197:. Yet the war was almost always described in conventional terms. The media also attempted to cover events in an episodic fashion, devoting time to the week's most intriguing battle, but the war rarely occurred in an episodic manner with actions taking place sporadically across South Vietnam. MACOI officials in charge of gathering information relied upon direct sources in the field that could often be inaccurate, incomplete, or simply unavailable. Additionally, the war was so complex and confusing that most reporters did not know what questions to ask, whereas those who did frequently skipped the briefings and pursued their own sources.
211:
our ultimate weapon". Nevertheless, the typical consensus of the organization changed drastically following the
American withdrawal. Even the former director Barry Zorthian questioned JUSPAO's success in Vietnam, further expounding on his thoughts by theorizing that the USIS has done little to learn from their mistakes since the 1970s. On the other hand, the Five O'clock Follies hosted by JUSPAO had an undeniable consequence on the war. During the American escalation in the late 1960s, the claims of victory presented in the briefings were taken at face value and rarely scrutinized. After the
185:" due to their inaccurate reported body counts, general atmosphere of confusion and numerous difficulties experienced in the presentation of the supposedly detailed information. Other issues and concerns with JUSPAO's briefings were numerous. The focus on American activities in South Vietnam essentially placed blinders on the press and public who rarely learned of allied operations. If maneuvers executed by the
165:
was often criticized during the war, but JUSPAO and
Zorthian attempted to work as closely as possible with military personnel. The director and officers formed relationships that allowed for a flow of information and advice between the two branches, however, the daily briefings held at JUSPAO would emphasize the issues that surrounded the operations of the USIS in Vietnam.
210:
touted the information program's merits in front of his colleagues on
Capitol Hill. The congressman stated, "The real war however, is being fought not for the bodies but the minds of the Vietcong. The work of JUSPAO is no less significant because it receives so little recognition. In my opinion it is
177:
under the direction of Barry
Zorthian. Army colonels trained in public relations passed out summaries of the meetings and pointed to colored charts to impress journalists with the United States' achievements. By 1967, JUSPAO had established itself as one of the main sources of news that the press had
168:
The JUSPAO began to host daily briefings updating the
American and foreign press on the progress of the war. These meetings occurred every day at 4:45pm and were hosted by the Military Assistance Command Office of Information (MACOI). After 1966 all of the briefings were held in the JUSPAO auditorium
164:
for political actions, MACV for military aspects, USAID for economic support, the
Mission Press Center for media relations, and finally JUSPAO for psychological programs. Daily operations required constant, complete, and detailed collaboration between the various agencies, which was a feature that
99:
Zorthian's official title was the United States
Mission Coordinator for Psychological Operations with responsibilities including developing PSYOP guidance for all elements of the United States military in South Vietnam. The intended purpose of JUSPAO was not just to de-conflict and coordinate the
159:
The United States government quickly enlisted JUSPAO to achieve its ambitions in
Southeast Asia, which determined to defend and build a nation through the complete integration of the military, political, economic, and psychological dimensions of action. The other agencies were the
178:
access to. Since the topics discussed were under close supervision of the government, military setbacks encountered by
American troops and operations by South Vietnamese forces received seldom mention, while Vietcong and PAVN losses were frequently exaggerated.
92:, was designated as the initial Director of JUSPAO. Zorthian had experience working with the USIA in the Asian mainland as he previously served as the deputy director of the USIS in New Delhi, India and worked as a scriptwriter and program manager for the
189:(ARVN) did merit acknowledgment, it was often done so in a negative fashion. Another problem came from the inherent issue of words and phrases that the media and public expected such as "lines", "fronts", and "advances". The war, much of which was
155:
also joined the PSYOPs program during the war when it created four separate psychological operation battalions, each of which possessed its own printing plant, photographic and tape recording production equipment, and loudspeaker trucks.
223:, even treated the Five O'clock Follies as the U.S. Army's PSYOP program against the press and public. Instead of attending the Follies, Herr and many other journalists tracked down their own stories with soldiers in the field.
205:
JUSPAO operated in South
Vietnam until 1972, but its general effectiveness is debated. During the war, many believed JUSPAO had an undeniable contribution to the American war effort. In the spring of 1966 Utah congressman
100:
activities of various involved agencies, but also to play the overall PSYOP strategy that would be followed. JUSPAO's official goal was to build on anti-communist nationalism throughout Indochina in support of the
79:
and recommended that he integrate all foreign information and PSYOP activities into a single office. The president would soon approve this recommendation, combining the United States Information Service (USIS),
56:. The USIS, the overseas component of the USIA, sought to foster a sympathetic understanding of American culture abroad and to build public support for U.S. foreign policy in other nations around the world.
449:
190:
151:
often handed out pro-American brochures during routine searched of merchant ships, and the USIA and JUSPAO filled available airwaves with anti-communist radio broadcasts. The
123:
In conjunction with several other USIA branches, the JUSPAO conducted an enormous amount of PSYOPS during the Vietnam War. Most of their operations aimed to win the "
494:
88:(USAID). The Joint United States Public Affairs Office was officially created on 14 May 1965 in United States Embassy Instruction 186. The USIS Director in Vietnam,
367:
News Policies in Vietnam: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, Eighty Ninth Congress, Second Session on News Policies in Vietnam
85:
457:
396:
Andrade, Dale. "Westmoreland was right: learning the wrong lessons from the Vietnam War." Small Wars & Insurgencies 19, no. 2 (2008): 145-181.
72:
68:
324:
215:, though, reporters lost faith in the official pronouncements released by JUSPAO and MACOI. Members of the media, including
81:
424:
282:
249:
49:
33:
29:
186:
48:
The United States Information Agency (USIA) had several integral components, one of the most important being the
417:
Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond
108:
76:
124:
182:
128:
25:
499:
8:
161:
152:
148:
430:
420:
370:
330:
320:
288:
278:
255:
245:
194:
71:
respectively, observed the many difficulties and inefficiencies of the uncoordinated
64:
93:
37:
275:
Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th Psyop Group in Vietnam
193:, rarely had any clearly defined "fronts" or "lines", excepting battles like the
369:. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1966. p. 72.
89:
488:
434:
334:
292:
212:
207:
136:
132:
105:
259:
374:
216:
53:
450:"Capturing the Lessons of Counterinsurgency: A Word from Barry Zorthian"
60:
170:
101:
144:
112:
181:
Reporters quickly began to refer to these daily briefings as the "
36:
efforts, JUSPAO provided direction for a range of public affairs,
28:
support in South Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. Involving military,
174:
67:, the Director of the United States Information Agency and the
317:
In Country: The Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War
140:
24:) was a multi-agency organization that provided integrated
75:, also known as "PSYOPs". The officials reached out to
127:" of the Vietnamese people. Between 1965 and 1972 the
244:. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. p. 554.
86:United States Agency for International Development
495:Defunct agencies of the United States government
486:
131:dropped approximately 50 million leaflets over
59:During a visit to South Vietnam in March 1965,
43:
419:. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. p. 18.
319:. New York: Metro Books. pp. 473–474.
18:Joint United States Public Affairs Office
414:
487:
447:
272:
239:
314:
448:Bishop, Donald M. (30 April 2005).
82:Military Assistance Command Vietnam
13:
14:
511:
50:United States Information Service
472:
441:
408:
399:
242:Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War
187:Army of the Republic of Vietnam
162:United States Embassy in Saigon
390:
381:
359:
350:
341:
308:
299:
277:. Pickle Partners Publishing.
266:
233:
115:in order to end the conflict.
40:and psychological operations.
1:
226:
118:
200:
7:
415:Kodosky, Robert J. (2007).
273:Barger, Michael G. (2014).
240:Kutler, Stanley I. (1996).
77:President Lyndon B. Johnson
10:
516:
44:Designation and objectives
104:or break the will of the
65:General Harold K. Johnson
454:Public Diplomacy Council
315:Olson, James S. (2008).
109:People's Army of Vietnam
73:psychological operations
129:United States Air Force
26:Information Operations
30:US Information Agency
183:Five O'Clock Follies
460:on 20 December 2016
69:Army Chief of Staff
149:United States Navy
52:(USIS) during the
326:978-1-4351-1184-4
195:Siege of Khe Sanh
102:Chieu Hoi Program
507:
479:
476:
470:
469:
467:
465:
456:. Archived from
445:
439:
438:
412:
406:
403:
397:
394:
388:
385:
379:
378:
363:
357:
354:
348:
345:
339:
338:
312:
306:
303:
297:
296:
270:
264:
263:
237:
125:hearts and minds
106:North Vietnamese
94:Voice of America
84:(MACV), and the
38:public diplomacy
34:State Department
515:
514:
510:
509:
508:
506:
505:
504:
485:
484:
483:
482:
477:
473:
463:
461:
446:
442:
427:
413:
409:
404:
400:
395:
391:
386:
382:
365:
364:
360:
355:
351:
347:Olson, 473–474.
346:
342:
327:
313:
309:
304:
300:
285:
271:
267:
252:
238:
234:
229:
203:
121:
46:
12:
11:
5:
513:
503:
502:
497:
481:
480:
471:
440:
425:
407:
398:
389:
380:
358:
349:
340:
325:
307:
298:
283:
265:
250:
231:
230:
228:
225:
202:
199:
191:unconventional
120:
117:
90:Barry Zorthian
45:
42:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
512:
501:
498:
496:
493:
492:
490:
475:
459:
455:
451:
444:
436:
432:
428:
426:9780739121399
422:
418:
411:
402:
393:
384:
376:
372:
368:
362:
353:
344:
336:
332:
328:
322:
318:
311:
302:
294:
290:
286:
284:9781782896876
280:
276:
269:
261:
257:
253:
251:0-13-276932-8
247:
243:
236:
232:
224:
222:
218:
214:
213:Tet Offensive
209:
208:David S. King
198:
196:
192:
188:
184:
179:
176:
172:
166:
163:
157:
154:
150:
146:
142:
138:
137:South Vietnam
134:
133:North Vietnam
130:
126:
116:
114:
110:
107:
103:
97:
95:
91:
87:
83:
78:
74:
70:
66:
62:
57:
55:
51:
41:
39:
35:
31:
27:
23:
19:
478:Kutler, 195.
474:
462:. Retrieved
458:the original
453:
443:
416:
410:
401:
392:
387:Kutler, 195.
383:
366:
361:
352:
343:
316:
310:
301:
274:
268:
241:
235:
220:
217:Michael Herr
204:
180:
167:
158:
122:
98:
58:
47:
21:
17:
15:
500:Vietnam War
405:Olson, 200.
111:(PAVN) and
54:Vietnam War
489:Categories
464:8 December
227:References
119:Operations
61:Carl Rowan
435:163625200
335:317495523
293:923354341
201:Aftermath
171:Rex Hotel
260:32970270
145:Cambodia
113:Vietcong
375:2224580
221:Esquire
169:at the
96:(VOA).
433:
423:
373:
356:Barger
333:
323:
305:Barger
291:
281:
258:
248:
175:Saigon
147:, the
143:, and
22:JUSPAO
466:2016
431:OCLC
421:ISBN
371:OCLC
331:OCLC
321:ISBN
289:OCLC
279:ISBN
256:OCLC
246:ISBN
153:Army
141:Laos
63:and
32:and
16:The
219:of
173:in
491::
452:.
429:.
329:.
287:.
254:.
139:,
135:,
468:.
437:.
377:.
337:.
295:.
262:.
20:(
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.