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140:), and granting of access by technical personnel charged with access control. All such linkages / controls have serious problems from a system design security perspective. Systems in which the key may not be changed easily are rendered especially vulnerable as the accidental release of the key will result in many devices becoming totally compromised, necessitating an immediate key change or replacement of the system.
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private, even when the information is held only under an affirmative legal obligation to protect it from unauthorized access. Another is technical concerns for the additional vulnerabilities likely to be introduced by supporting key escrow operations. Thus far, no key escrow system has been designed which meets both objections and nearly all have failed to meet even one.
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On a national level, key escrow is controversial in many countries for at least two reasons. One involves mistrust of the security of the structural escrow arrangement. Many countries have a long history of less than adequate protection of others' information by assorted organizations, public and
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151:, where users are required to surrender keys upon demand by law enforcement, or else face legal penalties. Key disclosure law avoids some of the technical issues and risks of key escrow systems, but also introduces new risks like loss of keys and legal issues such as involuntary
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Abelson, Harold; Anderson, Ross; Bellovin, Steven M.; Benaloh, Josh; Blaze, Matt; Diffie, Whitfield; Gilmore, John; Green, Matthew; Landau, Susan; Neumann, Peter G.; Rivest, Ronald L. (2015-11-17).
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to the intended recipient and at least one third party. The third party should be permitted access only under carefully controlled conditions, as for instance, a
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may gain access to those keys. These third parties may include businesses, who may want access to employees' secure business-related
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Key escrow is proactive, anticipating the need for access to keys; a retroactive alternative is
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CIA memo to Al Gore on suggested US policy on key recovery, 11. September 1996. Archived from
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The technical problem is a largely structural one. Access to protected
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so that, under certain circumstances, an authorized
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223:Journal of Cybersecurity
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226:: tyv009.
200:References
87:Key escrow
252:2057-2085
99:encrypted
64:June 2019
291:Category
194:Backdoor
163:See also
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103:escrow
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