762:) have argued that the mental states the agent invokes as justifying his action are physical states that cause the action. Problems have been raised for this view because the mental states seem to be reduced to mere physical causes. Their mental properties don't seem to be doing any work. If the reasons an agent cites as justifying his action, however, are not the cause of the action, they must explain the action in some other way or be causally impotent. Those who hold the belief that mental properties are reducible to physical properties are known as token-identity reductionists. Some have disagreed with the conclusion that this reduction means the mental explanations are causally impotent while still maintaining that the reduction is possible. For example, Dretske has put forward the viewpoint of reasons as structuring causes. This viewpoint maintains that the relation, intentional properties that are created in the process of justifying one's actions are causally potent in that the process is an instance of action. When considering that actions are causally potent, Dretske claims that the process of justifying one's actions is necessarily part of the causal system. Others have objected to the belief that mental states can cause physical action without asserting that mental properties can be reduced to physical properties. Such individuals suggest that mental states are epiphenomenal, in that they have no impact on physical states, but are nonetheless distinct entities (see
725:. For example, a pedestrian witnessing a terrible car accident may be morally responsible for calling an ambulance and for providing help directly if possible. Additionally to what the agent did, it is also relevant what the agent could have done otherwise, i.e. what powers and capacities the agent had. The agent's intentions are also relevant for responsibility, but we can be responsible for things we did not intend. For example, a chain smoker may have a negative impact on the health of the people around him. This is a side-effect of his smoking that is not part of his intention. The smoker may still be responsible for this damage, either because he was aware of this side-effect and decided to ignore it or because he should have been aware of it, so-called
504:. One problem with this approach is that the two forms of causation do not have to be incompatible. Few theorists deny that actions are teleological in the sense of being goal-oriented. But the representation of a goal in the agent's mind may act as an efficient cause at the same time. Because of these problems, most of the arguments for non-causalism are negative: they constitute objections pointing out why causalist theories are unfeasible. Important among them are arguments from wayward causation: that behavior only constitutes an action if it was caused by an intention in the right way, not in any way. This critique focuses on difficulties causalists have faced in explicitly formulating how to distinguish between proper and wayward causation.
342:. According to Davidson, it is not just the bodily behavior that counts as the action but also the consequences that follow from it. So the movement of the finger flipping the switch is part of the action as well as the electrons moving through the wire and the light bulb turning on. Some consequences are included in the action even though the agent did not intend them to happen. It is sufficient that what the agent does "can be described under an aspect that makes it intentional". So, for example, if flipping the light switch alerts the burglar then alerting the burglar is part of the agent's actions. In an example from
639:: they consist in preparing the mind for these contents to arise. They foster hospitable conditions but cannot ensure that the intended contents will appear. Strawson uses the analogy of jumping off a wall, in which the jumping itself (corresponding to the triggering) is considered an action, but the falling (corresponding to the entertaining of a content) is not an action anymore since it is outside the agent's control. Candace L. Upton and Michael Brent object that this account of mental actions is not complete. Taking their lead from mental activities taking place during
318:'s account or standard forms of volitionalism, hold that causal relations between the agent's mental states and the resulting behavior are essential to actions. According to Davidson, actions are bodily movements that are caused by intentions in the right way. Volitionalist theories include the notion of volitions in their account of actions. Volitions are understood as forms of summoning of means within one's power and are different from merely intending to do something later. Non-causalists, on the other hand, deny that intentions or similar states cause actions.
647:
intentions seems to fail for mental actions. The problem here is that the intention to think about something already needs to include the content of the thought. So the thought is no longer needed since the intention already "thinks" the content. This leads to a vicious regress since another intention would be necessary to characterize the first intention as an action. An objection not just to mental actions but to the distinction between physical and mental actions arises from the difficulty of finding strict criteria to distinguish the two.
429:
received a new treatment, may test if the treatment was successful by trying to move her legs. But trying and failing to move the legs is different from intending to do it later or merely wishing to do it: only in the former case does the patient learn that the treatment was unsuccessful. There is a sense in which tryings either take place or not, but cannot fail, unlike actions, whose success is uncertain. This line of thought has led some philosophers to suggest that the trying itself is an action: a special type of action called
549:
things, Booth performed only one action. One intuition in favor of this view is that we often do one thing by doing another thing: we shoot the gun by pulling the trigger or we turn on the light by flipping the switch. One argument against this view is that the different events may happen at different times. For example, Lincoln died of his injuries the following day, so a significant time after the shooting. This raises the question of how to explain that two events happening at different times are identical.
417:, as the summoning of means within one's power. But it has been argued that they can be treated as a unified notion since there is no important difference between the two for the theory of action because they play the same explanatory role. This role includes both the experiential level, involving the trying of something instead of merely intending to do so later, and the metaphysical level, in the form of mental causation bridging the gap between mental intention and bodily movement.
603:
the agent's skills. So contracting a given muscle is a basic action for an agent who has learned to do so. For something to be a basic action it is not just important what the agent can do but what the agent actually does. So raising one's right hand may only count as a basic action if it is done directly through the right hand. If the agent uses her left hand to lift the right hand then the raising of the right hand is not a basic action anymore.
544:, the pulling, the firing and the killing are three distinct actions. In its most extreme form, there is one distinct action for every action type. So, for example, since "singing" and "singing loudly" are two different action types, someone who sings loudly performs at least these two distinct actions. This kind of view has the unintuitive consequence that even the most simple exercises of agency result in a vast number of actions. Theories of
286:, it involves discovering "hat is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm". There is broad agreement that the answer to this question has to do with the agent's intentions. So driving a car is an action since the agent intends to do so, but sneezing is a mere behavior since it happens independent of the agent's intention. The dominant theory of the relation between the intention and the behavior is
366:
be that, instead of opening the holding hand intentionally, the intention makes the first climber so nervous that the rope slips through his hand and thus leads to the other climber's death. Davidson addresses this issue by excluding cases of wayward causation from his account since they are not examples of intentional behavior in the strict sense. So bodily behavior only constitutes an action if it was caused by intentions
306:
actions to be a distinct type of action that has characteristics quite different from physical actions. Deliberations and decisions are processes that often precede and lead to actions. Actions can be rational or irrational depending on the reason for which they are performed. The problem of responsibility is closely related to the philosophy of actions since we usually hold people responsible for what they do.
624:
actions are mental because they consist in volitions. But this position involves various problems, as explained in the corresponding section above. However, there is a middle path possible between these two extreme positions that allows for the existence of both physical and mental actions. Various mental events have been suggested as candidates for non-physical actions, like imagining, judging or remembering.
2217:
472:
way to avoid this objection is to hold that volitions constitute bodily movements, i.e. are an aspect of them, instead of causing them. Another response able to soften this objection is to hold that volitions are not just the initial triggers of the bodily movements but that they are continuous activities guiding the bodily movements while they are occurring.
598:. But it seems that bodily movements are themselves constituted by other events (muscle contractions) which are themselves constituted by other events (chemical processes). However, it appears that these more basic events are not actions since they are not under our direct volitional control. One way to solve these complications is to hold that
631:, who holds that mental actions consist in "triggering the delivery of content to one's field of consciousness". According to this view, the events of imagining, judging or remembering are not mental actions strictly speaking but they can be the products of mental actions. Mental actions, in the strict sense, are
338:. For example, the action of flipping a light switch rests, on the one hand, on the agent's belief that this bodily movement would turn on the light and, on the other hand, on the desire to have light. Because of its reliance on psychological states and causal relations, this position is considered to be a
365:
if the intention caused its goal to realize but in a very unusual way that was not intended, e.g. because the skills of the agent are not exercised in the way planned. For example, a rock climber forms the intention to kill the climber below him by letting go of the rope. A wayward causal chain would
623:
Philosophers have investigated the concept of actions mostly in regard to physical actions, which are usually understood in terms of bodily movements. It is not uncommon among philosophers to understand bodily movements as the only form of action. Some volitionists, on the other hand, claim that all
511:
for performing the same action. But when we perform it, we often perform it for one reason but not for another. For example, one reason for Abdul to go for cancer treatment is that he has prostate cancer, another is that they have his favorite newspaper in the waiting area. Abdul is aware of both of
471:
Volitionalists usually hold that there is a causal relation between volitions and bodily movements. Critics have pointed out that this position threatens to alienate us from our bodies since it introduces a strict distinction between our agency and our body, which is not how things appear to us. One
428:
is found in the second thesis. It involves the claim that some of our tryings lead to successful actions while others arise without resulting in an action. But even in an unsuccessful case there is still something: it is different from not trying at all. For example, a paralyzed person, after having
606:
A contrasting view identifies basic actions not with bodily movements but with mental volitions. One motivation for this position is that volitions are the most direct element in the chain of agency: they cannot fail, unlike bodily actions, whose success is initially uncertain. One argument against
423:
as a theory is characterized by three core theses: (1) that every bodily action is accompanied by a trying, (2) that tryings can occur without producing bodily movements and (3) that in the case of successful tryings, the trying is the cause of the bodily movement. The central idea of the notion of
373:
One important objection to
Davidson's theory of actions is that it does not account for the agent's role in the production of action. This role could include reflecting on what to do, choosing an alternative and then carrying it out. Another objection is that mere intentions seem to be insufficient
684:
he had a desire for ice cream. The agent's beliefs are another relevant feature for action explanation. So the desire to have ice cream does not explain that John went to the fridge unless it is paired with John's belief that there is ice cream in the fridge. The desire together with the belief is
602:
correspond to the most simple commands we can follow. This position excludes most forms of muscle contractions and chemical processes from the list of basic actions since we usually cannot follow the corresponding commands directly. What counts as a basic action, according to this view, depends on
305:
An important distinction among actions is between non-basic actions, which are done by doing something else, and basic actions, for which this is not the case. Most philosophical discussions of actions focus on physical actions in the form of bodily movements. But many philosophers consider mental
578:
doing another thing, like turning on a light by flipping a switch. In this example, the flipping of the switch is more basic than the turning-on of the light. But the turning-on of the light can itself constitute another action, like the action of alerting the burglar. It is usually held that the
548:
individuation of actions, on the other hand, hold that events that constitute each other or cause each other are to be counted as one action. On this view, the action of pulling the trigger is identical to the action of firing the gun and to the action of killing
Lincoln. So in doing all of these
495:
theories like
Davidson's account or standard forms of volitionalism. They usually agree that intentions are essential to actions. This brings with it the difficulty of accounting for the relation between intentions and actions in a non-causal way. Some suggestions have been made on this issue but
749:
states: 'We move our eyes, head and body in taking in what is around us... : crane our necks, peer, squint, reach for our glasses or draw near to get a better look...'...'Perception is a mode of activity on the part of the whole animal...It cannot be represented in terms of merely passive, and
667:
are relevant for actions since they frequently precede the action. It is often the case that several courses of action are open to the agent. In such cases, deliberation performs the function of evaluating the different options by weighing the reasons for and against them. Deciding then is the
467:
Volitions can also be used to explain how the agent knows about her own action. This knowledge about what one is doing or trying to do is available directly through introspection: the agent does not need to observe her behavior through sensory perception to arrive at this knowledge, unlike an
646:
One reason for doubting the existence of mental actions is that mental events often appear to be involuntary responses to internal or external stimuli and therefore not under our control. Another objection to the existence of mental actions is that the standard account of actions in terms of
468:
external observer. The experience of agency involved in volitions can be distinguished from the experience of freedom, which involves the additional aspect of having various alternative routes of action to choose from. But volition is possible even if there are no additional alternatives.
512:
these reasons, but he performs this action only because of the former reason. Causalist theories can account for this fact through causal relation: the former but not the latter reason causes the action. The challenge to non-causalist theories is to provide a convincing non-causal
720:
is closely related to the philosophy of actions since we usually hold people responsible for what they do. But in one sense the problem of responsibility is wider since we can be responsible not just for doing something but for failing to do something, so-called
679:
can be characterized as answers to why-questions. Explanations of actions are concerned with why the agent performed the action. The most straightforward answer to this question cites the agent's desire. For example, John went to the fridge
409:. They can be distinguished from intentions because they are directed at executing a course of action in the here and now, in contrast to intentions, which involve future-directed plans to do something later. Some authors also distinguish
2163:
Huxley, T. H., 1874, "On the
Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History", The Fortnightly Review 16 (New Series): 555–580. Reprinted in Method and Results: Essays by Thomas H. Huxley, New York: D. Appleton and Company,
704:. For example, John's action of going to the fridge would be considered irrational if his reason for this is bad, e.g. because his belief that there is ice cream in the fridge is merely based on
700:
Behavior that does not have a reason is not an action since it is not intentional. Every action has a reason but not every action has a good reason. Only actions with good reasons are considered
496:
this is still an open problem since none of them have gathered significant support. The teleological approach, for example, holds that this relation is to be understood not in terms of
437:: if something is an action because it was caused by a volition then we would have to posit one more volition in virtue of which the first trying can be regarded as an action.
643:, they argue that Strawson's account leaves out various forms of mental actions, like maintaining one's attention on an object or removing a content from consciousness.
2049:
353:
One difficulty with theories of action that try to characterize actions in terms of causal relations between mental states and bodily movements, so-called
330:, is due to Davidson, who holds that actions are bodily movements that are caused by intentions. Davidson explains the intentions themselves in terms of
378:
has pointed out, there seems to be a causal gap between intending to do something and actually doing it, which needs an act of the will to be overcome.
448:, in which case the aforementioned regress is inevitable, or they are not, in which case there would be no need to posit them as an explanatory inert "
302:
form a core aspect of actions. Non-causalist theories, on the other hand, often see intentions not as the action's cause but as a constituent of it.
294:
by the agent's intention to do so. On this view, actions are distinguished from other events by their causal history. Causalist theories include
464:, for example, avoids this problem by holding that actions are composed of two parts: a volition and the bodily movement corresponding to it.
611:
if it is paired with the assumption that an earlier volition is needed in order for the first volition to constitute an action. This is why
579:
chain or hierarchy of actions composed this way has a fundamental level at which it stops. The action at this fundamental level is called a
298:'s account, which defines actions as bodily movements caused by intentions in the right way, and volitionalist theories, according to which
314:
Conceptions of action try to determine what all actions have in common or what their essential features are. Causalist theories, like
594:, like the pressing of one's finger against the trigger, while the consequences of these movements, like the firing of the gun, are
245:
528:
concerns the question of whether two actions are identical or of how actions should be counted. For example, on April 14, 1865,
1709:
1351:
570:. This distinction is closely related to the problem of individuation since it also depends on the notion of doing one thing
94:
2221:
2200:
1673:
1611:
1525:
668:
process of picking one of these alternatives and forming an intention to perform it, thereby leading toward an action.
2242:
533:
1225:
374:
to cause actions, that other additional elements, namely volitions or tryings, are necessary. For example, as
759:
507:
An important challenge to non-causalism is due to
Davidson. As he points out, we usually have many different
315:
295:
2072:
508:
2237:
238:
1843:
2104:
780:
275:
84:
615:
often hold that volitions cause actions or are parts of actions but are not full actions themselves.
89:
2150:
845:
840:
231:
742:
212:
850:
825:
299:
129:
2247:
2061:"Davidson, D. Essays on Actions and Events, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2001a.
1992:
835:
830:
449:
8:
815:
283:
267:
63:
58:
44:
1131:
2252:
2138:
2128:
1824:
1562:
1463:
1413:
1302:
1198:
1112:
820:
810:
745:
in nature. That is, we carry out actions as an essential part of perceiving the world.
168:
68:
339:
1950:
1863:
1859:
1828:
1789:
1705:
1467:
1455:
1417:
1347:
1306:
1221:
1202:
1116:
529:
343:
1883:"Theories of Explanation: 4. Contemporary Developments in the Theory of Explanation"
1506:
389:
aim to overcome these shortcomings of
Davidson's account by including the notion of
2035:
2031:
1940:
1855:
1816:
1785:
1650:
1645:
1554:
1447:
1405:
1298:
1294:
1190:
1104:
763:
705:
497:
461:
143:
20:
1820:
1409:
2195:
1699:
1341:
1037:
805:
608:
434:
174:
1742:
1675:
Actions Are Not Events: An
Ontological Objection to the Causal Theory of Action
1613:
Actions Are Not Events: An
Ontological Objection to the Causal Theory of Action
1527:
Actions Are Not Events: An
Ontological Objection to the Causal Theory of Action
722:
628:
501:
138:
1945:
1928:
1451:
1194:
1108:
2231:
2191:
1954:
1867:
1584:
1459:
889:
800:
785:
453:
440:
An influential criticism of the volitional explanations of actions is due to
202:
183:
30:
1634:"Davidsonian Causalism and Wittgensteinian Anti-Causalism: A Rapprochement"
1340:
KĂĽhler, Michael; RĂĽther, Markus (27 October 2016). "7. Handlungsversuche".
441:
326:
The most well-known account of action, sometimes simply referred to as the
207:
115:
110:
24:
1970:"Irrationality and the Dynamic Unconscious: The Case for Wishful Thinking"
1698:
KĂĽhler, Michael; RĂĽther, Markus (27 October 2016). "6. Basishandlungen".
513:
375:
746:
1566:
795:
790:
726:
693:
of action usually hold that this reason explains the action because it
640:
259:
1969:
1804:
1726:
1393:
1321:
1265:
967:
919:
350:, pumping water can also be an instance of poisoning the inhabitants.
278:
is to determine how actions differ from other forms of behavior, like
2172:
2111:(Summer 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
2079:(Spring 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1907:
1482:
488:
271:
221:
164:
2019:
1773:
1633:
1558:
1542:
1435:
1282:
1178:
1158:
1092:
1021:
1911:
1243:"Causal Theories of Intentional Behavior and Wayward Causal Chains"
1242:
888:
Wilson, George; Shpall, Samuel; Piñeros
Glasscock, Juan S. (2016).
738:
456:: that volitions can play an explanatory role without leading to a
120:
1157:
Railton, Peter (2006). "Humean Theory of Practical Rationality".
775:
335:
331:
1882:
433:. But this claim is problematic since it threatens to lead to a
2216:
279:
1701:
Handbuch Handlungstheorie: Grundlagen, Kontexte, Perspektiven
1343:
Handbuch Handlungstheorie: Grundlagen, Kontexte, Perspektiven
887:
583:: it is not done by doing something else. For this reason,
193:
179:
19:
This article is about the theory of action in general. For
1929:"Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality"
1774:"Mental Ballistics or the Involuntariness of Spontaniety"
1093:"From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action"
270:
performs for a purpose, that is, guided by the person's
2133:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2019.
1436:"At one with our actions, but at two with our bodies"
532:
both pulled the trigger of his gun, fired a shot and
452:". But it has been suggested that this constitutes a
627:
One influential account of mental action comes from
2070:
562:An important distinction among actions is between
1910:(2016). "2. From Explanations to Why-Questions".
1672:Hu, Jiajun (2018). "5. A Davidsonian Challenge".
2229:
1513:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
896:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
587:are simple while non-basic actions are complex.
487:theories deny that intentions or similar states
1999:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1591:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1138:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
2071:van Riel, Raphael; Van Gulick, Robert (2019),
753:
671:
590:It is often assumed that bodily movements are
290:: driving the car is an action because it is
239:
1697:
1578:
1576:
1504:
1339:
1220:. Harvard University Press. pp. 37–45.
655:
1767:
1765:
1763:
1394:"Meditation and the Scope of Mental Action"
1163:. Oxford University Press. pp. 265–81.
1086:
1084:
1082:
1080:
1078:
913:
911:
909:
907:
905:
903:
1841:
1638:Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
1500:
1498:
1496:
1494:
1429:
1427:
1391:
1335:
1333:
1281:Adams, Frederick; Mele, Alfred R. (1992).
1076:
1074:
1072:
1070:
1068:
1066:
1064:
1062:
1060:
1058:
246:
232:
1944:
1724:
1693:
1691:
1689:
1687:
1685:
1649:
1627:
1625:
1623:
1582:
1573:
1387:
1385:
1383:
1319:
1280:
1263:
917:
2102:
1771:
1760:
1547:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
1381:
1379:
1377:
1375:
1373:
1371:
1369:
1367:
1365:
1363:
1215:
1132:"Donald Davidson: 2.1 Reasons as Causes"
1090:
1015:
1013:
1011:
1009:
1007:
1005:
1003:
1001:
999:
900:
883:
881:
879:
877:
875:
873:
871:
869:
867:
865:
2109:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2077:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1997:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1990:
1967:
1926:
1778:Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
1725:Honderich, Ted (2005). "Basic action".
1589:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1511:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1505:Wilson, George; Shpall, Samuel (2016).
1491:
1433:
1424:
1392:Brent, Michael; Upton, Candace (2019).
1330:
1156:
1136:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1055:
997:
995:
993:
991:
989:
987:
985:
983:
981:
979:
961:
959:
957:
955:
953:
951:
894:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
741:theory, perception is understood to be
607:this position is that it may lead to a
444:, who argued that volitions are either
405:are forms of affirming something, like
2230:
1974:Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology
1682:
1667:
1665:
1663:
1661:
1631:
1620:
1524:Hu, Jiajun (2018). "1. Introduction".
1507:"Action: 3. The Explanation of Action"
1176:
1129:
969:The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy
966:Audi, Robert (1999). "action theory".
949:
947:
945:
943:
941:
939:
937:
935:
933:
931:
618:
557:
2098:
2096:
2094:
2092:
1842:Szaniawski, Klemens (1 August 1980).
1540:
1480:
1360:
1172:
1170:
1160:The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory
1019:
862:
321:
2017:
1906:
1802:
1610:Hu, Jiajun (2018). "6. Conclusion".
1023:Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
976:
965:
29:. For the concept in sociology, see
16:Event done by an agent for a purpose
2201:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1887:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1658:
1264:Honderich, Ted (2005). "Volution".
1240:
928:
650:
13:
2189:
2183:
2089:
2052:: (2004), MIT Press(pp1/2 and 111)
1728:The Oxford Companion to Philosophy
1671:
1609:
1523:
1323:The Oxford Companion to Philosophy
1267:The Oxford Companion to Philosophy
1167:
921:The Oxford Companion to Philosophy
357:, is what has been referred to as
14:
2264:
2209:
1880:
1320:Honderich, Ted (2005). "Trying".
918:Honderich, Ted (2005). "Action".
711:
361:causal chains. A causal chain is
2215:
2103:Robb, David; Heil, John (2019),
1927:Alvarez, Maria (1 August 2018).
1790:10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00071.x
1020:Craig, Edward (1996). "Action".
519:
475:
381:
2157:
2121:
2064:
2055:
2042:
2011:
1984:
1961:
1920:
1900:
1874:
1844:"Philosophy of decision making"
1835:
1796:
1735:
1718:
1603:
1534:
1517:
1474:
1313:
1283:"The Intention/Volition Debate"
1274:
1257:
1234:
1209:
2036:10.5840/soctheorpract200935433
1651:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.006
1543:"A Noncausal Theory of Agency"
1299:10.1080/00455091.1992.10717283
1287:Canadian Journal of Philosophy
1150:
1123:
1030:
309:
1:
2107:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
2075:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
2020:"The Problem with Negligence"
1916:. Oxford University Press UK.
1821:10.1080/09515089.2019.1632427
1487:. Cambridge University Press.
1434:Haddock, Adrian (June 2005).
1410:10.1080/09515089.2018.1514491
1179:"Meditation and Self-Control"
972:. Cambridge University Press.
856:
732:
491:actions. They thereby oppose
95:Belief–desire–intention model
1860:10.1016/0001-6918(80)90041-4
413:, as acts of the will, from
397:in their theory of actions.
274:. The first question in the
23:' work on this subject, see
7:
1704:(in German). J.B. Metzler.
1346:(in German). J.B. Metzler.
1216:Anscombe, Gertrude (2000).
769:
754:Problem of mental causation
672:Explanation and rationality
10:
2269:
2024:Social Theory and Practice
1805:"What is 'Mental Action'?"
1731:. Oxford University Press.
1583:Schlosser, Markus (2019).
1541:Goetz, Stewart C. (1988).
1440:Philosophical Explorations
1326:. Oxford University Press.
1270:. Oxford University Press.
924:. Oxford University Press.
18:
1991:Talbert, Matthew (2019).
1946:10.1007/s11229-015-1005-9
1632:Queloz, Matthieu (2018).
1452:10.1080/13869790500095939
1195:10.1007/s11098-015-0578-y
1109:10.1007/s11406-013-9414-9
1091:Stuchlik, Joshua (2013).
750:internal, processes...'
685:often referred to as the
656:Deliberation and decision
90:Self-determination theory
1809:Philosophical Psychology
1772:Strawson, Galen (2003).
1398:Philosophical Psychology
758:Some philosophers (e.g.
552:
2243:Concepts in metaphysics
1968:Sturdee, P. G. (1995).
1747:Encyclopedia Britannica
1247:Behavior and Philosophy
1042:Encyclopedia Britannica
841:Symbolic interactionism
340:Humean theory of action
2173:"History of the Arrow"
2073:"Scientific Reduction"
1993:"Moral Responsibility"
534:killed Abraham Lincoln
213:Social identity theory
1183:Philosophical Studies
1130:Malpas, Jeff (2019).
851:Philosophy of Spinoza
826:Value-rational action
130:Individual difference
2224:at Wikimedia Commons
2050:Action in Perception
1881:Mayes, G. Randolph.
1644:(20201214): 153–72.
1481:Ginet, Carl (1990).
1241:Enç, Berent (2004).
1177:Latham, Noa (2016).
836:Dramaturgical action
831:Communicative action
450:ghost in the machine
280:involuntary reflexes
276:philosophy of action
266:is an event that an
2238:Action (philosophy)
2222:Action (philosophy)
2018:King, Matt (2009).
1803:Levy, Yair (2019).
816:Instrumental action
619:Physical and mental
558:Basic and non-basic
498:efficient causation
284:Ludwig Wittgenstein
51:In different fields
39:Part of a series on
2177:Up Down Left Right
2105:"Mental Causation"
821:Traditional action
811:Affectional action
691:Causalist theories
355:causalist theories
322:Davidson's account
2220:Media related to
1848:Acta Psychologica
1711:978-3-476-02492-3
1353:978-3-476-02492-3
596:non-basic actions
568:non-basic actions
530:John Wilkes Booth
502:final "causation"
256:
255:
2260:
2219:
2205:
2196:Zalta, Edward N.
2190:Wilson, George.
2165:
2161:
2155:
2154:
2148:
2144:
2142:
2134:
2130:Epiphenomenalism
2125:
2119:
2118:
2117:
2116:
2100:
2087:
2086:
2085:
2084:
2068:
2062:
2059:
2053:
2046:
2040:
2039:
2015:
2009:
2008:
2006:
2004:
1988:
1982:
1981:
1965:
1959:
1958:
1948:
1939:(8): 3293–3310.
1924:
1918:
1917:
1904:
1898:
1897:
1895:
1893:
1878:
1872:
1871:
1839:
1833:
1832:
1800:
1794:
1793:
1769:
1758:
1757:
1755:
1753:
1739:
1733:
1732:
1722:
1716:
1715:
1695:
1680:
1679:
1669:
1656:
1655:
1653:
1629:
1618:
1617:
1607:
1601:
1600:
1598:
1596:
1580:
1571:
1570:
1538:
1532:
1531:
1521:
1515:
1514:
1502:
1489:
1488:
1478:
1472:
1471:
1431:
1422:
1421:
1389:
1358:
1357:
1337:
1328:
1327:
1317:
1311:
1310:
1278:
1272:
1271:
1261:
1255:
1254:
1238:
1232:
1231:
1213:
1207:
1206:
1189:(7): 1779–1798.
1174:
1165:
1164:
1154:
1148:
1147:
1145:
1143:
1127:
1121:
1120:
1088:
1053:
1052:
1050:
1048:
1034:
1028:
1027:
1017:
974:
973:
963:
926:
925:
915:
898:
897:
885:
764:epiphenomenalism
706:wishful thinking
689:for the action.
651:Related concepts
500:but in terms of
462:John Stuart Mill
368:in the right way
328:standard account
248:
241:
234:
144:Goal orientation
36:
35:
21:Ludwig von Mises
2268:
2267:
2263:
2262:
2261:
2259:
2258:
2257:
2228:
2227:
2212:
2186:
2184:Further reading
2171:J. R. Finkel,
2168:
2162:
2158:
2146:
2145:
2136:
2135:
2127:
2126:
2122:
2114:
2112:
2101:
2090:
2082:
2080:
2069:
2065:
2060:
2056:
2047:
2043:
2016:
2012:
2002:
2000:
1989:
1985:
1966:
1962:
1925:
1921:
1905:
1901:
1891:
1889:
1879:
1875:
1840:
1836:
1801:
1797:
1770:
1761:
1751:
1749:
1741:
1740:
1736:
1723:
1719:
1712:
1696:
1683:
1670:
1659:
1630:
1621:
1608:
1604:
1594:
1592:
1581:
1574:
1559:10.2307/2107978
1539:
1535:
1522:
1518:
1503:
1492:
1479:
1475:
1432:
1425:
1390:
1361:
1354:
1338:
1331:
1318:
1314:
1279:
1275:
1262:
1258:
1239:
1235:
1228:
1214:
1210:
1175:
1168:
1155:
1151:
1141:
1139:
1128:
1124:
1089:
1056:
1046:
1044:
1038:"Action theory"
1036:
1035:
1031:
1018:
977:
964:
929:
916:
901:
886:
863:
859:
806:Social relation
772:
760:Donald Davidson
756:
735:
716:The problem of
714:
674:
658:
653:
621:
609:vicious regress
560:
555:
524:The problem of
522:
478:
458:vicious regress
435:vicious regress
384:
324:
316:Donald Davidson
312:
296:Donald Davidson
282:. According to
252:
175:Sense of agency
34:
17:
12:
11:
5:
2266:
2256:
2255:
2250:
2245:
2240:
2226:
2225:
2211:
2210:External links
2208:
2207:
2206:
2185:
2182:
2181:
2180:
2167:
2166:
2156:
2147:|website=
2120:
2088:
2063:
2054:
2041:
2030:(4): 577–595.
2010:
1983:
1960:
1919:
1908:Skow, Bradford
1899:
1873:
1854:(1): 327–341.
1834:
1815:(6): 971–993.
1795:
1784:(3): 227–257.
1759:
1743:"Basic action"
1734:
1717:
1710:
1681:
1657:
1619:
1602:
1572:
1553:(2): 303–316.
1533:
1516:
1490:
1473:
1446:(2): 157–172.
1423:
1359:
1352:
1329:
1312:
1293:(3): 323–337.
1273:
1256:
1233:
1226:
1208:
1166:
1149:
1122:
1103:(3): 867–886.
1054:
1029:
975:
927:
899:
860:
858:
855:
854:
853:
848:
843:
838:
833:
828:
823:
818:
813:
808:
803:
798:
793:
788:
783:
778:
771:
768:
755:
752:
734:
731:
718:responsibility
713:
712:Responsibility
710:
673:
670:
657:
654:
652:
649:
629:Galen Strawson
620:
617:
559:
556:
554:
551:
546:coarse-grained
521:
518:
516:of this fact.
485:anti-causalist
477:
474:
387:Volitionalists
383:
380:
346:'s manuscript
323:
320:
311:
308:
254:
253:
251:
250:
243:
236:
228:
225:
224:
218:
217:
216:
215:
210:
205:
197:
196:
190:
189:
188:
187:
177:
172:
162:
154:
153:
149:
148:
147:
146:
141:
139:Intentionality
133:
132:
126:
125:
124:
123:
118:
113:
105:
104:
100:
99:
98:
97:
92:
87:
79:
78:
74:
73:
72:
71:
69:Social science
66:
61:
53:
52:
48:
47:
41:
40:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2265:
2254:
2251:
2249:
2246:
2244:
2241:
2239:
2236:
2235:
2233:
2223:
2218:
2214:
2213:
2203:
2202:
2197:
2193:
2188:
2187:
2178:
2174:
2170:
2169:
2160:
2152:
2140:
2132:
2131:
2124:
2110:
2106:
2099:
2097:
2095:
2093:
2078:
2074:
2067:
2058:
2051:
2045:
2037:
2033:
2029:
2025:
2021:
2014:
1998:
1994:
1987:
1980:(2): 163–174.
1979:
1975:
1971:
1964:
1956:
1952:
1947:
1942:
1938:
1934:
1930:
1923:
1915:
1914:
1909:
1903:
1888:
1884:
1877:
1869:
1865:
1861:
1857:
1853:
1849:
1845:
1838:
1830:
1826:
1822:
1818:
1814:
1810:
1806:
1799:
1791:
1787:
1783:
1779:
1775:
1768:
1766:
1764:
1748:
1744:
1738:
1730:
1729:
1721:
1713:
1707:
1703:
1702:
1694:
1692:
1690:
1688:
1686:
1677:
1676:
1668:
1666:
1664:
1662:
1652:
1647:
1643:
1639:
1635:
1628:
1626:
1624:
1615:
1614:
1606:
1590:
1586:
1579:
1577:
1568:
1564:
1560:
1556:
1552:
1548:
1544:
1537:
1529:
1528:
1520:
1512:
1508:
1501:
1499:
1497:
1495:
1486:
1485:
1477:
1469:
1465:
1461:
1457:
1453:
1449:
1445:
1441:
1437:
1430:
1428:
1419:
1415:
1411:
1407:
1403:
1399:
1395:
1388:
1386:
1384:
1382:
1380:
1378:
1376:
1374:
1372:
1370:
1368:
1366:
1364:
1355:
1349:
1345:
1344:
1336:
1334:
1325:
1324:
1316:
1308:
1304:
1300:
1296:
1292:
1288:
1284:
1277:
1269:
1268:
1260:
1253:(1): 149–166.
1252:
1248:
1244:
1237:
1229:
1223:
1219:
1212:
1204:
1200:
1196:
1192:
1188:
1184:
1180:
1173:
1171:
1162:
1161:
1153:
1137:
1133:
1126:
1118:
1114:
1110:
1106:
1102:
1098:
1094:
1087:
1085:
1083:
1081:
1079:
1077:
1075:
1073:
1071:
1069:
1067:
1065:
1063:
1061:
1059:
1043:
1039:
1033:
1025:
1024:
1016:
1014:
1012:
1010:
1008:
1006:
1004:
1002:
1000:
998:
996:
994:
992:
990:
988:
986:
984:
982:
980:
971:
970:
962:
960:
958:
956:
954:
952:
950:
948:
946:
944:
942:
940:
938:
936:
934:
932:
923:
922:
914:
912:
910:
908:
906:
904:
895:
891:
884:
882:
880:
878:
876:
874:
872:
870:
868:
866:
861:
852:
849:
847:
844:
842:
839:
837:
834:
832:
829:
827:
824:
822:
819:
817:
814:
812:
809:
807:
804:
802:
801:Social action
799:
797:
794:
792:
789:
787:
786:Direct action
784:
782:
781:Action theory
779:
777:
774:
773:
767:
765:
761:
751:
748:
744:
740:
730:
728:
724:
719:
709:
707:
703:
698:
696:
692:
688:
683:
678:
669:
666:
662:
661:Deliberations
648:
644:
642:
638:
634:
630:
625:
616:
614:
610:
604:
601:
600:basic actions
597:
593:
592:basic actions
588:
586:
585:basic actions
582:
577:
573:
569:
565:
550:
547:
543:
542:individuation
539:
535:
531:
527:
526:individuation
520:Individuation
517:
515:
510:
505:
503:
499:
494:
490:
486:
482:
481:Non-causalist
476:Non-causalism
473:
469:
465:
463:
459:
455:
454:false dilemma
451:
447:
443:
438:
436:
432:
427:
422:
421:Volitionalism
418:
416:
412:
408:
404:
400:
396:
392:
388:
382:Volitionalism
379:
377:
371:
369:
364:
360:
356:
351:
349:
345:
341:
337:
333:
329:
319:
317:
307:
303:
301:
297:
293:
289:
285:
281:
277:
273:
269:
265:
261:
249:
244:
242:
237:
235:
230:
229:
227:
226:
223:
220:
219:
214:
211:
209:
206:
204:
203:Self-efficacy
201:
200:
199:
198:
195:
192:
191:
185:
181:
178:
176:
173:
170:
166:
163:
161:
158:
157:
156:
155:
151:
150:
145:
142:
140:
137:
136:
135:
134:
131:
128:
127:
122:
119:
117:
114:
112:
109:
108:
107:
106:
102:
101:
96:
93:
91:
88:
86:
85:Action theory
83:
82:
81:
80:
76:
75:
70:
67:
65:
62:
60:
57:
56:
55:
54:
50:
49:
46:
43:
42:
38:
37:
32:
31:Social action
28:
27:
22:
2199:
2176:
2159:
2129:
2123:
2113:, retrieved
2108:
2081:, retrieved
2076:
2066:
2057:
2044:
2027:
2023:
2013:
2001:. Retrieved
1996:
1986:
1977:
1973:
1963:
1936:
1932:
1922:
1912:
1902:
1890:. Retrieved
1886:
1876:
1851:
1847:
1837:
1812:
1808:
1798:
1781:
1777:
1750:. Retrieved
1746:
1737:
1727:
1720:
1700:
1674:
1641:
1637:
1612:
1605:
1593:. Retrieved
1588:
1550:
1546:
1536:
1526:
1519:
1510:
1483:
1476:
1443:
1439:
1404:(1): 52–71.
1401:
1397:
1342:
1322:
1315:
1290:
1286:
1276:
1266:
1259:
1250:
1246:
1236:
1217:
1211:
1186:
1182:
1159:
1152:
1140:. Retrieved
1135:
1125:
1100:
1096:
1045:. Retrieved
1041:
1032:
1026:. Routledge.
1022:
968:
920:
893:
846:Group action
757:
743:sensorimotor
736:
717:
715:
701:
699:
697:the action.
694:
690:
686:
681:
677:Explanations
676:
675:
664:
660:
659:
645:
636:
632:
626:
622:
613:volitionists
612:
605:
599:
595:
591:
589:
584:
581:basic action
580:
576:in virtue of
575:
571:
567:
563:
561:
545:
541:
538:fine-grained
537:
525:
523:
506:
492:
484:
480:
479:
470:
466:
457:
445:
442:Gilbert Ryle
439:
431:basic action
430:
425:
420:
419:
414:
410:
406:
402:
398:
394:
390:
386:
385:
372:
367:
362:
358:
354:
352:
347:
327:
325:
313:
304:
291:
287:
263:
257:
208:Self-concept
159:
116:Goal pursuit
111:Goal setting
26:Human Action
25:
2248:Determinism
1913:Reasons Why
1097:Philosophia
514:explanation
376:John Searle
310:Conceptions
2232:Categories
2115:2020-03-10
2083:2020-03-10
1227:0674003993
857:References
796:Praxeology
791:Enactivism
739:enactivism
733:Perception
727:negligence
641:meditation
540:theory of
407:intentions
260:philosophy
64:Psychology
59:Philosophy
2253:Free will
2149:ignored (
2139:cite book
2048:Alva Noë
1955:1573-0964
1868:0001-6918
1829:198595347
1484:On Action
1468:142740785
1460:1386-9795
1418:149891767
1307:142465441
1218:Intention
1203:170959501
1117:144779235
723:omissions
665:decisions
637:catalytic
633:prefatory
493:causalist
411:volitions
399:Volitions
348:Intention
300:volitions
288:causalism
272:intention
222:Free will
165:Intention
103:Processes
2192:"Action"
1933:Synthese
1585:"Agency"
890:"Action"
770:See also
747:Alva Noë
702:rational
391:volition
344:Anscombe
184:category
169:category
152:Concepts
121:Planning
77:Theories
2198:(ed.).
2003:1 March
1892:1 March
1752:1 March
1567:2107978
1142:1 March
1047:1 March
776:Ability
682:because
536:. On a
509:reasons
415:tryings
403:tryings
363:wayward
359:wayward
336:desires
332:beliefs
2179:(2011)
1953:
1866:
1827:
1708:
1595:14 May
1565:
1466:
1458:
1416:
1350:
1305:
1224:
1201:
1115:
695:causes
687:reason
446:active
426:trying
395:trying
292:caused
264:action
160:Action
45:Agency
2194:. In
2164:1898.
1825:S2CID
1563:JSTOR
1464:S2CID
1414:S2CID
1303:S2CID
1199:S2CID
1113:S2CID
564:basic
553:Types
489:cause
268:agent
262:, an
2151:help
2005:2021
1951:ISSN
1894:2021
1864:ISSN
1754:2021
1706:ISBN
1597:2021
1456:ISSN
1348:ISBN
1222:ISBN
1144:2021
1049:2021
663:and
566:and
401:and
334:and
194:Self
180:Goal
2032:doi
1941:doi
1937:195
1856:doi
1817:doi
1786:doi
1782:103
1646:doi
1555:doi
1448:doi
1406:doi
1295:doi
1191:doi
1187:173
1105:doi
766:).
737:In
635:or
574:or
483:or
393:or
258:In
2234::
2175:,
2143::
2141:}}
2137:{{
2091:^
2028:35
2026:.
2022:.
1995:.
1976:.
1972:.
1949:.
1935:.
1931:.
1885:.
1862:.
1852:45
1850:.
1846:.
1823:.
1813:32
1811:.
1807:.
1780:.
1776:.
1762:^
1745:.
1684:^
1660:^
1640:.
1636:.
1622:^
1587:.
1575:^
1561:.
1551:49
1549:.
1545:.
1509:.
1493:^
1462:.
1454:.
1442:.
1438:.
1426:^
1412:.
1402:32
1400:.
1396:.
1362:^
1332:^
1301:.
1291:22
1289:.
1285:.
1251:32
1249:.
1245:.
1197:.
1185:.
1181:.
1169:^
1134:.
1111:.
1101:41
1099:.
1095:.
1057:^
1040:.
978:^
930:^
902:^
892:.
864:^
729:.
708:.
572:by
460:.
370:.
2204:.
2153:)
2038:.
2034::
2007:.
1978:2
1957:.
1943::
1896:.
1870:.
1858::
1831:.
1819::
1792:.
1788::
1756:.
1714:.
1678:.
1654:.
1648::
1642:5
1616:.
1599:.
1569:.
1557::
1530:.
1470:.
1450::
1444:8
1420:.
1408::
1356:.
1309:.
1297::
1230:.
1205:.
1193::
1146:.
1119:.
1107::
1051:.
247:e
240:t
233:v
186:)
182:(
171:)
167:(
33:.
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.