31:
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assured the German people that the Soviet Union would be crushed well before the onset of winter, but that, in fact, did not happen, and there was little in the way of good news. The timing of the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor enabled Hitler to angle his planned speech to the Reichstag in a more positive fashion, squeezing as much propaganda value out of it as possible. Hitler, in fact, put off the speech – and the declaration of war – for several days, trying to arrive at the proper psychological moment to make the announcement. Still, the propaganda motive was hardly sufficient to justify declaring war on the US, especially considering that doing so would create an otherwise "unnatural alliance" between two disparate and heretofore antagonistic polities, the United States and the Soviet Union.
288:
320:, postponing the declaration for 24 hours to give himself time to prepare. A further meeting with Goebbels on 10 December finalised the planning, although Hitler had yet to work on his speech. The time selected was 3:00 pm, as it was a convenient time for German radio listeners and the broadcast could be received in Tokyo at 10:00 pm and in Washington DC at 8:00 am. Ribbentrop telephoned the German ambassador in Rome, asking him to contact Mussolini and ensure that Italy's declaration of war be coordinated with that of Germany. Meanwhile, there was considerable diplomatic activity to ensure that the amendments to the Tripartite Pact requested by the Japanese government be concluded; the Germans requested that the Japanese ambassador,
703:, Roosevelt had pledged that America would be the "arsenal of democracy" to forestall Axis domination in Europe. German attacks on American shipping – which came after a period in which U-boats were ordered to avoid doing so whenever possible – began well before the German declaration of war meant that American naval ships inevitably became involved in conflicts with German ones. Ribbentrop expressed the opinion that great powers do not wait to have war declared on them, and it may have seemed to Hitler – ignorant as he was of strains in the Anglo-American relationship – that the United States, as a near-belligerent, might formally declare war on Germany in any case.
563:
640:, who was told about the decision to widen the war when he returned from a month's leave, was astounded by Hitler's "cluelessness" about the military potential of the United States, and saw it as an example of Hitler's "dilettante approach and his limited knowledge of foreign countries". Nor had Hitler ordered the preparations necessary for such a decision or taken into account any logistical considerations. He may have seen a strategic advantage in the U.S. presumably being primarily engaged in responding to the Pearl Harbor attack, while German U-boats were unleashed on American shipping in the Atlantic, thereby severing the life-line of supplies to the UK, but he had not given Admiral
740:, led to the assumption that war between them was inevitable. As such, the decision was made to use the attack as a rationale for an official declaration of war in order to drive Britain out of the conflict by widening submarine operations and directly attacking U.S. commercial shipping. While Hitler's declaration of war against the United States eventually led to his downfall, initially it seemed successful in its objective of more effectively cutting Britain's supply lines, as the U.S. military's lack of tactics, equipment, and procedures for fighting U-boats caused 1942 to be the most devastating year of the war for shipping losses; the war declaration enabled the
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threat in the
Pacific. Hitler had, in fact, committed Germany to fight the United States while in the midst of a war of extermination against the Soviet Union, and without having first defeated Britain, instead of taking the option of putting off a conflict with the U.S. for as long as possible, forcing it to concentrate on the war in the Pacific against Japan, and making it much more difficult for it to become involved in the European war. At least to some extent he had held in his hands the power to control the timing of the intervention of the United States, and instead, by declaring war against America, he freed Roosevelt and Churchill to act as they saw fit.
296:
enemies
Germany was fighting, but Hitler dismissed this concern as not being essential to the outcome of the war, and, almost entirely without consultation, declared war against the United States. Hitler sought to preempt what he believed was an imminent declaration of war by Roosevelt, even though Roosevelt had not planned to declare war on Germany. In general, the Nazi hierarchy held low regard for the military resolve of the U.S. under Roosevelt, a stance that is widely considered a major error in their strategic thinking. In their eyes the United States was a corrupt, decadent, Jewish-dominated nation weakened by its large populations of
836:
November to the Danish and
Croatian Foreign Ministers "If one day the German nation is no longer sufficiently strong or sufficiently ready to sacrifice to stake its own blood for its existence, then let it perish and be annihilated by some other stronger power ... In that case I shall shed no tears for the German nation." Haffner comments "Was the declaration of war on America the first hint that Hitler had inwardly changed gear? Had he decided that if he could not go down in history as the greatest conqueror he would at least be the architect of the greatest catastrophe?" (p.120)
736:
believed that the United States was effectively acting as a belligerent in the conflict, given actions such as Lend-Lease of supplies to
Britain to sustain their war effort in the face of German aggression, President Roosevelt's public statements, the deployment of American soldiers and Marines to Iceland, and U.S. Navy escorts of convoys across the Atlantic, which sometimes came into contact with U-boats; these acts, as well as America's previous intervention in
99:
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Furthermore, throughout his life, Hitler had always gambled and won on the "long shot", betting everything on a single roll of the dice. Doing so had served him well up to this point, but his lack of information about the US and his ideological preconceptions about it made this particular choice a very poor one, unlikely to come up in Hitler's favor. From the historical perspective, however, his choice looks like a desperate act.
751:, who feared the possibility of two parallel but disconnected wars – the UK and Soviet Union versus Germany in Europe, and the US and the British Empire versus Japan in the Far East and the Pacific. With Nazi Germany's declaration against the United States in effect, American assistance for Britain in both theaters of war as a full ally was assured. It also simplified matters for the American government, as
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Puttkamer, blind to the realization that this power could be projected across the
Atlantic, he gained renewed confidence in a victorious outcome to the war. His generals suffered from the same land-locked hallucination: his entire headquarters staff gave themselves up to "an ecstasy of rejoicing"; the few who saw further "became even lonelier". Naval officers saw no more clearly than the generals.
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only in luxury and living the "good life" while dancing, drinking and enjoying "negrofied" music. Such a country, in Hitler's mind, would never be willing to make the economic and human sacrifices necessary to threaten
National Socialist Germany – and thus set the stage for a dangerously inaccurate view of the very nation that Hitler had stated in his unpublished
339:" broadcasts in which he said the American people should "Remember always that Germany and Italy, regardless of any formal declaration of war, consider themselves at war with the United States at this moment just as much as they consider themselves at war with Britain or Russia". Churchill spoke in the
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One advantage which the declaration of war against the U.S. provided for Hitler was as a propaganda diversion for the German public, to distract them from the state of the war against the Soviet Union, in which
Germany had suffered severe setbacks and an unexpectedly prolonged engagement. Hitler had
759:
When Pearl Harbor happened, we were desperate. ... We were all in agony. The mood of the
American people was obvious – they were determined that the Japanese had to be punished. We could have been forced to concentrate all our efforts on the Pacific, unable from then on to give
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From the perspective of the
American administration, the United States was obliged to assist a fellow democracy in her struggle against Fascist aggression in Europe, which necessitated material and financial support, short of war, to both the British Empire and the Soviet Union. This provoked heated
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Hitler's lack of knowledge about the US and its industrial and demographic capacity for mounting a war on two fronts also entered into his decision. As early as mid-March 1941 – nine months before the Japanese attack – President Roosevelt was acutely aware of Hitler's
307:
American public opinion swung heavily against Germany after Pearl Harbor, which was believed to be inspired by or organized by Germany. A 10 December Gallup poll (after Pearl Harbor but before the German declaration of war) found that 90% of Americans answered "Yes" to the question "Should President
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It was also the case that from the German point of view, the United States was practically a belligerent already. Roosevelt had come as close to entering the war as a neutral power could possibly come, and perhaps had crossed over the line as well. For over a year, the U.S. had been providing large
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in June 1941. Indeed, Hitler had confided to the Japanese ambassador "ne should strike – as hard as possible – and not waste time declaring war." The prospect of a worldwide war also underscored Hitler's tendency towards grandiose thinking, and reinforced his feeling
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on the morning of 11 December, saying that "Not only the British Empire now but the United States are fighting for life; Russia is fighting for life, and China is fighting for life. Behind these four great combatant communities are ranged all the free spirit and hopes of all the conquered countries
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Hillgruber (1981), p.95. Quote: "Hitler's declaration of war on the United States ... was not an objective foreign policy move. ... Rather, it was a gesture designed to conceal the fact that he could no longer control the direction of the war ... His admission ... on January 3,
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Regardless of Hitler's reasons for the declaration, the decision is generally seen as an enormous strategic blunder on his part, as it allowed the United States to enter the European war in support of the United Kingdom and the Allies without much public opposition, while still facing the Japanese
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publicly declared that he had ordered the American Navy and Air Force to shoot on sight at any German war vessel. In his speech of October 27, 1941, he once more expressly affirmed that this order was in force. Acting under this order, vessels of the American Navy, since early September 1941, have
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of Germany, was one of the most powerful and notorious dictators of the 20th century. The course of relations between Germany and the United States had deteriorated since the beginning of World War II, inevitably so given the increasing cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom.
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Another factor was that Hitler's deeply-held racial prejudices made him see the US as a decadent bourgeois democracy filled with people of mixed race, a population heavily under the influence of Jews and "Negroes", with no history of authoritarian discipline to control and direct them, interested
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There was also a motivation linked to Hitler's own psychology. At a time when the Wehrmacht had just been forced by the Red Army and the Russian winter to move to the defense in the invasion of Russia, Hitler may have wanted to show by declaring war that he was still the master of the situation.
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Haffner speculates that the decision may have marked the beginning of Hitler's ultimate position that if the German people did not have sufficient "will" to win the war, then they deserved to go down in absolute ruin. He cites the recent setbacks on the Eastern Front, and Hitler's remarks on 27
586:
While Hitler's alleged reasons for declaring war against the United States were numerous, he was not obliged by treaty to support Japan except if it was directly attacked by a third party, and was inspired to respond promptly because of his enthusiasm for Japan's decisive surprise attack, which
735:
From the point of view of Hitler and much of the German political and military elite, declaring war against the U.S. in response to the Pearl Harbor attack was a calculated risk in fighting the U.S. before they were prepared to effectively defend themselves. By that time, the German leadership
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policy had also been adopted one year before, in September 1939. While these policies inevitably strained diplomacy between the two nations, American relations with Germany had deteriorated for years, particularly after the withdrawal of the American ambassador to Germany in 1938 following the
295:
According to the terms of their agreements, Germany was obliged to come to the aid of Japan if a third country attacked Japan, but not if Japan attacked a third country. Ribbentrop reminded Hitler of this, and noted that a declaration of war against the United States would add to the number of
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As late as 24 February 1945, Hitler spoke of the "vast territory" of the United States in America, "ample to absorb the energies of all their people", as the model which he hoped to emulate for Germany in Europe, "to ensure for her complete economic independence inside a territory of a size
771:
characterizes Hitler's decision to declare war on the US when he was not required to as " typical Hitler forward move, attempting to seize the initiative ... ut it was a move from weakness, not strength. And it was more irrational than any strategic decision taken to that date." In his
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The news came as a surprise to Hitler although he knew of their intention to attack somewhere at some time and had made up his mind to support them if they attacked the United States. Now frivolously disregarding the huge financial and productive power of America and, according to ... von
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656:, and the rapidly progressing efforts of the Americans' industrial capacity before and through 1941 to start providing its armed forces with the ordnance, combat aircraft and ships that would be required to defeat the Axis as a whole, the US was already well on the path to a complete
691:' and race held the key to his image of the United States. To Hitler the United States was a country with a white 'Nordic' racial core, to which he attributed its economic success and standard of living, and in which he saw a model for his vision of German 'living space' in Europe.
600:
I can only be grateful to Providence that it entrusted me with the leadership in this historic struggle which, for the next five hundred or a thousand years, will be described as decisive, not only for the history of Germany, but for the whole of Europe and indeed the whole
516:, with a speech lasting for 88 minutes in which he listed German successes to date. The second part of the speech was devoted to an attack on Roosevelt and "the Anglo-Saxon Jewish-capitalist world", concluding that "In the 2,000 years of German history known to us, our
767:, one of Hitler's biographers, has argued that Hitler's decision was "really no longer an act of his own volition, but a gesture governed by a sudden awareness of his own impotence. That gesture was Hitler's last strategic initiative of any importance." Historian
264:, at the beginning of December that relations between the United States and the Japanese Empire had deteriorated to a point where hostilities were imminent. He was thereafter instructed to ask Germany for a commitment to declare war under the terms of the
782:
said of Hitler's decision "There is to this day no comprehensible rational explanation for what one is tempted to describe as an act of lunacy. ... Even viewed as an act of desperation his declaration of war on America really does not make sense."
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debate in the United States, but most Americans supported aid, not necessarily direct American involvement. The re-election of Roosevelt in 1940 also emboldened him to pursue further sustained aid to the United Kingdom, given he had already approved the
284:. This agreement, drafted on 4 December, committed the primary Axis powers to go to war with the United States in the event of hostilities with Japan, and essentially superseded the Tripartite Pact as an offensive, rather than defensive, alliance.
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more than purely peripheral help to Britain. It was truly astounding when Hitler declared war on us three days later. I cannot tell you our feelings of triumph. It was a totally irrational thing for him to do, and I think it saved Europe.
280:: that if Japan became embroiled in a war with the United States, Germany would, naturally, enter the war on Japan's side. When the Japanese asked for a written assurance of this, Hitler complied, with express consent from
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had either been asked or given". It is likely that if they had been asked, the military leadership would have advised against expanding the war, given the extent of the crisis on the Eastern Front. Hitler's
260:, heralding a war between Japan and the United States. Japan had not informed its ally, Germany, in advance of the attack, although the Japanese ambassador had communicated to the German Foreign Minister,
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on the morning of 11 December asking them to declare war on Germany and Italy; meeting at noon, the motion passed through both houses without dissent, although there were some abstentions. Vice President
434:, the Government of the United States from initial violations of neutrality has finally proceeded to open acts of war against Germany. The Government of the United States has thereby virtually created a
1187:
687:
The economic potential and racial composition of America had implications for Hitler's own ideological construct, indeed, how he saw Germany's current problems and future hopes. His central ideas of '
668:. With German troops on the outskirts of Moscow, Hitler may also have counted on a quick defeat of the Soviet Union making available German economic and military resources tied up in that invasion.
102:
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from the British, believing that doing so would not only harm the British cause, but would also serve to help keep the U.S. out of the war. On 28 November 1941, Ribbentrop confirmed to
577:, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor actually buoyed Hitler's assurance in winning the war, and improved morale among the high leadership of the armed forces. Peter Padfield writes:
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in favor of the adversaries of Germany and having continually been guilty of the most severe provocations toward Germany ever since the outbreak of the European war, provoked by the
1493:
505:, the head of the Division of European Affairs. In Berlin, there was consternation that Mussolini had decided to preempt Hitler and declare war in a speech from the balcony at the
1153:
1239:
145:, following two days of consultation. It has been referred to as Hitler's "most puzzling" decision of World War II. Publicly, the formal declaration was made to American
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in Europe ... It would indeed bring shame upon our generation if we did not teach them a lesson which will not be forgotten in the records of a thousand years".
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has never been more unified and united than it is today". On the same day, German ambassadors in the capitals of the other Tripartite Pact signatories;
1814:
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Although Germany on her part has strictly adhered to the rules of international law in her relations with the United States during every period of the
420:
Furthermore, the naval forces of the United States, under order of their Government and contrary to international law have treated and seized German
1835:
316:
Hitler arrived in Berlin on Tuesday 9 December and met with Goebbels at midday, when he disclosed his intention to declare war in a speech to the
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in 1940, American public opinion towards Germany had become increasingly hostile, particularly after Roosevelt won another election term in 1940.
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which had developed between the two countries had put a strain on relations between the United States, still technically a neutral country, and
501:. On their arrival however, Hull refused to see the German delegation and it was not until 9:30 that they were able to pass their note to
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30:
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664:" for itself and its allies. Hitler, however, was dismissive of the military power of the United States, a view that was shared by
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to offer counsel. Jodl, who was Hitler's chief military advisor on operation planning, and his immediate second in charge, General
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Declaring war on the United States for having "having violated ... all rules of neutrality in favor of the adversaries of Germany"
792:
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340:
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215:. United States warships escorting American supply vessels bound for the United Kingdom were already engaged in an undeclared
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The Government of the United States having violated in the most flagrant manner and in ever increasing measure all rules of
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The essence of Ribbentrop's comment to Morris, without the descriptive commentary, is confirmed by Bloch, Michael (1992)
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360:'s office where Ribbentrop read Morris the formal declaration; the meeting lasted from 2:18 to 2:21 pm. The text was:
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compatible with her population", adding that "a great people has need of broad acres". Genoud, Francois, ed. (1961).
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which prevented direct involvement in the war, brought the U.S. to push hard against the traditional boundaries of
896:
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to prevent the Axis domination of Europe. By 1941, much of the Neutrality Acts had largely been repealed by the
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declared war against the United States, in response to what was claimed to be a "series of provocations" by the
649:
569:'s signing of the declaration of war against Germany, the response of the United States to Hitler's declaration
379:
245:, allowing Roosevelt more freedom to pursue further aid for Britain without legal impediments. Even before the
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Germany too, as from today, considers herself as being in a state of war with the United States of America.
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684:, 1928) would be the Third Reich's most serious challenge beyond his intended defeat of the Soviet Union.
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any advance notification so he could position his U-boats to take maximum advantage of the new situation.
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bearing aid. Roosevelt's desire to help the British, despite the objections of the influential American
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at 2:45 pm; an estimated crowd of 100,000 gathered to hear his speech which lasted only four minutes.
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that he was a figure of historic proportions. As he said in his declaration speech to the Reichstag:
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466:, a diplomat who worked with Morris, after reading the declaration, Ribbentrop screamed at Morris,
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623:, later recalled that it "was another entirely independent decision on which no advice from the
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with the United States of America and declares that under these circumstances brought about by
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472:("Your President has wanted this war, now he has it"), turned on his heels and left the room.
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498:
406:
276:, the Japanese ambassador to Germany, what Hitler himself had told Japanese foreign minister
1576:. Translated by Ewald Osers. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp.117–18.
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amounts of economic aid to Britain and the Soviet Union in the form of loans and credit and
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arrived at the White House with the declaration, which was signed by Roosevelt at 3:00 pm.
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8:
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Whatever consultations Hitler sought for his decision, he did not invite anyone from the
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Documents on German Foreign Policy - Series D - Volume XIII - June 23 - December 11 1941
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826:. London. p. 88. For problems with this source, see Kershaw (2000), n.121, pp. 1024–25.
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435:
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1941 German war declaration in response to alleged provocations from the United States
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hand-over of military control of Iceland from the United Kingdom to the United States
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1942, that he did 'not yet' know 'how America could be defeated' speaks for itself."
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should that occur. Hitler and Ribbentrop had been urging Japan to attack and seize
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542:, were instructed to obtain their declarations of war against the United States.
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The Testament of Adolf Hitler: The Hitler–Bormann Documents, February–April 1945
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The Testament of Adolf Hitler. The Hitler–Bormann Documents, February–April 1945
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on September 3, 1939, has finally resorted to open military acts of aggression.
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At 3:00 pm, Hitler addressed the 855 deputies of the Reichstag gathered in the
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Roosevelt have asked Congress to declare war on Germany, as well as on Japan?"
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Britain and the United States were already aware of German intentions through
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Hitler's declaration of war came as a great relief to British Prime Minister
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Closeup of Hitler as war is declared upon the United States, 11 December 1941
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1024:"Hitler Attacks Pearl Harbor: Why the United States Declared War on Germany"
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signals intelligence and on 9 December, Roosevelt gave one of his national "
162:, with Germany's action having eliminated any remaining meaningful domestic
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1117:"German Declaration of War with the United States : December 11, 1941"
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Accept, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, the expression of my high consideration.
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1335:. Translated by Chase, Jefferson. New York: Knopf. pp. 221–222.
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1486:"What If Hitler Never Declared War on the U.S. During World War II?"
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Adolf Hitler, the leader of the NSDAP (Nazi Party), chancellor, and
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Russia's Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II
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The German Government therefore establishes the following facts:
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Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940-1941
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405:, have opened fire on German submarines according to plan. The
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413:, himself confirmed that American destroyers attacked German
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systematically attacked German naval forces. Thus, American
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Adolf Hitler's Declaration of War against the United States
469:"Ihr Präsident hat diesen Krieg gewollt; jetzt hat er ihn"
1664:. Profiles in Power. Harlow, England: Pearson Education.
1236:"Hitler's Speech Declaring War Against the United States"
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Gallup Vault: U.S. Opinion and the Start of World War II
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On 7 December 1941, Japanese forces launched a surprise
1011:"Unsurpassed: The Popular Appeal of Franklin Roosevelt"
123:
United States declaration of war against Imperial Japan
1763:
Smyth, Howard M.; and Lambert, Margaret, eds. (1964).
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Dönitz: The Last Fuhrer: Portrait of a Nazi War Leader
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Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
1195:, Telegram No. 577 (11 December 1941) from "Schmidt"
485:in Washington, with instructions to present it to
441:The German Government, consequently, discontinues
1748:. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
1745:December 1941: Twelve Days that Began a World War
166:opposition to the U.S. joining the European war.
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1762:
587:German forces had used when they attacked the
573:According to Hitler's Naval Adjutant, Admiral
133:government when the U.S. was still officially
1766:Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945
1514:Redford, Duncan, and Grove, Philip D. (2014)
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1780:. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office
1075:The Devil's Disciples: Hitler's Inner Circle
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611:except perhaps for the sycophantic generals
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158:in the latter's office. Later that day, the
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24:Declaration of war against the United States
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373:British declaration of war against Germany
176:Consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor
141:. The decision to declare war was made by
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648:hostility towards the United States, and
254:attack on the United States Pacific Fleet
114:On 11 December 1941, four days after the
1841:Germany–United States military relations
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1193:United States Government Printing Office
711:one month before the 1940 election. The
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1836:Declarations of war during World War II
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1656:
1555:
1536:Albert Speer: His Battle with the Truth
1464:. New York: Simon and Schuster. p. 900.
1391:"Bill to Aid Britain Strongly Backed".
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979:. New York: Hill and Wang. pp.731–732.
793:Declarations of war during World War II
347:On Thursday 11 December 1941, American
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1427:How Hitler Could Have Won World War II
1290:. p.235; quoting Warlimont, W. (1964)
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650:the destructive potential it presented
545:Roosevelt had written a brief note to
1788:, Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books,
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1496:from the original on 28 November 2020
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311:
1516:The Royal Navy: A History Since 1900
1461:The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich
1071:
79:Adolf Hitler, Joachim von Ribbentrop
1484:Farley, Robert (2 September 2016).
1363:The Origins of the Second World War
1242:from the original on 11 August 2021
1065:
13:
1718:To Hell and Back: Europe 1914–1949
1127:from the original on 24 March 2013
798:Diplomatic history of World War II
652:. Due to this attitude within the
324:, should be empowered to sign the
14:
1882:
1815:11 December 1941 Reichstag speech
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1774:United States Department of State
1618:Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives
952:. New York: Vintage. pp.655–657.
424:on the high seas as enemy ships.
1808:
1204:Smyth & Lambert 1964, p. 999
491:United States Secretary of State
328:on Tokyo's behalf to save time.
207:, and many other results of the
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38:announces the declaration of war
1866:1941 in international relations
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1139:
1123:. Lillian Goldman Law Library.
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475:The same text had been sent to
1643:Germany and the Two World Wars
1601:. New York: Crown Publishing.
990:
977:The Third Reich: A New History
925:
885:
864:
850:
407:Secretary of the American Navy
380:President of the United States
189:Destroyers for Bases Agreement
1:
1538:. New York: Knopf. p.267–68.
858:"The Big Leak - Rainbow Five"
843:
169:
1778:Department of State Bulletin
1631:Genoud, François ed. (1961)
1446:Kershaw (2007), pp. 382–430.
1382:Hillgruber (1981), pp. 50–51
1292:Inside Hitler's Headquarters
160:U.S. declared war on Germany
7:
1429:. New York: Crown. p. 108.
1333:Hitler: Downfall: 1939–1945
998:"Public Opinion: 1935-1946"
922:Bullock (1992), pp. 661–664
786:
378:On September 11, 1941, the
154:by German Foreign Minister
10:
1887:
1683:Hitler: 1936–1945: Nemesis
1591:
1365:. London: Longman. p. 94.
1269:Mawdsley 2011, pp. 253–254
1260:Mawdsley 2011, pp. 250–253
1225:Mawdsley 2011, pp. 248-249
1080:W. W. Norton & Company
1053:Mawdsley 2011, pp. 223–225
931:Kershaw (2007), pp.444–446
326:"No separate peace" clause
205:Pan-American Security Zone
173:
1846:1941 in the United States
1784:Weeks, Albert L. (2004),
1425:Alexander, Bevin (2000).
1416:Kershaw (2000), pp.444–45
1282:London: Victor Gollancz.
1177:. New York: Crown. p.347
882:Bullock (1992), pp.766-67
709:destroyers-for-bases deal
660:which would make it the "
567:Franklin Delano Roosevelt
558:Post-declaration opinions
96:
91:
83:
75:
61:
43:
28:
23:
1306:Kershaw (2007), p.383–84
808:
575:Karl-Jesko von Puttkamer
183:FĂĽhrer und Reichskanzler
1528:Galbraith, John Kenneth
1278:Padfield, Peter (1984)
1175:Ribbentrop: A Biography
1160:6 November 2021 at the
772:biographical analysis,
364:MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES:
203:, the extension of the
1685:. London: Allen Lane.
1597:Bloch, Michael (1992)
1164:. Plunkett Lake Press.
1072:Read, Anthony (2004).
762:
753:John Kenneth Galbraith
674:
632:
625:
607:
603:
584:
570:
518:
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468:
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387:, as for instance the
358:Joachim von Ribbentrop
349:
292:
262:Joachim von Ribbentrop
217:
182:
156:Joachim von Ribbentrop
147:
119:attack on Pearl Harbor
49:; 82 years ago
1573:The Meaning of Hitler
1490:National Interest.org
1315:Kershaw (2016), p.352
1216:Mawdsley 2011, p. 253
1191:(1945) pp.1004–1005.
1062:Mawdsley 2011, p. 247
1044:Mawdsley 2011, p. 236
1035:Mawdsley 2011, p. 221
870:Kershaw (2007), p.382
775:The Meaning of Hitler
757:
598:
579:
565:
499:Eastern Standard Time
493:, at 3:30 pm, German
362:
290:
1856:December 1941 events
1817:at Wikimedia Commons
1621:. New York: Knopf.
662:arsenal of democracy
593:Operation Barbarossa
443:diplomatic relations
258:Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
209:special relationship
1776:(13 December 1941)
1702:New York: Penguin.
1639:Hillgruber, Andreas
1395:. February 9, 1941.
803:Kellogg–Briand Pact
455:December 11, 1941.
447:President Roosevelt
1769:. London: H.M.S.O.
1568:Haffner, Sebastian
1456:Shirer, William L.
1393:The New York Times
1121:The Avalon Project
638:Nicolaus von Below
571:
312:German declaration
300:, immigrants, and
293:
1813:Media related to
1795:978-0-7391-0736-2
1755:978-0-300-15445-0
1731:978-0-14-310992-1
1708:978-1-59420-123-3
1530:, interviewed by
1518:. Tauris. p. 182.
1342:978-1-101-87400-4
1294:Weidenfeld, p.208
1150:Memoirs 1925-1950
1146:Keenan, George F.
1093:978-0-393-04800-1
1022:Hill, Richard F.
1009:Norpoth, Helmut.
996:Cantril, Hadley.
973:Burleigh, Michael
780:Sebastian Haffner
749:Winston Churchill
742:Second Happy Time
514:Kroll Opera House
482:chargé d'affaires
350:chargé d'affaires
298:African-Americans
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1803:External links
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1720:. New York:
1717:
1714:Kershaw, Ian
1699:
1696:Kershaw, Ian
1682:
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1658:Kershaw, Ian
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1556:Kershaw 1991
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1500:12 September
1498:. Retrieved
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503:Ray Atherton
487:Cordell Hull
477:Hans Thomsen
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402:Reuben James
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227:isolationist
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164:isolationist
143:Adolf Hitler
139:World War II
127:Nazi Germany
113:
70:Nazi Germany
18:
1871:Axis powers
1082:. pp.
769:Ian Kershaw
738:World War I
682:Second Book
658:war economy
654:White House
642:Karl Dönitz
613:Alfred Jodl
495:summer time
458:RIBBENTROP.
432:present war
233:imposed by
1825:Categories
1599:Ribbentrop
1405:Weeks 2004
1246:21 October
1131:2 November
1000:. p. 1173.
844:References
755:recalled:
697:Lend-Lease
636:adjutant,
497:, 8:30 am
415:submarines
385:destroyers
369:neutrality
239:neutrality
193:Lend-Lease
174:See also:
170:Background
107:Wikisource
1185:, citing
699:; in the
633:Luftwaffe
626:Wehrmacht
608:Wehrmacht
318:Reichstag
282:Mussolini
270:Singapore
256:based at
92:Full text
76:Author(s)
66:Reichstag
44:Presented
1742:(2011).
1716:(2016).
1660:(1991).
1570:(1979).
1534:(1995).
1494:Archived
1458:(1960).
1361:(1998).
1331:(2020).
1240:Archived
1158:Archived
1125:Archived
1026:. p. 37.
1013:. p. 39.
975:(2000).
948:(1975).
895:(1940).
787:See also
547:Congress
540:Slovakia
532:Bulgaria
399:and the
235:Congress
218:de facto
121:and the
116:Japanese
62:Location
1698:(2007)
1681:(2000)
1641:(1981)
1615:(1992)
1592:Sources
1148:(2020)
591:during
536:Croatia
528:Romania
524:Hungary
223:U-boats
213:Germany
137:during
135:neutral
84:Purpose
52: (
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950:Hitler
601:world.
489:, the
409:, Mr.
396:Kearny
393:, the
199:, the
195:, the
36:Hitler
809:Notes
390:Greer
333:Magic
1790:ISBN
1750:ISBN
1726:ISBN
1704:ISBN
1687:ISBN
1666:ISBN
1647:ISBN
1623:ISBN
1603:ISBN
1578:ISBN
1540:ISBN
1502:2016
1431:ISBN
1367:ISBN
1337:ISBN
1284:ISBN
1248:2021
1179:ISBN
1154:p.96
1133:2013
1088:ISBN
981:ISBN
954:ISBN
615:and
538:and
519:Volk
411:Knox
187:The
1084:783
105:at
1827::
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960:.
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860:.
680:(
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