1697:, it is estimated that 6.5 million people (more than 20% of voters) voted tactically either as a way of preventing a "hard Brexit" or preventing another Conservative government led by the Tactical2017 campaign. Many Green Party candidates withdrew from the race in order to help the Labour Party secure closely fought seats against the Conservatives. This ultimately led to the Conservatives losing seats in the election even though they increased their overall vote share.
2609:
638:
1361:
1137:
778:
1458:, several websites, such as taktikaiszavazas.hu (meaning "strategic voting"), promoted the idea to vote for opposition candidates with the highest probability of winning a given seat. About a quarter of opposition voters adopted this behavior, resulting in a total of 498,000 extra votes gained by opposition parties. A total of 14 extra single seats were taken by several parties and independent candidates.
41:
2455:
candidates but do not rank any less-preferred candidate over any more-preferred one. This form of exaggeration has an effect whenever the voter's honest rating for the intended winner is below that candidate's median rating; or when their honest rating for the intended loser is above it. In other words, half of voters will have an incentive to strategize, while half will not.
2522:
in first place, ranking the candidate whom they like less in last place. If neither candidate is the sincere first or last choice, the voter is using both the compromising and burying strategies at once. If many different groups voters use this strategy, this gives a paradoxical advantage to the candidate generally thought least likely to win.
1672:, organised a similar campaign. Since then strategic voting has become a consideration in British politics as is reflected in by-elections and by the growth in sites such as tacticalvote.co.uk, who encourage strategic voting as a way of defusing the two party system and empowering the individual voter. For the
1676:, voteswap.org attempted to prevent the Conservative Party staying in government by encouraging Green Party supporters to tactically vote for the Labour Party in listed marginal seats. In 2017 swapmyvote.uk was formed to help supporters of all parties swap their votes with people in other constituencies.
2521:
has both a strong incentive and a large vulnerability to burial. Here is a hypothetical example of both factors at the same time: if there are two candidates the most likely to win, the voter can maximize the impact on the contest between these candidates by ranking the candidate the voter likes more
1798:
in which anyone could vote regardless of their party affiliation. Davis supporters were rumored to have voted for Simon because
Riordan was perceived as a greater threat to Davis; this, combined with a negative advertising campaign by Davis describing Riordan as a "big-city liberal", allowed Simon to
1511:
won 13 seats of 26 seats in district council and was just one seat short of absolute majority. NijolÄ NaujokienÄ (candidate to the district's mayoral seat from the Labour Party) came short by 0.68 per cent in the mayoral election. Her opponent, Saulius
GrinkeviÄius, had a 22 per cent gap to overcome.
2458:
Typically, this would not be the case unless there were two similar candidates favored by the same set of voters. A strategic vote against a similar rival could result in a favored candidate winning; although if voters for both similar rivals used this strategy, it could cause a candidate favored by
1614:
In the 2016 General
Election in Spain, the incentives for voting tactically were much larger than usual, following the rise of the Podemos and Ciudadanos and following the economic crisis and election in 2015. The strategic voters successfully influenced the outcome of the election, despite a record
1102:
the differences between candidates: all above-average candidates are given perfect scores or ranks, while all below-average candidates are given the lowest possible score. This has the advantage of making it less likely for a disliked candidate to win, but the disadvantage that the winning candidate
1094:
Compression is a strategy where a voter refuses to disclose which of two candidates they honestly prefer (i.e. both candidates are equally-ranked). Compression is unique in that it involves casting a sincere vote, i.e. one that does not lie about which candidate a voter prefers (only "how much" they
2469:
Strategic voters are faced with the initial tactic as to how highly to score their second-choice candidate. The voter may want to retain expression of a high preference of their favorite candidate over their second choice. But that does not allow the same voter to express a high preference of their
1667:
set up GROT (Get Rid Of Them) a strategic voter campaign whose aim was to help prevent the
Conservative Party from gaining a 5th term in office. This coalition was drawn from individuals in all the main opposition parties, and many who were not aligned with any party. While it is hard to prove that
2239:
Because strategic voting relies heavily on voters' perception of how other voters intend to vote, campaigns in electoral methods that promote compromise frequently focus on affecting voters' perception of campaign viability. Most campaigns craft refined media strategies to shape the way voters see
1398:
due to the separate votes for party-lists and local single-winner electoral district candidates. The vote for party-lists is considered sincere if the party vote share is significantly above the 5% electoral threshold in
Germany. In Germany the share of strategic voters was found around 30%, which
712:
shows that no voting system has a single "always-best" strategy, i.e. one that always maximizes a voter's satisfaction with the result, regardless of other voters' ballots. This implies all voting systems can sometimes encourage voters to strategize. However, weaker guarantees can be shown under
2454:
Such a strategy involves "semi-honest exaggeration". Unlike in most voting systems, voters rarely (if ever) have an incentive to lie about which of two candidates they prefer, which makes such far milder than under other voting systems. Voters exaggerate the difference between a certain pair of
2368:
elections, where the first preference is all that counts (and thus lesser-evil voting is the only effective kind of strategic voting). The most typical tactic is to assess which two candidates are frontrunners (most likely to win) and to vote for the preferred one of those two, even if a third
1197:
Tactical voting may occur in isolation or as part of an organized campaign. In the former situation, electors make their own judgement as to the most effective way to (typically) prevent the election of a specific candidate or party. In the latter, one or more parties or groups encourage their
3705:
Sir John
Curtice, Professor of Politics at Strathclyde University, highlighted how many Labour voters switched to the Liberal Democrats in the Tiverton and Honiton by-election, to topple a Tory majority of 24,000. 'Labour and Liberal Democrat voters are ganging up against the Tories, voting
1901:
This rational voter model assumes that the voter's utility of the election result is dependent only on which candidate wins and not on any other aspect of the election, for example showing support for a losing candidate in the vote tallies. The model also assumes the voter chooses how to vote
1865:
for next election); voters have a set of sincere preferences, or utility rankings, by which to rate candidates; voters have some knowledge of each other's preferences; and voters understand how best to use strategic voting to their advantage. The extent to which this model resembles real-life
1474:
system at parliamentary and district levels, most of strategic voting takes place in single-member constituencies (or districts in mayoral elections). These constituencies have two-round system when no candidate wins more than 50 per cent of the votes in the first round. A notable example of
1803:. The strategy to nominate Simon (if in fact it was a reality), was successful, as he lost in the general election against Davis. However, it resulted in the lowest gubernatorial general election turnout in modern California political history, thus requiring fewer signatures to qualify a
2465:
and Laraki noted that under majority judgment, many voters have no opportunity or incentive to use strategy. They argued based on a simulation that the highest median methods minimized the number of voters with an incentive to misrepresent their opinions, among the methods they studied.
2502:
to show that, if unstrategic voters only approved candidates whom they considered "very good" or better, strategic voters would be able to sway the result frequently, but that if unstrategic voters approved all candidates they considered "good" or better, approval was the second most
2391:
Theoretical results indicate that, under two-round runoff voting with three candidates, strategic equilibria exist in which only two candidates receive votes. It has been shown experimentally that voters are influenced by a candidate's perceived likelihood of winning the election.
2219:
Range: Calculate the average utility of all candidates. Vote the maximum points for all candidates that have a higher-than-average utility; vote the minimum points for all candidates that have a lower-than-average utility; vote any value for a candidate with a utility equal to the
1845:. (Puerto Ricans have the chance to vote by party or by candidate. Separatists voted under their ideology but for the center party's candidate, which caused major turmoil.) After a recount and a trial, Acevedo VilĂĄ was certified as governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
1309:
responded by asking voters to "lend" their votes to his party, suggesting that the
Liberal Party was bound to lose the election regardless of strategic voting. This failed to prevent the Conservatives from winning the election, although they did not win a majority of seats.
1201:
Organized tactical voting in which a political party mounts a campaign calling on its supporters not to vote for their own favored candidates, but for those of a party which it perceives as more likely to defeat a common opponent, is less common. An example is the
1615:
low turnout of 66.5%. In a natural experiment in
Andalusia 9% voted strategically when having opportunity, strategic behavior did not increase with time, and did not affect surrounding electoral areas, under the assumption that strategic voting happens only for
2328:, they found that range voting had the highest (worst) strategic vulnerability, while their own method majority judgment had the lowest (best). Further investigation would be needed to be sure that this result remained true with different sets of candidates.
2477:, because the only option is to approve of a candidate or not, optimal strategic voting rarely includes ranking a less-preferred candidate over a more-preferred candidate. However, strategy is in fact inevitable when a voter decides their "approval cutoff".
1301:(NDP). In the 2004 election, the governing Liberal Party was able to convince many New Democratic voters to vote Liberal to avoid a Conservative government. In the 2006 elections, the Liberal Party attempted the same strategy, with Prime Minister
1577:
with the questions asked in a persuasive way took place, with the oppositing recommending to not take the referendal card. The voter turnout of the referendum is 40%, making it non-binding and merely a suggestion for all the future governments.
1565:, websites like pogonimypis.pl (meaning "We'll chase the PiS") gave information for which voters should vote for in their constituency in order to maximize the chance of the opposition winning the extra seat. The campaign was a success, with
3692:
2582:
has a strong incentive towards free riding, a kind of decapitation strategy. If a voter expects their favorite candidate will almost-certainly be elected, insincerely ranking the second candidate first does not hurt the favored candidate.
1507:(who came in second place). Monika NavickienÄ eventually won the constituency by around 900 votes. At a district level, an example could be KÄdainiai district's mayoral election in the 2015 municipal elections. In the first round, the
2259:
Strategic voting is highly dependent on the voting method being used. A strategic vote which improves a voter's satisfaction under one method could make no change or lead to a less-satisfying result under another method.
2287:
Moreover, although by the
GibbardâSatterthwaite theorem no deterministic single-winner voting method is immune to strategic voting in all cases, some methods' results are more resistant to strategic voting than others'.
1668:
GROT swung the election itself, it did attract significant media attention and brought strategic voting into the mainstream for the first time in UK politics. In 2001, the
Democratic Left's successor organisation, the
1015:) candidate, but not with the intent of getting them elected. Instead, the voter intends for the weak candidate to eliminate a strong alternative, who would otherwise keep the voter's preferred candidate from winning.
3540:
1122:. Exaggeration can be effective in all other systems. (Requiring strict rankings removes the opportunity for compression, but replaces it with opportunities for turkey-raising, lesser-evil voting, and/or burial.)
1837:'s candidate of that year, was unpopular across much of the territory due to large corruption schemes and the privatization of public corporations. To prevent Rossell from winning, other factions supported the
2062:
3391:
Stephenson, Laura B., et al., editors. The Many Faces of Strategic Voting: Tactical Behavior in Electoral Systems Around the World. University of Michigan Press, 2018. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvh4zhzr.
1528:
has seen strategic voting regularly occur in several elections, including one party explicitly or implicitly encouraging voters to vote for a candidate other than theirs. This happened first in 1996 in the
890:
never incentivize a voter to rank or rate a lesser evil above one's favorite, they may still incentivize voters to rank or rate the lesser evil higher to stop a greater evil from winning. For instance, in
2158:
1708:
instead of Johnson, so that Huntâseen as "a lower-energy challenger"âwould finish in second place, allowing an easier defeat in the party vote. Strategic voting was expected to play a major role in the
2195:, but can be estimated from predicted winning probabilities. An important special case occurs when the voter has no information about how other voters will vote. This is sometimes referred to as the
4352:
3682:
2216:
Approval: Calculate the average utility of all candidates. Vote for all candidates that have a higher-than-average utility; do not vote for any candidates that have a lower-than-average utility.
1639:. As the members were elected in multi-member districts, the parties urged their supporters to vote for a party-nominated candidate according to criteria, such as the last digit of the voter's
2240:
their candidacy. During this phase, there can be an analogous effect where campaign donors and activists may decide whether or not to support candidates tactically with their money and time.
957:
A voter ranks an alternative lower in the hope of defeating it. For example, a voter may insincerely rank a perceived strong alternative last in order to help their preferred alternative win.
3173:
1221:
An intermediate case also exists, where a non-party campaign attempts to coordinate tactical voting, typically with the goal of defeating a certain party. Cases of this include the Canadian
1399:
decreased to 9% if only non-allied party candidates were contenders for the electoral district winner. In a contentious election year the share of strategic voters increased to around 45%.
1218:, under which certain Liberal candidates would stand aside in favor of Labour ones, again to ensure that the Conservative candidates would not win on the basis of a split anti-Tory vote.
3374:
1822:. In addition to running ads highlighting Akin's conservative stances, McCaskill also directed messages to surrogates to tell Akin to run ads which would increase his primary polling.
2276:) voting schemes. Game theory can also be used to analyze the pros and cons of different methods. For instance, when electors vote for their own preferences rather than tactically,
3201:
3064:
1841:'s candidate. The elections were close; statehood advocates won a seat in the U.S. house of representatives and majorities in both legislative branches, but lost governance to
895:, a voter may have an incentive to strategically approve a lesser evil that they dislike. Although not considered favorite betrayal, this is also a type of compromise strategy.
3531:
3035:
Duverger's Law of Plurality Voting The Logic of Party Competition in Canada, India, the United Kingdom and the United States, 2009, André Blais, Bernard Grofman, Shaun Bowler
2251:
in the United States), candidates put disproportionate resources into competing strongly in the first few stages, because those stages affect the reaction of later stages.
2170:, depending on the voting method and the voter's prospective ratings for each candidate. For specific voting methods, the gain can be maximized using the following rules:
1717:
poll suggesting that 19% of voters would be doing so tactically. 49% of strategic voters said they would do so in the hope of stopping a party whose views they opposed.
3244:
3215:
1679:
In the 2006 local elections in London, strategic voting was promoted by sites such as London Strategic Voter in a response to national and international issues.
2398:
is vulnerable to three of the four kinds of strategy discussed above. It is vulnerable to lesser-evil voting; to turkey-raising; and to strategic truncation.
4375:
1720:
According to a 2020 study, older voters in the UK vote strategically more than younger voters, and richer voters vote more strategically than poorer voters.
3187:
1704:
to determine the final two candidates for the party vote, it was suggested that front-runner Boris Johnson's campaign encouraged some of its MPs to back
694:, a voter may recognize their favorite candidate is unlikely to win and so instead support a candidate they think is more likely to win (a tactic called
686:
is voting in consideration of possible ballots cast by other voters in order to maximize one's satisfaction with the election's results. For example, in
3959:
2174:
Plurality: Vote for the candidate with the highest prospective rating. This is different from choosing the best of the frontrunners, which is a common
2917:
2586:
Some forms of STV allow strategic voters to gain an advantage by listing a candidate who is very likely to lose in first place. This strategy, called
4332:
1606:, won. Prominent Slovenian public opinion researchers claimed that such proportions of strategic voting had not been recorded anywhere else before.
4199:
4423:
4195:
3378:
1819:
2231:
pivot probabilities. Because of these additional requirements, such equilibria may in practice be less widely applicable than the strategies.
3356:
1804:
3116:
3258:
2178:
approach to voting. In rare cases, the highest prospective rating can belong to a weak candidate (one with a low probability of winning).
1701:
1690:
from capturing such seats. This conclusion was reached by comparing results to the demographics of constituencies and polling districts.
1530:
358:
3719:
2224:
Myerson and Weber also describe voting equilibria that require all voters use the optimal strategy and all voters share a common set of
1974:
2213:
Borda: Rank the candidates in decreasing order preference (decreasing order of utility). This is the sincere ranking of the candidates.
1406:
one party asked in several elections their voters to vote for another allied party to help this party cross the electoral threshold.
4400:
VoteRoll is a blog roll voting system that offers tiered strategic voting to develop statistics for people voting online since 2010.
3229:
867:
by increasing the rating for a candidate they dislike, in hopes of defeating a candidate they dislike even more. For example, under
1878:
and Weber. The strategy is broadly applicable to a number of single-winner voting methods that are additive point methods, such as
1521:
1391:
323:
3607:
3505:
3470:
3092:
2073:
1682:
In Northern Ireland, it is believed that (predominantly Protestant) Unionist voters in Nationalist strongholds have voted for the
1434:
often organize to divide their votes across different tickets, avoiding the concentration of votes on one or a few candidates. In
1538:
864:
353:
192:
3581:
2959:. Society for Political Methodology (American Political Science Association; Washington University in St. Louis). Archived from
2953:
1838:
1771:
1480:
1419:
1403:
1275:
295:
4346:
3903:
3017:
2830:
2805:
2765:
2686:
2284:
favors those candidates with strong core support but otherwise narrower appeal due to holding more uncompromising positions.
1728:
1640:
1587:
1455:
1305:
asking New Democrats and Greens to vote for the Liberal Party to prevent a Conservative win. The New Democratic Party leader
3284:
2591:
2386:
1834:
1747:
1710:
1694:
1673:
1656:
1496:
1203:
2985:
1628:
1534:
1492:
1435:
1341:
over Harper's Conservatives, observers noted that the increase in support for the Liberals at the expense of the NDP and
875:, voters often choose to support an option they believe has a better chance of winning instead of their honest favorite.
868:
498:
1357:
in France shows strategic voting in the first round, due to considerations which candidate will reach the second round.
2409:. However, satisfying later-no-harm does not (by itself) provide resistance to such strategies, unless paired with the
1683:
1562:
1794:. Polls predicted that Riordan would defeat Davis, while Simon would not. At that time, the Republican primaries were
4171:
2499:
2301:
2268:
prove that any useful single-winner voting method based on preference ranking is prone to some kind of manipulation.
2265:
1365:
1250:
1184:
1158:
817:
795:
748:
can create opportunities for strategic voting, as can small electoral districts (e.g. those used most often with the
3138:
1166:
4090:
2261:
1660:
666:
2897:
4034:
Blais, André; Labbé-St-Vincent, Simon; Laslier, Jean-François; Sauger, Nicolas; Van der Straeten, Karine (2011).
3377:[Researchers on the Polls: Tactical Voting Won] (in Slovenian). Delo.si. 12 December 2011. Archived from
3337:
2531:
1525:
1861:. That is, voters are only voting in order to make an impact on one election at a time (not, say, to build the
1546:
1330:
1314:
1294:
1290:
1234:
1230:
1162:
799:
343:
3045:
2450:
Top-rate all candidates with above-average utility, and bottom-rate all candidates with below-average utility.
1599:
4382:
3970:
2512:
1271:
2559:. Strategy in Condorcet methods can become highly complex, but almost always involves burial or truncation.
2924:
2573:
1632:
1488:
1318:
1283:
1226:
1210:(incidentally, the predecessors of the Liberal Democrats from the previous example) and the then-insurgent
620:
280:
3842:
2401:
There is a common misconception that instant-runoff is not affected by a kind of strategic voting called
851:
695:
271:
1750:, as a means to defeat Conservative candidates in seats with traditional large Conservative majorities.
4338:
2544:
2540:
2210:
Plurality: Vote for the most preferred (highest utility) candidate. This is the sincere plurality vote.
1759:
1595:
1395:
1242:
887:
300:
237:
3174:"Frontas prieĆĄ A.PaleckÄŻ Naujojoje Vilnioje: KonservatorÄ M.NavickienÄ remia net ideologiniai prieĆĄai"
2332:
methods show typically less strategic voting, with the exception of electoral thresholds, which cause
1786:(a self-financed businessman) vied for a chance to compete against the unpopular incumbent Democratic
4116:
1222:
714:
493:
252:
4261:"Free Riding and Vote Management under Proportional Representation by the Single Transferable Vote"
3779:
2627:
2579:
2359:
2187:
Range: Vote the maximum (minimum) for all candidates with a positive (negative) prospective rating.
1842:
1566:
1508:
1423:
1215:
1147:
757:
749:
745:
328:
2377:
is sufficiently common for any method based on first preferences to produce two-party domination.
1643:
or the voter's birth month. This maximized the opposition's seat gains and resulted in the ruling
4214:
2548:
2418:
2410:
2365:
2273:
1879:
1783:
1736:
1334:
1151:
788:
722:
687:
314:
3009:
3003:
2879:
Plurality, runoff, Hare, minimax, Borda, approval, and range are all vulnerable to compromising.
1036:, to a lesser degree (because the voter cannot change their first preference between "rounds"):
4413:
3886:
Balinski, Michel; Laraki, Rida (2011). "Election by Majority Judgment: Experimental Evidence".
3563:
2847:
1854:
1787:
1732:
1574:
508:
409:
290:
3921:"Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation: Threshold Insurance in German Elections"
2899:
Raising Turkeys: An Extension and Devastating Application of Myerson-Weber Voting Equilibrium
2439:
Most cardinal, single-winner voting systems in large elections encourage similar strategies:
2414:
2395:
2281:
2192:
1342:
1054:
1037:
976:
951:
939:
909:
872:
691:
363:
348:
247:
3127:
2647:
2482:
2374:
2247:, where some voters have information about previous voters' preferences (e.g. presidential
1669:
1298:
883:, as voters will abandon minor-party candidates to support stronger major-party candidates.
709:
659:
2434:
1504:
8:
4418:
2632:
2402:
2163:
The gain in expected utility can be maximized by choosing a vote with suitable values of
1853:
Academic analysis of strategic voting is based on the rational voter model, derived from
1770:
is stronger than in most countries. One high-profile example of strategic voting was the
1763:
1739:. This resulted in the Liberal Democrats winning what had previously been a Conservative
879:
says that systems vulnerable to this strategy will typically (though not always) develop
761:
741:
404:
2597:
In Malta's STV the two-party system can cause strategic voting away from third parties.
2206:
pivot probabilities are all equal and the rules for the specific voting methods become:
1442:'s Project ThunderGo. The anti-establishment camp gained 29 seats, a historical record.
4189:
4124:
4071:
4063:
4016:
3940:
3865:
3820:
3812:
3663:
3532:"Green Party pulls out of crucial general election seat to help Labour beat the Tories"
3480:
3432:
2731:
2297:
1636:
1616:
1431:
1207:
831:
718:
702:
615:
574:
164:
149:
103:
98:
71:
3150:
3139:
Als die CDU noch Leihstimmen zu vergeben hatte, Christopher Pramstaller, 2013 (German)
1512:
In the second round, Saulius GrinkeviÄius won by around 8 per cent (and 1,600 votes).
1375:
752:). Proportional representation systems with small districts often involve large-scale
4360:
4342:
4234:
4177:
4167:
4142:
4055:
4008:
3944:
3899:
3824:
3727:
3667:
3655:
3436:
3013:
2870:
2826:
2801:
2761:
2723:
2682:
2487:
2370:
2337:
2325:
2293:
1767:
1724:
1603:
1484:
1267:
1211:
1041:
935:
876:
584:
564:
503:
452:
333:
285:
219:
144:
134:
113:
108:
25:
4308:
4075:
2960:
2503:
strategy-resistant method of the ones they studied, after majority judgment itself.
2430:
4226:
4134:
4047:
4036:"Strategic Vote Choice in One-round and Two-round Elections: An Experimental Study"
4000:
3932:
3891:
3857:
3802:
3794:
3687:
3645:
3422:
3414:
2862:
2793:
2715:
2637:
2622:
2536:
2380:
2321:
2313:
2277:
2248:
2244:
1894:. The strategy is optimal in the sense that the strategy will maximize the voter's
1811:
1354:
1050:
1033:
1029:
984:
980:
967:
905:
900:
880:
518:
447:
399:
242:
228:
4230:
4138:
3683:"Sir John Curtice: Tories in trouble but Keir Starmer still missing crucial spark"
1895:
4334:
Making Votes Count : Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems
4161:
2676:
2652:
2614:
2492:
2474:
2462:
2317:
2289:
1887:
1862:
1775:
1550:
1471:
1379:
1066:
926:
892:
753:
726:
652:
642:
569:
552:
488:
414:
368:
66:
4285:
3895:
3117:
France's election: 'strategic' voting among Montreal's French citizens, CTV News
2329:
1500:
1476:
1338:
1326:
1322:
737:
513:
457:
262:
257:
202:
197:
3936:
3650:
3633:
2866:
2719:
1591:
4407:
4181:
4146:
4059:
4051:
4012:
3838:
3731:
3659:
3418:
2874:
2727:
2657:
2642:
2556:
2552:
2443:
Calculate the expected (average) utility of the election result (the average
2406:
1875:
1647:
losing 10 seats, receiving the lowest share of seats in history at the time.
1246:
1119:
1083:
1016:
1004:
610:
528:
523:
183:
159:
154:
76:
3920:
3093:"Canada Election Result Numbers Show Canadians Voted Strategically: Experts"
4238:
4004:
3402:
2478:
2305:
2296:
method, performed an initial investigation of this question using a set of
1891:
1795:
1238:
1110:
1099:
1062:
1058:
922:
730:
605:
589:
537:
428:
419:
394:
174:
139:
2184:
Approval: Vote for all candidates that have a positive prospective rating.
1687:
1631:, strategic voting was implemented by the opposition parties, such as the
4260:
3720:"Tactical voting could defeat Tories in once safe seats, campaigners say"
2539:
are vulnerable to 3 of the 4 kinds of strategy listed above, because the
2518:
2336:. The method for seat allocation can cause strategic voting, for example
2333:
2309:
2269:
1883:
1833:'s 2004 elections were affected by strategic voting. Pedro RossellĂł, the
1830:
1779:
1705:
1590:, 30% of voters voted tactically. Public polls predicted an easy win for
1542:
1306:
1302:
1279:
1025:
963:
918:
579:
462:
442:
169:
4117:"An Examination of Ranked-Choice Voting in the United States, 2004â2022"
4067:
4035:
4020:
3988:
3807:
2787:
2758:
Gaming the vote: why elections aren't fair (and what we can do about it)
2735:
2608:
1360:
637:
16:
Choosing a candidate other than preferred to undercut a less desired one
3869:
3816:
3427:
3151:""Legislative Council Election Exit Poll Analysis Article Series" No.2"
3046:"Strategic Voting Must Include Casting Your Ballot for the Green Party"
2797:
2703:
1791:
1664:
1644:
1427:
802: in this section. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
437:
305:
129:
89:
3357:"Exit poll: Polish government's referendum invalidated by low turnout"
4091:"Why Approval Voting is Unworkable in Contested Elections - FairVote"
3070:
2181:
Borda: Rank the candidates in decreasing order of prospective rating.
2175:
1815:
1740:
1467:
1439:
1415:
1198:
supporters to vote tactically in an effort to influence the outcome.
85:
4378:âArticle on strategic voting within larger strategic considerations
3861:
3798:
1136:
777:
4129:
338:
4390:
4033:
2421:
still incentivize truncation or bullet voting in some situations.
2272:
has been used to search for some kind of "minimally manipulable" (
2057:{\displaystyle R_{i}=\sum _{j\neq i}\;p_{ij}\cdot (u_{i}-u_{j})\,}
1364:
Stenciling on a Parisian sidewalk ahead of the first round of the
3475:
2951:
2444:
1800:
1451:
1103:
may not be the one most desired out of the above-average options.
2381:
Plurality-runoff family (RCV, two-round, and partisan primaries)
1766:
contributes to a two-party system, where the observed effect of
1282:. This failed to unseat Harris but succeeded in suppressing the
740:
methods tend to be difficult to manipulate in the absence of an
3506:"General Election 2017: 6.5 million voted tactically on 8 June"
1714:
57:
32:
1475:
strategic voting at the parliamentary level could be the 10th
1345:
was partially due to strategic voting for Liberal candidates.
3919:
Shikano, Susumu; Herrmann, Michael; Thurner, Paul W. (2009).
2280:-like methods tend to settle on compromise candidates, while
2823:
The Mathematics of Voting and Elections: A Hands-On Approach
2300:
simulated elections based on the results from a poll of the
2153:{\displaystyle G(p,v,u)=\sum _{i=1}^{k}\;v_{i}\cdot R_{i}\,}
40:
4397:
3960:"Seat bias formulas in proportional representation systems"
3753:
3443:
3216:"KÄdainiai baigia atsikvoĆĄÄti nuo Viktoro Uspaskicho kerĆł?"
3066:
Federal Election 2015: Strategic voters challenge democracy
2067:
The gain in expected utility for a given vote is given by:
1956:
will be tied for the most total points to win the election.
1570:
4088:
3890:. Studies in Public Choice. Vol. 25. pp. 13â54.
3888:
In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform
2498:
Balinski and Laraki used rated ballots from a poll of the
2387:
Instant-runoff voting § Resistance to tactical voting
2373:
is the observation that this kind of strategic voting and
2348:
2304:
which they had carried out using rated ballots. Comparing
1866:
elections is the subject of considerable academic debate.
1746:
In 2024, tactical voting is again being advocated for the
3403:"Strategic voting in proportional representation systems"
3128:
On the Extent of Strategic Voting, Jorg L. Spenkuch, 2012
2495:
was the method least amenable to tactical perturbations.
1902:
individually and not in collaboration with other voters.
4361:
The Proof of the GibbardâSatterthwaite Theorem Revisited
3754:"How I Helped Todd Akin Win â So I Could Beat Him Later"
3310:
1874:
An example of a rational voter strategy is described by
1537:. From 1996 until 2005, it was a regular feature in the
1499:'s candidates endorsed their supporters to vote for the
1374:" (strategic voting) as a reason for voters to vote for
4387:
VotePair: Uniting Progressives Through Strategic Voting
2923:. Voting with Bidirectional Elimination. Archived from
3918:
2814:
2513:
Borda count § Potential for tactical manipulation
1274:, strategic voting was encouraged by opponents of the
3375:"Raziskovalci o anketah: zmagalo taktiÄno glasovanje"
3338:"Co zrobiÄ z kartÄ
do referendum? Najlepiej nie braÄ"
2825:. Mathematical World. American Mathematical Society.
2532:
Condorcet method § Potential for tactical voting
2076:
1977:
1438:, the practices of strategic voting were expanded by
2604:
1394:
allows to estimate the share of strategic voters in
1270:
in Canada is weaker than in other countries. In the
4163:
Majority judgment: measuring, ranking, and electing
4115:Graham-Squire, Adam; McCune, David (12 June 2023).
4114:
767:
3989:"A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections"
3843:"Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result"
3530:
2152:
2056:
2320:with two different absolute approval thresholds,
1919:= the number of points to be voted for candidate
1898:when the number of voters is sufficiently large.
1297:, strategic voting was a concern for the federal
4405:
4213:Hershbach, Dudley; Brams, Steven (25 May 2001).
3259:"Increase in split votes, election figures show"
2424:
1723:In an example of individuals voting tactically,
756:operations, which are common in countries using
3582:"Did Boris's dirty tricks help Hunt over Gove?"
3561:
3063:Tremonti, Anna Maria (Host) (15 October 2015).
2915:
2786:VoliÄ, Ismar (2 April 2024). "Duverger's law".
1799:win the primary despite a last-minute business
1774:. During the Republican primaries, Republicans
1735:candidate in order to ensure the defeat of the
1329:among centrist and left-leaning parties in the
4306:
4212:
3885:
3562:Cartwright, James; Smith, Lilly (6 May 2018).
3471:"æ°éČ黚ăæ·æć話ăé
ç„šçźèšé«ćçïŒæć§ææșćž¶èĄ°è°ćĄéžèäčćźïŒć°ćș·æ°æ
柀 20180815"
2986:Could Democrats Decide the Winner in Michigan?
2845:
2701:
2506:
1545:throughout its existence and from 2005 in the
3245:"Give your vote more oomph- Strategic voting"
2254:
1317:, strategic voting was primarily against the
1256:
660:
3778:Myerson, Roger B.; Weber, Robert J. (1993).
3777:
3631:
3608:"Who's tactically voting, and why? | YouGov"
3230:"Sensacija: Darbo partija prarado KÄdainius"
3031:
3029:
2995:
2954:"Analysis of Crossover and Strategic Voting"
2952:R. Michael Alvarez; Jonathan Nagler (1999).
2364:Lesser-evil voting is exceedingly common in
2191:Pivot probabilities are rarely estimated in
1549:electorate which has been won solely by the
1369:
1245:with the goal of opposing and weakening the
4198:) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (
4089:The Non-majority Rule Desk (29 July 2011).
3500:
3498:
3188:"2016 m. Seimo rinkimĆł rezultatai - VRK.lt"
3001:
2947:
2945:
2674:
2567:
1931:= the voter's gain in utility if candidate
1702:2019 Conservative Party leadership election
1165:. Unsourced material may be challenged and
1019:is a well-known example of such a strategy.
369:Parallel voting (Mixed member majoritarian)
4206:
4194:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
3957:
3335:
2820:
2755:
2125:
2007:
1098:In one common form, the strategy involves
1011:A voter gives a high rank to a weak (i.e.
667:
653:
334:Mixed single vote (positive vote transfer)
272:Proportional and semi-proportional systems
4128:
3806:
3751:
3649:
3426:
3336:Przyborska, Katarzyna (12 October 2023).
3026:
2905:. American Political Science Association.
2447:if the election was repeated many times).
2234:
2149:
2053:
1869:
1333:. Following the landslide victory of the
1185:Learn how and when to remove this message
818:Learn how and when to remove this message
3881:
3879:
3752:Mccaskill, Sen Claire (11 August 2015).
3632:Eggers, Andrew C.; Vivyan, Nick (2020).
3495:
2942:
2760:(1. ed.). New York: Hill and Wang.
1522:mixed-member proportional representation
1392:mixed-member proportional representation
1359:
4283:
3837:
2918:"Voting with Bidirectional Elimination"
2574:Single transferable vote § Tactics
2360:Plurality voting § Tactical voting
2349:First-preference (core support) methods
1848:
4424:Party-list proportional representation
4406:
4376:Tactical Voting Can Be a Weak Strategy
3986:
3717:
3354:
2895:
2821:Hodge, J.K.; Klima, R.E. (2018). "6".
2695:
2562:
2459:neither of these voter groups to win.
2292:and Rida Laraki, the inventors of the
1772:2002 California gubernatorial election
1481:2016 Lithuanian parliamentary election
1430:, voters supporting candidates of the
1420:party-list proportional representation
1404:party-list proportional representation
713:stronger conditions. Examples include
3876:
3787:The American Political Science Review
3680:
3242:
3090:
2891:
2889:
2887:
2792:. Princeton University Press. Ch. 2.
2785:
2781:
2779:
2777:
2681:. Blackwell (Yale U.P. in the U.S.).
1729:2022 Tiverton and Honiton by-election
1588:2011 Slovenian parliamentary election
1456:2018 Hungarian parliamentary election
4286:"Computer counting in STV elections"
3468:
3400:
2992:28 Feb. 2012. Retrieved 9 Dec. 2017.
1204:1906 United Kingdom general election
1163:adding citations to reliable sources
1130:
899:Most affects: Especially strong for
800:adding citations to reliable sources
771:
4330:
4258:
3450:æé·ćż. "ç«ć§éžèäžæ°éČ黚çăèŻć競éžçç„ăïŒ ä»„ćé«ć
©ćžçșäŸ".
2839:
2353:
1820:2012 US Senate election in Missouri
1805:recall that ultimately ousted Davis
1731:in the UK tactically supported the
1641:National Identification Card Number
1493:Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union
1483:. To prevent independent candidate
1436:2016 Hong Kong Legislative Election
13:
4284:Woodall, Douglas R. (March 1994).
4159:
3355:Tilles, Daniel (15 October 2023).
2884:
2774:
2369:candidate is preferred over both.
1859:short-term instrumentally rational
1684:Social Democratic and Labour Party
1563:2023 Polish parliamentary election
229:Plurality and majoritarian systems
14:
4435:
4389:. 20 October 2004. Archived from
4369:
4166:. Laraki, Rida. Cambridge, Mass.
3695:from the original on 24 June 2022
3638:American Political Science Review
3285:"Labour gets tactical with Epsom"
3091:Press, Jordan (20 October 2015).
2848:"Strategic voting and nomination"
2704:"Strategic voting and nomination"
2500:2007 French presidential election
2417:that pass later-no-harm but fail
2302:2007 French presidential election
1650:
1366:2017 French presidential election
1251:2021 Russian legislative election
339:Scorporo (negative vote transfer)
3681:Cecil, Nicholas (24 June 2022).
3543:from the original on 26 May 2022
2607:
1753:
1586:According to some media, in the
1293:, and to a lesser extent in the
1272:1999 Ontario provincial election
1214:(founded in 1900) agreed on the
1135:
776:
768:Common types of strategic voting
736:With large electoral districts,
636:
39:
4300:
4277:
4252:
4153:
4108:
4082:
4027:
3980:
3951:
3912:
3831:
3780:"A Theory of Voting Equilibria"
3771:
3745:
3711:
3674:
3634:"Who Votes More Strategically?"
3625:
3600:
3574:
3555:
3523:
3462:
3449:
3394:
3385:
3367:
3348:
3329:
3303:
3277:
3251:
3236:
3222:
3208:
3194:
3180:
3166:
3157:
3143:
3132:
3121:
3110:
3084:
3056:
3038:
2978:
2896:Monroe, Burt (September 2001).
2590:, is essentially eliminated by
2470:second choice over any others.
2435:Approval voting § Strategy
1526:electoral system of New Zealand
1241:campaign organized by Russia's
1126:
787:needs additional citations for
4359:Svensson, Lars-Gunnar (1999).
3958:Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2007).
3718:Walker, Peter (17 June 2024).
3243:Smith, Phil (28 August 2017).
2916:Matthew S. Cook (March 2011).
2909:
2846:Green-Armytage, James (2014).
2749:
2702:Green-Armytage, James (2014).
2668:
2098:
2080:
2050:
2024:
1825:
1629:1995 Legislative Yuan election
1515:
1402:Due to electoral threshold in
344:Mixed ballot transferable vote
1:
4231:10.1126/science.292.5521.1449
4139:10.1080/00344893.2023.2221689
2663:
2425:Cardinal single-winner voting
2266:GibbardâSatterthwaite theorem
2262:Arrow's impossibility theorem
1758:Strategic voting in the US's
1541:electorate, which was won by
1028:and multi-round systems like
4307:Markus Schulze (June 2004).
4040:Political Research Quarterly
3993:The American Economic Review
3479:(in Chinese). Archived from
3317:(in Polish). 14 October 2023
3002:Issacharoff, Samuel (2007).
2756:Poundstone, William (2008).
2525:
2431:Score voting § Strategy
2343:
2199:. In this special case, the
1909:candidates and a voter let:
1857:. In this model, voters are
1633:Democratic Progressive Party
1461:
1409:
1284:Ontario New Democratic Party
1227:Conservative Party of Canada
1225:campaign, which opposed the
886:While methods that pass the
621:End-to-end verifiable voting
281:Single non-transferable vote
7:
3967:4th ECPR General Conference
3896:10.1007/978-1-4419-7539-3_2
2675:Farquharson, Robin (1969).
2600:
2507:Ranked single-winner voting
1839:Partido Popular Democratico
1581:
1569:losing the majority in the
1520:Since New Zealand moved to
1325:, which had benefited from
715:one-dimensional preferences
479:Voting patterns and effects
10:
4440:
4339:Cambridge University Press
4324:
4215:"The Science of Elections"
3008:. Thompson West. pp.
2571:
2545:sincere favorite criterion
2541:Condorcet winner criterion
2529:
2510:
2428:
2384:
2357:
2255:Influence of voting method
1944:= the (voter's perceived)
1760:first-past-the-post voting
1596:Slovenian Democratic Party
1533:, and then in 1999 in the
1445:
1396:first-past-the-post voting
1385:
1257:Examples in real elections
1243:Anti-Corruption Foundation
888:sincere favorite criterion
829:
301:Single transferable voting
238:First-past-the-post voting
4160:L., Balinski, M. (2010).
3937:10.1080/01402380902779147
3651:10.1017/S0003055419000820
2867:10.1007/s00355-013-0725-3
2855:Social Choice and Welfare
2720:10.1007/s00355-013-0725-3
2708:Social Choice and Welfare
2543:is incompatible with the
2197:zero information strategy
1622:
1556:
1348:
1261:
1223:Anything But Conservative
494:Voting advice application
324:Mixed-member proportional
253:Plurality-at-large voting
4365:Fisher, Stephen (2001).
4052:10.1177/1065912909358583
3987:Bouton, Laurent (2013).
3419:10.1177/1354068810389638
2714:(1). Springer: 111â138.
2628:Keynesian beauty contest
2580:single transferable vote
2568:Single transferable vote
1674:2015 UK general election
1657:1997 UK general election
1609:
1598:; however, his opponent
1424:largest remainder method
1286:vote to a historic low.
1276:Progressive Conservative
1216:Gladstone-MacDonald pact
750:single transferable vote
359:Ruralâurban proportional
354:Dual-member proportional
329:Additional member system
3469:TVBS (15 August 2018).
2549:participation criterion
2411:participation criterion
2330:Party-list proportional
2274:incentive compatibility
1594:, the candidate of the
1497:Social Democratic Party
1266:The observed effect of
723:dichotomous preferences
4005:10.1257/aer.103.4.1248
3925:West European Politics
3401:Lago, Ignacio (2012).
3202:"Balsavimo rezultatai"
2789:Making Democracy Count
2491:magazine in 2001 that
2340:favors large parties.
2235:Pre-election influence
2154:
2124:
2058:
1870:MyersonâWeber strategy
1855:rational choice theory
1788:Governor of California
1573:. At the same time, a
1382:
1370:
1235:2015 federal elections
1057:and all commonly-used
952:poison pill amendments
904:, to a lesser degree:
721:is strategyproof) and
509:Passive electioneering
410:Straight-ticket voting
4393:on 17 September 2008.
3706:tactically,' he said.
3564:"Flipping the Script"
2485:argued in a paper in
2396:Instant runoff voting
2282:instant-runoff voting
2193:political forecasting
2155:
2104:
2059:
1835:New Progressive Party
1748:2024 general election
1711:2019 General Election
1695:2017 general election
1363:
1315:2015 federal election
1291:2004 federal election
977:Instant-runoff voting
873:instant-runoff voting
863:A voter supports the
746:apportionment methods
364:Majority bonus system
349:Alternative Vote Plus
248:Instant-runoff voting
3342:KrytykaPolityczna.pl
3005:The Law of Democracy
2648:Strategic nomination
2483:Dudley R. Herschbach
2375:strategic nomination
2074:
1975:
1849:Rational voter model
1810:Similarly, in 2012,
1670:New Politics Network
1524:voting in 1996, the
1299:New Democratic Party
1159:improve this section
796:improve this article
733:are strategyproof).
315:Mixed-member systems
3976:on 7 February 2009.
3163:taktikaiszavazas.hu
3069:(Radio broadcast).
3050:The Huffington Post
2930:on 20 November 2011
2633:Lesser of two evils
2588:Woodall free riding
2563:Multi-winner voting
1843:AnĂbal Acevedo VilĂĄ
1764:presidential system
1602:, the candidate of
1061:systems, including
869:first-past-the-post
865:lesser of two evils
856:, sometimes called
742:electoral threshold
643:Politics portal
405:Split-ticket voting
4331:Cox, Gary (1997).
3052:. 18 October 2015.
2798:10.2307/jj.7492228
2150:
2054:
2006:
1962:prospective rating
1686:(SDLP) to prevent
1617:district magnitude
1553:party since 2005.
1531:Wellington Central
1489:Liberal Movement's
1432:pro-democracy camp
1383:
1077:(sometimes called
994:(sometimes called
842:(sometimes called
839:Lesser-evil voting
832:Lesser-evil voting
744:. However, biased
703:lesser-evil voting
616:Voter registration
575:Voter intimidation
99:Write-in candidate
72:Provisional ballot
4348:978-0-521-58527-9
4288:. McDougall Trust
4259:Schulze, Markus.
3905:978-1-4419-7538-6
3758:POLITICO Magazine
3539:. 25 April 2017.
3537:independent.co.uk
3381:on 25 April 2012.
3361:Notes From Poland
3291:. 8 November 2023
3265:. 8 November 2023
3019:978-1-58778-460-6
2832:978-1-4704-4287-3
2807:978-0-691-24882-0
2767:978-0-8090-4892-2
2688:978-0-631-12460-3
2537:Condorcet methods
2326:majority judgment
2294:majority judgment
2245:rolling elections
1991:
1960:Then the voter's
1946:pivot probability
1935:wins the election
1778:(former mayor of
1604:Positive Slovenia
1505:Monika NavickienÄ
1485:Algirdas Paleckis
1195:
1194:
1187:
1034:primary elections
968:Condorcet methods
881:two party-systems
853:favorite betrayal
828:
827:
820:
710:Gibbard's theorem
697:favorite betrayal
677:
676:
628:
627:
585:Voter suppression
565:Ballot harvesting
543:
542:
504:Paradox of voting
470:
469:
453:None of the above
385:Voting strategies
376:
375:
286:Cumulative voting
220:Electoral systems
210:
209:
145:Electronic voting
135:Compulsory voting
4431:
4394:
4356:
4355:on 25 June 2015.
4351:. Archived from
4320:
4319:
4313:
4304:
4298:
4297:
4295:
4293:
4281:
4275:
4274:
4272:
4270:
4265:
4256:
4250:
4249:
4247:
4245:
4210:
4204:
4203:
4193:
4185:
4157:
4151:
4150:
4132:
4112:
4106:
4105:
4103:
4101:
4086:
4080:
4079:
4031:
4025:
4024:
3999:(4): 1248â1288.
3984:
3978:
3977:
3975:
3969:. Archived from
3964:
3955:
3949:
3948:
3916:
3910:
3909:
3883:
3874:
3873:
3847:
3835:
3829:
3828:
3810:
3784:
3775:
3769:
3768:
3766:
3764:
3749:
3743:
3742:
3740:
3738:
3715:
3709:
3708:
3702:
3700:
3688:Evening Standard
3678:
3672:
3671:
3653:
3629:
3623:
3622:
3620:
3618:
3604:
3598:
3597:
3595:
3593:
3578:
3572:
3571:
3559:
3553:
3552:
3550:
3548:
3534:
3527:
3521:
3520:
3518:
3516:
3502:
3493:
3492:
3490:
3488:
3466:
3460:
3459:
3447:
3441:
3440:
3430:
3398:
3392:
3389:
3383:
3382:
3371:
3365:
3364:
3352:
3346:
3345:
3333:
3327:
3326:
3324:
3322:
3307:
3301:
3300:
3298:
3296:
3281:
3275:
3274:
3272:
3270:
3255:
3249:
3248:
3240:
3234:
3233:
3226:
3220:
3219:
3212:
3206:
3205:
3198:
3192:
3191:
3184:
3178:
3177:
3170:
3164:
3161:
3155:
3154:
3147:
3141:
3136:
3130:
3125:
3119:
3114:
3108:
3107:
3105:
3103:
3088:
3082:
3081:
3079:
3077:
3060:
3054:
3053:
3042:
3036:
3033:
3024:
3023:
2999:
2993:
2982:
2976:
2975:
2973:
2971:
2965:
2958:
2949:
2940:
2939:
2937:
2935:
2929:
2922:
2913:
2907:
2906:
2904:
2893:
2882:
2881:
2852:
2843:
2837:
2836:
2818:
2812:
2811:
2783:
2772:
2771:
2753:
2747:
2746:
2744:
2742:
2699:
2693:
2692:
2678:Theory of Voting
2672:
2638:Primary election
2623:Electoral fusion
2617:
2612:
2611:
2354:Plurality voting
2322:Condorcet voting
2314:plurality voting
2278:Condorcet method
2159:
2157:
2156:
2151:
2148:
2147:
2135:
2134:
2123:
2118:
2063:
2061:
2060:
2055:
2049:
2048:
2036:
2035:
2020:
2019:
2005:
1987:
1986:
1964:for a candidate
1948:that candidates
1896:expected utility
1812:Claire McCaskill
1733:Liberal Democrat
1479:constituency in
1373:
1355:two-round system
1190:
1183:
1179:
1176:
1170:
1139:
1131:
1076:
1075:
993:
992:
985:plurality voting
949:
948:
906:two-round system
841:
840:
823:
816:
812:
809:
803:
780:
772:
669:
662:
655:
641:
640:
559:
558:
519:Political apathy
483:
482:
448:Election boycott
389:
388:
243:Two-round system
225:
224:
54:
53:
43:
21:
20:
4439:
4438:
4434:
4433:
4432:
4430:
4429:
4428:
4404:
4403:
4381:
4372:
4349:
4341:. p. 340.
4327:
4311:
4305:
4301:
4291:
4289:
4282:
4278:
4268:
4266:
4263:
4257:
4253:
4243:
4241:
4211:
4207:
4187:
4186:
4174:
4158:
4154:
4113:
4109:
4099:
4097:
4087:
4083:
4032:
4028:
3985:
3981:
3973:
3962:
3956:
3952:
3917:
3913:
3906:
3884:
3877:
3862:10.2307/1914083
3845:
3836:
3832:
3799:10.2307/2938959
3782:
3776:
3772:
3762:
3760:
3750:
3746:
3736:
3734:
3716:
3712:
3698:
3696:
3679:
3675:
3630:
3626:
3616:
3614:
3606:
3605:
3601:
3591:
3589:
3580:
3579:
3575:
3568:Design Observer
3560:
3556:
3546:
3544:
3529:
3528:
3524:
3514:
3512:
3504:
3503:
3496:
3486:
3484:
3483:on 14 June 2019
3467:
3463:
3448:
3444:
3399:
3395:
3390:
3386:
3373:
3372:
3368:
3353:
3349:
3334:
3330:
3320:
3318:
3311:"Pogonimy PiS!"
3309:
3308:
3304:
3294:
3292:
3283:
3282:
3278:
3268:
3266:
3257:
3256:
3252:
3241:
3237:
3228:
3227:
3223:
3214:
3213:
3209:
3200:
3199:
3195:
3186:
3185:
3181:
3172:
3171:
3167:
3162:
3158:
3149:
3148:
3144:
3137:
3133:
3126:
3122:
3115:
3111:
3101:
3099:
3097:Huffington Post
3089:
3085:
3075:
3073:
3062:
3061:
3057:
3044:
3043:
3039:
3034:
3027:
3020:
3000:
2996:
2984:Negrin, Matt. "
2983:
2979:
2969:
2967:
2966:on 25 June 2010
2963:
2956:
2950:
2943:
2933:
2931:
2927:
2920:
2914:
2910:
2902:
2894:
2885:
2850:
2844:
2840:
2833:
2819:
2815:
2808:
2784:
2775:
2768:
2754:
2750:
2740:
2738:
2700:
2696:
2689:
2673:
2669:
2666:
2653:Vote allocation
2615:Politics portal
2613:
2606:
2603:
2576:
2570:
2565:
2534:
2528:
2515:
2509:
2493:approval voting
2475:approval voting
2437:
2427:
2413:. Systems like
2389:
2383:
2362:
2356:
2351:
2346:
2318:approval voting
2290:Michel Balinski
2257:
2237:
2229:
2204:
2168:
2143:
2139:
2130:
2126:
2119:
2108:
2075:
2072:
2071:
2044:
2040:
2031:
2027:
2012:
2008:
1995:
1982:
1978:
1976:
1973:
1972:
1968:is defined as:
1942:
1929:
1917:
1905:Given a set of
1872:
1863:political party
1851:
1828:
1776:Richard Riordan
1756:
1661:Democratic Left
1653:
1625:
1612:
1584:
1559:
1518:
1487:' victory, the
1472:parallel voting
1464:
1448:
1412:
1388:
1380:Emmanuel Macron
1376:François Fillon
1351:
1264:
1259:
1191:
1180:
1174:
1171:
1156:
1140:
1129:
1095:are preferred).
1073:
1072:
1067:approval voting
990:
989:
946:
945:
927:approval voting
893:approval voting
838:
837:
834:
824:
813:
807:
804:
793:
781:
770:
754:vote management
684:tactical voting
673:
635:
630:
629:
570:Ballot stuffing
556:
553:Electoral fraud
545:
544:
489:Coattail effect
480:
472:
471:
415:Tactical voting
386:
378:
377:
291:Binomial system
222:
212:
211:
90:Ballot measures
67:Absentee ballot
51:
26:Politics series
17:
12:
11:
5:
4437:
4427:
4426:
4421:
4416:
4402:
4401:
4395:
4379:
4371:
4370:External links
4368:
4367:
4366:
4363:
4357:
4347:
4326:
4323:
4322:
4321:
4316:Voting Matters
4299:
4276:
4251:
4225:(5521): 1449.
4205:
4172:
4152:
4121:Representation
4107:
4081:
4046:(3): 637â645.
4026:
3979:
3950:
3931:(3): 634â656.
3911:
3904:
3875:
3856:(4): 587â601.
3839:Gibbard, Allan
3830:
3793:(1): 102â114.
3770:
3744:
3710:
3673:
3644:(2): 470â485.
3624:
3599:
3588:. 20 June 2019
3573:
3554:
3522:
3494:
3461:
3454:(in Chinese).
3442:
3413:(5): 653â665.
3407:Party Politics
3393:
3384:
3366:
3347:
3328:
3315:pogonimypis.pl
3302:
3276:
3250:
3235:
3221:
3207:
3193:
3179:
3165:
3156:
3142:
3131:
3120:
3109:
3083:
3055:
3037:
3025:
3018:
2994:
2977:
2941:
2908:
2883:
2861:(1): 111â138.
2838:
2831:
2813:
2806:
2773:
2766:
2748:
2694:
2687:
2665:
2662:
2661:
2660:
2655:
2650:
2645:
2640:
2635:
2630:
2625:
2619:
2618:
2602:
2599:
2569:
2566:
2564:
2561:
2527:
2524:
2508:
2505:
2452:
2451:
2448:
2426:
2423:
2415:instant runoff
2382:
2379:
2371:Duverger's law
2355:
2352:
2350:
2347:
2345:
2342:
2338:D'Hondt method
2256:
2253:
2236:
2233:
2227:
2222:
2221:
2217:
2214:
2211:
2202:
2189:
2188:
2185:
2182:
2179:
2166:
2161:
2160:
2146:
2142:
2138:
2133:
2129:
2122:
2117:
2114:
2111:
2107:
2103:
2100:
2097:
2094:
2091:
2088:
2085:
2082:
2079:
2065:
2064:
2052:
2047:
2043:
2039:
2034:
2030:
2026:
2023:
2018:
2015:
2011:
2004:
2001:
1998:
1994:
1990:
1985:
1981:
1958:
1957:
1940:
1936:
1927:
1923:
1915:
1871:
1868:
1850:
1847:
1827:
1824:
1796:open primaries
1768:Duverger's law
1755:
1752:
1727:voters in the
1652:
1651:United Kingdom
1649:
1624:
1621:
1611:
1608:
1600:Zoran JankoviÄ
1583:
1580:
1558:
1555:
1539:Ohariu-Belmont
1517:
1514:
1501:Homeland Union
1477:Naujoji Vilnia
1470:, which has a
1463:
1460:
1447:
1444:
1411:
1408:
1387:
1384:
1350:
1347:
1339:Justin Trudeau
1327:vote splitting
1323:Stephen Harper
1321:government of
1278:government of
1268:Duverger's law
1263:
1260:
1258:
1255:
1193:
1192:
1143:
1141:
1134:
1128:
1125:
1124:
1123:
1114:
1104:
1096:
1092:
1070:
1045:
1038:instant-runoff
1020:
1009:
991:Turkey-raising
987:
971:
958:
955:
943:
936:Coombs' method
930:
916:Also affected:
913:
910:instant-runoff
896:
884:
877:Duverger's law
861:
826:
825:
784:
782:
775:
769:
766:
692:instant-runoff
675:
674:
672:
671:
664:
657:
649:
646:
645:
632:
631:
626:
625:
624:
623:
618:
613:
608:
600:
599:
595:
594:
593:
592:
587:
582:
577:
572:
567:
557:
555:and prevention
551:
550:
547:
546:
541:
540:
534:
533:
532:
531:
526:
521:
516:
514:Vote splitting
511:
506:
501:
496:
491:
481:
478:
477:
474:
473:
468:
467:
466:
465:
460:
458:Refused ballot
455:
450:
445:
440:
432:
431:
425:
424:
423:
422:
417:
412:
407:
402:
397:
387:
384:
383:
380:
379:
374:
373:
372:
371:
366:
361:
356:
351:
346:
341:
336:
331:
326:
318:
317:
311:
310:
309:
308:
303:
298:
293:
288:
283:
275:
274:
268:
267:
266:
265:
263:Usual judgment
260:
258:General ticket
255:
250:
245:
240:
232:
231:
223:
218:
217:
214:
213:
208:
207:
206:
205:
203:Voting machine
200:
195:
187:
186:
180:
179:
178:
177:
172:
167:
162:
157:
152:
147:
142:
137:
132:
124:
123:
119:
118:
117:
116:
111:
106:
101:
93:
92:
82:
81:
80:
79:
74:
69:
61:
60:
52:
49:
48:
45:
44:
36:
35:
29:
28:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
4436:
4425:
4422:
4420:
4417:
4415:
4414:Voting theory
4412:
4411:
4409:
4399:
4396:
4392:
4388:
4384:
4380:
4377:
4374:
4373:
4364:
4362:
4358:
4354:
4350:
4344:
4340:
4336:
4335:
4329:
4328:
4317:
4310:
4309:"Free Riding"
4303:
4287:
4280:
4262:
4255:
4240:
4236:
4232:
4228:
4224:
4220:
4216:
4209:
4201:
4197:
4191:
4183:
4179:
4175:
4173:9780262015134
4169:
4165:
4164:
4156:
4148:
4144:
4140:
4136:
4131:
4126:
4122:
4118:
4111:
4096:
4095:FairVote Blog
4092:
4085:
4077:
4073:
4069:
4065:
4061:
4057:
4053:
4049:
4045:
4041:
4037:
4030:
4022:
4018:
4014:
4010:
4006:
4002:
3998:
3994:
3990:
3983:
3972:
3968:
3961:
3954:
3946:
3942:
3938:
3934:
3930:
3926:
3922:
3915:
3907:
3901:
3897:
3893:
3889:
3882:
3880:
3871:
3867:
3863:
3859:
3855:
3851:
3844:
3840:
3834:
3826:
3822:
3818:
3814:
3809:
3804:
3800:
3796:
3792:
3788:
3781:
3774:
3759:
3755:
3748:
3733:
3729:
3725:
3721:
3714:
3707:
3694:
3690:
3689:
3684:
3677:
3669:
3665:
3661:
3657:
3652:
3647:
3643:
3639:
3635:
3628:
3613:
3609:
3603:
3587:
3583:
3577:
3569:
3565:
3558:
3542:
3538:
3533:
3526:
3511:
3507:
3501:
3499:
3482:
3478:
3477:
3472:
3465:
3457:
3453:
3446:
3438:
3434:
3429:
3424:
3420:
3416:
3412:
3408:
3404:
3397:
3388:
3380:
3376:
3370:
3362:
3358:
3351:
3343:
3339:
3332:
3316:
3312:
3306:
3290:
3286:
3280:
3264:
3260:
3254:
3246:
3239:
3231:
3225:
3217:
3211:
3203:
3197:
3189:
3183:
3175:
3169:
3160:
3152:
3146:
3140:
3135:
3129:
3124:
3118:
3113:
3098:
3094:
3087:
3072:
3068:
3067:
3059:
3051:
3047:
3041:
3032:
3030:
3021:
3015:
3011:
3007:
3006:
2998:
2991:
2987:
2981:
2962:
2955:
2948:
2946:
2926:
2919:
2912:
2901:
2900:
2892:
2890:
2888:
2880:
2876:
2872:
2868:
2864:
2860:
2856:
2849:
2842:
2834:
2828:
2824:
2817:
2809:
2803:
2799:
2795:
2791:
2790:
2782:
2780:
2778:
2769:
2763:
2759:
2752:
2737:
2733:
2729:
2725:
2721:
2717:
2713:
2709:
2705:
2698:
2690:
2684:
2680:
2679:
2671:
2667:
2659:
2658:Vote swapping
2656:
2654:
2651:
2649:
2646:
2644:
2643:Ranked voting
2641:
2639:
2636:
2634:
2631:
2629:
2626:
2624:
2621:
2620:
2616:
2610:
2605:
2598:
2595:
2593:
2592:Meek's method
2589:
2584:
2581:
2575:
2560:
2558:
2557:later-no-help
2554:
2553:later-no-harm
2550:
2546:
2542:
2538:
2533:
2523:
2520:
2514:
2504:
2501:
2496:
2494:
2490:
2489:
2484:
2480:
2476:
2471:
2467:
2464:
2460:
2456:
2449:
2446:
2442:
2441:
2440:
2436:
2432:
2422:
2420:
2419:participation
2416:
2412:
2408:
2407:bullet voting
2404:
2399:
2397:
2393:
2388:
2378:
2376:
2372:
2367:
2361:
2341:
2339:
2335:
2331:
2327:
2323:
2319:
2315:
2311:
2307:
2303:
2299:
2295:
2291:
2285:
2283:
2279:
2275:
2271:
2267:
2263:
2252:
2250:
2246:
2241:
2232:
2230:
2218:
2215:
2212:
2209:
2208:
2207:
2205:
2198:
2194:
2186:
2183:
2180:
2177:
2173:
2172:
2171:
2169:
2144:
2140:
2136:
2131:
2127:
2120:
2115:
2112:
2109:
2105:
2101:
2095:
2092:
2089:
2086:
2083:
2077:
2070:
2069:
2068:
2045:
2041:
2037:
2032:
2028:
2021:
2016:
2013:
2009:
2002:
1999:
1996:
1992:
1988:
1983:
1979:
1971:
1970:
1969:
1967:
1963:
1955:
1951:
1947:
1943:
1937:
1934:
1930:
1924:
1922:
1918:
1912:
1911:
1910:
1908:
1903:
1899:
1897:
1893:
1889:
1885:
1881:
1877:
1867:
1864:
1860:
1856:
1846:
1844:
1840:
1836:
1832:
1823:
1821:
1817:
1813:
1808:
1806:
1802:
1797:
1793:
1789:
1785:
1781:
1777:
1773:
1769:
1765:
1761:
1754:United States
1751:
1749:
1744:
1742:
1738:
1737:Conservatives
1734:
1730:
1726:
1721:
1718:
1716:
1712:
1707:
1703:
1698:
1696:
1691:
1689:
1685:
1680:
1677:
1675:
1671:
1666:
1662:
1658:
1648:
1646:
1642:
1638:
1634:
1630:
1620:
1618:
1607:
1605:
1601:
1597:
1593:
1589:
1579:
1576:
1572:
1568:
1564:
1554:
1552:
1548:
1544:
1540:
1536:
1532:
1527:
1523:
1513:
1510:
1506:
1503:'s candidate
1502:
1498:
1494:
1490:
1486:
1482:
1478:
1473:
1469:
1459:
1457:
1454:, during the
1453:
1443:
1441:
1437:
1433:
1429:
1425:
1421:
1417:
1407:
1405:
1400:
1397:
1393:
1381:
1377:
1372:
1367:
1362:
1358:
1356:
1346:
1344:
1340:
1336:
1332:
1331:2011 election
1328:
1324:
1320:
1316:
1311:
1308:
1304:
1300:
1296:
1295:2006 election
1292:
1287:
1285:
1281:
1277:
1273:
1269:
1254:
1252:
1249:party in the
1248:
1247:United Russia
1244:
1240:
1236:
1232:
1228:
1224:
1219:
1217:
1213:
1209:
1205:
1199:
1189:
1186:
1178:
1168:
1164:
1160:
1154:
1153:
1149:
1144:This section
1142:
1138:
1133:
1132:
1121:
1120:Random ballot
1118:
1115:
1112:
1108:
1105:
1101:
1097:
1093:
1090:
1086:
1085:
1084:bullet voting
1080:
1071:
1068:
1064:
1060:
1056:
1055:antiplurality
1052:
1049:
1046:
1043:
1039:
1035:
1031:
1027:
1024:
1023:Most affects:
1021:
1018:
1017:Party raiding
1014:
1010:
1007:
1006:
1001:
997:
988:
986:
982:
978:
975:
972:
969:
965:
962:
961:Most affects:
959:
956:
953:
944:
941:
940:antiplurality
937:
934:
931:
928:
924:
920:
917:
914:
911:
907:
903:
902:
897:
894:
889:
885:
882:
878:
874:
870:
866:
862:
859:
858:decapitation.
855:
854:
849:
845:
836:
835:
833:
822:
819:
811:
801:
797:
791:
790:
785:This section
783:
779:
774:
773:
765:
763:
759:
755:
751:
747:
743:
739:
734:
732:
728:
724:
720:
716:
711:
707:
705:
704:
699:
698:
693:
689:
685:
681:
670:
665:
663:
658:
656:
651:
650:
648:
647:
644:
639:
634:
633:
622:
619:
617:
614:
612:
611:Secret ballot
609:
607:
604:
603:
602:
601:
597:
596:
591:
588:
586:
583:
581:
578:
576:
573:
571:
568:
566:
563:
562:
561:
560:
554:
549:
548:
539:
538:Protest votes
536:
535:
530:
529:Voter turnout
527:
525:
524:Voter fatigue
522:
520:
517:
515:
512:
510:
507:
505:
502:
500:
497:
495:
492:
490:
487:
486:
485:
484:
476:
475:
464:
461:
459:
456:
454:
451:
449:
446:
444:
441:
439:
436:
435:
434:
433:
430:
429:Protest votes
427:
426:
421:
418:
416:
413:
411:
408:
406:
403:
401:
400:Fusion voting
398:
396:
393:
392:
391:
390:
382:
381:
370:
367:
365:
362:
360:
357:
355:
352:
350:
347:
345:
342:
340:
337:
335:
332:
330:
327:
325:
322:
321:
320:
319:
316:
313:
312:
307:
304:
302:
299:
297:
294:
292:
289:
287:
284:
282:
279:
278:
277:
276:
273:
270:
269:
264:
261:
259:
256:
254:
251:
249:
246:
244:
241:
239:
236:
235:
234:
233:
230:
227:
226:
221:
216:
215:
204:
201:
199:
196:
194:
191:
190:
189:
188:
185:
182:
181:
176:
173:
171:
168:
166:
163:
161:
160:Postal voting
158:
156:
155:Polling place
153:
151:
148:
146:
143:
141:
138:
136:
133:
131:
128:
127:
126:
125:
121:
120:
115:
112:
110:
107:
105:
102:
100:
97:
96:
95:
94:
91:
87:
84:
83:
78:
77:Sample ballot
75:
73:
70:
68:
65:
64:
63:
62:
59:
56:
55:
47:
46:
42:
38:
37:
34:
31:
30:
27:
23:
22:
19:
4398:VoteRoll.com
4391:the original
4386:
4353:the original
4333:
4315:
4302:
4290:. Retrieved
4279:
4267:. Retrieved
4254:
4242:. Retrieved
4222:
4218:
4208:
4162:
4155:
4120:
4110:
4098:. Retrieved
4094:
4084:
4043:
4039:
4029:
3996:
3992:
3982:
3971:the original
3966:
3953:
3928:
3924:
3914:
3887:
3853:
3850:Econometrica
3849:
3833:
3808:10419/221141
3790:
3786:
3773:
3761:. Retrieved
3757:
3747:
3735:. Retrieved
3724:The Guardian
3723:
3713:
3704:
3697:. Retrieved
3686:
3676:
3641:
3637:
3627:
3615:. Retrieved
3612:yougov.co.uk
3611:
3602:
3590:. Retrieved
3586:Coffee House
3585:
3576:
3567:
3557:
3545:. Retrieved
3536:
3525:
3513:. Retrieved
3509:
3485:. Retrieved
3481:the original
3474:
3464:
3455:
3451:
3445:
3410:
3406:
3396:
3387:
3379:the original
3369:
3360:
3350:
3344:(in Polish).
3341:
3331:
3319:. Retrieved
3314:
3305:
3293:. Retrieved
3288:
3279:
3267:. Retrieved
3262:
3253:
3238:
3224:
3210:
3196:
3182:
3168:
3159:
3145:
3134:
3123:
3112:
3100:. Retrieved
3096:
3086:
3074:. Retrieved
3065:
3058:
3049:
3040:
3004:
2997:
2989:
2980:
2968:. Retrieved
2961:the original
2932:. Retrieved
2925:the original
2911:
2898:
2878:
2858:
2854:
2841:
2822:
2816:
2788:
2757:
2751:
2739:. Retrieved
2711:
2707:
2697:
2677:
2670:
2596:
2587:
2585:
2577:
2535:
2516:
2497:
2486:
2479:Steven Brams
2472:
2468:
2461:
2457:
2453:
2438:
2400:
2394:
2390:
2363:
2334:wasted votes
2306:range voting
2286:
2258:
2242:
2238:
2225:
2223:
2200:
2196:
2190:
2164:
2162:
2066:
1965:
1961:
1959:
1953:
1949:
1945:
1938:
1932:
1925:
1920:
1913:
1906:
1904:
1900:
1873:
1858:
1852:
1829:
1809:
1757:
1745:
1722:
1719:
1699:
1692:
1681:
1678:
1654:
1626:
1613:
1585:
1560:
1519:
1509:Labour Party
1465:
1449:
1413:
1401:
1389:
1352:
1319:Conservative
1312:
1288:
1265:
1239:Smart Voting
1220:
1212:Labour Party
1206:, where the
1200:
1196:
1181:
1172:
1157:Please help
1145:
1127:Coordination
1116:
1111:Rated voting
1107:Most affects
1106:
1100:exaggerating
1088:
1082:
1078:
1063:score voting
1059:rated voting
1047:
1022:
1012:
1003:
999:
995:
973:
960:
932:
915:
898:
857:
852:
848:compromising
847:
843:
814:
805:
794:Please help
789:verification
786:
735:
731:score voting
708:
701:
696:
683:
679:
678:
606:Election ink
590:Voter caging
499:Likely voter
420:Vote pairing
395:Issue voting
193:Popular vote
175:Voting booth
140:Early voting
24:Part of the
18:
3617:12 December
3592:12 December
3458:(1): 58â60.
3428:10230/48115
3102:22 February
3076:22 February
2519:Borda count
2310:Borda count
2298:Monte Carlo
2270:Game theory
1831:Puerto Rico
1826:Puerto Rico
1780:Los Angeles
1706:Jeremy Hunt
1592:Janez JanĆĄa
1543:Peter Dunne
1516:New Zealand
1495:'s and the
1418:, with its
1378:instead of
1371:votez utile
1343:Green Party
1313:During the
1307:Jack Layton
1303:Paul Martin
1280:Mike Harris
1175:August 2024
1089:truncation.
1081:. Includes
1074:Compression
1000:pied-piper.
850:. Includes
719:median rule
717:(where the
580:Vote buying
463:Spoilt vote
443:Donkey vote
170:Vote center
150:Open ballot
4419:Psephology
4408:Categories
4318:(18): 2â8.
4130:2301.12075
4100:11 October
3763:3 February
3321:16 October
3295:8 November
3269:8 November
2664:References
2572:See also:
2530:See also:
2511:See also:
2429:See also:
2403:truncation
2385:See also:
2358:See also:
1792:Gray Davis
1784:Bill Simon
1665:Bruce Kent
1645:Kuomintang
1575:referendum
1535:Coromandel
1428:Hare quota
1368:invoking "
950:(includes
844:compromise
830:See also:
808:April 2024
738:party list
598:Prevention
438:Abstention
306:Spare vote
296:Party-list
130:Ballot box
122:Collection
104:Electorate
86:Candidates
4190:cite book
4182:707923182
4147:0034-4893
4060:1065-9129
4013:0002-8282
3945:154800908
3825:143828854
3732:0261-3077
3668:210896040
3660:0003-0554
3487:15 August
3437:143798201
3289:NZ Herald
3263:NZ Herald
3071:CBC Radio
2990:ABC News,
2875:0176-1714
2728:0176-1714
2526:Condorcet
2366:plurality
2344:By method
2249:primaries
2176:heuristic
2137:⋅
2106:∑
2038:−
2022:⋅
2000:≠
1993:∑
1880:Plurality
1816:Todd Akin
1741:safe seat
1713:, with a
1688:Sinn FĂ©in
1637:New Party
1619:above 5.
1468:Lithuania
1462:Lithuania
1440:Benny Tai
1426:with the
1416:Hong Kong
1410:Hong Kong
1237:, or the
1146:does not
1051:Plurality
1030:two-round
1002:Includes
981:two round
901:plurality
688:plurality
680:Strategic
50:Balloting
4269:14 March
4239:11379606
4123:: 1â19.
4076:14130949
4068:23056381
4021:23469618
3841:(1973).
3693:Archived
3541:Archived
2970:21 April
2934:21 April
2741:18 April
2736:43663746
2601:See also
2463:Balinski
2264:and the
2220:average.
1888:Approval
1814:boosted
1635:and the
1582:Slovenia
1335:Liberals
1208:Liberals
1079:leveling
1013:pushover
996:pushover
760:such as
727:approval
184:Counting
165:Precinct
4325:Sources
4292:6 March
4219:Science
3870:1914083
3817:2938959
3737:17 June
3699:24 June
3547:5 April
3515:5 April
3510:sky.com
3476:YouTube
2488:Science
2445:utility
1876:Myerson
1818:in the
1801:scandal
1700:In the
1693:In the
1663:helped
1655:In the
1627:In the
1561:In the
1452:Hungary
1446:Hungary
1386:Germany
1337:led by
1289:In the
1229:in the
1167:removed
1152:sources
1117:Immune:
1048:Immune:
1042:Coombs'
1005:raiding
974:Immune:
933:Immune:
762:Ireland
725:(where
58:Ballots
4383:"FAQs"
4345:
4244:10 May
4237:
4180:
4170:
4145:
4074:
4066:
4058:
4019:
4011:
3943:
3902:
3868:
3823:
3815:
3730:
3666:
3658:
3452:ć°çŁæżæČ»ćžć
3435:
3247:. RNZ.
3016:
2873:
2829:
2804:
2764:
2734:
2726:
2685:
2555:, and
2433:, and
2324:, and
1890:, and
1782:) and
1725:Labour
1715:YouGov
1623:Taiwan
1557:Poland
1491:, the
1422:using
1349:France
1262:Canada
1032:, and
947:Burial
758:STV-PR
114:Ticket
33:Voting
4312:(PDF)
4264:(PDF)
4125:arXiv
4072:S2CID
4064:JSTOR
4017:JSTOR
3974:(PDF)
3963:(PDF)
3941:S2CID
3866:JSTOR
3846:(PDF)
3821:S2CID
3813:JSTOR
3783:(PDF)
3664:S2CID
3433:S2CID
2964:(PDF)
2957:(PDF)
2928:(PDF)
2921:(PDF)
2903:(PDF)
2851:(PDF)
2732:JSTOR
1892:Range
1884:Borda
1610:Spain
1547:Epsom
1026:Borda
964:Borda
923:Score
919:Borda
912:(RCV)
198:Tally
109:Slate
4343:ISBN
4294:2011
4271:2016
4246:2024
4235:PMID
4200:link
4196:link
4178:OCLC
4168:ISBN
4143:ISSN
4102:2016
4056:ISSN
4009:ISSN
3900:ISBN
3765:2024
3739:2024
3728:ISSN
3701:2022
3656:ISSN
3619:2019
3594:2019
3549:2018
3517:2018
3489:2018
3323:2023
3297:2023
3271:2023
3104:2016
3078:2016
3014:ISBN
2972:2014
2936:2012
2871:ISSN
2827:ISBN
2802:ISBN
2762:ISBN
2743:2024
2724:ISSN
2683:ISBN
2578:The
2517:The
2481:and
1952:and
1762:and
1571:Sejm
1390:The
1353:The
1233:and
1231:2008
1150:any
1148:cite
1087:and
1065:and
1040:and
983:and
966:and
908:and
88:and
4227:doi
4223:292
4135:doi
4048:doi
4001:doi
3997:103
3933:doi
3892:doi
3858:doi
3803:hdl
3795:doi
3646:doi
3642:114
3423:hdl
3415:doi
3010:276
2863:doi
2794:doi
2716:doi
2473:In
2405:or
2243:In
1567:PiS
1551:ACT
1466:In
1450:In
1414:In
1161:by
998:or
871:or
846:or
798:by
729:or
706:).
700:or
690:or
682:or
4410::
4385:.
4337:.
4314:.
4233:.
4221:.
4217:.
4192:}}
4188:{{
4176:.
4141:.
4133:.
4119:.
4093:.
4070:.
4062:.
4054:.
4044:64
4042:.
4038:.
4015:.
4007:.
3995:.
3991:.
3965:.
3939:.
3929:32
3927:.
3923:.
3898:.
3878:^
3864:.
3854:41
3852:.
3848:.
3819:.
3811:.
3801:.
3791:87
3789:.
3785:.
3756:.
3726:.
3722:.
3703:.
3691:.
3685:.
3662:.
3654:.
3640:.
3636:.
3610:.
3584:.
3566:.
3535:.
3508:.
3497:^
3473:.
3456:13
3431:.
3421:.
3411:18
3409:.
3405:.
3359:.
3340:.
3313:.
3287:.
3261:.
3095:.
3048:.
3028:^
3012:.
2988:"
2944:^
2886:^
2877:.
2869:.
2859:42
2857:.
2853:.
2800:.
2776:^
2730:.
2722:.
2712:42
2710:.
2706:.
2594:.
2551:,
2547:,
2316:,
2312:,
2308:,
2228:ij
2203:ij
1941:ij
1886:,
1882:,
1807:.
1790:,
1743:.
1659:,
1253:.
1109::
1053:,
1008:.)
979:,
938:,
925:,
921:,
764:.
4296:.
4273:.
4248:.
4229::
4202:)
4184:.
4149:.
4137::
4127::
4104:.
4078:.
4050::
4023:.
4003::
3947:.
3935::
3908:.
3894::
3872:.
3860::
3827:.
3805::
3797::
3767:.
3741:.
3670:.
3648::
3621:.
3596:.
3570:.
3551:.
3519:.
3491:.
3439:.
3425::
3417::
3363:.
3325:.
3299:.
3273:.
3232:.
3218:.
3204:.
3190:.
3176:.
3153:.
3106:.
3080:.
3022:.
2974:.
2938:.
2865::
2835:.
2810:.
2796::
2770:.
2745:.
2718::
2691:.
2226:p
2201:p
2167:i
2165:v
2145:i
2141:R
2132:i
2128:v
2121:k
2116:1
2113:=
2110:i
2102:=
2099:)
2096:u
2093:,
2090:v
2087:,
2084:p
2081:(
2078:G
2051:)
2046:j
2042:u
2033:i
2029:u
2025:(
2017:j
2014:i
2010:p
2003:i
1997:j
1989:=
1984:i
1980:R
1966:i
1954:j
1950:i
1939:p
1933:i
1928:i
1926:u
1921:i
1916:i
1914:v
1907:k
1188:)
1182:(
1177:)
1173:(
1169:.
1155:.
1113:.
1091:)
1069:.
1044:.
970:.
954:)
942:.
929:.
860:)
821:)
815:(
810:)
806:(
792:.
668:e
661:t
654:v
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
