Free will - Knowledge

1583:, the literature often fails to distinguish between physical determinism and higher level forms of determinism (predeterminism, theological determinism, etc.) As such, hard determinism with respect to theological determinism (or "Hard Theological Determinism" above) might be classified as hard incompatibilism with respect to physical determinism (if no claim was made regarding the internal causality or determinism of the universe), or even compatibilism (if freedom from the constraint of determinism was not considered necessary for free will), if not hard determinism itself. By the same principle, metaphysical libertarianism (a form of incompatibilism with respect to physical determinism) might be classified as compatibilism with respect to theological determinism (if it was assumed such free will events were pre-ordained and therefore were destined to occur, but of which whose outcomes were not "predestined" or determined by God). If hard theological determinism is accepted (if it was assumed instead that such outcomes were predestined by God), then metaphysical libertarianism is not, however, possible, and would require reclassification (as hard incompatibilism for example, given that the universe is still assumed to be indeterministic – although the classification of hard determinism is technically valid also). 853:

volition – a willing, trying, or endeavoring on behalf of the agent (such as the cognitive component of lifting one's arm). Such intentional actions are interpreted as free actions. It has been suggested, however, that such acting cannot be said to exercise control over anything in particular. According to non-causal accounts, the causation by the agent cannot be analysed in terms of causation by mental states or events, including desire, belief, intention of something in particular, but rather is considered a matter of spontaneity and creativity. The exercise of intent in such intentional actions is not that which determines their freedom – intentional actions are rather self-generating. The "actish feel" of some intentional actions do not "constitute that event's activeness, or the agent's exercise of active control", rather they "might be brought about by direct stimulation of someone's brain, in the absence of any relevant desire or intention on the part of that person". Another question raised by such non-causal theory, is how an agent acts upon reason, if the said intentional actions are spontaneous.

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lobe and progressing to the primary motor cortex and then to parietal cortex has been observed. The sense of agency thus appears to normally emerge in conjunction with this orderly sequential network activation incorporating premotor association cortices together with primary motor cortex. In particular, the supplementary motor complex on the medial surface of the frontal lobe appears to activate prior to primary motor cortex presumably in associated with a preparatory pre-movement process. In a recent study using functional magnetic resonance imaging, alien movements were characterized by a relatively isolated activation of the primary motor cortex contralateral to the alien hand, while voluntary movements of the same body part included the natural activation of motor association cortex associated with the premotor process. The clinical definition requires "feeling that one limb is foreign or has a

1918:, have no second-order desire not to take the drug. The second group, "unwilling addicts", have a second-order desire not to take the drug, while the third group, "willing addicts", have a second-order desire to take it. According to Frankfurt, the members of the first group are devoid of will and therefore are no longer persons. The members of the second group freely desire not to take the drug, but their will is overcome by the addiction. Finally, the members of the third group willingly take the drug they are addicted to. Frankfurt's theory can ramify to any number of levels. Critics of the theory point out that there is no certainty that conflicts will not arise even at the higher-order levels of desire and preference. Others argue that Frankfurt offers no adequate explanation of how the various levels in the hierarchy mesh together. 3237:"Do not say: "It was God's doing that I fell away," for what he hates he does not do. Do not say: "He himself has led me astray," for he has no need of the wicked. Abominable wickedness the Lord hates and he does not let it happen to those who fear him. God in the beginning created human beings and made them subject to their own free choice. If you choose, you can keep the commandments; loyalty is doing the will of God. Set before you are fire and water; to whatever you choose, stretch out your hand. Before everyone are life and death, whichever they choose will be given them. Immense is the wisdom of the Lord; mighty in power, he sees all things. The eyes of God behold his works, and he understands every human deed. He never commands anyone to sin, nor shows leniency toward deceivers." - Ben Sira 15:11-20 NABRE 2969:. This is the tendency for people to trust the reliability of their own introspections while distrusting the introspections of other people. The theory implies that people will more readily attribute free will to themselves rather than others. This prediction has been confirmed by three of Pronin and Kugler's experiments. When college students were asked about personal decisions in their own and their roommate's lives, they regarded their own choices as less predictable. Staff at a restaurant described their co-workers' lives as more determined (having fewer future possibilities) than their own lives. When weighing up the influence of different factors on behavior, students gave desires and intentions the strongest weight for their own behavior, but rated personality traits as most predictive of other people. 2423:. The will is "the primary mover of all the powers of the soul... and it is also the efficient cause of motion in the body." Choice falls into five stages: (i) intellectual consideration of whether an objective is desirable, (ii) intellectual consideration of means of attaining the objective, (iii) will arrives at an intent to pursue the objective, (iv) will and intellect jointly decide upon choice of means (v) will elects execution. Free will enters as follows: Free will is an "appetitive power", that is, not a cognitive power of intellect (the term "appetite" from Aquinas's definition "includes all forms of internal inclination"). He states that judgment "concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite ." 2994:

people's responses to moral dilemmas under a deterministic model of reality). Edward Cokely has found that incompatibilism is intuitive – it was naturally adhered to, in that determinism does indeed negate belief in moral responsibility in general. Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols have proposed that incompatibilism may or may not be intuitive, and that it is dependent to some large degree upon the circumstances; whether or not the crime incites an emotional response – for example if it involves harming another human being. They found that belief in free will is a cultural universal, and that the majority of participants said that (a) our universe is indeterministic and (b) moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism.

3108: 807: 426:, in the traditional phrase. Being responsible for one's choices is the first cause of those choices, where first cause means that there is no antecedent cause of that cause. The argument, then, is that if a person has free will, then they are the ultimate cause of their actions. If determinism is true, then all of a person's choices are caused by events and facts outside their control. So, if everything someone does is caused by events and facts outside their control, then they cannot be the ultimate cause of their actions. Therefore, they cannot have free will. This argument has also been challenged by various compatibilist philosophers. 2976:

will due to its indeterminacy. This misconception applies both when considering oneself and others. Another contribution is choice. It has been demonstrated that people's belief in free will increases if presented with a simple level of choice. The specificity of the amount of choice is important, as too little or too great a degree of choice may negatively influence belief. It is also likely that the associative relationship between level of choice and perception of free will is influentially bidirectional. It is also possible that one's desire for control, or other basic motivational patterns, act as a third variable.

3255: 885:. The first two accounts do not require free will to be a fundamental constituent of the universe. Ordinary randomness is appealed to as supplying the "elbow room" that libertarians believe necessary. A first common objection to event-causal accounts is that the indeterminism could be destructive and could therefore diminish control by the agent rather than provide it (related to the problem of origination). A second common objection to these models is that it is questionable whether such indeterminism could add any value to deliberation over that which is already present in a deterministic world. 1616: 926:, where he hypothesizes that "in each case, the indeterminism is functioning as a hindrance or obstacle to her realizing one of her purposes – a hindrance or obstacle in the form of resistance within her will which must be overcome by effort." According to Robert Kane such "ultimate responsibility" is a required condition for free will. An important factor in such a theory is that the agent cannot be reduced to physical neuronal events, but rather mental processes are said to provide an equally valid account of the determination of outcome as their physical processes (see 5056:

the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will must be considered a feature of conscious life that corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description, but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.

4169:...the well-known dilemma of determinism. One horn of this dilemma is the argument that if an action was caused or necessitated, then it could not have been done freely, and hence the agent is not responsible for it. The other horn is the argument that if the action was not caused, then it is inexplicable and random, and thus it cannot be attributed to the agent, and hence, again, the agent cannot be responsible for it.... Whether we affirm or deny necessity and determinism, it is impossible to make any coherent sense of moral freedom and responsibility. 1911:

desires (a second-order desire) to the effect that one of the desires prevails over the others. A person's will is identified with their effective first-order desire, that is, the one they act on, and this will is free if it was the desire the person wanted to act upon, that is, the person's second-order desire was effective. So, for example, there are "wanton addicts", "unwilling addicts" and "willing addicts". All three groups may have the conflicting first-order desires to want to take the drug they are addicted to and to not want to take it.

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test where they would be rewarded with cash. Provoking a rejection of free will has also been associated with increased aggression and less helpful behaviour. However, although these initial studies suggested that believing in free will is associated with more morally praiseworthy behavior, more recent studies (including direct, multi-site replications) with substantially larger sample sizes have reported contradictory findings (typically, no association between belief in free will and moral behavior), casting doubt over the original findings.

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of origination. He rejects compatibilism because it, like incompatibilism, assumes a single, fundamental notion of freedom. There are really two notions of freedom: voluntary action and origination. Both notions are required to explain freedom of will and responsibility. Both determinism and indeterminism are threats to such freedom. To abandon these notions of freedom would be to abandon moral responsibility. On the one side, we have our intuitions; on the other, the scientific facts. The "new" problem is how to resolve this conflict.

1455: 1796: 2291:' views were ambivalent. While he believed in free will on "ethical grounds", he did not believe that there was evidence for it on scientific grounds, nor did his own introspections support it. Ultimately he believed that the problem of free will was a metaphysical issue and, therefore, could not be settled by science. Moreover, he did not accept incompatibilism as formulated below; he did not believe that the indeterminism of human actions was a prerequisite of moral responsibility. In his work 2059:

there can be physical restrictions to the body, psychological restrictions to the decision, and rational restrictions to the formation of reasons (desires plus beliefs) that should lead to what we would call a reasonable action. The last two are usually called "restrictions of free will". The restriction at the level of reasons is particularly important since it can be motivated by external reasons that are insufficiently conscious to the agent. One example was the collective suicide led by

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ways, all of them involve aspects of the way people make decisions and initiate actions, which have been studied extensively by neuroscientists. Some of the experimental observations are widely viewed as implying that free will does not exist or is an illusion (but many philosophers see this as a misunderstanding). Third, psychologists have studied the beliefs that the majority of ordinary people hold about free will and its role in assigning moral responsibility.

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observed behavior. However, Wegner has been able to manipulate people's thoughts and behaviors so as to conform to or violate the two requirements for causal inference. Through such work, Wegner has been able to show that people often experience conscious will over behaviors that they have not, in fact, caused – and conversely, that people can be led to experience a lack of will over behaviors they did cause. For instance,

2297:, he wrote that "instinct and utility between them can safely be trusted to carry on the social business of punishment and praise" regardless of metaphysical theories. He did believe that indeterminism is important as a "doctrine of relief" – it allows for the view that, although the world may be in many respects a bad place, it may, through individuals' actions, become a better one. Determinism, he argued, undermines 2051:

natural occurrences of deterministic deliberation in the brain in terms of the first person perspective of the conscious agent performing the deliberation. Such an approach has been considered a form of identity dualism. A description of "how conscious experience might affect brains" has been provided in which "the experience of conscious free will is the first-person perspective of the neural correlates of choosing."

10164:...it is important to be clear about exactly what experience one wants one's subjects to introspect. Of course, explaining to subjects exactly what the experimenter wants them to experience can bring its own problems–...instructions to attend to a particular internally generated experience can easily alter both the timing and the content of that experience and even whether or not it is consciously experienced at all. 642: 1451:, in which the antecedent conditions are the nature and will of God. With respect to free will and the classification of theological compatibilism/incompatibilism below, "theological determinism is the thesis that God exists and has infallible knowledge of all true propositions including propositions about our future actions," more minimal criteria designed to encapsulate all forms of theological determinism. 15938: 12110: 2495:, the belief that all happiness and suffering arise from previous actions, is considered a wrong view according to Buddhist doctrines. Because Buddhists also reject agenthood, the traditional compatibilist strategies are closed to them as well. Instead, the Buddhist philosophical strategy is to examine the metaphysics of causality. Ancient India had many heated arguments about the nature of causality with 963:) map to the underlying indeterminacy of the physical construct. This relationship, however, requires a causative role over probabilities that is questionable, and it is far from established that brain activity responsible for human action can be affected by such events. Secondarily, these incompatibilist models are dependent upon the relationship between action and conscious volition, as studied in the 2427:

of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature."

3633:...Aristotle and Epictetus: In the latter authors it was the fact that nothing hindered us from doing or choosing something that made us have control over them. In Alexander's account, the terms are understood differently: what makes us have control over things is the fact that we are causally undetermined in our decision and thus can freely decide between doing/choosing or not doing/choosing them. 13543: 3452: 988:. It is required that what the agent causes is not causally determined by prior events. It is also required that the agent's causing of that event is not causally determined by prior events. A number of problems have been identified with this view. Firstly, it is difficult to establish the reason for any given choice by the agent, which suggests they may be random or determined by 2673:", concerning the relative importance of genetics and biology as compared to culture and environment in human behavior. The view of many researchers is that many human behaviors can be explained in terms of humans' brains, genes, and evolutionary histories. This point of view raises the fear that such attribution makes it impossible to hold others responsible for their actions. 2118: 2152: 2280:"Moral" in this case refers to action that is willed, while "imagination" refers to the mental capacity to envision conditions that do not already hold. Both of these functions are necessarily conditions for freedom. Steiner aims to show that these two aspects of inner and outer freedom are integral to one another, and that true freedom is only achieved when they are united. 3202:(the belief that God and man cooperate in salvation), Methodism teaches that "Our Lord Jesus Christ did so die for all men as to make salvation attainable by every man that cometh into the world. If men are not saved that fault is entirely their own, lying solely in their own unwillingness to obtain the salvation offered to them. (John 1:9; I Thess. 5:9; Titus 2:11-12)." 1343:, or some other force), including human actions. Predeterminism is frequently taken to mean that human actions cannot interfere with (or have no bearing on) the outcomes of a pre-determined course of events, and that one's destiny was established externally (for example, exclusively by a creator deity). The concept of predeterminism is often argued by invoking 1356:. It can also be used interchangeably with causal determinism – in the context of its capacity to determine future events. Despite this, predeterminism is often considered as independent of causal determinism. The term predeterminism is also frequently used in the context of biology and heredity, in which case it represents a form of 3085:. This is worrying because counterfactual thinking ("If I had done something different...") is an important part of learning from one's choices, including those that harmed others. Again, this cannot be taken to mean that belief in determinism is to blame; these are the results we would expect from increasing people's belief in fatalism. 1660:

responsible for bodily action, although unconscious brain activity is often caused by external events (for example, the instantaneous reaction to being burned). Cartesian dualism implies that the physical world is not deterministic – and in which external mind controls (at least some) physical events, providing an interpretation of

6794:"Determinism" is, in essence, the position holding that all behavior is caused by prior behavior. "Predeterminism" is the position holding that all behavior is caused by conditions predating behavior altogether (such impersonal boundaries as "the human conditions", instincts, the will of God, inherent knowledge, fate, and such). 2801:

not a proof of the non-existence of free will, as also unconscious agendas may be free and non-deterministic. According to their suggestion, man has relative freedom, i.e. freedom in degrees, that can be increased or decreased through deliberate choices that involve both conscious and unconscious (panencephalic) processes.

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randomness, mental processes as experienced have no influence on the probabilistic outcomes (such as volition). According to many interpretations, indeterminism enables free will to exist, while others assert the opposite (because the action was not controllable by the physical being who claims to possess the free will).

1886:, claimed that "Liberty then is only and can be only the power to do what one will." He asked, "would you have everything at the pleasure of a million blind caprices?" For him, free will or liberty is "only the power of acting, what is this power? It is the effect of the constitution and present state of our organs." 1288: – that they have independently fixed all events and outcomes in the universe in advance. In such a case, even if an individual could have influence over their lower level physical system, their choices in regard to this cannot be their own, as is the case with libertarian free will. Omniscience features as an 8182: 3074:. Having participants read articles that simply "disprove free will" is unlikely to increase their understanding of determinism, or the compatibilistic free will that it still permits. In other words, experimental manipulations purporting to "provoke disbelief in free will" may instead cause a belief in 8297:

Circular causality departs so strongly from the classical tenets of necessity, invariance, and precise temporal order that the only reason to call it that is to satisfy the human habitual need for causes.... The very strong appeal of agency to explain events may come from the subjective experience of

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For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of

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claimed that divine omnipotence cannot be separated from divine goodness. As a truly omnipotent and good being, God could create beings with true freedom over God. Furthermore, God would voluntarily do so because "the greatest good... which can be done for a being, greater than anything else that one

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declared that "the free will of man, moved and excited by God, can by its consent co-operate with God, Who excites and invites its action; and that it can thereby dispose and prepare itself to obtain the grace of justification. The will can resist grace if it chooses. It is not like a lifeless thing,

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Regardless of the validity of belief in free will, it may be beneficial to understand where the idea comes from. One contribution is randomness. While it is established that randomness is not the only factor in the perception of the free will, it has been shown that randomness can be mistaken as free

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does not emerge in conjunction with the overt appearance of the purposeful act even though the sense of ownership in relationship to the body part is maintained. This phenomenon corresponds with an impairment in the premotor mechanism manifested temporally by the appearance of the readiness potential

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It has been shown that in several brain-related conditions, individuals cannot entirely control their own actions, though the existence of such conditions does not directly refute the existence of free will. Neuroscientific studies are valuable tools in developing models of how humans experience free

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From an anthropological perspective, free will can be regarded as an explanation for human behavior that justifies a socially sanctioned system of rewards and punishments. Under this definition, free will may be described as a political ideology. In a society where people are taught to believe that

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A compatibilist interpretation of Aquinas's view is defended thus: "Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause

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Compatibilist models adhere to models of mind in which mental activity (such as deliberation) can be reduced to physical activity without any change in physical outcome. Although compatibilism is generally aligned to (or is at least compatible with) physicalism, some compatibilist models describe the

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The term predeterminism suggests not just a determining of all events, but the prior and deliberately conscious determining of all events (therefore done, presumably, by a conscious being). While determinism usually refers to a naturalistically explainable causality of events, predeterminism seems by

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stretching back to the origin of the universe. In the case of predeterminism, this chain of events has been pre-established, and human actions cannot interfere with the outcomes of this pre-established chain. Predeterminism can be used to mean such pre-established causal determinism, in which case it

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or determinateness is the notion that all propositions, whether about the past, present, or future, are either true or false. This creates a unique problem for free will given that propositions about the future already have a truth value in the present (that is it is already determined as either true

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makes an extrapolation of physical determinism as inferred on the macroscopic scale by the behaviour of a set of dominoes to neural activity in the brain where; "If the brain is nothing but a complex physical object whose states are as much governed by physical laws as any other physical object, then

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subjects with information about an effect increases the probability that a person falsely believes is the cause. The implication for such work is that the perception of conscious will (which he says might be more accurately labelled as 'the emotion of authorship') is not tethered to the execution of

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is the patient's delusion of being controlled by an external force. People with schizophrenia will sometimes report that, although they are acting in the world, they do not recall initiating the particular actions they performed. This is sometimes likened to being a robot controlled by someone else.

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with specialized multivariate analyses to study the temporal dimension in the activation of the cortical network associated with voluntary movement in human subjects, an anterior-to-posterior sequential activation process beginning in the supplementary motor area on the medial surface of the frontal

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argues that a no-free-will conclusion is based on dubious assumptions about the location of consciousness, as well as questioning the accuracy and interpretation of Libet's results. Kornhuber and Deecke underlined that absence of conscious will during the early Bereitschaftspotential (termed BP1) is

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Science has contributed to the free will problem in at least three ways. First, physics has addressed the question of whether nature is deterministic, which is viewed as crucial by incompatibilists (compatibilists, however, view it as irrelevant). Second, although free will can be defined in various

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However, the preceding quote has often been misinterpreted as Vivekananda implying that everything is predetermined. What Vivekananda actually meant by lack of free will was that the will was not "free" because it was heavily influenced by the law of cause and effect – "The will is not free, it

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In Buddhism it is taught that the idea of absolute freedom of choice (that is that any human being could be completely free to make any choice) is unwise, because it denies the reality of one's physical needs and circumstances. Equally incorrect is the idea that humans have no choice in life or that

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Freeman introduces what he calls "circular causality" to "allow for the contribution of self-organizing dynamics", the "formation of macroscopic population dynamics that shapes the patterns of activity of the contributing individuals", applicable to "interactions between neurons and neural masses...

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through experience, he finds to his astonishment that he is not free, but liable to necessity; that notwithstanding all his resolutions and reflections he does not change his conduct, and that from the beginning to the end of his life he must bear the same character that he himself condemns, and, as

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entities. Further, even if they were micro-level events, they do not seem to have any relevance to how the world is at the macroscopic level. He maintains that incompatibilism is false because, even if indeterminism is true, incompatibilists have not provided, and cannot provide, an adequate account

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According to Dennett, because individuals have the ability to act differently from what anyone expects, free will can exist. Incompatibilists claim the problem with this idea is that we may be mere "automata responding in predictable ways to stimuli in our environment". Therefore, all of our actions

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Compatibilism often regards the agent free as virtue of their reason. Some explanations of free will focus on the internal causality of the mind with respect to higher-order brain processing – the interaction between conscious and unconscious brain activity. Likewise, some modern compatibilists

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This argument is very often accepted as a basis for theological incompatibilism: denying either libertarian free will or divine foreknowledge (omniscience) and therefore theological determinism. On the other hand, theological compatibilism must attempt to find problems with it. The formal version of

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is the capacity to know everything that there is to know (included in which are all future events), and is a property often attributed to a creator deity. Omniscience implies the existence of destiny. Some authors have claimed that free will cannot coexist with omniscience. One argument asserts that

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Various definitions of free will that have been proposed for Metaphysical Libertarianism (agent/substance causal, centered accounts, and efforts of will theory), along with examples of other common free will positions (Compatibilism, Hard Determinism, and Hard Incompatibilism). Red circles represent

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that causes those negative effects. Kathleen Vohs has found that those whose belief in free will had been eroded were more likely to cheat. In a study conducted by Roy Baumeister, after participants read an article arguing against free will, they were more likely to lie about their performance on a

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Whether people naturally adhere to an incompatibilist model of free will has been questioned in the research. Eddy Nahmias has found that incompatibilism is not intuitive – it was not adhered to, in that determinism does not negate belief in moral responsibility (based on an empirical study of

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For example, if a person hears an explosion and sees a tree fall down that person is likely to infer that the explosion caused the tree to fall over. However, if the explosion occurs after the tree falls down (that is, the first requirement is not met), or rather than an explosion, the person hears

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supporting the view that human perception of conscious control is an illusion. Wegner summarizes some empirical evidence that may suggest that the perception of conscious control is open to modification (or even manipulation). Wegner observes that one event is inferred to have caused a second event

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Event-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will typically rely upon physicalist models of mind (like those of the compatibilist), yet they presuppose physical indeterminism, in which certain indeterministic events are said to be caused by the agent. A number of event-causal accounts of free will

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do so because our success in carrying out our ends depends in part on factors wholly beyond our control. Furthermore, there are always external constraints on the range of options we can meaningfully try to undertake. As the presence or absence of these conditions and constraints are not (usually)

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An alternative explanation builds on the idea that subjects tend to confuse determinism with fatalism... What happens then when agents' self-efficacy is undermined? It is not that their basic desires and drives are defeated. It is rather, I suggest, that they become skeptical that they can control

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A study by Aaron Schurger and colleagues published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences challenged assumptions about the causal nature of the readiness potential itself (and the "pre-movement buildup" of neural activity in general), casting doubt on conclusions drawn from studies

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the conscious mental act to do so. Some believe the implication is that free will was not involved in the decision and is an illusion. The first of these experiments reported the brain registered activity related to the move about 0.2 s before movement onset. However, these authors also found that

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in 1965.). Although it was well known that the readiness potential reliably preceded the physical action, Libet asked whether it could be recorded before the conscious intention to move. To determine when subjects felt the intention to move, he asked them to watch the second hand of a clock. After

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predicts events only in terms of probabilities, casting doubt on whether the universe is deterministic at all, although evolution of the universal state vector is completely deterministic. Current physical theories cannot resolve the question of whether determinism is true of the world, being very

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in other things (things that cause or necessitate other things). According to Hume, 'causation' is on weak grounds: "Once we realise that 'A must bring about B' is tantamount merely to 'Due to their constant conjunction, we are psychologically certain that B will follow A,' then we are left with a

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developed a neocompatibilist theory based on the causal theory of action that is complementary to classical compatibilism. According to him, physical, psychological and rational restrictions can interfere at different levels of the causal chain that would naturally lead to action. Correspondingly,

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and epistemic limits on the precision of our knowledge of the current state of the world, the future is ill-defined for all finite beings. The only well-defined things are "expectations". The ability to do "otherwise" only makes sense when dealing with these expectations, and not with some unknown

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free will must assert influence on physical reality, and where mind is responsible for such influence (as opposed to ordinary system randomness), it must be distinct from body to accomplish this. Both substance and property dualism offer such a distinction, and those particular models thereof that

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of all events and outcomes by the divinity (that is, they do not classify the weaker version as 'theological determinism' unless libertarian free will is assumed to be denied as a consequence), or that the weaker version does not constitute 'theological determinism' at all. Theological determinism

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agrees with Locke that the truth or falsity of determinism is irrelevant to the problem. He argues that the notion of free will leads to an infinite regress and is therefore senseless. According to Strawson, if one is responsible for what one does in a given situation, then one must be responsible

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propose that for any given decision between two possibilities, the strength of reason will be considered for each option, yet there is still a probability the weaker candidate will be chosen. An obvious objection to such a view is that decisions are explicitly left up to chance, and origination or

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Non-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will do not require a free action to be caused by either an agent or a physical event. They either rely upon a world that is not causally closed, or physical indeterminism. Non-causal accounts often claim that each intentional action requires a choice or

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Buttrick, Nicholas R.; Aczel, Balazs; Aeschbach, Lena F.; Bakos, Bence E.; Brühlmann, Florian; Claypool, Heather M.; Hüffmeier, Joachim; Kovacs, Marton; Schuepfer, Kurt; Szecsi, Peter; Szuts, Attila; Szöke, Orsolya; Thomae, Manuela; Torka, Ann-Kathrin; Walker, Ryan J.; Wood, Michael J. (September

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in holding that necessity and possibility are defined with respect to a given point in time and a given matrix of empirical circumstances, and so something that is merely possible from the perspective of one observer may be necessary from the perspective of an omniscient. Some philosophers follow

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Since at least 1959, free will belief in individuals has been analysed with respect to traits in social behaviour. In general, the concept of free will researched to date in this context has been that of the incompatibilist, or more specifically, the libertarian, that is freedom from determinism.

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Others have argued that data such as the Bereitschaftspotential undermine epiphenomenalism for the same reason, that such experiments rely on a subject reporting the point in time at which a conscious experience occurs, thus relying on the subject to be able to consciously perform an action. That

2765:

Some argue that placing the question of free will in the context of motor control is too narrow. The objection is that the time scales involved in motor control are very short, and motor control involves a great deal of unconscious action, with much physical movement entirely unconscious. On that

2588:

Therefore we see at once that there cannot be any such thing as free-will; the very words are a contradiction, because will is what we know, and everything that we know is within our universe, and everything within our universe is moulded by conditions of time, space and causality. ... To acquire

2435:

Historically, most of the philosophical effort invested in resolving the dilemma has taken the form of close examination of definitions and ambiguities in the concepts designated by "free", "freedom", "will", "choice" and so forth. Defining 'free will' often revolves around the meaning of phrases

1910:

The notion of levels of decision is presented in a different manner by Frankfurt. Frankfurt argues for a version of compatibilism called the "hierarchical mesh". The idea is that an individual can have conflicting desires at a first-order level and also have a desire about the various first-order

843:

require physical indeterminism, such as probabilistic subatomic particle behavior – theory unknown to many of the early writers on free will. Incompatibilist theories can be categorised based on the type of indeterminism they require; uncaused events, non-deterministically caused events, and

433:

in the 1960s and has received much attention in the modern literature. The simplified argument runs along these lines: if determinism is true, then we have no control over the events of the past that determined our present state and no control over the laws of nature. Since we can have no control

2656:

work by amplifying quantum effects into practically usable signals. A more significant question is whether the indeterminism of quantum mechanics allows for the traditional idea of free will (based on a perception of free will). If a person's action is, however, only a result of complete quantum

2470:, often translated as "dependent origination", "dependent arising" or "conditioned genesis". It teaches that every volition is a conditioned action as a result of ignorance. In part, it states that free will is inherently conditioned and not "free" to begin with. It is also part of the theory of 2275:

Steiner then argues that inner freedom is achieved when we integrate our sensory impressions, which reflect the outer appearance of the world, with our thoughts, which lend coherence to these impressions and thereby disclose to us an understandable world. Acknowledging the many influences on our

455:

the consequence argument that, if Jane had remained standing, she would have either generated a contradiction, violated the laws of nature or changed the past. Hence, compatibilists are committed to the existence of "incredible abilities", according to Ginet and van Inwagen. One response to this

450:

The difficulty of this argument for some compatibilists lies in the fact that it entails the impossibility that one could have chosen other than one has. For example, if Jane is a compatibilist and she has just sat down on the sofa, then she is committed to the claim that she could have remained

419:

Another argument for incompatibilism is that of the "causal chain". Incompatibilism is key to the idealist theory of free will. Most incompatibilists reject the idea that freedom of action consists simply in "voluntary" behavior. They insist, rather, that free will means that someone must be the

8176:

Kant argued that, in order that human life is not just a "dream" (a random or projected by subjects juxtaposition of moments), the temporality of event A as before or after B must submit to a rule. An established order then implies the existence of some necessary conditions and causes, that is:

2949:

Wegner has applied this principle to the inferences people make about their own conscious will. People typically experience a thought that is consistent with a behavior, and then they observe themselves performing this behavior. As a result, people infer that their thoughts must have caused the

2651:

Assuming that an indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, one may still object that such indeterminism is for all practical purposes confined to microscopic phenomena. This is not always the case: many macroscopic phenomena are based on quantum effects. For instance, some

2186:

underlying the phenomenal world, is in itself groundless: that is, not subject to time, space, and causality (the forms that governs the world of appearance). Thus, the will, in itself and outside of appearance, is free. Schopenhauer discussed the puzzle of free will and moral responsibility in

164:

have done otherwise without physical impediment. Many contemporary compatibilists instead identify free will as a psychological capacity, such as to direct one's behavior in a way responsive to reason, and there are still further different conceptions of free will, each with their own concerns,

2846:

response to an unwanted, premonitory urge. Tics are experienced as irresistible and must eventually be expressed. People with Tourette syndrome are sometimes able to suppress their tics for limited periods, but doing so often results in an explosion of tics afterward. The control exerted (from

822:

Accounts of libertarianism subdivide into non-physical theories and physical or naturalistic theories. Non-physical theories hold that the events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation, which requires that the world is not closed under

1659:

holds that the mind is a nonphysical substance, the seat of consciousness and intelligence, and is not identical with physical states of the brain or body. It is suggested that although the two worlds do interact, each retains some measure of autonomy. Under cartesian dualism external mind is

11126:

Some studies have been conducted indicating that people react strongly to the way in which mental determinism is described, when reconciling it with moral responsibility. Eddy Nahmias has noted that when people's actions are framed with respect to their beliefs and desires (rather than their

3010:

The researchers also found that people consider acts more "free" when they involve a person opposing external forces, planning, or making random actions. Notably, the last behaviour, "random" actions, may not be possible; when participants attempt to perform tasks in a random manner (such as

2436:

like "ability to do otherwise" or "alternative possibilities". This emphasis upon words has led some philosophers to claim the problem is merely verbal and thus a pseudo-problem. In response, others point out the complexity of decision making and the importance of nuances in the terminology.

156:. Different compatibilists offer very different definitions of what "free will" means and consequently find different types of constraints to be relevant to the issue. Classical compatibilists considered free will nothing more than freedom of action, considering one free of will simply if, 3000:

Studies also reveal a correlation between the likelihood of accepting a deterministic model of mind and personality type. For example, Adam Feltz and Edward Cokely found that people of an extrovert personality type are more likely to dissociate belief in determinism from belief in moral

99:

are seen as deserving credit or blame. Whether free will exists, what it is and the implications of whether it exists or not constitute some of the longest running debates of philosophy. Some conceive of free will as the ability to act beyond the limits of external influences or wishes.

1157:

in such a way that any state (of an object or event) is completely determined by prior states. Causal determinism proposes that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to the origin of the universe. Causal determinists believe that there is nothing uncaused or

1571:: "If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely." For example, a human observer could in principle have a machine that could detect what will happen in the future, but the existence of this machine or their use of it has no influence on the outcomes of events. 2086:

positing a mind or soul existing apart from one's body while perceiving, thinking, choosing freely, and as a result acting independently on the body, include both traditional religious metaphysics and less common newer compatibilist concepts. Also consistent with both autonomy and

917:

is related to the role of will power in decision making. It suggests that the indeterminacy of agent volition processes could map to the indeterminacy of certain physical events – and the outcomes of these events could therefore be considered caused by the agent. Models of

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ability would seem to be at odds with early epiphenomenalism, which according to Huxley is the broad claim that consciousness is "completely without any power... as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery".

2375:

suggested at a minimum our decision processes with moral implications lie outside the reach of everyday causality, and lie outside the rules governing material objects. "There is a sharp difference between moral judgments and judgments of fact... Moral judgments... must be

740:. Imagine an entity that knows all facts about the past and the present, and knows all natural laws that govern the universe. If the laws of nature were determinate, then such an entity would be able to use this knowledge to foresee the future, down to the smallest detail. 2103:

holds the view that "determinism is true, compatibilism and incompatibilism are both false" and the real problem lies elsewhere. Honderich maintains that determinism is true because quantum phenomena are not events or things that can be located in space and time, but are

1725:) are not ontologically reducible to physical states. Although one might suppose that mental states and neurological states are different in kind, that does not rule out the possibility that mental states are correlated with neurological states. In one such construction, 2460:, "There is free action, there is retribution, but I see no agent that passes out from one set of momentary elements into another one, except the of those elements." Buddhists believe in neither absolute free will, nor determinism. It preaches a middle doctrine, named 3213:

For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to become conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the first-born among many brethren; and whom He predestined, these He also called; and whom He called, these He also justified; and whom He justified, these He also

1162:. The most common form of causal determinism is nomological determinism (or scientific determinism), the notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid natural laws, that every occurrence results inevitably from prior events. 2880:. The standard neurological explanation is that the felt will reported by the speaking left hemisphere does not correspond with the actions performed by the non-speaking right hemisphere, thus suggesting that the two hemispheres may have independent senses of will. 2478:

in Hinduism. In Buddhism, the idea of karma is much less deterministic. The Buddhist notion of karma is primarily focused on the cause and effect of moral actions in this life, while in Hinduism the concept of karma is more often connected with determining one's

8193:

Schopenhauer, who by the way continued and simplified Kant's system, argued (among others basing on optical illusions and the "initial processing") that it is the intellect or even the brain what generates the image of the world out of something else, by

6682:

Predeterminism is here defined by the assumption that the experimenter's 'free will' in deciding what to measure (such as his choice to measure the x- or the y-component of an electron's spin), is in fact limited by deterministic laws, hence not free at

752:, whether about the past, present or future, are either true or false. The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how choices can be free, given that what one does in the future is already determined as true or false in the present. 376:

Incompatibilism is the position that free will and determinism are logically incompatible, and that the major question regarding whether or not people have free will is thus whether or not their actions are determined. "Hard determinists", such as

2770:; free will is a longer term phenomenon" and free will is a higher level activity that "cannot be captured in a description of neural activity or of muscle activation..." The bearing of timing experiments upon free will is still under discussion. 7196:

The body-mind relationship...includes the problem of man's position in the physical world...'World 1'. The world of conscious human processes I shall call 'World 2', and the world of the objective creations of the human mind I shall call 'World

6735:

Quantum Theory provided a beautiful description of the behaviour of isolated atoms and nuclei and small aggregates of elementary particles. Modern science recognized that predisposition rather than predeterminism is what is widely prevalent in

979:

Agent/substance-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will rely upon substance dualism in their description of mind. The agent is assumed power to intervene in the physical world. Agent (substance)-causal accounts have been suggested by both

1866:, asserting, for example, that "no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe [ 1825:

positions are concerned with a sort of "metaphysically free will", which compatibilists claim has never been coherently defined. Compatibilists argue that determinism does not matter; though they disagree among themselves about what, in turn,

412:": if a person is like other mechanical things that are determined in their behavior such as a wind-up toy, a billiard ball, a puppet, or a robot, then people must not have free will. This argument has been rejected by compatibilists such as 10177: 2685:". Responsibility does not require that behavior be uncaused, as long as behavior responds to praise and blame. Moreover, it is not certain that environmental determination is any less threatening to free will than genetic determination. 792:, is perhaps more relevant. Despite this, hard determinism has grown less popular in present times, given scientific suggestions that determinism is false – yet the intention of their position is sustained by hard incompatibilism. 839:. Physical determinism implies there is only one possible future and is therefore not compatible with libertarian free will. As consequent of incompatibilism, metaphysical libertarian explanations that do not involve dispensing with 3053:

those desires; and in the face of that skepticism, they fail to apply the effort that is needed even to try. If they were tempted to behave badly, then coming to believe in fatalism makes them less likely to resist that temptation.

11221:

Stillman, Tyler F.; Roy F. Baumeister; Kathleen D. Vohs; Nathaniel M. Lambert; Frank D. Fincham; Lauren E. Brewer (2010-01-01). "Personal Philosophy and Personnel Achievement: Belief in Free Will Predicts Better Job Performance".

3844:

Nothing that might be a solution has yet been described. This is not a case where there are several possible candidate solutions and we don't know which is correct. It is a case where nothing believable has (to my knowledge) been

397:, are those incompatibilists who accept free will and deny determinism, holding the view that some form of indeterminism is true. Another view is that of hard incompatibilists, which state that free will is incompatible with both 8515:

necessity from God strictly with regard to a concrete ("contingent") act. A typical choice was not separately ordained to be so-and-so by God; St. Thomas says the choice is not necessary, but in fact that apparently means it was

3907:

One of the strongest supports for the free choice thesis is the unmistakable intuition of virtually every human being that he is free to make the choices he does and that the deliberations leading to those choices are also free

2631: – and some thinkers claimed that the simple process of gathering sufficient information would allow them to predict future events with perfect accuracy. Modern science, on the other hand, is a mixture of deterministic and 2594:

is a phenomenon bound by cause and effect, but there is something behind the will which is free." Vivekananda never said things were absolutely determined and placed emphasis on the power of conscious choice to alter one's past

2325:

approached free will via the notion of causality. It was his position that causality was a mental construct used to explain the repeated association of events, and that one must examine more closely the relation between things

1207:

Destiny or fate is a predetermined course of events. It may be conceived as a predetermined future, whether in general or of an individual. It is a concept based on the belief that there is a fixed natural order to the cosmos.

204:

proposed its own meanings) lack of necessity in human will, so that "the will is free" meant "the will does not have to be such as it is". This requirement was universally embraced by both incompatibilists and compatibilists.

1837:

that choice (freedom to enact one's will), although not all writers observe this distinction. Nonetheless, some philosophers have defined free will as the absence of various impediments. Some "modern compatibilists", such as

2384:

and between the behaving animal and its environment". In this view, mind and neurological functions are tightly coupled in a situation where feedback between collective actions (mind) and individual subsystems (for example,

2091:, they allow for free personal agency based on practical reasons within the laws of physics. While less popular among 21st-century philosophers, non-naturalist compatibilism is present in most if not almost all religions. 1509:, does not affect the outcome. God's providence is "compatible" with voluntary choice. Soft theological determinism is known as theological compatibilism (see figure, top right). A rejection of theological determinism (or 633:

itself may occupy any of the nine positions, that is, there is no logical contradiction between determinism and free will, and either or both may be true or false in principle. However, the most common meaning attached to

8500:, Book III about Providence, c. 88–91 (260–267), where it is postulated that everything has its cause and it is again and again in detail referred also to all individual choices of man etc., even refuting opposite views. 3019:

A recent 2020 survey has shown that compatibilism is quite a popular stance among those who specialize in philosophy (59.2%). Belief in libertarianism amounted to 18.8%, while a lack of belief in free will equaled 11.2%.

1846:, argue free will is simply freely choosing to do what constraints allow one to do. In other words, a coerced agent's choices can still be free if such coercion coincides with the agent's personal intentions and desires. 456:

argument is that it equivocates on the notions of abilities and necessities, or that the free will evoked to make any given choice is really an illusion and the choice had been made all along, oblivious to its "decider".

284:

from the freedom to enact it. Given that humans all experience a sense of free will, some modern compatibilists think it is necessary to accommodate this intuition. Compatibilists often associate freedom of will with the

3390:

is challenged by most theologians. Free will, according to Islamic doctrine is the main factor for man's accountability in his/her actions throughout life. Actions taken by people exercising free will are counted on the

2888:

Although the neural mechanisms of schizophrenia are not yet clear, one influential hypothesis is that there is a breakdown in brain systems that compare motor commands with the feedback received from the body (known as

4400:

Instead of postulating a universal law of causality and then having to deny the possibility of choice, we start with the premise that freedom of choice exists, and then we seek to explain causality as a property of

275:

have addressed the dilemma of free will by arguing that free will holds as long as humans are not externally constrained or coerced. Modern compatibilists make a distinction between freedom of will and freedom of

706:

Determinism can be divided into causal, logical and theological determinism. Corresponding to each of these different meanings, there arises a different problem for free will. Hard determinism is the claim that

2717:

in the 1980s, in which he asked each subject to choose a random moment to flick their wrist while he measured the associated activity in their brain; in particular, the build-up of electrical signal called the

438:

of them. Since our present choices and acts, under determinism, are the necessary consequences of the past and the laws of nature, then we have no control over them and, hence, no free will. This is called the

6924:

Many religions of the world have considered that the path of history is predetermined by God or Fate. On this basis, many believe that what will happen will happen, and they accept their destiny with fatalism.

904:. An obvious objection to such a view is that an agent cannot be assigned ownership over their decisions (or preferences used to make those decisions) to any greater degree than that of a compatibilist model. 1814:

is a non-metaphysical concept. Likewise, some compatibilists define free will as freedom to act according to one's determined motives without hindrance from other individuals. So for example Aristotle in his

891:

asserts that the indeterminism is confined to an earlier stage in the decision process. This is intended to provide an indeterminate set of possibilities to choose from, while not risking the introduction of

16481: 2129:"Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined." 10614:

Stillman, T.F., R.F. Baumeister, F.D. Fincham, T.E. Joiner, N.M. Lambert, A.R. Mele, and D.M. Tice. 2008. Guilty, free, and wise. Belief in free will promotes learning from negative emotions. Manuscript in

6847:

The problem of predeterminism is one that involves the factors of heredity and environment, and the point to be debated here is the relation of the present self that chooses to these predetermining agencies

6649:

Predeterminism: the philosophical and theological view that combines God with determinism. On this doctrine events throughout eternity have been foreordained by some supernatural power in a causal sequence.

3115:

The notions of free will and predestination are heavily debated among Christians. Free will in the Christian sense is the ability to choose between good or evil. Among Catholics, there are those holding to

768:

its outcome in advance. The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how our actions can be free if there is a being who has determined them for us in advance, or if they are already set in

2143:

discussed the possibility that the entire debate about free will is nothing more than a merely "verbal" issue. He suggested that it might be accounted for by "a false sensation or seeming experience" (a

2042:

may experience a conscious desire to escape addiction, but be unable to do so. The "will" is disconnected from the freedom to act. This situation is related to an abnormal production and distribution of

992:(without an underlying basis for the free will decision). Secondly, it has been questioned whether physical events can be caused by an external substance or mind – a common problem associated with 1806:

Compatibilists maintain that determinism is compatible with free will. They believe freedom can be present or absent in a situation for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics. For instance,

249:) is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain, and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect). 1833:

Although there are various impediments to exercising one's choices, free will does not imply freedom of action. Freedom of choice (freedom to select one's will) is logically separate from freedom to

1670:

suggests a two-way interaction, that some physical events cause some mental acts and some mental acts cause some physical events. One modern vision of the possible separation of mind and body is the

947:

C.S. Lewis stated the logical possibility that if the physical world were proved indeterministic this would provide an entry point to describe an action of a non-physical entity on physical reality.

193:(3rd century CE): "what makes us have control over things is the fact that we are causally undetermined in our decision and thus can freely decide between doing/choosing or not doing/choosing them". 1753:

requires a distinction between the mental and the physical, being a commentary on the incompatibility of (determined) physical reality and one's presumably distinct experience of will. Secondarily,

3814:

Hence the notion of contingency appeared as the very opposition of necessity, so that wherever a thing is considered dependent or relies upon another thing, it is contingent and thus not necessary.

896:(random decision making). The selection process is deterministic, although it may be based on earlier preferences established by the same process. Deliberative indeterminism has been referenced by 3007:

and colleagues reviewed literature on the psychological effects of a belief (or disbelief) in free will and found that most people tend to believe in a sort of "naive compatibilistic free will".

10511:

Feltz, Adam; Edward T. Cokely (March 2009). "Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism".

8298:

cause and effect that develops early in human life, before the acquisition of language...the question I raise here is whether brains share this property with other material objects in the world.

7563:

Yet perhaps not all conscious volition is an illusion. Our findings suggest that the traditional folk notions of willpower and character strength have some legitimate basis in genuine phenomena.

3028:

79 percent of evolutionary biologists said that they believe in free will according to a survey conducted in 2007, only 14 percent chose no free will, and 7 percent did not answer the question.

2790:

Benjamin Libet's results are quoted in favor of epiphenomenalism, but he believes subjects still have a "conscious veto", since the readiness potential does not invariably lead to an action. In

2745:

These studies of the timing between actions and the conscious decision bear upon the role of the brain in understanding free will. A subject's declaration of intention to move a finger appears

4312:

Free will, compatibilists argue, is here to stay, and the challenge for science is to figure out exactly how it works and not to peddle silly arguments that deny the undeniable (Dennett 2003)

3877:

The persistence of the traditional free will problem in philosophy seems to me something of a scandal. After all these centuries...it does not seem to me that we have made very much progress.

4998:... any observation necessitates an interference with the course of the phenomena, which is of such a nature that it deprives us of the foundation underlying the causal mode of description. 3066:

Moreover, whether or not these experimental findings are a result of actual manipulations in belief in free will is a matter of debate. First of all, free will can at least refer to either

4981:

Based on a lecture to the Scandinavian Meeting of Natural Scientists and published in Danish in Fysisk Tidsskrift in 1929. First published in English in 1934 by Cambridge University Press.

8198:, e.g. concrete physical objects. Intellect in his works is strictly connected with recognizing causes and effects and associating them, it is somewhat close to the contemporary view of 1231:

implies there is a set course that cannot be deviated from, but does not of itself make any claim with respect to the setting of that course (i.e., it does not necessarily conflict with

1364:

definition to suggest a person or a "someone" who is controlling or planning the causality of events before they occur and who then perhaps resides beyond the natural, causal universe.

8311: 2205:

of the will, is as such determined, and has entered the form of the phenomenon, the principle of sufficient reason. Hence we get the strange fact that everyone considers himself to be

677:. The relevance of such prospective indeterminate activity to free will is, however, contested, even when chaos theory is introduced to magnify the effects of such microscopic events. 8968:

Libet, Benjamin; Gleason, Curtis A.; Wright, Elwood W.; Pearl, Dennis K. (1983). "Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential)".

1105:

for the way one is in certain mental respects. But it is impossible for one to be responsible for the way one is in any respect. This is because to be responsible in some situation

6438:

Groblacher, Simon; Paterek, Tomasz; Kaltenbaek, Rainer; Brukner, Caslav; Zukowski, Marek; Aspelmeyer, Markus; Zeilinger, Anton (2007). "An experimental test of non-local realism".

1758:

are not causally inert with respect to the physical world provide a basis for illustrating incompatibilist free will (i.e. interactionalist dualism and non-reductive physicalism).

1682:, that is the notion that different epistemological methodologies are necessary to attain a full description of the world. Other forms of epistemological pluralist dualism include 2276:

choices, he nevertheless points out that they do not preclude freedom unless we fail to recognise them. Steiner argues that outer freedom is attained by permeating our deeds with

6886:

However, predeterminism is not completely avoided. If the codes within the genotype are not designed properly, then the organisms being evolved will be fundamentally handicapped.

1121:, and so on. At some point in the chain, there must have been an act of origination of a new causal chain. But this is impossible. Man cannot create himself or his mental states 777:, the idea that all behaviors, beliefs, and desires are fixed by our genetic endowment and our biochemical makeup, the latter of which is affected by both genes and environment, 230:

On one hand, humans have a strong sense of freedom, which leads them to believe that they have free will. On the other hand, an intuitive feeling of free will could be mistaken.

8203: 10684:

Gregory W. Graffin and William B. Provine, "Evolution, Religion, and Free Will," American Scientist 95 (July–August 2007), 294–97; results of Cornell Evolution Project survey,

1225:). Destiny likewise is related to determinism, but makes no specific claim of physical determinism. Even with physical indeterminism an event could still be destined to occur. 922:

have been constructed in which it is seen as a particular kind of complex, high-level process with an element of physical indeterminism. An example of this approach is that of

2491:

their lives are pre-determined. To deny freedom would be to deny the efforts of Buddhists to make moral progress (through our capacity to freely choose compassionate action).

1858:, claim that a person is acting on the person's own will only when it is the desire of that person to do the act, and also possible for the person to be able to do otherwise, 1127:. This argument entails that free will itself is absurd, but not that it is incompatible with determinism. Strawson calls his own view "pessimism" but it can be classified as 13407: 11973: 9838: 8032:"Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke in zwölf Bänden. Mit Einleitung von Dr. Rudolf Steiner, Stuttgart: Verlag der J.G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung Nachfolger, o.J. (1894–96)" 2742:

brain activity of the readiness potential leading up to subjects' movements began approximately half a second before the subject was aware of a conscious intention to move.

2055: 416:

on the grounds that, even if humans have something in common with these things, it remains possible and plausible that we are different from such objects in important ways.

1093:). He also took the view that the truth of determinism was irrelevant. He believed that the defining feature of voluntary behavior was that individuals have the ability to 3042:

Baumeister and colleagues found that provoking disbelief in free will seems to cause various negative effects. The authors concluded, in their paper, that it is belief in

1097:

a decision long enough to reflect or deliberate upon the consequences of a choice: "...the will in truth, signifies nothing but a power, or ability, to prefer or choose".

2854:, the affected individual's limb will produce unintentional movements without the will of the person. The affected limb effectively demonstrates 'a will of its own.' The 14544: 4107:

Are behaviors, judgments, and other higher mental processes the product of free conscious choices, as influenced by internal psychological states (motives, preferences,

1568: 8202:

and formation of associations. The intellectuality of all perception implied then of course that causality is rooted in the world, precedes and enables experience. See

3234:

There are also mentions of moral freedom in what are now termed as 'Deuterocanonical' works which the Orthodox and Catholic Churches use. In Sirach 15 the text states:

8953:, 1965. Hirnpotentialänderungen bei Willkürbewegungen und passiven Bewegungen des Menschen: Bereitschaftspotential und reafferente Potentiale. Pflügers Arch 284: 1–17. 1958:, a fundamental question is: From the standpoint of statistical outcomes, to what extent do the choices of a conscious being have the ability to influence the future? 233:

It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the view that the physical world can be explained entirely by

4825: 10624:

Bar-Hillel, M. 2007. Randomness is too important to trust to chance. Presented at the 2007 Summer Institute in Informed Patient Choice, Dartmouth Medical School, NH

10081: 2997:

Studies indicate that peoples' belief in free will is inconsistent. Emily Pronin and Matthew Kugler found that people believe they have more free will than others.

1951:

are controlled by forces outside ourselves, or by random chance. More sophisticated analyses of compatibilist free will have been offered, as have other critiques.

1899:

have tried to revive traditionally accepted struggles of free will with the formation of character. Compatibilist free will has also been attributed to our natural

219:

The underlying questions are whether we have control over our actions, and if so, what sort of control, and to what extent. These questions predate the early Greek

10744:

Baumeister, R.F.; Masicampo, E.J.; DeWall, C.N. (2009). "Prosocial benefits of feeling free: Disbelief in free will increases aggression and reduces helpfulness".

13347: 2972:

Caveats have, however, been identified in studying a subject's awareness of mental events, in that the process of introspection itself may alter the experience.

2565:

is truly free, and its freedom is also distinct from all feelings, thoughts, actions, or wills, and is thus not at all a freedom of will. The metaphysics of the

1493:

Weak theological determinism is either compatible or incompatible with metaphysical libertarian free will depending upon one's philosophical interpretation of

11492:, 1947 Harvard University Press; Religious Philosophy, 1961 Harvard University Press; and "St. Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy" in Religious Philosophy 2946:

the ring of a telephone (that is, the second requirement is not met), then that person is not likely to infer that either noise caused the tree to fall down.

2252:. The controllable and uncontrollable aspects of decision making thereby are made logically separable, as pointed out in the introduction. This separation of 15819: 2404:

viewed humans as pre-programmed (by virtue of being human) to seek certain goals, but able to choose between routes to achieve these goals (our Aristotelian

1008:

has defended hard incompatibilism, identifying a variety of positions where free will is irrelevant to indeterminism/determinism, among them the following:

719:(see causal determinism below), it can include all forms of determinism that necessitate the future in its entirety. Relevant forms of determinism include: 16485: 9039: 7527:

The nonconscious forms of self-regulation may follow different causal principles and do not rely on the same resources as the conscious and effortful ones.

2735:

making a movement, the volunteer reported the time on the clock when they first felt the conscious intention to move; this became known as Libet's W time.

1739:

of mental properties correlated with physical properties – implying causal reducibility. Non-reductive physicalism is therefore often categorised as

1717:

is grounded in the idea that everything in the world can actually be reduced analytically to its fundamental physical, or material, basis. Alternatively,

971:, one of the main architects of quantum theory, suggested, however, that no connection could be made between indeterminism of nature and freedom of will. 15470: 11603: 2959:. Although many interpret this work as a blow against the argument for free will, both psychologists and philosophers have criticized Wegner's theories. 11026:"Response to 'Free Will as Advanced Action Control for Human Social Life and Culture' by Roy F. Baumeister, A. William Crescioni and Jessica L. Alquist" 3921: 359:

determinism feed the development of compatibilist models. Separate classes of compatibilism and incompatibilism may even be formed to represent these.

16328: 11513: 8084:

Steiner, R. (1964). Rudolf Steiner Press, London, 1964, 1970, 1972, 1979, 230 pp., translated from the 12th German edition of 1962 by Michael Wilson.

3316:

Maimonides's reasoned that human beings must have free will (at least in the context of choosing to do good or evil), as without this, the demands of

1830:

matter. To be a compatibilist, one need not endorse any particular conception of free will, but only deny that determinism is at odds with free will.

1810:

make judgments about whether individuals are acting under their own free will under certain circumstances without bringing in metaphysics. Similarly,

1541:

the argument rests on a number of premises, many of which have received some degree of contention. Theological compatibilist responses have included:

111:

identified this issue, which remains a major focus of philosophical debate. The view that posits free will as incompatible with determinism is called

1505:(terminology used for clarity only). Soft theological determinism claims that humans have free will to choose their actions, holding that God, while 11528: 10333:

Feltz, Adam; Edward T. Cokely; Thomas Nadelhoffer (2009-02-01). "Natural Compatibilism versus Natural Incompatibilism: Back to the Drawing Board".

2148:), which is associated with many of our actions when we perform them. On reflection, we realize that they were necessary and determined all along. 1221:, but makes no specific claim of physical determinism. Even with physical indeterminism an event could still be fated externally (see for instance 9926:

Aarts, H.; Custers, R.; Wegner, D. (2005). "On the inference of personal authorship: enhancing experienced agency by priming effect information".

11827: 8511:. In order to avoid, at least in concept, the absolution of man of any guilt he then notes the contingency of all that takes place, i.e. lack of 10226:

Feldman, G.; Baumeister, R.F.; Wong, K.F. (2014). "July 30). Free will is about choosing: The link between choice and the belief in free will".

1773:

us to have experiences." According to some, "Intricately related to the hard problem of consciousness, the hard problem of free will represents

1713:; that is, that there are no non-physical substances (for example physically independent minds). Physicalism can be reductive or non-reductive. 1438:'s omniscience is perfect, what God knows about the future will inevitably happen, which means, consequently, that the future is already fixed." 185:(1st century CE): "it was the fact that nothing hindered us from doing or choosing something that made us have control over them". According to 11907: 11418: 11129:

Nahmias, Eddy; D. Justin Coates; Trevor Kvaran (2007-09-01). "Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions".

10032: 7366: 2099:

Some philosophers' views are difficult to categorize as either compatibilist or incompatibilist, hard determinist or libertarian. For example,

732:, future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature. Such determinism is sometimes illustrated by the 788:

Suggestions have been made that hard determinism need not maintain strict determinism, where something near to, like that informally known as

11401: 8326: 7913:

Stump, Eleonore (1996). "Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities". In Howard-Snyder, Daniel; Jordan, Jeff (eds.).

6583: 4296:

Joshua Greene; Jonathan Cohen (2011). "For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything". In Judy Illes; Barbara J. Sahakian (eds.).

1769:: "Solving the hard problem of consciousness involves determining how physiological processes such as ions flowing across the nerve membrane 1368:

asserts that a supremely powerful being has indeed fixed all events and outcomes in the universe in advance, and is a famous doctrine of the

661:

what goes on in our heads is as fixed and determined by prior events as what goes on when one domino topples another in a long row of them."

3186:

which remains purely passive. Weakened and diminished by Adam's fall, free will is yet not destroyed in the race (Sess. VI, cap. i and v)."

14520: 5080: 316:, as well as models supporting more minimal criteria; such as the ability to consciously veto an action or competing desire. Yet even with 152:

choices will turn out. Compatibilists thus consider the debate between libertarians and hard determinists over free will vs. determinism a

7928:

Honderich, T. (2001). "Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as Both False and the Real Problem". In Kane, Robert (ed.).

4085: 3309: 1995:

in which the mind is simply part of nature, perhaps merely a feature of many very complex self-programming feedback systems (for example,

313: 8528:, where one can try to show that more and more developed products appearing in the evolution of a universe or, simpler, an automaton are 8177:

sufficient bases (a so-called sufficient reason is the coincidence of all the necessary conditions). Without established causality, both

6366:

Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind; An Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense; And an Essay on Quantity

967:. It is evident that observation may disturb the outcome of the observation itself, rendering limited our ability to identify causality. 12472: 4365: 1304:

with a good creator deity (i.e. if a deity knew what they were going to choose, then they are responsible for letting them choose it).

10671: 9088: 1979:

models of free will often consider deterministic relationships as discoverable in the physical world (including the brain). Cognitive

479:

for undecided, there are exactly nine positions regarding determinism/free will that consist of any two of these three possibilities:

15766: 15445: 15435: 9600:

Assal, F.; Schwartz, S.; Vuilleumier, P. (2007). "Moving with or without will: Functional neural correlates of alien hand syndrome".

2815:

A study that compared deliberate and arbitrary decisions, found that the early signs of decision are absent for the deliberate ones.

2553:, for instance, matter is without any freedom, and soul lacks any ability to control the unfolding of matter. The only real freedom ( 1235:

free will). Free will if existent could be the mechanism by which that destined outcome is chosen (determined to represent destiny).

10685: 5137: 2511:, and Buddhists all taking slightly different lines. In many ways, the Buddhist position is closer to a theory of "conditionality" ( 1513:) is classified as theological incompatibilism also (see figure, bottom), and is relevant to a more general discussion of free will. 955:) introduce random occurrences at an atomic or subatomic level. These events might affect brain activity, and could seemingly allow 9791:

Frith, CD; Blakemore, S; Wolpert, DM (2000). "Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia: abnormalities in the awareness of action".

728:

The idea that everything is caused by prior conditions, making it impossible for anything else to happen. In its most common form,

11992: 11584:

Gazzaniga, M. & Steven, M.S. (2004) Free Will in the 21st Century: A Discussion of Neuroscience and Law, in Garland, B. (ed.)

10698:

Vohs, K.D.; Schooler, J.W. (2008). "The value of believing in free will: Encouraging a belief in determinism increases cheating".

9857: 2834:) despite the fact that they would prefer not to do so when it is socially inappropriate. Tics are described as semi-voluntary or 1876:

writes, "this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains." Similarly,

14787: 14552: 11536: 8504: 6398: 2713:, and researchers can now watch the brain's decision-making process at work. A seminal experiment in this field was conducted by 2047:

in the brain. The neuroscience of free will places restrictions on both compatibilist and incompatibilist free will conceptions.

5532:

Free will is the capacity of conscious agents to choose a future course of action among several available physical alternatives.

1431:

dictating all events in history: "everything that happens has been predestined to happen by an omniscient, omnipotent divinity."

15455: 12462: 10567:

Baumeister, R.; Crescioni, A.W.; Alquist, J. (2009). "Free will as advanced action control for human social life and culture".

4737:

Sartre also provides a psychological version of the argument by claiming that if man's actions are not his own, he would be in

3409: 959:

free will if the apparent indeterminacy of some mental processes (for instance, subjective perceptions of control in conscious

11472:

Ockham, William. Predestination, God's Knowledge, and Future Contingents, early 14th century, trans. Marilyn McCord Adams and

9495: 8524:

with regard to its direct previous cause in will and intellect. (The contingency, or fortuity, is even intuitive under modern

8096:

See Bricklin, Jonathan, "A Variety of Religious Experience: William James and the Non-Reality of Free Will", in Libet (1999),

4978: 2868:

together with observable involuntary motor activity" (emphasis in original). This syndrome is often a result of damage to the

2063:. The suicidal agents were not conscious that their free will have been manipulated by external, even if ungrounded, reasons. 16209: 15974: 15791: 13377: 12545: 12477: 11986: 11966: 11923: 11883: 11840: 11814:, Vallacher R.R., Tesser A., Borkowski W. (2000). Society of Self: The emergence of collective properties in self-structure. 11806: 11760: 11743: 11395: 10368:

Nichols, Shaun; Joshua Knobe (2007-12-01). "Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions".

10157: 10128: 10091: 10015: 9851: 9258: 9234: 9185: 9156: 8625: 8600: 8555: 8395: 8290: 8261: 8228: 8142: 8069: 7956: 7787: 7586: 7556: 7520: 7286: 7256: 7189: 7156: 7112: 7019: 6983: 6947: 6567: 6518: 6374: 6340: 6306: 6211: 6175: 6141: 6080: 6038: 6013: 5975: 5941: 5907: 5873: 5839: 5805: 5693: 5659: 5625: 5591: 5555: 5436: 5336: 5230: 5167: 5040: 4958: 4931: 4902: 4665: 4608: 4482: 4393: 4305: 4221: 4194: 4162: 4133: 3969: 3900: 3870: 3837: 3778: 3724: 3690: 3661: 3620: 3331: 2860: 1656: 11257: 8732:

Physics is simply unable to resolve the question of free will, although, if anything, it probably leans towards determinism.

2758:

to activity in the muscle underlying the movement; the entire process resulting in action involves more steps than just the

1217:

generally implies there is a set course that cannot be deviated from, and over which one has no control. Fate is related to

16275: 16073: 15751: 15440: 14837: 13477: 13397: 10787:

Monroe, Andrew E.; Brady, Garrett L.; Malle, Bertram F. (21 September 2016). "This Isn't the Free Will Worth Looking For".

6766:

Leibniz presents a clear case of a philosopher who does not think that predeterminism requires universal causal determinism

5317:: "We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state." For further discussion see 2189: 1182: 666: 17: 4831: 2677:'s view is that fear of determinism in the context of "genetics" and "evolution" is a mistake, that it is "a confusion of 2573:

schools strongly suggest a belief in determinism, but do not seem to make explicit claims about determinism or free will.

2178:

and thus liable to necessity. Thus, he argues, humans do not possess free will as conventionally understood. However, the

1666: 15344: 14568: 12446: 12098: 12083: 12068: 10097: 8650: 5102: 3481: 2859:

recordable on the scalp several hundred milliseconds before the overt appearance of a spontaneous willed movement. Using

2645: 2244:, which focuses on the problem of free will. Steiner (1861–1925) initially divides this into the two aspects of freedom: 4238: 2209:

quite free, even in his individual actions, and imagines he can at any moment enter upon a different way of life... But

1747:, yet other types of property dualism do not adhere to the causal reducibility of mental states (see epiphenomenalism). 165:

sharing only the common feature of not finding the possibility of determinism a threat to the possibility of free will.

16287: 16242: 15761: 15657: 15334: 8031: 6422: 8520:

with regard to God and the law of nature (as a specific case that could have not existed in other circumstances), and

3338: 133:

to be incompatible with free will and thus free will to be impossible whatever the case may be regarding determinism.

16112: 13668: 12154: 12028: 11952: 11937: 11864: 11788: 11774: 11593: 11569: 11523: 10924:

Nadelhoffer, Thomas; Shepard, Jason; Crone, Damien L.; Everett, Jim A.C.; Earp, Brian D.; Levy, Neil (October 2020).

8931: 8906: 8881: 8856: 8816: 8673: 8018: 7980: 7749:

A thoughtful list of careful distinctions regarding the application of empirical science to these issues is found in

7713: 7693: 7488: 6272: 5365: 4775: 4715: 4690: 4576: 3931: 3590: 3350: 1721:

asserts that mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties: that mental states (such as

79:, and other judgements which apply only to actions that are freely chosen. It is also connected with the concepts of 10873:

Caspar, Emilie A.; Vuillaume, Laurène; Magalhães De Saldanha da Gama, Pedro A.; Cleeremans, Axel (17 January 2017).

6935: 1777:

core problem of conscious free will: Does conscious volition impact the material world?" Others however argue that "

16521: 16252: 16232: 16068: 15853: 15741: 15480: 13580: 11025: 3225:

He predestined us to adoption as sons through Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the kind intention of His will.

2749:

the brain has begun to implement the action, suggesting to some that unconsciously the brain has made the decision

2653: 1289: 148:

for free will, arguing that choice involves preference for one course of action over another, requiring a sense of

815:

One kind of incompatibilism, metaphysical libertarianism holds onto a concept of free will that requires that the

107:

suggests that only one course of events is possible, which is inconsistent with a libertarian model of free will.

16536: 16526: 16376: 15859: 15846: 14937: 13327: 10288:

Nahmias, Eddy; Stephen G Morris; Thomas Nadelhoffer; Jason Turner (2006-07-01). "Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?".

9692:

Scepkowski, L.A.; Cronin-Golomb, A. (2003). "The alien hand: cases, categorizations, and anatomical correlates".

2342:

of causal law (i.e. that it precedes all experience and is rooted in the construction of the perceivable world):

785:. Combinations and syntheses of determinist theses, such as bio-environmental determinism, are even more common. 662: 296:, namely, that if the world is deterministic, then our feeling that we are free to choose an action is simply an 12126: 10405:

Sarkissian, HAGOP; Amita Chatterjee; Felipe de Brigard; Joshua Knobe; Shaun Nichols; Smita Sirker (2010-06-01).

9070: 5196: 3681:. In Raymond Y. Chiao; Marvin L. Cohen; Anthony J. Leggett; William D. Phillips; Charles L. Harper, Jr. (eds.). 3107: 2669:

have frequently addressed questions related to free will. One of the most heated debates in biology is that of "

1932:, Dennett presents an argument for a compatibilist theory of free will, which he further elaborated in the book 16247: 15941: 15865: 15505: 14536: 10926:"Does encouraging a belief in determinism increase cheating? Reconsidering the value of believing in free will" 8430:

our responsibility, it is plausible that the central loci of our responsibility are our choices, or "willings".

8181:

and in the external world, the passing of time would be impossible, because it is essentially directional. See

5404: 4504: 2310: 2175: 1862:. Hobbes sometimes attributes such compatibilist freedom to each individual and not to some abstract notion of 1434:

The second form, weak theological determinism, is based on the concept of divine foreknowledge – "because

7878:

Nida-Rümelin, Julian (1 January 2019). "The Reasons Account of Free Will A Libertarian-Compatibilist Hybrid".

4530: 4018: 3111:

Augustine's view of free will and predestination would go on to have a profound impact on Christian theology.

2218:

Schopenhauer elaborated on the topic in Book IV of the same work and in even greater depth in his later essay

16348: 15905: 15607: 15465: 14882: 14353: 13770: 13183: 13093: 13068: 12979: 3262: 1766: 1546: 1387:. Fatalism is the idea that everything is fated to happen, so that humans have no control over their future. 1255: 125:(the claim that determinism is true and thus free will is not possible). Another incompatibilist position is 10634:

Wagenaar, W.A. (1972). "Generation of random sequences by human subjects: A critical survey of literature".

6852:

Garris, M.D.; et al. (1992). "A Platform for Evolving Genetic Automata for Text Segmentation (GNATS)".

2623:

Early scientific thought often portrayed the universe as deterministic – for example in the thought of

1442:

There exist slight variations on the above categorisation. Some claim that theological determinism requires

864:

is associated with all particles, and pervades the entire universe, in both animate and inanimate entities.

16506: 16358: 16176: 15892: 15309: 15042: 14600: 14560: 14473: 13512: 12618: 11811: 11612: 11127:

neurological underpinnings), they are more likely to dissociate determinism from moral responsibility. See

3986: 3346: 3067: 1602: 1474:

Strong theological determinism is not compatible with metaphysical libertarian free will, and is a form of

993: 801: 382: 309: 118: 2523: 1423:. Two forms of theological determinism exist, here referenced as strong and weak theological determinism. 806: 16531: 16516: 15898: 15825: 15813: 14957: 14780: 14232: 13387: 12326: 8579:" in Freedom and Determinism. Campbell, Joseph Keim; O'Rourke, Michael; and Shier, David. 2004. MIT Press 8178: 3499: 3366:

the theological issue is not usually how to reconcile free will with God's foreknowledge, but with God's

2363:(which referenced the so-called intellectuality of representations, that is, in other words, objects and 1754: 1552:

Assert differences in non-temporal knowledge (space-time independence), an approach taken for example by

1467: 1005: 1004:

Hard incompatibilism is the idea that free will cannot exist, whether the world is deterministic or not.

301: 9003:

Libet, B. (1985). "Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action".

8766: 5257: 3088:

Along similar lines, Tyler Stillman has found that belief in free will predicts better job performance.

1490:

free will. Hard theological determinism is a form of theological incompatibilism (see figure, top left).

1482:

has absolute control over a person's actions. Hard theological determinism is similar in implication to

16338: 16307: 15872: 15707: 15672: 15567: 15384: 14877: 14528: 13492: 12958: 12573: 12114: 12014: 11854: 11292: 9394:"Internally Generated Preactivation of Single Neurons in Human Medial Frontal Cortex Predicts Volition" 8009: 7547:(Volume 2 of Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 487 7511:(Volume 2 of Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 487 3374:

developed an "acquisition" or "dual-agency" form of compatibilism, in which human free will and divine

3371: 3176: 2321: 2220: 1882: 1683: 1517:

The basic argument for theological fatalism in the case of weak theological determinism is as follows:

1348: 1086: 308:

is false and free will is possible (at least some people have free will). This view is associated with

32: 8419:. The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. 7752: 6606: 2536: 16541: 16202: 16042: 16032: 16012: 15967: 15886: 15652: 15562: 15012: 14987: 14927: 14719: 13228: 13063: 12683: 12538: 12467: 12187: 11078:"'Irresponsible and a Disservice': The integrity of social psychology turns on the free will dilemma" 5357: 3249: 2698: 2241: 1996: 1971: 1962:

and other philosophical problems pose questions about free will and predictable outcomes of choices.

1928: 1718: 1679: 964: 927: 923: 782: 394: 356: 10648: 10382: 10302: 10063: 10005: 9895: 9040:"Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential)" 8786: 7400: 6702: 5116: 5074: 3741: 16102: 16080: 15515: 15032: 14735: 14222: 13879: 13635: 13502: 13437: 12351: 9881:

Wegner, D.M.; Wheatley, T. (1999). "Apparent mental causation: sources of the experience of will".

8117: 7609:

Gallagher, S. (2000). "Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science".

6936:

Anne Lockyer Jordan; Anne Lockyer Jordan Neil Lockyer Edwin Tate; Neil Lockyer; Edwin Tate (2004).

4542: 4417: 3519: 3228: 2847:

seconds to hours at a time) may merely postpone and exacerbate the ultimate expression of the tic.

1671: 190: 174: 108: 11382: 6591: 4449: 3081:

Baumeister and colleagues also note that volunteers disbelieving in free will are less capable of

2452:

accepts both freedom and determinism (or something similar to it), but despite its focus on human

16047: 15832: 15726: 15450: 15430: 15404: 15319: 14842: 13367: 13297: 13178: 12963: 12643: 11629: 11324: 10686:

http://faculty.bennington.edu/~sherman/Evolution%20in%20America/evol%20religion%20free%20will.pdf

10033:"When consciousness matters: a critical review of Daniel Wegner's The illusion of conscious will" 7726: 7480: 3082: 2918: 2225:

In this work, he stated, "You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can

2079: 1980: 1401: 1396: 1377: 1297: 1281: 1222: 755: 729: 716: 336: 332: 246: 8745: 8590: 6103:

Randolph Clarke (1996). "Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action".

3746:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University – via Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 3240:

The exact meaning of these verses has been debated by Christian theologians throughout history.

1249:

Discussion regarding destiny does not necessitate the existence of supernatural powers. Logical

1211:

Although often used interchangeably, the words "fate" and "destiny" have distinct connotations.

16270: 16262: 16156: 16027: 16022: 15997: 15931: 15692: 15627: 15460: 14817: 14773: 14212: 13813: 13765: 13239: 13133: 13113: 12990: 12918: 12863: 12786: 12568: 12356: 12291: 10643: 10377: 10297: 9890: 8412: 7771: 7541:"Chapter 23: Free Willpower: A limited resource theory of volition, choice and self-regulation" 7505:"Chapter 23: Free Willpower: A limited resource theory of volition, choice and self-regulation" 5111: 4444: 4272: 4092: 3282: 2966: 2723: 2462: 1615: 1357: 824: 774: 638:

is that some form of determinism is true and yet we have some form of free will, position (3).

348: 335:, although other forms of determinism are also relevant to free will. For example, logical and 214: 10605:. Unpublished manuscript, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada: University of British Columbia. 9173: 8376: 8216: 8130: 8057: 7540: 7504: 5320: 4182: 4117: 4062: 3957: 3825: 3708: 3678: 3254: 1497: – and as such is interpreted as either a form of hard theological determinism (known as 16411: 16237: 16171: 15687: 15647: 15572: 15475: 15354: 14977: 14897: 14592: 14584: 14512: 14468: 13830: 13825: 13720: 13427: 13337: 13208: 12898: 12843: 12838: 12796: 12724: 12658: 12588: 12436: 12411: 12366: 12316: 12265: 12147: 11342: 11220: 10145: 9218: 9146: 8946: 8278: 8245: 7944: 7732: 7246: 7223: 7173: 7140: 6689: 6632: 6005: 5999: 5547:

Intentionality, Deliberation and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy

5014: 4211: 4150: 3858: 3651: 3610: 3217: 3097: 2727: 2670: 2083: 2035: 2031: 1714: 1630: 1592: 960: 952: 938: 919: 674: 200:) was introduced by Christian philosophy (4th century CE). It has traditionally meant (until 9553:"A comparison of Granger causality and coherency in fMRI-based analysis of the motor system" 9443:"Neural precursors of decisions that matter—an ERP study of deliberate and arbitrary choice" 8746:"Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as Both False, and the Real Problem" 8543: 8373:

A discussion of the roles of will, intellect and passions in Aquinas' teachings is found in

4948: 4886: 4383: 4318: 3890: 819:

be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances.

460:

suggests that compatibilists are only committed to the ability to do something otherwise if

16195: 16007: 16002: 15960: 15839: 15677: 15617: 15510: 15314: 15194: 14847: 14709: 13849: 13839: 13820: 13798: 13760: 13698: 13610: 13573: 13535: 13472: 12933: 12908: 12833: 12531: 12512: 12492: 12376: 12321: 12311: 12255: 12182: 11262: 10465: 9346: 9127: 7817: 6861: 6806: 6718: 6673: 6510:

Christosis: Pauline Soteriology in Light of Deification in Irenaeus and Cyril of Alexandria

6457: 5491: 5314: 5020: 4894: 4333: 3195: 2951: 2909: 2762:

of brain activity. The bearing of these results upon notions of free will appears complex.

2641: 2072: 2027: 2023: 2019: 2004: 1959: 1702: 1498: 1186: 1128: 778: 352: 328: 271:

Compatibilists maintain that mental reality is not of itself causally effective. Classical

265: 242: 126: 68: 15245: 14373: 11632:– disembodied, strangers to blood, sweat, and tears – have no occasion for that." (p. 30.) 7348: 3404: 3194:, have free will through which they can choose God and to do good works, with the goal of 2022:). Cognitive naturalism stresses the role of neurological sciences. Overall brain health, 1014:

Determinism (D) is true, D does not imply we lack free will (F), but in fact we do lack F.

811:

mental states; blue circles represent physical states; arrows describe causal interaction.

8: 16459: 16017: 15612: 15525: 15174: 15002: 14822: 14679: 14640: 14616: 14483: 14403: 14383: 14358: 14328: 13740: 13620: 13317: 13153: 13118: 13098: 13053: 12868: 12858: 12828: 12502: 12497: 12396: 12371: 12286: 12042: 11849: 11731: 11617: 8771: 5094: 3770: 3466: 3425: 3181:

thus rejecting free will. In condemnation of Calvin and Luther views, the Roman Catholic

2955:

actual behaviors, but is inferred from various cues through an intricate mental process,

2921:'s contributions to the free will debate have come primarily through social psychologist 2851: 2780:

suggest that the cancelling or "veto" of an action may first arise subconsciously as well

2719: 2453: 2356: 2167: 2155: 1710: 1478:(equivalent to theological fatalism below). It claims that free will does not exist, and 1470:

free will as consequent of theological determinism and its philosophical interpretation.

901: 816: 743: 657: 457: 452: 447:

remarks that C.D. Broad had a version of the consequence argument as early as the 1930s.

61: 13033: 11432:

Jackson, Timothy P. (1998). "Arminian edification: Kierkegaard on grace and free will".

10469: 9350: 8690: 8576: 7476: 7459: 6865: 6722: 6677: 6461: 5495: 5024: 4979:"The Atomic Theory and the Fundamental Principles underlying the Description of Nature; 4337: 3740:

McKenna, Michael; Coates, D. Justin (2015). "Compatibilism". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).

3308:, in a two part treatment, where human free will is specified as part of the universe's 2589:

freedom we have to get beyond the limitations of this universe; it cannot be found here.

381:, are those incompatibilists who accept determinism and reject free will. In contrast, " 103:

Some conceive free will to be the capacity to make choices undetermined by past events.

16511: 16501: 16405: 16037: 15912: 15879: 15682: 15662: 15637: 15632: 15577: 15296: 14917: 14887: 14674: 14669: 14504: 14443: 14313: 13901: 13808: 13793: 13745: 13693: 13507: 13497: 13267: 13257: 12761: 12673: 12431: 12416: 11901: 11876:

Quantum theory and free will : how mental intentions translate into bodily actions

11748: 11716: 11662: 11637: 11412: 11239: 11198: 11173: 11154: 11104: 11077: 11058: 10995: 10953: 10901: 10874: 10850: 10823: 10804: 10769: 10723: 10584: 10544: 10488: 10453: 10434: 10404: 10311: 10270: 10208: 10055: 9986: 9951: 9816: 9753: 9728: 9669: 9644: 9625: 9577: 9552: 9533: 9469: 9442: 9418: 9393: 9369: 9335:"An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement" 9334: 9310: 9283: 9119: 9020: 7945:"Part III: On the origin and nature of the emotions; Postulates (Proposition II, Note)" 7895: 7634: 7438: 7360: 7323: 7062: 7043: 6915: 6877: 6757: 6663: 6489: 6447: 6261: 5774: 5580: 5523: 5481: 5292: 5288: 5062: 5046: 4862: 4858: 4357: 3582: 3395:

because they are their own; however, the free will happens with the permission of God.

3317: 3164: 3156: 2930: 2405: 2000: 1817: 1646: 1598: 1459: 1448: 1373: 1344: 1170: 1146: 737: 733: 723: 699: 593:

may occupy any of the nine positions except (5), (8) or (3), which last corresponds to

378: 16477: 15108: 12040:'s assertion that God does not play dice with the universe has been misinterpreted)", 10872: 10120: 9804: 9284:"Timing and awareness of movement decisions: does consciousness really come too late?" 8727: 8501: 7843:

Lemos, John (2002). "Evolution and Free Will: A Defense of Darwinian Non–naturalism".

7622: 2456:, it rejects the western concept of a total agent from external sources. According to 2301: – the idea that progress is a real concept leading to improvement in the world. 227:), and some modern philosophers lament the lack of progress over all these centuries. 189:, the notion of incompatibilist free will is perhaps first identified in the works of 16333: 15597: 15557: 15542: 15270: 15199: 15179: 15063: 14947: 14729: 14714: 14704: 14684: 14433: 14264: 14167: 14157: 13886: 13844: 13547: 13277: 13193: 13148: 12734: 12703: 12426: 12386: 12301: 12270: 12177: 12024: 11982: 11962: 11948: 11933: 11919: 11889: 11879: 11860: 11836: 11784: 11770: 11756: 11739: 11667: 11589: 11574: 11565: 11519: 11391: 11203: 11146: 11142: 11109: 11094: 11062: 10999: 10957: 10945: 10906: 10855: 10808: 10761: 10715: 10711: 10588: 10536: 10528: 10493: 10426: 10422: 10391: 10350: 10346: 10315: 10287: 10200: 10153: 10124: 10087: 10011: 9990: 9943: 9908: 9847: 9820: 9808: 9758: 9709: 9674: 9617: 9582: 9525: 9474: 9423: 9374: 9315: 9264: 9254: 9230: 9181: 9152: 9111: 9062: 8985: 8927: 8902: 8877: 8852: 8812: 8669: 8645: 8621: 8596: 8551: 8391: 8286: 8257: 8224: 8138: 8065: 8014: 7976: 7952: 7899: 7860: 7783: 7709: 7689: 7626: 7582: 7552: 7516: 7484: 7315: 7282: 7252: 7185: 7152: 7108: 7015: 6979: 6943: 6563: 6514: 6481: 6473: 6370: 6336: 6302: 6268: 6207: 6200: 6171: 6137: 6076: 6034: 6009: 5971: 5937: 5903: 5869: 5835: 5801: 5778: 5739: 5689: 5655: 5621: 5587: 5551: 5527: 5515: 5507: 5503: 5432: 5361: 5332: 5226: 5163: 5129: 5036: 4954: 4927: 4898: 4866: 4771: 4711: 4686: 4661: 4604: 4572: 4478: 4389: 4349: 4301: 4217: 4190: 4158: 4129: 3965: 3927: 3896: 3866: 3833: 3774: 3720: 3686: 3657: 3616: 3586: 3489: 3457: 3420: 2905: 2823: 2636: 2595: 2577: 2471: 2179: 2008: 1811: 1300:, and is closely related to other such arguments, for example the incompatibility of 1163: 934: 444: 390: 281: 201: 96: 15017: 13038: 11158: 10941: 10773: 10548: 10438: 10212: 10059: 9955: 9629: 9123: 6881: 6781:

Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society

5472:

Danko D. Georgiev (2021). "Quantum propensities in the brain cortex and free will".

5296: 4361: 1781:

plays a far smaller role in human life than Western culture has tended to believe."

1619: 320:, arguments have been made against libertarianism in that it is difficult to assign 252:

The puzzle of reconciling 'free will' with a deterministic universe is known as the

16454: 16419: 16366: 16299: 16166: 16161: 16141: 16121: 16090: 15771: 15712: 15414: 15399: 15394: 15369: 15329: 15304: 15184: 15154: 15022: 14992: 14972: 14832: 14699: 14624: 14608: 14438: 14423: 14368: 14147: 13929: 13896: 13891: 13788: 13688: 13625: 13605: 13597: 13173: 13158: 13138: 12938: 12750: 12693: 12421: 12391: 12381: 12346: 12260: 12250: 12240: 12204: 12199: 12140: 11915: 11712: 11657: 11649: 11473: 11243: 11231: 11193: 11185: 11138: 11099: 11089: 11048: 11040: 10985: 10937: 10896: 10886: 10845: 10835: 10796: 10753: 10727: 10707: 10653: 10576: 10520: 10483: 10473: 10418: 10387: 10342: 10307: 10262: 10235: 10192: 10116: 10047: 9978: 9935: 9900: 9800: 9748: 9740: 9701: 9664: 9656: 9609: 9572: 9564: 9537: 9517: 9464: 9454: 9413: 9405: 9364: 9354: 9305: 9295: 9103: 9054: 9024: 9012: 8977: 8723: 7887: 7852: 7618: 7430: 7072: 6911: 6907: 6869: 6838: 6726: 6662:

Hooft, G. (2001). "How does god play dice? (Pre-)determinism at the Planck scale".

6555: 6493: 6465: 6112: 5766: 5729: 5499: 5284: 5121: 5050: 5028: 4854: 4633: 4341: 3766: 3578: 3509: 3494: 3476: 3392: 3205: 3191: 3182: 3148: 3144: 3126: 2786:

suggest models that explain the relationship between conscious intention and action

2704: 2546: 1740: 1726: 1687: 1483: 1244: 1090: 689: 297: 237:. The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either 122: 80: 11801:

Muhm, Myriam (2004). Abolito il libero arbitrio – Colloquio con Wolf Singer.

7638: 7180:(A lecture given in Mannheim, 8 May 1972 ed.). Psychology Press. pp. 23 4887: 3471: 2513: 1454: 121:(the claim that determinism is false and thus free will is at least possible) and 16449: 15776: 15587: 15537: 15265: 15209: 15169: 15129: 15007: 14912: 14754: 14488: 14227: 14182: 14142: 14090: 14035: 14025: 13949: 13924: 13906: 13859: 13750: 13683: 13678: 13566: 13287: 13218: 13203: 13123: 13103: 13078: 12888: 12698: 12633: 12406: 12401: 12341: 12296: 12245: 12063: 12037: 11822: 11560: 11288: 10524: 10196: 9939: 9409: 9248: 8508: 8199: 7576: 7379: 7100: 7007: 6971: 6937: 6779: 6508: 6426: 6364: 6330: 6296: 6235: 6165: 6131: 6070: 5965: 5931: 5897: 5863: 5829: 5794: 5683: 5649: 5615: 5545: 5426: 5220: 5155: 4655: 4598: 4568: 4472: 4246: 4183:"Chapter 9: The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will" 4022: 3863:

Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power

3561:

To state it briefly, we define "free will" as a will unimpeded by any compulsion.

3413: 3273: 2869: 2855: 2792: 2694: 2198: 2105: 2039: 1955: 1934: 1900: 1839: 1822: 1750: 1661: 1580: 1232: 981: 956: 942: 712: 371: 293: 186: 113: 16429: 11798:. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic. Collected essays by scientists and philosophers. 10051: 9729:"Subjective experience, involuntary movement, and posterior alien hand syndrome" 9222: 8950: 2731: 1169:

Fundamental debate continues over whether the physical universe is likely to be

362:

Below are the classic arguments bearing upon the dilemma and its underpinnings.

16439: 16424: 16391: 16151: 15786: 15736: 15364: 15275: 15204: 15189: 15159: 15134: 15088: 15073: 15068: 14967: 14907: 14892: 14872: 14862: 14857: 14827: 14724: 14478: 14378: 14363: 14338: 14333: 14217: 14107: 14045: 13964: 13954: 13944: 13854: 13735: 13730: 13715: 13655: 13640: 13615: 13417: 13198: 13188: 13043: 13028: 12973: 12744: 12603: 12507: 12441: 12219: 12214: 12059: 11555: 10974:"Many Labs 5: Registered Replication of Vohs and Schooler (2008), Experiment 1" 10239: 9904: 7951:(Original work published 1677 ed.). Digireads.com Publishing. p. 54. 6559: 6116: 5734: 5717: 3892:

Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will

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compatible with determinism. Some compatibilists even hold that determinism is

92: 11360: 11044: 10580: 9982: 9174:"Chapter 6: Where's the action? Epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will" 9107: 9058: 9016: 8981: 7538: 7502: 7141:"Chapter 5: Mental causation and intentionality in a mind naturalizing theory" 6730: 5770: 5125: 4180: 3955: 2557:) consists in realizing the ultimate separateness of matter and self. For the 2240:, who collaborated in a complete edition of Arthur Schopenhauer's work, wrote 1903:, where one must believe they are an agent in order to function and develop a 1678:. Cartesian dualism and Popper's three worlds are two forms of what is called 1637:(for example, consciousness, memory, and judgment) and body (for example, the 1017:

D is true, D does not imply we lack F, but in fact we don't know if we have F.

673:

in nature, fundamental limits of precision in measurement are inherent in the

177:

literature. The notion of compatibilist free will has been attributed to both

16495: 16146: 16136: 15602: 15260: 15250: 15240: 15230: 15164: 15149: 15144: 15139: 15103: 15098: 15093: 15078: 15037: 14932: 14796: 14408: 14348: 14298: 14137: 14075: 14060: 13959: 13874: 13803: 13755: 13663: 13645: 13487: 13213: 13163: 13128: 13108: 13088: 12653: 12361: 12336: 12331: 12033: 11893: 11832: 11679: 11235: 11189: 11150: 10990: 10973: 10891: 10840: 10800: 10757: 10532: 10430: 10354: 10319: 9705: 9300: 9201: 8548:

The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the Contemporary Debates

8442: 8351: 7864: 7319: 6477: 5743: 5511: 3645: 3524: 3433: 3337:

At the same time, Maimonides – and other thinkers – recognizes the

3171: 3071: 3037: 2922: 2893: 2884: 2883:

In addition, one of the most important ("first rank") diagnostic symptoms of

2674: 2584:, offers a good example of the worry about free will in the Hindu tradition. 2484: 2372: 2346: 2288: 2100: 1992: 1976: 1855: 1807: 1799: 1790: 1778: 1730: 1576: 1527: 1487: 1428: 1327:

is the idea that all events are determined in advance. Predeterminism is the

1190: 1174: 948: 761: 715:, so free will does not exist. Although hard determinism generally refers to 670: 646: 605:. The position (1) of hard determinism adds to the table the contention that 402: 317: 272: 153: 137: 130: 10478: 10111:

Pronin, Emily (2009). "The Introspection Illusion". In Mark P. Zanna (ed.).

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Adrian G. Guggisberg and Annaïs Mottaz have also challenged those findings.

2602:. But it is the strong man who stands up and says I will make my own fate." 2549:

do not agree with each other entirely on the question of free will. For the

2408:). His view has been associated with both compatibilism and libertarianism. 1427:

The first one, strong theological determinism, is based on the concept of a

16444: 16117: 15756: 15702: 15027: 14902: 14852: 14689: 14632: 14463: 14458: 14453: 14428: 14398: 14132: 14005: 13939: 13934: 13869: 13725: 13710: 13467: 13233: 13168: 13058: 12968: 12818: 12688: 12598: 12578: 12306: 11671: 11653: 11599: 11485: 11207: 11113: 10949: 10910: 10859: 10765: 10719: 10540: 10497: 10204: 9947: 9912: 9812: 9762: 9713: 9621: 9586: 9529: 9478: 9427: 9378: 9319: 9143:

A brief discussion of possible interpretation of these results is found in

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Frankfurt, H. (1971). "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person".

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Oxford Hb Of Free Will:Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories

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Mark Balaguer (1999). "Libertarianism as a Scientifically Reputable View".

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Libet, Benjamin (2003). "Can Conscious Experience affect brain Activity?".

4353: 3577:. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Vol. 50. pp. 1–52. 3429: 2965:

has argued that the subjective experience of free will is supported by the

2962: 2913: 2827: 2628: 2615:

humans have free will, free will may be described as a political doctrine.

2508: 2229:

only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing."

2197:

But the fact is overlooked that the individual, the person, is not will as

2015: 2003:), and so must be studied by the methods of empirical science, such as the 1943: 1938:. The basic reasoning is that, if one excludes God, an infinitely powerful 1795: 1762: 1664:

free will. Stemming from Cartesian dualism, a formulation sometimes called

1549:, although this denies foreknowledge and therefore theological determinism. 613:

is untrue, and the position (2) of libertarianism adds the contention that

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It Ain't Necessarily So: The Dream of the Human Genome and other Illusions

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Further discussion of this compatibilistic theory can be found in Thomas'

8463: 8217:"Chapter 7: The critique of morality: The three pillars of Kantian ethics" 7769: 3412:

is a contemporary expansion of this theme, adding how God, free will, and

1690:. Epistemological pluralism is one view in which the mind-body problem is 1462:

of philosophical positions regarding free will and theological determinism

16473: 16434: 16371: 16312: 16218: 15983: 15389: 15379: 15349: 15324: 15214: 15083: 14982: 14962: 14952: 14922: 14388: 14192: 13969: 13630: 13223: 13143: 13073: 13023: 12801: 12729: 12708: 12663: 12628: 12583: 12554: 11871: 9744: 8085: 5095:"On Indeterminism, Chaos, and Small Number Particle Systems in the Brain" 3504: 3342: 3187: 3160: 3140: 3043: 2767: 2710: 2570: 2162:

is not subordinate to the laws of necessity (causality) and is thus free.

1984: 1698: 1675: 1650: 1638: 1610: 1522: 1510: 1506: 1494: 1420: 1405: 1353: 1301: 1272: 1267: 1250: 1218: 1140: 985: 857: 840: 789: 765: 749: 708: 650: 398: 386: 305: 104: 76: 47: 11450:, vol. III. Reprinted in Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1967–78. 11053: 9459: 9333:

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foreknowledge implies destiny (it is known for certain what one will do)

1276:

an omniscient creator not only implies destiny but a form of high level

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seems to have held views on predestination similar to Calvinism in his

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This empiricist view was often denied by trying to prove the so-called

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Other forms of determinism are more relevant to compatibilism, such as

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More studies have since been conducted, including some that try to:

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were both asserted, and which became a cornerstone of the dominant

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generating random numbers), their behaviour betrays many patterns.

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basis "...free will cannot be squeezed into time frames of 150–350

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one another (descriptions of regularity in nature) and things that

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would have been meaningless, there would be no need for the

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3709:"The root of the free will problem: kinds of non-existence" 3383: 2558: 2496: 2272:

causes from the internal disposition receiving this cause.

1634: 1340: 1214: 1181:, it can be used to identify indeterminism in natural law. 861: 832: 828: 408:

Traditional arguments for incompatibilism are based on an "

344: 12132: 10978:

Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science

10566: 8682: 5405:"Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will" 2938:

The first event immediately precedes the second event, and

2117: 1849: 1032:

D isn't true, we don't have F, but F is compatible with D.

911:

responsibility cannot be assigned for any given decision.

15415:

Type physicalism (reductive materialism, identity theory)

14249: 13558: 11796:

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11725: 10743: 9969:

Kihlstrom, John (2004). "An unwarrantable impertinence".

8223:(Paperback ed.). Clarendon Press. pp. 196–201. 7772:"The addicted human brain: insights from imaging studies" 6784:. Far Western Philosophy of Education Society. p. 12 4918:

Fischer, John Martin (2009). "Chapter 2: Compatibilism".

3386:

Islam, Ash'aris understanding of a higher balance toward

2831: 2411:

In facing choices, he argued that humans are governed by

2034:

clearly influence mental activity, and their impact upon

1868: 1435: 1408:

stating that all events that happen are pre-ordained, or

1336: 1293: 434:

over these matters, we also can have no control over the

38:"Freewill" redirects here. For the software company, see 9599: 8098:

The Volitional Brain: Toward a Neuroscience of Free Will

7098: 5685:

Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology

5225:. Continuum International Publishing Group. p. 21. 4524: 4522: 4520: 4518: 4411: 4409: 3604: 3602: 3159:

which was formulated by the French Reformed theologian,

2395: 1193:, and are being constrained by ongoing experimentation. 1117:, one must have been responsible for the way one was at 1109:, one must have been responsible for the way one was at 669:, and while not necessarily representative of intrinsic 327:

Free will here is predominantly treated with respect to

268:

for actions if they are caused entirely by past events.

13348:

A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

12019:

John Baer, James C. Kaufman, Roy F. Baumeister (2008).

10691: 10451: 10004:

John Baer; James C. Kaufman; Roy F. Baumeister (2008).

9691: 9550: 8967: 8541: 7770:

Nora D Volkow; Joanna S Fowler; Gene-Jack Wang (2007).

6332:

A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge

5582:

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3713:

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3341:

given (i) that Judaism simultaneously recognizes God's

2361:

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2260:

has a very long history, going back at least as far as

429:

A third argument for incompatibilism was formulated by

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5718:"Libertarianism and Avoidability: A Reply to Widerker" 5709: 5681: 3432:, in holding that free will is a feature of a human's 3304:) is foundational. The most succinct statement is by 2598:: "It is the coward and the fool who says this is his 15820:

Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness

10510: 10454:"People believe they have more free will than others" 10225: 9790: 7917:. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 73–88. 7275:

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challenge metaphysical libertarianism with ideas of

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The Philosophical Journey: An Interactive Approach.

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The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature'

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Taylor & Francis. p. 11. 3208:discusses Predestination in some of his Epistles. 2830:make involuntary movements and utterances (called 974: 11783:McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages 11642:Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 11579:Agent Based Models and Generative Social Science. 10083:Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will 8464:"Summa Theologica: Free-will (Prima Pars, Q. 83)" 7304:"Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical" 7272: 7221: 7014:. Vol. 1. Macmillan Reference. p. 217. 6322: 5861: 5471: 5214: 5212: 5210: 4381: 3964:. Oxford University Press. pp. 183, 190–93. 2872:, either when it is severed to treat intractable 1633:, that is, consideration of the relation between 304:is the form of incompatibilism which posits that 160:one counterfactually wanted to do otherwise, one 16493: 10822:Crone, Damien L.; Levy, Neil L. (28 June 2018). 10786: 10734: 10115:. Vol. 41. Academic Press. pp. 42–43. 9551:Kayser, A.S.; Sun, F.T.; D'Esposito, M. (2009). 9496:Definitions and Classification of Tic Disorders. 9281: 9171: 8256:. University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 20. 7234:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 6506: 6418:. London: Routledge. Retrieved August 17, 2006, 5537: 5153: 4040:"How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?" 3987:"Fear of mechanism: A compatibilist critique of 3649: 3572: 3023: 2783:explain the underlying brain structures involved 2430: 1942:, and other such possibilities, then because of 1921: 173:The problem of free will has been identified in 11961:, Wij Zijn Ons Brein, Publishing Centre, 2010. 11828:Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will 10458:Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 10452:Pronin, Emily; Matthew B. Kugler (2010-12-28). 9726: 8374: 8062:The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy 7824:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University 7778:. Jones & Bartlett Learning. pp. 1061 7750: 7251:(12th ed.). Cengage Learning. p. 39. 6969: 6929: 6197: 6102: 5827: 4911: 4884: 3676: 3031: 1419:, or that they are destined to occur given its 629:as meaning both concepts are of dubious value. 292:A different approach to the dilemma is that of 264:dilemma as well: the question of how to assign 67:Free will is closely linked to the concepts of 11945:How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains? 11610:, Princeton University Press, 2023, 333 pp.), 10407:"Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal?" 10178:"March 1). Mistaking randomness for free will" 9880: 9037: 7666: 7574: 7568: 7498: 7496: 7138: 7092: 6999: 6939:Philosophy of Religion for A Level OCR Edition 6233: 5929: 5902:. Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp. 33–61. 5647: 5345: 5318: 5207: 4946: 4033: 4031: 4007:never count as self-evident proof of anything. 3951: 3949: 3947: 3945: 3943: 3919: 3888: 3759:"Did Epicurus discover the free-will problem?" 3706: 3573:Baumeister, Roy F.; Monroe, Andrew E. (2014). 3349:. 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Psychology Press. p. 8. 4060: 3856: 3739: 2392:) jointly decide upon the behaviour of both. 1821:, and the Stoic Chrysippus. In contrast, the 1075:, and any position that includes having F as 16472:This article incorporates material from the 14521:Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel 12091: 11608:Free Agents: How Evolution Gave Us Free Will 11459:Mackie, J.L. (1955) "Evil and Omnipotence", 11285:Discipline of the Immanuel Missionary Church 11224:Social Psychological and Personality Science 11171: 10828:Social Psychological and Personality Science 10789:Social Psychological and Personality Science 10697: 10246: 9151:(2nd ed.). Academic Press. p. 86. 8214: 8157: 8055: 7995:, Vol. 1., trans. E. F. J. Payne, p. 113-114 7877: 7743: 7667:Fischer, John Martin; Ravizza, Mark (1998). 7532: 6963: 6898:Sherman, H. (1981). "Marx and determinism". 6851: 6824: 6164:Timothy O'Connor (2005). Robert Kane (ed.). 6129: 6062: 6028: 5750: 4596: 4477:. 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To be responsible for the way one was at 27:Ability to make choices without constraints 16210: 16196: 15975: 15961: 14788: 14774: 13581: 13567: 12546: 12532: 12473:Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness 12155: 12141: 11906:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher ( 11635: 11417:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher ( 11019: 11017: 11015: 11013: 11011: 11009: 10746:Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 9769: 9508:Zinner, S.H. (2000). "Tourette disorder". 9490: 9488: 9253:. Bradford Books. MIT Press. p. 131. 9165: 9137: 8641: 8639: 8637: 8595:. 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But it 14553:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 12076: 11971: 11466: 11431: 11341: 11006: 10562: 10560: 10558: 10252: 10030: 9836: 9544: 9501: 9485: 8963: 8961: 8959: 8871: 8634: 8609: 8349: 8312:"Aquinas: Compatibilist or Libertarian" 7822:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 7763: 7680: 7678: 7581:. Oxford University Press. p. 96. 7449: 7405:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 7398: 7165: 6554:. SAGE Publications. pp. 1035–36. 6545: 6534: 6399:An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 6072:Person And Object: A Metaphysical Study 6029:Kane, Robert (2007). "Libertarianism". 6022: 5409:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 5351: 5262:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 5201:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 5008: 5006: 4809:van Inwagen, P.; Zimmerman, D. 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Oxford University Press, New York 11537:"There's No Such Thing as Free Will" 11534: 11323: 11082:British Journal of Social Psychology 10555: 10079: 9038:Benjamin Libet; et al. (1983). 8956: 8915: 8800: 8383:Arguments of the philosophers series 7993:The World as Will and Representation 7809: 7675: 7656:. New York: Oxford University Press. 7041: 7012:Encyclopedia of science and religion 6416:Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 5380: 5374: 5003: 4799: 4680: 4243:Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy 4118:"Chapter 7: Free will is un-natural" 3763:Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3250:Free will in theology § Judaism 3169:On the Predestination of the Saints. 2190:The World as Will and Representation 1965: 1586: 1183:Interpretations of quantum mechanics 667:interpretations of quantum mechanics 14569:Elements of the Philosophy of Right 12099:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 12084:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 12069:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 9827: 8876:. 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Cambridge, MA: 7915:Faith, Freedom, and Rationality 7751:Stoljar, Daniel (Sep 9, 2009). 7545:Oxford Handbook of Human Action 7509:Oxford Handbook of Human Action 7308:Philosophy & Public Affairs 6942:. Nelson Thornes. p. 211. 6891: 6813:. Merriam-Webster, Incorporated 6799: 6741: 6654: 6625: 6576: 6390: 5682:Daniel Clement Dennett (1981). 5452: 5268: 5197:"Arguments for Incompatibilism" 5086: 4922:. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 44 4838: 4817: 4784: 4759: 4744: 4724: 4699: 4674: 4617: 4505:"Arguments for Incompatibilism" 3913: 3882: 3808: 3131:There are also some holding to 3102: 2934:when two requirements are met: 2927:The Illusion of Conscious Will, 2842:: they may be experienced as a 2400:Thirteenth century philosopher 1521:Assume divine foreknowledge or 975:Agent/substance-causal theories 860:, the theory that a quality of 844:agent/substance-caused events. 15506:Altered state of consciousness 14537:The Theory of Moral Sentiments 13907:Value monism – Value pluralism 12463:Liberty, equality, brotherhood 11975:The Illusion of Conscious Will 11767:The Significance of Free Will. 10146:"The neuroscience of movement" 9840:The Illusion of Conscious Will 9206:The Illusion of Conscious Will 9180:. MIT Press. pp. 119–21. 8789:. Infidels.org. 25 August 2000 8653:. ramakrishnavivekananda.info. 7731:Hylton, Peter (Apr 30, 2010). 7006:Wentzel Van Huyssteen (2003). 6976:Dictionary of World Philosophy 6912:10.1080/00213624.1981.11503814 6267:. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 6136:. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 6033:. Wiley-Blackwell. p. 9. 5614:Laura Waddell Ekstrom (2000). 5354:God, Foreknowledge and Freedom 5219:Raymond J. VanArragon (2010). 4811:Metaphysics: The Big Questions 4603:. Cambridge University Press. 4385:How Brains Make Up Their Minds 4298:Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics 4239:"Free will. In E. Craig (Ed.)" 3895:. Lexington Books. p. 8. 3793: 3750: 3733: 3428:, a philosopher known for his 3370:, or divine commanding power. 3091: 2311:Principle of sufficient reason 2176:principle of sufficient reason 2094: 1802:was a classical compatibilist. 1709:is no more extensive than its 1653:and non-physical expositions. 1447:can also be seen as a form of 1261: 1177:with respect to violations of 653:completely by laws of physics. 56:is the capacity or ability to 13: 1: 16349:Parallel universes in fiction 15608:Hard problem of consciousness 15466:Integrated information theory 11131:Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10121:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)00401-2 9971:Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9805:10.1016/S0165-0173(99)00052-1 9005:Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8728:10.1016/S0262-4079(06)61122-6 8421:Philosophers who distinguish 8135:The significance of free will 7623:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5 7403:. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). 7048:The Consolation of Philosophy 6295:Michael J. Zimmerman (1984). 6069:Roderick M. Chisholm (2004). 5967:The Significance of Free Will 5462:(London, 1797), Vol. 1, p. 92 5352:Fischer, John Martin (1989). 5277:Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5199:. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). 4683:The Significance of Free Will 4531:"Foreknowledge and Free Will" 3531: 3263:U.S. House of Representatives 3139:. Among Protestants there is 3024:Among evolutionary biologists 2812:such as Libet's and Fried's. 2644:, and open to many different 2431:Free will as a pseudo-problem 1922:Free will as unpredictability 1767:hard problem of consciousness 1705:holding that everything that 1256:problem of future contingents 1100:The contemporary philosopher 1026:D is unproven, but we have F. 944:Miracles: A preliminary study 16359:Philosophy of space and time 16177:Libertarianism (metaphysics) 15906:What Is It Like to Be a Bat? 15893:The Science of Consciousness 15767:Subjectivity and objectivity 14601:On the Genealogy of Morality 14561:Critique of Practical Reason 13513:Philosophy of space and time 11779:Lawhead, William F. (2005). 11613:The New York Review of Books 11476:1982, Hackett, esp pp. 46–47 11384:Guide to Understanding Islam 10525:10.1016/j.concog.2008.08.001 10255:American Sociological Review 10197:10.1016/j.concog.2010.12.012 9940:10.1016/j.concog.2004.11.001 9410:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.11.045 8415:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 8244:Herbert James Paton (1971). 7943:Benedict de Spinoza (2008). 7755:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 7735:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 7611:Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7226:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 7172:Karl Raimund Popper (1999). 7143:. In Alberto Peruzzi (ed.). 7061:Aquinas, St. Thomas (1923). 6827:"Freedom and psycho-genesis" 6513:. Mohr Siebeck. p. 50. 6206:. Cornell University Press. 6049:and would be more likely to 5800:. Harvard University Press. 5586:. Cornell University Press. 5407:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 5260:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 5013:Niels Bohr (April 1, 1933). 4989:. Robert O. Doyle, publisher 4827:How to think about free will 4753:The Metaphysics of Free Will 4545:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 4533:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 4507:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 4420:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 4275:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 4063:"The dilemma of determinism" 3926:. Beacon Press. p. 38. 3575:Recent Research on Free Will 3536: 3272:the concept of "Free will" ( 3032:Effects of the belief itself 2170:, the actions of humans, as 1860:if the person had decided to 1647:Philosophical models of mind 1603:Dualism (philosophy of mind) 1503:soft theological determinism 1476:hard theological determinism 1020:D is true, and we do have F. 802:Libertarianism (metaphysics) 289:to make rational decisions. 7: 15899:Understanding Consciousness 15826:Consciousness and Cognition 15814:A Universe of Consciousness 13388:The Phenomenology of Spirit 12327:Freedom from discrimination 12162: 12009:Williams, Clifford (1980). 11928:Van Inwagen, Peter (1986). 11535:Cave, Stephen (June 2016). 11446:Kierkegaard, Søren. (1848) 11349:. Harvard University Press. 10513:Consciousness and Cognition 10185:Consciousness and Cognition 10052:10.1080/0951508021000042049 9928:Consciousness and Cognition 9498:. Retrieved 19 August 2006. 9208:. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 9145:David A. Rosenbaum (2009). 8353:Thomas Aquinas on Free Will 8277:Freeman, Walter J. (2009). 8034:(in German). Archived from 7708:. Oxford University Press. 7245:E. Bruce Goldstein (2010). 7178:All Life is Problem Solving 7107:. Oxford University Press. 6335:. Oxford University Press. 5970:. Oxford University Press. 5654:. Oxford University Press. 5550:. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 5431:. Oxford University Press. 5160:Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 4300:. Oxford University Press. 4213:Understanding Consciousness 4084:John A Bargh (2007-11-16). 3615:. Oxford University Press. 3500:Problem of mental causation 3443: 3300: 3288: 2660: 1987:approach to studying human 1761:It has been noted that the 796:Metaphysical libertarianism 713:incompatible with free will 475:for "true" and "false" and 302:Metaphysical libertarianism 175:ancient Greek philosophical 119:metaphysical libertarianism 10: 16558: 16339:Many-worlds interpretation 16226:General terms and concepts 15873:The Astonishing Hypothesis 15568:Disorders of consciousness 14529:A Treatise of Human Nature 13588: 12188:Personification of Liberty 12036:, "Is the Cosmos Random? ( 12015:Hackett Publishing Company 11859:, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 11855:On the Freedom of the Will 11688:Cognition and Brain Theory 11515:Laws, Mind, and Free Will. 11293:Immanuel Missionary Church 10240:10.1016/j.jesp.2014.07.012 9905:10.1037/0003-066X.54.7.480 9250:Consciousness Reconsidered 8013:, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 8010:On the Freedom of the Will 7932:. Oxford University Press. 7473:A Treatise of Human Nature 6900:Journal of Economic Issues 6811:Merriam-Webster Dictionary 6611:Collins English Dictionary 6560:10.4135/9781412963961.n191 6117:10.5840/philtopics19962427 5862:Peter Van Inwagen (1983). 5796:Philosophical Explanations 5735:10.5840/faithphil199512123 4768:Freedom and Responsibility 4382:Walter J. Freeman (2000). 4014:For full text on line see 3923:Freedom of choice affirmed 3859:"The problem of free will" 3802:On the Freedom of the Will 3715:. Routledge. pp. 142 3472:Angst#Existentialist angst 3436:, and thus that non-human 3247: 3243: 3177:On the Bondage of the Will 3095: 3035: 2903: 2896:and delusions of control. 2726:, which was discovered by 2702: 2692: 2534: 2322:A Treatise of Human Nature 2308: 2221:On the Freedom of the Will 2070: 1969: 1883:Dictionnaire philosophique 1788: 1684:psychophysical parallelism 1596: 1590: 1394: 1349:chain of prior occurrences 1317: 1311: 1265: 1242: 1200: 1138: 1089:, a similar stance on the 1087:theological noncognitivism 889:Deliberative indeterminism 875:deliberative indeterminism 799: 687: 369: 260:. This dilemma leads to a 212: 45: 33:Free will (disambiguation) 29: 16400: 16357: 16321: 16298: 16261: 16225: 16056: 15990: 15922: 15805: 15653:Minimally conscious state 15563:Consciousness after death 15493: 15423: 15295: 15288: 15223: 15117: 15051: 14810: 14803: 14745: 14652: 14497: 14263: 13988: 13917: 13779: 13654: 13596: 13526: 13450: 13249: 12989: 12717: 12561: 12468:All men are created equal 12455: 12279: 12233: 12170: 11947:Exeter: Imprint Academic 11636:Goodenough, O.R. (2004). 11564:. New York: Viking Press 11390:. Istanbul. p. 209. 11331:. London: Luzac & Co. 11045:10.1007/s12152-009-9046-8 10581:10.1007/s12152-010-9058-4 10152:. MIT Press. p. 19. 9983:10.1017/S0140525X04300154 9172:Gallagher, Shaun (2009). 9108:10.1007/s00221-009-1946-7 9017:10.1017/S0140525X00044903 8851:. New York: McGraw-Hill. 8310:Staley, Kevin M. (2005). 8285:. MIT Press. p. 88. 8246:"§2 Moral judgements are 7733:"Willard van Orman Quine" 7399:McKenna, Michael (2004). 7386:, Oxford 1998, Chapter 6. 7008:"theological determinism" 6731:10.1080/13604819608900044 6507:Ben C. Blackwell (2011). 6004:. HarperCollins. p. 5403:Randolph, Clarke (2008). 5385:. London: Luzac & Co. 5381:Watt, Montgomery (1948). 5358:Stanford University Press 5256:Eshleman, Andrew (2009). 5154:G.H.R. Parkinson (2012). 5126:10.1142/S0219635206001112 4541:McKenna, Michael (2009). 4529:Zagzebski, Linda (2011). 4416:McKenna, Michael (2009). 4237:Strawson, Galen (2011) . 4086:"Free will is un-natural" 3757:Bobzien, Susanne (2000). 3650:C. James Goodwin (2009). 3609:Bobzien, Susanne (1998). 3419:Some philosophers follow 3398: 2822:For example, people with 2699:Neuroscience of free will 2242:The Philosophy of Freedom 2078:Alternatives to strictly 1972:Neuroscience of free will 1719:non-reductive physicalism 1680:epistemological pluralism 1672:"three-world" formulation 965:neuroscience of free will 928:non-reductive physicalism 783:psychological determinism 553: 518: 513: 510: 507: 504: 501: 498: 495: 492: 489: 383:metaphysical libertarians 16248:Self-fulfilling prophecy 16081:Contingency (philosophy) 15516:Artificial consciousness 15033:William Kingdon Clifford 13880:Universal prescriptivism 13503:Philosophy of psychology 13438:Simulacra and Simulation 11630:Artificial intelligences 11588:, New York: Dana Press, 11236:10.1177/1948550609351600 11190:10.1177/1088868308316091 11024:Holton, Richard (2011). 10991:10.1177/2515245920917931 10892:10.3389/FPSYG.2017.00020 10841:10.1177/1948550618780732 10801:10.1177/1948550616667616 10758:10.1177/0146167208327217 10080:Mele, Alfred R. (2009). 10040:Philosophical Psychology 9778:Clinical Psychopathology 9706:10.1177/1534582303260119 9301:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00385 8651:"Sayings and utterances" 8375:Stump, Eleonore (2003). 8319:The Saint Anselm Journal 8204:online text of his proof 8183:online text of his proof 8118:Harvard University Press 7477:Of liberty and necessity 7248:Sensation and Perception 7101:"chapter 6, section 2.1" 6970:A. Pabl Iannone (2001). 6298:An essay on human action 6198:William L. Rowe (1991). 6053:our freedom rather than 5828:Richard Sorabji (1980). 5195:Vihvelin, Kadri (2003). 4885:Strawson, Galen (2010). 4793:Freedom and Determinisim 4600:Living without Free Will 4563:van Invagen, P. (1983). 4503:Vihvelin, Kadri (2011). 3677:Robert C Bishop (2010). 3520:Voluntarism (philosophy) 3357: 3143:, held primarily by the 2892:), leading to attendant 2754:awareness of action was 2545:) schools of thought in 2113:Free will as an illusion 2071:Not to be confused with 1765:have yet to resolve the 1755:metaphysical libertarian 1667:interactionalist dualism 1545:Deny the truth value of 1468:metaphysical libertarian 1073:classical libertarianism 1047:Living without Free Will 994:interactionalist dualism 711:is true, and that it is 191:Alexander of Aphrodisias 109:Ancient Greek philosophy 46:Not to be confused with 16522:Concepts in metaphysics 15833:Consciousness Explained 15752:Stream of consciousness 15727:Secondary consciousness 15451:Global workspace theory 15436:Dynamic core hypothesis 15431:Attention schema theory 15405:Revisionary materialism 15320:Eliminative materialism 14843:Charles Augustus Strong 13669:Artificial intelligence 13368:Critique of Pure Reason 11699:Harnad, Stevan (2001). 11347:The Philosophy of Kalam 10879:Frontiers in Psychology 10479:10.1073/pnas.1012046108 9360:10.1073/pnas.1210467109 9247:Flanagan, O.J. (1992). 9059:10.1093/brain/106.3.623 8982:10.1093/brain/106.3.623 8926:. New York: NYREV Inc. 8666:Filosofia della Scienza 8325:(2): 74. Archived from 8160:"David Hume: Causation" 7892:10.25162/arsp-2019-0001 7857:10.1111/1467-9973.00240 7727:Willard van Orman Quine 7575:Saul Smilansky (2000). 7481:Oxford University Press 7139:Sandro Nannini (2004). 6234:Richard Taylor (1966). 5930:John R. Searle (2001). 5771:10.1023/a:1004218827363 5648:Alfred R. Mele (2006). 5319:John T Roberts (2006). 5264:(Winter 2009 ed.). 5203:(Winter 2003 ed.). 4947:Alex Rosenberg (2005). 4830:, p. 15, archived from 4708:On Selfhood and Godhood 4706:Campbell, C.A. (1957). 4549:(Winter 2009 ed.). 4511:(Spring 2011 ed.). 4346:10.1196/annals.1279.003 4003:Feelings or intuitions 3920:Corliss Lamont (1969). 3889:Gregg D Caruso (2012). 3707:Janet Richards (2001). 3339:paradox that will arise 3083:counterfactual thinking 2919:Experimental psychology 2900:Experimental psychology 2351:Critique of Pure Reason 1947:and unknowable future. 1569:Alternate Possibilities 1402:Theological determinism 1397:Theological determinism 1391:Theological determinism 1378:theological determinism 1298:argument from free will 1282:theological determinism 1223:theological determinism 1071:, position 6 a form of 1067:, position 1 a form of 823:physics. This includes 756:Theological determinism 717:nomological determinism 483:Galen Strawson's table 462:different circumstances 337:theological determinism 333:nomological determinism 331:in the strict sense of 247:nomological determinism 16537:Philosophy of religion 16527:Philosophical problems 16412:closed timelike curves 16263:Time travel in fiction 16157:Metaphysical necessity 15887:The Emperor's New Mind 15693:Problem of other minds 15628:Introspection illusion 15461:Holonomic brain theory 14818:Alfred North Whitehead 12959:Type–token distinction 12787:Hypostatic abstraction 12569:Abstract object theory 12125:Quotations related to 11930:An Essay on Free Will. 11654:10.1098/rstb.2004.1548 11512:Horst, Steven (2011), 10636:Psychological Bulletin 10144:Susan Pockett (2009). 10031:Nahmias, Eddy (2002). 9776:Schneider, K. (1959). 7991:Schopenhauer, Arthur. 7930:The Free Will Handbook 7818:"Moral Non-Naturalism" 7578:Free Will and Illusion 7407:(Summer 200 ed.). 6697:Cite journal requires 6637:Philosophy 302: Ethics 6590:. 2010. Archived from 5896:Ted Honderich (1973). 5792:Robert Nozick (1981). 5311:scientific determinism 5258:"Moral Responsibility" 4751:Fischer, R.M. (1994). 4061:William James (1896). 3857:John R Searle (2013). 3330:("commandments"), and 3265: 3112: 3055: 2980:Believing in free will 2967:introspection illusion 2724:Bereitschaftspotential 2591: 2367:perceived with senses) 2216: 2163: 2125: 1803: 1622: 1567:Deny the Principle of 1463: 1358:biological determinism 915:Efforts of will theory 883:efforts of will theory 825:interactionist dualism 812: 775:biological determinism 703: 654: 601:, and position (2) is 318:physical indeterminism 280:, that is, separating 258:dilemma of determinism 215:Free will in antiquity 196:The term "free will" ( 181:(4th century BCE) and 16460:Traversable wormholes 16238:Closed timelike curve 16172:Uncertainty principle 15688:Primary consciousness 15573:Divided consciousness 15476:Multiple drafts model 14978:Maurice Merleau-Ponty 14593:The Methods of Ethics 13831:Divine command theory 13826:Ideal observer theory 13548:Philosophy portal 13428:Being and Nothingness 12844:Mental representation 11914:Tosun, Ender (2020). 11878:. Cham, Switzerland. 11816:Psychological Review. 11765:Kane, Robert (1998). 11381:Tosun, Ender (2012). 11361:"Man and His Destiny" 10700:Psychological Science 9883:American Psychologist 9661:10.1136/jnnp.55.9.806 9522:10.1542/pir.21-11-372 8922:Lewontin, R. (2000). 8811:. Prentice Hall Inc. 8689:Hoefer, Carl (2008). 8589:Flood, Gavin (2004). 8498:Summa contra gentiles 8445:. Newadvent.org. 1907 8215:R Kevin Hill (2003). 8056:Keimpe Algra (1999). 7423:Journal of Philosophy 6825:Ormond, A.T. (1894). 6130:Alan Donagan (1987). 5933:Rationality in Action 5865:An Essay on Free Will 5759:Philosophical Studies 5411:(Fall 2008 ed.). 5079:Full text on line at 4733:Being and Nothingness 4731:Sartre, J.P. (1943). 4626:Philosophical Studies 4597:Pereboom, D. (2003). 4565:An Essay on Free Will 4537:(Fall 2011 ed.). 4149:Paul Russell (2002). 4116:John A Bargh (2008). 3830:The View From Nowhere 3824:Thomas Nagel (1989). 3261:of Maimonides in the 3257: 3110: 3098:Free will in theology 3050: 2957:authorship processing 2738:Libet found that the 2671:nature versus nurture 2640:far from a potential 2606:Scientific approaches 2586: 2264:and the teachings of 2195: 2174:, are subject to the 2154: 2120: 2032:personality disorders 1954:In the philosophy of 1798: 1715:Reductive physicalism 1629:is one aspect of the 1618: 1575:In the definition of 1457: 1292:for the existence of 953:quantum indeterminacy 933:Although at the time 868:Event-causal theories 809: 697: 675:uncertainty principle 644: 117:and encompasses both 16271:Timelines in fiction 16113:Deterministic system 15840:Cosmic Consciousness 15678:Philosophical zombie 15618:Higher consciousness 15511:Animal consciousness 15315:Double-aspect theory 14848:Christopher Peacocke 14710:Political philosophy 13473:Feminist metaphysics 12513:Right-libertarianism 12493:Civil libertarianism 12447:Water and sanitation 12183:Moral responsibility 12117:at Wikimedia Commons 11943:Velmans, Max (2003) 11850:Schopenhauer, Arthur 11753:I Am A Strange Loop. 11263:The Gospel Coalition 11076:Miles, J.B. (2011). 9745:10.1136/jnnp.68.1.83 9510:Pediatrics in Review 8872:Dawkins, R. (1976). 8807:Pinel, P.J. (1990). 8691:"Causal Determinism" 8668:. Milan: Mondadori. 8377:"Intellect and will" 8129:Robert Kane (1998). 7302:Rawls, John (1985). 7063:"Ia, q. 14, art 13." 6831:Psychological Review 6594:on September 4, 2012 6363:Thomas Reid (2012). 6105:Philosophical Topics 6075:. Psychology Press. 5998:Lewis, C.S. (1947). 5964:Robert Kane (1996). 5722:Faith and Philosophy 5578:Hugh McCann (1998). 5425:Robert Kane (2005). 4813:. Oxford: Blackwell. 4755:. Oxford: Blackwell. 4654:Dennett, D. (1984). 4210:Max Velmans (2009). 4038:Max Velmans (2002). 3989:The Volitional Brain 3196:Christian perfection 3155:held by most in the 3151:; and there is also 3120:, adopted from what 2910:Cognitive psychology 2642:theory of everything 2524:Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 2328:regularly succeeding 2073:Religious naturalism 2024:substance dependence 2020:cognitive psychology 1703:philosophical theory 1511:divine foreknowledge 1499:theological fatalism 1185:at present are both 1129:hard incompatibilism 1000:Hard incompatibilism 790:adequate determinism 779:cultural determinism 748:The notion that all 663:Physical determinism 623:hard incompatibilism 441:consequence argument 329:physical determinism 254:problem of free will 243:physical determinism 169:History of free will 140:hold that free will 127:hard incompatibilism 69:moral responsibility 31:For other uses, see 18:Freedom (philosophy) 16507:Action (philosophy) 16308:Grandfather paradox 15613:Heterophenomenology 15526:Attentional control 15175:Lawrence Weiskrantz 15003:Patricia Churchland 14838:Brian O'Shaughnessy 14823:Arthur Schopenhauer 14680:Evolutionary ethics 14641:Reasons and Persons 14617:A Theory of Justice 13771:Uncertain sentience 13318:Daneshnameh-ye Alai 12829:Linguistic modality 12503:Left-libertarianism 12498:Drug liberalization 12043:Scientific American 11823:Sapolsky, Robert M. 11749:Hofstadter, Douglas 11581:Complexity, IV (5). 11448:Journals and Papers 11314:Rambam Teshuvah 5:5 11305:Rambam Teshuvah 5:4 10470:2010PNAS..10722469P 10411:Mind & Language 10335:Mind & Language 9602:Annals of Neurology 9557:Human Brain Mapping 9460:10.7554/elife.39787 9351:2012PNAS..109E2904S 9148:Human Motor Control 8897:Pinker, S. (2002). 8847:Morris, D. (1967). 8834:Behavioral Genetics 8772:Scientific American 8616:Koller, J. (2007). 7684:Dennett, D. (2003) 7652:Watson, D. (1982). 7084:C.S. Lewis (1980). 6866:1992SPIE.1710..714G 6723:1996City....1..181S 6678:2001hep.th....4219T 6588:Oxford Dictionaries 6470:10.1038/nature05677 6462:2007Natur.446..871G 6259:John Thorp (1980). 5868:. Clarendon Press. 5496:2021BiSys.20804474G 5025:1933Natur.131..457B 4338:2003NYASA1001...39D 4317:DC Dennett (2003). 3467:Agency in Mormonism 3426:Philo of Alexandria 2989:What people believe 2852:alien hand syndrome 2720:readiness potential 2445:Buddhist philosophy 2193:, Book 2, Sec. 23: 2168:Arthur Schopenhauer 2156:Arthur Schopenhauer 1711:physical properties 1701:. Physicalism is a 1331:that all events of 1239:Logical determinism 902:John Martin Fischer 848:Non-causal theories 835:overrides physical 744:Logical determinism 484: 16532:Philosophy of life 16517:Concepts in ethics 16484:but not under the 16406:general relativity 16329:Alternative future 16322:Parallel timelines 16300:Temporal paradoxes 16276:in science fiction 15913:Wider than the Sky 15880:The Conscious Mind 15683:Philosophy of mind 15663:Neurophenomenology 15638:Locked-in syndrome 15633:Knowledge argument 15297:Philosophy of mind 14918:George Henry Lewes 14888:Douglas Hofstadter 14675:Ethics in religion 14670:Descriptive ethics 14505:Nicomachean Ethics 13508:Philosophy of self 13498:Philosophy of mind 12762:Embodied cognition 12674:Scientific realism 12092:Colleen McClusky. 11556:Dennett, Daniel C. 11295:. 1986. p. 7. 9288:Front Hum Neurosci 8618:Asian Philosophies 8507:2017-11-23 at the 7479:" (1967 edition). 7455:Hobbes, T. (1651) 7349:Meyer, Susan Sauve 7145:Mind and Causality 7044:"Book V, Prose vi" 6750:Studia Leibnitiana 6425:2007-08-25 at the 6396:Locke, J. (1689). 6237:Action and purpose 5651:Free Will and Luck 5620:. Westview Press. 4889:Freedom and belief 4660:. Bradford Books. 4638:10.1007/BF01112527 4424:(Winter ed.). 4021:2013-05-05 at the 3705:See, for example, 3483:De libero arbitrio 3266: 3165:Augustine of Hippo 3157:Reformed tradition 3145:Methodist Churches 3113: 3015:Among philosophers 2931:empirical evidence 2541:The six orthodox ( 2440:Eastern philosophy 2278:moral imagination. 2246:freedom of thought 2164: 2126: 2009:cognitive sciences 1818:Nicomachean Ethics 1804: 1623: 1599:Philosophy of mind 1547:future contingents 1464: 1449:causal determinism 1374:Christian theology 1345:causal determinism 1135:Causal determinism 813: 734:thought experiment 724:Causal determinism 704: 655: 625:if one interprets 597:. Position (1) is 482: 209:Western philosophy 16468: 16467: 16420:Alcubierre metric 16334:Alternate history 16185: 16184: 15950: 15949: 15648:Mind–body problem 15598:Flash suppression 15558:Cartesian theater 15543:Binocular rivalry 15489: 15488: 15355:Mind–body dualism 15284: 15283: 15271:Victor J. Stenger 15246:Erwin Schrödinger 15200:Stanislas Dehaene 15180:Michael Gazzaniga 15064:Donald D. Hoffman 14948:John Polkinghorne 14928:Gottfried Leibniz 14763: 14762: 14730:Social philosophy 14715:Population ethics 14705:Philosophy of law 14685:History of ethics 14168:Political freedom 13845:Euthyphro dilemma 13636:Suffering-focused 13556: 13555: 12735:Category of being 12704:Truthmaker theory 12521: 12520: 12178:Cognitive liberty 12113:Media related to 11988:978-0-262-23222-7 11967:978-90-254-3522-6 11924:978-605-63198-2-2 11885:978-3-319-58301-3 11842:978-0-5255-6097-5 11761:978-0-465-03078-1 11744:978-1-4516-8340-0 11701:"No Easy Way Out" 11648:(1451): 1805–09. 11604:Kevin J. Mitchell 11596:, pp. 51–70. 11397:978-605-63198-1-5 10159:978-0-262-51257-2 10130:978-0-12-374472-2 10093:978-0-19-538426-0 10017:978-0-19-518963-6 9853:978-0-262-23222-7 9614:10.1002/ana.21173 9569:10.1002/hbm.20771 9260:978-0-262-56077-1 9235:978-0-7618-5862-1 9187:978-0-262-51257-2 9158:978-0-12-374226-1 8646:Swami Vivekananda 8627:978-0-13-092385-1 8602:978-0-521-60401-7 8557:978-0-19-973339-2 8423:freedom of action 8397:978-0-415-02960-5 8292:978-0-262-51257-2 8263:978-0-8122-1023-1 8230:978-0-19-928552-5 8144:978-0-19-512656-3 8112:James, W. (1907) 8071:978-0-521-25028-3 8030:Steiner, Rudolf. 7971:Hume, D. (1765). 7958:978-1-4209-3114-3 7789:978-0-7637-5083-1 7588:978-0-19-825018-0 7558:978-0-19-530998-0 7522:978-0-19-530998-0 7471:Hume, D. (1740). 7288:978-0-14-023012-3 7258:978-0-495-60149-4 7191:978-0-415-17486-2 7158:978-1-58811-475-4 7137:See for example: 7114:978-0-19-510763-0 7086:Mere Christianity 7021:978-0-02-865705-9 6985:978-0-415-17995-9 6949:978-0-7487-8078-5 6874:10.1117/12.140132 6569:978-1-4129-4164-8 6520:978-3-16-151672-6 6376:978-1-4077-2950-3 6342:978-0-19-875160-1 6308:978-0-8204-0122-5 6213:978-0-8014-2557-8 6177:978-0-19-517854-8 6143:978-0-7102-1168-2 6082:978-0-415-29593-2 6040:978-1-4051-3486-6 6015:978-0-688-17369-2 5977:978-0-19-510550-6 5943:978-0-262-69282-3 5909:978-0-7100-7392-1 5875:978-0-19-824924-5 5841:978-0-7156-1549-2 5807:978-0-674-66479-1 5695:978-0-262-54037-7 5661:978-0-19-530504-3 5627:978-0-8133-9093-2 5593:978-0-8014-8583-1 5557:978-0-7546-6058-3 5438:978-0-19-514970-8 5338:978-0-415-93927-0 5232:978-1-4411-3867-5 5169:978-0-415-00323-0 5042:978-0-444-89972-9 4960:978-0-415-34317-6 4933:978-1-4051-3486-6 4904:978-0-19-924750-9 4681:Kane, R. (1996). 4667:978-0-262-54042-1 4610:978-0-521-79198-4 4484:978-1-4051-3486-6 4395:978-0-231-12008-1 4307:978-0-19-162091-1 4249:on 26 August 2012 4223:978-0-415-42515-5 4196:978-0-19-518963-6 4164:978-0-19-515290-6 4135:978-0-19-518963-6 3985:TW Clark (1999). 3971:978-0-19-518963-6 3902:978-0-7391-7136-3 3872:978-0-231-51055-4 3839:978-0-19-505644-0 3780:978-0-19-924226-9 3726:978-0-415-21243-4 3692:978-0-521-88239-2 3663:978-0-470-52278-3 3622:978-0-19-823794-5 3490:Free will theorem 3458:Philosophy portal 3421:William of Ockham 3405:Søren Kierkegaard 3289:bechirah chofshit 3286: 3124:put forth in the 2906:Cognitive science 2824:Tourette syndrome 2665:Like physicists, 2637:Quantum mechanics 2578:Swami Vivekananda 2576:A quotation from 2493:Pubbekatahetuvada 2472:karma in Buddhism 2463:pratītyasamutpāda 2250:freedom of action 2084:mind–body dualism 2082:physics, such as 1966:The physical mind 1960:Newcomb's paradox 1914:The first group, 1812:political liberty 1657:Cartesian dualism 1649:are divided into 1631:mind–body problem 1593:Mind–body problem 1587:Mind–body problem 1164:Quantum mechanics 935:quantum mechanics 647:domino's movement 588: 587: 445:Peter van Inwagen 391:Peter van Inwagen 282:freedom of choice 202:the Enlightenment 198:liberum arbitrium 16:(Redirected from 16549: 16542:Religious ethics 16455:van Stockum dust 16367:Butterfly effect 16212: 16205: 16198: 16189: 16188: 16167:Superdeterminism 16162:Necessitarianism 16142:Hard determinism 16122:Non-essentialism 16091:Cause (medicine) 15977: 15970: 15963: 15954: 15953: 15940: 15939: 15930: 15929: 15772:Unconscious mind 15400:Reflexive monism 15395:Property dualism 15370:New mysterianism 15330:Epiphenomenalism 15310:Computationalism 15305:Anomalous monism 15293: 15292: 15185:Michael Graziano 15155:Francisco Varela 15059:Carl Gustav Jung 15023:Thomas Metzinger 14993:Martin Heidegger 14973:Kenneth M. Sayre 14833:Bertrand Russell 14808: 14807: 14790: 14783: 14776: 14767: 14766: 14753: 14752: 14700:Moral psychology 14645: 14637: 14629: 14625:Practical Ethics 14621: 14613: 14609:Principia Ethica 14605: 14597: 14589: 14581: 14573: 14565: 14557: 14549: 14541: 14533: 14525: 14517: 14513:Ethics (Spinoza) 14509: 14148:Moral imperative 13606:Consequentialism 13583: 13576: 13569: 13560: 13559: 13546: 13545: 13544: 13534: 13533: 13443: 13433: 13423: 13413: 13403: 13393: 13383: 13373: 13363: 13353: 13343: 13333: 13323: 13313: 13303: 13293: 13283: 13273: 13263: 12939:Substantial form 12751:Cogito, ergo sum 12694:Substance theory 12548: 12541: 12534: 12525: 12524: 12205:Positive liberty 12200:Negative liberty 12157: 12150: 12143: 12134: 12133: 12124: 12112: 12103: 12088: 12073: 12064:Zalta, Edward N. 12013:. Indianapolis: 12006: 12004: 12003: 11997: 11991:. Archived from 11980: 11911: 11905: 11897: 11846: 11720: 11695: 11675: 11665: 11544: 11507:The Grand Design 11493: 11483: 11477: 11474:Norman Kretzmann 11470: 11464: 11457: 11451: 11444: 11438: 11437: 11429: 11423: 11422: 11416: 11408: 11406: 11389: 11378: 11372: 11371: 11369: 11368: 11357: 11351: 11350: 11339: 11333: 11332: 11325:Watt, Montgomery 11321: 11315: 11312: 11306: 11303: 11297: 11296: 11281: 11275: 11274: 11272: 11270: 11254: 11248: 11247: 11218: 11212: 11211: 11201: 11169: 11163: 11162: 11124: 11118: 11117: 11107: 11097: 11073: 11067: 11066: 11056: 11030: 11021: 11004: 11003: 10993: 10968: 10962: 10961: 10921: 10915: 10914: 10904: 10894: 10870: 10864: 10863: 10853: 10843: 10819: 10813: 10812: 10784: 10778: 10777: 10741: 10732: 10731: 10695: 10689: 10682: 10676: 10675: 10674:. November 2021. 10668: 10662: 10661: 10658:10.1037/h0032060 10651: 10631: 10625: 10622: 10616: 10612: 10606: 10599: 10593: 10592: 10564: 10553: 10552: 10508: 10502: 10501: 10491: 10481: 10464:(52): 22469–74. 10449: 10443: 10442: 10402: 10396: 10395: 10385: 10365: 10359: 10358: 10330: 10324: 10323: 10305: 10285: 10279: 10278: 10250: 10244: 10243: 10223: 10217: 10216: 10182: 10173: 10167: 10166: 10141: 10135: 10134: 10108: 10102: 10101: 10096:. Archived from 10077: 10071: 10070: 10068: 10062:. Archived from 10037: 10028: 10022: 10021: 10001: 9995: 9994: 9966: 9960: 9959: 9923: 9917: 9916: 9898: 9878: 9872: 9871: 9869: 9868: 9862: 9856:. 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Archived from 9044: 9035: 9029: 9028: 9000: 8994: 8993: 8965: 8954: 8944: 8938: 8937: 8919: 8913: 8912: 8894: 8888: 8887: 8874:The Selfish Gene 8869: 8863: 8862: 8844: 8838: 8837: 8829: 8823: 8822: 8804: 8798: 8797: 8795: 8794: 8783: 8777: 8776: 8763: 8757: 8756: 8754: 8753: 8741: 8735: 8734: 8711: 8705: 8704: 8702: 8701: 8686: 8680: 8679: 8661: 8655: 8654: 8643: 8632: 8631: 8613: 8607: 8606: 8586: 8580: 8573: 8562: 8561: 8539: 8533: 8494: 8488: 8485:Summa Theologiae 8483:Thomas Aquinas, 8481: 8475: 8474: 8472: 8471: 8460: 8454: 8453: 8451: 8450: 8439: 8433: 8432: 8408: 8402: 8401: 8371: 8365: 8364: 8362: 8361: 8347: 8341: 8340: 8338: 8337: 8331: 8316: 8307: 8301: 8300: 8274: 8268: 8267: 8241: 8235: 8234: 8212: 8206: 8191: 8185: 8174: 8168: 8167: 8155: 8149: 8148: 8126: 8120: 8110: 8101: 8094: 8088: 8082: 8076: 8075: 8053: 8047: 8046: 8044: 8043: 8027: 8021: 8002: 7996: 7989: 7983: 7969: 7963: 7962: 7940: 7934: 7933: 7925: 7919: 7918: 7910: 7904: 7903: 7875: 7869: 7868: 7840: 7834: 7833: 7831: 7829: 7813: 7807: 7806:CSP, 2014, Ch. 7 7800: 7794: 7793: 7767: 7761: 7760: 7747: 7741: 7740: 7723: 7717: 7702: 7696: 7688:. Viking Books. 7682: 7673: 7672: 7664: 7658: 7657: 7649: 7643: 7642: 7606: 7600: 7599: 7597: 7595: 7572: 7566: 7565: 7536: 7530: 7529: 7500: 7491: 7475:Section VIII.: " 7469: 7463: 7453: 7447: 7446: 7418: 7409: 7408: 7396: 7387: 7380:Bobzien, Susanne 7377: 7371: 7370: 7364: 7356: 7345: 7339: 7338: 7336: 7334: 7299: 7293: 7292: 7269: 7263: 7262: 7242: 7236: 7235: 7219: 7206: 7200: 7199: 7169: 7163: 7162: 7135: 7126: 7125: 7123: 7121: 7096: 7090: 7089: 7081: 7075: 7073:Summa Theologica 7070: 7067:Summa Theologica 7058: 7052: 7051: 7039: 7033: 7032: 7030: 7028: 7003: 6997: 6996: 6994: 6992: 6967: 6961: 6960: 6958: 6956: 6933: 6927: 6926: 6895: 6889: 6888: 6849: 6843:10.1037/h0065249 6823:See for example 6822: 6820: 6818: 6807:"Predeterminism" 6803: 6797: 6796: 6791: 6789: 6775: 6769: 6768: 6745: 6739: 6738: 6706: 6700: 6695: 6693: 6685: 6671: 6660:See for example 6658: 6652: 6651: 6646: 6644: 6629: 6623: 6622: 6620: 6618: 6607:"Predeterminism" 6603: 6601: 6599: 6584:"Predeterminism" 6580: 6574: 6573: 6543: 6532: 6531: 6529: 6527: 6504: 6498: 6497: 6455: 6446:(7138): 871–75. 6435: 6429: 6412: 6403: 6394: 6388: 6387: 6385: 6383: 6360: 6354: 6353: 6351: 6349: 6326: 6320: 6319: 6317: 6315: 6292: 6286: 6285: 6283: 6281: 6266: 6256: 6250: 6249: 6247: 6245: 6231: 6225: 6224: 6222: 6220: 6205: 6195: 6189: 6188: 6186: 6184: 6161: 6155: 6154: 6152: 6150: 6127: 6121: 6120: 6100: 6094: 6093: 6091: 6089: 6066: 6060: 6059: 6026: 6020: 6019: 5995: 5989: 5988: 5986: 5984: 5961: 5955: 5954: 5952: 5950: 5927: 5921: 5920: 5918: 5916: 5893: 5887: 5886: 5884: 5882: 5859: 5853: 5852: 5850: 5848: 5825: 5819: 5818: 5816: 5814: 5799: 5789: 5783: 5782: 5754: 5748: 5747: 5737: 5713: 5707: 5706: 5704: 5702: 5679: 5673: 5672: 5670: 5668: 5645: 5639: 5638: 5636: 5634: 5611: 5605: 5604: 5602: 5600: 5585: 5575: 5569: 5568: 5566: 5564: 5541: 5535: 5534: 5489: 5469: 5463: 5456: 5450: 5449: 5447: 5445: 5422: 5413: 5412: 5400: 5387: 5386: 5378: 5372: 5371: 5356:. Stanford, CA: 5349: 5343: 5342: 5307: 5301: 5300: 5272: 5266: 5265: 5253: 5244: 5243: 5241: 5239: 5216: 5205: 5204: 5192: 5181: 5180: 5178: 5176: 5151: 5145: 5144: 5142: 5119: 5099: 5090: 5084: 5078: 5072: 5068: 5066: 5058: 5033:10.1038/131457a0 5010: 5001: 5000: 4995: 4994: 4974: 4965: 4964: 4944: 4938: 4937: 4915: 4909: 4908: 4892: 4882: 4871: 4870: 4842: 4836: 4835: 4821: 4815: 4814: 4806: 4797: 4796: 4788: 4782: 4781: 4766:Bok, H. (1998). 4763: 4757: 4756: 4748: 4742: 4736: 4728: 4722: 4721: 4703: 4697: 4696: 4678: 4672: 4671: 4651: 4642: 4641: 4621: 4615: 4614: 4594: 4583: 4582: 4560: 4551: 4550: 4538: 4526: 4513: 4512: 4500: 4489: 4488: 4470: 4455: 4454: 4452: 4432: 4426: 4425: 4413: 4404: 4403: 4379: 4373: 4372: 4370: 4323: 4314: 4293: 4287: 4286: 4284: 4283: 4268: 4259: 4258: 4256: 4254: 4234: 4228: 4227: 4207: 4201: 4200: 4178: 4172: 4171: 4146: 4140: 4139: 4113: 4104: 4103: 4097: 4091:. Archived from 4090: 4081: 4075: 4074: 4058: 4052: 4051: 4035: 4026: 4009: 3982: 3976: 3975: 3953: 3938: 3937: 3917: 3911: 3910: 3886: 3880: 3879: 3854: 3848: 3847: 3821: 3815: 3812: 3806: 3805: 3797: 3791: 3790: 3788: 3787: 3754: 3748: 3747: 3737: 3731: 3730: 3703: 3697: 3696: 3674: 3668: 3667: 3642: 3636: 3635: 3630: 3629: 3606: 3597: 3596: 3570: 3564: 3563: 3547: 3510:Superdeterminism 3495:Locus of control 3460: 3455: 3454: 3453: 3440:lack free will. 3416:are consistent. 3403:The philosopher 3393:Day of Judgement 3303: 3297: 3296: 3291: 3281: 3279: 3206:Paul the Apostle 3192:prevenient grace 3183:Council of Trent 3149:Jacobus Arminius 3127:Summa Theologica 3062: 3001:responsibility. 2866:will of its own, 2705:Neurostimulation 2547:Hindu philosophy 2531:Hindu philosophy 2001:cognitive robots 1741:property dualism 1729:, mental events 1727:anomalous monism 1688:epiphenomenalism 1484:hard determinism 1412:to happen, by a 1245:B-theory of time 1197:Destiny and fate 1091:existence of God 1069:hard determinism 1065:soft determinism 908:Centred accounts 879:centred accounts 690:Hard determinism 684:Hard determinism 599:hard determinism 595:soft determinism 485: 481: 294:incompatibilists 123:hard determinism 43: 36: 21: 16557: 16556: 16552: 16551: 16550: 16548: 16547: 16546: 16492: 16491: 16469: 16464: 16450:Tipler cylinder 16409: 16396: 16353: 16317: 16294: 16257: 16221: 16216: 16186: 16181: 16052: 15986: 15981: 15951: 15946: 15918: 15801: 15777:Unconsciousness 15588:Explanatory gap 15538:Binding problem 15485: 15419: 15280: 15266:Susan Blackmore 15219: 15210:Stuart Hameroff 15130:Antonio Damasio 15113: 15109:Wolfgang Köhler 15047: 15008:Paul Churchland 14913:George Berkeley 14883:Donald Davidson 14799: 14794: 14764: 14759: 14741: 14648: 14643: 14635: 14627: 14619: 14611: 14603: 14595: 14587: 14579: 14571: 14563: 14555: 14547: 14539: 14531: 14523: 14515: 14507: 14493: 14266: 14259: 14183:Self-discipline 14143:Moral hierarchy 14091:Problem of evil 14036:Double standard 14026:Culture of life 13984: 13913: 13860:Non-cognitivism 13775: 13650: 13592: 13587: 13557: 13552: 13542: 13540: 13522: 13446: 13441: 13431: 13421: 13411: 13401: 13391: 13381: 13371: 13361: 13351: 13341: 13331: 13321: 13311: 13301: 13291: 13288:De rerum natura 13281: 13271: 13261: 13245: 12985: 12889:Physical object 12725:Abstract object 12713: 12699:Theory of forms 12634:Meaning of life 12557: 12552: 12522: 12517: 12451: 12437:To be forgotten 12352:Internet access 12275: 12229: 12166: 12161: 12054: 12049: 12001: 11999: 11995: 11989: 11978: 11899: 11898: 11886: 11872:Stapp, Henry P. 11843: 11561:Freedom Evolves 11551: 11549:Further reading 11502: 11497: 11496: 11484: 11480: 11471: 11467: 11458: 11454: 11445: 11441: 11430: 11426: 11410: 11409: 11404: 11398: 11387: 11379: 11375: 11366: 11364: 11359: 11358: 11354: 11340: 11336: 11322: 11318: 11313: 11309: 11304: 11300: 11289:Shoals, Indiana 11283: 11282: 11278: 11268: 11266: 11256: 11255: 11251: 11219: 11215: 11170: 11166: 11125: 11121: 11074: 11070: 11028: 11022: 11007: 10969: 10965: 10922: 10918: 10871: 10867: 10820: 10816: 10785: 10781: 10742: 10735: 10696: 10692: 10683: 10679: 10670: 10669: 10665: 10649:10.1.1.211.9085 10632: 10628: 10623: 10619: 10613: 10609: 10600: 10596: 10565: 10556: 10509: 10505: 10450: 10446: 10403: 10399: 10383:10.1.1.175.1091 10366: 10362: 10331: 10327: 10303:10.1.1.364.1083 10286: 10282: 10267:10.2307/2089386 10251: 10247: 10224: 10220: 10180: 10174: 10170: 10160: 10142: 10138: 10131: 10109: 10105: 10094: 10078: 10074: 10066: 10035: 10029: 10025: 10018: 10002: 9998: 9967: 9963: 9924: 9920: 9896:10.1.1.188.8271 9879: 9875: 9866: 9864: 9860: 9854: 9843: 9835: 9828: 9799:(2–3): 357–63. 9789: 9785: 9774: 9770: 9725: 9721: 9690: 9686: 9641: 9637: 9598: 9594: 9563:(11): 3475–94. 9549: 9545: 9506: 9502: 9493: 9486: 9439: 9435: 9390: 9386: 9331: 9327: 9280: 9276: 9261: 9245: 9241: 9217: 9213: 9199: 9195: 9188: 9170: 9166: 9159: 9142: 9138: 9130: 9091: 9085: 9081: 9073: 9042: 9036: 9032: 9001: 8997: 8966: 8957: 8945: 8941: 8934: 8920: 8916: 8909: 8895: 8891: 8884: 8870: 8866: 8859: 8845: 8841: 8830: 8826: 8819: 8805: 8801: 8792: 8790: 8785: 8784: 8780: 8765: 8764: 8760: 8751: 8749: 8742: 8738: 8722:(2578): 52–55. 8712: 8708: 8699: 8697: 8687: 8683: 8676: 8662: 8658: 8649: 8644: 8635: 8628: 8614: 8610: 8603: 8587: 8583: 8574: 8565: 8558: 8540: 8536: 8509:Wayback Machine 8495: 8491: 8482: 8478: 8469: 8467: 8466:. Newadvent.org 8462: 8461: 8457: 8448: 8446: 8441: 8440: 8436: 8427:freedom of will 8409: 8405: 8398: 8372: 8368: 8359: 8357: 8348: 8344: 8335: 8333: 8329: 8314: 8308: 8304: 8293: 8275: 8271: 8264: 8242: 8238: 8231: 8213: 8209: 8200:cerebral cortex 8192: 8188: 8175: 8171: 8156: 8152: 8145: 8127: 8123: 8111: 8104: 8095: 8091: 8083: 8079: 8072: 8054: 8050: 8041: 8039: 8028: 8024: 8003: 7999: 7990: 7986: 7970: 7966: 7959: 7941: 7937: 7926: 7922: 7911: 7907: 7876: 7872: 7841: 7837: 7827: 7825: 7814: 7810: 7802:Claudio Costa. 7801: 7797: 7790: 7768: 7764: 7748: 7744: 7724: 7720: 7703: 7699: 7686:Freedom Evolves 7683: 7676: 7665: 7661: 7650: 7646: 7607: 7603: 7593: 7591: 7589: 7573: 7569: 7559: 7537: 7533: 7523: 7501: 7494: 7470: 7466: 7454: 7450: 7435:10.2307/2024717 7419: 7412: 7401:"Compatibilism" 7397: 7390: 7378: 7374: 7358: 7357: 7346: 7342: 7332: 7330: 7300: 7296: 7289: 7270: 7266: 7259: 7243: 7239: 7224:"Consciousness" 7210:Josh Weisberg. 7207: 7203: 7192: 7170: 7166: 7159: 7136: 7129: 7119: 7117: 7115: 7097: 7093: 7082: 7078: 7059: 7055: 7040: 7036: 7026: 7024: 7022: 7004: 7000: 6990: 6988: 6986: 6968: 6964: 6954: 6952: 6950: 6934: 6930: 6896: 6892: 6816: 6814: 6805: 6804: 6800: 6787: 6785: 6776: 6772: 6746: 6742: 6717:(1–2): 181–83. 6698: 6696: 6687: 6686: 6659: 6655: 6642: 6640: 6631: 6630: 6626: 6616: 6614: 6605: 6597: 6595: 6582: 6581: 6577: 6570: 6544: 6535: 6525: 6523: 6521: 6505: 6501: 6436: 6432: 6427:Wayback Machine 6413: 6406: 6395: 6391: 6381: 6379: 6377: 6361: 6357: 6347: 6345: 6343: 6327: 6323: 6313: 6311: 6309: 6293: 6289: 6279: 6277: 6275: 6257: 6253: 6243: 6241: 6240:. Prentice-Hall 6232: 6228: 6218: 6216: 6214: 6196: 6192: 6182: 6180: 6178: 6162: 6158: 6148: 6146: 6144: 6128: 6124: 6101: 6097: 6087: 6085: 6083: 6067: 6063: 6041: 6027: 6023: 6016: 5996: 5992: 5982: 5980: 5978: 5962: 5958: 5948: 5946: 5944: 5928: 5924: 5914: 5912: 5910: 5894: 5890: 5880: 5878: 5876: 5860: 5856: 5846: 5844: 5842: 5826: 5822: 5812: 5810: 5808: 5790: 5786: 5755: 5751: 5714: 5710: 5700: 5698: 5696: 5680: 5676: 5666: 5664: 5662: 5646: 5642: 5632: 5630: 5628: 5612: 5608: 5598: 5596: 5594: 5576: 5572: 5562: 5560: 5558: 5542: 5538: 5470: 5466: 5457: 5453: 5443: 5441: 5439: 5423: 5416: 5401: 5390: 5379: 5375: 5368: 5350: 5346: 5339: 5308: 5304: 5273: 5269: 5254: 5247: 5237: 5235: 5233: 5217: 5208: 5193: 5184: 5174: 5172: 5170: 5152: 5148: 5140: 5117:10.1.1.361.7065 5097: 5091: 5087: 5070: 5069: 5060: 5059: 5043: 5011: 5004: 4992: 4990: 4975: 4968: 4961: 4945: 4941: 4934: 4916: 4912: 4905: 4883: 4874: 4843: 4839: 4822: 4818: 4807: 4800: 4789: 4785: 4778: 4764: 4760: 4749: 4745: 4729: 4725: 4718: 4704: 4700: 4693: 4679: 4675: 4668: 4652: 4645: 4622: 4618: 4611: 4595: 4586: 4579: 4569:Clarendon Press 4561: 4554: 4543:"Compatibilism" 4527: 4516: 4501: 4492: 4485: 4471: 4458: 4433: 4429: 4418:"Compatibilism" 4414: 4407: 4396: 4380: 4376: 4368: 4321: 4308: 4294: 4290: 4281: 4279: 4269: 4262: 4252: 4250: 4235: 4231: 4224: 4208: 4204: 4197: 4179: 4175: 4165: 4147: 4143: 4136: 4101: 4099: 4095: 4088: 4082: 4078: 4059: 4055: 4036: 4029: 4023:Wayback Machine 4001:(8–9): 279–93. 3983: 3979: 3972: 3954: 3941: 3934: 3918: 3914: 3903: 3887: 3883: 3873: 3855: 3851: 3840: 3822: 3818: 3813: 3809: 3798: 3794: 3785: 3783: 3781: 3755: 3751: 3738: 3734: 3727: 3704: 3700: 3693: 3675: 3671: 3664: 3644:An argument by 3643: 3639: 3627: 3625: 3623: 3607: 3600: 3593: 3571: 3567: 3548: 3544: 3539: 3534: 3529: 3456: 3451: 3449: 3446: 3401: 3360: 3252: 3246: 3105: 3100: 3094: 3064: 3057: 3040: 3034: 3026: 3017: 2991: 2982: 2916: 2902: 2870:corpus callosum 2856:sense of agency 2793:Freedom Evolves 2707: 2701: 2695:Neurophilosophy 2693:Main articles: 2691: 2663: 2646:interpretations 2621: 2619:Quantum physics 2608: 2539: 2533: 2447: 2442: 2433: 2398: 2313: 2307: 2286: 2235: 2199:thing-in-itself 2115: 2097: 2076: 2069: 1997:neural networks 1974: 1968: 1956:decision theory 1935:Freedom Evolves 1924: 1901:sense of agency 1892: 1852: 1840:Harry Frankfurt 1823:incompatibilist 1793: 1787: 1763:laws of physics 1751:Incompatibilism 1662:incompatibilist 1613: 1595: 1589: 1581:incompatibilism 1399: 1393: 1322: 1316: 1310: 1296:, known as the 1270: 1264: 1247: 1241: 1233:incompatibilist 1205: 1199: 1191:indeterministic 1149:within a given 1143: 1137: 1045:Derk Pereboom, 1002: 982:George Berkeley 977: 957:incompatibilist 949:Indeterministic 870: 850: 804: 798: 738:Laplace's demon 692: 686: 591:Incompatibilism 374: 372:Incompatibilism 368: 366:Incompatibilism 310:non-materialist 217: 211: 187:Susanne Bobzien 171: 114:incompatibilism 51: 44: 37: 30: 28: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 16555: 16545: 16544: 16539: 16534: 16529: 16524: 16519: 16514: 16509: 16504: 16466: 16465: 16463: 16462: 16457: 16452: 16447: 16442: 16440:Krasnikov tube 16437: 16432: 16427: 16425:BTZ black hole 16422: 16416: 16414: 16398: 16397: 16395: 16394: 16392:Predestination 16389: 16384: 16379: 16374: 16369: 16363: 16361: 16355: 16354: 16352: 16351: 16346: 16341: 16336: 16331: 16325: 16323: 16319: 16318: 16316: 16315: 16310: 16304: 16302: 16296: 16295: 16293: 16292: 16291: 16290: 16280: 16279: 16278: 16267: 16265: 16259: 16258: 16256: 16255: 16250: 16245: 16240: 16235: 16229: 16227: 16223: 16222: 16215: 16214: 16207: 16200: 16192: 16183: 16182: 16180: 16179: 16174: 16169: 16164: 16159: 16154: 16152:Predeterminism 16149: 16144: 16139: 16134: 16129: 16124: 16115: 16110: 16105: 16100: 16095: 16094: 16093: 16083: 16078: 16077: 16076: 16071: 16060: 16058: 16057:Related topics 16054: 16053: 16051: 16050: 16045: 16040: 16035: 16030: 16025: 16020: 16015: 16010: 16005: 16000: 15994: 15992: 15988: 15987: 15980: 15979: 15972: 15965: 15957: 15948: 15947: 15945: 15944: 15934: 15923: 15920: 15919: 15917: 15916: 15909: 15902: 15895: 15890: 15883: 15876: 15869: 15862: 15857: 15850: 15843: 15836: 15829: 15822: 15817: 15809: 15807: 15803: 15802: 15800: 15799: 15794: 15789: 15787:Visual masking 15784: 15779: 15774: 15769: 15764: 15759: 15754: 15749: 15744: 15739: 15737:Sentiocentrism 15734: 15729: 15724: 15723: 15722: 15710: 15705: 15700: 15695: 15690: 15685: 15680: 15675: 15670: 15665: 15660: 15655: 15650: 15645: 15640: 15635: 15630: 15625: 15620: 15615: 15610: 15605: 15600: 15595: 15590: 15585: 15580: 15575: 15570: 15565: 15560: 15555: 15550: 15545: 15540: 15535: 15530: 15529: 15528: 15518: 15513: 15508: 15503: 15497: 15495: 15491: 15490: 15487: 15486: 15484: 15483: 15478: 15473: 15468: 15463: 15458: 15453: 15448: 15443: 15438: 15433: 15427: 15425: 15421: 15420: 15418: 15417: 15412: 15407: 15402: 15397: 15392: 15387: 15382: 15377: 15372: 15367: 15365:Neutral monism 15362: 15357: 15352: 15347: 15345:Interactionism 15342: 15337: 15332: 15327: 15322: 15317: 15312: 15307: 15301: 15299: 15290: 15286: 15285: 15282: 15281: 15279: 15278: 15276:Wolfgang Pauli 15273: 15268: 15263: 15258: 15253: 15248: 15243: 15238: 15233: 15227: 15225: 15221: 15220: 15218: 15217: 15212: 15207: 15205:Steven Laureys 15202: 15197: 15192: 15190:Patrick Wilken 15187: 15182: 15177: 15172: 15167: 15162: 15160:Gerald Edelman 15157: 15152: 15147: 15142: 15137: 15135:Benjamin Libet 15132: 15127: 15121: 15119: 15115: 15114: 15112: 15111: 15106: 15101: 15096: 15091: 15089:Max Wertheimer 15086: 15081: 15076: 15074:Gustav Fechner 15071: 15069:Franz Brentano 15066: 15061: 15055: 15053: 15049: 15048: 15046: 15045: 15043:William Seager 15040: 15035: 15030: 15025: 15020: 15018:René Descartes 15015: 15010: 15005: 15000: 14995: 14990: 14985: 14980: 14975: 14970: 14968:Keith Frankish 14965: 14960: 14955: 14950: 14945: 14940: 14935: 14930: 14925: 14920: 14915: 14910: 14908:Galen Strawson 14905: 14900: 14895: 14893:Edmund Husserl 14890: 14885: 14880: 14875: 14873:David Papineau 14870: 14865: 14863:David Chalmers 14860: 14858:Daniel Dennett 14855: 14850: 14845: 14840: 14835: 14830: 14828:Baruch Spinoza 14825: 14820: 14814: 14812: 14805: 14801: 14800: 14793: 14792: 14785: 14778: 14770: 14761: 14760: 14758: 14757: 14746: 14743: 14742: 14740: 14739: 14732: 14727: 14725:Secular ethics 14722: 14720:Rehabilitation 14717: 14712: 14707: 14702: 14697: 14692: 14687: 14682: 14677: 14672: 14667: 14662: 14656: 14654: 14650: 14649: 14647: 14646: 14638: 14630: 14622: 14614: 14606: 14598: 14590: 14585:Utilitarianism 14582: 14574: 14566: 14558: 14550: 14542: 14534: 14526: 14518: 14510: 14501: 14499: 14495: 14494: 14492: 14491: 14486: 14481: 14476: 14471: 14466: 14461: 14456: 14451: 14446: 14441: 14436: 14431: 14426: 14421: 14416: 14411: 14406: 14401: 14396: 14391: 14386: 14381: 14376: 14371: 14366: 14361: 14356: 14351: 14346: 14341: 14336: 14331: 14326: 14321: 14316: 14311: 14306: 14301: 14296: 14291: 14286: 14281: 14276: 14270: 14268: 14261: 14260: 14258: 14257: 14252: 14247: 14242: 14237: 14236: 14235: 14230: 14225: 14215: 14210: 14205: 14200: 14195: 14190: 14185: 14180: 14175: 14170: 14165: 14160: 14155: 14150: 14145: 14140: 14135: 14130: 14125: 14120: 14115: 14110: 14105: 14100: 14095: 14094: 14093: 14088: 14083: 14073: 14068: 14063: 14058: 14053: 14048: 14043: 14038: 14033: 14028: 14023: 14018: 14013: 14008: 14003: 13998: 13992: 13990: 13986: 13985: 13983: 13982: 13977: 13972: 13967: 13962: 13957: 13952: 13947: 13945:Existentialist 13942: 13937: 13932: 13927: 13921: 13919: 13915: 13914: 13912: 13911: 13910: 13909: 13899: 13894: 13889: 13884: 13883: 13882: 13877: 13872: 13867: 13857: 13852: 13847: 13842: 13840:Constructivism 13837: 13836: 13835: 13834: 13833: 13828: 13818: 13817: 13816: 13814:Non-naturalism 13811: 13796: 13791: 13785: 13783: 13777: 13776: 13774: 13773: 13768: 13763: 13758: 13753: 13748: 13743: 13738: 13733: 13728: 13723: 13718: 13713: 13708: 13707: 13706: 13696: 13691: 13686: 13681: 13676: 13671: 13666: 13660: 13658: 13652: 13651: 13649: 13648: 13643: 13641:Utilitarianism 13638: 13633: 13628: 13623: 13618: 13613: 13608: 13602: 13600: 13594: 13593: 13586: 13585: 13578: 13571: 13563: 13554: 13553: 13551: 13550: 13538: 13527: 13524: 13523: 13521: 13520: 13515: 13510: 13505: 13500: 13495: 13490: 13485: 13480: 13475: 13470: 13465: 13460: 13454: 13452: 13451:Related topics 13448: 13447: 13445: 13444: 13434: 13424: 13418:Being and Time 13414: 13404: 13394: 13384: 13374: 13364: 13354: 13344: 13334: 13324: 13314: 13304: 13294: 13284: 13274: 13264: 13253: 13251: 13247: 13246: 13244: 13243: 13236: 13231: 13226: 13221: 13216: 13211: 13206: 13201: 13196: 13191: 13186: 13181: 13176: 13171: 13166: 13161: 13156: 13151: 13146: 13141: 13136: 13131: 13126: 13121: 13116: 13111: 13106: 13101: 13096: 13091: 13086: 13081: 13076: 13071: 13066: 13061: 13056: 13051: 13046: 13041: 13036: 13031: 13026: 13021: 13016: 13011: 13006: 13001: 12995: 12993: 12991:Metaphysicians 12987: 12986: 12984: 12983: 12976: 12971: 12966: 12961: 12956: 12951: 12946: 12941: 12936: 12931: 12926: 12921: 12916: 12911: 12906: 12901: 12896: 12891: 12886: 12881: 12876: 12871: 12866: 12861: 12856: 12851: 12846: 12841: 12836: 12831: 12826: 12821: 12816: 12811: 12810: 12809: 12799: 12794: 12789: 12784: 12779: 12774: 12769: 12764: 12759: 12754: 12747: 12745:Causal closure 12742: 12737: 12732: 12727: 12721: 12719: 12715: 12714: 12712: 12711: 12706: 12701: 12696: 12691: 12686: 12681: 12676: 12671: 12666: 12661: 12656: 12651: 12646: 12641: 12636: 12631: 12626: 12621: 12619:Libertarianism 12616: 12611: 12606: 12604:Existentialism 12601: 12596: 12591: 12586: 12581: 12576: 12571: 12565: 12563: 12559: 12558: 12551: 12550: 12543: 12536: 12528: 12519: 12518: 12516: 12515: 12510: 12508:Libertarianism 12505: 12500: 12495: 12490: 12485: 12480: 12475: 12470: 12465: 12459: 12457: 12453: 12452: 12450: 12449: 12444: 12439: 12434: 12429: 12424: 12419: 12414: 12409: 12404: 12399: 12394: 12389: 12384: 12379: 12374: 12369: 12364: 12359: 12354: 12349: 12344: 12339: 12334: 12329: 12324: 12319: 12314: 12309: 12304: 12299: 12294: 12289: 12283: 12281: 12277: 12276: 12274: 12273: 12268: 12263: 12258: 12253: 12248: 12243: 12237: 12235: 12231: 12230: 12228: 12227: 12222: 12220:Social liberty 12217: 12215:Self-ownership 12212: 12207: 12202: 12197: 12196: 12195: 12185: 12180: 12174: 12172: 12168: 12167: 12160: 12159: 12152: 12145: 12137: 12131: 12130: 12118: 12105: 12104: 12089: 12074: 12053: 12052:External links 12050: 12048: 12047: 12031: 12017: 12007: 11987: 11969: 11956: 11941: 11926: 11912: 11884: 11868: 11847: 11841: 11819: 11809: 11799: 11792: 11777: 11763: 11746: 11738:. Free Press. 11729: 11721: 11696: 11680:Harnad, Stevan 11676: 11633: 11597: 11582: 11572: 11552: 11550: 11547: 11546: 11545: 11532: 11526: 11510: 11501: 11498: 11495: 11494: 11478: 11465: 11452: 11439: 11424: 11396: 11373: 11363:. Al-islam.org 11352: 11343:Wolfson, Harry 11334: 11316: 11307: 11298: 11276: 11249: 11213: 11184:(2): 168–192. 11164: 11119: 11068: 11005: 10984:(3): 429–438. 10963: 10916: 10865: 10834:(5): 612–619. 10814: 10795:(2): 191–199. 10779: 10733: 10690: 10677: 10663: 10626: 10617: 10607: 10594: 10554: 10503: 10444: 10397: 10360: 10325: 10280: 10261:(3): 375–384. 10245: 10218: 10168: 10158: 10136: 10129: 10103: 10100:on 2011-11-13. 10092: 10072: 10069:on 2011-08-13. 10023: 10016: 9996: 9961: 9918: 9873: 9852: 9826: 9783: 9768: 9719: 9684: 9635: 9592: 9543: 9516:(11): 372–83. 9500: 9484: 9433: 9384: 9325: 9274: 9259: 9239: 9211: 9193: 9186: 9164: 9157: 9136: 9133:on 2014-12-17. 9079: 9076:on 2013-05-26. 9030: 8995: 8955: 8939: 8932: 8914: 8907: 8889: 8882: 8864: 8857: 8839: 8824: 8817: 8799: 8778: 8758: 8744:Honderich, E. 8736: 8706: 8681: 8674: 8656: 8633: 8626: 8608: 8601: 8581: 8563: 8556: 8534: 8489: 8476: 8455: 8434: 8403: 8396: 8366: 8342: 8302: 8291: 8269: 8262: 8236: 8229: 8207: 8186: 8169: 8150: 8143: 8121: 8102: 8089: 8077: 8070: 8048: 8022: 7997: 7984: 7964: 7957: 7935: 7920: 7905: 7870: 7851:(4): 468–482. 7845:Metaphilosophy 7835: 7808: 7795: 7788: 7762: 7742: 7718: 7697: 7674: 7659: 7644: 7601: 7587: 7567: 7557: 7531: 7521: 7492: 7464: 7448: 7410: 7388: 7372: 7340: 7314:(3): 223–251. 7294: 7287: 7264: 7257: 7237: 7201: 7190: 7164: 7157: 7127: 7113: 7091: 7076: 7053: 7034: 7020: 6998: 6984: 6962: 6948: 6928: 6890: 6798: 6770: 6740: 6699:|journal= 6669:hep-th/0104219 6653: 6624: 6575: 6568: 6548:Predeterminism 6533: 6519: 6499: 6430: 6404: 6389: 6375: 6355: 6341: 6321: 6307: 6287: 6273: 6251: 6226: 6212: 6190: 6176: 6156: 6142: 6122: 6095: 6081: 6061: 6039: 6021: 6014: 5990: 5976: 5956: 5942: 5922: 5908: 5888: 5874: 5854: 5840: 5820: 5806: 5784: 5765:(2): 189–211. 5749: 5708: 5694: 5674: 5660: 5640: 5626: 5606: 5592: 5570: 5556: 5536: 5464: 5451: 5437: 5414: 5388: 5373: 5366: 5344: 5337: 5302: 5267: 5245: 5231: 5206: 5182: 5168: 5146: 5085: 5081:us.archive.org 5071:|journal= 5041: 5016:Light and Life 5002: 4966: 4959: 4939: 4932: 4910: 4903: 4872: 4837: 4816: 4798: 4783: 4776: 4758: 4743: 4723: 4716: 4698: 4691: 4673: 4666: 4643: 4616: 4609: 4584: 4577: 4552: 4514: 4490: 4483: 4456: 4427: 4405: 4394: 4374: 4306: 4288: 4260: 4229: 4222: 4202: 4195: 4173: 4163: 4141: 4134: 4114:Also found in 4076: 4053: 4027: 3977: 3970: 3939: 3932: 3912: 3901: 3881: 3871: 3849: 3838: 3816: 3807: 3792: 3779: 3749: 3732: 3725: 3698: 3691: 3669: 3662: 3648:described by: 3637: 3621: 3598: 3591: 3565: 3541: 3540: 3538: 3535: 3533: 3530: 3528: 3527: 3522: 3517: 3512: 3507: 3502: 3497: 3492: 3487: 3479: 3474: 3469: 3463: 3462: 3461: 3445: 3442: 3400: 3397: 3388:predestination 3359: 3356: 3355: 3354: 3335: 3270:Jewish thought 3248:Main article: 3245: 3242: 3137:Luis de Molina 3122:Thomas Aquinas 3104: 3101: 3096:Main article: 3093: 3090: 3060:Richard Holton 3049: 3033: 3030: 3025: 3022: 3016: 3013: 3005:Roy Baumeister 2990: 2987: 2981: 2978: 2943: 2942: 2939: 2901: 2898: 2894:hallucinations 2890:proprioception 2798:Daniel Dennett 2788: 2787: 2784: 2781: 2778: 2722:(after German 2715:Benjamin Libet 2690: 2687: 2662: 2659: 2620: 2617: 2607: 2604: 2532: 2529: 2446: 2443: 2441: 2438: 2432: 2429: 2402:Thomas Aquinas 2397: 2394: 2369: 2368: 2359:'s proof from 2354: 2306: 2303: 2285: 2282: 2238:Rudolf Steiner 2234: 2231: 2138: 2137: 2131:Baruch Spinoza 2122:Baruch Spinoza 2114: 2111: 2096: 2093: 2068: 2067:Non-naturalism 2065: 2030:, and various 1967: 1964: 1923: 1920: 1916:wanton addicts 1905:theory of mind 1891: 1888: 1851: 1848: 1844:Daniel Dennett 1789:Main article: 1786: 1783: 1643:nervous system 1620:René Descartes 1591:Main article: 1588: 1585: 1573: 1572: 1565: 1558:Thomas Aquinas 1550: 1538: 1537: 1534: 1531: 1525: 1515: 1514: 1491: 1444:predestination 1440: 1439: 1432: 1395:Main article: 1392: 1389: 1366:Predestination 1325:Predeterminism 1320:Predestination 1314:Predeterminism 1312:Main article: 1309: 1308:Predeterminism 1306: 1286:predestination 1278:predeterminism 1266:Main article: 1263: 1260: 1240: 1237: 1201:Main article: 1198: 1195: 1179:causal closure 1139:Main article: 1136: 1133: 1102:Galen Strawson 1061: 1060: 1059: 1058: 1057: 1056: 1055: 1054: 1053: 1052: 1051: 1050: 1034: 1033: 1030: 1027: 1024: 1021: 1018: 1015: 1001: 998: 976: 973: 937:(and physical 898:Daniel Dennett 869: 866: 849: 846: 800:Main article: 797: 794: 771: 770: 758: 753: 746: 741: 726: 688:Main article: 685: 682: 658:Alex Rosenberg 603:libertarianism 586: 585: 582: 579: 576: 573: 570: 567: 564: 561: 558: 551: 550: 547: 544: 541: 538: 535: 532: 529: 526: 523: 516: 515: 512: 509: 506: 503: 500: 497: 494: 491: 488: 414:Daniel Dennett 410:intuition pump 370:Main article: 367: 364: 273:compatibilists 266:responsibility 239:causal closure 223:(for example, 210: 207: 170: 167: 138:compatibilists 26: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 16554: 16543: 16540: 16538: 16535: 16533: 16530: 16528: 16525: 16523: 16520: 16518: 16515: 16513: 16510: 16508: 16505: 16503: 16500: 16499: 16497: 16490: 16489: 16487: 16483: 16479: 16475: 16461: 16458: 16456: 16453: 16451: 16448: 16446: 16443: 16441: 16438: 16436: 16433: 16431: 16428: 16426: 16423: 16421: 16418: 16417: 16415: 16413: 16407: 16403: 16399: 16393: 16390: 16388: 16385: 16383: 16380: 16378: 16375: 16373: 16370: 16368: 16365: 16364: 16362: 16360: 16356: 16350: 16347: 16345: 16342: 16340: 16337: 16335: 16332: 16330: 16327: 16326: 16324: 16320: 16314: 16311: 16309: 16306: 16305: 16303: 16301: 16297: 16289: 16286: 16285: 16284: 16281: 16277: 16274: 16273: 16272: 16269: 16268: 16266: 16264: 16260: 16254: 16251: 16249: 16246: 16244: 16241: 16239: 16236: 16234: 16231: 16230: 16228: 16224: 16220: 16213: 16208: 16206: 16201: 16199: 16194: 16193: 16190: 16178: 16175: 16173: 16170: 16168: 16165: 16163: 16160: 16158: 16155: 16153: 16150: 16148: 16147:Indeterminism 16145: 16143: 16140: 16138: 16137:Compatibilism 16135: 16133: 16130: 16128: 16125: 16123: 16119: 16116: 16114: 16111: 16109: 16106: 16104: 16101: 16099: 16096: 16092: 16089: 16088: 16087: 16084: 16082: 16079: 16075: 16072: 16070: 16067: 16066: 16065: 16062: 16061: 16059: 16055: 16049: 16046: 16044: 16043:Technological 16041: 16039: 16036: 16034: 16033:Psychological 16031: 16029: 16026: 16024: 16021: 16019: 16016: 16014: 16013:Environmental 16011: 16009: 16006: 16004: 16001: 15999: 15996: 15995: 15993: 15989: 15985: 15978: 15973: 15971: 15966: 15964: 15959: 15958: 15955: 15943: 15935: 15933: 15925: 15924: 15921: 15915: 15914: 15910: 15907: 15903: 15901: 15900: 15896: 15894: 15891: 15889: 15888: 15884: 15882: 15881: 15877: 15875: 15874: 15870: 15868: 15867: 15863: 15861: 15858: 15856: 15855: 15851: 15849: 15848: 15844: 15842: 15841: 15837: 15835: 15834: 15830: 15828: 15827: 15823: 15821: 15818: 15816: 15815: 15811: 15810: 15808: 15804: 15798: 15795: 15793: 15790: 15788: 15785: 15783: 15780: 15778: 15775: 15773: 15770: 15768: 15765: 15763: 15760: 15758: 15755: 15753: 15750: 15748: 15745: 15743: 15740: 15738: 15735: 15733: 15730: 15728: 15725: 15721: 15720: 15716: 15715: 15714: 15711: 15709: 15706: 15704: 15701: 15699: 15696: 15694: 15691: 15689: 15686: 15684: 15681: 15679: 15676: 15674: 15673:Phenomenology 15671: 15669: 15666: 15664: 15661: 15659: 15656: 15654: 15651: 15649: 15646: 15644: 15641: 15639: 15636: 15634: 15631: 15629: 15626: 15624: 15621: 15619: 15616: 15614: 15611: 15609: 15606: 15604: 15603:Hallucination 15601: 15599: 15596: 15594: 15591: 15589: 15586: 15584: 15581: 15579: 15576: 15574: 15571: 15569: 15566: 15564: 15561: 15559: 15556: 15554: 15551: 15549: 15546: 15544: 15541: 15539: 15536: 15534: 15531: 15527: 15524: 15523: 15522: 15519: 15517: 15514: 15512: 15509: 15507: 15504: 15502: 15499: 15498: 15496: 15492: 15482: 15479: 15477: 15474: 15472: 15469: 15467: 15464: 15462: 15459: 15457: 15454: 15452: 15449: 15447: 15444: 15442: 15439: 15437: 15434: 15432: 15429: 15428: 15426: 15422: 15416: 15413: 15411: 15408: 15406: 15403: 15401: 15398: 15396: 15393: 15391: 15388: 15386: 15383: 15381: 15378: 15376: 15373: 15371: 15368: 15366: 15363: 15361: 15358: 15356: 15353: 15351: 15348: 15346: 15343: 15341: 15338: 15336: 15335:Functionalism 15333: 15331: 15328: 15326: 15323: 15321: 15318: 15316: 15313: 15311: 15308: 15306: 15303: 15302: 15300: 15298: 15294: 15291: 15287: 15277: 15274: 15272: 15269: 15267: 15264: 15262: 15261:Roger Penrose 15259: 15257: 15254: 15252: 15251:Marvin Minsky 15249: 15247: 15244: 15242: 15241:Eugene Wigner 15239: 15237: 15234: 15232: 15231:Annaka Harris 15229: 15228: 15226: 15222: 15216: 15213: 15211: 15208: 15206: 15203: 15201: 15198: 15196: 15193: 15191: 15188: 15186: 15183: 15181: 15178: 15176: 15173: 15171: 15168: 15166: 15165:Giulio Tononi 15163: 15161: 15158: 15156: 15153: 15151: 15150:Francis Crick 15148: 15146: 15145:Christof Koch 15143: 15141: 15140:Bernard Baars 15138: 15136: 15133: 15131: 15128: 15126: 15123: 15122: 15120: 15116: 15110: 15107: 15105: 15104:William James 15102: 15100: 15099:Wilhelm Wundt 15097: 15095: 15094:Sigmund Freud 15092: 15090: 15087: 15085: 15082: 15080: 15079:Julian Jaynes 15077: 15075: 15072: 15070: 15067: 15065: 15062: 15060: 15057: 15056: 15054: 15050: 15044: 15041: 15039: 15038:William Lycan 15036: 15034: 15031: 15029: 15026: 15024: 15021: 15019: 15016: 15014: 15011: 15009: 15006: 15004: 15001: 14999: 14996: 14994: 14991: 14989: 14986: 14984: 14981: 14979: 14976: 14974: 14971: 14969: 14966: 14964: 14961: 14959: 14958:Joseph Levine 14956: 14954: 14951: 14949: 14946: 14944: 14941: 14939: 14936: 14934: 14933:Immanuel Kant 14931: 14929: 14926: 14924: 14921: 14919: 14916: 14914: 14911: 14909: 14906: 14904: 14901: 14899: 14898:Frank Jackson 14896: 14894: 14891: 14889: 14886: 14884: 14881: 14879: 14876: 14874: 14871: 14869: 14866: 14864: 14861: 14859: 14856: 14854: 14851: 14849: 14846: 14844: 14841: 14839: 14836: 14834: 14831: 14829: 14826: 14824: 14821: 14819: 14816: 14815: 14813: 14809: 14806: 14802: 14798: 14797:Consciousness 14791: 14786: 14784: 14779: 14777: 14772: 14771: 14768: 14756: 14748: 14747: 14744: 14738: 14737: 14733: 14731: 14728: 14726: 14723: 14721: 14718: 14716: 14713: 14711: 14708: 14706: 14703: 14701: 14698: 14696: 14693: 14691: 14688: 14686: 14683: 14681: 14678: 14676: 14673: 14671: 14668: 14666: 14663: 14661: 14658: 14657: 14655: 14651: 14642: 14639: 14634: 14631: 14626: 14623: 14618: 14615: 14610: 14607: 14602: 14599: 14594: 14591: 14586: 14583: 14578: 14575: 14570: 14567: 14562: 14559: 14554: 14551: 14546: 14543: 14538: 14535: 14530: 14527: 14522: 14519: 14514: 14511: 14506: 14503: 14502: 14500: 14496: 14490: 14487: 14485: 14482: 14480: 14477: 14475: 14472: 14470: 14467: 14465: 14462: 14460: 14457: 14455: 14452: 14450: 14447: 14445: 14442: 14440: 14437: 14435: 14432: 14430: 14427: 14425: 14422: 14420: 14417: 14415: 14412: 14410: 14407: 14405: 14402: 14400: 14397: 14395: 14392: 14390: 14387: 14385: 14382: 14380: 14377: 14375: 14372: 14370: 14367: 14365: 14362: 14360: 14357: 14355: 14352: 14350: 14347: 14345: 14342: 14340: 14337: 14335: 14332: 14330: 14327: 14325: 14322: 14320: 14317: 14315: 14312: 14310: 14307: 14305: 14302: 14300: 14297: 14295: 14292: 14290: 14287: 14285: 14282: 14280: 14277: 14275: 14272: 14271: 14269: 14267: 14262: 14256: 14253: 14251: 14248: 14246: 14243: 14241: 14238: 14234: 14231: 14229: 14226: 14224: 14221: 14220: 14219: 14216: 14214: 14211: 14209: 14206: 14204: 14201: 14199: 14196: 14194: 14191: 14189: 14186: 14184: 14181: 14179: 14176: 14174: 14171: 14169: 14166: 14164: 14161: 14159: 14156: 14154: 14151: 14149: 14146: 14144: 14141: 14139: 14138:Moral courage 14136: 14134: 14131: 14129: 14126: 14124: 14121: 14119: 14116: 14114: 14111: 14109: 14106: 14104: 14101: 14099: 14096: 14092: 14089: 14087: 14084: 14082: 14079: 14078: 14077: 14076:Good and evil 14074: 14072: 14069: 14067: 14064: 14062: 14061:Family values 14059: 14057: 14054: 14052: 14049: 14047: 14044: 14042: 14039: 14037: 14034: 14032: 14029: 14027: 14024: 14022: 14019: 14017: 14014: 14012: 14009: 14007: 14004: 14002: 13999: 13997: 13994: 13993: 13991: 13987: 13981: 13978: 13976: 13973: 13971: 13968: 13966: 13963: 13961: 13958: 13956: 13953: 13951: 13948: 13946: 13943: 13941: 13938: 13936: 13933: 13931: 13928: 13926: 13923: 13922: 13920: 13916: 13908: 13905: 13904: 13903: 13900: 13898: 13895: 13893: 13890: 13888: 13885: 13881: 13878: 13876: 13875:Quasi-realism 13873: 13871: 13868: 13866: 13863: 13862: 13861: 13858: 13856: 13853: 13851: 13848: 13846: 13843: 13841: 13838: 13832: 13829: 13827: 13824: 13823: 13822: 13819: 13815: 13812: 13810: 13807: 13806: 13805: 13802: 13801: 13800: 13797: 13795: 13792: 13790: 13787: 13786: 13784: 13782: 13778: 13772: 13769: 13767: 13764: 13762: 13759: 13757: 13754: 13752: 13749: 13747: 13744: 13742: 13739: 13737: 13734: 13732: 13729: 13727: 13724: 13722: 13719: 13717: 13714: 13712: 13709: 13705: 13702: 13701: 13700: 13699:Environmental 13697: 13695: 13692: 13690: 13687: 13685: 13682: 13680: 13677: 13675: 13672: 13670: 13667: 13665: 13662: 13661: 13659: 13657: 13653: 13647: 13644: 13642: 13639: 13637: 13634: 13632: 13629: 13627: 13624: 13622: 13621:Particularism 13619: 13617: 13614: 13612: 13609: 13607: 13604: 13603: 13601: 13599: 13595: 13591: 13584: 13579: 13577: 13572: 13570: 13565: 13564: 13561: 13549: 13539: 13537: 13529: 13528: 13525: 13519: 13516: 13514: 13511: 13509: 13506: 13504: 13501: 13499: 13496: 13494: 13493:Phenomenology 13491: 13489: 13486: 13484: 13481: 13479: 13476: 13474: 13471: 13469: 13466: 13464: 13461: 13459: 13456: 13455: 13453: 13449: 13440: 13439: 13435: 13430: 13429: 13425: 13420: 13419: 13415: 13410: 13409: 13405: 13400: 13399: 13395: 13390: 13389: 13385: 13380: 13379: 13375: 13370: 13369: 13365: 13360: 13359: 13355: 13350: 13349: 13345: 13340: 13339: 13335: 13330: 13329: 13325: 13320: 13319: 13315: 13310: 13309: 13305: 13300: 13299: 13295: 13290: 13289: 13285: 13280: 13279: 13275: 13270: 13269: 13265: 13260: 13259: 13255: 13254: 13252: 13250:Notable works 13248: 13242: 13241: 13237: 13235: 13232: 13230: 13227: 13225: 13222: 13220: 13217: 13215: 13212: 13210: 13207: 13205: 13202: 13200: 13197: 13195: 13192: 13190: 13187: 13185: 13182: 13180: 13177: 13175: 13172: 13170: 13167: 13165: 13162: 13160: 13157: 13155: 13152: 13150: 13147: 13145: 13142: 13140: 13137: 13135: 13132: 13130: 13127: 13125: 13122: 13120: 13117: 13115: 13112: 13110: 13107: 13105: 13102: 13100: 13097: 13095: 13092: 13090: 13087: 13085: 13082: 13080: 13077: 13075: 13072: 13070: 13067: 13065: 13062: 13060: 13057: 13055: 13052: 13050: 13047: 13045: 13042: 13040: 13037: 13035: 13032: 13030: 13027: 13025: 13022: 13020: 13017: 13015: 13012: 13010: 13007: 13005: 13002: 13000: 12997: 12996: 12994: 12992: 12988: 12982: 12981: 12977: 12975: 12972: 12970: 12967: 12965: 12962: 12960: 12957: 12955: 12952: 12950: 12947: 12945: 12942: 12940: 12937: 12935: 12932: 12930: 12927: 12925: 12922: 12920: 12917: 12915: 12912: 12910: 12907: 12905: 12902: 12900: 12897: 12895: 12892: 12890: 12887: 12885: 12882: 12880: 12877: 12875: 12872: 12870: 12867: 12865: 12862: 12860: 12857: 12855: 12852: 12850: 12847: 12845: 12842: 12840: 12837: 12835: 12832: 12830: 12827: 12825: 12822: 12820: 12817: 12815: 12812: 12808: 12805: 12804: 12803: 12800: 12798: 12795: 12793: 12790: 12788: 12785: 12783: 12780: 12778: 12775: 12773: 12770: 12768: 12765: 12763: 12760: 12758: 12755: 12753: 12752: 12748: 12746: 12743: 12741: 12738: 12736: 12733: 12731: 12728: 12726: 12723: 12722: 12720: 12716: 12710: 12707: 12705: 12702: 12700: 12697: 12695: 12692: 12690: 12687: 12685: 12682: 12680: 12677: 12675: 12672: 12670: 12667: 12665: 12662: 12660: 12657: 12655: 12654:Phenomenalism 12652: 12650: 12647: 12645: 12642: 12640: 12637: 12635: 12632: 12630: 12627: 12625: 12622: 12620: 12617: 12615: 12612: 12610: 12607: 12605: 12602: 12600: 12597: 12595: 12592: 12590: 12587: 12585: 12582: 12580: 12577: 12575: 12574:Action theory 12572: 12570: 12567: 12566: 12564: 12560: 12556: 12549: 12544: 12542: 12537: 12535: 12530: 12529: 12526: 12514: 12511: 12509: 12506: 12504: 12501: 12499: 12496: 12494: 12491: 12489: 12486: 12484: 12481: 12479: 12476: 12474: 12471: 12469: 12466: 12464: 12461: 12460: 12458: 12454: 12448: 12445: 12443: 12440: 12438: 12435: 12433: 12430: 12428: 12425: 12423: 12420: 12418: 12415: 12413: 12410: 12408: 12405: 12403: 12400: 12398: 12395: 12393: 12390: 12388: 12385: 12383: 12380: 12378: 12375: 12373: 12370: 12368: 12367:Morphological 12365: 12363: 12360: 12358: 12355: 12353: 12350: 12348: 12345: 12343: 12340: 12338: 12335: 12333: 12330: 12328: 12325: 12323: 12320: 12318: 12315: 12313: 12310: 12308: 12305: 12303: 12300: 12298: 12295: 12293: 12290: 12288: 12285: 12284: 12282: 12278: 12272: 12269: 12267: 12266:Morphological 12264: 12262: 12259: 12257: 12254: 12252: 12249: 12247: 12244: 12242: 12239: 12238: 12236: 12232: 12226: 12223: 12221: 12218: 12216: 12213: 12211: 12208: 12206: 12203: 12201: 12198: 12194: 12191: 12190: 12189: 12186: 12184: 12181: 12179: 12176: 12175: 12173: 12169: 12165: 12158: 12153: 12151: 12146: 12144: 12139: 12138: 12135: 12128: 12123: 12119: 12116: 12111: 12107: 12106: 12101: 12100: 12095: 12090: 12086: 12085: 12080: 12077:Kevin Timpe. 12075: 12071: 12070: 12065: 12061: 12056: 12055: 12045: 12044: 12039: 12035: 12034:George Musser 12032: 12030: 12029:0-19-518963-9 12026: 12022: 12018: 12016: 12012: 12008: 11998:on 2018-12-12 11994: 11990: 11984: 11981:. MIT Press. 11977: 11976: 11970: 11968: 11964: 11960: 11957: 11954: 11953:0-907845-39-8 11950: 11946: 11942: 11939: 11938:0-19-824924-1 11935: 11931: 11927: 11925: 11921: 11917: 11913: 11909: 11903: 11895: 11891: 11887: 11881: 11877: 11873: 11869: 11866: 11865:0-631-14552-4 11862: 11858: 11856: 11851: 11848: 11844: 11838: 11834: 11833:Penguin Press 11830: 11829: 11824: 11820: 11817: 11813: 11810: 11808: 11807:larchivio.org 11804: 11800: 11797: 11793: 11790: 11789:0-07-296355-7 11786: 11782: 11778: 11776: 11775:0-19-512656-4 11772: 11768: 11764: 11762: 11758: 11755:Basic Books. 11754: 11750: 11747: 11745: 11741: 11737: 11733: 11730: 11728: 11727: 11722: 11718: 11714: 11710: 11706: 11702: 11697: 11693: 11689: 11685: 11681: 11677: 11673: 11669: 11664: 11659: 11655: 11651: 11647: 11643: 11639: 11634: 11631: 11627: 11623: 11619: 11615: 11614: 11609: 11605: 11601: 11600:Gleick, James 11598: 11595: 11594:1-932594-04-3 11591: 11587: 11583: 11580: 11576: 11573: 11571: 11570:0-670-03186-0 11567: 11563: 11562: 11557: 11554: 11553: 11542: 11538: 11533: 11530: 11527: 11525: 11524:0-262-01525-0 11521: 11517: 11516: 11511: 11508: 11504: 11503: 11491: 11487: 11482: 11475: 11469: 11462: 11456: 11449: 11443: 11435: 11428: 11420: 11414: 11403: 11399: 11393: 11386: 11385: 11377: 11362: 11356: 11348: 11344: 11338: 11330: 11326: 11320: 11311: 11302: 11294: 11290: 11286: 11280: 11265: 11264: 11259: 11253: 11245: 11241: 11237: 11233: 11229: 11225: 11217: 11209: 11205: 11200: 11195: 11191: 11187: 11183: 11179: 11175: 11168: 11160: 11156: 11152: 11148: 11144: 11140: 11137:(1): 214–42. 11136: 11132: 11123: 11115: 11111: 11106: 11101: 11096: 11091: 11088:(2): 205–18. 11087: 11083: 11079: 11072: 11064: 11060: 11055: 11050: 11046: 11042: 11038: 11034: 11027: 11020: 11018: 11016: 11014: 11012: 11010: 11001: 10997: 10992: 10987: 10983: 10979: 10975: 10967: 10959: 10955: 10951: 10947: 10943: 10939: 10935: 10931: 10927: 10920: 10912: 10908: 10903: 10898: 10893: 10888: 10884: 10880: 10876: 10869: 10861: 10857: 10852: 10847: 10842: 10837: 10833: 10829: 10825: 10818: 10810: 10806: 10802: 10798: 10794: 10790: 10783: 10775: 10771: 10767: 10763: 10759: 10755: 10752:(2): 260–68. 10751: 10747: 10740: 10738: 10729: 10725: 10721: 10717: 10713: 10709: 10705: 10701: 10694: 10687: 10681: 10673: 10667: 10659: 10655: 10650: 10645: 10641: 10637: 10630: 10621: 10611: 10604: 10598: 10590: 10586: 10582: 10578: 10574: 10570: 10563: 10561: 10559: 10550: 10546: 10542: 10538: 10534: 10530: 10526: 10522: 10519:(1): 342–50. 10518: 10514: 10507: 10499: 10495: 10490: 10485: 10480: 10475: 10471: 10467: 10463: 10459: 10455: 10448: 10440: 10436: 10432: 10428: 10424: 10420: 10417:(3): 346–58. 10416: 10412: 10408: 10401: 10393: 10389: 10384: 10379: 10376:(4): 663–85. 10375: 10371: 10364: 10356: 10352: 10348: 10344: 10340: 10336: 10329: 10321: 10317: 10313: 10309: 10304: 10299: 10295: 10291: 10284: 10276: 10272: 10268: 10264: 10260: 10256: 10249: 10241: 10237: 10233: 10229: 10222: 10214: 10210: 10206: 10202: 10198: 10194: 10191:(3): 965–71. 10190: 10186: 10179: 10172: 10165: 10161: 10155: 10151: 10147: 10140: 10132: 10126: 10122: 10118: 10114: 10107: 10099: 10095: 10089: 10085: 10084: 10076: 10065: 10061: 10057: 10053: 10049: 10046:(4): 527–41. 10045: 10041: 10034: 10027: 10019: 10013: 10009: 10008: 10000: 9992: 9988: 9984: 9980: 9977:(5): 666–67. 9976: 9972: 9965: 9957: 9953: 9949: 9945: 9941: 9937: 9934:(3): 439–58. 9933: 9929: 9922: 9914: 9910: 9906: 9902: 9897: 9892: 9889:(7): 480–91. 9888: 9884: 9877: 9863:on 2018-12-12 9859: 9855: 9849: 9846:. MIT Press. 9842: 9841: 9833: 9831: 9822: 9818: 9814: 9810: 9806: 9802: 9798: 9794: 9787: 9779: 9772: 9764: 9760: 9755: 9750: 9746: 9742: 9738: 9734: 9730: 9723: 9715: 9711: 9707: 9703: 9700:(4): 261–77. 9699: 9695: 9688: 9680: 9676: 9671: 9666: 9662: 9658: 9655:(9): 806–10. 9654: 9650: 9646: 9639: 9631: 9627: 9623: 9619: 9615: 9611: 9608:(3): 301–06. 9607: 9603: 9596: 9588: 9584: 9579: 9574: 9570: 9566: 9562: 9558: 9554: 9547: 9539: 9535: 9531: 9527: 9523: 9519: 9515: 9511: 9504: 9497: 9491: 9489: 9480: 9476: 9471: 9466: 9461: 9456: 9452: 9448: 9444: 9437: 9429: 9425: 9420: 9415: 9411: 9407: 9404:(3): 548–62. 9403: 9399: 9395: 9388: 9380: 9376: 9371: 9366: 9361: 9356: 9352: 9348: 9344: 9340: 9336: 9329: 9321: 9317: 9312: 9307: 9302: 9297: 9293: 9289: 9285: 9278: 9270: 9266: 9262: 9256: 9252: 9251: 9243: 9236: 9232: 9228: 9224: 9220: 9215: 9207: 9203: 9197: 9189: 9183: 9179: 9175: 9168: 9160: 9154: 9150: 9149: 9140: 9129: 9125: 9121: 9117: 9113: 9109: 9105: 9102:(4): 535–39. 9101: 9097: 9096:Exp Brain Res 9090: 9083: 9072: 9068: 9064: 9060: 9056: 9053:(3): 623–42. 9052: 9048: 9041: 9034: 9026: 9022: 9018: 9014: 9011:(4): 529–66. 9010: 9006: 8999: 8991: 8987: 8983: 8979: 8976:(3): 623–42. 8975: 8971: 8964: 8962: 8960: 8952: 8948: 8943: 8935: 8933:88-420-6418-1 8929: 8925: 8918: 8910: 8908:0-14-200334-4 8904: 8900: 8893: 8885: 8883:88-04-39318-1 8879: 8875: 8868: 8860: 8858:0-385-33430-3 8854: 8850: 8849:The Naked Ape 8843: 8835: 8828: 8820: 8818:88-15-07174-1 8814: 8810: 8809:Biopsychology 8803: 8788: 8782: 8774: 8773: 8768: 8762: 8747: 8740: 8733: 8729: 8725: 8721: 8717: 8716:New Scientist 8710: 8696: 8692: 8685: 8677: 8675:88-424-9359-7 8671: 8667: 8660: 8652: 8647: 8642: 8640: 8638: 8629: 8623: 8619: 8612: 8604: 8598: 8594: 8593: 8585: 8578: 8572: 8570: 8568: 8559: 8553: 8549: 8545: 8538: 8531: 8527: 8523: 8519: 8514: 8510: 8506: 8503: 8499: 8493: 8486: 8480: 8465: 8459: 8444: 8438: 8431: 8428: 8424: 8418: 8414: 8407: 8399: 8393: 8389: 8385: 8382: 8378: 8370: 8355: 8354: 8346: 8332:on 2015-12-21 8328: 8324: 8320: 8313: 8306: 8299: 8294: 8288: 8284: 8280: 8273: 8265: 8259: 8255: 8251: 8249: 8240: 8232: 8226: 8222: 8218: 8211: 8205: 8201: 8197: 8190: 8184: 8180: 8173: 8165: 8161: 8154: 8146: 8140: 8136: 8132: 8125: 8119: 8115: 8109: 8107: 8099: 8093: 8087: 8081: 8073: 8067: 8063: 8059: 8052: 8038:on 2018-10-06 8037: 8033: 8026: 8020: 8019:0-631-14552-4 8016: 8012: 8011: 8006: 8001: 7994: 7988: 7982: 7981:0-87220-230-5 7978: 7974: 7968: 7960: 7954: 7950: 7946: 7939: 7931: 7924: 7916: 7909: 7901: 7897: 7893: 7889: 7885: 7881: 7874: 7866: 7862: 7858: 7854: 7850: 7846: 7839: 7823: 7819: 7812: 7805: 7799: 7791: 7785: 7781: 7777: 7773: 7766: 7758: 7754: 7746: 7738: 7734: 7728: 7722: 7715: 7714:0-19-513336-6 7711: 7707: 7701: 7695: 7694:0-670-03186-0 7691: 7687: 7681: 7679: 7670: 7663: 7655: 7648: 7640: 7636: 7632: 7628: 7624: 7620: 7616: 7612: 7605: 7590: 7584: 7580: 7579: 7571: 7564: 7560: 7554: 7550: 7546: 7542: 7535: 7528: 7524: 7518: 7514: 7510: 7506: 7499: 7497: 7490: 7489:0-87220-230-5 7486: 7482: 7478: 7474: 7468: 7461: 7458: 7452: 7444: 7440: 7436: 7432: 7428: 7424: 7417: 7415: 7406: 7402: 7395: 7393: 7385: 7381: 7376: 7368: 7362: 7354: 7350: 7344: 7329: 7325: 7321: 7317: 7313: 7309: 7305: 7298: 7290: 7284: 7280: 7276: 7268: 7260: 7254: 7250: 7249: 7241: 7233: 7229: 7225: 7217: 7213: 7205: 7198: 7193: 7187: 7183: 7179: 7175: 7168: 7160: 7154: 7150: 7146: 7142: 7134: 7132: 7116: 7110: 7106: 7102: 7095: 7087: 7080: 7074: 7068: 7064: 7057: 7049: 7045: 7038: 7023: 7017: 7013: 7009: 7002: 6987: 6981: 6977: 6973: 6972:"determinism" 6966: 6951: 6945: 6941: 6940: 6932: 6925: 6921: 6917: 6913: 6909: 6905: 6901: 6894: 6887: 6883: 6879: 6875: 6871: 6867: 6863: 6859: 6855: 6848: 6844: 6840: 6837:(3): 217–29. 6836: 6832: 6828: 6812: 6808: 6802: 6795: 6783: 6782: 6774: 6767: 6763: 6759: 6755: 6751: 6744: 6737: 6732: 6728: 6724: 6720: 6716: 6712: 6704: 6691: 6684: 6679: 6675: 6670: 6665: 6657: 6650: 6638: 6634: 6628: 6612: 6608: 6593: 6589: 6585: 6579: 6571: 6565: 6561: 6557: 6553: 6549: 6542: 6540: 6538: 6522: 6516: 6512: 6511: 6503: 6495: 6491: 6487: 6483: 6479: 6475: 6471: 6467: 6463: 6459: 6454: 6449: 6445: 6441: 6434: 6428: 6424: 6421: 6417: 6411: 6409: 6401: 6400: 6393: 6378: 6372: 6369:. HardPress. 6368: 6367: 6359: 6344: 6338: 6334: 6333: 6325: 6310: 6304: 6300: 6299: 6291: 6276: 6274:9780710005656 6270: 6265: 6264: 6255: 6239: 6238: 6230: 6215: 6209: 6204: 6203: 6194: 6179: 6173: 6169: 6168: 6160: 6145: 6139: 6135: 6134: 6126: 6118: 6114: 6110: 6106: 6099: 6084: 6078: 6074: 6073: 6065: 6058: 6056: 6052: 6048: 6047:spontaneously 6042: 6036: 6032: 6025: 6017: 6011: 6007: 6003: 6002: 5994: 5979: 5973: 5969: 5968: 5960: 5945: 5939: 5936:. MIT Press. 5935: 5934: 5926: 5911: 5905: 5901: 5900: 5892: 5877: 5871: 5867: 5866: 5858: 5843: 5837: 5834:. Duckworth. 5833: 5832: 5824: 5809: 5803: 5798: 5797: 5788: 5780: 5776: 5772: 5768: 5764: 5760: 5753: 5745: 5741: 5736: 5731: 5727: 5723: 5719: 5712: 5697: 5691: 5688:. MIT Press. 5687: 5686: 5678: 5663: 5657: 5653: 5652: 5644: 5629: 5623: 5619: 5618: 5610: 5595: 5589: 5584: 5583: 5574: 5559: 5553: 5549: 5548: 5540: 5533: 5529: 5525: 5521: 5517: 5513: 5509: 5505: 5501: 5497: 5493: 5488: 5483: 5479: 5475: 5468: 5461: 5455: 5440: 5434: 5430: 5429: 5421: 5419: 5410: 5406: 5399: 5397: 5395: 5393: 5384: 5377: 5369: 5367:1-55786-857-3 5363: 5359: 5355: 5348: 5340: 5334: 5330: 5326: 5322: 5321:"Determinism" 5316: 5313:goes back to 5312: 5306: 5298: 5294: 5290: 5286: 5282: 5278: 5271: 5263: 5259: 5252: 5250: 5234: 5228: 5224: 5223: 5215: 5213: 5211: 5202: 5198: 5191: 5189: 5187: 5171: 5165: 5161: 5157: 5156:"determinism" 5150: 5139: 5135: 5131: 5127: 5123: 5118: 5113: 5110:(2): 223–47. 5109: 5105: 5104: 5096: 5089: 5082: 5076: 5064: 5057: 5052: 5048: 5044: 5038: 5034: 5030: 5026: 5022: 5018: 5017: 5009: 5007: 4999: 4988: 4984: 4982: 4973: 4971: 4962: 4956: 4952: 4951: 4943: 4935: 4929: 4925: 4921: 4914: 4906: 4900: 4896: 4891: 4890: 4881: 4879: 4877: 4868: 4864: 4860: 4856: 4853:(3): 113–21. 4852: 4848: 4841: 4834:on 2008-09-11 4833: 4829: 4828: 4824:Inwagen, P., 4820: 4812: 4805: 4803: 4794: 4787: 4779: 4777:0-691-01566-X 4773: 4769: 4762: 4754: 4747: 4740: 4734: 4727: 4719: 4717:0-415-29624-2 4713: 4709: 4702: 4694: 4692:0-19-512656-4 4688: 4684: 4677: 4669: 4663: 4659: 4658: 4650: 4648: 4639: 4635: 4631: 4627: 4620: 4612: 4606: 4602: 4601: 4593: 4591: 4589: 4580: 4578:0-19-824924-1 4574: 4570: 4566: 4559: 4557: 4548: 4544: 4536: 4532: 4525: 4523: 4521: 4519: 4510: 4506: 4499: 4497: 4495: 4486: 4480: 4476: 4469: 4467: 4465: 4463: 4461: 4451: 4450:10.1.1.5.2852 4446: 4443:(12): 24–28. 4442: 4438: 4431: 4423: 4419: 4412: 4410: 4402: 4397: 4391: 4387: 4386: 4378: 4367: 4363: 4359: 4355: 4351: 4347: 4343: 4339: 4335: 4331: 4327: 4320: 4313: 4309: 4303: 4299: 4292: 4278: 4274: 4267: 4265: 4248: 4244: 4240: 4233: 4225: 4219: 4215: 4214: 4206: 4198: 4192: 4188: 4184: 4177: 4170: 4166: 4160: 4156: 4152: 4145: 4137: 4131: 4127: 4123: 4119: 4112: 4110: 4098:on 2012-09-03 4094: 4087: 4080: 4072: 4068: 4064: 4057: 4049: 4045: 4041: 4034: 4032: 4024: 4020: 4017: 4013: 4008: 4006: 4000: 3996: 3992: 3990: 3981: 3973: 3967: 3963: 3959: 3952: 3950: 3948: 3946: 3944: 3935: 3933:9780826404763 3929: 3925: 3924: 3916: 3909: 3904: 3898: 3894: 3893: 3885: 3878: 3874: 3868: 3864: 3860: 3853: 3846: 3841: 3835: 3831: 3827: 3820: 3811: 3803: 3796: 3782: 3776: 3772: 3768: 3764: 3760: 3753: 3745: 3744: 3736: 3728: 3722: 3718: 3714: 3710: 3702: 3694: 3688: 3684: 3680: 3673: 3665: 3659: 3655: 3654: 3647: 3646:Rudolf Carnap 3641: 3634: 3624: 3618: 3614: 3613: 3605: 3603: 3594: 3592:9780128002841 3588: 3584: 3580: 3576: 3569: 3562: 3558: 3557: 3552: 3546: 3542: 3526: 3525:Will to power 3523: 3521: 3518: 3516: 3513: 3511: 3508: 3506: 3503: 3501: 3498: 3496: 3493: 3491: 3488: 3485: 3484: 3480: 3478: 3477:Buridan's ass 3475: 3473: 3470: 3468: 3465: 3464: 3459: 3448: 3441: 3439: 3435: 3431: 3427: 3422: 3417: 3415: 3411: 3406: 3396: 3394: 3389: 3385: 3382:position. In 3381: 3377: 3373: 3369: 3365: 3352: 3348: 3344: 3340: 3336: 3333: 3329: 3328: 3323: 3319: 3315: 3314: 3313: 3311: 3307: 3302: 3290: 3284: 3275: 3271: 3264: 3260: 3256: 3251: 3241: 3238: 3235: 3232: 3230: 3226: 3221: 3219: 3215: 3209: 3207: 3203: 3201: 3197: 3193: 3189: 3184: 3180: 3178: 3173: 3172:Martin Luther 3170: 3166: 3162: 3158: 3154: 3150: 3146: 3142: 3138: 3134: 3130: 3128: 3123: 3119: 3109: 3099: 3089: 3086: 3084: 3079: 3077: 3073: 3069: 3063: 3061: 3054: 3048: 3045: 3039: 3038:Self-efficacy 3029: 3021: 3012: 3008: 3006: 3002: 2998: 2995: 2986: 2977: 2973: 2970: 2968: 2964: 2960: 2958: 2953: 2947: 2940: 2937: 2936: 2935: 2932: 2928: 2924: 2923:Daniel Wegner 2920: 2915: 2911: 2907: 2897: 2895: 2891: 2886: 2885:schizophrenia 2881: 2879: 2875: 2871: 2867: 2862: 2857: 2853: 2848: 2845: 2841: 2837: 2833: 2829: 2828:tic disorders 2825: 2820: 2816: 2813: 2809: 2806: 2802: 2799: 2795: 2794: 2785: 2782: 2779: 2776: 2775: 2774: 2771: 2769: 2763: 2761: 2757: 2752: 2748: 2743: 2741: 2736: 2733: 2729: 2725: 2721: 2716: 2712: 2706: 2700: 2696: 2686: 2684: 2680: 2676: 2675:Steven Pinker 2672: 2668: 2658: 2655: 2649: 2647: 2643: 2638: 2634: 2630: 2626: 2616: 2612: 2603: 2601: 2597: 2590: 2585: 2583: 2579: 2574: 2572: 2568: 2564: 2561:school, only 2560: 2556: 2552: 2548: 2544: 2538: 2528: 2526: 2525: 2520: 2516: 2515: 2514:idappaccayatā 2510: 2506: 2502: 2498: 2494: 2488: 2486: 2482: 2477: 2473: 2469: 2465: 2464: 2459: 2455: 2451: 2437: 2428: 2424: 2422: 2418: 2414: 2409: 2407: 2403: 2393: 2391: 2387: 2381: 2379: 2374: 2373:Immanuel Kant 2371:In the 1780s 2366: 2362: 2358: 2355: 2352: 2348: 2345: 2344: 2343: 2341: 2336: 2333: 2329: 2324: 2323: 2318: 2312: 2302: 2300: 2296: 2295: 2290: 2289:William James 2281: 2279: 2273: 2271: 2267: 2263: 2259: 2255: 2251: 2247: 2243: 2239: 2230: 2228: 2224: 2222: 2215: 2212: 2208: 2204: 2200: 2194: 2192: 2191: 2185: 2181: 2177: 2173: 2169: 2166:According to 2161: 2157: 2153: 2149: 2147: 2142: 2136: 2132: 2128: 2127: 2123: 2119: 2110: 2107: 2102: 2101:Ted Honderich 2092: 2090: 2085: 2081: 2074: 2064: 2062: 2057: 2056:Claudio Costa 2052: 2048: 2046: 2041: 2037: 2033: 2029: 2025: 2021: 2017: 2014: 2010: 2006: 2002: 1998: 1994: 1993:consciousness 1990: 1986: 1982: 1978: 1977:Compatibilist 1973: 1963: 1961: 1957: 1952: 1948: 1945: 1941: 1937: 1936: 1931: 1930: 1919: 1917: 1912: 1908: 1906: 1902: 1898: 1887: 1885: 1884: 1879: 1875: 1871: 1870: 1865: 1861: 1857: 1856:Thomas Hobbes 1847: 1845: 1841: 1836: 1831: 1829: 1824: 1820: 1819: 1813: 1809: 1808:courts of law 1801: 1800:Thomas Hobbes 1797: 1792: 1791:Compatibilism 1785:Compatibilism 1782: 1780: 1779:consciousness 1776: 1772: 1768: 1764: 1759: 1756: 1752: 1748: 1746: 1742: 1738: 1734: 1733: 1728: 1724: 1720: 1716: 1712: 1708: 1704: 1700: 1695: 1693: 1689: 1685: 1681: 1677: 1673: 1669: 1668: 1663: 1658: 1654: 1652: 1648: 1644: 1640: 1636: 1632: 1628: 1621: 1617: 1612: 1608: 1604: 1600: 1594: 1584: 1582: 1578: 1577:compatibilism 1570: 1566: 1563: 1559: 1555: 1551: 1548: 1544: 1543: 1542: 1535: 1532: 1529: 1526: 1524: 1520: 1519: 1518: 1512: 1508: 1504: 1500: 1496: 1492: 1489: 1488:compatibilist 1485: 1481: 1477: 1473: 1472: 1471: 1469: 1461: 1458:A simplified 1456: 1452: 1450: 1445: 1437: 1433: 1430: 1429:creator deity 1426: 1425: 1424: 1422: 1418: 1415: 1411: 1407: 1404:is a form of 1403: 1398: 1388: 1386: 1381: 1379: 1375: 1371: 1367: 1361: 1359: 1355: 1350: 1346: 1342: 1338: 1334: 1330: 1326: 1321: 1315: 1305: 1303: 1299: 1295: 1291: 1287: 1283: 1280:such as hard 1279: 1274: 1269: 1259: 1257: 1252: 1246: 1236: 1234: 1230: 1226: 1224: 1220: 1216: 1212: 1209: 1204: 1194: 1192: 1188: 1187:deterministic 1184: 1180: 1176: 1175:indeterminism 1172: 1171:deterministic 1167: 1165: 1161: 1156: 1153:are bound by 1152: 1148: 1142: 1132: 1130: 1126: 1125: 1120: 1116: 1112: 1108: 1103: 1098: 1096: 1092: 1088: 1084: 1080: 1078: 1077:compatibilism 1074: 1070: 1066: 1048: 1044: 1043: 1042: 1041: 1040: 1039: 1038: 1037: 1036: 1035: 1031: 1028: 1025: 1022: 1019: 1016: 1013: 1012: 1011: 1010: 1009: 1007: 1006:Derk Pereboom 997: 995: 991: 987: 983: 972: 970: 966: 962: 958: 954: 950: 946: 945: 940: 939:indeterminism 936: 931: 929: 925: 921: 916: 912: 909: 905: 903: 899: 895: 890: 886: 884: 880: 876: 865: 863: 859: 854: 845: 842: 838: 834: 830: 826: 820: 818: 808: 803: 793: 791: 786: 784: 780: 776: 767: 764:decreeing or 763: 762:creator deity 759: 757: 754: 751: 747: 745: 742: 739: 735: 731: 727: 725: 722: 721: 720: 718: 714: 710: 701: 698:A simplified 696: 691: 681: 678: 676: 672: 671:indeterminism 668: 664: 659: 652: 648: 643: 639: 637: 636:compatibilism 632: 631:Compatibilism 628: 624: 620: 616: 612: 608: 604: 600: 596: 592: 583: 580: 577: 574: 571: 568: 565: 562: 559: 557: 552: 548: 545: 542: 539: 536: 533: 530: 527: 524: 522: 517: 487: 486: 480: 478: 474: 470: 465: 463: 459: 454: 448: 446: 442: 437: 432: 427: 425: 424: 417: 415: 411: 406: 404: 403:indeterminism 400: 396: 392: 388: 384: 380: 373: 363: 360: 358: 357:psychological 354: 350: 346: 342: 338: 334: 330: 325: 323: 319: 315: 311: 307: 303: 299: 295: 290: 288: 283: 279: 274: 269: 267: 263: 259: 255: 250: 248: 244: 240: 236: 231: 228: 226: 222: 216: 206: 203: 199: 194: 192: 188: 184: 180: 176: 166: 163: 159: 155: 154:false dilemma 151: 147: 143: 139: 136:In contrast, 134: 132: 131:indeterminism 128: 124: 120: 116: 115: 110: 106: 101: 98: 94: 90: 86: 82: 78: 74: 70: 65: 63: 59: 55: 49: 41: 34: 19: 16471: 16470: 16445:Misner space 16430:Gödel metric 16410:can contain 16386: 16131: 16118:Essentialism 15911: 15897: 15885: 15878: 15871: 15864: 15852: 15845: 15838: 15831: 15824: 15812: 15757:Subconscious 15717: 15703:Quantum mind 15592: 15195:Roger Sperry 15170:Karl Pribram 15118:Neuroscience 15028:Thomas Nagel 14903:Fred Dretske 14878:David Pearce 14853:Colin McGinn 14734: 14690:Human rights 14633:After Virtue 14359:Schopenhauer 14133:Moral agency 14070: 14006:Common sense 13902:Universalism 13870:Expressivism 13850:Intuitionism 13821:Subjectivism 13766:Terraforming 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Upholding 3175: 3168: 3125: 3114: 3103:Christianity 3087: 3080: 3065: 3056: 3051: 3041: 3027: 3018: 3009: 3003: 2999: 2996: 2992: 2983: 2974: 2971: 2963:Emily Pronin 2961: 2956: 2948: 2944: 2926: 2917: 2914:Neuroscience 2882: 2876:or due to a 2865: 2849: 2843: 2839: 2835: 2826:and related 2821: 2817: 2814: 2810: 2807: 2803: 2791: 2789: 2772: 2764: 2759: 2756:anticipatory 2755: 2750: 2746: 2744: 2739: 2737: 2708: 2682: 2678: 2664: 2650: 2622: 2613: 2609: 2592: 2587: 2575: 2554: 2540: 2522: 2512: 2492: 2489: 2485:future lives 2461: 2448: 2434: 2425: 2420: 2416: 2412: 2410: 2399: 2382: 2380:judgments." 2377: 2370: 2360: 2357:Schopenhauer 2350: 2349:'s proof in 2337: 2331: 2327: 2320: 2314: 2292: 2287: 2277: 2274: 2269: 2257: 2253: 2249: 2245: 2236: 2226: 2219: 2217: 2211:a posteriori 2210: 2206: 2202: 2196: 2188: 2165: 2145: 2139: 2134: 2098: 2077: 2053: 2049: 2016:neuroscience 2012: 1975: 1953: 1949: 1933: 1927: 1925: 1915: 1913: 1909: 1893: 1881: 1867: 1863: 1859: 1853: 1834: 1832: 1827: 1816: 1805: 1774: 1770: 1760: 1749: 1743:rather than 1731: 1696: 1691: 1665: 1655: 1626: 1625:The idea of 1624: 1574: 1539: 1516: 1502: 1479: 1475: 1465: 1441: 1414:monotheistic 1400: 1382: 1362: 1323: 1271: 1248: 1227: 1213: 1210: 1206: 1168: 1144: 1122: 1118: 1114: 1110: 1106: 1099: 1094: 1081: 1076: 1072: 1068: 1064: 1062: 1046: 1003: 989: 978: 943: 932: 914: 913: 907: 906: 893: 888: 887: 882: 878: 874: 871: 855: 851: 821: 814: 787: 772: 750:propositions 705: 679: 656: 635: 630: 626: 622: 618: 614: 610: 606: 602: 598: 594: 590: 589: 555: 520: 519:Determinism 476: 472: 468: 466: 461: 453:follows from 449: 440: 436:consequences 435: 428: 421: 418: 407: 375: 361: 326: 321: 291: 277: 270: 257: 253: 251: 235:physical law 232: 229: 218: 197: 195: 172: 161: 157: 149: 145: 141: 135: 112: 102: 89:deliberation 66: 53: 52: 16474:Citizendium 16435:Kerr metric 16372:Determinism 16313:Causal loop 16219:Time travel 16103:Illusionism 16048:Theological 15984:Determinism 15390:Physicalism 15385:Parallelism 15380:Panpsychism 15350:Materialism 15325:Emergentism 15215:Wolf Singer 15084:Kurt Koffka 15013:Philip Goff 14988:Michael Tye 14983:Max Velmans 14963:Karl Popper 14953:John Searle 14938:John Eccles 14923:Georges Rey 14508:(c. 322 BC) 14374:Kierkegaard 14193:Stewardship 13970:Rousseauian 13887:Rationalism 13799:Cognitivism 13746:Programming 13721:Meat eating 13694:Engineering 13298:Metaphysics 13282:(c. 200 BC) 13272:(c. 350 BC) 13262:(c. 350 BC) 13149:Collingwood 13054:Malebranche 12802:Information 12730:Anima mundi 12709:Type theory 12664:Physicalism 12629:Materialism 12584:Determinism 12555:Metaphysics 12357:Information 12322:Family life 12292:Association 12079:"Free Will" 12060:"Free Will" 11805:19.08.2004 11732:Harris, Sam 11033:Neuroethics 10569:Neuroethics 10341:(1): 1–23. 8748:. Ucl.ac.uk 8413:"Free Will" 7886:(1): 3–10. 7429:(1): 5–20. 7271:Quote from 7120:22 December 7027:22 December 6991:22 December 6955:22 December 6817:20 December 6788:20 December 6643:19 December 6617:20 December 6604:. See also 6598:20 December 6382:27 December 6348:27 December 6314:27 December 6301:. P. Lang. 6280:27 December 6244:27 December 6219:27 December 6183:27 December 6149:27 December 6088:27 December 5983:27 December 5949:27 December 5915:27 December 5881:27 December 5847:27 December 5813:27 December 5701:27 December 5667:27 December 5633:27 December 5599:27 December 5563:27 December 5444:27 December 5238:22 December 5175:26 December 4273:"Free Will" 4253:12 December 4050:(11): 2–29. 3765:: 287–338. 3551:Carus, Paul 3505:Prospection 3343:omniscience 3278:בחירה חפשית 3188:John Wesley 3161:John Calvin 3141:Arminianism 3092:In theology 3044:determinism 2840:involuntary 2836:unvoluntary 2740:unconscious 2683:exculpation 2679:explanation 2571:Vaisheshika 2095:Other views 1985:physicalist 1699:physicalism 1639:human brain 1611:Physicalism 1523:omniscience 1495:omniscience 1421:omniscience 1410:predestined 1406:determinism 1354:determinism 1302:omnipotence 1273:Omniscience 1268:Omniscience 1262:Omniscience 1251:determinism 1219:determinism 1160:self-caused 1141:Determinism 986:Thomas Reid 924:Robert Kane 858:panpsychism 841:physicalism 831:, will, or 709:determinism 458:David Lewis 399:determinism 395:Robert Kane 387:Thomas Reid 385:", such as 322:Origination 306:determinism 105:Determinism 93:prohibition 77:culpability 48:Self-agency 16496:Categories 16402:Spacetimes 16377:Eternalism 16344:Multiverse 16098:Falliblism 16028:Linguistic 16023:Historical 15998:Biological 15782:Upanishads 15583:Experience 15548:Blindsight 15375:Nondualism 15256:Max Planck 15236:David Bohm 15052:Psychology 14943:John Locke 14868:David Hume 14811:Philosophy 14404:Bonhoeffer 14113:Immorality 14056:Eudaimonia 14016:Conscience 14011:Compassion 13897:Skepticism 13892:Relativism 13809:Naturalism 13789:Absolutism 13761:Technology 13611:Deontology 13358:Monadology 13292:(c. 80 BC) 12999:Parmenides 12884:Perception 12782:Experience 12669:Relativism 12644:Naturalism 12594:Enactivism 12317:Fair trial 12002:2018-12-12 11959:Dick Swaab 11803:L'Espresso 11726:PhilPapers 11367:2010-11-21 10936:: 104342. 10234:: 239–45. 9867:2018-12-12 9269:lc92010057 9202:Wegner, D. 8793:2010-11-21 8752:2010-11-21 8700:2008-11-01 8518:contingent 8470:2012-08-13 8449:2012-08-13 8360:2015-12-09 8336:2015-12-09 8179:in subject 8114:Pragmatism 8086:((online)) 8042:2007-08-02 8007:, Arthur, 7949:The Ethics 7594:6 February 7483:, Oxford. 7333:4 December 7042:Boethius. 6860:: 714–24. 6526:8 December 6420:((online)) 5728:: 119–25. 5487:2107.06572 5480:: 104474. 5474:Biosystems 5283:: 242–57. 4993:2012-09-14 4632:: 121–37. 4567:. Oxford: 4282:2013-01-15 4102:2012-08-21 3786:2015-12-09 3628:2015-12-09 3556:The Monist 3532:References 3372:al-Ash'ari 3306:Maimonides 3259:Bas relief 3214:glorified. 3036:See also: 2904:See also: 2703:See also: 2667:biologists 2635:theories. 2633:stochastic 2625:Democritus 2535:See also: 2505:Samkhyists 2458:the Buddha 2388:and their 2317:David Hume 2309:See also: 2294:Pragmatism 2270:antecedent 2266:Chrysippus 2203:phenomenon 2141:David Hume 2080:naturalist 2054:Recently, 2028:depression 2005:behavioral 1981:naturalism 1970:See also: 1929:Elbow Room 1897:psychology 1874:David Hume 1597:See also: 1562:C.S. Lewis 1528:Infallible 1370:Calvinists 1329:philosophy 1318:See also: 1243:See also: 1083:John Locke 969:Niels Bohr 651:determined 554:Free will 431:Carl Ginet 349:biological 225:Chrysippus 213:See also: 85:persuasion 16512:Causality 16502:Free will 16478:Free will 16476:article " 16387:Free will 16283:Time loop 16132:Free will 16064:Causality 15797:Yogachara 15732:Sentience 15593:Free will 15533:Awareness 15521:Attention 15410:Solipsism 15125:Anil Seth 14998:Ned Block 14665:Casuistry 14577:Either/Or 14484:Korsgaard 14479:Azurmendi 14444:MacIntyre 14384:Nietzsche 14314:Augustine 14309:Confucius 14289:Aristotle 14265:Ethicists 14223:Intrinsic 14188:Suffering 14098:Happiness 14071:Free will 14051:Etiquette 13996:Authority 13940:Epicurean 13935:Confucian 13930:Christian 13865:Emotivism 13689:Discourse 13626:Pragmatic 13598:Normative 13518:Teleology 13483:Mereology 13463:Cosmology 13322:(c. 1000) 13219:Plantinga 13209:Armstrong 13159:Heidegger 13134:Whitehead 13119:Nietzsche 13039:Descartes 13009:Aristotle 12964:Universal 12894:Principle 12864:Necessity 12824:Intention 12777:Existence 12740:Causality 12679:Solipsism 12609:Free will 12483:Anarchism 12417:Sexuality 12312:Education 12271:Political 12225:Free will 12127:Free will 12115:Free will 11902:cite book 11894:991595874 11751:. (2007) 11736:Free Will 11413:cite book 11151:1475-4975 11063:143687015 11039:: 13–16. 11000:227095775 10958:220057834 10930:Cognition 10809:152011660 10644:CiteSeerX 10642:: 65–72. 10589:143223154 10533:1053-8100 10431:1468-0017 10378:CiteSeerX 10355:1468-0017 10320:1933-1592 10298:CiteSeerX 9991:144699878 9891:CiteSeerX 9821:206021496 9219:Kornhuber 8947:Kornhuber 8522:necessary 8487:, Q83 A1. 8381:Aquinas, 7900:155641763 7865:1467-9973 7704:Kane, R. 7654:Free Will 7457:Leviathan 7361:cite book 7355:. Oxford. 7320:0048-3915 6613:. 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