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Supervenience

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with global mental–physical supervenience on the simple formulation described above for two worlds to have the same number of people in the same physical states, but for the mental states to be distributed over those people in different ways (e.g. I have my father's thoughts in the other world, and he has my thoughts). To handle this, property-preserving isomorphisms (1-1 and onto functions between the objects of two worlds, whereby an object in one world has a property if and only if the object which that function takes you to in the other world does) are used, and once this is done, several varieties of global supervenience can be defined.
79:. Some philosophers believe it possible for some A to supervene on some B without being entailed by B. In such cases it may seem puzzling why A should supervene on B and equivalently why changes in A should require changes in B. Two important applications of supervenience involve cases like this. One of these is the supervenience of mental properties (like the sensation of pain) on physical properties (like the firing of 'pain neurons'). A second is the supervenience of normative facts (facts about how things ought to be) on natural facts (facts about how things are). 573:
worlds, will also be psychologically the same. On the other hand, if psychological properties only weakly locally supervene on physical properties, then those correlations between base and supervenient properties that hold in virtue of the supervenience relation are maintained within each world, but can be different in different worlds. For example, my physical duplicates in the actual world will have the same thoughts as I have; but my physical duplicates in other possible worlds may have different thoughts than I have in the actual world.
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that does not causally interact with that world. The possibility of such a world should be compatible with physicalism as this is a property of the actual world; but a supervenience-based definition of physicalism would imply that such a world could not exist, because it differs from the actual world
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There are also several kinds of global supervenience relations, which were introduced to handle cases in which worlds are the same at the base level and also at the supervenient level, but where the ways the properties are connected and distributed in the worlds differ. For example, it is consistent
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of entities to which those properties apply, and a modal force have been specified. For modal forms of supervenience, the modal strength of the relation is usually taken to be a parameter (that is, the possible worlds appealed to may be physically possible, logically possible, etc.). Also, note that
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There is also discussion among philosophers about mental supervenience and our experience of duration. If all mental properties supervene only upon some physical properties at durationless moments, then it may be difficult to explain our experience of duration. The philosophical belief that mental
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living in lightless pools. Eyes are expensive, and in lightless cave pools there is little reason for fish to have eyes. Yet, despite the remarkably consistent convergent evolution producing sightless cave fish, the genetics that produce the loss of sight phenotype is different nearly every time.
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For example, if psychological properties globally supervene on physical properties, then any two worlds physically the same will be psychologically the same. The value of global supervenience is that it allows for supervenient properties to be determined not by local properties of an individual
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which is a remarkably predictable example of convergent evolution where the same phenotypes consistently evolve for the same reasons. Organisms released from predation tend to become larger, while organisms limited by food tend to become smaller. Yet there are almost infinite numbers of genetic
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with respect to a set of properties. Thus, (1) can be understood more intuitively as the claim that all objects that are indiscernible with respect to a base set of properties are indiscernible with respect to a supervenient set of properties, or, as it is also sometimes said, that B-twins are
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The difference is essentially whether correlations between base and supervenient properties hold within actual worlds only, or across possible worlds. For example, if psychological properties strongly locally supervene on physical properties, then any two people physically the same, in any two
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consisting of persons, then (1) says that any two persons who are physically indiscernible are mentally indiscernible, and (2) says that any person who has a mental property has some physical property such that any person with that physical property has that mental property.
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formalized the concept and began applying it to many issues in the philosophy of mind. This raised numerous questions about how various formulations relate to one another, how adequate the formulation is to various philosophical tasks (in particular, the task of formulating
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itself. Similarly, the overall suffering caused by an earthquake might supervene on the spatiotemporal entities that constituted it, the deaths it caused, or the natural disaster itself. The claim that moral properties are supervenient upon non-moral properties is called
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was identical to the actual world, except it possessed an extra ammonium molecule on one of Saturn's rings. This may not seem to provide much of a problem, but because Jackson's solution refers only to minimal physical duplicates, this allows for the mental properties of
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thing alone, but by some wider spatiotemporal distribution of things and properties. For example, something's being a dollar bill depends not only on the paper and the inks it is made out of, but also on a widely dispersed variety of features of the world it occupies.
308: 164:. As he said in 1970, "supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respects, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respects without altering in some physical respects." 426: 754:. Imagine two persons who are indistinguishable in their local physical properties. One has a dog in front of his eyes and the other has a dog-image artificially projected onto his retinae. It might be reasonable to say that the former is in the 726:
supervenience. The claim that mental properties supervene globally on physical properties requires only a quite modest commitment: any difference between two possible worlds with respect to their instantiated mental properties entails at least
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is whether mental phenomena do in fact supervene on physical phenomena. This is incorrect. It is by and large agreed that some form of supervenience holds in these cases: Pain happens when the appropriate neurons fire. The disagreement is over
970:(in all possible worlds) would prove physicalism false. However, physicalism allows for the existence of necessary beings, because any minimal physical duplicate would have the same necessary being as the actual world. This however is 946:
constraint, rather than a metaphysical one; this avoids any objection based on the thesis ruling out metaphysical possibilities which a physicalist would leave open. But the thesis would not rule out the metaphysical possibility of
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Supervenience, which means literally "coming or occurring as something novel, additional, or unexpected", from "super," meaning on, above, or additional, and "venire," meaning to come in Latin, shows occurrences in the
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it is agreed that facts about how persons ought to act are not entailed by natural facts but cannot vary unless natural facts vary, and this rigid binding without entailment might seem puzzling.
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Although supervenience seems to be perfectly suited to explain the predictions of physicalism (i.e. the mental is dependent on the physical), there are four main problems with it. They are
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to be vastly different from those in the actual world. If such a difference would cause mental differences on Earth, it would not be consistent with our understanding of physicalism.
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called the "unlovely proliferation". These varieties are based both on (1) and (2) above, but because (1) is more common we shall focus on varieties of supervenience based on it.
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It is sometimes claimed that what is at issue in these problems is the supervenience claim itself. For example, it has been claimed that what is at issue with respect to
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In the contemporary literature, there are two primary (and non-equivalent) formulations of supervenience (for both definitions let A and B be sets of properties).
790:'s computer. In this case, the arrangement of bytes in that packet supervenes on the physical properties of the phone signal. More generally, each layer of the 797:
We can find supervenience wherever a message is conveyed by a representational medium. When we see a letter "a" in a page of print, for example, the meaning
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Examples of supervenience, in which case the truth values of some propositions cannot vary unless the truth values of some other propositions vary, include:
650: 505:(1) and (2) are sometimes called "schemata" because they do not correspond to actual supervenience relations until the sets of properties A and B, the 694:, many philosophers make the general claim that the mental supervenes on the physical. In its most recent form this position derives from the work of 568:
Strong: For any worlds w1 and w2, and for any two objects x in w1 and y in w2, if x and y are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible.
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of seeing a dog (and of knowing that he does so), whereas the latter is not in such a state of seeing a dog (but falsely believes that he sees one).
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changes that might lead to changes in body size. Another example of convergent evolution is the loss of sight that almost universally occurs in
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If two persons are indistinguishable in all of their physical properties, they must also be indistinguishable in all of their mental properties.
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For example, if mental states locally supervene on brain states, then being in the same brain state entails being in the same mental state.
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Weak: For any world w, and for any two objects x in w and y in w, if x and y are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible.
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can be used to support this claim. Throughout nature, convergent evolution produces incredibly similar phenotypes from a diverse set of
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which is identical to our world in the distribution of all mental and physical characteristics (i.e. they are identical), except world
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and physical events exist as a series of durationless moments that lie between the physical past and the physical future is known as
143:, must, under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same degree" (p. 261). This usage also carried over into the work of 673:
might supervene on the physical properties of the agent, the mental state of the agent (his or her intention), or the external
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in the early literature properties were not always central, and there remain some who prefer to frame the relation in terms of
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was the first to use the term to describe a broadly physicalist (and non-reductive) approach to the philosophy of mind, called
303:{\displaystyle \forall x\forall y(\forall X_{\in B}(Xx\leftrightarrow Xy)\rightarrow \forall Y_{\in A}(Yx\leftrightarrow Yy))} 195:(1) A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if all things that are B-indiscernible are A-indiscernible. Formally: 1409: 1388: 1374: 1360: 983: 446: 893:'s; he adjusted the supervenience-based definition of physicalism to state "Physicalism is true at a possible world 1429: 91:. Materialists claim that we observe supervenience because the neural phenomena entail the mental phenomena, while 1083:
Mitchell, Valone, W.A., T.J. (1990). "The Optimization Research Program: Studying Adaptations by Their Function".
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Both local and global supervenience come in many forms. Local supervenience comes in strong and weak varieties:
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For example, if one lets A be a set of mental properties, lets B be a set of physical properties, and chooses a
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was proposed by Horgan and Lewis in 1983; they envisioned a possible world (a world that could possibly exist)
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Global: For any two worlds w1 and w2, if w1 and w2 are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible.
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wrote in 1922, "if a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree, then... anything
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The problem is similar with respect to the supervenience of normative facts on natural facts. Discussing the
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Other varieties of supervenience include multiple-domains supervenience and similarity-based supervenience.
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Some points of clarification: first, the definitions above involve quantification over properties and hence
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Horgan, Terry (1993) "From supervenience to superdupervenience: meeting the demands of a material world."
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Local: For any two objects x and y, if x and y are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible.
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force is specified depends on which more specific variety of supervenience one decides upon (see below).
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Supervenience is of interest to philosophers because it differs from other nearby relations, for example
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with respect to a mental property, but is physically identical. A typical response to this objection is
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Whether there is a table in the living room supervenes on the positions of molecules in the living room.
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A-twins. Finally, supervenience claims typically involve some modal force, however, the way that
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if and only if any world which is a minimal physical duplicate (i.e. is physically identical) of
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difference in the physical properties instantiated in those two worlds. Importantly, it does
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in 1993 when he stated that according to Jackson's idea of supervenience, a possible world
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with regard to the content both of words and (more relevant to our concerns here) of
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is sometimes held to be supervenient upon the physical properties of the object. In
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that make up the painting), the artistic composition of the painting (in this case,
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with fundamentally different genotypes underpinning the phenotypes. One example is
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Its systematic use in philosophy is considered to have begun in early 20th-century
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deny this. The dualist's challenge is to explain supervenience without entailment.
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Properties of individual molecules supervene on the properties of individual atoms.
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The upper levels on this chart can be considered to supervene on the lower levels.
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The possibility of "supervenience without entailment" or "supervenience without
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refers to a relation between sets of properties or sets of facts. X is said to
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was proposed by Jackson in 1998, in which he stated that the existence of a
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might supervene on the physical composition of the painting (the specific
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some difference in Y is necessary for any difference in X to be possible.
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We can begin by distinguishing between local and global supervenience:
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Suppose that the supervenience thesis for physicalism is stated as a
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require that the mental properties of an individual person supervene
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This weak global thesis is particularly important in the light of
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Arguments against supervenience-based formulations of physicalism
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Foster, J.B. (1964). "The evolution of mammals on islands".
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There are several examples of supervenience to be found in
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supervenes on the geometry of the boundary of the printed
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of computer networking supervenes on the layers below it.
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capture the concept of sharing all properties, or being
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Davidson, Donald (1970) "Mental Events." Reprinted in
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Kemper, K.E.; Visscher, P.M.; Gooddard, M.E. (2012).
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One's moral character supervenes on one's action(s).
1265:Gatenby R.A., Gillies R.J & Brown J.S. (2011). 839:This is because phenotype supervenes on genotype. 485: 420: 302: 149:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supervenience 1045:, New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., pp. 253-75. 486:{\displaystyle (\forall X(Xx\leftrightarrow Xy))} 1416: 1082: 702:of a person are supervenient on their physical 1216:"Genetic architecture of body size in mammals" 1181:Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh 954: 782:, the audio signal on a phone line transports 167:In subsequent years Terence ("Terry") Horgan, 917:provides a problem for Jackson's solution to 714:An alternative claim, advanced especially by 525: 111:" is contested territory among philosophers. 1117:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list ( 722:supervenience claim; or, weaker still, mere 530:Beginning in the 1980s, inspired largely by 59:of (A) supervenes on the truth value of its 16:Relation between sets of properties or facts 769: 443:. Second, in (1), expressions of the form 1312: 1310: 865: 1290: 1241: 1231: 1331: 1041:"The Conception of Intrinsic Value", in 1021: 1019: 808: 18: 1316: 1307: 1048: 1417: 1174: 1131: 1440:Concepts in the philosophy of science 1016: 1336:. New York: Oxford University Press. 1061: 786:between the user's computer and the 685: 575: 180:), and whether it avoids or entails 1410:Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project 1389:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1375:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1361:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 628: 624:Examples of supervenient properties 13: 1435:Concepts in the philosophy of mind 1321:. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1073:. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 984:Functionalism (philosophy of mind) 909:The lone ammonium molecule problem 453: 385: 357: 329: 323: 260: 220: 211: 205: 14: 1466: 1370:"Supervenience and Determination" 1350: 1344: 739:on that person's physical state. 580: 1325: 1085:The Quarterly Review of Biology 937: 1258: 1207: 1168: 1125: 1076: 1035: 915:lone ammonium molecule problem 884:contains an experience called 853:lone ammonium molecule problem 480: 477: 468: 459: 450: 415: 412: 409: 400: 391: 373: 354: 345: 297: 294: 285: 276: 257: 254: 245: 236: 217: 187: 1: 1056:Essays on Actions and Events 861:problem of necessary beings. 817:can be said to supervene on 7: 977: 961:problem of necessary beings 955:Problem of necessary beings 780:dial-up internet connection 637:of a physical object to an 591:may have misleading content 10: 1471: 1319:From Metaphysics to Ethics 1070:On the Plurality of Worlds 526:Varieties of supervenience 114: 1267:"Of cancer and cave fish" 1193:10.1017/S0080456800012163 1058:. Oxford: Clarendon Press 788:Internet service provider 122:Oxford English Dictionary 1384:"Supervenience and Mind" 1332:Chalmers, David (1996). 1233:10.1186/gb-2012-13-4-244 1009: 770:Computational properties 1430:Metaphysical properties 919:epiphenomenal ectoplasm 886:epiphenomenal ectoplasm 866:Epiphenomenal ectoplasm 849:Epiphenomenal ectoplasm 63:, (¬A), and vice versa. 1004:Multiple realizability 813:In biological systems 522:instead, for example. 487: 422: 304: 24: 1271:Nature Reviews Cancer 1175:Fisher, R.A. (1918). 1043:Philosophical Studies 949:philosophical zombies 921:. It was proposed by 809:Biological properties 488: 423: 305: 124:dating back to 1844. 84:the mind-body problem 22: 1397:Humean supervenience 1317:Jackson, F. (1998). 1067:Lewis, David (1986) 857:modal status problem 831:evolution on islands 823:convergent evolution 778:. 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M. Hare 137:G.E. Moore 76:entailment 29:philosophy 1450:Mereology 1201:181213898 1032:: 555-86. 874:ectoplasm 836:cave fish 815:phenotype 792:OSI Model 655:molecules 469:↔ 454:∀ 401:→ 386:∀ 383:∧ 366:∈ 358:∃ 355:→ 338:∈ 330:∀ 324:∀ 286:↔ 269:∈ 261:∀ 258:→ 246:↔ 229:∈ 221:∀ 212:∀ 206:∀ 109:reduction 38:supervene 1301:21548400 1252:22546202 1105:84451535 978:See also 859:and the 819:genotype 752:thoughts 706:. Then: 667:goodness 520:entities 93:dualists 61:negation 1408:at the 1354:(ed.). 1292:3971416 1243:3446298 1162:7870628 1142:Bibcode 671:charity 115:History 1299:  1289:  1250:  1240:  1199:  1160:  1134:Nature 1103:  851:, the 724:global 665:, the 663:ethics 647:beauty 645:, the 507:domain 1197:S2CID 1158:S2CID 1101:S2CID 1027:Mind. 1010:Notes 803:glyph 639:agent 635:value 518:, or 516:facts 500:modal 135:. As 41:on Y 1297:PMID 1248:PMID 1119:link 959:The 913:The 827:taxa 737:only 729:some 659:dots 633:The 131:and 55:The 1399:at 1287:PMC 1279:doi 1238:PMC 1228:doi 1189:doi 1150:doi 1138:202 1093:doi 1030:102 733:not 690:In 649:of 27:In 1421:: 1386:. 1372:. 1358:. 1309:^ 1295:. 1285:. 1275:11 1273:. 1269:. 1246:. 1236:. 1224:13 1222:. 1218:. 1195:. 1185:52 1183:. 1179:. 1156:. 1148:. 1136:. 1115:}} 1111:{{ 1099:. 1089:65 1087:. 1018:^ 855:, 766:. 682:. 514:, 184:. 151:. 31:, 1392:. 1378:. 1364:. 1303:. 1281:: 1254:. 1230:: 1203:. 1191:: 1164:. 1152:: 1144:: 1121:) 1107:. 1095:: 932:W 927:W 899:W 895:W 882:W 878:W 607:) 603:( 599:. 593:. 481:) 478:) 475:y 472:X 466:x 463:X 460:( 457:X 451:( 416:) 413:) 410:) 407:y 404:X 398:y 395:Y 392:( 389:y 380:x 377:Y 374:( 369:B 362:Y 352:x 349:X 346:( 341:A 334:X 327:x 298:) 295:) 292:y 289:Y 283:x 280:Y 277:( 272:A 265:Y 255:) 252:y 249:X 243:x 240:X 237:( 232:B 225:X 218:( 215:y 209:x

Index


philosophy
if and only if
truth value
negation
entailment
the mind-body problem
why this is so
dualists
is-ought problem
reduction
Oxford English Dictionary
meta-ethics
emergentism
G.E. Moore
R. M. Hare
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supervenience
Donald Davidson
anomalous monism
David Lewis
Jaegwon Kim
physicalism
reductionism
domain of discourse
higher-order logic
indiscernible
modal
domain
predicates
facts

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