Intention - Knowledge

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intentions and a mean multiple correlation of .76 for the equation predicting intentions from both attitudes and norms. With similar objectives but larger samples, Sheppard et al.'s and van den Putte's meta-analyses estimated correlations of .53 and .62 for the prediction of behavior and multiple correlations of .66 and .68, respectively, for the prediction of intentions. All these studies have reflected the strong correlation that exists between people's attitudes, social norms and their intentions, as well as between their intention and the prediction of their behaviors. However, these correlations do not remain unchanged across all the conditions in people's life. Although people are likely to develop intentions to perform the action in question if they have a favorable attitude and perceive the behavior as controllable, then people's perception of control would be irrelevant to intentions when people have negative attitudes and perceive normative pressure not to perform certain actions. Research has also shown that people are more likely to perform an action if they have previously formed the corresponding intentions. Their intentions to perform the action appear to derive from attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. To state an example: The reason one may be motivated to consume alcohol after work is determined by several factors: (1) Intention. The idea that drinking can help an individual relieve stress and enjoy one's time, for example, can greatly influence the attitude towards post-work drinking. (2) Subjective norms in one's surroundings. This factor is mainly cultural, so how much a society values and rewards drinking, but also strongly influenced by one's immediate social circle's values about this specific issue. (3) Perceived behavioural control towards the intended behaviour, specifically regarding the amounts of alcohol consumed. (4) Trends in behaviour. The longer the behaviour has been influenced by the previous factors, the more likely the behaviour is prone to be repeated as the original intention becomes reinforced.

272:. An action-desire is a desire to perform an action. On this view, to intend to do sport tomorrow is to have a desire to do sport tomorrow together with a belief that one will do sport tomorrow. Some accounts also hold that this belief is based on the desire: one believes that one will do it because one desires to do it. A similar definition sees intentions as "self-fulfilling expectations that are motivated by a desire for their fulfillment and that represent themselves as such". An important virtue of this approach is its simplicity and its explanatory power. It also manages to account for the fact that there seems to be a close relationship between what one believes, what one desires, and what one intends. But various arguments against this reduction have been presented in the contemporary literature. These often take the form of counterexamples, in which there is both a corresponding belief and a desire without an intention or an intention without one of these components. This is sometimes explained in relation to the idea that intentions involve a form of commitment to or settledness on the intended course of action by the agent. But this aspect is not present in beliefs and desires by themselves. For example, when considering whether to respond to an insult through retaliation, the agent may have both a desire to do so and a belief that they will end up doing this, based on how they acted in the past. But the agent may still lack the corresponding intention since they are not fully decided. It is also possible to have an intention to do something without believing that one actually will do it, for example, because the agent had similar intentions earlier and also failed to act on them back then or because the agent is unsure whether they will succeed. But it has been argued that a weaker relation between intentions and beliefs may be true, e.g. that intentions involve a belief that there is a chance of achieving what one intends. 338:

represents itself as the cause of going to the gym. One important motivation for accepting a self-referentiality theory is to explain a certain type of case: a case in which the behavior is just like it was intended, but the intention either did not cause the behavior at all or did not cause it in the right way. For example, the agent intends to shoot an intruder, is then startled by a moving shadow, which causes their finger to twitch, thereby shooting the intruder. It is often claimed that in such cases, the behavior in question does not constitute an intentional action, i.e. that the agent did not shoot the intruder intentionally, despite intending to shoot the intruder and shooting the intruder. This paradox can be solved through self-referentiality theories. The behavior in question is not an intentional action because the intention was not properly realized: it was part of the intention to cause the behavior, which did not happen in the right way. It is usually accepted that intentions have to cause the corresponding behavior in the right way for intentional actions to arise. But the claim that this happens on the level of the content of the intention, i.e. that the intention represents itself as causing the behavior, is often contested. Instead, it has been argued that the content of intentions consists only of the corresponding action plan without representing the intention itself and its causal relation to the execution of this plan.

546:. Deliberation involves formulating promising courses of action and assessing their value by considering the reasons for and against them. An example of this type of intention formation is a student who is up all night thinking about whether to major in English and then finally decides to do so. But not all decisions are preceded by deliberation and not every act of deliberation results in a decision. Another type of intention formation happens without making any explicit decision. In such cases, the agent just finds themselves committed to the corresponding course of action without consciously deciding for it or against its alternatives. This is the case for many actions done out of habit. For example, habitually unlocking the office door in the morning is usually an intentional action that happens without a prior explicit decision to do so. It has been argued that decisions can be understood as a type of mental action that consists in resolving uncertainty about what to do. Decisions are usually seen as a momentary change from not having the intention to having it. This contrasts with deliberation, which normally refers to a drawn-out process. But these technical distinctions are not always reflected in how the terms are used in ordinary language. 859:" refers to a specific form of language structure used for reference to the present and the future but also for ongoing and habitual events in the past. For example, ‘He writes/is writing/wrote/was writing/will write letters.’ People are more likely to interpret the event as ongoing, and likely to resume the action in the future when it has been described with the imperfective verb aspect. Similarly, using present tense to describe an action as ongoing may strengthen intentions to perform the same action in the future. Previous research has showed that both information on past behavior and their attitude towards such behavior play crucial roles in predicting people's future behavioral tendency. Recent research done by Carrera and others concluded that verb tense may not have direct influence on intentions, however it could still affect the type of information used as a basis of behavioral intentions. When participants described a past episode using the present tense, they consistently used the more concrete past behavior as a basis for their intentions. In contrast, when participants described a past episode using the past tense, they consistently used the more abstract attitude as a basis for their intentions. 562:. They also help guide the action itself and try to coordinate the agent's behavior over time. A similar function of intentions is to coordinate one's behavior with the behavior of other agents, either by forming intentions together or by reacting to the intentions others already have. This enables various complex forms of cooperation. Not every form of human behavior is guided by intentions. This concerns, for example, bodily reflexes like sneezing or other uncontrolled processes like digestion, which happen without following a previously devised mental plan. Intentions are intimately related to practical reason, i.e. to the reasons for which we act. These reasons are often explained in terms of beliefs and desires. For example, the agent's reason to cross a road may consist in their desire to reach the other side and their belief that this is achieved by crossing it. Because of this close connection to behavior, intentions are frequently used to explain why people engage in certain behavior. Such explanations are often teleological in the sense that they cited the intended goal as the reason for the behavior. 595:

or over shoot a target, or attempt to perform an action but their hand slipped. The aim of the study was to determine whether the children were able to interpret the intention of the adult, regardless of the actual action performed. Young children have a tendency to imitate other people's actions. The outcome measure was what the child chose to re-enact—the actual event (literal motions), or the adult's goal, which was not accomplished. The results of the study suggested that 18-month-olds are able to infer unseen goals and intentions of others based on their actions. Infants who saw unsuccessful attempts at a target act and infants who saw the target act imitated the act at a higher rate than infants who saw neither the act nor an attempt. Similar paradigms were conducted with children 9 months old and 15 months old. Nine-month-olds did not respond to the unsuccessful attempt demonstrations; however, 15-month-olds acted similarly to the 18-month-olds. This suggests that between 9 months and 15 months of age the ability to infer intentions in other people develops.

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many courses of action are too complex to be represented at once in full detail. Instead, usually only proximal intentions involve detailed representations while distal intentions may leave their object vague until it becomes more relevant to the task at hand. But distal intentions still play an important role in guiding the formation of proximal intentions. A simple plan to buy batteries at the close-by electronics store, for example, involves many steps, like putting on shoes, opening one's door, closing and locking it, going to the traffic light, turning left, etc. These steps are not represented in full detail while the agent is putting on their shoes. Central to this process is the agent's ability to monitor the progress in relation to the proximal intention and to adjust the current behavior accordingly. In this way, intention has the capacity to coordinate the agent's behavior over time. While both proximal and distal intentions are relevant for one's sense of agency, it has been argued that distal intentions lead to a stronger sense of agency.

372:. The agent's commitment to the course of action in question consists in their active execution of the plan. But not all forms of human behavior are intentional. Raising one's hand may happen intentionally or unintentionally, for example, when a student wants to signal to the teacher that they have a question in contrast to an involuntary bodily reflex. It is often held that a central aspect of immediate intentions is that the agent knows what they are doing and why they are doing it. This means that the action is accompanied by a certain form of knowledge that is absent in mere purposive behavior. This aspect is sometimes used to contrast the behavior of humans and animals. There is no general agreement that all intentional actions are accompanied by this type of knowledge. One reason to doubt this is that even for intentional actions, the agent is not always able to articulate what they are doing and why they are doing it. Some defenders try to explain this by holding that the corresponding knowledge is there, even if it is not conscious. 599:

desired. When outcomes are achieved without the action of the individual directed at the goal, intention is not attributed to the actor; rather, the event is considered an accident. Research by Astington and colleagues (1993) found that 3-year-olds are skilled at matching goals to outcomes to infer intention. If another individual's goals match an outcome, 3-year-olds are able to conclude that the action was done “on purpose.” Conversely, when goals do not match outcomes, the children labeled the individual's actions as accidental. Children may come to distinguish between desire and intention when they learn to view the mind as a medium for representations of the world. Astington argues that initially desire is undifferentiated from intention in that both function as a goal state. Children then develop a more mature command of understanding other's intentions when they are able to represent an action as caused by a prior intention that is separate from desire.

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actually drinks the toxin the next day, all that matters is that they have the intention to do so by the end of today. The puzzle concerns the question of whether it is possible to really form this intention. The reason for doubting this is that once the agent has formed the intention and received the money, they have no reason anymore to actually drink the toxin: this step is optional. But if they know all along that they will not drink the toxin after all, it is highly questionable whether they can actually form the corresponding intention. This is closely related to the idea that intending something entails believing that one will do it. But since the agent has no reason to actually do it once they have received the money, they would not believe that they would do it. This counts against the idea that they can intend it to begin with.

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pointing intended to direct and share intention rather than request an object), reveals the understanding of others as attentional and intentional agents (e.g. Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007). This understanding is indicated by object-directed reactions to pointing (rather than focusing on the hand). Pointing is also thought to denote perspective-taking ability and understanding of intention, as the individual must be able to understand that the actor is attending to the object and, perhaps most importantly, that the actor is attempting to communicate information regarding the referent. The development of pointing is thought to reach a critical stage at around 9 to 12 months in normally developing children (e.g. Leung & Rheingold, 1981; Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Schaffer, 2005). Liszkowski,

308:. The claim that intentions are accompanied by desires is generally accepted. But there are various arguments against the claim that intentions are nothing but desires. They often focus on cases where people intend to do something different from their predominant desire. For example, the agent may intend to go to the gym even though they have a much stronger desire to go to the pub instead. This may be the case because the agent thinks that going to the gym is better even though this is not in tune with their desires. Another counterexample comes from cases where the agent has not yet formed an intention even though one desire is predominant. A closely related theory understands intentions as dispositions to act and desires as dispositions to form intentions, i.e. as higher-order dispositions to act. 288:, sees intentions as evaluative attitudes. On his view, desires are conditional evaluative attitudes while intentions are unconditional evaluative attitudes. This means that desires see their object as positive in a certain respect while intentions see their object as positive overall or all things considered. So the agent may have a desire to go to the gym because it is healthy whereas their intention to go to the gym is based on the evaluation that it is good all things considered. This theory is closely related to the belief-desire theory explained above since it also includes the idea that beliefs are involved in intentions. Here the belief in question is not a belief that one will do the action but a belief that the action in question is a means towards the positively evaluated end. 224:

share the same content with other mental states, like beliefs and desires. But the different mental states are distinguished from each other concerning their attitudes. Admiring the idea of helping the poor, for example, is different from intending to help the poor, even though both states share the same plan as their content. One difference between desires and intentions is that intentions impose more restrictions on their contents. This includes that intentions are directed at possible courses of action, i.e. that they involve something the agent can do or at least thinks they can do. Desires, on the other hand, do not involve this form of restriction. In this sense, it is possible to desire sunny weather for tomorrow but not to intend sunny weather for tomorrow.

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all-out judgment that the intended course of action is good. On this view, intentions evaluate their intended course of action as good all things considered. This aspect stands in contrast to desires, which evaluate their object merely as good in some sense but leave it open whether it is bad in another sense. Someone who is still deliberating whether to perform a certain action, for example, has not yet committed themselves to performing it and therefore lacks the corresponding intention. It has been argued that this form of commitment or being-settled-on is unique to intentions and is not found in other mental states like beliefs or desires. In this sense, intentions may be based on or accompanied by beliefs and desires but are not reducible to them.

449:, like urges or experiences of dizziness, which are outside the domain of rationality. Various criteria for the rationality of intentions have been proposed. Some hold that intentions are based on desires and beliefs and that, therefore, their rationality depends on these desires and beliefs. On this view, desires present certain goals, beliefs present the means needed to achieve these goals and intentions constitute commitments to realize the means towards these goals. In this sense, an intention that is based on irrational states is itself irrational. For example, the intention to heal oneself through the power of crystals is irrational if it is based on an irrational belief concerning the 877:

getting rid of a despised enemy. Opponents may claim that the moral difference in question only concerns the evaluation of the doctor as a person but not of their action. On this view, there is a difference between the moral values of persons and of actions: intentions concern the moral value of persons but not of actions. The intention principle is usually also rejected by consequentialists. They hold that only the consequences of an action matter but not how it was motivated. According to utilitarians, for example, an action is right if it produces the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In some cases, even actions performed with bad intentions may have this effect.

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reason. The question then is whether doing something for a reason is possible without having a corresponding intention. This is especially relevant for simple actions that are part of bigger routines. Walking to the cinema, for example, involves taking various steps. According to this argument, each step is an intentional action but the agent does not form a distinct intention for each step. Instead, most of them are not explicitly represented by the mind. Another counterexample against the thesis that performing an action intentionally involves intending to perform this action is based on the awareness of unintended side-effects, sometimes referred to as

364:. In some cases, the intention may point very far into the future, as when a teenager decides they want to become president one day. In other cases, the formation of the prospective intention only slightly precedes the action, as when the agent intends to scratch their back and does so right away. The commitment to the course of action is reversible. So if the agent encounters good reasons later on for not going through with it, the intention may be dropped or reformulated. In this sense, having a prospective intention to perform a specific action does not ensure that this action will actually be performed later on. 329:

a different appointment at the same time at a different location. Another objection is based on the observation that not all intentions are successful, i.e. that one can intend to do something but fail to do it. For example, one may intend to follow the shortest route home but take a wrong turn and thereby fail to perform the corresponding action. In such cases, it may be argued that the intention was present whereas the action was absent, i.e. the agent intended to take the shortest route but did not take the shortest route. The possibility of the two coming apart would suggest that they are not identical.

909:, but not a means. On this view, for example, terror bombing an ammunition factory in order to weaken the enemy's resolve by killing all the civilians working in it is impermissible. But performing the same attack as a tactical bombing in order to reduce the enemy's ammunition supply is permissible, even if the same amount of civilian deaths were foreseen as a side effect. Many of the arguments directed at the intention principle also apply to the doctrine of double effect. Additional arguments focus on the difficulty of drawing a general distinction between intended means and foreseen side-effects. 586:. Theory of mind research attempts to map how children come to understand the mind as a representational device for the world. This research has focused on the development of knowledge that others have beliefs, desires, and intentions that are different from one's own. A basic ability to comprehend other people's intentions based on their actions is critical to the development of theory of mind. Social, cognitive and developmental psychological research has focused on the question: How do young children develop the ability to understand other people's behaviors and intentions? 522:. For example, an intention to go to the supermarket may be based on another intention: the intention to eat. Because of this dependence, the agent would not have formed the earlier intention if the latter intention had been absent. In normal cases, the instrumental intention disappears if the intention it is based on does not exist anymore. In the example above, the agent may drop the intention to go to the supermarket if their doctor recommends them to start fasting. But there are special cases in which the instrumental intention persists nonetheless, sometimes referred to as 579:

conceptualize how people and animals differ from objects. Much of behavior is caused by intentions, and understanding intentions helps to interpret these behaviors. Second, intentions are integral to an understanding of morality. Children learn to assign praise or blame based on whether actions of others are intentional. Intention is also necessary to understand and predict the plans and future actions of others. Understanding the intentions and motives of others aids in the interpretation of communication, and the achievement of cooperative goals.

729:, a specific intent is required. This distinction is closely related to the difference between direct and indirect intent, but not identical to it. Direct intent refers to the desire to bring about a specific outcome. Indirect intent is about an almost certain outcome of an action that the agent is aware of but does not actively want. For example, if Ben intends to murder Ann with a stone by throwing it at her through a closed window then murdering Ann is a direct intent while breaking the window is an indirect intent. 244:" even though the two are closely related. Intentionality is the more general term: it refers to the power of minds to represent or to stand for things, properties, and states of affairs. Intentions are one form of intentionality since their contents represent possible courses of action. But there are other forms of intentionality, like simple beliefs or perceptions, that do not involve intentions. The adjective "intentional" is ambiguous since it can refer either to intentions or to intentionality. 639:

to predict the internal mental states and potential future actions of others. Research on biological motion has found cells in the primate superior temporal polysensory area (STP) that respond specifically to biological motion. In addition, there are brain regions, including the superior temporal sulcus, that respond to biological but not non-biological motion. These findings suggest that humans may have a biologically-based affinity for spotting and interpreting purposeful, biological motions.

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been suggested how intentions are related to beliefs. On the one hand, it seems impossible to intend to do something one beliefs to be impossible. Some accounts go even further and suggest that intentions involve the belief that one will perform the action in question. Besides that, it has been suggested that beliefs are necessary for intentions to connect the behavior to the intended goal. On this view, intentions involve the belief that the intended behavior would cause the intended goal.

675:, or neural regions, including the premotor cortex, and parietal cortex, that activate both when individuals are engaging in an action, and when they are observing the actions of others. This suggests individuals may be simulating the motor movements via internal representations of their own motor movements. Thus, research indicates that humans are hard-wired to notice biological motion, infer intention, and use previous mental representations to predict future actions of others. 494:, like declaring a meeting to be closed when one intends to open it. Freud sees such phenomena not as unintentional errors but ascribes to them a deeper meaning as expressions of unconscious wishes. As a window to the unconscious, interpreting the unconscious intentions behind such phenomena and raising the patient's awareness of them are important aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis. But there is no general agreement as to whether this type of behavior should be seen as 296:, i.e. that people do not always do what they believe would be best to do. An example of akrasia is an author who believes it would be best to work on his new book but ends up watching TV instead, despite his unconditional evaluative attitude in favor of working. In this sense, intentions cannot be unconditional evaluative attitudes since it is possible to intend to do one alternative while having an unconditional evaluative attitude towards another alternative. 6386: 822:

to form the intention today but not a reason to perform the action tomorrow. So the reason for forming the intention is different from the reason for performing the action. This is sometimes expressed by saying that the agent has the "wrong type of reason" to form the intention. On this account, it is impossible to form the intention because the right type of reason for the intention is derivative of the reason for the action itself, which is absent.

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in a certain behavior. Understanding the behavior of others in terms of intentions already happens in early childhood. Important in this context is the role of gestures, pointing, attention, and eye movement to understand the intentions of others and to form shared intentions. In the philosophy of action, a central question is whether it is true for all intentional actions that they are caused or accompanied by intentions. The

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this goal. At first, unconscious intentions are usually ascribed to the agent by spectators and may only be avowed by the agent themselves retrospectively. But this form of explanation is not always conclusive, since, at least for some cases, other explanations are available as well. For example, some behavior may be explained as the execution of a blind habit, which may occur with neither consciousness nor intention.

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Pelphrey, 2005). Intention may be ascribed to an individual based on where in space that individual is attending. Intention is understood not only through actions and the manipulation of objects, but by tracking eye movements. Research in this area is focused on how humans develop the understanding that eye gaze indicates that the observer may be psychologically connected to the referent.

6397: 413:: they involve side effects that the agent puts up with in order to realize their main intention. For example, Ted is unaware that smoking causes bladder cancer, but he is aware that it helps him to deal with stress and that it causes lung cancer. His reason for smoking is to deal with stress. Increasing his risk of lung cancer is a side effect he puts up with. So when smoking, Ted 458:

to become healthy but is unwilling to exercise. In such a case, it may still be rational for the agent to desire to become healthy, but intending it is not. This principle is expressed in the proverb "he who wills the end, wills the means". It has also been suggested that additional requirements of rationality concern the consistency between one's beliefs and one's intentions.

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incorrectly predicting one's own behavior. But various belief-desire theories are unable to explain this normative difference. Other arguments focus on the dissimilarities between these states. For example, one can desire impossible things but one cannot intend to do what one thinks is impossible. And whereas beliefs can be true or false, this does not apply to intentions.

793:, an action is an event that is intentional under some description. On this view, it is a central aspect of actions that they are caused by an agent's mental state: their intention. Another important aspect is that this causation happens in the right way, i.e. that the intention causes the event it planned and that the event is caused by employing the agent's 453:. But irrationality can also arise if two intentions are not consistent with each other, i.e. if the agent intends both to perform one action and to perform another action while believing that these two actions are incompatible with each other. A closely related form of irrationality applies to the relation between means and ends. This so-called 356:

this action since the agent has committed themselves to following them when the time comes. In this sense, it is sometimes held that desires evaluate their object only concerning one specific aspect while the commitments in intentions are based on an all-out evaluation. On this view, the intended course of action is not just evaluated as

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intention" itself. On this view, it is incoherent to talk of the mental states in question as unconscious intentions. The reason given for this is that intending something must be accompanied by some form of self-knowledge on the side of the agent about what is intended. This would not be possible if the mental state is unconscious.

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intention and not drink the toxin or (2) form the intention and drink the toxin. Since the second option maximizes utility, it is rational to follow it and drink the toxin. The difficulty for this approach concerns explaining how the agent can hold onto their intention to drink the toxin after they have received the money.

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intention. Having the unconditional intention to return the book, on the other hand, involves planning to return it independent of the friend's behavior. Unconditional intentions are stronger in the sense that the agent is fully committed to the course of action without relying on the presence of a triggering condition.

106:. It states that intending to do something consists in desiring it the most. Opponents of this approach have articulated various counterexamples with the goal of showing that intentions do not always coincide with the agent's strongest desire. A different approach to the theories mentioned so far is due to 876:

to a suffering and terminally ill patient who consents. Defenders of the intention principle may claim that it depends on the doctor's intention whether this action is permissible. Specifically, this concerns whether it is done with the intention to relieve the patient's pain or with the intention of

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value of the corresponding actions. This is sometimes termed the "intention principle": the thesis that whether an action is morally permissible sometimes depends on the agent's intention for performing this action. On this view, an otherwise permissible act may be impermissible if it is motivated by

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Various philosophers agree that it is impossible to form this type of intention. Their goal is often to find a general principle explaining why this is the case. Various accounts focus on the idea that the reason to perform the action is absent when it is time to perform it. So the agent has a reason

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Gestures are often recognized as a tool indicative of higher social reasoning. In order to engage in or understand a gesture, an individual has to recognize it as an indicator of an object or event separate from the self or the actor. It is thought that pointing, especially declarative pointing (i.e.

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Thus, research suggests that by the age of fifteen months, humans are capable of understanding intentional acts in others. The ability to distinguish between intention and desire develops in early childhood. Gestures and object-directed actions have also been studied in connexion with the development

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From an early age, typically-developing children parse human actions in terms of goals, rather than in terms of movements in space, or muscle movements. Meltzoff (1995) conducted a study in which 18-month-olds were shown an unsuccessful act. For instance, children watched an adult accidentally under

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intentions. Unconscious intentions are often used to explain cases where an agent behaves a certain way without being aware of this. This is especially relevant if the behavior is clearly directed at a goal while the agent does not consciously intend to pursue this goal or is not even aware of having

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holds that it is irrational to intend to perform one action without intending to perform another action while believing that this latter action is necessary to achieve the former action. For example, it would be irrational to intend to become healthy if the agent believes that exercising is necessary

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consequences intended obliquely carry more weight on a moral level than unintentional bad consequences. There is no consensus whether obliquely intended behavior constitutes an intentional action, e.g. whether it is correct to state that smokers aware of the dangers intentionally damage their health.

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An important difference among intentions is that between prospective and immediate intentions. Prospective intentions, also called "prior intentions", are forward-looking: they are plans held by the agent to perform some kind of action in the future. They are different from merely desiring to perform

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are concerned with a more remote future. Immediate intentions, on the other hand, are intentions that guide the agent while they are performing the action in question. They are also called "intentions-in-action" or "act-related" intentions. The term "intention" usually refers to anticipated means or

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Some philosophers have rejected this close link between action and intention. This criticism is based on the idea that a person can perform an action intentionally without having a corresponding intention to perform this action. Doing something intentionally is usually associated with doing it for a

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Neuroimaging research suggests that biological motion is processed differently from other types of motion. Biological motion is processed as a category in which individuals are able to infer intention. An evolutionary perspective of this phenomenon is that humans survived on the basis of being able

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Thus, it seems pointing may be more complex than a straightforward indicator of social understanding. Early pointing may not indicate an understanding of intention; rather it may indicate an association between the gesture and interesting objects or events. However, an understanding of intention may

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These distinctions are relevant for morality and the law. Committing a crime unintentionally, for example, is usually seen as a less serious offense than committing the same crime intentionally. This is often referred to as negligence in contrast to having bad intentions. It is usually held that bad

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Some difficulties in understanding intentions are due to various ambiguities and inconsistencies in how the term is used in ordinary language. For this reason, theorists often distinguish various types of intentions in order to avoid misunderstandings and to clearly specify what is being researched.

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anything towards realizing this plan. Defenders have rejected this argument by trying to elucidate how even minimal preparatory steps may already be seen as part of the action. Such steps may include, for example, not making any other plans that may interfere with the plan in question, like planning

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and her followers provide an alternative account that denies the distinction between intentions and actions. On this view, to intend a goal is already a form of acting towards this goal and therefore not a distinct mental state. This means that when one intends to visit the zoo next Thursday, one is

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is sometimes preceded by the deliberation of promising alternative courses of action and may happen in decisions, in which the agent chooses between these alternatives. Intentions are responsible for initiating, sustaining, and terminating actions and are frequently used to explain why people engage

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How people think about and verbally communicate their own intentions also impacts these intentions. For example, asking a question about prior behaviors using the imperfective aspect of language seems to be able to bring out stronger intentions to perform such a behavior in the future. According to

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A central aspect of intentions concerning the attitude towards their content is that the agent has committed themselves to the plan in question. This is different from merely wanting to do something and thinking that doing it would be good. It is sometimes argued that this commitment consists in an

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The predictive validity of the theory of Reasoned Action has been examined in numerous studies that have previously served as literature for at least three quantitative reviews. Ajzen and Fishbein (1973) reviewed 10 studies and reported a .63 average correlation for the prediction of behavior from

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Intentions are closely related to other mental states, like beliefs and desires. It is generally accepted that intentions involve some form of desire: the intended action is seen as good or desirable in some sense. This aspect makes it possible for intentions to motivate actions. Various ways have

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Johansson devised a way to study biological motion without interference from other characteristics of humans such as body shape, or emotional expression. He attached dots of light to actors' joints and recorded the movements in a dark environment, so that only the dots of light were visible. The

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Critics of the notion of "unconscious intentions" have raised doubts about the empirical evidence cited in favor of unconscious intentions, which is often based on interpretations resting on various controversial assumptions. Another line of argument is directed against the concept of "unconscious

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plan further ahead. The same intention can be both proximal and distal if it is directed both at what to do right now and what to do later. For example, deciding to start watching a movie now in one sitting involves an intention that is both proximal and distal. This distinction is important since

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The self-referentiality theory asserts that one central feature of intentions is that they are self-referential. This means that the intentions do not just represent the intended course of action but also represent themselves as the cause of the action. On this view, the intention to go to the gym

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Another important aspect of intentions is that they have conditions of satisfaction, like beliefs and desires. This means that intentions are either successful or unsuccessful. An intention that produces the intended action is a successful intention. But if the produced behavior falls short of its

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must prove that there was intent (or another form of mens rea) in addition to showing that the accused physically committed the crime. There are different ways in which intent can be proved or disproved depending on the case and the type of intent involved. One way to do so is to look at previous

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Intentions, like various other mental states, can be understood as consisting of two components: a content and an attitude towards this content. On this view, the content of an intention is the action plan in question and the attitude involves a commitment to executing this action. Intentions may

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Although human behavior is extremely complex and still remains unpredictable, psychologists are trying to understand the influential factors in the process of forming intentions and performing actions. The theories of Reasoned Action and Planned Behavior are comprehensive theories that specify a

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In criminal law, an important distinction is between general and specific intent. General intent is the weaker term. It implies that the person meant to act the way they did. It does not imply that they wanted to cause harm or that they were trying to achieve a particular result, unlike specific

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what their own actions and intentions might be in the situation. Individuals connect their own actions to internal mental states through the experience of sensory information when movements are carried out; this sensory information is stored and connected to one's own intentions. Since internal

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In one experiment, 18-month-olds observed either a human or a mechanical arm attempting to perform actions, but failing to achieve a goal. The children imitated the action to complete the intended goal when the arm was human, but not when it was mechanical. This suggests that from a young age,

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Research suggests that faces are pivotal in offering social cues necessary for children's cognitive, language, and social development. These cues may offer information on another's emotional state, focus of attention, and potential intentions (For a discussion see Mosconi, Mack, McCarthy, &

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is the traditionally dominant approach. According to a simple version of it, having an intention is nothing but having a desire to perform a certain action and a belief that one will perform this action. Belief-desire theories are frequently criticized based on the fact that neither beliefs nor

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The development of understanding intention has also been studied in toddlers. As mentioned previously, an intentional action is based on the belief that the course of action will satisfy a desire. In that case, what was intended can be interpreted as a function of an understanding for what was

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and denies the distinction between intentions and actions. On her view, to intend a goal is already a form of acting towards this goal and therefore not a distinct mental state. This account struggles to explain cases in which intentions and actions seem to come apart, as when the agent is not

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But not everyone agrees that forming the intention is impossible. According to the rationalist solution, for example, it is possible to form the intention because there is a decisive reason to drink the toxin. The idea behind this approach is that there are two options today: (1) not form the

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due to Gregory Kavka. It involves a billionaire offering the agent one million dollars for forming the intention by the end of the day to drink a vial of toxin the following day. The toxin makes a person ill for one day but has no lasting effect otherwise. It does not matter whether the agent

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Humans have a tendency to infer intention from motion, even in the absence of other distinguishing features (e.g. body shape, emotional expression). This was demonstrated in a study by Heider and Simmel; they had observers view videos of moving triangles, and found that participants tended to

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Various other distinctions among types of intentions are found in the academic literature. Conditional intentions are intentions to do something just in case a certain condition obtains. Planning to return a book to a friend on the condition that she asks for it is an example of a conditional

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is, among other things, concerned with how children learn to ascribe intentions to others. Understanding intention is thought to be pivotal in understanding social contexts in numerous ways. First, acquiring an understanding of intention is important for development in that it helps children

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Another objection focuses on the normative difference between beliefs and intentions. This is relevant for cases where the agent fails to act according to the intended course of action, for example, due to having a weak will. This type of failure is different from the mere epistemic error of

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towards this content. Other mental states can have action plans as their content, as when one admires a plan, but differ from intentions since they do not involve a practical commitment to realizing this plan. Successful intentions bring about the intended course of action while unsuccessful

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that involve action plans to which the agent has committed themselves. As action plans, they can guide behavior. The action plan constitutes the content of the intention while the commitment is the agent's attitude towards this content. The term "intention" can be used both for prospective

895:). On this view, donating a lot of money to charities is still in some sense morally flawed if it is done with the intention of impressing other people. According to Kant, the main intention should always be to do one's duty: the good will consist in doing one's duty for the sake of duty. 616:

and colleagues (2004) found that human children begin to point at around one year of age and do so with a multiple motives, including sharing attention and interest. Earlier pointing may be different in nature and is thought to develop from a learned association between reaching and adult

839:, intention is influenced by people's attitude toward performing the behavior and the subjective norm. However, the level of perceived control is believed to be influential on people's behavioral intention along with their attitude and subjective norms, according to the 904:

is a closely related principle. It states that there are cases in which the agent may not intend to harm others, even if this harm is used as means to a greater good. But in otherwise equivalent cases it is permissible to harm others if this harm is a side effect, or a

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goal, the intention is unsuccessful. The content of the intention determines its conditions of satisfaction. Success is usually not fully up to the agent since various factors outside the agent's control and awareness may influence the success of the attempted action.

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suggests that intentions are self-referential, i.e. that they do not just represent the intended course of action but also represent themselves as the cause of the action. But the claim that this happens on the level of the content of the intention has been contested.

542:. In this case, various alternatives are considered by the agent, who then chooses the most favorable one. This choice results in a commitment to the chosen plan of action and thereby constitutes the formation of an intention. Often the choice itself is preceded by 805:. One example consists of a chairman deciding to endorse a new project to boost profits despite its negative impact on the environment. In this case, it has been argued that the chairman intentionally harms the environment without an intention to do so. 603:

of the understanding of intention. The development of the ability to use gestures and object-directed actions in social situations has been studied from numerous perspectives, including the embodiment perspective and the social-cognitive perspective.

3661:

Baron-Cohen, Simon; Wheelwright, Sally; Hill, Jacqueline; Raste, Yogini; Plumb, Ian (February 2001). "The 'Reading the Mind in the Eyes' Test Revised Version: A Study with Normal Adults, and Adults with Asperger Syndrome or High-functioning Autism".

797:. These additional requirements are needed to exclude so-called "wayward" causal chains, i.e. cases in which the intended behavior happens but the corresponding intention either did not cause the behavior at all or did not cause it in the right way. 321:

already on the way to doing so. An important strength of this account is that it gives a unified explanation of intentions: it does not need to distinguish between prospective and immediate intentions since all intentions are immediate intentions.

4812:Östen Dahl, Viveka Velupillai. 2013. Perfective/Imperfective Aspect. In: Dryer, Matthew S. & Haspelmath, Martin (eds.) The World Atlas of Language Structures Online. Leipzig: Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. Retrieved from 835:

limited number of psychological variables that can influence behavior, namely (a) intention; (b) attitude toward the behavior; (c) subjective norm; (d) perceived behavioral control; and (e) behavioral, normative and control beliefs. In the

4636:, Kanfer, F. H., Becker, M. H., & Middlestadt, S. E. (1992). Factors influencing behavior and behavior change (Report prepared for the National Institute of Mental Health).Bethesda, MD: National Institute of Mental Health. 558:. Some theorists of intentions even base their definition of intentions on the functions they execute. Intentions are responsible for initiating, sustaining, and terminating actions. In this sense, they are closely related to 408:

in that they constitute the agent's reason for performing the action. A third type involves consequences of which the agent is aware but which play no important role for the agent's motivation. These are the objects of

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mental states, such as intention, cannot be understood directly through observing movements, it is hypothesized that these internal states are inferred based on one's own stored representations of those movements.

291:

This theory has been criticized based on the idea that there is a difference between evaluating a course of action and committing oneself to a course of action. This difference is important for explaining cases of

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are to be defined, i.e. how they differ from other types of events like a sunrise, a car breaking down, or digestion. The most common approach to this question defines actions in terms of intentions. According to

3705:

Mosconi, Matthew W.; Mack, Peter B.; McCarthy, Gregory; Pelphrey, Kevin A. (August 2005). "Taking an 'intentional stance' on eye-gaze shifts: A functional neuroimaging study of social perception in children".

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and idolizing women who killed men could be used as evidence of intent. Certain forms of evidence can also be employed by the defense to show that intent was not present. For example, a person suffering from

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Johansson figures, as they came to be known, have been used to demonstrate that individuals attribute mental states, such as desires and intentions to movements, that are otherwise disconnected from context.

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The intentional actions performed by agents usually carry a vast number of major or minor consequences with them. The agent is usually unaware of many of them. In relation to these consequences, the agent is

367:

Immediate intentions, also known as "intentions-in-action" or "act-related" intentions, are intentions that guide the agent while they are performing the action in question. They are closely related to the

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during the crime, this may be used as a defense by claiming that no specific intent was present. This is based on the idea that the defendant was mentally too impaired to form a specific intent.

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Another distinction can be drawn between intentions that act as means to other intentions and intentions to do something for its own sake. This is closely related to the difference between

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Meltzoff, A.N.; Brooks, R. (2001). ""Like me" as a building block for understanding other minds: Bodily acts, attention, and intention". In Malle, B.F.; Moses, L.J.; Baldwin, D.A. (eds.).

498:. Unconscious intentions are also sometimes used to explain apparently irrational behavior. In this sense, it has been claimed that excessive hand washing seen in some people with the 4719:

van den Putte, B. (1991). 20 years of the theory of reasoned action of Fishbein and Ajzen: A meta-analysis. Unpublished manuscript. University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands

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Sheppard, B. H.; Hartwick, J.; Warshaw, P. R. (1988). "The theory of reasoned action: A meta-analysis of past research with recommendations for modifications and future research".

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tries to overcome this problem by explaining intentions in terms of unconditional evaluations. That is to say that intentions do not just present the intended course of action as

102:, i.e. that agents do not always intend what they see as the best course of action. A closely related theory identifies intentions not with unconditional evaluations but with 6261: 215:. This can be understood in terms of causal chains, i.e. that desires cause intentions, intentions cause actions, and actions cause the realization of the desired outcome. 4778:

Conner, M.; Godin, G.; Norman, P.; Sheeran, P. (2011). "Using the question-behavior effect to promote disease prevention behaviors: two randomized controlled trials".

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Jenkins, J.; Greenbuam, R. (1991). "Intention and emotion in child psychopathology: Building cooperative plans". In Zelazo, P.D.; Astington, J.W.; Olson, D.R. (eds.).

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is a famous defender of the intention principle. For him, it is central that one does not just act outwardly in accordance with one's duty, which he terms "legality" (

709:. The severity of criminal offenses often depends on the type and the degree of intent involved. But the specific characterizations and the role of intent differ from 2244:

Vinding, Mikkel C.; Pedersen, Michael N.; Overgaard, Morten (1 September 2013). "Unravelling intention: Distal intentions increase the subjective sense of agency".

4965:"The present projects past behavior into the future while the past projects attitudes into the future: How verb tense moderates predictors of drinking intentions" 6201: 3396:

Liszkowski, Ulf; Carpenter, Malinda; Henning, Anne; Striano, Tricia; Tomasello, Michael (June 2004). "Twelve-month-olds point to share attention and interest".

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attribute intentions and even personality traits to the shapes based on their movements. The movement had to be animate, meaning self-propelled and non-linear.

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ends that motivate the agent. But in some cases, it can refer to anticipated side-effects that are neither means nor ends to the agent. In this case, the term "

856: 2778:

D’Olimpio, Francesca; Mancini, Francesco (November 2014). "Role of Deontological Guilt in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder–Like Checking and Washing Behaviors".

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in which a person commits themselves to a course of action. Having the plan to visit the zoo tomorrow is an example of an intention. The action plan is the

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Most theories of intention see intentions as mental states that are closely related to actions but may occur without the corresponding action in question.

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Psychological research suggests that understanding intentions of others may be a prerequisite for a higher-level understanding of other people's minds or

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Moll, H.; Tomasello, M. (2007). "Cooperation and human cognition: the Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis". In Emery, N.; Clayton, N.; Frith, C (eds.).

131:. Prospective intentions, also known as "prior intentions", involve plans for the future. They can be subdivided according to how far they plan ahead: 2904:

Feinfield, Kristin A; Lee, Patti P; Flavell, Eleanor R; Green, Frances L; Flavell, John H (July 1999). "Young Children's Understanding of Intention".

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Liszkowski, Ulf; Carpenter, Malinda; Tomasello, Michael (March 2007). "Pointing out new news, old news, and absent referents at 12 months of age".

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are the paradigmatic form of intention: in them, the agent is aware of their goals. But it has been suggested that actions can also be guided by

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Liroz, F. (2010). Web created by F. Liroz Professor in Spanish Language Department at American School of Madrid, Spain, (date Feb. 6, 2012),

2957: 754:

could claim that, when they hit another person, they did not do so intentionally but under the effect of a seizure. If the perpetrator was

211:, and intentions. This explanation is based on the idea that desires motivate behavior and beliefs direct the behavior towards the desired 502:

may be motivated by an unconscious intention to wash away one's guilt, even though the person may cite very different reasons when asked.

6768: 705:. Some form of mens rea is usually required for criminal offenses but legal transgressions committed without it can still be grounds for 2206:

Plaks, Jason E.; Robinson, Jeffrey S. (1 September 2017). "Proximal and Distal Intent: Toward a New Folk Theory of Intentional Action".

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Another theory focuses exclusively on the relation between intention and desire. It states that intending to do something consists in

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holds that in order to understand intention in others, individuals must observe an action, and then infer the actor's intentions by

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Oram, MW; Perrett, DI (1994). "Responses of Anterior Superior Temporal Polysensory (STPa) Neurons to "Biological Motion" Stimuli".

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Woodward, Amanda L.; Guajardo, Jose J. (January 2002). "Infants' understanding of the point gesture as an object-directed action".

425:. Motivational intentions are the paradigmatic form of intentions and are the main focus of the academic literature on intentions. 189:

intentions, which are not yet executed, and for the intentions guiding the behavior as it happens, so-called immediate intentions,

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was present. For example, if a female employee is accused of murdering her male boss, then her previous blog posts condemning the

172:

aims to predict behavior based on how pre-existing attitudes and subjective norms determine behavioral intentions. In ethics, the

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Mele, Alfred R. (2009). "Intention and Intentional Action". In Beckermann, Ansgar; McLaughlin, Brian P.; Walter, Sven (eds.).

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states that whether an action is morally permissible sometimes depends on the agent's intention for performing this action.

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desires involve a practical commitment to performing an action, which is often illustrated in various counterexamples. The

621:

develop as the child develops a theory of mind and begins to use pointing to convey meaning about referents in the world.

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Ajzen, Icek; Fishbein, Martin (2000). "Attitudes and the Attitude-Behavior Relation: Reasoned and Automatic Processes".

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Blakemore, Sarah-Jayne; Decety, Jean (August 2001). "From the perception of action to the understanding of intention".

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Liao, S. Matthew (2012). "Intentions and Moral Permissibility: The Case of Acting Permissibly with Bad Intentions".

843:. Not surprisingly, in most studies, intention is driven by attitudes to a greater extent than by subjective norms. 717:

intent. For some offenses, general intent is sufficient while for others, specific intent is required. For example,

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The term "intention" refers to a group of related phenomena. For this reason, theorists often distinguish various

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Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers

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Theories of intention try to capture the characteristic features of intentions. Some accounts focus more either

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Ajzen, I.; Fishbein, M. (1973). "Attitudinal and normative variables as predictors of specific behaviors".

889:). Instead, the agent should also be inwardly motivated by the right intention, which he terms "morality" ( 324:

An obvious counterargument to this position is that, in the example of the zoo above, one is not currently

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Gallese, V; Goldman, A (1 December 1998). "Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading".

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humans are able to infer intention specifically as a biological mechanism between motions and goals.

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Intentions can arise in different ways. The paradigmatic type of intention formation happens through

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A well-known thought experiment concerning the relation between intention and action is the

693:. It refers to the state of mind of the perpetrator, specifically to their plan to commit a 111:

currently doing anything towards realizing their plan or in the case of failed actions. The

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in order to avoid misunderstandings. The most-discussed distinction is that between

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It is often suggested that the agent's intentions play a central role in the

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intentions fail to do so. Intentions, like many other mental states, have

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Prospective intentions can be categorized by how far they plan ahead.

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is to deal with stress whereas increasing his risk of lung cancer is

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explains human behavior on the basis of mental states, including

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Intentions have various psychological functions in the agent's

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Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics

4813: 4027: 3448: 3230:

Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of social cognition

3154:

Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition

1432:

Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet

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try to capture the characteristic features of intentions. The

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Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments

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responsiveness to the child's desire for a referent object.

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involve plans for what one wants to do straightaway whereas

135:

involve plans for what one wants to do straightaway whereas

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Lerner, K. Lee; Lerner, Brenda Wilmoth (2006). "Mens Rea".

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The traditionally dominant approach reduces intentions to

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Mental state representing commitment to perform an action

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Velleman, J. David; Bratman, Michael E. (April 1991).

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are usually seen as general intent offenses while for

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Intentions are rationally evaluable: they are either

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"Intention". 654: 566:Knowledge of the intention of others 279: 5153:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 4262:West's Encyclopedia of American Law 4209:West's Encyclopedia of American Law 3115: 3106: 2433: 1761: 1720: 1386: 1290:Craig, Edward (1996). "Intention". 701:, and not to the physical element, 486:Various prominent examples, due to 284:Another prominent approach, due to 197:involves an act-related intention. 20:For the philosophical concept, see 13: 6769:Concepts in the philosophy of mind 5345:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1996.tb00783.x 5173:Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2021). 5146: 4826:Madden, C.J.; Zwaan, R.A. (2003). 3954:The American Journal of Psychology 3767:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.11-01-00168.1991 3560:. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 3528:10.1111/j.2044-835X.1991.tb00862.x 2396:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00031.x 2306:10.1093/oso/9780198853145.003.0015 2036:Moore, James W. 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New York: Academic Press. 2298:Fundamentals of Criminal Law 2258:10.1016/j.concog.2013.05.003 2208:Review of General Psychology 1642:"Britannica: intentionality" 784:, a central question is how 236:Intention and intentionality 7: 6242:The Phenomenology of Spirit 5122:"Doctrine of Double Effect" 4814:http://wals.info/chapter/65 4747:10.1037/0033-2909.127.1.142 4632:Fishbein, M., Bandura, A., 4397:Encyclopedia of Criminology 3755:The Journal of Neuroscience 3072:Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2479:. Oxford University Press. 2246:Consciousness and Cognition 944:Intentions (disambiguation) 912: 862: 590:Infancy and early childhood 45:Intentions (disambiguation) 10: 6815: 4981:10.1016/j.jesp.2012.04.001 4600:Philosophical Explorations 4289:Criminal Laws in Australia 4142:Robinson, Paul H. (2002). 3995:Johansson, Gunnar (1973). 3918:10.1037/0012-1649.31.5.838 3342:10.1037/0012-1649.17.2.215 3190:10.1037/0012-1649.31.5.838 2839:. Oxford University Press. 2822:. Oxford University Press. 2371:. Oxford University Press. 2009:Schlosser, Markus (2019). 1821:. Oxford University Press. 1727:Philosophical Perspectives 1022:. Oxford University Press. 841:theory of planned behavior 762:Relation to other concepts 682: 625:Attention and eye movement 474:is the difference between 362:good all things considered 333:Self-referentiality theory 113:self-referentiality theory 96:good all things considered 34: 29:Intention (disambiguation) 18: 6675: 6642: 6550: 6448: 6380: 6304: 6103: 5843: 5571: 5415: 5120:McIntyre, Alison (2019). 5041:10.1007/s10982-012-9134-5 4893:10.1080/14792779943000116 4435:10.1007/s11406-013-9414-9 4400:. Routledge. p. 74. 4343:World of Forensic Science 4319:. Routledge. p. 68. 3573:Emotion in the Human Face 3490:10.1017/S0140525X00041790 3382:. 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(2001). 3178:Developmental Psychology 2965:The Philosophical Review 2891:10.1215/00318108-1539089 2850:Wallace, R. Jay (2020). 2792:10.1177/2167702614529549 2746:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02777 2138:Philosophical Psychology 2055:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01272 1482:Astington, J.W. (1993). 929:Intention (criminal law) 685:Intention (criminal law) 576:Developmental psychology 571:Developmental psychology 393:Motivational and oblique 49:Purpose (disambiguation) 6799:Concepts in metaphysics 6718:Relational frame theory 6693:Higher nervous activity 6222:Critique of Pure Reason 5205:Encyclopædia Britannica 4047:10.1093/brain/119.2.593 3676:10.1111/1469-7610.00715 3378:Schaffer, H.R. (2005). 3172:Meltzoff, A.N. (1995). 2733:Frontiers in Psychology 2682:Frontiers in Psychology 2042:Frontiers in Psychology 1952:10.1023/A:1018336525240 1120:Setiya, Kieran (2018). 550:Psychological functions 530:Formation of intentions 447:arational mental states 433:Rational and irrational 300:Strongest-desire theory 165:formation of intentions 37:Intent (disambiguation) 6688:Experiential avoidance 5813:Type–token distinction 5641:Hypostatic abstraction 5423:Abstract object theory 4832:Memory & Cognition 4735:Psychological Bulletin 3586:Langton, S.R. (2000). 3556:Bassili, J.N. (1989). 3025:Tomasello, M. (1999). 2292:Simester, A P (2021). 2105:10.1098/rspb.2013.0991 1669:Jacob, Pierre (2019). 1614:Jacob, Pierre (2019). 1587:Driver, Julia (2018). 1529:10.1006/jesp.1996.1314 1428:"What are intentions?" 891: 885: 419:motivational intention 400:acting unintentionally 219:Content and commitment 195:three-point field goal 158:unconscious intentions 6703:Ironic process theory 6468:Cognitive flexibility 6402:Philosophy portal 6282:Being and Nothingness 5698:Mental representation 3398:Developmental Science 3303:Cognitive Development 3255:Developmental Science 2906:Cognitive Development 2173:Philosophical Studies 1940:Philosophical Studies 1890:Philosophical Studies 1818:Motivation and Agency 1768:www.rep.routledge.com 1458:Searle, J.R. (1983). 1406:www.rep.routledge.com 661:simulation hypothesis 607:Gestures and pointing 248:Theories of intention 79:Theories of intention 41:Intentionally (horse) 6327:Feminist metaphysics 5369:at Wikimedia Commons 5248:Altwicker, Tilmann. 2879:Philosophical Review 2434:Lee, Wooram (2018). 2331:Philosophical Issues 1208:. pp. 691–710. 857:Imperfective Aspects 782:philosophy of action 524:motivational inertia 496:intentional behavior 306:desiring it the most 260:Belief-desire theory 154:Conscious intentions 129:immediate intentions 92:good in some respect 83:belief-desire theory 27:For other uses, see 6789:Metaphysics of mind 6764:Analytic philosophy 6733:Thought suppression 6172:Daneshnameh-ye Alai 5683:Linguistic modality 3512:Butterworth, George 3367:. pp. 245–260. 1802:10.5840/jpr_1995_19 1497:Perner, J. (1991). 767:Beliefs and desires 747:patriarchal society 492:slips of the tongue 382:Proximal intentions 376:Proximal and distal 342:Types of intentions 174:intention principle 133:proximal intentions 121:types of intentions 104:predominant desires 6362:Philosophy of self 6352:Philosophy of mind 5616:Embodied cognition 5528:Scientific realism 5175:"Consequentialism" 5149:"Consequentialism" 5029:Law and Philosophy 4845:10.3758/BF03196106 4550:Levy, Ken (2009). 4239:Hofstra Law Review 4014:10.3758/BF03212378 3571:Ekman, P. (1982). 2998:Bloom, P. (2000). 2538:dictionary.apa.org 2513:dictionary.apa.org 2418:Reasons for Action 2343:10.1111/phis.12051 2220:10.1037/gpr0000122 2099:(1763): 20130991. 1902:10.1007/BF00354051 1740:10.1111/phpe.12136 1646:www.britannica.com 959:Telos (philosophy) 934:Intentional stance 803:oblique intentions 423:obliquely intended 411:oblique intentions 318:Elizabeth Anscombe 312:Intending as doing 191:as discussed below 108:Elizabeth Anscombe 47:, and 6746: 6745: 6505:Critical thinking 6473:Cognitive liberty 6410: 6409: 5589:Category of being 5558:Truthmaker theory 5365:Media related to 5147:Haines, William. 4780:Health Psychology 4407:978-1-135-45543-9 4380:978-1-5438-4906-6 4353:978-1-4144-0295-6 4326:978-1-000-28383-9 4299:978-1-86287-558-6 4187:978-1-4058-5871-7 4125:978-0-02-865992-3 3607:10.1080/713755908 2494:978-0-19-873490-1 2315:978-0-19-885314-5 2179:(11): 2833–2853. 1441:978-0-19-538164-1 1223:978-0-19-926261-8 713:to jurisdiction. 655:Simulation theory 386:distal intentions 280:Evaluation theory 142:oblique intention 137:distal intentions 88:evaluation theory 6806: 6784:Mental processes 6443:Mental processes 6437: 6430: 6423: 6414: 6413: 6400: 6399: 6398: 6388: 6387: 6297: 6287: 6277: 6267: 6257: 6247: 6237: 6227: 6217: 6207: 6197: 6187: 6177: 6167: 6157: 6147: 6137: 6127: 6117: 5793:Substantial form 5605:Cogito, ergo sum 5548:Substance theory 5402: 5395: 5388: 5379: 5378: 5364: 5349: 5348: 5328: 5319: 5318: 5298: 5292: 5291: 5271: 5265: 5264: 5262: 5260: 5245: 5239: 5238: 5236: 5234: 5218: 5209: 5208: 5201:"utilitarianism" 5197: 5191: 5190: 5188: 5186: 5170: 5164: 5163: 5161: 5159: 5144: 5138: 5137: 5135: 5133: 5117: 5102: 5101: 5083: 5059: 5053: 5052: 5024: 5003: 5002: 4992: 4975:(5): 1196–1200. 4960: 4954: 4953: 4943: 4911: 4905: 4904: 4876: 4870: 4864: 4858: 4857: 4847: 4823: 4817: 4810: 4804: 4803: 4792:10.1037/a0023036 4775: 4769: 4768: 4758: 4726: 4720: 4717: 4711: 4710: 4682: 4676: 4675: 4672:10.1037/h0034440 4655: 4649: 4646: 4637: 4630: 4624: 4623: 4591: 4580: 4579: 4547: 4528: 4527: 4511: 4500: 4499: 4487: 4481: 4480: 4470: 4464: 4463: 4453: 4447: 4446: 4418: 4412: 4411: 4391: 4385: 4384: 4364: 4358: 4357: 4346:. Thomson/Gale. 4337: 4331: 4330: 4310: 4304: 4303: 4283: 4277: 4276: 4265:. Thomson/Gale. 4256: 4247: 4246: 4230: 4224: 4223: 4212:. Thomson/Gale. 4203: 4192: 4191: 4171: 4160: 4159: 4139: 4130: 4129: 4109: 4103: 4102: 4066: 4060: 4059: 4049: 4025: 4019: 4018: 4016: 3992: 3986: 3985: 3949: 3940: 3939: 3929: 3897: 3891: 3890: 3872: 3848: 3842: 3841: 3815: 3795: 3789: 3788: 3778: 3746: 3740: 3739: 3702: 3696: 3695: 3658: 3652: 3651: 3643: 3637: 3636: 3618: 3592: 3583: 3577: 3576: 3568: 3562: 3561: 3553: 3547: 3546: 3538: 3532: 3531: 3508: 3502: 3501: 3473: 3467: 3466: 3446: 3440: 3439: 3421: 3393: 3384: 3383: 3375: 3369: 3368: 3360: 3354: 3353: 3325: 3319: 3318: 3309:(1): 1061–1084. 3298: 3289: 3288: 3278: 3250: 3244: 3243: 3221: 3212: 3211: 3201: 3169: 3158: 3157: 3149: 3134: 3133: 3113: 3104: 3103: 3084:10.1038/35086023 3067: 3050: 3049: 3041: 3035: 3034: 3022: 3016: 3015: 2995: 2989: 2988: 2962: 2953: 2947: 2946: 2938: 2932: 2931: 2929: 2901: 2895: 2894: 2874: 2868: 2867: 2865: 2863: 2847: 2841: 2840: 2830: 2824: 2823: 2813: 2804: 2803: 2775: 2769: 2768: 2758: 2748: 2724: 2718: 2717: 2707: 2697: 2673: 2667: 2666: 2657:(1–4): 251–267. 2646: 2631: 2630: 2613:(184): 178–182. 2602: 2593: 2592: 2564: 2549: 2548: 2546: 2544: 2530: 2524: 2523: 2521: 2519: 2505: 2499: 2498: 2469:Speake, Jennifer 2464: 2458: 2457: 2455: 2431: 2422: 2421: 2409: 2400: 2399: 2379: 2373: 2372: 2362: 2347: 2346: 2326: 2320: 2319: 2289: 2278: 2277: 2241: 2232: 2231: 2203: 2197: 2196: 2168: 2162: 2161: 2133: 2127: 2126: 2116: 2084: 2078: 2077: 2067: 2057: 2033: 2027: 2026: 2024: 2022: 2006: 2000: 1999: 1989: 1972: 1971: 1935: 1922: 1921: 1885: 1872: 1871: 1861: 1850: 1849: 1829: 1823: 1822: 1812: 1806: 1805: 1785: 1779: 1778: 1776: 1774: 1759: 1753: 1752: 1742: 1718: 1712: 1711: 1709: 1707: 1693: 1687: 1686: 1684: 1682: 1666: 1657: 1656: 1654: 1652: 1638: 1632: 1631: 1629: 1627: 1616:"Intentionality" 1611: 1605: 1604: 1602: 1600: 1584: 1573: 1572: 1562: 1541: 1540: 1512: 1503: 1502: 1494: 1488: 1487: 1479: 1464: 1463: 1455: 1446: 1445: 1423: 1417: 1416: 1414: 1412: 1397: 1384: 1383: 1373: 1298: 1297: 1287: 1228: 1227: 1201: 1138: 1137: 1135: 1133: 1117: 1024: 1023: 1013: 894: 888: 536:practical reason 32: 25: 6814: 6813: 6809: 6808: 6807: 6805: 6804: 6803: 6749: 6748: 6747: 6742: 6671: 6638: 6546: 6525:Problem solving 6510:Decision-making 6444: 6441: 6411: 6406: 6396: 6394: 6376: 6300: 6295: 6285: 6275: 6265: 6255: 6245: 6235: 6225: 6215: 6205: 6195: 6185: 6175: 6165: 6155: 6145: 6142:De rerum natura 6135: 6125: 6115: 6099: 5839: 5743:Physical object 5579:Abstract object 5567: 5553:Theory of forms 5488:Meaning of life 5411: 5406: 5357: 5352: 5329: 5322: 5299: 5295: 5272: 5268: 5258: 5256: 5246: 5242: 5232: 5230: 5219: 5212: 5199: 5198: 5194: 5184: 5182: 5171: 5167: 5157: 5155: 5145: 5141: 5131: 5129: 5118: 5105: 5060: 5056: 5025: 5006: 4961: 4957: 4912: 4908: 4877: 4873: 4865: 4861: 4824: 4820: 4811: 4807: 4776: 4772: 4727: 4723: 4718: 4714: 4683: 4679: 4656: 4652: 4647: 4640: 4634:Triandis, H. C. 4631: 4627: 4592: 4583: 4548: 4531: 4520:Proto Sociology 4512: 4503: 4488: 4484: 4471: 4467: 4454: 4450: 4419: 4415: 4408: 4392: 4388: 4381: 4365: 4361: 4354: 4338: 4334: 4327: 4311: 4307: 4300: 4284: 4280: 4273: 4257: 4250: 4231: 4227: 4220: 4204: 4195: 4188: 4172: 4163: 4156: 4140: 4133: 4126: 4110: 4106: 4077:(12): 493–501. 4067: 4063: 4026: 4022: 3993: 3989: 3966:10.2307/1416950 3950: 3943: 3898: 3894: 3849: 3845: 3813:10.1.1.330.4410 3796: 3792: 3747: 3743: 3703: 3699: 3659: 3655: 3644: 3640: 3590: 3584: 3580: 3569: 3565: 3554: 3550: 3539: 3535: 3509: 3505: 3474: 3470: 3463: 3447: 3443: 3394: 3387: 3376: 3372: 3361: 3357: 3326: 3322: 3299: 3292: 3251: 3247: 3240: 3222: 3215: 3170: 3161: 3150: 3137: 3114: 3107: 3068: 3053: 3042: 3038: 3023: 3019: 3012: 2996: 2992: 2977:10.2307/2185304 2960: 2954: 2950: 2939: 2935: 2902: 2898: 2875: 2871: 2861: 2859: 2848: 2844: 2831: 2827: 2814: 2807: 2776: 2772: 2725: 2721: 2674: 2670: 2647: 2634: 2603: 2596: 2565: 2552: 2542: 2540: 2532: 2531: 2527: 2517: 2515: 2507: 2506: 2502: 2495: 2465: 2461: 2432: 2425: 2410: 2403: 2380: 2376: 2363: 2350: 2327: 2323: 2316: 2290: 2281: 2242: 2235: 2204: 2200: 2169: 2165: 2134: 2130: 2085: 2081: 2034: 2030: 2020: 2018: 2007: 2003: 1990: 1975: 1936: 1925: 1886: 1875: 1862: 1853: 1830: 1826: 1813: 1809: 1786: 1782: 1772: 1770: 1760: 1756: 1719: 1715: 1705: 1703: 1695: 1694: 1690: 1680: 1678: 1667: 1660: 1650: 1648: 1640: 1639: 1635: 1625: 1623: 1612: 1608: 1598: 1596: 1585: 1576: 1563: 1544: 1513: 1506: 1495: 1491: 1480: 1467: 1456: 1449: 1442: 1424: 1420: 1410: 1408: 1398: 1387: 1374: 1301: 1288: 1231: 1224: 1202: 1141: 1131: 1129: 1118: 1027: 1014: 971: 967: 915: 865: 832: 811: 791:Donald Davidson 778: 769: 764: 707:civil liability 687: 681: 679:In criminal law 657: 636: 627: 609: 592: 573: 568: 552: 538:in the form of 532: 512: 464: 435: 395: 378: 370:sense of agency 358:good in one way 353: 344: 335: 314: 302: 286:Donald Davidson 282: 262: 250: 238: 221: 201:Folk psychology 184:Intentions are 182: 52: 33: 26: 19: 17: 12: 11: 5: 6812: 6802: 6801: 6796: 6791: 6786: 6781: 6776: 6771: 6766: 6761: 6744: 6743: 6741: 6740: 6735: 6730: 6725: 6720: 6715: 6713:Mental fatigue 6710: 6705: 6700: 6695: 6690: 6685: 6679: 6677: 6673: 6672: 6670: 6669: 6664: 6659: 6654: 6648: 6646: 6640: 6639: 6637: 6636: 6631: 6630: 6629: 6624: 6619: 6609: 6604: 6599: 6594: 6584: 6579: 6574: 6573: 6572: 6562: 6556: 6554: 6548: 6547: 6545: 6544: 6539: 6538: 6537: 6532: 6522: 6517: 6512: 6507: 6502: 6497: 6492: 6487: 6486: 6485: 6475: 6470: 6465: 6460: 6454: 6452: 6446: 6445: 6440: 6439: 6432: 6425: 6417: 6408: 6407: 6405: 6404: 6392: 6381: 6378: 6377: 6375: 6374: 6369: 6364: 6359: 6354: 6349: 6344: 6339: 6334: 6329: 6324: 6319: 6314: 6308: 6306: 6305:Related topics 6302: 6301: 6299: 6298: 6288: 6278: 6272:Being and Time 6268: 6258: 6248: 6238: 6228: 6218: 6208: 6198: 6188: 6178: 6168: 6158: 6148: 6138: 6128: 6118: 6107: 6105: 6101: 6100: 6098: 6097: 6090: 6085: 6080: 6075: 6070: 6065: 6060: 6055: 6050: 6045: 6040: 6035: 6030: 6025: 6020: 6015: 6010: 6005: 6000: 5995: 5990: 5985: 5980: 5975: 5970: 5965: 5960: 5955: 5950: 5945: 5940: 5935: 5930: 5925: 5920: 5915: 5910: 5905: 5900: 5895: 5890: 5885: 5880: 5875: 5870: 5865: 5860: 5855: 5849: 5847: 5845:Metaphysicians 5841: 5840: 5838: 5837: 5830: 5825: 5820: 5815: 5810: 5805: 5800: 5795: 5790: 5785: 5780: 5775: 5770: 5765: 5760: 5755: 5750: 5745: 5740: 5735: 5730: 5725: 5720: 5715: 5710: 5705: 5700: 5695: 5690: 5685: 5680: 5675: 5670: 5665: 5664: 5663: 5653: 5648: 5643: 5638: 5633: 5628: 5623: 5618: 5613: 5608: 5601: 5599:Causal closure 5596: 5591: 5586: 5581: 5575: 5573: 5569: 5568: 5566: 5565: 5560: 5555: 5550: 5545: 5540: 5535: 5530: 5525: 5520: 5515: 5510: 5505: 5500: 5495: 5490: 5485: 5480: 5475: 5473:Libertarianism 5470: 5465: 5460: 5458:Existentialism 5455: 5450: 5445: 5440: 5435: 5430: 5425: 5419: 5417: 5413: 5412: 5405: 5404: 5397: 5390: 5382: 5376: 5375: 5370: 5356: 5355:External links 5353: 5351: 5350: 5339:(2): 147–168. 5320: 5293: 5282:(4): 367–376. 5266: 5254:www.rwi.uzh.ch 5240: 5210: 5207:. 8 June 2023. 5192: 5165: 5139: 5103: 5054: 5035:(6): 703–724. 5004: 4955: 4906: 4871: 4859: 4838:(5): 663–672. 4818: 4816:on 2015-07-15. 4805: 4786:(3): 300–309. 4770: 4741:(1): 142–161. 4721: 4712: 4699:10.1086/209170 4693:(3): 325–343. 4677: 4650: 4638: 4625: 4606:(3): 294–311. 4581: 4562:(2): 267–289. 4529: 4501: 4482: 4465: 4448: 4429:(3): 867–886. 4413: 4406: 4386: 4379: 4359: 4352: 4332: 4325: 4305: 4298: 4278: 4271: 4248: 4225: 4218: 4193: 4186: 4161: 4154: 4131: 4124: 4104: 4061: 4040:(2): 593–609. 4020: 4007:(2): 201–211. 3987: 3941: 3912:(5): 838–850. 3892: 3863:(6): 1167–75. 3843: 3790: 3741: 3714:(1): 247–252. 3697: 3670:(2): 241–251. 3653: 3638: 3578: 3563: 3548: 3533: 3503: 3484:(1): 107–154. 3468: 3461: 3441: 3404:(3): 297–307. 3385: 3370: 3355: 3336:(2): 215–220. 3320: 3290: 3245: 3238: 3213: 3184:(5): 838–850. 3159: 3135: 3105: 3078:(8): 561–567. 3051: 3036: 3017: 3010: 2990: 2948: 2933: 2927:2027.42/150591 2912:(3): 463–486. 2896: 2885:(2): 209–239. 2869: 2842: 2825: 2805: 2786:(6): 727–739. 2770: 2719: 2668: 2632: 2594: 2575:(175): 12–22. 2550: 2525: 2500: 2493: 2459: 2423: 2401: 2390:(1): 177–180. 2374: 2348: 2321: 2314: 2279: 2252:(3): 810–815. 2233: 2214:(3): 242–254. 2198: 2163: 2128: 2079: 2028: 2001: 1973: 1923: 1896:(3): 309–329. 1873: 1851: 1840:(2): 222–266. 1824: 1807: 1780: 1754: 1733:(1): 164–183. 1721:Lee W (2020). 1713: 1688: 1658: 1633: 1606: 1574: 1542: 1523:(2): 101–121. 1504: 1489: 1465: 1447: 1440: 1418: 1400:Oppy, Graham. 1385: 1299: 1229: 1222: 1139: 1025: 968: 966: 963: 962: 961: 956: 951: 946: 941: 939:Intentionality 936: 931: 926: 921: 914: 911: 864: 861: 831: 828: 810: 807: 777: 774: 768: 765: 763: 760: 683:Main article: 680: 677: 673:mirror neurons 656: 653: 635: 632: 626: 623: 608: 605: 591: 588: 584:theory of mind 572: 569: 567: 564: 551: 548: 531: 528: 511: 508: 472:psychoanalysis 463: 460: 434: 431: 394: 391: 377: 374: 352: 349: 343: 340: 334: 331: 313: 310: 301: 298: 281: 278: 261: 258: 249: 246: 242:intentionality 237: 234: 220: 217: 181: 178: 73:intentionality 22:Intentionality 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 6811: 6800: 6797: 6795: 6792: 6790: 6787: 6785: 6782: 6780: 6777: 6775: 6772: 6770: 6767: 6765: 6762: 6760: 6757: 6756: 6754: 6739: 6736: 6734: 6731: 6729: 6726: 6724: 6721: 6719: 6716: 6714: 6711: 6709: 6706: 6704: 6701: 6699: 6696: 6694: 6691: 6689: 6686: 6684: 6681: 6680: 6678: 6674: 6668: 6665: 6663: 6660: 6658: 6655: 6653: 6652:Consolidation 6650: 6649: 6647: 6645: 6641: 6635: 6632: 6628: 6625: 6623: 6620: 6618: 6615: 6614: 6613: 6610: 6608: 6605: 6603: 6600: 6598: 6595: 6592: 6588: 6585: 6583: 6580: 6578: 6575: 6571: 6568: 6567: 6566: 6563: 6561: 6558: 6557: 6555: 6553: 6549: 6543: 6540: 6536: 6533: 6531: 6528: 6527: 6526: 6523: 6521: 6518: 6516: 6513: 6511: 6508: 6506: 6503: 6501: 6500:Consciousness 6498: 6496: 6495:Comprehension 6493: 6491: 6488: 6484: 6481: 6480: 6479: 6476: 6474: 6471: 6469: 6466: 6464: 6461: 6459: 6456: 6455: 6453: 6451: 6447: 6438: 6433: 6431: 6426: 6424: 6419: 6418: 6415: 6403: 6393: 6391: 6383: 6382: 6379: 6373: 6370: 6368: 6365: 6363: 6360: 6358: 6355: 6353: 6350: 6348: 6347:Phenomenology 6345: 6343: 6340: 6338: 6335: 6333: 6330: 6328: 6325: 6323: 6320: 6318: 6315: 6313: 6310: 6309: 6307: 6303: 6294: 6293: 6289: 6284: 6283: 6279: 6274: 6273: 6269: 6264: 6263: 6259: 6254: 6253: 6249: 6244: 6243: 6239: 6234: 6233: 6229: 6224: 6223: 6219: 6214: 6213: 6209: 6204: 6203: 6199: 6194: 6193: 6189: 6184: 6183: 6179: 6174: 6173: 6169: 6164: 6163: 6159: 6154: 6153: 6149: 6144: 6143: 6139: 6134: 6133: 6129: 6124: 6123: 6119: 6114: 6113: 6109: 6108: 6106: 6104:Notable works 6102: 6096: 6095: 6091: 6089: 6086: 6084: 6081: 6079: 6076: 6074: 6071: 6069: 6066: 6064: 6061: 6059: 6056: 6054: 6051: 6049: 6046: 6044: 6041: 6039: 6036: 6034: 6031: 6029: 6026: 6024: 6021: 6019: 6016: 6014: 6011: 6009: 6006: 6004: 6001: 5999: 5996: 5994: 5991: 5989: 5986: 5984: 5981: 5979: 5976: 5974: 5971: 5969: 5966: 5964: 5961: 5959: 5956: 5954: 5951: 5949: 5946: 5944: 5941: 5939: 5936: 5934: 5931: 5929: 5926: 5924: 5921: 5919: 5916: 5914: 5911: 5909: 5906: 5904: 5901: 5899: 5896: 5894: 5891: 5889: 5886: 5884: 5881: 5879: 5876: 5874: 5871: 5869: 5866: 5864: 5861: 5859: 5856: 5854: 5851: 5850: 5848: 5846: 5842: 5836: 5835: 5831: 5829: 5826: 5824: 5821: 5819: 5816: 5814: 5811: 5809: 5806: 5804: 5801: 5799: 5796: 5794: 5791: 5789: 5786: 5784: 5781: 5779: 5776: 5774: 5771: 5769: 5766: 5764: 5761: 5759: 5756: 5754: 5751: 5749: 5746: 5744: 5741: 5739: 5736: 5734: 5731: 5729: 5726: 5724: 5721: 5719: 5716: 5714: 5711: 5709: 5706: 5704: 5701: 5699: 5696: 5694: 5691: 5689: 5686: 5684: 5681: 5679: 5676: 5674: 5671: 5669: 5666: 5662: 5659: 5658: 5657: 5654: 5652: 5649: 5647: 5644: 5642: 5639: 5637: 5634: 5632: 5629: 5627: 5624: 5622: 5619: 5617: 5614: 5612: 5609: 5607: 5606: 5602: 5600: 5597: 5595: 5592: 5590: 5587: 5585: 5582: 5580: 5577: 5576: 5574: 5570: 5564: 5561: 5559: 5556: 5554: 5551: 5549: 5546: 5544: 5541: 5539: 5536: 5534: 5531: 5529: 5526: 5524: 5521: 5519: 5516: 5514: 5511: 5509: 5508:Phenomenalism 5506: 5504: 5501: 5499: 5496: 5494: 5491: 5489: 5486: 5484: 5481: 5479: 5476: 5474: 5471: 5469: 5466: 5464: 5461: 5459: 5456: 5454: 5451: 5449: 5446: 5444: 5441: 5439: 5436: 5434: 5431: 5429: 5428:Action theory 5426: 5424: 5421: 5420: 5418: 5414: 5410: 5403: 5398: 5396: 5391: 5389: 5384: 5383: 5380: 5374: 5371: 5368: 5363: 5359: 5358: 5346: 5342: 5338: 5334: 5327: 5325: 5316: 5312: 5308: 5304: 5297: 5289: 5285: 5281: 5277: 5270: 5255: 5251: 5244: 5228: 5224: 5217: 5215: 5206: 5202: 5196: 5180: 5176: 5169: 5154: 5150: 5143: 5127: 5123: 5116: 5114: 5112: 5110: 5108: 5099: 5095: 5091: 5087: 5082: 5077: 5073: 5069: 5065: 5058: 5050: 5046: 5042: 5038: 5034: 5030: 5023: 5021: 5019: 5017: 5015: 5013: 5011: 5009: 5000: 4996: 4991: 4986: 4982: 4978: 4974: 4970: 4966: 4959: 4951: 4947: 4942: 4937: 4933: 4929: 4925: 4921: 4917: 4910: 4902: 4898: 4894: 4890: 4886: 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November 5132:10 November 4926:(1): 5–22. 4423:Philosophia 2862:15 November 2543:11 November 2518:11 November 2144:(1): 1–14. 1796:: 571–583. 1762:Steward H. 1706:13 November 1681:13 November 1651:13 November 1626:13 November 1599:15 November 1411:13 November 1122:"Intention" 756:intoxicated 738:prosecution 480:unconscious 268:and action- 125:prospective 6753:Categories 6723:Mental set 6602:Peripheral 6552:Perception 6535:strategies 6212:Monadology 6146:(c. 80 BC) 5853:Parmenides 5738:Perception 5636:Experience 5523:Relativism 5498:Naturalism 5448:Enactivism 5259:9 November 5081:1810.05903 3960:(2): 243. 3708:NeuroImage 3616:1893/21047 2971:(2): 277. 2607:Philosophy 2569:Philosophy 1132:7 November 965:References 949:Motivation 734:conviction 703:actus reus 665:estimating 560:motivation 490:, involve 468:psychology 443:irrational 180:Definition 150:irrational 6779:Free will 6759:Intention 6698:Intention 6683:Attention 6617:Harmonics 6570:RGB model 6520:Intuition 6490:Foresight 6483:affective 6463:Awareness 6450:Cognition 6372:Teleology 6337:Mereology 6317:Cosmology 6176:(c. 1000) 6073:Plantinga 6063:Armstrong 6013:Heidegger 5988:Whitehead 5973:Nietzsche 5893:Descartes 5863:Aristotle 5818:Universal 5748:Principle 5718:Necessity 5678:Intention 5631:Existence 5594:Causality 5533:Solipsism 5463:Free will 5367:Intention 5049:144540970 4901:144702714 4666:: 41–57. 4620:202259118 4443:144779235 3982:143057281 3808:CiteSeerX 3498:145165393 3350:145185720 3130:618996982 2800:146962812 2627:251062551 2589:170742495 2274:206955309 2228:148919243 2193:149780291 2158:144771278 2021:9 October 1968:169717685 1918:170415727 1749:1520-8583 924:Entention 892:Moralität 886:Legalität 795:abilities 614:Carpenter 540:decisions 476:conscious 56:intention 6738:Volition 6728:Thinking 6708:Learning 6657:Encoding 6390:Category 6312:Axiology 6166:(c. 270) 6094:more ... 6048:Anscombe 6043:Strawson 6038:Davidson 5933:Berkeley 5873:Plotinus 5834:more ... 5773:Relation 5753:Property 5728:Ontology 5651:Identity 5572:Concepts 5503:Nihilism 5468:Idealism 5416:Theories 5315:43593317 5288:23683644 4999:23606757 4950:10909874 4887:: 1–33. 4854:12956232 4800:21553974 4765:11271752 4707:55744406 4576:55654286 4526:: 39–52. 4492:"Action" 4099:10108122 4091:21227300 3936:25147406 3887:14169352 3879:12354405 3838:18583392 3830:23962364 3736:25792636 3728:16023041 3684:11280420 3625:10994231 3428:15595371 3285:17286836 3208:25147406 3126:ProQuest 3124:(12–B). 3100:53690941 3092:11483999 2765:30846963 2739:: 2777. 2714:34335416 2688:: 2587. 2266:23732190 2123:23740784 2074:27621713 2048:: 1272. 2011:"Agency" 1537:14173135 954:Scienter 913:See also 863:Morality 752:seizures 699:mens rea 439:rational 146:rational 68:attitude 6794:Thought 6662:Storage 6530:methods 6162:Enneads 6156:(c. 50) 6122:Timaeus 6112:Sophist 6058:Dummett 6053:Deleuze 5993:Russell 5983:Bergson 5978:Meinong 5958:Bolzano 5918:Leibniz 5898:Spinoza 5883:Aquinas 5868:Proclus 5798:Thought 5788:Subject 5768:Reality 5763:Quality 5733:Pattern 5693:Meaning 5668:Insight 5626:Essence 5611:Concept 5513:Realism 5478:Liberty 5443:Dualism 5098:8757799 4990:3627212 4941:4807731 4756:4780418 4056:8800951 3974:1416950 3927:4137788 3785:1702462 3776:6575184 3692:3016793 3633:1880814 3436:3915664 3199:4137788 2985:2185304 2756:6393333 2705:8316855 2471:(ed.). 2114:3774240 2065:5002400 1960:4320993 1910:4319923 786:actions 780:In the 719:battery 294:akrasia 270:desires 266:beliefs 209:desires 205:beliefs 100:akrasia 64:content 6667:Recall 6644:Memory 6634:Visual 6627:Speech 6607:Social 6587:Haptic 6560:Amodal 6296:(1981) 6286:(1943) 6276:(1927) 6266:(1846) 6256:(1818) 6246:(1807) 6236:(1783) 6226:(1781) 6216:(1714) 6206:(1710) 6196:(1677) 6192:Ethics 6186:(1641) 6088:Parfit 6078:Kripke 6068:Putnam 6028:Sartre 6018:Carnap 5968:Peirce 5913:Newton 5888:Suárez 5878:Scotus 5758:Qualia 5723:Object 5713:Nature 5708:Motion 5688:Matter 5621:Entity 5493:Monism 5313: 5286: 5096: 5047: 4997: 4987: 4948: 4938: 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