

4467:

in the city of Huế were mortared and rocketed and then attacked by two battalions of the PAVN 6th Regiment. Their target was the ARVN

4216:

summed up the feelings of his colleagues by asking "How could any effort against Saigon, especially downtown Saigon, be a diversion?"

9596: 3805:

composed of 35 infantry and 20 artillery or anti-aircraft artillery regiments, which were, in turn, composed of 230 infantry and six

5146: 9553: 4828: 3754: 3366: 2755: 2153: 9484: 4022:

while in possession of two pre-recorded audio tapes whose message appealed to the populace in "already occupied Saigon, Huế, and

3846: 3572:

magazine, Westmoreland dared the communists to launch an attack: "I hope they try something because we are looking for a fight."

9233: 4662:

during the "Border Battles" of 1967 and the nine-month winter-spring campaign, 45,267 PAVN/VC troops had been killed in action.

8059: 5829: 5799: 5116:. Continuing their border-clearing operations, three PAVN regiments asserted heavy pressure on the U.S. Special Forces camp at 9833: 8998: 8871: 8732: 8653: 8634: 8034: 7188: 7079: 6890: 4604:

small-scale infantry attacks on outlying positions. With the exception of the overrunning of the U.S. Special Forces camp at

4404: 3935: 3912: 580: 5339: 9083: 7437:

Lorell, Mark & Kelley, Charles, Jr. "Casualties, Public Opinion and Presidential Policy During the Vietnam War" (1985)

5438: 4741:"quick victory" faction, Lê Duẩn also came under severe criticism. In August, Chinh's report on the situation was accepted 4592: 4527: 4331: 4268: 3614:(no relation). From the early to mid-1960s, the militants had dictated the direction of the war in South Vietnam. General 3485: 3462: 3341:

and inflicted heavy casualties on PAVN/VC forces. The popular uprising anticipated by Hanoi never materialized. During the

8107:

Ang Cheng Guan (July 1998). "Decision-making Leading to the Tet Offensive (1968) – The Vietnamese Communist Perspective".

5060:

The fighting had no sooner died down around Saigon than U.S. forces in Quảng Tín Province suffered a defeat when the PAVN

4640:

this figure has been held as excessively optimistic, as it represented more than half the forces involved in this battle.

9729: 9611: 9578: 9527: 9256: 7473:

Lorell, Mark & Kelley, Charles, Jr. Casualties, Public Opinion and Presidential Policy During the Vietnam War (1985)

4835: 4494: 3648:

and that they were too "conservative and captive to old methods and past experience... mechanically repeating the past."

3370: 2457: 1458: 4702:

From this point forward, Hanoi was forced to fill nearly 70% of the VC's ranks with PAVN regulars. PRG Justice Minister

9813: 9623: 9467: 9242: 9194: 7814: 7419:

Three of the four ARVN Corps' commanders, for example, were replaced for their dismal performance during the offensive.

6983: 6958: 5496: 4229: 3939: 3386:

The term "Tet offensive" usually refers to the January–February 1968 offensive, but it can also include the so-called "

3145: 2677: 1824: 8553:

Nguyen, Lien-Hang T. (2006). "The War Politburo: North Vietnam's Diplomatic and Political Road to the Tet Offensive".

6188: 2660: 9189: 8909: 8890: 8852: 8833: 8811: 8789: 8770: 8751: 8713: 8694: 8673: 8615: 8583: 8535: 8516: 8495: 8472: 8453: 8422: 8403: 8370: 8351: 8328: 8309: 8286: 8263: 8239: 8211: 8189: 8167: 8160:

Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet in Vietnam and Washington

8148: 8129: 7959: 7935: 7884: 7839: 7374: 7344: 7170:

Duiker, p. 296. This was mainly due to General Creighton Abrams' new "One War" strategy and the CIA/South Vietnamese

6784: 6665: 6510: 4125: 3900: 3466: 2793: 2645: 621: 9543: 9184: 9149: 9063: 7082:. The Joint Chiefs of Staff created a Top Secret assessment on whether to maintain the Khe Sanh Combat Base or not. 4971: 4074: 4000: 3619: 3045: 1819: 1774: 628: 573: 7460: 6505:

Oberdorfer, Don (1971) Tet!: The Turning Point in the Vietnam War. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

4423:

While their attacks on Saigon had been quickly repulsed, in early March, more than 20 VC battalions remained near

3876:. For 49 days during early September and lasting into October, the PAVN began shelling the U.S. Marine outpost of 3362: 9052: 8090: 8009:

Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theater, Volume 5: Concluding the 30 Years War. Southeast Asia Report No. 1247

7777:

Zaffiri, pp. 315–316. Westmoreland was "bitter" and was upset that he "had been made the goat for the war." Ibid.

5109: 4288: 4004: 3358: 3302: 2381: 2264: 1738: 1580: 651: 3636:

During the same period, a counter-attack was launched by a new, third grouping (the centrists) led by President

9783: 9093: 9088: 8947: 8436: 7205: 7016:

Stephen T. Hosmer, Viet Cong Repression and its Implications for the Future (Rand Corporation, 1970), pp. 72–8.

4872:

unwarranted urgency in Wheeler's queries. Westmoreland was tempted, however, when Wheeler emphasized that the

4008: 3988: 1335: 1289: 614: 5450:

Tổng công kích, Tổng nổi dậy Tết mậu thân 1968 (Tet offensive 1968) – ARVN's Đại Nam publishing in 1969, p. 35

741: 9416: 8528:

Reluctant Soldier... Proud Veteran: How a cynical Vietnam vet learned to take pride in his service to the USA

4585: 3992: 3916: 3881: 3607: 3420: 3196: 2472: 2021: 1507: 1393: 8802:(1994). "Tet: The 1968 General Offensive and General Uprising". In Warner, Jayne S.; Luu Doan Huynh (eds.). 7620:(Undersecretary of State), Walt W. Rostow (National Security Advisor), Richard Helms (Director of the CIA), 4407:

walked into an ambush losing 48 killed in just 8 minutes. U.S. forces claimed they killed 20 VC. Specialist

3922:

The most severe of what came to be known as "the Border Battles" erupted during October and November around

3170: 634: 9666: 9500: 9433: 9179: 5914:

Those in the administration and the military who urged a change in strategy included: Secretary of Defense

5871: 4827:

Further information on the debate over the media's portrayal of the offensive and the public response:

4468: 4200:

In most cases, the defense was led by the South Vietnamese. Local militia or ARVN forces, supported by the

4192:, and Kien Tuong in IV Corps were assaulted. The last attack of the initial operation was launched against 3407:

Leading up to the Tet Offensive were years of marked political instability and a series of coups after the

2223: 2048: 1214: 1133: 761: 8048:

The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam 1960–68, Part 2

9747: 9423: 9068: 9034: 5468:

Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia. Naval Institute Press, 2008. P 33

5316: 4506: 3470: 3383:

to become publicly uncooperative in the negotiations, casting doubt on Johnson's ability to bring peace.

3295: 2841: 2745: 2395: 2105: 1954: 955: 639: 9356: 6841:

Palmer, p. 245. These units included the VC 12th Main Force Battalion and the Huế City Sapper Battalion.

6717: 5030: 4978:, where the President suffered an unexpected setback in the election, finishing barely ahead of Senator 4793:

Civilians sort through the ruins of their homes in Cholon, the heavily damaged Chinese section of Saigon

4770: 4703: 3412: 3380: 2765: 262: 9679: 9601: 9406: 9270: 9016: 8053: 5048: 4677:

The PAVN/VC effort to regain control of the countryside was somewhat more successful. According to the

4520: 4376: 4350: 4034:

administration was unprepared. No one – in either Washington or Vietnam – was expecting what happened.

3873: 3408: 3377: 3306: 3007: 2710: 2705: 2369: 2332: 2037: 1977: 1916: 1856: 49:

Map indicating towns and cities in which significant fighting occurred during the Tet Offensive of 1968

6744: 5371: 3896: 3419:

were persuaded to commit to democratic reforms in an effort to stabilize the political situation at a

3328:

The offensive was launched prematurely in the early morning hours of 30 January in large parts of the

9606: 9573: 9472: 9445: 9275: 9251: 8991: 8008: 7256: 6885:

Pike, COL Thomas F., Military Records, February 1968, 3rd Marine Division: The Tet Offensive, p. 71,

5040: 4963:, the advice of the group was decisive in convincing Johnson to reduce the bombing of North Vietnam. 4479: 4373: 3976: 3955: 3798: 3562: 3394:

in August, or the 21 weeks of unusually intense combat that followed the initial attacks in January.

3113: 2890: 2559: 2533: 2409: 2140: 2070: 1708: 1587: 1123: 1103: 1097: 948: 895: 699: 7684:

President Johnson was convinced that the source of the leak was the Undersecretary of the Air Force

7474: 7438: 4803: 4471: 4364:

Outside the city proper, two VC battalions attacked the U.S. logistical and headquarters complex at

4133: 2798: 9628: 9505: 9214: 9121: 9078: 8931: 8094: 5026: 4859: 4628: 4342: 4169: 3996: 3908: 3333: 3152: 2952: 2786: 2589: 2552: 2500: 2493: 2352: 2339: 2325: 2318: 2304: 2243: 2208: 2192: 2173: 2166: 2119: 2056: 1793: 1701: 1635: 1428: 1342: 1245: 1207: 5311: 5044:

U.S. Marines move through the ruins of the hamlet of Dai Do after several days of intense fighting

4424: 3681: 2760: 9479: 9338: 9247: 9168: 8821: 8064: 8028: 6776:

United States Army in Vietnam Combat Operations Staying the Course October 1967 to September 1968

4531: 4346: 4225: 3611: 3536: 3496: 3329: 3182: 3101: 3072: 3030: 2972: 2603: 2526: 2479: 2437: 2428: 2416: 2278: 2257: 2200: 2077: 1961: 1624: 1553: 1519: 1472: 1308: 1295: 1002: 828: 731: 331: 182: 8381: 6855: 6271: 5178: 3872:

aimed at taking Khe Sanh Combat Base, the western anchor of the Marines' defensive positions in

3615: 2609: 9843: 9510: 9462: 9174: 6950: 5651: 5124:

mass-defection had not been attained during this "final and decisive phase". Yet, as historian

5061: 4499: 4475: 4432: 4369: 4082: 3984: 3931: 3523: 3175: 3158: 3126: 3023: 3000: 2876: 2869: 2855: 2779: 2715: 2595: 2507: 2402: 2236: 2229: 2063: 2031: 1968: 1922: 1752: 1526: 1320: 1186: 1156: 880: 836: 751: 342: 8431:

Laurence, John (2002) The Cat from Hue: a Vietnam War Story, Public Affairs Press (New York),

7364: 7334: 6817: 5208:

This Order of Battle controversy resurfaced in 1982 when Westmoreland filed a lawsuit against

3603: 565: 353: 9365: 9324: 7944: 6774: 5113: 4975: 4935:

While this was being deliberated, the troop request was leaked to the press and published in

4789: 4734: 4678: 4428: 4272: 4260: 4189: 3892: 3769: 3500: 3492: 3416: 3133: 3119: 3107: 2979: 2965: 2920: 2899: 2862: 2772: 2720: 2670: 2582: 2573: 2546: 2444: 2422: 2362: 2346: 2311: 2297: 2180: 2112: 2016: 1998: 1984: 1928: 1890: 1861: 1673: 1566: 1540: 1414: 1382: 1315: 1275: 1252: 1070: 1023: 1016: 929: 915: 816: 528: 364: 273: 6942: 5187:, "General offensive and uprising of Tet Mau Than". The Vietnamese name 'Mau Than' uses the 5132:

20,000 PAVN/VC troops defected to allied forces, a threefold increase over the 1968 figure.

4395: 3904: 9705: 9646: 8984: 8744:

A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam

3750: 3606:. The militant faction, on the other hand, tended to follow the foreign policy line of the 3481: 3458: 3449:

The United States and the Vietnam War § Search and destroy, the strategy of attrition

3065: 3039: 3014: 2927: 2848: 2826: 2740: 2725: 2655: 2513: 2486: 2451: 2290: 2271: 1910: 1806: 1724: 1596: 1547: 1513: 1442: 1421: 1407: 1193: 1050: 995: 307: 4086: 3888:, an intense aerial bombardment campaign of 4,000 sorties into and just north of the DMZ. 8: 9568: 9517: 9437: 9347: 9160: 9116: 7617: 5935: 5931: 5919: 5271: 5166: 5098: 4956: 4490: 4450: 4408: 4358: 4264: 4106: 3645: 3391: 3346: 3189: 2906: 2883: 2834: 2730: 2692: 2615: 2388: 2159: 2126: 1883: 1744: 1666: 1643: 1630: 1465: 1370: 1179: 1058: 1037: 1009: 982: 864: 706: 694: 689: 521: 7906:

The United States Army in Vietnam, Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968

5550: 4489:

Since there were no U.S. formations stationed in Huế, relief forces had to move up from

3599: 2933: 719: 9386: 9311: 9297: 8342:

The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930–1975. 2 vols

8340: 8077: 7988: 5915: 5853: 5279: 5065: 4937: 4605: 4571: 4416: 3839: 3527: 3350: 3164: 3058: 3051: 2806: 2735: 2650: 2540: 2519: 2465: 2186: 2147: 2043: 1991: 1947: 1875: 1798: 1787: 1731: 1687: 1533: 1500: 1479: 1451: 1435: 1330: 1282: 1142: 1128: 1117: 1091: 1064: 969: 962: 908: 901: 850: 821: 809: 779: 725: 714: 677: 8957: 8595:

Summons of the Trumpet: The History of the Vietnam War from a Military Man's Viewpoint

6483:

For a treatment of official statements predicting the offensive, see Peter Braestrup.

4766: 4177: 3835: 3637: 9391: 9301: 9284: 9111: 8905: 8886: 8867: 8848: 8829: 8807: 8785: 8766: 8747: 8728: 8709: 8690: 8684: 8669: 8649: 8630: 8611: 8579: 8541: 8531: 8512: 8506: 8491: 8468: 8449: 8443: 8432: 8418: 8399: 8366: 8347: 8324: 8305: 8282: 8275: 8259: 8253: 8235: 8229: 8225: 8207: 8185: 8163: 8144: 8141:

The Tet Effect: Intelligence and the Public Perception of War (Cass Military Studies)

8125: 7955: 7931: 7880: 7835: 7810: 7605: 7370: 7340: 7201: 7184: 7075: 6979: 6954: 6943: 6886: 6780: 6661: 6506: 5927: 5774: 5692: 5492: 4983: 4807: 4463:

At 03:40 on the foggy morning of 31 January, allied defensive positions north of the

4444: 4027: 3884:(DMZ). The intense shelling (100–150 rounds per day) prompted Westmoreland to launch 3865: 3777: 3697: 3630: 3454: 3342: 3201: 2958: 2819: 2750: 2375: 2284: 2132: 2092: 1904: 1897: 1849: 1659: 1610: 1486: 1400: 1349: 1268: 1226: 1200: 1110: 1044: 1030: 988: 976: 889: 792: 786: 672: 295: 284: 5807: 4141: 3310: 9401: 9333: 9154: 9144: 9126: 8971: 8562: 8484: 8391: 8249: 8060:

MILESTONES: 1961–1968, U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War: The Tet Offensive, 1968

7621: 6212:

William, Thomas Allison. The Tet Offensive: a brief history with documents. pp. 25.

5344: 5267: 5188: 5034: 4995: 4851: 4686: 4673:

A VC guerrilla awaits interrogation following his capture in the attacks on Saigon.

4645:

U.S. and other allied forces suffered 1,536 killed, 7,764 wounded, and 11 missing.

3951: 3927: 3923: 3842: 3555: 3542: 2946: 2700: 2684: 2665: 2634: 2621: 2026: 2011: 1940: 1867: 1780: 1758: 1680: 1649: 1617: 1559: 1301: 1261: 1170: 1163: 941: 871: 797: 756: 666: 658: 8604: 6816:. Project CHECO, Pacific Air Force. 14 December 1968. pp. 8–9. Archived from 6496:

Laurence, John (2002), The Cat from Hue: a Vietnam War Story, PublicAffairs Press.

5029:, backed by artillery from across the DMZ, threatened the U.S. logistical base at 4998:

would oversee the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the continuation of negotiations.

3721: 9617: 9522: 9441: 9228: 8041: 8035:

CIA: Intelligence Warning of the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam; An Interim Study

8015: 7685: 7643: 7629: 7613: 7171: 6658:

War in the Shallows: U.S. Navy and Coastal and Riverine Warfare in Vietnam 1965-8

6192: 6018:

Victory in Vietnam: A History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975, p. xiv.

5857: 5847: 5366: 5247: 4979: 4899: 4847: 4839: 4449:

Further information on communist atrocities committed during the occupation:

4213: 4046: 3980: 3869: 3693: 3568: 2993: 2565: 2086: 1934: 1716: 1694: 1603: 1573: 1493: 1376: 1363: 1356: 1325: 1084: 935: 857: 7102:

CACCF: Combat Area Casualties Current File, as of Nov. 1993, Public Use Version

4193: 4129: 9717: 9396: 9370: 9320: 8962: 8763:

The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1973

8221: 7689: 5714: 5654:. This view was supported by William Westmoreland and his friend Jamie Salt in 5263: 5255: 5251: 5243: 5125: 4886: 4641: 4613: 4412: 4365: 4319: 4153: 4050: 3516: 3298:(PAVN) launched a surprise attack on 30 January 1968 against the forces of the 3088: 2986: 2939: 2913: 2813: 2216: 2098: 1149: 922: 803: 4326: 4161: 3735:

VC special forces study maps of District 7, Saigon, prior to the Tet offensive

3435: 3430:

Protests, campaigning and the atmosphere of elections were interpreted by the

320: 9777: 9164: 9048: 9030: 8545: 7972: 7609: 7183:

Macmillan Dictionary of Historical Terms. Chris Cook. Palgrave Macmillan UK.

6797: 6694: 5923: 5778: 5117: 5007: 4493:, eight kilometers to the southeast. In a misty drizzle, U.S. Marines of the 4464: 4388:

fighting between VC and allied forces erupted in the Chinese neighborhood of

4173: 4042: 3508: 3476: 3411:. In 1966, the leadership in South Vietnam, represented by the Head of State 3387: 3373: 3299: 3292: 3094: 3080: 2005: 1232: 1077: 682: 517: 415: 398: 337: 326: 315: 302: 290: 279: 268: 257: 232: 169: 157: 101: 88: 80: 8952: 8566: 7945:

Shulimson, Jack; Blaisol, Leonard; Smith, Charles R.; Dawson, David (1997).

5367:"Tet Offensive | Facts, Casualties, Videos, & Significance | Britannica" 5128:

has pointed out "the communist failures were not final or decisive either".

4291:, seven infantry battalions (one mechanized), and six artillery battalions. 4280: 4185: 3731: 3672: 3561:

Westmoreland was even more emphatic in his assertions. At an address at the

9693: 9411: 8799: 8065: 7768:

The four dissenters were Bradley, Murphy, Fortas and Taylor. Karnow, p. 562

6185: 6171:

Nguyen, p. 34. Duiker, p. 288. Also see Doyle, Lipsman and Maitland, p. 56.

5239: 4555: 4547: 4276: 4181: 4145: 3546: 8298: 5662:, Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1982, p. 133; Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, 4165: 9007: 7625: 6632: 5275: 4966:

Johnson was depressed and despondent in the course of recent events. The

4947: 4873: 4712: 4708: 4542: 4296: 3991:

brigade. South Vietnamese strength totaled 350,000 regulars in the Army,

3284: 603: 436: 422: 207: 36: 8296:

Doyle, Edward; Lipsman, Samuel; Maitland, Terrance; et al. (1986).

7928:

Victory in Vietnam: A History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975

7807:

The Magnificent Bastards: The Joint Army-Marine Defense of Dong Ha, 1968

6945:

The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: Political, Social, Military History

5105: 4019: 3283:

was a major escalation and one of the largest military campaigns of the

8627:

Military Records, February 1968, 3rd Marine Division: The Tet Offensive

7072:

Military Records, February 1968, 3rd Marine Division: The Tet Offensive

5767:"Nixon Tried to Spoil Johnson's Vietnam Peace Talks in '68, Notes Show" 5259: 4511: 4137: 4094: 3854: 3653: 3623: 8295: 4287:

Battalions. U.S. Army units participating in the defense included the

4098: 3954:, commander of U.S. forces in III Corps, which included the sensitive 3764:

VC troops pose with new AK-47 assault rifles and American field radios

9042: 7925: 4920: 4596: 4117: 4078: 3877: 3703: 3322: 3318: 3288: 1389: 429: 243: 195: 9764: 8054:

Library of Congress Country Studies: Vietnam & The Tet Offensive

7930:. trans. Pribbenow, Merle. Lawrence KS: University of Kansas Press. 7450:

Laurence, John The Cat from Hue (2002) PublicAffairs Press, New York

5540:

PAVN's Department of warfare, 124th/TGi, document 1.103 (11-2-1969)

4157: 3966: 3707:

VC special forces are sworn into the forces before the Tet Offensive

3519:, the news media then was inundated by a wave of effusive optimism. 44: 8177: 6695:"Just How Big an Impact Do Pictures of War Have on Public Opinion?" 5678:, San Rafael CA: Presidio Press, 1978, p. 214; Patrick McGarvey in 5209: 5141: 4858:

the US forces with 16,592 soldiers killed. On 23 February the U.S.

4038: 3526:. "We are beginning to win this struggle", asserted Vice President 2251: 443: 219: 5258:, (former Secretary of State and the Treasury), Associate Justice 5033:, in northwestern Quảng Trị Province. In what became known as the 4595:, where a French base had been besieged and ultimately overrun by 4299:

of the artillery pieces had been removed, rendering them useless.

476:

123 aircraft destroyed, 214 heavily damaged and 215 medium damaged

8199: 7971:

This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the

7475:

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3060.pdf

7439:

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3060.pdf

7336:

Victory at Any Cost: The Genius of Viet Nam's Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap

7130: 7128: 6796:

This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the

5682:, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1969; and Wirtz, p. 60. 5512:

Communist Leaders Stoutly Defend Tet Losses – The Washington Post

5089:

May) U.S. casualties amounted to 1,161 killed and 3,954 wounded,

4149: 4090: 4023: 3780:. This logistical effort also involved re-arming the VC with new 3314: 7091:

Oberdorfer, p. 261, See also Palmer, p. 254, and Karnow, p. 534.

5942:. New York: Harvest Books, 1999, p. 6. Throughout the year, the 5489:

The Myths of Tet The most misunderstood event of the Vietnam War

8204:

From Enemy to Friend: A North Vietnamese Perspective on the War

8018:, Washington, D.C.; Foreign Broadcast Information Service; 1983 6487:, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1983, 1:60–77. 5658:, Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1976, p. 322; Harry G. Summers in 4931:

ARVN Rangers moving through western Cholon, Saigon, 10 May 1968

4102: 3806: 3760: 3677: 595: 8976: 7701:. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977, pp. 202–205. 7125: 5693:"U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War: The Tet Offensive, 1968" 4570:

Further information on operations around the Combat Base:

9723: 8068:; Smith, Hedrick; Kenworthy, E. W.; Butterfield, Fox (1971). 7647: 7586:. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1971, pp. 389–392. 5477:"These figures are for the period January 31 to February 29." 4657:

A number of South Vietnamese targets during the Tet offensive

4617: 4345:, chief of the National Police, publicly executed VC officer 4018:

On 28 January, eleven VC cadres were captured in the city of

3785: 3781: 3586: 3139: 9839:

Military history of the United States during the Vietnam War

8396:

The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963–1969

7954:. History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps. 7832:

House to House: Playing the Enemy's Game in Saigon, May 1968

5551:"Tết Mậu Thân 1968 qua những số liệu – Báo Nhân Dân điện tử" 4011:, which were the equivalent of regional and local militias. 3491:

Provided with an enemy intelligence windfall accrued during

7216: 7214: 5071: 4695: 3930:. The clashes there between the four regiments of the PAVN 3828: 126:

North Vietnam and Viet Cong political and strategic victory

8953:

Bibliography: The Tet Offensive and the Battle of Khe Sanh

8220: 6637:. Public Broadcasting Service. p. Time in video: 6:57 5555:

Tết Mậu Thân 1968 qua những số liệu – Báo Nhân Dân điện tử

5428:

Hoang Ngoc Lung (1978). The General Offensives of 1968–69.

5012: 4455: 4250: 4132:

in the Capital Military District; Quảng Trị (again), Huế,

4112: 3447:

Further information on the U.S. effort prior to 1968:

5262:, Henry Cabot Lodge (twice Ambassador to South Vietnam), 4829:

News media and the Vietnam War § Tet Offensive: 1968

4653: 3531: 8526:

Nau, Terry L. (2013). "Chapter 4: Tet Changes The War".

7983:. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps Historical Branch. 7624:(Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs), 7211: 6014:

Nguyen, p. 4.; Duiker, William J. (2002) "Foreword," in

4927: 4729: 4306:

Black smoke covers areas of Sài Gòn during Tet offensive

8686:

The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam

8663: 8481: 5097:

Further information on Phase III of the offensive:

4580: 4124:

At 03:00 on 31 January PAVN/VC forces attacked Saigon,

9809:

Battles of the Vietnam War involving the United States

8176: 6418: 6416: 5938:, commander of II Field Force, Vietnam. Lewis Sorley, 5674:, New York: Viking, 1983, p. 537; U.S. Grant Sharp in 5295: 5006:

Further information on Phase II of the offensive:

4399:

ARVN Rangers defending Saigon in 1968 Battle of Saigon

4353:

and a film cameraman. That photograph, with the title

9677: 8804:

The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives

8682: 8530:. Leipzig: Amazon Distribution GmbH. pp. 27–38. 7978: 7628:(the Pentagon's International Security Affairs), and 7461:"Vietnam War U.S. Military Fatal Casualty Statistics" 6718:"48 U.S. soldiers killed in ambush on edge of Saigon" 5949:

The Pentagon Papers as Reported by the New York Times

5529:

The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives

8706:

The Tet Offensive: Politics, War, and Public Opinion

8592: 8552: 8272: 7948:

The U.S. Marines in Vietnam: 1968, the Decisive Year

5741:"Is This the Worst Year in Modern American History?" 4443:

Further information on the battle for the city:

4242:

Tet offensive attack on Joint General Staff Compound

4234:

Tet offensive battle of Cholon and Phu Tho Racetrack

3797:

open negotiations if the U.S. unconditionally ended

9819:

Attacks on diplomatic missions of the United States

8861: 8643: 8624: 8273:Dougan, Clark; Weiss, Stephen; et al. (1983). 7903: 6660:. Naval History and Heritage Command. p. 284. 6413: 6316:. U.S. Marine Corps Historical Branch, 1969, p. 17. 5934:, deputy commander of MACV; and Lieutenant General 5872:"The Importance of the Vietnam War's Tet Offensive" 5685: 4970:article had been released just two days before the 4620:delivery method, aerial resupply was never halted. 4372:was struck by a battalion, while the adjacent ARVN 3950:This course of events disturbed Lieutenant General 560:

14,300 killed, 24,000 wounded, and 630,000 refugees

8779: 8760: 8603: 8483: 8339: 8297: 8274: 7486:Halberstam, David (1979) The Powers That Be, Knopf 6715: 4197:64 district capitals and scores of smaller towns. 3402: 9829:Battles and operations of the Vietnam War in 1968 8703: 8578:. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 7366:Giap: The General Who Defeated America in Vietnam 6779:. Center of Military History United States Army. 6745:"G.I.'s and enemy battle 8 hours north of Saigon" 6742: 6683:. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1999. 5531:. Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993, pgs. 49 & 50. 4156:, Tuy Hòa and U.S. installations at Bong Son and 4003:. They were in turn supported by the 151,000-man 3919:and left 800 PAVN troops dead at its conclusion. 3667: 9799:Battles of the Vietnam War involving South Korea 9794:Battles of the Vietnam War involving New Zealand 9775: 7877:Air Power and the Airlift Evacuation of Kham Duc 7057: 7055: 7053: 7038:, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1998, p. 242. 6551: 6549: 6256:, p. 208. See also Doyle, Lipsman and Maitland, 5182: 4842:" that had opened in 1967 widened into a chasm. 4838:came under heavy criticism and ridicule as the " 4054:battalions closer to Saigon to defend the city. 8880: 8722: 7916: 6909: 6907: 6547: 6545: 6543: 6541: 6539: 6537: 6535: 6533: 6531: 6529: 5636: 5634: 5632: 5630: 5628: 5626: 5624: 5622: 5620: 5618: 5616: 5614: 5612: 5610: 5608: 5606: 5604: 5602: 5600: 5598: 5596: 5594: 5592: 5527:, in Jayne S. Warner and Luu Doan Huynh, eds., 4246:Tet offensive attacks on Bien Hoa and Long Binh 4085:, was the first to be hit, followed shortly by 16:Military campaign during the Vietnam War (1968) 9789:Battles of the Vietnam War involving Australia 8883:The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War 8361:Gilbert, Marc J.; Head, William, eds. (1996). 8106: 7926:Military History Institute of Vietnam (2002). 7662: 7660: 5922:; Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs 5590: 5588: 5586: 5584: 5582: 5580: 5578: 5576: 5574: 5572: 4627:In the end, a major allied relief expedition ( 9804:Battles of the Vietnam War involving Thailand 8992: 8842: 8741: 8601: 7910:United States Army Center of Military History 7704: 7050: 6388: 6386: 6384: 6382: 6380: 6378: 6376: 6374: 6372: 6370: 6368: 6366: 6364: 6362: 6360: 6358: 6356: 6354: 6352: 6350: 6348: 6346: 6344: 6342: 5225:This was the version given in Douglas Pike's 4238:Tet offensive attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base 3442: 581: 173: 8820: 8798: 8689:. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 8648:. Charleston, SC: Createspace. p. 202. 8482:Maitland, Terrence; McInerney, John (1983). 8184:. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press. 8100: 8082:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list ( 7993:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list ( 7542: 7540: 7538: 7536: 7534: 7532: 7530: 7528: 7104:. Washington, D.C.: National Archives, 1993. 6925: 6904: 6634:Vietnam, a television History: Tet offensive 6581: 6579: 6526: 6463:. New York: Random House, 1991, pp. 467–468. 6340: 6338: 6336: 6334: 6332: 6330: 6328: 6326: 6324: 6322: 6090:See also Doyle, Lipsman and Maitland, p. 56. 5424: 5422: 5420: 5418: 5416: 5414: 5412: 5410: 5408: 5406: 5404: 5402: 5266:(former High Commissioner of West Germany), 5184:Tổng tiến công và nổi dậy, Tết Mậu Thân 1968 3817: 9528:Normalization of US–Vietnam relations 8360: 8029:The 1968 Battles of Quang Tri City& Hue 7861: 7859: 7857: 7855: 7853: 7851: 7744: 7669: 7657: 7558: 7516: 7404: 6299: 6297: 6295: 6293: 6291: 6289: 6287: 6285: 6283: 6281: 6107: 6105: 5569: 5400: 5398: 5396: 5394: 5392: 5390: 5388: 5386: 5384: 5382: 5270:(former diplomat), General Taylor, General 5246:(former Under Secretary of State), General 5174: 3432:Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam 3425:1967 South Vietnamese presidential election 3390:" offensive that took place in May and the 67:(1 month, 1 week and 3 days) 8999: 8985: 8606:The End of the Line: The Siege of Khe Sanh 8576:Tet!: The Turning Point in the Vietnam War 8573: 7921:. McLean VA: General Research Corporation. 7654:. Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1988, p. 525. 7507: 7233:(New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), p. 223 7122:Doyle, Lipsman and Maitland, pp. 118, 120. 6768: 6766: 6475: 6466: 6434: 5983: 5981: 5979: 5977: 5975: 3353:, fighting continued for two more months. 588: 574: 9824:Battles and operations of the Vietnam War 8666:Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh 8462: 8398:. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. 8157: 7780: 7525: 7495:Brinkley, Douglas (2012) Cronkite, Harper 7395: 7323:Doyle, Lipsman and Maitland, pp. 126–127. 6853: 6849: 6847: 6576: 6425: 6319: 6215: 6036:Nguyen, p. 20. See also Wirtz, pp. 30–50. 5990: 5963: 5845: 8948:A Viet Nam Reappraisal Clark M. Clifford 8782:After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam 8646:I Corps Vietnam: An Aerial Retrospective 8248: 7848: 7369:. St. Martin's Press. pp. 189–190. 7339:. Potomac Books, Inc. pp. 272–273. 6655: 6278: 6186:http://grunt.space.swri.edu/gilbert3.htm 6114: 6102: 6057: 6030: 5379: 5274:(U.S. Commander in the Korean War), and 5229:, published by the U.S. Mission in 1970. 5214:The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception 5070: 5047: 5039: 5011: 4926: 4788: 4765: 4728: 4668: 4652: 4616:cargo aircraft employing the innovative 4579: 4541: 4505: 4454: 4394: 4325: 4301: 4249: 4111: 3965: 3834: 3759: 3730: 3702: 3671: 3475: 3367:1968 United States presidential election 9549:Opposition to United States involvement 8899: 8885:. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. 8866:. New York: Columbia University Press. 8668:. Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press. 8504: 8390: 8379: 8206:. Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press. 8198: 8162:. New Haven CT: Yale University Press. 7874: 6934: 6854:Willbanks, James H. (25 January 2011). 6772: 6763: 6630: 6306: 6203:Doyle, Lipsman and Maitland, pp. 58–59. 5972: 5738: 5199:) in the traditional year-naming cycle. 4733:South Vietnamese troops in action near 4180:in III Corps and Kien Hoa, Dinh Tuong, 3961: 133:for details and long-term consequences) 123:U.S. and South Vietnam tactical victory 9776: 8932:Westmoreland request for troops Feb 12 8508:Thunder from Above: Air War, 1941–1968 8412: 8337: 8321:The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam 8318: 8255:Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975 8119: 7646:(McNamara) only to replace him with a 7363:Warren, James A. (24 September 2013). 7362: 7358: 7356: 7332: 7253:"Vietnam Veterans for Academic Reform" 6967: 6940: 6844: 6692: 4415:for his actions at Quoi Xuan. General 3812: 8980: 8511:. Boston: Boston Publishing Company. 8490:. Boston: Boston Publishing Company. 8448:. New York: Oxford University Press. 8304:. Boston: Boston Publishing Company. 8281:. Boston: Boston Publishing Company. 8138: 8031:, US Army Center for Military History 7829: 7804: 7604:The group included McNamara, General 6973: 6410:Maitland and McInerney, pp. 160–183. 6016:Military History Institute of Vietnam 5951:. New York: Ballantine, 1971, p. 592. 5841: 5839: 5764: 5486: 5480: 5216:, which aired had on 23 January 1982. 5016:Attacks on Saigon, Phase II, May 1968 4273:Republic of Vietnam Navy Headquarters 3349:. Around the American combat base at 3159:Bo De River, Nha Trang, Tha Cau River 569: 69:Phase 3: 9 August – 23 September 1968 9730: 9662: 8963:United States History: Tet Offensive 8864:The Tet Offensive: A Concise History 8441: 7305:Arnold, p. 91. See also Karnow, 534. 5849:The Tet Offensive: A Concise History 4120:battle in Nam O village near Da Nang 4026:". The following afternoon, General 3891:On 27 October, an ARVN battalion at 3859:Current Readings in Military History 3832:a relatively short period of time." 3463:Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 9266:U.S. escalation / "Americanization" 8525: 7353: 6856:"Tet – What Really Happened at Hue" 6716:Joseph B. Treaster (4 March 1968). 6162:Doyle, Lipsman and Maitland, p. 56. 6054:Doyle, Lipsman and Maitland, p. 55. 5695:. United States Department of State 5278:(former Secretary of Defense), and 4919:On 27 February, Secretary of State 4390:Cholon around the Phú Thọ racetrack 3970:South Vietnam, Corps Tactical Zones 3640:, Lê Đức Thọ, and Foreign Minister 3365:to end the war. Shortly before the 61:Phase 1: 30 January – 20 March 1968 13: 9195:1960 South Vietnamese coup attempt 8664:Prados, John; Stubbe, Ray (1991). 8231:Counsel to the President: A Memoir 8124:. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. 8022: 7719:Stephens, Bret, "American Honor", 6743:Joseph B Treaster (5 March 1968). 6481:Hammond, p. 342.; Zaffiri, p. 280. 6180:Marc J. Gilbert & James Wells 5836: 5340:"Tet Offensive | Encyclopedia.com" 4773:was the president of South Vietnam 4648: 4584:Northern Quảng Trị Province & 4546:Burial of 300 victims of the 1968 4526:Outside Huế, elements of the U.S. 4411:would be posthumously awarded the 4385:3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment 4230:Tet offensive attack on US Embassy 3369:, Republican candidate and former 14: 9855: 9190:North Vietnamese invasion of Laos 8920: 7919:The General Offensives of 1968–69 5212:after the airing of its program, 5191:. 1968 was a year of Yang-Earth ( 3580: 537:PAVN source (total for 3 phases): 9756: 9739: 9711: 9699: 9687: 9661: 9652: 9651: 9642: 9641: 9544:Draft evasion in the Vietnam War 7966: 7868: 7823: 7798: 7789: 7771: 7762: 7753: 7735: 7726: 7713: 7678: 7635: 7598: 7589: 7576: 7567: 7549: 7498: 7489: 7480: 7467: 7453: 7444: 7431: 7422: 7413: 7383: 7326: 7317: 7308: 7299: 7290: 7281: 7272: 7263: 7245: 7236: 7223: 7194: 7177: 7164: 7151: 7141: 7116: 7107: 7094: 7085: 7064: 7041: 7028: 7019: 7010: 7001: 6992: 6978:. Rosen Publishing. p. 42. 6791: 5830:"50th Anniversary 1967 Election" 5282:(U.S. representative at the UN). 5232: 5227:The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror 5219: 5084:June when 152 members of the VC 4866: 4822: 4817:meeting with Johnson in Honolulu 4761: 4758:additional 1.4 million people." 4202:South Vietnamese National Police 4063:"Crack the Sky, Shake the Earth" 4005:South Vietnamese Regional Forces 3620:Central Office for South Vietnam 3575: 442: 435: 428: 421: 414: 397: 358: 347: 336: 325: 314: 301: 289: 278: 267: 256: 237: 225: 212: 200: 188: 175: 162: 150: 43: 9180:Vietnamese migration of 1954–55 9006: 8968:Works by or about Tet offensive 8629:. Charleston, SC: Createspace. 8380:Hayward, Stephen (April 2004). 8109:Journal of Contemporary History 7896: 7879:. Office of Air Force History. 7612:(Deputy Secretary of Defense), 6916: 6901:William, Thomas Allison, pp.51. 6895: 6879: 6870: 6835: 6803: 6736: 6709: 6686: 6674: 6649: 6624: 6615: 6606: 6597: 6588: 6567: 6558: 6516: 6499: 6490: 6452: 6443: 6404: 6395: 6263: 6247: 6234: 6224: 6206: 6197: 6174: 6165: 6156: 6147: 6135: 6123: 6093: 6084: 6075: 6066: 6048: 6039: 6021: 6008: 5999: 5954: 5908: 5899: 5890: 5864: 5822: 5792: 5765:Baker, Peter (3 January 2017). 5758: 5732: 5707: 5643: 5543: 5534: 5516: 5505: 5471: 5202: 5160: 5104:attacks on the border towns of 5025:when the 8,000 men of the PAVN 4906: 4289:716th Military Police Battalion 4009:South Vietnamese Popular Forces 3868:patrol prematurely triggered a 3403:South Vietnam political context 3303:Army of the Republic of Vietnam 501:One PAVN source (Saigon only): 71:(1 month and 2 weeks) 9429:United States prisoners of war 8958:Tet Offensive Research Project 8683:Schandler, Herbert Y. (1977). 8610:. New York: Ballantine Books. 8323:. Boulder CO: Westview Press. 7979:Shore, Moyars S., III (1969). 5926:; Ambassador to South Vietnam 5739:Fallows, James (31 May 2020). 5491:. University of Kansas Press. 5462: 5453: 5444: 5431: 5359: 5332: 5304: 5052:Kham Duc during the evacuation 4514:tank during the battle for Huế 4379:was the objective of another. 3989:Republic of Korea Marine Corps 3755:November presidential election 3746:general offensive and uprising 3668:General offensive and uprising 3592:general offensive and uprising 3469:estimates of the MACV and the 1813: 130: 1: 9612:Henry Kissinger’s involvement 8847:. London: Osprey Publishers. 8593:Palmer, Dave Richard (1978). 8555:Journal of Vietnamese Studies 8258:. Novato CA: Presidio Press. 7616:(Secretary of the Treasury), 7034:Karnow, p. 555, John Prados, 5852:. Columbia University Press. 5289: 5242:(former Secretary of State), 4725:out to be a fortunate result. 4510:U.S. Marines advance past an 4077:, in I Corps, were attacked. 3911:that drew in elements of the 3662:Revisionist Anti-Party Affair 3397: 1775:New Year's Day battle of 1968 460:Total casualties in Phase One 65:Phase 2: 5 May – 15 June 1968 9834:Campaigns of the Vietnam War 8904:. New York: William Morrow. 8862:Willbanks, James H. (2008). 8784:. New York: The Free Press. 8644:Pike, COL Thomas F. (2017). 8625:Pike, COL Thomas F. (2013). 8383:The Tet Offensive: Dialogues 7904:Hammond, William H. (1988). 6272:The Tet Offensive: Dialogues 5846:Willbanks, James H. (2007). 5092: 4634: 4057: 3987:infantry divisions, and the 3926:, another border outpost in 1840:Joint General Staff Compound 1830:Cholon and Phu Tho Racetrack 1172:Thayer, Irving and Thayer II 531:reports (Phase One and Two): 7: 9220:Independence Palace bombing 8780:Spector, Ronald H. (1993). 8761:Stanton, Shelby L. (1985). 8746:. New York: Harvest Books. 8465:Giap: The Victor in Vietnam 8346:. Armonk NY: M. E. Sharpe. 8319:Duiker, William J. (1996). 8091:Vietnam January–August 1968 7699:The Unmaking of a President 7231:The Vietnam Wars: 1945–1990 5135: 5075:Vietcong killed in Mini-Tet 5001: 4982:. Soon afterwards, Senator 4565: 4332:execution of Nguyễn Văn Lém 4081:, headquarters of the U.S. 3471:Central Intelligence Agency 1768:Tet Offensive and aftermath 10: 9860: 9602:Canada and the Vietnam War 9271:1965 South Vietnamese coup 9079:People's Republic of China 9059:International participants 8943:General notes by O.Khiara 8845:The Vietnam War, 1956–1975 8806:. Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe. 8704:Schmitz, David F. (2004). 8234:. New York: Random House. 7723:, January 22, 2008, p. 18. 6876:Shulimson, et al., p. 175. 5918:; Undersecretary of State 5147:VC and PAVN battle tactics 5096: 5005: 4955:called a conclave of the " 4826: 4569: 4448: 4442: 4223: 3913:U.S. 1st Infantry Division 3676:VC prior to departing for 3608:People's Republic of China 3446: 3443:United States war strategy 3409:1963 South Vietnamese coup 3378:South Vietnamese President 3307:United States Armed Forces 3209:Lists of allied operations 534:75,000+ killed and wounded 9814:Battles involving Vietnam 9637: 9607:CIA activities in Vietnam 9589: 9536: 9493: 9455: 9379: 9203: 9137: 9104: 9023: 9014: 8467:. London: Fourth Estate. 8463:Macdonald, Peter (1994). 8180:; Chanoff, David (1999). 8158:Braestrup, Peter (1983). 8120:Arnold, James R. (1990). 8101:Historiography and memory 7555:See also Zaffiri, p. 305. 7333:Currey, Cecil B. (2005). 6631:Alvarez, Everett (1983). 6144:, p. 380. Nguyen, fn. 147 5171:Sự kiện Tết Mậu Thân 1968 4219: 4144:as well as U.S. bases at 4101:, Da Nang, Qui Nhơn, and 3977:1st Australian Task Force 3956:Capital Military District 3818:Suspicions and diversions 3799:Operation Rolling Thunder 2641:Cambodia and Mekong Delta 611: 556: 385: 381:Total: ~323,000 – 595,000 370: 249: 143: 53: 42: 34: 25: 9629:Women in the Vietnam War 9561:United States news media 9506:Indochina refugee crisis 9501:Cambodian–Vietnamese War 9276:Bombing of North Vietnam 9215:Strategic Hamlet Program 8900:Zaffiri, Samuel (1994). 8881:Wirtz, James J. (1991). 8822:Westmoreland, William C. 8725:Vietnamkrigen: 1880–1980 8723:Smedberg, Marco (2008). 8708:. Westport CT: Praeger. 8574:Oberdorfer, Don (1971). 8413:Karnow, Stanley (1991). 8365:. Westport CT: Praeger. 8095:Foreign Relations Series 7917:Hoang Ngoc Lung (1978). 7573:See also Zaffiri, p. 309 6941:Tucker, Spencer (2011). 6461:Counsel to the President 6081:Wirtz, pp. 36–40, 47–49. 5153: 4860:Selective Service System 3907:. This attack sparked a 3602:and Minister of Defense 3296:People's Army of Vietnam 2224:DMZ Campaign (1969–1971) 2217:Vietnamization 1969–1971 1459:Malheur I and Malheur II 9248:Gulf of Tonkin incident 9169:Battle of Dien Bien Phu 8828:. New York: Doubleday. 8597:. New York: Ballantine. 8567:10.1525/vs.2006.1.1-2.4 8040:April 17, 2016, at the 7875:Gropman, Allan (1985). 7100:Department of Defense, 6811:"The Defense of Saigon" 6656:Sherwood, John (2015). 5372:Encyclopædia Britannica 5238:The group consisted of 4593:Battle of Điện Biên Phủ 4532:101st Airborne Division 4341:On 1 February, General 4226:Battle of Saigon (1968) 3847:II Field Force, Vietnam 3694:Buddhist crises of 1963 3482:William C. Westmoreland 3461:, the commander of the 3459:William C. Westmoreland 3334:II Corps Tactical Zones 737:Dương Liễu – Nhông Pass 9657:Battles and operations 9597:Awards and decorations 9511:Vietnamese boat people 9480:Impact of Agent Orange 9468:Body count controversy 9175:1954 Geneva Conference 8843:Wiest, Andrew (2002). 8742:Sorley, Lewis (1999). 8602:Pisor, Robert (1982). 8505:Morocco, John (1984). 8442:Lewy, Gunther (1980). 8338:Elliot, David (2003). 8182:In the Jaws of History 8122:The Tet Offensive 1968 8014:July 10, 2019, at the 7981:The Battle of Khe Sanh 6974:Wiest, Andrew (2009). 6773:Villard, Erik (2017). 6697:. History News Network 6681:In the Jaws of History 6314:The Battle of Khe Sanh 5905:Hammond, pp. 326, 327. 5652:unintended consequence 5183: 5170: 5076: 5053: 5045: 5017: 4932: 4794: 4774: 4737: 4727: 4700: 4674: 4658: 4588: 4550: 4515: 4460: 4438: 4433:Operation Toan Thang I 4400: 4334: 4307: 4255: 4121: 4071: 3985:Republic of Korea Army 3971: 3940:173rd Airborne Brigade 3849: 3765: 3736: 3708: 3684: 3493:Operations Cedar Falls 3488: 3421:conference in Honolulu 3359:Johnson Administration 1845:Bien Hoa and Long Binh 250:Commanders and leaders 9784:1968 in South Vietnam 9366:1975 spring offensive 9325:ARVN campaign in Laos 9321:Vietnamization policy 8417:. New York: Penguin. 7830:Nolan, Keith (2006). 7805:Nolan, Keith (1994). 7650:." Phillip Davidson, 7595:Johnson, pp. 406–407. 7070:Pike, COL Thomas F., 6949:. ABC-CLIO. pp. 6693:Perlmutter, David D. 6401:Morocco, pp. 174–176. 5487:Moise, Edwin (2017). 5114:Operation Allen Brook 5074: 5051: 5043: 5015: 4976:New Hampshire primary 4930: 4792: 4769: 4735:Tan Son Nhut Air Base 4732: 4722: 4691: 4679:U.S. State Department 4672: 4656: 4583: 4545: 4509: 4458: 4429:Operation Quyet Thang 4405:9th Infantry Regiment 4398: 4381:Tan Son Nhut Air Base 4329: 4305: 4261:Tan Son Nhut Air Base 4253: 4172:. The following day, 4115: 4061: 3969: 3936:4th Infantry Division 3838: 3768:According to General 3763: 3734: 3706: 3675: 3501:Joseph A. McChristian 3479: 3046:Tan Son Nhut Air Base 2382:Montgomery Rendezvous 2265:Massachusetts Striker 1835:Tan Son Nhut Air Base 769:American intervention 386:Casualties and losses 9485:Environmental impact 9357:Battle of Phước Long 9122:Cold War (1962–1979) 8727:. Historiska Media. 8277:Nineteen Sixty-Eight 8139:Blood, Jake (2005). 7908:. Washington, D.C.: 7428:Clifford, pp. 47–55. 7259:on 26 February 2009. 7113:Karnow, pp. 544–545. 6422:Palmer, pp. 229–233. 5960:Karnow, pp. 545–546. 5664:The Irony of Vietnam 4528:1st Cavalry Division 4269:US Embassy in Saigon 3962:Before the offensive 3886:Operation Neutralize 3880:, just south of the 3751:Khe Sanh Combat Base 1221:Tan Son Nhut airbase 599:Military engagements 540:111,179 casualties: 308:William Westmoreland 29:Sự kiện Tết Mậu Thân 9565:In popular culture 9518:Sino-Vietnamese War 9348:Paris Peace Accords 9161:First Indochina War 9150:Japanese occupation 9117:Cambodian Civil War 8939:General information 8072:. New York: Bantam. 8070:The Pentagon Papers 7721:Wall Street Journal 7692:suggested that the 7618:Nicholas Katzenbach 7582:Lyndon B. Johnson, 6254:Victory in Vietnam, 5936:Frederick C. Weyand 5932:Creighton W. Abrams 5920:Nicholas Katzenbach 5719:www.u-s-history.com 5676:Strategy for Defeat 5317:National Geographic 5272:Matthew B. Ridgeway 5099:Phase III offensive 4850:, anchorman of the 4612:Air Force's use of 4495:1st Marine Division 4491:Phu Bai Combat Base 4459:Huế and the Citadel 4409:Nicholas J. Cutinha 4359:1969 Pulitzer Prize 4265:Independence Palace 4107:Phillip B. Davidson 3897:Phước Long Province 3813:U.S. unpreparedness 3784:assault rifles and 3646:First Indochina War 3563:National Press Club 3415:and Prime Minister 3392:Phase III offensive 2693:Paris Peace Accords 2473:Pennsylvania Square 2127:Phase III Offensive 2022:Landing Zone Center 1136:Baton Rouge Victory 480:Total for 3 phases: 464:45,820 casualties: 98: / 9339:Christmas bombings 9312:Cambodian campaign 8765:. New York: Dell. 8486:A Contagion of War 8445:America in Vietnam 8415:Vietnam: A History 8226:Holbrooke, Richard 7732:Braestrup, 1:679f. 7390:Victory in Vietnam 7296:Arnold, pp. 87–88. 7287:Pribbenow, p. 249. 6931:Shulimson, p. 216. 6913:Shulimson, p. 213. 6749:The New York Times 6722:The New York Times 6603:Braestrup, p. 108. 6191:2005-10-27 at the 6142:Victory in Vietnam 6130:Victory in Vietnam 6099:Nguyen, pp. 18–20. 6027:Nguyen, pp. 15–16. 5916:Robert S. McNamara 5804:kansaspress.ku.edu 5800:"The Myths of Tet" 5771:The New York Times 5680:Visions of Victory 5280:Arthur J. Goldberg 5077: 5054: 5046: 5018: 4938:The New York Times 4933: 4795: 4775: 4738: 4675: 4659: 4589: 4572:Battle of Khe Sanh 4551: 4516: 4461: 4417:Fillmore K. Mearns 4401: 4335: 4308: 4256: 4122: 4116:U.S. Marines with 3972: 3905:Bình Long Province 3882:Demilitarized Zone 3874:Quảng Trị Province 3850: 3840:Lieutenant General 3766: 3737: 3709: 3685: 3549:asserted that the 3528:Hubert H. Humphrey 3489: 2807:Fall of Phnom Penh 2466:Cambodian campaign 490:RVN/U.S. claimed: 9675: 9674: 9392:Ho Chi Minh trail 9285:Buddhist Uprising 9243:Coup against Minh 9234:Coup against Diem 9157:(1949–1955) 9112:Laotian Civil War 9105:Related conflicts 9084:Republic of China 8873:978-0-231-12841-4 8826:A Soldier Reports 8734:978-91-85507-88-7 8655:978-1-36-628720-5 8636:978-1-481219-46-4 8392:Johnson, Lyndon B 8363:The Tet Offensive 8250:Davidson, Phillip 7741:Braestrup, 1:687. 7710:Oberdofer p. 269. 7632:(Bundy's deputy). 7606:Maxwell D. Taylor 7584:The Vantage Point 7504:Smedberg, p. 195. 7463:. 15 August 2016. 7189:978-1-349-10084-2 7080:978-1-481219-46-4 7061:Prados and Stubbe 6891:978-1-481219-46-4 5928:Henry Cabot Lodge 5878:. 29 January 2018 5858:10.7312/will12840 5832:. 5 October 2017. 5668:The Tet Offensive 5656:A Soldier Reports 5557:. 25 January 2008 5181:Tet event", also 5179:Yang Earth Monkey 5022:general offensive 4984:Robert F. Kennedy 4897:According to the 4629:Operation Pegasus 4425:Gia Định Province 4370:Biên Hòa Air Base 4254:Attacks on Saigon 4160:in II Corps; and 3895:, the capital of 3866:U.S. Marine Corps 3778:Ho Chi Minh Trail 3455:Lyndon B. Johnson 3274: 3273: 2820:Mayaguez incident 2514:Firebase O'Reilly 2396:Campbell Streamer 2106:Pocahontas Forest 977:Buddhist Uprising 873:Masher/White Wing 564: 563: 516:Phase One, Phase 296:Lyndon B. Johnson 139: 138: 9851: 9769: 9761: 9760: 9759: 9752: 9744: 9743: 9742: 9732: 9716: 9715: 9714: 9704: 9703: 9702: 9692: 9691: 9690: 9683: 9665: 9664: 9655: 9654: 9645: 9644: 9402:Operation Popeye 9334:Easter Offensive 9155:State of Vietnam 9145:French Indochina 9127:Cold War in Asia 9035:Việt Minh / PAVN 9001: 8994: 8987: 8978: 8977: 8972:Internet Archive 8915: 8896: 8877: 8858: 8839: 8817: 8795: 8776: 8757: 8738: 8719: 8700: 8679: 8659: 8640: 8621: 8609: 8598: 8589: 8570: 8549: 8522: 8501: 8489: 8478: 8459: 8428: 8409: 8387: 8376: 8357: 8345: 8334: 8315: 8303: 8292: 8280: 8269: 8245: 8217: 8195: 8173: 8154: 8135: 8116: 8087: 8081: 8073: 7998: 7992: 7984: 7970: 7969: 7965: 7953: 7941: 7922: 7913: 7891: 7890: 7872: 7866: 7863: 7846: 7845: 7834:. Zenith Press. 7827: 7821: 7820: 7802: 7796: 7793: 7787: 7784: 7778: 7775: 7769: 7766: 7760: 7757: 7751: 7750:Johnson, p. 415. 7748: 7742: 7739: 7733: 7730: 7724: 7717: 7711: 7708: 7702: 7682: 7676: 7675:Johnson, p. 400. 7673: 7667: 7666:Johnson, p. 399. 7664: 7655: 7639: 7633: 7622:William P. Bundy 7602: 7596: 7593: 7587: 7580: 7574: 7571: 7565: 7564:Zaffiri, p. 308. 7562: 7556: 7553: 7547: 7544: 7523: 7522:Zaffiri, p. 304. 7520: 7514: 7511: 7505: 7502: 7496: 7493: 7487: 7484: 7478: 7471: 7465: 7464: 7457: 7451: 7448: 7442: 7435: 7429: 7426: 7420: 7417: 7411: 7410:Zaffiri, p. 293. 7408: 7402: 7399: 7393: 7387: 7381: 7380: 7360: 7351: 7350: 7330: 7324: 7321: 7315: 7312: 7306: 7303: 7297: 7294: 7288: 7285: 7279: 7276: 7270: 7267: 7261: 7260: 7255:. Archived from 7249: 7243: 7240: 7234: 7227: 7221: 7220:Smedberg, p. 196 7218: 7209: 7198: 7192: 7181: 7175: 7168: 7162: 7155: 7149: 7145: 7139: 7132: 7123: 7120: 7114: 7111: 7105: 7098: 7092: 7089: 7083: 7068: 7062: 7059: 7048: 7045: 7039: 7032: 7026: 7025:Hosmer, pp 73–4. 7023: 7017: 7014: 7008: 7005: 6999: 6996: 6990: 6989: 6971: 6965: 6964: 6948: 6938: 6932: 6929: 6923: 6920: 6914: 6911: 6902: 6899: 6893: 6883: 6877: 6874: 6868: 6867: 6865: 6863: 6858:. historynet.com 6851: 6842: 6839: 6833: 6832: 6830: 6828: 6822: 6815: 6807: 6801: 6795: 6794: 6790: 6770: 6761: 6760: 6758: 6756: 6740: 6734: 6733: 6731: 6729: 6713: 6707: 6706: 6704: 6702: 6690: 6684: 6678: 6672: 6671: 6653: 6647: 6646: 6644: 6642: 6628: 6622: 6621:Stanton, p. 215. 6619: 6613: 6610: 6604: 6601: 6595: 6594:Zaffiri, p. 283. 6592: 6586: 6583: 6574: 6571: 6565: 6564:Stanton, p. 209. 6562: 6556: 6553: 6524: 6520: 6514: 6503: 6497: 6494: 6488: 6479: 6473: 6472:Zaffiri, p. 280. 6470: 6464: 6456: 6450: 6449:Sheehan, p. 778. 6447: 6441: 6440:Stanton, p. 195. 6438: 6432: 6429: 6423: 6420: 6411: 6408: 6402: 6399: 6393: 6390: 6317: 6310: 6304: 6301: 6276: 6267: 6261: 6251: 6245: 6238: 6232: 6228: 6222: 6219: 6213: 6210: 6204: 6201: 6195: 6182:Hau Nghia Part 3 6178: 6172: 6169: 6163: 6160: 6154: 6151: 6145: 6139: 6133: 6127: 6121: 6118: 6112: 6109: 6100: 6097: 6091: 6088: 6082: 6079: 6073: 6070: 6064: 6061: 6055: 6052: 6046: 6043: 6037: 6034: 6028: 6025: 6019: 6012: 6006: 6005:Elliot, p. 1055. 6003: 5997: 5994: 5988: 5985: 5970: 5967: 5961: 5958: 5952: 5912: 5906: 5903: 5897: 5896:Hammond, p. 326. 5894: 5888: 5887: 5885: 5883: 5876:War on the Rocks 5868: 5862: 5861: 5843: 5834: 5833: 5826: 5820: 5819: 5817: 5815: 5810:on 11 March 2021 5806:. Archived from 5796: 5790: 5789: 5787: 5785: 5762: 5756: 5755: 5753: 5751: 5736: 5730: 5729: 5727: 5725: 5711: 5705: 5704: 5702: 5700: 5689: 5683: 5647: 5641: 5640:Dougan and Weiss 5638: 5567: 5566: 5564: 5562: 5547: 5541: 5538: 5532: 5520: 5514: 5509: 5503: 5502: 5484: 5478: 5475: 5469: 5466: 5460: 5457: 5451: 5448: 5442: 5435: 5429: 5426: 5377: 5376: 5363: 5357: 5356: 5354: 5352: 5345:Encyclopedia.com 5336: 5330: 5329: 5327: 5325: 5308: 5302: 5301:Smedberg, p. 188 5299: 5283: 5268:Robert D. Murphy 5236: 5230: 5223: 5217: 5206: 5200: 5189:sexagenary cycle 5186: 5176: 5164: 5035:Battle of Dai Do 4996:Richard M. Nixon 4972:Democratic Party 4852:CBS Evening News 4771:Nguyễn Văn Thiệu 4694:Sky" – non-stop 4687:Marilyn B. Young 4480:Ngô Quang Trưởng 4355:Saigon Execution 4343:Nguyễn Ngọc Loan 4069: 4007:and 149,000-man 3952:Frederick Weyand 3928:Kon Tum Province 3843:Frederick Weyand 3717:time possible." 3642:Nguyễn Duy Trinh 3616:Nguyễn Chí Thanh 3556:Bruce Palmer Jr. 3543:Ellsworth Bunker 3413:Nguyễn Văn Thiệu 3381:Nguyễn Văn Thiệu 3300:South Vietnamese 3293:North Vietnamese 3081:Naval operations 3008:Proud Deep Alpha 2701:War of the flags 2685:The Vinh wiretap 2635:Easter Offensive 2370:Pipestone Canyon 2333:Washington Green 2038:Concordia Square 1978:Burlington Trail 1917:Truong Cong Dinh 606: 600: 590: 583: 576: 567: 566: 447: 446: 440: 439: 433: 432: 426: 425: 419: 418: 402: 401: 379:Phase 1: ~80,000 363: 362: 352: 351: 341: 340: 330: 329: 319: 318: 310: 306: 305: 294: 293: 283: 282: 272: 271: 263:Nguyễn Văn Thiệu 261: 260: 242: 241: 231: 229: 228: 218: 216: 215: 206: 204: 203: 194: 192: 191: 185: 181: 179: 178: 168: 166: 165: 156: 154: 153: 113: 112: 110: 109: 108: 103: 99: 96: 95: 94: 91: 55: 54: 47: 23: 22: 9859: 9858: 9854: 9853: 9852: 9850: 9849: 9848: 9774: 9773: 9772: 9762: 9757: 9755: 9745: 9740: 9738: 9735: 9731:sister projects 9728:at Knowledge's 9722: 9712: 9710: 9700: 9698: 9688: 9686: 9678: 9676: 9671: 9633: 9618:Pentagon Papers 9585: 9532: 9489: 9451: 9375: 9229:Buddhist crisis 9199: 9185:1955 referendum 9133: 9100: 9019: 9010: 9005: 8923: 8918: 8912: 8893: 8874: 8855: 8836: 8814: 8792: 8773: 8754: 8735: 8716: 8697: 8676: 8656: 8637: 8618: 8586: 8538: 8519: 8498: 8475: 8456: 8425: 8406: 8373: 8354: 8331: 8312: 8289: 8266: 8242: 8222:Clifford, Clark 8214: 8192: 8170: 8151: 8132: 8103: 8075: 8074: 8044:; April 8, 1968 8042:Wayback Machine 8025: 8023:Primary sources 8016:Wayback Machine 7986: 7985: 7967: 7962: 7951: 7938: 7899: 7894: 7887: 7873: 7869: 7864: 7849: 7842: 7828: 7824: 7817: 7803: 7799: 7794: 7790: 7785: 7781: 7776: 7772: 7767: 7763: 7759:Karnow, p. 562. 7758: 7754: 7749: 7745: 7740: 7736: 7731: 7727: 7718: 7714: 7709: 7705: 7686:Townsend Hoopes 7683: 7679: 7674: 7670: 7665: 7658: 7644:Doubting Thomas 7640: 7636: 7630:Philip C. Habib 7614:Henry H. Fowler 7603: 7599: 7594: 7590: 7581: 7577: 7572: 7568: 7563: 7559: 7554: 7550: 7546:Pentagon Papers 7545: 7526: 7521: 7517: 7513:Palmer, p. 258. 7512: 7508: 7503: 7499: 7494: 7490: 7485: 7481: 7472: 7468: 7459: 7458: 7454: 7449: 7445: 7436: 7432: 7427: 7423: 7418: 7414: 7409: 7405: 7400: 7396: 7388: 7384: 7377: 7361: 7354: 7347: 7331: 7327: 7322: 7318: 7314:Karnow, p. 536. 7313: 7309: 7304: 7300: 7295: 7291: 7286: 7282: 7277: 7273: 7268: 7264: 7251: 7250: 7246: 7241: 7237: 7229:Marilyn Young, 7228: 7224: 7219: 7212: 7199: 7195: 7182: 7178: 7172:Phoenix Program 7169: 7165: 7156: 7152: 7146: 7142: 7133: 7126: 7121: 7117: 7112: 7108: 7099: 7095: 7090: 7086: 7069: 7065: 7060: 7051: 7046: 7042: 7033: 7029: 7024: 7020: 7015: 7011: 7006: 7002: 6997: 6993: 6986: 6976:The Vietnam War 6972: 6968: 6961: 6939: 6935: 6930: 6926: 6921: 6917: 6912: 6905: 6900: 6896: 6884: 6880: 6875: 6871: 6861: 6859: 6852: 6845: 6840: 6836: 6826: 6824: 6823:on 17 June 2018 6820: 6813: 6809: 6808: 6804: 6792: 6787: 6771: 6764: 6754: 6752: 6741: 6737: 6727: 6725: 6714: 6710: 6700: 6698: 6691: 6687: 6679: 6675: 6668: 6654: 6650: 6640: 6638: 6629: 6625: 6620: 6616: 6611: 6607: 6602: 6598: 6593: 6589: 6585:Karnow, p. 549. 6584: 6577: 6572: 6568: 6563: 6559: 6554: 6527: 6521: 6517: 6504: 6500: 6495: 6491: 6482: 6480: 6476: 6471: 6467: 6457: 6453: 6448: 6444: 6439: 6435: 6431:Palmer, p. 235. 6430: 6426: 6421: 6414: 6409: 6405: 6400: 6396: 6391: 6320: 6311: 6307: 6302: 6279: 6268: 6264: 6252: 6248: 6239: 6235: 6229: 6225: 6221:Duiker, p. 299. 6220: 6216: 6211: 6207: 6202: 6198: 6193:Wayback Machine 6179: 6175: 6170: 6166: 6161: 6157: 6152: 6148: 6140: 6136: 6128: 6124: 6119: 6115: 6110: 6103: 6098: 6094: 6089: 6085: 6080: 6076: 6071: 6067: 6062: 6058: 6053: 6049: 6044: 6040: 6035: 6031: 6026: 6022: 6013: 6009: 6004: 6000: 5996:Karnow, p. 514. 5995: 5991: 5986: 5973: 5969:Karnow, p. 546. 5968: 5964: 5959: 5955: 5944:Pentagon Papers 5913: 5909: 5904: 5900: 5895: 5891: 5881: 5879: 5870: 5869: 5865: 5844: 5837: 5828: 5827: 5823: 5813: 5811: 5798: 5797: 5793: 5783: 5781: 5763: 5759: 5749: 5747: 5737: 5733: 5723: 5721: 5715:"Tet Offensive" 5713: 5712: 5708: 5698: 5696: 5691: 5690: 5686: 5648: 5644: 5639: 5570: 5560: 5558: 5549: 5548: 5544: 5539: 5535: 5521: 5517: 5510: 5506: 5499: 5485: 5481: 5476: 5472: 5467: 5463: 5458: 5454: 5449: 5445: 5436: 5432: 5427: 5380: 5375:. 16 July 2023. 5365: 5364: 5360: 5350: 5348: 5338: 5337: 5333: 5323: 5321: 5312:"Tet Offensive" 5310: 5309: 5305: 5300: 5296: 5292: 5287: 5286: 5248:Omar N. Bradley 5237: 5233: 5224: 5220: 5207: 5203: 5165: 5161: 5156: 5138: 5101: 5095: 5010: 5004: 4980:Eugene McCarthy 4961:Pentagon Papers 4909: 4900:Pentagon Papers 4869: 4848:Walter Cronkite 4840:credibility gap 4831: 4825: 4764: 4704:Trương Như Tảng 4651: 4637: 4574: 4568: 4500:Battle of Seoul 4474:located in the 4453: 4451:Massacre at Huế 4447: 4441: 4248: 4222: 4214:Peter Braestrup 4210:Washington Post 4070: 4067: 4060: 4047:Washington Post 4037:Weyand invited 3981:Royal Thai Army 3964: 3845:, commander of 3820: 3815: 3670: 3583: 3578: 3467:order of battle 3451: 3445: 3405: 3400: 3347:Massacre at Huế 3277: 3276: 3275: 3270: 3197:Paracel Islands 2892:Rolling Thunder 2560:Toan Thang 1/71 2534:Jefferson Glenn 2410:Nantucket Beach 2141:Champaign Grove 2071:Mameluke Thrust 1935:My Lai Massacre 1589:Wheeler/Wallowa 1377:The Hill Fights 1104:John Paul Jones 1098:Minh Thanh Road 896:Suoi Bong Trang 701:Quyet Thang 202 615:Guerrilla phase 607: 598: 596: 594: 539: 535: 533: 526: 489: 475: 463: 458: 456: 454: 452: 448: 441: 434: 427: 420: 413: 412: 410: 408: 406: 396: 395: 380: 357: 356: 346: 345: 335: 334: 324: 323: 313: 300: 299: 298: 288: 287: 277: 276: 266: 265: 255: 236: 235: 226: 224: 213: 211: 210: 201: 199: 198: 189: 187: 186: 176: 174: 172: 163: 161: 160: 151: 149: 106: 104: 100: 97: 92: 89: 87: 85: 84: 83: 70: 68: 66: 64: 63:(2 months) 62: 48: 27: 17: 12: 11: 5: 9857: 9847: 9846: 9841: 9836: 9831: 9826: 9821: 9816: 9811: 9806: 9801: 9796: 9791: 9786: 9771: 9770: 9753: 9724: 9721: 9720: 9708: 9696: 9673: 9672: 9670: 9669: 9659: 9649: 9638: 9635: 9634: 9632: 9631: 9626: 9621: 9614: 9609: 9604: 9599: 9593: 9591: 9587: 9586: 9584: 9583: 9582: 9581: 9576: 9571: 9563: 9558: 9557: 9556: 9546: 9540: 9538: 9534: 9533: 9531: 9530: 9525: 9520: 9515: 9514: 9513: 9503: 9497: 9495: 9491: 9490: 9488: 9487: 9482: 9477: 9476: 9475: 9470: 9459: 9457: 9453: 9452: 9450: 9449: 9431: 9426: 9421: 9420: 9419: 9414: 9404: 9399: 9397:Sihanouk Trail 9394: 9389: 9387:Củ Chi tunnels 9383: 9381: 9377: 9376: 9374: 9373: 9371:Fall of Saigon 9368: 9359: 9350: 9341: 9336: 9327: 9314: 9305: 9287: 9278: 9273: 9268: 9259: 9254: 9245: 9236: 9231: 9222: 9217: 9207: 9205: 9201: 9200: 9198: 9197: 9192: 9187: 9182: 9177: 9172: 9158: 9152: 9147: 9141: 9139: 9135: 9134: 9132: 9131: 9130: 9129: 9119: 9114: 9108: 9106: 9102: 9101: 9099: 9098: 9097: 9096: 9091: 9086: 9081: 9076: 9071: 9066: 9056: 9046: 9027: 9025: 9021: 9020: 9015: 9012: 9011: 9004: 9003: 8996: 8989: 8981: 8975: 8974: 8965: 8960: 8955: 8950: 8941: 8940: 8936: 8935: 8928: 8927: 8922: 8921:External links 8919: 8917: 8916: 8910: 8897: 8891: 8878: 8872: 8859: 8853: 8840: 8834: 8818: 8812: 8796: 8790: 8777: 8771: 8758: 8752: 8739: 8733: 8720: 8714: 8701: 8695: 8680: 8674: 8661: 8660:www.tfpike.com 8654: 8641: 8635: 8622: 8616: 8599: 8590: 8584: 8571: 8550: 8536: 8523: 8517: 8502: 8496: 8479: 8473: 8460: 8454: 8439: 8429: 8423: 8410: 8404: 8388: 8377: 8371: 8358: 8352: 8335: 8329: 8316: 8310: 8293: 8287: 8270: 8264: 8246: 8240: 8218: 8212: 8196: 8190: 8174: 8168: 8155: 8149: 8136: 8130: 8117: 8102: 8099: 8098: 8097: 8088: 8062: 8057: 8051: 8045: 8032: 8024: 8021: 8020: 8019: 8006: 7976: 7960: 7942: 7936: 7923: 7914: 7900: 7898: 7895: 7893: 7892: 7885: 7867: 7847: 7840: 7822: 7816:978-0891414858 7815: 7797: 7788: 7786:Sorley, p. 18. 7779: 7770: 7761: 7752: 7743: 7734: 7725: 7712: 7703: 7690:Don Oberdorfer 7677: 7668: 7656: 7652:Vietnam at War 7634: 7597: 7588: 7575: 7566: 7557: 7548: 7524: 7515: 7506: 7497: 7488: 7479: 7466: 7452: 7443: 7430: 7421: 7412: 7403: 7401:Arnold, p. 90. 7394: 7382: 7375: 7352: 7345: 7325: 7316: 7307: 7298: 7289: 7280: 7271: 7262: 7244: 7235: 7222: 7210: 7193: 7176: 7163: 7157:Tran Van Tra, 7150: 7140: 7134:Tran Van Tra, 7124: 7115: 7106: 7093: 7084: 7074:, p. 205–208, 7063: 7049: 7040: 7036:The Blood Road 7027: 7018: 7009: 7000: 6991: 6985:978-1404218451 6984: 6966: 6960:978-1851099610 6959: 6933: 6924: 6915: 6903: 6894: 6878: 6869: 6843: 6834: 6802: 6785: 6762: 6735: 6708: 6685: 6673: 6666: 6648: 6623: 6614: 6605: 6596: 6587: 6575: 6573:Palmer, p. 238 6566: 6557: 6525: 6515: 6498: 6489: 6474: 6465: 6451: 6442: 6433: 6424: 6412: 6403: 6394: 6318: 6312:Moyars Shore, 6305: 6277: 6262: 6246: 6240:Trần Văn Trà, 6233: 6223: 6214: 6205: 6196: 6173: 6164: 6155: 6146: 6134: 6122: 6120:Nguyen, p. 27. 6113: 6111:Nguyen, p. 24. 6101: 6092: 6083: 6074: 6065: 6063:Nguyen, p. 22. 6056: 6047: 6038: 6029: 6020: 6007: 5998: 5989: 5971: 5962: 5953: 5907: 5898: 5889: 5863: 5835: 5821: 5791: 5757: 5731: 5706: 5684: 5642: 5568: 5542: 5533: 5515: 5504: 5498:978-0700625024 5497: 5479: 5470: 5461: 5452: 5443: 5430: 5378: 5358: 5331: 5303: 5293: 5291: 5288: 5285: 5284: 5264:John J. McCloy 5256:Douglas Dillon 5252:Arthur H. Dean 5244:George W. Ball 5231: 5218: 5201: 5158: 5157: 5155: 5152: 5151: 5150: 5144: 5137: 5134: 5126:Ronald Spector 5094: 5091: 5027:320th Division 5003: 5000: 4968:New York Times 4908: 4905: 4887:Clark Clifford 4868: 4865: 4824: 4821: 4763: 4760: 4650: 4647: 4642:Stanley Karnow 4636: 4633: 4614:C-130 Hercules 4567: 4564: 4440: 4437: 4413:Medal of Honor 4366:Long Binh Post 4347:Nguyễn Văn Lém 4320:Me Linh Square 4221: 4218: 4176:, Long Thanh, 4065: 4059: 4056: 4051:Don Oberdorfer 4041:Correspondent 3983:regiment, two 3963: 3960: 3909:ten-day battle 3870:PAVN offensive 3819: 3816: 3814: 3811: 3669: 3666: 3631:aerial bombing 3618:, the head of 3604:Võ Nguyên Giáp 3582: 3581:Party politics 3579: 3577: 3574: 3517:Walt W. Rostow 3444: 3441: 3404: 3401: 3399: 3396: 3371:vice president 3315:Tết Nguyên Đán 3272: 3271: 3269: 3268: 3263: 3258: 3253: 3248: 3243: 3238: 3233: 3228: 3223: 3218: 3205: 3204: 3199: 3194: 3187: 3180: 3173: 3168: 3161: 3156: 3153:Deckhouse Five 3149: 3142: 3137: 3130: 3123: 3116: 3111: 3104: 3102:Gulf of Tonkin 3099: 3077: 3076: 3069: 3062: 3055: 3048: 3043: 3036: 3027: 3020: 3011: 3004: 2997: 2990: 2983: 2976: 2969: 2962: 2955: 2950: 2943: 2936: 2931: 2924: 2917: 2914:Combat Skyspot 2910: 2903: 2896: 2887: 2880: 2873: 2866: 2859: 2852: 2845: 2838: 2827:Air operations 2823: 2822: 2817: 2814:Fall of Saigon 2810: 2803: 2796: 2791: 2784: 2769: 2768: 2763: 2758: 2753: 2748: 2743: 2738: 2733: 2728: 2723: 2718: 2713: 2708: 2703: 2688: 2687: 2682: 2681: 2680: 2675: 2668: 2663: 2658: 2653: 2648: 2643: 2625: 2624: 2619: 2612: 2607: 2600: 2599: 2598: 2590:Middlesex Peak 2586: 2579: 2570: 2569: 2568: 2556: 2553:Cuu Long 44-02 2549: 2544: 2537: 2530: 2523: 2516: 2511: 2504: 2501:Wolfe Mountain 2497: 2494:Pickens Forest 2490: 2483: 2476: 2469: 2462: 2461: 2460: 2448: 2441: 2434: 2425: 2420: 2413: 2406: 2399: 2392: 2385: 2378: 2373: 2366: 2359: 2358: 2357: 2354:Hamburger Hill 2343: 2340:Virginia Ridge 2336: 2329: 2326:Oklahoma Hills 2322: 2319:Montana Mauler 2315: 2308: 2305:Frederick Hill 2301: 2294: 2287: 2282: 2275: 2268: 2261: 2254: 2249: 2245:Toan Thang III 2240: 2233: 2226: 2213: 2212: 2209:Fayette Canyon 2205: 2198: 2194:Speedy Express 2189: 2184: 2177: 2174:Sheridan Sabre 2170: 2167:Henderson Hill 2163: 2156: 2151: 2144: 2137: 2136: 2135: 2123: 2120:Somerset Plain 2116: 2109: 2102: 2095: 2090: 2083: 2074: 2067: 2060: 2057:Jeb Stuart III 2053: 2052: 2051: 2049:Coral–Balmoral 2046: 2041: 2034: 2029: 2024: 2019: 2014: 2002: 1995: 1988: 1981: 1974: 1965: 1958: 1951: 1944: 1937: 1932: 1925: 1920: 1913: 1908: 1901: 1894: 1887: 1880: 1879: 1878: 1873: 1864: 1859: 1854: 1847: 1842: 1837: 1832: 1827: 1822: 1810: 1803: 1802: 1801: 1796: 1794:Ban Houei Sane 1784: 1777: 1764: 1763: 1756: 1749: 1742: 1735: 1728: 1721: 1712: 1705: 1702:Kien Giang 9-1 1698: 1691: 1684: 1677: 1670: 1663: 1656: 1655: 1654: 1640: 1639: 1638: 1633: 1621: 1614: 1607: 1600: 1593: 1584: 1577: 1570: 1563: 1556: 1551: 1544: 1537: 1530: 1523: 1516: 1511: 1504: 1497: 1490: 1483: 1476: 1469: 1462: 1455: 1448: 1447: 1446: 1439: 1432: 1425: 1418: 1411: 1404: 1386: 1379: 1374: 1367: 1360: 1353: 1346: 1343:Francis Marion 1339: 1333: 1328: 1323: 1318: 1305: 1298: 1293: 1286: 1279: 1272: 1265: 1258: 1249: 1236: 1235: 1230: 1223: 1218: 1211: 1208:Paul Revere IV 1204: 1197: 1190: 1183: 1176: 1167: 1160: 1153: 1146: 1139: 1131: 1126: 1121: 1114: 1107: 1100: 1095: 1088: 1081: 1074: 1067: 1062: 1055: 1048: 1041: 1034: 1027: 1020: 1013: 1006: 999: 992: 985: 980: 973: 966: 959: 952: 945: 938: 933: 926: 919: 912: 905: 898: 893: 886: 885: 884: 868: 861: 854: 841: 840: 833: 826: 819: 814: 813: 812: 800: 795: 790: 783: 765: 764: 759: 754: 749: 744: 739: 734: 729: 722: 717: 712: 704: 697: 692: 687: 680: 675: 670: 663: 656: 649: 647:Palace Bombing 644: 637: 632: 625: 612: 609: 608: 593: 592: 585: 578: 570: 562: 561: 554: 553: 552: 551: 548: 547:61,267 wounded 545: 513: 512: 511:7,000 captured 509: 508:10,000 wounded 506: 499: 498: 497:5,800 captured 495: 494:45,000+ killed 483: 478: 477: 472: 471:35,212 wounded 469: 455:19,295 wounded 409:15,917 wounded 404:South Vietnam: 388: 387: 383: 382: 377: 373: 372: 368: 367: 354:Hoàng Văn Thái 311: 252: 251: 247: 246: 222: 146: 145: 141: 140: 137: 136: 135: 134: 127: 124: 119: 115: 114: 79: 77: 73: 72: 59: 51: 50: 40: 39: 32: 31: 21: 20: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 9856: 9845: 9844:Tet Offensive 9842: 9840: 9837: 9835: 9832: 9830: 9827: 9825: 9822: 9820: 9817: 9815: 9812: 9810: 9807: 9805: 9802: 9800: 9797: 9795: 9792: 9790: 9787: 9785: 9782: 9781: 9779: 9768:from Wikidata 9767: 9766: 9754: 9750: 9749: 9737: 9736: 9733: 9727: 9726:Tet Offensive 9719: 9709: 9707: 9706:United States 9697: 9695: 9685: 9684: 9681: 9668: 9660: 9658: 9650: 9648: 9640: 9639: 9636: 9630: 9627: 9625: 9622: 9620: 9619: 9615: 9613: 9610: 9608: 9605: 9603: 9600: 9598: 9595: 9594: 9592: 9588: 9580: 9577: 9575: 9572: 9570: 9567: 9566: 9564: 9562: 9559: 9555: 9552: 9551: 9550: 9547: 9545: 9542: 9541: 9539: 9535: 9529: 9526: 9524: 9521: 9519: 9516: 9512: 9509: 9508: 9507: 9504: 9502: 9499: 9498: 9496: 9492: 9486: 9483: 9481: 9478: 9474: 9473:POW/MIA issue 9471: 9469: 9466: 9465: 9464: 9461: 9460: 9458: 9454: 9447: 9443: 9439: 9435: 9432: 9430: 9427: 9425: 9422: 9418: 9415: 9413: 9410: 9409: 9408: 9405: 9403: 9400: 9398: 9395: 9393: 9390: 9388: 9385: 9384: 9382: 9378: 9372: 9369: 9367: 9363: 9360: 9358: 9354: 9351: 9349: 9345: 9342: 9340: 9337: 9335: 9331: 9328: 9326: 9322: 9318: 9315: 9313: 9309: 9306: 9303: 9299: 9295: 9294:Tet Offensive 9291: 9288: 9286: 9282: 9279: 9277: 9274: 9272: 9269: 9267: 9263: 9260: 9258: 9257:December coup 9255: 9253: 9249: 9246: 9244: 9240: 9237: 9235: 9232: 9230: 9226: 9223: 9221: 9218: 9216: 9212: 9209: 9208: 9206: 9202: 9196: 9193: 9191: 9188: 9186: 9183: 9181: 9178: 9176: 9173: 9170: 9166: 9162: 9159: 9156: 9153: 9151: 9148: 9146: 9143: 9142: 9140: 9136: 9128: 9125: 9124: 9123: 9120: 9118: 9115: 9113: 9110: 9109: 9107: 9103: 9095: 9092: 9090: 9087: 9085: 9082: 9080: 9077: 9075: 9072: 9070: 9067: 9065: 9064:United States 9062: 9061: 9060: 9057: 9054: 9050: 9049:South Vietnam 9047: 9044: 9040: 9036: 9032: 9031:North Vietnam 9029: 9028: 9026: 9022: 9018: 9013: 9009: 9002: 8997: 8995: 8990: 8988: 8983: 8982: 8979: 8973: 8969: 8966: 8964: 8961: 8959: 8956: 8954: 8951: 8949: 8946: 8945: 8944: 8938: 8937: 8933: 8930: 8929: 8925: 8924: 8913: 8911:0-688-11179-3 8907: 8903: 8898: 8894: 8892:0-8014-8209-7 8888: 8884: 8879: 8875: 8869: 8865: 8860: 8856: 8854:1-84176-419-1 8850: 8846: 8841: 8837: 8835:0-385-00434-6 8831: 8827: 8823: 8819: 8815: 8813:1-56324-131-5 8809: 8805: 8801: 8797: 8793: 8791:0-679-75046-0 8787: 8783: 8778: 8774: 8772:0-89141-232-8 8768: 8764: 8759: 8755: 8753:0-15-601309-6 8749: 8745: 8740: 8736: 8730: 8726: 8721: 8717: 8715:0-7425-4486-9 8711: 8707: 8702: 8698: 8696:0-691-02222-4 8692: 8688: 8687: 8681: 8677: 8675:0-395-55003-3 8671: 8667: 8662: 8657: 8651: 8647: 8642: 8638: 8632: 8628: 8623: 8619: 8617:0-393-32269-6 8613: 8608: 8607: 8600: 8596: 8591: 8587: 8585:0-8018-6703-7 8581: 8577: 8572: 8568: 8564: 8561:(1–2): 4–58. 8560: 8556: 8551: 8547: 8543: 8539: 8537:9781482761498 8533: 8529: 8524: 8520: 8518:0-939526-09-3 8514: 8510: 8509: 8503: 8499: 8497:0-939526-05-0 8493: 8488: 8487: 8480: 8476: 8474:1-85702-107-X 8470: 8466: 8461: 8457: 8455:0-19-502732-9 8451: 8447: 8446: 8440: 8438: 8434: 8430: 8426: 8424:0-670-84218-4 8420: 8416: 8411: 8407: 8405:0-03-084492-4 8401: 8397: 8393: 8389: 8385: 8384: 8378: 8374: 8372:0-275-95480-3 8368: 8364: 8359: 8355: 8353:0-7656-0602-X 8349: 8344: 8343: 8336: 8332: 8330:0-8133-8587-3 8326: 8322: 8317: 8313: 8311:0-939526-21-2 8307: 8302: 8301: 8294: 8290: 8288:0-939526-06-9 8284: 8279: 8278: 8271: 8267: 8265:0-89141-306-5 8261: 8257: 8256: 8251: 8247: 8243: 8241:0-394-56995-4 8237: 8233: 8232: 8227: 8223: 8219: 8215: 8213:1-55750-881-X 8209: 8205: 8201: 8197: 8193: 8191:0-253-21301-0 8187: 8183: 8179: 8175: 8171: 8169:0-300-02953-5 8165: 8161: 8156: 8152: 8150:0-415-34997-4 8146: 8143:. Routledge. 8142: 8137: 8133: 8131:0-275-98452-4 8127: 8123: 8118: 8114: 8110: 8105: 8104: 8096: 8092: 8089: 8085: 8079: 8071: 8067: 8066:Sheehan, Neil 8063: 8061: 8058: 8055: 8052: 8049: 8046: 8043: 8039: 8036: 8033: 8030: 8027: 8026: 8017: 8013: 8010: 8007: 8005: 8001: 7996: 7990: 7982: 7977: 7974: 7973:public domain 7963: 7961:0-16-049125-8 7957: 7950: 7949: 7943: 7939: 7937:0-7006-1175-4 7933: 7929: 7924: 7920: 7915: 7911: 7907: 7902: 7901: 7888: 7886:9781477540480 7882: 7878: 7871: 7862: 7860: 7858: 7856: 7854: 7852: 7843: 7841:9780760323304 7837: 7833: 7826: 7818: 7812: 7808: 7801: 7792: 7783: 7774: 7765: 7756: 7747: 7738: 7729: 7722: 7716: 7707: 7700: 7695: 7691: 7687: 7681: 7672: 7663: 7661: 7653: 7649: 7645: 7638: 7631: 7627: 7623: 7619: 7615: 7611: 7610:Paul H. Nitze 7607: 7601: 7592: 7585: 7579: 7570: 7561: 7552: 7543: 7541: 7539: 7537: 7535: 7533: 7531: 7529: 7519: 7510: 7501: 7492: 7483: 7476: 7470: 7462: 7456: 7447: 7440: 7434: 7425: 7416: 7407: 7398: 7391: 7386: 7378: 7376:9781137098917 7372: 7368: 7367: 7359: 7357: 7348: 7346:9781574887426 7342: 7338: 7337: 7329: 7320: 7311: 7302: 7293: 7284: 7275: 7266: 7258: 7254: 7248: 7239: 7232: 7226: 7217: 7215: 7207: 7203: 7197: 7190: 7186: 7180: 7173: 7167: 7160: 7154: 7144: 7138:, pp. 49, 50. 7137: 7131: 7129: 7119: 7110: 7103: 7097: 7088: 7081: 7077: 7073: 7067: 7058: 7056: 7054: 7047:Pisor, p. 61. 7044: 7037: 7031: 7022: 7013: 7004: 6998:Lewy, p. 274. 6995: 6987: 6981: 6977: 6970: 6962: 6956: 6952: 6947: 6946: 6937: 6928: 6919: 6910: 6908: 6898: 6892: 6888: 6882: 6873: 6857: 6850: 6848: 6838: 6819: 6812: 6806: 6799: 6798:public domain 6788: 6786:9780160942808 6782: 6778: 6777: 6769: 6767: 6750: 6746: 6739: 6723: 6719: 6712: 6696: 6689: 6682: 6677: 6669: 6667:9780945274773 6663: 6659: 6652: 6636: 6635: 6627: 6618: 6609: 6600: 6591: 6582: 6580: 6570: 6561: 6552: 6550: 6548: 6546: 6544: 6542: 6540: 6538: 6536: 6534: 6532: 6530: 6519: 6512: 6511:0-8018-6703-7 6508: 6502: 6493: 6486: 6478: 6469: 6462: 6455: 6446: 6437: 6428: 6419: 6417: 6407: 6398: 6389: 6387: 6385: 6383: 6381: 6379: 6377: 6375: 6373: 6371: 6369: 6367: 6365: 6363: 6361: 6359: 6357: 6355: 6353: 6351: 6349: 6347: 6345: 6343: 6341: 6339: 6337: 6335: 6333: 6331: 6329: 6327: 6325: 6323: 6315: 6309: 6300: 6298: 6296: 6294: 6292: 6290: 6288: 6286: 6284: 6282: 6274: 6273: 6266: 6259: 6255: 6250: 6243: 6237: 6227: 6218: 6209: 6200: 6194: 6190: 6187: 6183: 6177: 6168: 6159: 6150: 6143: 6138: 6131: 6126: 6117: 6108: 6106: 6096: 6087: 6078: 6069: 6060: 6051: 6045:Wirtz, p. 20. 6042: 6033: 6024: 6017: 6011: 6002: 5993: 5984: 5982: 5980: 5978: 5976: 5966: 5957: 5950: 5945: 5941: 5937: 5933: 5929: 5925: 5924:William Bundy 5921: 5917: 5911: 5902: 5893: 5877: 5873: 5867: 5859: 5855: 5851: 5850: 5842: 5840: 5831: 5825: 5809: 5805: 5801: 5795: 5780: 5776: 5772: 5768: 5761: 5746: 5742: 5735: 5720: 5716: 5710: 5694: 5688: 5681: 5677: 5673: 5669: 5665: 5661: 5657: 5653: 5646: 5637: 5635: 5633: 5631: 5629: 5627: 5625: 5623: 5621: 5619: 5617: 5615: 5613: 5611: 5609: 5607: 5605: 5603: 5601: 5599: 5597: 5595: 5593: 5591: 5589: 5587: 5585: 5583: 5581: 5579: 5577: 5575: 5573: 5556: 5552: 5546: 5537: 5530: 5526: 5519: 5513: 5508: 5500: 5494: 5490: 5483: 5474: 5465: 5456: 5447: 5440: 5434: 5425: 5423: 5421: 5419: 5417: 5415: 5413: 5411: 5409: 5407: 5405: 5403: 5401: 5399: 5397: 5395: 5393: 5391: 5389: 5387: 5385: 5383: 5374: 5373: 5368: 5362: 5347: 5346: 5341: 5335: 5320:. 20 May 2022 5319: 5318: 5313: 5307: 5298: 5294: 5281: 5277: 5273: 5269: 5265: 5261: 5257: 5253: 5249: 5245: 5241: 5235: 5228: 5222: 5215: 5211: 5205: 5198: 5194: 5190: 5185: 5180: 5172: 5168: 5163: 5159: 5148: 5145: 5143: 5140: 5139: 5133: 5129: 5127: 5121: 5119: 5115: 5111: 5107: 5100: 5090: 5087: 5082: 5073: 5069: 5067: 5063: 5058: 5050: 5042: 5038: 5036: 5032: 5028: 5023: 5014: 5009: 5008:May offensive 4999: 4997: 4991: 4987: 4985: 4981: 4977: 4973: 4969: 4964: 4962: 4958: 4952: 4949: 4943: 4940: 4939: 4929: 4925: 4922: 4917: 4913: 4904: 4902: 4901: 4895: 4891: 4888: 4882: 4878: 4875: 4867:Troop request 4864: 4861: 4855: 4853: 4849: 4843: 4841: 4837: 4830: 4823:United States 4820: 4818: 4812: 4809: 4808:Cần Lao Party 4805: 4804:Ngô Đình Diệm 4799: 4791: 4787: 4783: 4779: 4772: 4768: 4762:South Vietnam 4759: 4755: 4752: 4746: 4744: 4736: 4731: 4726: 4721: 4717: 4714: 4710: 4705: 4699: 4697: 4690: 4688: 4682: 4680: 4671: 4667: 4663: 4655: 4649:North Vietnam 4646: 4643: 4632: 4630: 4625: 4621: 4619: 4615: 4609: 4607: 4601: 4598: 4594: 4587: 4582: 4578: 4573: 4563: 4559: 4557: 4549: 4544: 4540: 4536: 4533: 4529: 4524: 4522: 4513: 4508: 4504: 4501: 4496: 4492: 4487: 4483: 4481: 4477: 4473: 4470: 4466: 4465:Perfume River 4457: 4452: 4446: 4445:Battle of Huế 4436: 4434: 4430: 4426: 4421: 4418: 4414: 4410: 4406: 4397: 4393: 4391: 4386: 4382: 4378: 4375: 4371: 4367: 4362: 4360: 4356: 4352: 4348: 4344: 4339: 4333: 4328: 4324: 4321: 4316: 4312: 4304: 4300: 4298: 4292: 4290: 4284: 4282: 4278: 4274: 4270: 4266: 4262: 4252: 4247: 4243: 4239: 4235: 4231: 4227: 4217: 4215: 4211: 4205: 4203: 4198: 4195: 4191: 4188:, Vĩnh Bình, 4187: 4183: 4179: 4175: 4171: 4167: 4163: 4159: 4155: 4151: 4147: 4143: 4139: 4135: 4131: 4127: 4119: 4114: 4110: 4108: 4104: 4100: 4096: 4092: 4088: 4087:Buôn Ma Thuột 4084: 4083:I Field Force 4080: 4076: 4064: 4055: 4052: 4048: 4044: 4043:John Laurence 4040: 4035: 4031: 4029: 4025: 4021: 4016: 4012: 4010: 4006: 4002: 3998: 3994: 3990: 3986: 3982: 3978: 3968: 3959: 3957: 3953: 3948: 3944: 3941: 3937: 3933: 3929: 3925: 3920: 3918: 3917:18th Division 3915:and the ARVN 3914: 3910: 3906: 3902: 3898: 3894: 3889: 3887: 3883: 3879: 3875: 3871: 3867: 3862: 3860: 3856: 3848: 3844: 3841: 3837: 3833: 3830: 3826: 3825:Resolution 13 3810: 3808: 3802: 3800: 3796: 3792: 3787: 3783: 3779: 3773: 3771: 3762: 3758: 3756: 3752: 3747: 3741: 3733: 3729: 3727: 3726:fait accompli 3723: 3718: 3715: 3714:Resolution 14 3705: 3701: 3699: 3695: 3689: 3683: 3679: 3674: 3665: 3663: 3657: 3655: 3649: 3647: 3643: 3639: 3634: 3632: 3627: 3625: 3621: 3617: 3613: 3609: 3605: 3601: 3595: 3593: 3588: 3576:North Vietnam 3573: 3571: 3570: 3564: 3559: 3557: 3552: 3548: 3544: 3539: 3538: 3533: 3529: 3525: 3520: 3518: 3512: 3510: 3509:Richard Helms 3504: 3502: 3498: 3497:Junction City 3494: 3487: 3483: 3478: 3474: 3472: 3468: 3464: 3460: 3456: 3450: 3440: 3437: 3433: 3428: 3426: 3422: 3418: 3417:Nguyễn Cao Kỳ 3414: 3410: 3395: 3393: 3389: 3384: 3382: 3379: 3375: 3374:Richard Nixon 3372: 3368: 3364: 3360: 3354: 3352: 3348: 3344: 3343:Battle of Huế 3338: 3335: 3331: 3326: 3324: 3320: 3316: 3312: 3308: 3304: 3301: 3297: 3294: 3290: 3286: 3282: 3281:Tet Offensive 3267: 3264: 3262: 3259: 3257: 3254: 3252: 3249: 3247: 3244: 3242: 3239: 3237: 3234: 3232: 3229: 3227: 3224: 3222: 3219: 3217: 3214: 3213: 3212: 3211: 3210: 3203: 3200: 3198: 3195: 3193: 3192: 3188: 3186: 3185: 3184:Custom Tailor 3181: 3179: 3178: 3174: 3172: 3169: 3167: 3166: 3162: 3160: 3157: 3155: 3154: 3150: 3148: 3147: 3143: 3141: 3138: 3136: 3135: 3131: 3129: 3128: 3124: 3122: 3121: 3117: 3115: 3112: 3110: 3109: 3105: 3103: 3100: 3097: 3096: 3091: 3090: 3086: 3085: 3084: 3083: 3082: 3075: 3074: 3073:Frequent Wind 3070: 3068: 3067: 3063: 3061: 3060: 3056: 3054: 3053: 3049: 3047: 3044: 3042: 3041: 3037: 3035: 3034: 3033: 3032:Linebacker II 3028: 3026: 3025: 3021: 3019: 3018: 3017: 3012: 3010: 3009: 3005: 3003: 3002: 2998: 2996: 2995: 2991: 2989: 2988: 2984: 2982: 2981: 2977: 2975: 2974: 2973:Commando Hunt 2970: 2968: 2967: 2963: 2961: 2960: 2956: 2954: 2951: 2949: 2948: 2944: 2942: 2941: 2937: 2935: 2932: 2930: 2929: 2925: 2923: 2922: 2918: 2916: 2915: 2911: 2909: 2908: 2904: 2902: 2901: 2897: 2895: 2894: 2893: 2888: 2886: 2885: 2881: 2879: 2878: 2874: 2872: 2871: 2867: 2865: 2864: 2860: 2858: 2857: 2853: 2851: 2850: 2846: 2844: 2843: 2839: 2837: 2836: 2832: 2831: 2830: 2829: 2828: 2821: 2818: 2816: 2815: 2811: 2809: 2808: 2804: 2802: 2801: 2797: 2795: 2792: 2790: 2789: 2785: 2783: 2782: 2778: 2777: 2776: 2775: 2774: 2767: 2764: 2762: 2759: 2757: 2754: 2752: 2749: 2747: 2746:Iron Triangle 2744: 2742: 2739: 2737: 2734: 2732: 2729: 2727: 2724: 2722: 2719: 2717: 2714: 2712: 2709: 2707: 2704: 2702: 2699: 2698: 2697: 2696: 2694: 2686: 2683: 2679: 2678:2nd Quang Trị 2676: 2674: 2673: 2669: 2667: 2664: 2662: 2661:Mỹ Chánh Line 2659: 2657: 2654: 2652: 2649: 2647: 2646:1st Quang Trị 2644: 2642: 2639: 2638: 2637: 2636: 2632: 2631: 2630: 2629: 2623: 2620: 2618: 2617: 2613: 2611: 2608: 2606: 2605: 2604:Caroline Hill 2601: 2597: 2594: 2593: 2592: 2591: 2587: 2585: 2584: 2580: 2578: 2577: 2576: 2571: 2567: 2564: 2563: 2562: 2561: 2557: 2555: 2554: 2550: 2548: 2545: 2543: 2542: 2538: 2536: 2535: 2531: 2529: 2528: 2527:Imperial Lake 2524: 2522: 2521: 2517: 2515: 2512: 2510: 2509: 2505: 2503: 2502: 2498: 2496: 2495: 2491: 2489: 2488: 2484: 2482: 2481: 2480:Clinch Valley 2477: 2475: 2474: 2470: 2468: 2467: 2463: 2459: 2456: 2455: 2454: 2453: 2449: 2447: 2446: 2442: 2440: 2439: 2438:Randolph Glen 2435: 2433: 2432: 2431: 2430:Toan Thang IV 2426: 2424: 2421: 2419: 2418: 2417:Fulton Square 2414: 2412: 2411: 2407: 2405: 2404: 2400: 2398: 2397: 2393: 2391: 2390: 2386: 2384: 2383: 2379: 2377: 2374: 2372: 2371: 2367: 2365: 2364: 2360: 2356: 2355: 2351: 2350: 2349: 2348: 2344: 2342: 2341: 2337: 2335: 2334: 2330: 2328: 2327: 2323: 2321: 2320: 2316: 2314: 2313: 2309: 2307: 2306: 2302: 2300: 2299: 2295: 2293: 2292: 2288: 2286: 2283: 2281: 2280: 2279:Purple Martin 2276: 2274: 2273: 2269: 2267: 2266: 2262: 2260: 2259: 2258:Iron Mountain 2255: 2253: 2250: 2248: 2247: 2246: 2241: 2239: 2238: 2234: 2232: 2231: 2227: 2225: 2222: 2221: 2220: 2219: 2218: 2211: 2210: 2206: 2204: 2203: 2202:Taylor Common 2199: 2197: 2196: 2195: 2190: 2188: 2185: 2183: 2182: 2178: 2176: 2175: 2171: 2169: 2168: 2164: 2162: 2161: 2157: 2155: 2152: 2150: 2149: 2145: 2143: 2142: 2138: 2134: 2131: 2130: 2129: 2128: 2124: 2122: 2121: 2117: 2115: 2114: 2110: 2108: 2107: 2103: 2101: 2100: 2096: 2094: 2091: 2089: 2088: 2084: 2082: 2081: 2080: 2079:Toan Thang II 2075: 2073: 2072: 2068: 2066: 2065: 2061: 2059: 2058: 2054: 2050: 2047: 2045: 2042: 2040: 2039: 2035: 2033: 2030: 2028: 2025: 2023: 2020: 2018: 2015: 2013: 2010: 2009: 2008: 2007: 2006:May Offensive 2003: 2001: 2000: 1996: 1994: 1993: 1989: 1987: 1986: 1982: 1980: 1979: 1975: 1973: 1972: 1971: 1966: 1964: 1963: 1962:Cochise Green 1959: 1957: 1956: 1952: 1950: 1949: 1945: 1943: 1942: 1938: 1936: 1933: 1931: 1930: 1926: 1924: 1921: 1919: 1918: 1914: 1912: 1909: 1907: 1906: 1902: 1900: 1899: 1895: 1893: 1892: 1888: 1886: 1885: 1881: 1877: 1874: 1872: 1871: 1870: 1865: 1863: 1860: 1858: 1855: 1853: 1852: 1848: 1846: 1843: 1841: 1838: 1836: 1833: 1831: 1828: 1826: 1823: 1821: 1818: 1817: 1816: 1815: 1814:Tet Offensive 1811: 1809: 1808: 1804: 1800: 1797: 1795: 1792: 1791: 1790: 1789: 1785: 1783: 1782: 1778: 1776: 1773: 1772: 1771: 1770: 1769: 1762: 1761: 1757: 1755: 1754: 1750: 1748: 1747: 1743: 1741: 1740: 1736: 1734: 1733: 1729: 1727: 1726: 1722: 1720: 1719: 1718: 1713: 1711: 1710: 1706: 1704: 1703: 1699: 1697: 1696: 1692: 1690: 1689: 1685: 1683: 1682: 1678: 1676: 1675: 1671: 1669: 1668: 1664: 1662: 1661: 1657: 1653: 1652: 1648: 1647: 1646: 1645: 1641: 1637: 1634: 1632: 1629: 1628: 1627: 1626: 1625:Shenandoah II 1622: 1620: 1619: 1615: 1613: 1612: 1608: 1606: 1605: 1601: 1599: 1598: 1594: 1592: 1591: 1590: 1585: 1583: 1582: 1578: 1576: 1575: 1571: 1569: 1568: 1564: 1562: 1561: 1557: 1555: 1554:Suoi Chau Pha 1552: 1550: 1549: 1545: 1543: 1542: 1538: 1536: 1535: 1531: 1529: 1528: 1524: 1522: 1521: 1520:Hong Kil Dong 1517: 1515: 1512: 1510: 1509: 1505: 1503: 1502: 1498: 1496: 1495: 1491: 1489: 1488: 1484: 1482: 1481: 1477: 1475: 1474: 1473:Barking Sands 1470: 1468: 1467: 1463: 1461: 1460: 1456: 1454: 1453: 1449: 1445: 1444: 1440: 1438: 1437: 1433: 1431: 1430: 1426: 1424: 1423: 1419: 1417: 1416: 1412: 1410: 1409: 1405: 1403: 1402: 1398: 1397: 1396: 1395: 1391: 1387: 1385: 1384: 1380: 1378: 1375: 1373: 1372: 1368: 1366: 1365: 1361: 1359: 1358: 1354: 1352: 1351: 1347: 1345: 1344: 1340: 1337: 1334: 1332: 1329: 1327: 1324: 1322: 1321:2nd Prek Klok 1319: 1317: 1316:1st Prek Klok 1313: 1312: 1311: 1310:Junction City 1306: 1304: 1303: 1299: 1297: 1296:Tra Binh Dong 1294: 1292: 1291: 1287: 1285: 1284: 1280: 1278: 1277: 1273: 1271: 1270: 1266: 1264: 1263: 1259: 1257: 1256: 1255: 1250: 1248: 1247: 1243: 1242: 1241: 1240: 1234: 1233:Firebase Bird 1231: 1229: 1228: 1224: 1222: 1219: 1217: 1216: 1212: 1210: 1209: 1205: 1203: 1202: 1198: 1196: 1195: 1191: 1189: 1188: 1184: 1182: 1181: 1177: 1175: 1174: 1173: 1168: 1166: 1165: 1161: 1159: 1158: 1154: 1152: 1151: 1147: 1145: 1144: 1140: 1138: 1137: 1132: 1130: 1127: 1125: 1122: 1120: 1119: 1115: 1113: 1112: 1108: 1106: 1105: 1101: 1099: 1096: 1094: 1093: 1089: 1087: 1086: 1082: 1080: 1079: 1075: 1073: 1072: 1068: 1066: 1063: 1061: 1060: 1056: 1054: 1053: 1049: 1047: 1046: 1042: 1040: 1039: 1035: 1033: 1032: 1028: 1026: 1025: 1021: 1019: 1018: 1014: 1012: 1011: 1007: 1005: 1004: 1003:Davy Crockett 1000: 998: 997: 993: 991: 990: 986: 984: 981: 979: 978: 974: 972: 971: 967: 965: 964: 960: 958: 957: 953: 951: 950: 946: 944: 943: 939: 937: 934: 932: 931: 927: 925: 924: 920: 918: 917: 913: 911: 910: 906: 904: 903: 899: 897: 894: 892: 891: 887: 883: 882: 878: 877: 876: 875: 874: 869: 867: 866: 862: 860: 859: 855: 853: 852: 848: 847: 846: 845: 839: 838: 834: 832: 831: 830:Bushmaster II 827: 825: 824: 820: 818: 815: 811: 808: 807: 806: 805: 801: 799: 796: 794: 791: 789: 788: 784: 782: 781: 777: 776: 775: 774: 771: 770: 763: 760: 758: 755: 753: 750: 748: 745: 743: 740: 738: 735: 733: 732:Camp Holloway 730: 728: 727: 723: 721: 718: 716: 713: 711: 710: 705: 703: 702: 698: 696: 693: 691: 688: 686: 685: 681: 679: 676: 674: 671: 669: 668: 664: 662: 661: 657: 655: 654: 650: 648: 645: 643: 642: 638: 636: 633: 631: 630: 626: 624: 623: 619: 618: 617: 616: 610: 605: 601: 591: 586: 584: 579: 577: 572: 571: 568: 559: 555: 550:5,070 missing 549: 546: 544:45,267 killed 543: 542: 541: 538: 532: 530: 525: 523: 519: 510: 507: 505:5,000+ killed 504: 503: 502: 496: 493: 492: 491: 488: 487:In Phase One: 484: 481: 474:1,530 missing 473: 470: 467: 466: 465: 461: 451: 445: 438: 431: 424: 417: 405: 400: 394: 393:In Phase One: 390: 389: 384: 378: 375: 374: 369: 366: 361: 355: 350: 344: 343:Văn Tiến Dũng 339: 333: 328: 322: 317: 312: 309: 304: 297: 292: 286: 281: 275: 274:Nguyễn Cao Kỳ 270: 264: 259: 254: 253: 248: 245: 240: 234: 233:North Vietnam 223: 221: 209: 197: 184: 171: 170:United States 159: 158:South Vietnam 148: 147: 142: 132: 128: 125: 122: 121: 120: 117: 116: 111: 82: 81:South Vietnam 78: 75: 74: 60: 57: 56: 52: 46: 41: 38: 33: 30: 26:Tet Offensive 24: 19: 9763: 9751:from Commons 9746: 9725: 9616: 9590:Other topics 9412:Agent Orange 9361: 9352: 9343: 9329: 9316: 9307: 9293: 9289: 9280: 9261: 9238: 9224: 9210: 9024:Participants 8942: 8902:Westmoreland 8901: 8882: 8863: 8844: 8825: 8803: 8800:Tran Van Tra 8781: 8762: 8743: 8724: 8705: 8685: 8665: 8645: 8626: 8605: 8594: 8575: 8558: 8554: 8527: 8507: 8485: 8464: 8444: 8414: 8395: 8382: 8362: 8341: 8320: 8299: 8276: 8254: 8230: 8203: 8181: 8159: 8140: 8121: 8112: 8108: 8069: 8050:, Section 48 7980: 7947: 7927: 7918: 7905: 7897:Bibliography 7876: 7870: 7831: 7825: 7806: 7800: 7791: 7782: 7773: 7764: 7755: 7746: 7737: 7728: 7720: 7715: 7706: 7698: 7693: 7680: 7671: 7651: 7637: 7600: 7591: 7583: 7578: 7569: 7560: 7551: 7518: 7509: 7500: 7491: 7482: 7469: 7455: 7446: 7433: 7424: 7415: 7406: 7397: 7389: 7385: 7365: 7335: 7328: 7319: 7310: 7301: 7292: 7283: 7274: 7265: 7257:the original 7247: 7238: 7230: 7225: 7196: 7179: 7166: 7158: 7153: 7143: 7135: 7118: 7109: 7101: 7096: 7087: 7071: 7066: 7043: 7035: 7030: 7021: 7012: 7003: 6994: 6975: 6969: 6944: 6936: 6927: 6918: 6897: 6881: 6872: 6860:. 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General 3398:Background 3323:rebellions 3319:defections 3309:and their 3146:Sea Dragon 3066:Eagle Pull 3040:Homecoming 2928:Shed Light 2849:Ranch Hand 2766:Phước Long 2756:Thượng Đức 2741:Svay Rieng 2726:Ap Da Bien 2610:Long Khánh 2487:Elk Canyon 2452:Texas Star 2291:Maine Crag 2272:Wayne Grey 2154:Thượng Đức 1825:US Embassy 1807:Coronado X 1725:Manchester 1597:Coronado V 1548:Hood River 1514:The Slopes 1443:Kingfisher 1422:Prairie IV 1408:Prairie II 1290:Enterprise 1194:Shenandoah 1052:Lam Son II 996:Birmingham 520:and Phase 376:~1,300,000 332:Lê Đức Thọ 102:11°N 107°E 9537:Reactions 9494:Aftermath 9165:Việt Minh 9074:Australia 9043:Viet Cong 8546:870660174 8300:The North 8078:cite book 7989:cite book 7392:, p. 223. 6755:28 August 6728:28 August 6485:Big Story 6392:Willbanks 6269:Hayward, 6258:The North 6132:, p. 371. 5779:0362-4331 5093:Phase III 5064:attacked 4921:Dean Rusk 4635:Aftermath 4597:Viet Minh 4521:Highway 1 4374:III Corps 4212:reporter 4166:Vĩnh Long 4134:Quảng Tín 4079:Nha Trang 4058:Offensive 4049:reporter 3993:Air Force 3878:Con Thien 3722:Phạm Hùng 3486:COMUSMACV 3291:(VC) and 3289:Viet Cong 3191:End Sweep 2934:Thanh Hoa 2907:Arc Light 2884:Iron Hand 2835:Farm Gate 2794:Phan Rang 2731:Quang Duc 2616:Chenla II 2389:Utah Mesa 2160:Maui Peak 1884:Hop Tac I 1857:Quảng Trị 1746:Muscatine 1667:Lancaster 1644:MacArthur 1631:Ong Thanh 1508:Concordia 1466:Kole Kole 1390:Con Thien 1371:Manhattan 1180:Attleboro 1059:Hawthorne 1038:Hardihood 1010:Austin IV 983:Xa Cam My 865:Van Buren 762:Dong Xoai 695:Kien Long 690:Long Dinh 635:Đồng Khởi 558:Civilian: 244:Viet Cong 196:Australia 131:aftermath 9647:Category 9554:Protests 9523:Veterans 9380:Conflict 9298:Khe Sanh 9069:Thailand 8824:(1976). 8394:(1971). 8252:(1988). 8228:(1991). 8202:(2002). 8178:Bui Diem 8038:Archived 8012:Archived 7809:. Dell. 7477:pp 71–85 7441:pp 71–85 7191:. 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