17:
95:
469:
547:, corresponding to 40 percent of its equity. On 4 July 1931, Danat-Bank ran out of discountable bills. The Reichsbank had to discontinue its liquidity assistance on 10 July 1931, and on 13 July 1931 Danat publicly disclosed its inability to meet commitments, triggering a general panic as the public felt the Reichsbank was reaching the limits of its liquidity assistance capacity. The government declared a general bank holiday, starting on 14 July 1931. On 15 July 1931, the Reichsbank suspended the convertibility of the Reichsmark, effectively taking Germany out of the
496:
115:
with a preponderance of short-term debt, much of it foreign. Germany was the world's largest capital importer between 1924 and 1929, with U.S. banks lending massively to German counterparts and U.S. investors buying German bonds in large volumes. By mid-1928, 42 percent of deposits at joint-stock banks were foreign, and the share was 18 percent of all deposits in the German banking sector in 1929. This unusual feature of the German financial system was a direct legacy of the
119:, which durably impaired the role of capital markets and made the country abnormally dependent on short-term foreign lending. Many German companies routinely parked their money in foreign subsidiaries that in turn lent to their German parent. Similar patterns could be observed in other Central European countries that had suffered from hyperinflation, particularly
948:" and a run on the banks viewed as "two independent causes". Schnabel thus similarly de-emphasized the centrality of foreign-currency aspects, and noted the absence of currency mismatch in large banks' balance sheets despite high shares of foreign deposits. Schnabel also argued that the large Berlin-based universal banks were made to feel
536:, which brought some relief even though it was initially opposed by France. On 22 June 1931, the Reichsbank introduced restrictions to its domestic bill discounts, with the aim disincentivizing transfers of money abroad by German firms - but this had catastrophic effect by creating financial squeezes even for essentially sound firms.
692:, a number of banks became insolvent and were liquidated, acquired or nationalized. In France, a new wave of deposit withdrawals from small and mid-sized banks occurred between July 1931 and January 1932, albeit on a slightly smaller scale than the previous one in late 1930,, and triggered the collapse of a significant bank, the
964:
The long-accepted causal link between the
Creditanstalt collapse and the events in Germany has likewise been questioned in more recent historiography. Separately, recent research has demonstrated that France was not spared by the banking crisis, against a long-established view that the country had
357:
that "periodical publication of German banks' statement provide safe means for judging their situation which is safe despite large foreign withdrawals." In spite of the apparent abundance of data, however, German public authorities' knowledge about the true state of banks' financial condition was
114:
Germany's banking sector shrank dramatically from 1913 to 1924 but expanded rapidly again in the later 1920s, with fivefold growth of aggregate bank assets between 1924 and 1930. The banks were generally undercapitalized and overstretched following rapid balance sheet expansion in the late 1920s,
889:
The financial crisis of 1931 has long been identified as a major contributor to the global economic depression of the early 1930s. In the early decades following the crisis, it was often described as a somewhat serendipitous crisis of confidence, in which the key mechanism was the withdrawal of
735:
Germany made "standstill agreements" with major creditor countries in August and
September, following a conference in London on 20-23 July. The general bank holiday was lifted after three weeks on 5 August 1931. The Hoover moratorium, which aimed to protect longer-term exposures by imposing a
142:
The large Berlin-based branch banks also made a large number of acquisitions of smaller competitors, a trend which contributed in the rapid increase of their market share from 12.6 to 23.3 percent of total assets between 1913 and 1928, and culminated in 1929 with two large-scale transactions,
174:), implied that this increase in leverage was not kept in check by public supervision. Even at the time, self-regulation was not obviously effective to keep risks in check: for example, Deutsche Bank was impacted by a series of scandals related to poor credit risk controls in the mid-1920s.
758:
The financial crisis sharply exacerbated the economic downturn that had started before mid-1931. The German turmoil of July 1931 generated powerful spillover impact on other countries, particularly the United States which were uniquely exposed because of the structuring of German post-WWI
484:
527:
On 11 May 1931, Creditanstalt publicly announced that it would not be able to publish a financial statement.. On 6 June 1931, the German government announced it would be unable to pay reparations as previously planned, triggering a parliamentary crisis. On 20 June 1931, U.S. President
739:
Political constraints linked to the controversies over war reparations, implying that the "appearance of prosperity" and visible public investment should be avoided, weighed negatively on key economic sectors such as the automobile market and infrastructure works. Economic historian
312:
Harbingers of crisis started to accumulate at the end of the decade. German stock prices started declining with the "Black Friday" of May 1927, and GDP growth slowed substantially in 1928 and turned negative in 1929. Industrial production started to decline from mid-1929. A cyclical
965:
been spared. That view was distorted by the lack of accessible data beyond the country's four largest banks which were comparatively unscathed, and could only be corrected with the rediscovery of a unique collection of balance-sheet data of most French banks gathered by
744:
concludes that Brüning "ruined the German economy — and destroyed German democracy — in the effort to show once and for all that
Germany could not pay reparations." It remains debated, however, to which extent an alternative strategy of expansion would have been viable.
566:) to allow the system's core banks to transact among themselves without being bound by the general restrictions on payments: this started with 11 institutions, and expanded to 44 by 4 August 1931, after which the bank holiday restrictions were fully lifted and the
749:
notes that the legacy of the hyperinflation episode of the early 1920s implied that public borrowing and spending could not be an appropriate strategy for crisis resolution, in
Germany as in other Central European Countries including Austria, Hungary, and Poland.
736:
standstill on short-term repayments, disproportionately impacted
British merchant banks involved in trade finance to German counterparts, but also triggered a collapse in the value of German bonds, many of which had been underwritten by American institutions.
767:
in
December 1932, triggering defaults by France and the UK on interallied war debts. Ultimately, losses of U.S. investors into German debt amounted to 13 to 16 percent of U.S. 1931 GDP, and the German debt problem would only be settled in 1953 with the
687:
Significant banks collapsed in other countries as well. In
Hungary, in addition to high foreign indebtedness, several banks had significant exposures to Austrian banks and were thus directly impacted by the Austrian banking turmoil. In the
358:
systematically deficient. Conversely, the issue of foreign lending was heavily politicized in
Germany and its importance correspondingly overestimated, not least because much of the "foreign capital" invested in Germany was actually
960:
and Samad
Sarferaz found empirical evidence "consistent with the claim of Schnabel (2004) that Germany's 1931 crisis was causally a banking crisis, whereas monetary transmission under the Gold Standard played only a limited role."
612:(6 percent each), and other Berlin-based joint-stock banks (10 percent). The Akzeptbank's early activity was mainly focused on the largest problem banks, namely Danat-Bank, Dresdner Bank, Landesbank der Rheinprovinz as well as
584:) was set up to make interbank bills acceptable as collateral by the Reichsbank through credit enhancement. Its capital of 200 million Reichsmark was subscribed (albeit at 25 percent) by the government (40 percent), the
935:
has argued in 1984 that a domestic crisis of public finances was at the core of the German sequence, noting that domestic deposit flight predated the exodus of foreign investors in
Germany by several critical weeks.
775:
At its low point in 1932, German economic output had declined 39 percent from its level in 1929. The large joint-stock banks were fully reprivatized in 1937. Capital controls were kept for an extended time period.
1502:
324:
as a sufficient mechanism to ensure the soundness of the banking sector, not least as German banks published balance sheet data on a monthly basis, and also confidentially reported foreign debt data to the
1600:
The CEE History Project: The History of Savings Banks in Central and Eastern Europe and the History of Erste Group's subsidiaries in the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Romania,
397:
In France, an early wave of deposit flight occurred from October 1930 to February 1931, during which retail savers transferred their holdings on a large scale from small and mid-sized banks, for which no
499:
863:
898:
described the crisis as triggered by "vicissitudes would have to be explained primarily in terms of accidents and external factors". This narrative was echoed in reference works such as those by
836:
of 5 December 1931). Initially the Reichsbank was associated with the supervisory process through a newly established Supervisory Office, but that role was transferred to the Economics Minister
299:) had no branch network and were comparatively more active lending to other banks than to industry. There was no simple correlation between bank type and risk profiles; for example, the
369:
Incipient financial instability occurred in Spring 1929, due to fictions in the reparations negotiations; July 1930, due to governmental crisis; and September 1930, due to the
684:. The UK abandoned gold parity on 19 September 1931, and Austria did so on 8 October 1931. France remained in the gold standard until 1936, with severe deflationary effect.
558:
Meanwhile, the Reichsbank sponsored several mechanisms to facilitate the revival of interbank transactions. On 18 July 1931, it established a temporary Transfer Association (
148:
810:
460:
generated additional friction, restricting the willingness of Austria's international creditors and especially France to support the country in moments of turmoil.
82:
The causes of the crisis included a complex mix of financial, fiscal, macroeconomic, political and international imbalances that have nurtured a lively debate of
701:
697:
651:
240:
317:
started in May 1930 and resulted in German money supply, defined as currency and bank deposits, contracting by 17 percent from June 1930 to June 1931.
718:
617:
514:
899:
783:
in Germany, which had been essentially nonexistent (except for savings banks) before 1931. On 19 September 1931, a decree established the office of
1618:
1553:
384:
910:
1468:
Die Erfahrung der Inflation im internationalen Zusammenhang und Vergleich / The Experience of Inflation International and Comparative Studies
419:
1444:
504:
440:. Its traditional strength, however, ironically became a vulnerability as the government leaned on it to absorb struggling banks, including
868:
555:. From 1931/17/16, some banking transactions were again authorized but with severe limits and restrictions, partly loosened on 20 July.
456:
which had sold its Austrian operations to Creditanstalt in 1926 in an all-shares transaction. In 1930 and early 1931, the project of an
1229:(2), Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University: 349–373,
769:
67:
on 15 July 1931, followed by the UK on 19 September 1931, and extensive losses in the U.S. financial system that contributed to the
334:
1782:
662:
589:
1409:
Jose A. Lopez and Kris James Mitchener (2018), "Uncertainty and Hyperinflation: European Inflation Dynamics after World War I",
693:
16:
436:
was widely viewed as a pillar of financial stability given its history of market dominance and prudent management led by the
260:
211:) represented more than one-third of the German banking sector measured by total assets; large Berlin-based universal banks (
116:
1777:
1772:
593:
166:. The long-standing practice of self-regulation in the German banking sector, with the exception of local savings banks (
377:. These episodes, however, were kept under control by the Reichsbank. Similarly, the collapse in August 1929 of insurer
1534:
255:
220:
124:
597:
338:
1767:
1483:
601:
94:
1536:
Flight-to-safety and the Credit Crunch: A new history of the banking crisis in France during the Great Depression
956:
and uncontrolled balance sheet expansion in a context of increasing competition among banks. In 2014, economists
1598:
666:
441:
292:
642:
acquired equity in the ailing joint-stock banks, and consequently became the owner of a 91-percent stake in
468:
411:
957:
815:
763:, an agreement was outlined on a three-year suspension of German reparations, but that was rejected by the
374:
153:
760:
457:
300:
136:
56:
1596:
921:
670:
346:
296:
1464:"Surviving in a Harsh World: Trade and Inflation in the Czechoslovak and Austrian Republics 1918–1926"
1762:
43:
was a major episode of financial instability that peaked with the collapse of several major banks in
932:
746:
673:, neither requested nor received public financial assistance, although the latter was state-owned.
639:
585:
449:
359:
1633:
1264:
1757:
120:
44:
706:
303:
had expanded its lending to municipalities without proper risk management, whereas its peer the
1787:
349:) before a supervisory regime was first introduced in 1941. In June 1931, Reichsbank President
228:
128:
1395:
1383:
75:
in Germany and its eventual takeover of government in early 1933, as well as the emergence of
1738:
1728:
1532:
987:
689:
628:
532:
announced a one-year "holiday" or moratorium on the payment of political debts, known as the
163:
656:
245:
8:
1579:(3), Cambridge University Press, on behalf of the Economic History Association: 872–876,
1133:(3), Cambridge University Press, on behalf of the Economic History Association: 822–871,
878:
874:
850:
itself was dissolved in 1944 with its duties taken over by the economics ministry. After
780:
723:
632:
605:
453:
206:
24:
806:
622:
519:
488:
1714:
Weltmarktorientierung und relative Stagnation: Währungspolitik in Deutschland 1924-1931
1664:
1580:
1356:
1348:
1246:
1238:
1189:
1150:
1142:
1061:
904:
354:
132:
1388:
Financial market regulation in the wake of financial crisis: the historical experience
966:
342:
1734:
1612:
1547:
1479:
1391:
1360:
1250:
1193:
1154:
895:
859:
832:
533:
437:
399:
321:
1471:
1424:
1414:
1340:
1230:
1179:
1134:
1053:
491:(1885-1970) was ultimately responsible for the country's crisis management strategy
403:
389:
68:
1635:
Politicians, bankers and the Great Depression: The Spanish banking crisis of 1931
1597:
Norbert Bacher, Matthias Beitl, Nadia Rapp-Wimberger, Aleksandra Aleksić (2015),
949:
937:
915:
837:
827:
559:
552:
445:
212:
167:
48:
333:
only gathered balance sheet information from the largest four commercial banks (
1301:, Economic History Department, London School of Economics and Political Science
529:
424:
415:
394:, turned out to be an idiosyncratic event and perceived as such by depositors.
330:
83:
1475:
1293:
1184:
1138:
1751:
982:
764:
677:
643:
609:
548:
495:
433:
363:
314:
284:
276:
159:
103:
76:
64:
52:
1503:"Die Landesbank der Rheinprovinz in der groĂźen Bankenkrise der 1920er Jahre"
1463:
28:
953:
855:
851:
224:
1681:
1641:, Frankfurt: European Association for Banking and Financial History (EABH)
1170:
Temin, Peter (2008), "The German crisis of 1931: evidence and tradition",
539:
From mid-June, concerns arose around a loan of 48 million Reichsmark that
444:
and Union-Bank. Its governance was also disrupted by the emergence of the
1295:
The Austrian Banking Crisis Of 1931: One Bad Apple Spoils The Whole Bunch
941:
925:
741:
647:
472:
414:. Several joint-stock and private banks failed as a consequence, such as
350:
288:
144:
1668:
1652:
1429:
1242:
1218:
862:, until a national banking supervisor was re-established in 1962 as the
71:. The crisis has been widely associated with the subsequent rise of the
1584:
1568:
1419:
1352:
1328:
1234:
1146:
1122:
1065:
1041:
945:
540:
476:
370:
326:
280:
186:
99:
72:
60:
1533:
Patrice Baubeau, Eric Monnet, Angelo Riva, and Stefano Ungaro (2018),
1408:
646:(in which Danat-Bank had been forcibly merged), a 69-percent stake in
891:
729:
544:
232:
1344:
1057:
877:. Another decree on 6 October 1931 granted legal personality to the
779:
The crisis had major consequences for the development of prudential
680:
continued after Germany's exit in mid-July, immediately followed by
79:
in Austria and other authoritarian developments in Central Europe.
1445:"Romanian Stabilization in the 1920s and the Missing Gold Reserves"
944:
in currency and banking markets respectively, namely a "run on the
20:
1733:, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Economics,
1329:"German Banking between the Wars: The Crisis of the Credit Banks"
681:
362:
by German investors e.g. via the Netherlands and Switzerland for
236:
483:
1726:
1566:
613:
510:
266:
107:
32:
1052:(1), Wiley, on behalf of the Economic History Society: 68–87,
383:(FAVAG) due to fraudulent management, known in Germany as the
952:
by the Reichsbank's liquidity policy stance, contributing to
1411:
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working Paper Series
1384:"Banking Crisis in Germany (1931) and the Road to Recovery"
291:) maintained extensive branch networks, while others (e.g.
251:
63:
on 13 July 1931. It triggered the exit of Germany from the
227:, about 6 percent; the rest being mainly provincial (e.g.
1265:"Did monetary forces cause the Hungarian crises of 1931?"
1219:"Currency Versus Banking in the Financial Crisis of 1931"
711:
failed on 7 July 1931 together with two subsidiaries,
320:
German policymakers displayed excessive confidence in
429:
in November 1930, and a severe credit crunch ensued.
1699:
Die deutsche Bankenkrise 1931 - Finanzen und Politik
1663:(2). Sage Publications, Inc.: 75–77 September 1932.
1631:
1730:
Made in Germany: The German Currency crisis of 1931
1682:Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz (1963),
1461:
1684:A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960
1042:"The Causes of the German Banking Crisis of 1931"
661:was similarly merged), and a 35-percent stake in
1749:
1413:, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco: 01–51,
698:Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie
1696:
1216:
728:, causing a credit contraction in the whole of
1381:
1278:, European Historical Economics Society (EHES)
1569:"Comment on "The German Twin Crisis of 1931""
844:upon a legislative revision in 1939, and the
712:
1711:
1617:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (
1552:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (
1442:
1322:
1320:
1318:
1316:
1314:
1312:
1310:
1308:
845:
826:, by new comprehensive banking legislation (
821:
784:
696:which was restructured in early 1932 as the
579:
573:
567:
378:
304:
270:
204:
198:
192:
184:
178:
1287:
1285:
1217:Ritschl, Albrecht; Sarferaz, Samad (2014),
1116:
1114:
1112:
1110:
1108:
1106:
1104:
1102:
1100:
1098:
1096:
1094:
790:
1500:
1496:
1494:
1326:
1092:
1090:
1088:
1086:
1084:
1082:
1080:
1078:
1076:
1074:
873:, which again cooperated closely with the
543:had granted to struggling textile company
1528:
1526:
1524:
1522:
1520:
1518:
1516:
1428:
1418:
1377:
1375:
1373:
1371:
1369:
1305:
1212:
1210:
1208:
1206:
1204:
1202:
1183:
881:and reinforced their public supervision.
820:. In 1934, this was transformed into the
770:London Agreement on German External Debts
572:was disbanded. Then on 28 July 1931, the
402:existed, to cash, direct deposits at the
1727:Thomas Ferguson and Peter Temin (2001),
1567:Thomas Ferguson and Peter Temin (2004),
1282:
1256:
1120:
1035:
1033:
1031:
1029:
1027:
1025:
1023:
494:
482:
467:
93:
15:
1653:"The Result of the Lausanne Conference"
1491:
1272:EHES Working Papers in Economic History
1165:
1163:
1071:
1021:
1019:
1017:
1015:
1013:
1011:
1009:
1007:
1005:
1003:
753:
714:Banco de Reus de Descuentos y Préstamos
663:Deutsche Bank und Disconto-Gesellschaft
590:Deutsche Bank und Disconto-Gesellschaft
588:(a Reichsbank subsidiary, 10 percent),
380:Frankfurter Allgemeine Versicherungs-AG
1750:
1513:
1366:
1291:
1262:
1199:
864:Bundesaufsichtsamt fĂĽr das Kreditwesen
854:, banking supervision was devolved in
513:, head office in 1931 of the troubled
269:) and other joint-stock banks. Of the
1590:
1169:
1039:
665:. By contrast, the non-branch banks,
335:Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris
1160:
1000:
969:between 1901 and 1939, known as the
594:Deutsche Zentralgenossenschaftskasse
1625:
786:Reichskommissar fĂĽr das Bankgewerbe
500:Bank- und Kaufhaus Obernstraße 2–12
448:as a major shareholder through the
13:
256:Allgemeine Deutsche Credit-Anstalt
14:
1799:
884:
800:Imperial Commissioner for Banking
602:Deutsche Rentenbank-Kreditanstalt
475:(1879-1962) was President of the
353:assured his American counterpart
177:By the late 1920s, public banks (
1123:"The German Twin Crisis of 1931"
890:short-term foreign deposits or "
847:Aufsichtsamt fĂĽr das Kreditwesen
823:Aufsichtsamt fĂĽr das Kreditwesen
761:Lausanne Conference of July 1932
1720:
1705:
1690:
1675:
1645:
1560:
1455:
1436:
1339:(3), Harvard College: 554–605,
598:Bank fĂĽr Industrie-Obligationen
339:Crédit Industriel et Commercial
41:European banking crisis of 1931
1783:Economy of the Weimar Republic
1402:
479:during the events of July 1931
1:
1716:, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot
1632:Enrique Jorge-Sotelo (2022),
1223:International Economic Review
667:Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft
442:Allgemeine Bodencreditanstalt
293:Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft
89:
1686:, Princeton University Press
1507:Portal Rheinische Geschichte
1462:Jonathan Bloomfield (1984),
638:The Reichsbank's subsidiary
309:had behaved more prudently.
7:
1778:Economic history of Germany
1773:Economic history of Austria
1573:Journal of Economic History
1127:Journal of Economic History
1046:The Economic History Review
976:
575:Akzept- und Garantiebank AG
458:Austro-German Customs Union
301:Landesbank der Rheinprovinz
117:hyperinflation of 1921-1923
57:Landesbank der Rheinprovinz
10:
1804:
694:Banque Nationale de Crédit
671:Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft
631:to support the network of
297:Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft
1476:10.1515/9783110850734-011
1327:Balderston, Theo (1991),
1185:10.1007/s11698-007-0014-4
1139:10.1017/S0022050704002980
1121:Schnabel, Isabel (2004),
940:in 2004 identified it as
842:Reichswirtschaftsminister
463:
373:'s strong showing in the
306:Mitteldeutsche Landesbank
149:Mitteldeutsche Creditbank
1768:1931 in economic history
1697:Karl Erich Born (1967),
1607:, Vienna: ERSTE Stiftung
993:
805:), for which Chancellor
640:Deutsche Golddiskontbank
586:Deutsche Golddiskontbank
450:Anglo-International Bank
1382:Martin Pontzen (2009).
1333:Business History Review
931:By contrast, historian
920:, and more recently by
219:), another 20 percent;
1292:Macher, Flora (2018),
1263:Macher, Flora (2015),
1040:James, Harold (1984),
846:
841:
831:
822:
785:
713:
676:The unraveling of the
580:
574:
568:
563:
524:
492:
480:
406:, and accounts at the
379:
305:
271:
229:Bayerische Vereinsbank
216:
205:
199:
193:
185:
179:
171:
111:
36:
1712:Gerd Hardach (1976),
1443:Silviu Cerna (2020).
988:Emergency Banking Act
690:Kingdom of Yugoslavia
629:Deutsche Girozentrale
498:
486:
471:
164:Disconto-Gesellschaft
131:, to a lesser extent
97:
59:on 11 July 1931, and
19:
1449:The Market for Ideas
759:reparations. At the
754:Aftermath and legacy
418:in October 1930 and
275:, the four largest (
223:, about 10 percent;
875:Deutsche Bundesbank
781:banking supervision
606:Prussian State Bank
569:Ăśberweisungsverband
564:Ăśberweisungsverband
454:Anglo-Austrian Bank
329:. By contrast, the
135:, and much less so
1671:– via JSTOR.
1542:, Banque de France
1420:10.24148/wp2018-06
1390:. Banca d'Italia.
1235:10.1111/iere.12052
627:, and lent to the
525:
493:
487:German Chancellor
481:
375:Reichstag election
355:George L. Harrison
162:'s acquisition of
147:'s acquisition of
112:
37:
896:Joseph Schumpeter
833:Kreditwesengesetz
702:Banco de Cataluña
652:Barmer Bankverein
534:Hoover Moratorium
438:Rothschild family
410:state-guaranteed
400:deposit guarantee
322:market discipline
241:Barmer Bankverein
221:cooperative banks
1795:
1763:Great Depression
1742:
1741:
1724:
1718:
1717:
1709:
1703:
1702:
1694:
1688:
1687:
1679:
1673:
1672:
1649:
1643:
1642:
1640:
1629:
1623:
1622:
1616:
1608:
1606:
1594:
1588:
1587:
1564:
1558:
1557:
1551:
1543:
1541:
1530:
1511:
1510:
1501:Albert Fischer.
1498:
1489:
1488:
1459:
1453:
1452:
1440:
1434:
1433:
1432:
1422:
1406:
1400:
1399:
1379:
1364:
1363:
1324:
1303:
1302:
1300:
1289:
1280:
1279:
1269:
1260:
1254:
1253:
1214:
1197:
1196:
1187:
1167:
1158:
1157:
1118:
1069:
1068:
1037:
958:Albrecht Ritschl
919:
908:
872:
849:
825:
819:
807:Heinrich BrĂĽning
804:
801:
798:
795:
792:
788:
727:
719:Banco de Tortosa
716:
710:
660:
626:
583:
578:(later known as
577:
571:
553:capital controls
523:
508:
489:Heinrich BrĂĽning
428:
404:Banque de France
393:
382:
347:Société Générale
308:
274:
264:
249:
210:
202:
196:
190:
182:
157:
69:Great Depression
55:on 11 May 1931,
1803:
1802:
1798:
1797:
1796:
1794:
1793:
1792:
1748:
1747:
1746:
1745:
1725:
1721:
1710:
1706:
1701:, Munich: Piper
1695:
1691:
1680:
1676:
1651:
1650:
1646:
1638:
1630:
1626:
1610:
1609:
1604:
1595:
1591:
1565:
1561:
1545:
1544:
1539:
1531:
1514:
1499:
1492:
1486:
1460:
1456:
1441:
1437:
1407:
1403:
1380:
1367:
1345:10.2307/3116768
1325:
1306:
1298:
1290:
1283:
1267:
1261:
1257:
1215:
1200:
1168:
1161:
1119:
1072:
1058:10.2307/2596832
1038:
1001:
996:
979:
967:Crédit Lyonnais
950:too big to fail
938:Isabel Schnabel
922:Thomas Ferguson
913:
902:
900:Karl Erich Born
887:
866:
813:
811:Friedrich Ernst
802:
799:
796:
793:
756:
721:
704:
654:
620:
517:
502:
466:
446:Bank of England
422:
387:
343:Crédit Lyonnais
258:
243:
151:
98:Head office of
92:
12:
11:
5:
1801:
1791:
1790:
1785:
1780:
1775:
1770:
1765:
1760:
1758:Banking crises
1744:
1743:
1719:
1704:
1689:
1674:
1644:
1624:
1589:
1559:
1512:
1490:
1484:
1470:, De Gruyter,
1454:
1435:
1401:
1365:
1304:
1281:
1255:
1198:
1159:
1070:
998:
997:
995:
992:
991:
990:
985:
978:
975:
886:
885:Historiography
883:
755:
752:
592:(10 percent),
551:, and imposed
530:Herbert Hoover
465:
462:
416:Banque Oustric
360:round-tripping
331:Bank of France
200:Kommunalbanken
137:Czechoslovakia
91:
88:
84:historiography
35:, 13 July 1931
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1800:
1789:
1788:Gold standard
1786:
1784:
1781:
1779:
1776:
1774:
1771:
1769:
1766:
1764:
1761:
1759:
1756:
1755:
1753:
1740:
1736:
1732:
1731:
1723:
1715:
1708:
1700:
1693:
1685:
1678:
1670:
1666:
1662:
1658:
1657:World Affairs
1654:
1648:
1637:
1636:
1628:
1620:
1614:
1603:
1602:
1593:
1586:
1582:
1578:
1574:
1570:
1563:
1555:
1549:
1538:
1537:
1529:
1527:
1525:
1523:
1521:
1519:
1517:
1508:
1504:
1497:
1495:
1487:
1485:9783110850734
1481:
1477:
1473:
1469:
1465:
1458:
1450:
1446:
1439:
1431:
1426:
1421:
1416:
1412:
1405:
1397:
1393:
1389:
1385:
1378:
1376:
1374:
1372:
1370:
1362:
1358:
1354:
1350:
1346:
1342:
1338:
1334:
1330:
1323:
1321:
1319:
1317:
1315:
1313:
1311:
1309:
1297:
1296:
1288:
1286:
1277:
1273:
1266:
1259:
1252:
1248:
1244:
1240:
1236:
1232:
1228:
1224:
1220:
1213:
1211:
1209:
1207:
1205:
1203:
1195:
1191:
1186:
1181:
1177:
1173:
1166:
1164:
1156:
1152:
1148:
1144:
1140:
1136:
1132:
1128:
1124:
1117:
1115:
1113:
1111:
1109:
1107:
1105:
1103:
1101:
1099:
1097:
1095:
1093:
1091:
1089:
1087:
1085:
1083:
1081:
1079:
1077:
1075:
1067:
1063:
1059:
1055:
1051:
1047:
1043:
1036:
1034:
1032:
1030:
1028:
1026:
1024:
1022:
1020:
1018:
1016:
1014:
1012:
1010:
1008:
1006:
1004:
999:
989:
986:
984:
983:Panic of 1930
981:
980:
974:
972:
968:
962:
959:
955:
951:
947:
943:
939:
934:
929:
927:
923:
917:
912:
906:
901:
897:
893:
882:
880:
876:
870:
865:
861:
857:
853:
848:
843:
839:
835:
834:
829:
824:
817:
812:
808:
787:
782:
777:
773:
771:
766:
765:U.S. Congress
762:
751:
748:
743:
737:
733:
731:
725:
720:
715:
708:
703:
699:
695:
691:
685:
683:
679:
678:gold standard
674:
672:
668:
664:
658:
653:
649:
645:
644:Dresdner Bank
641:
636:
634:
633:savings banks
630:
624:
619:
618:Schröder-Bank
615:
611:
610:Dresdner Bank
607:
603:
599:
595:
591:
587:
582:
576:
570:
565:
561:
556:
554:
550:
549:gold standard
546:
542:
537:
535:
531:
521:
516:
515:Schröder-Bank
512:
506:
501:
497:
490:
485:
478:
474:
470:
461:
459:
455:
452:, the former
451:
447:
443:
439:
435:
434:Creditanstalt
430:
426:
421:
417:
413:
412:savings banks
409:
405:
401:
395:
391:
386:
385:FAVAG scandal
381:
376:
372:
367:
365:
364:tax avoidance
361:
356:
352:
348:
344:
340:
336:
332:
328:
323:
318:
316:
315:credit crunch
310:
307:
302:
298:
294:
290:
286:
285:Dresdner Bank
282:
278:
277:Deutsche Bank
273:
268:
262:
257:
253:
247:
242:
238:
234:
230:
226:
225:private banks
222:
218:
214:
209:
208:
201:
195:
194:Girozentralen
189:
188:
181:
175:
173:
169:
165:
161:
160:Deutsche Bank
155:
150:
146:
140:
138:
134:
130:
126:
122:
118:
109:
105:
104:Schinkelplatz
101:
96:
87:
85:
80:
78:
77:Austrofascism
74:
70:
66:
65:gold standard
62:
58:
54:
53:Creditanstalt
50:
46:
42:
34:
30:
26:
22:
18:
1729:
1722:
1713:
1707:
1698:
1692:
1683:
1677:
1660:
1656:
1647:
1634:
1627:
1599:
1592:
1576:
1572:
1562:
1535:
1506:
1467:
1457:
1448:
1438:
1430:10419/180328
1410:
1404:
1387:
1336:
1332:
1294:
1275:
1271:
1258:
1226:
1222:
1175:
1171:
1130:
1126:
1049:
1045:
970:
963:
954:moral hazard
933:Harold James
930:
911:Gerd Hardach
888:
856:West Germany
852:World War II
778:
774:
757:
747:Harold James
738:
734:
700:. In Spain,
686:
675:
650:(into which
637:
557:
538:
526:
432:In Austria,
431:
407:
396:
368:
319:
311:
187:Landesbanken
180:Staatsbanken
176:
141:
113:
81:
51:, including
40:
38:
1172:Cliometrica
942:twin crises
926:Peter Temin
914: [
903: [
867: [
814: [
742:Peter Temin
722: [
705: [
655: [
648:Commerzbank
621: [
518: [
503: [
473:Hans Luther
423: [
420:Banque Adam
388: [
351:Hans Luther
289:Commerzbank
272:Grossbanken
259: [
244: [
217:Grossbanken
152: [
145:Commerzbank
1752:Categories
946:Reichsmark
879:Sparkassen
809:appointed
581:Akzeptbank
541:Danat-Bank
477:Reichsbank
371:Nazi Party
327:Reichsbank
281:Danat-Bank
207:Sparkassen
172:Sparkassen
100:Danat-Bank
90:Background
73:Nazi Party
61:Danat-Bank
29:MĂĽhlendamm
1361:154642962
1251:153140854
1194:153640975
1155:154503072
892:hot money
730:Catalonia
545:Nordwolle
233:Hypo-Bank
110:, in 1925
25:Sparkasse
1669:20662122
1613:citation
1548:citation
1243:24517047
1178:: 5–17,
977:See also
408:de facto
21:Bank run
1601:Ukraine
1585:3874822
1396:2101727
1353:3116768
1147:3874821
1066:2596832
858:to the
794:
682:Hungary
250:in the
237:Bavaria
133:Romania
125:Hungary
121:Austria
49:Germany
45:Austria
23:at the
1739:260993
1737:
1667:
1583:
1482:
1394:
1359:
1351:
1249:
1241:
1192:
1153:
1145:
1064:
860:Länder
838:German
828:German
614:Bremen
608:, and
560:German
511:Bremen
464:Crisis
345:, and
287:, and
267:Saxony
213:German
203:, and
168:German
129:Poland
127:, and
108:Berlin
33:Berlin
1665:JSTOR
1639:(PDF)
1605:(PDF)
1581:JSTOR
1540:(PDF)
1357:S2CID
1349:JSTOR
1299:(PDF)
1268:(PDF)
1247:S2CID
1239:JSTOR
1190:S2CID
1151:S2CID
1143:JSTOR
1062:JSTOR
994:Notes
971:Album
918:]
907:]
871:]
818:]
726:]
709:]
659:]
625:]
522:]
507:]
427:]
392:]
263:]
248:]
156:]
1735:SSRN
1619:link
1554:link
1480:ISBN
1392:SSRN
924:and
791:lit.
717:and
669:and
295:and
252:Ruhr
231:and
158:and
47:and
39:The
1472:doi
1425:hdl
1415:doi
1341:doi
1231:doi
1180:doi
1135:doi
1054:doi
909:or
894:".
732:.
616:'s
509:in
265:in
235:in
102:at
27:on
1754::
1661:95
1659:.
1655:.
1615:}}
1611:{{
1577:64
1575:,
1571:,
1550:}}
1546:{{
1515:^
1505:.
1493:^
1478:,
1466:,
1447:.
1423:,
1386:.
1368:^
1355:,
1347:,
1337:65
1335:,
1331:,
1307:^
1284:^
1276:86
1274:,
1270:,
1245:,
1237:,
1227:55
1225:,
1221:,
1201:^
1188:,
1174:,
1162:^
1149:,
1141:,
1131:64
1129:,
1125:,
1073:^
1060:,
1050:37
1048:,
1044:,
1002:^
973:.
928:.
916:de
905:de
869:de
840::
830::
816:de
772:.
724:es
707:es
657:de
635:.
623:de
604:,
600:,
596:,
562::
520:de
505:de
425:fr
390:de
366:.
341:,
337:,
283:,
279:,
261:de
254:,
246:de
239:,
215::
197:,
191:,
183:,
170::
154:de
139:.
123:,
106:,
86:.
31:,
1621:)
1556:)
1509:.
1474::
1451:.
1427::
1417::
1398:.
1343::
1233::
1182::
1176:2
1137::
1056::
803:'
797:'
789:(
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
