809:"if the notion of logical justification can be applied only to such theses and arguments as can be presumed capable of gaining in the long run universal agreement, the disputes to which the uses of any essentially contested concept give rise are not genuine or rational disputes at all. ... So long as contestant users of any essentially contested concept believe, however deludedly, that their own use of it is the only one that can command honest and informed approval, they are likely to persist in the hope that they will ultimately persuade and convert all their opponents by logical means. But once let the truth out of the bag — i.e., the essential contestedness of the concept in question — then this harmless if deluded hope may well be replaced by a ruthless decision to cut the cackle, to damn the heretics and to exterminate the unwanted."
183:
advocated by other theorists, each theorist trying to be deemed the champion. It has been treated as an excuse in that, rather than acknowledge that the failure to reach agreement is due to such factors as imprecision, ignorance, or belligerence, instead theorists point to the terms and concepts under dispute and insist that they are always open to contest — that they are terms and concepts about which we can never expect to reach agreement.
22:
680:, entirely different theories of why and how each of the "standard cases" are, in fact, genuine acts of "unfairness". And, because each considers that certain principles " must be relied upon to show that a particular division or attribution is unfair" are more "fundamental" than certain other principles, it can be said that members of the group have different
1486:
database: alienation, autonomy, author, bankruptcy, boycott, citizenship, civil rights, coherence, community, competition, the
Constitution, corruption, culture, discrimination, diversity, equality, equal protection, freedom, harm, justification, liberalism, merit, motherhood, the national interest,
695:
of "fairness", by demanding that others act "fairly". In this case, those instructed to act "fairly" are responsible for "developing and applying their own conception of fairness as controversial cases arise". Each of those issuing the instructions (or setting the standards) may have quite different
591:
In essence, Hart (1961), Rawls (1971), Dworkin (1972), and Lukes (1974) distinguished between the "unity" of a notion and the "multiplicity" of its possible instantiations. From their work it is easy to understand the issue as one of determining whether there is a single notion that has a number of
353:
These features distinguish Gallie's "essentially contested concepts" from others, "which can be shown, as a result of analysis or experiment, to be radically confused"; or, as Gray would have it, they are the features that relate to the task of distinguishing the "general words, which really denote
304:
Clarke argued that to state that a concept is merely "contested" is to "attribute significance to the contest rather than to the concept". Yet, to state that a concept is "contestable" (rather than "merely contested") is to "attribute some part of any contest to the concept"; namely, "to claim that
182:
Since its introduction by W.B. Gallie in 1956, the expression "essentially contested concept" has been treated both as a challenge and as an excuse by social theorists. It has been treated as a challenge in that theorists consider their uses of terms and concepts to be in competition with the uses
624:
He supposes that he has instructed his children not to treat others "unfairly" and asks us to recognize that, whilst he would have undoubtedly had particular "examples" (of the sorts of conduct he was intending to discourage) in mind at the time he spoke to his children, whatever it was that he
759:
Whilst Gallie's expression "essentially contested concepts" precisely denotes those "essentially questionable and corrigible concepts" which "are permanently and essentially subject to revision and question", close examination of the wide and varied and imprecise applications of Gallie's term
349:
Freeden remarks that "not all essentially contested concepts signify valued achievements; they may equally signify disapproved and denigrated phenomena", and
Gerring asks us to imagine just how difficult it would be to " to craft definitions of slavery, fascism, terrorism, or genocide without
760:
subsequent to 1956, by those who have ascribed their own literal meaning to Gallie's term without ever consulting Gallie's work, have led many philosophers to conclude that "essentially disputed concepts" would have been far better choice for Gallie's meaning, for at least three reasons:
305:
some feature or property of the concept makes it polysemantic, and that the concept contains some internal conflict of ideas"; and it's this state of affairs that provides the "essentially contestable concept" with its "inherent potential generating disputes".
1487:
nature, popular sovereignty, pornography, power, privacy, property, proportionality, prosperity, prostitution, public interest, punishment, reasonable expectations, religion, republicanism, rights, sovereignty, speech, sustainable development, and textuality.
160:(e.g., "fairness"), but not on the best realization thereof. They are "concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users", and these disputes "cannot be settled by appeal to
137:
The term essentially contested concepts gives a name to a problematic situation that many people recognize: that in certain kinds of talk there is a variety of meanings employed for key terms in an argument, and there is a feeling that
803:", when, in fact, " term 'essential' refers to the location of the disagreement or indeterminacy; it is contestation at the core, not just at the borderlines or penumbra of a concept". Yet, according to Gallie, is also clear that:
313:
In 1956 Gallie proposed a set of seven conditions for the existence of an essentially contested concept. Gallie was very specific about the limits of his enterprise: it dealt exclusively with abstract, qualitative notions, such as
194:
notion, such as the legal precept "treat like cases alike; and treat different cases differently", with "each party to defend its case with what it claims to be convincing arguments, evidence and other forms of justification".
1192:
They are unpackings of, elaborations upon, or extensions of Gallie's original seven features that have been made by a very wide range of scholars spread over a wide range of academic and intellectual pursuits over the last 60
671:
of unfairness, and its members may appeal to that concept in moral instruction or argument." However, the members may still disagree over many of these "controversial cases"; and differences of this sort indicate that members
667:. The members of this group "agree on a great number of standard cases of unfairness and use these as benchmarks against which to test other, more controversial cases". In these circumstances, says Dworkin, "the group has a
300:
Clarke drew attention to the substantial differences between the expressions "essentially contested" and "essentially contestable", that were being extensively used within the literature as if they were interchangeable.
1314:
Connolly (1974, p. 40) expressed the view that once the participants in a particular political dispute realized that the concept was an essentially contested concept, the ensuing political discussions would be far more
750:
As a consequence, according to
Dworkin, whenever an appeal is made to "fairness", a moral issue is raised; and, whenever a conception of "fairness" is laid down, an attempt is being made to answer that moral issue.
189:
The disputes that attend an essentially contested concept are driven by substantive disagreements over a range of different, entirely reasonable (although perhaps mistaken) interpretations of a mutually-agreed-upon
297:, one should seek to "locate the source of the dispute"; and in doing so, one might find that the source was "within the concept itself", or " some underlying non-conceptual disagreement between the contestants".
516:
Because it is essentially contested, rather than "radically confused", the continued use of the essentially contested concept is justified by the fact that, despite all of their on-going disputation,
1037:
When discussing finance, "bank" is an essentially contested concept; because the discussion involves establishing the "correct" application, meaning or interpretation of this polysemous term.
992:
A statement that, in essence, is usually nothing more than a simple observation that the apparent dispute it is simply a consequence of the same label being applied to different referents.
458:
than others; and, furthermore, even if one particular instantiation seems best at the moment, there is always the possibility that a new, better instantiation will emerge in the future.
467:
Disputes centred on essentially contested concepts are "perfectly genuine", "not resolvable by argument", and "nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence".
206:; while "This picture is a work of art" may meet strong opposition due to disputes over what "work of art" denotes. He suggests three avenues whereby one might resolve such disputes:
1588:
965:
Hart (1961, p. 156) speaks of "a uniform or constant feature", and "a shifting or varying criterion used in determining when, for any given purposes, cases are alike or different".
636:"I stand ready to admit that some particular act I had thought was fair when I spoke was in fact unfair, or vice versa, if one of my children is able to convince me of that later."
176:, it has a far more specific application; although the notion could be misleadingly and evasively used to justify "agreeing to disagree", the term offers something more valuable:
784:
made at the same time as an assertion that "they have any common subject-matter" is incoherent; and, also, it reveals an "inconsistency in the idea of essential contestability".
461:
Each party knows and recognizes that its own peculiar usage/interpretation of the concept is disputed by others who, in their turn, hold different and quite incompatible views.
974:
Gallie (1956a), p. 169. The dispute is about the proper use of the concept; and all argue that the concept is being "used inappropriately" by others (Smith, 2002, p. 332).
687:
Consequently, those responsible for giving "instructions", and those responsible for setting "standards" of "fairness", in this community may be doing one of two things:
1937:
Rodriguez, P.-A., "Human dignity as an essentially contested concept", "Cambridge Review of
International Affairs", Vol. 28, No. 4. (April 2015), pp. 743–756.
1419:"; but, from the fact that "it assumes that one conception is superior to another", it is clear that "it sets a standard they must try — and may fail — to meet".
454:
instantiation of an essentially contested concept (or, at least, none knowable to be the best), it is also obvious that some instantiations will be considerably
1345:
the argument. See McKnight (2003), p. 261; and Perry (1977), p. 25. In an attempt to account for cases where disputants trace their individual notions back to
552:
have variously embellished Gallie's proposal by arguing that certain of the difficulties encountered with Gallie's proposition may be due to the unintended
1379:
Dworkin (1972), pp. 27-28 (an almost identical passage appears at
Dworkin, 1972, pp. 134-135). The four-paragraph passage is in Section II of the article
696:
explanations underlying their actions; and, also, they may well change their explanations from time to time, without ever changing the standards they set.
1362:
The concept/conception terminology seems to originate with Gallie's (1956a) own comment that, whilst they might still continue to employ the contested
795:
and is, now, being widely used to denote something like "very hotly contested, with no resolution in sight", due to an entirely mistaken view that the
715:
It is important to recognize that rather than it just being a case of delivering two different instructions; it is a case of delivering two different
727:
of "fairness", one invokes the ideal (and, implicitly, the universally agreed upon) notion of "fairness"; and whatever one might believe is the best
40:
738:
of "fairness", one specifies what one believes to be the best instantiation of the notion "fairness"; and, by this action, one specifies what one
2005:
150:("Each meaning gives a partial view so the more meanings the better") are none of them the appropriate attitude towards that variety of meanings.
527:
The continued use of the essentially contested concept also helps to sustain and develop our understanding of the concept's original exemplar/s.
464:
Each party must (at least to a certain extent) understand the criteria upon which the other participants’ (repudiated) views are based.
775:
Expressly stipulating that a specific issue can never be resolved, and then calling it a "contest" seems both absurd and misleading.
945:. That term was first introduced into political theory in 1958 by Gallie, who applies it to various subject-terms including power.
1464:
There seems to be a radical fault in the very notion of a contest that can not by its nature be won or lost. (Gray, 1999, p. 96)
354:
an essentially contested concept" from those other "general words, whose uses conceal a diversity of distinguishable concepts":
1552:
Benn, S.I. & Gaus, G.F., "The Public and the
Private: Concepts and Action", pp. 3–27 in Benn, S.I. & Gaus, G.F.,
1399:
These unfair acts involve either "a wrongful division of benefits and burdens, or a wrongful attribution of praise or blame".
1726:
Gerring, J., "What Makes a
Concept Good? A Criterial Framework for Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences",
640:
Dworkin argues that this admission of error would not entail any "change" to his original instructions, because the true
1034:
is that the polysemous word’s meanings have multiplied over time (in the sense of its original meaning being extended).
2025:
1500:. The descriptive definition is still a definition, even if one may think it less interesting than Gallie's definition.
924:
58:
2010:
2000:
1598:
Collier, D. & Mahon, J.E., "Conceptual “Stretching” Revisited: Adapting
Categories in Comparative Analysis",
652:
of fairness might have had in mind". Therefore, he argues, his instructions do, in fact, "cover" this new case.
633:"I would expect my children to apply my instructions to situations I had not and could not have thought about."
1761:
Gray, J., "Political Power, Social Theory, and
Essential Contestability", pp. 75–101 in Miller, D. &
1740:
Gingell, J. & Winch, C., "Essentially
Contested Concepts", pp. 88–89 in Gingell, J. & Winch, C.,
592:
different instantiations, or whether there is more than one notion, each of which is reflected in a different
1482:
Waldron (2002, p. 149) found that the following concepts had been labelled as "essentially contested" in the
286:
Barry Clarke suggested that, in order to determine whether a particular dispute was a consequence of true
88:
to facilitate an understanding of the different applications or interpretations of the sorts of abstract,
1496:
Of course, the equivalent view about the term in general is reasonable: it merely uses the descriptive
36:
780:
878:
Published immediately as Gallie (1956a); a later, slightly altered version appears in Gallie (1964).
2020:
1870:
Mason, A., "On Explaining Political Disagreement: The Notion of an Essentially Contested Concept",
703:
of "fairness"; by, for example, specifying that all hard cases were to be decided "by applying the
229:
113:
1605:
Connolly, W.E., "Essentially Contested Concepts in Politics", pp. 10–44 in Connolly, W.E.,
663:
of "fairness", he asks us to imagine a group whose members share the view that certain acts are
125:
89:
1353:, Connolly (1974, p. 14) proposes that we think of the shared exemplar as a "cluster concept".
1266:
Because, in the absence of this condition, it is possible that experience could establish one
629:
when he issued such instructions was not confined to those "examples" alone, for two reasons:
1891:
Miller, D., "Linguistic Philosophy and Political Theory", pp. 35–51 in Miller, D. &
210:
Discovering a new meaning of "work of art" to which all disputants could thenceforward agree.
173:
121:
1800:
Jacobs, M., “Sustainable Development as a Contested Concept“, pp. 21–45 in Dobson, A.,
842:
603:, Dworkin used the example of "fairness" to isolate and elaborate the difference between a
117:
75:
1877:
Mason, A., "The Notion of an Essentially Contested Concept", pp. 47–68 in Mason, A.,
8:
501:
Because the use of an essentially contested concept is always the application of one use
394:
The different users of the concept will often allocate substantially different orders of
146:("All answers are equally true (or false); everyone has a right to his own truth"), and
618:
161:
139:
369:
Essentially contested concepts denote comprehensively evaluated entities that have an
346:, etc., it is clear that the concepts he chose were exclusively positively regarded).
2015:
920:
216:
Declaring "work of art" to be a number of different concepts employing the same name.
1747:
Grafstein, R., "A Realist Foundation for Essentially Contested Political Concepts",
1566:
Boulay, H., "Essentially Contested Concepts and the Teaching of Political Science",
887:
They are "evaluative" in the sense that they deliver some sort of "value-judgement".
1938:
470:
Each party's use of their own specific usage/interpretation is driven by a need to
409:
Psychological and sociological causes influence the extent to which any particular
334:(and, if Gallie's choices are contrasted with negatively regarded concepts such as
1975:
Waldron, J., "Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?",
1942:
1698:
Garver, E., "Essentially Contested Concepts: The Ethics and Tactics of Argument",
1684:
Gallie, W.B., "Essentially Contested Concepts", pp. 157–191 in Gallie, W.B.,
1649:
Ehrenberg, K.M., "Law is not (Best Considered) an Essentially Contested Concept",
1892:
1762:
914:
609:
1802:
Fairness and Futurity: Essays on Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice
1255:, and democratic achievements are always judged in the light of such alterations
655:
Exploring what he considers to be the "crucial distinction" between the overall
1045:
832:
788:
708:
704:
545:
266:
Is there a genuine dispute about the term's correct application that, in fact,
105:
1994:
1559:
Booth, W.C., "“Preserving the Exemplar”: or, How Not to Dig Our Own Graves",
910:
906:
858:
827:
553:
537:
520:
of the competitors acknowledge that the contested concept is derived from a
847:
822:
549:
191:
101:
79:
1982:
Waldron, J., "Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues",
1961:
Smith, K., "Mutually Contested Concepts and Their Standard General Use",
800:
239:
Do two or more different concepts share the same word, as in the case of
233:
147:
1916:
Postema, G.J., "Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law",
1645:
1380:
1219:
For this reason, Benn and Gaus (1983, pp. 3-5) advocate using the term "
919:. Sage Reference. Los Angeles: SAGE (published 2011). pp. 221–222.
432:
and vague, and are subject to considerable modification in the light of
1968:
Swanton, C., "On the “Essential Contestedness” of Political Concepts",
1863:
MacIntyre, A., "The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts",
1497:
1430:
541:
228:
Has the term been incorrectly used, as in the case of mistakenly using
143:
109:
93:
1772:
Gray, J.N., "On the Contestability of Social and Political Concepts",
1434:
852:
837:
793:
has "run wild" in the law review literature over the ensuing 60 years
199:
644:
of his instructions was that " meant the family to be guided by the
1786:
Härlin, M. & Sundberg, P., "Taxonomy and Philosophy of Names",
1628:
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association
1417:
He notes that this does not " them a discretion to act as they like
1253:
democratic targets will be raised or lowered as circumstances alter
1049:
1030:
764:
Gallie's term has led many to the mistaken belief that he spoke of
376:
The evaluation must be attributed to the internally complex entity
260:
221:
202:" can be successfully contested if the work is actually painted in
1902:
Nielsen, K., "On Rationality and Essentially Contested Concepts",
1531:
Abbey, R., "Is Liberalism Now an Essentially Contested Concept?",
1754:
Gray, J., "On Liberty, Liberalism and Essential Contestability",
1677:
Gallie, W.B. (1956b), "Art as an Essentially Contested Concept",
1483:
291:
203:
172:
Although Gallie's term is widely used to denote imprecise use of
157:
156:
Essentially contested concepts involve widespread agreement on a
1814:
Kekes, J., "Essentially Contested Concepts: A Reconsideration",
1653:, Vol.7 (2011), pp. 209–232. doi: 10.1017/S174455231100005X
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McKnight, C., "Medicine as an Essentially Contested Concept",
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Daly, S., "Philanthropy as an Essentially Contested Concept",
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Gilbert, M., "Notes on the Concept of a Social Convention",
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of how the game should be played" (p. 176, emphasis added).
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For, otherwise, it would only be, at best, an essentially "
1041:
742:
by "fairness"; and whatever one might believe is the ideal
1589:"Essentially contested concepts: Debates and applications"
754:
1626:
Davidson, D., "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme",
97:
778:
Any assertion that "essentially contested" concepts are
213:
Convincing all the disputants to conform to one meaning.
167:
1670:
Gallie, W.B.(1956a), "Essentially Contested Concepts",
1658:
Ideologies and Political Theory — A Conceptual Approach
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Cooper, D.E., "Lewis on our Knowledge of Conventions",
1040:
In a different dispute over banks, where one speaks of
224:. Here, a number of critical questions must be asked:
1366:, the "different teams come to hold… very different
909:(February 2011). "Essentially Contested Concept". In
450:
Whilst, by Gallie's express stipulation, there is no
1965:, Vol. 2, No.3, (1 November 2002), pp. 329–343.
1587:
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1535:, Vol. 27, No. 4, (December 2005), pp. 461–480.
421:
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1103:Gallie (1956a), passim. Kekes (1977, p. 71) offers
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1909:Perry, T.D., "Contested Concepts and Hard Cases",
1888:, Vol. 29, No. 4, (August 2003), pp. 261–262.
1691:Gallie, W.B., "What Makes a Subject Scientific?",
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486:) usage/interpretation against that of all other (
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1920:, Vol.11, No.1, (January 1982), pp. 165–203.
1842:Lucy, W.N.R., "Rights, Values, and Controversy",
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1758:, Vol.8, No. 4, (October 1978), pp. 385–402.
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1693:The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
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1208:appraisal presupposes an accepted set of criteria
556:of two separate domains associated with the term
198:Gallie speaks of how "This picture is painted in
142:("My answer is right and all others are wrong"),
1992:
1951:, Princeton University Press, (Princeton), 1979.
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1580:Clarke, B., "Eccentrically Contested Concepts",
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659:of "fairness" and some particular, and specific
387:of that internally complex entity are initially
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1913:, Vol.88, No.1, (October 1977), pp. 20–35.
1818:, Vol.10, No. 2, (Spring 1977), pp. 71–89.
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1663:Frohock, F.M., "The Structure of “Politics”",
791:'s research has revealed that Gallie's notion
273:Or, is it really the case that the term is an
131:Garver (1978) describes their use as follows:
1986:, Vol.82, No.3, (May 1994), pp. 509–540.
1874:, Vol.33, No.1, (March 1990), pp. 81–98.
1867:, Vol.84, No.1, (October 1973), pp. 1–9.
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1751:, Vol. 41, No.1, (March 1988), pp. 9–28.
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531:
505:all other uses, any usage is intentionally
220:Otherwise, the dispute probably centres on
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1257:" (Gallie, 1956a, p. 186, emphasis added).
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59:Learn how and when to remove this message
43:, without removing the technical details.
1849:Lukes, S., "A Reply to K.I. Macdonald",
1272:universally more acceptable than another
1251:Politics being the art of the possible,
1719:Gellner, E., "The Concept of a Story",
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1204:not all value judgements are appraisive
905:
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1688:, Chatto & Windus, (London), 1964.
417:for a given individual, regarded as a
406:to each of those constituent elements.
350:recourse to 'pejorative' attributes".
82:(1912–1998) introduced the term
1705:Garver, E., "Paradigms and Princes",
1665:The American Political Science Review
1600:The American Political Science Review
1433:(the correctness of action), not for
617:(various instantiations, for example
587:of those ideal and abstract notions).
425:by one individual and not by another.
168:Identifying the presence of a dispute
41:make it understandable to non-experts
1851:British Journal of Political Science
1783:, Chatto and Windus, (London), 1965.
1756:British Journal of Political Science
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599:In a section of his 1972 article in
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1674:, Vol.56, (1956), pp. 167–198.
358:Essentially contested concepts are
13:
1932:Coercion: A Nonevaluative Approach
1899:, Clarendon Press, (Oxford), 1983.
1769:, Clarendon Press, (Oxford), 1983.
1065:a conflict between truth and error
402:", and/or substantially different
14:
2037:
1879:Explaining Political Disagreement
1821:Khatchadourian, H., "Vagueness",
1707:Philosophy of the Social Sciences
1630:, Vol. 47, (1974), pp. 5–20.
1554:Public and Private in Social Life
1245:" an example of a concept being "
1028:The embedded meaning of the term
723:In the case of the appeal to the
648:of fairness, not by any specific
1607:The Terms of Political Discourse
1328:All from Gallie (1956a), p. 169.
20:
1749:The Western Political Quarterly
1593:Journal of Political Ideologies
1540:Review of International Studies
1512:
1503:
1490:
1476:
1467:
1458:
1449:
1440:
1423:
1411:
1402:
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1177:
1168:
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1150:
1097:
1088:
1079:
1070:
1057:
1022:
1013:
1004:
995:
1963:Journal of Classical Sociology
1897:The Nature of Political Theory
1837:Canadian Journal of Philosophy
1809:Canadian Journal of Philosophy
1767:The Nature of Political Theory
1202:Baldwin stresses that whilst "
986:
977:
968:
959:
950:
899:
890:
881:
872:
1:
1956:British Journal of Aesthetics
1943:10.1080/09557571.2015.1021297
1832:, Blackwell, (Oxford), 2002 .
1556:, Croom Helm, (London), 1983.
1524:
1437:(the correctness of thought).
1351:mutually compatible exemplars
943:essentially contested concept
755:Not "hotly disputed" concepts
734:In the case of laying down a
275:essentially contested concept
85:essentially contested concept
1934:, Rodopi, (Amsterdam), 2000.
1918:The Journal of Legal Studies
1860:, Macmillan, (London), 1974.
1744:, Routledge, (London), 1999.
1642:The New York Review of Books
1637:, Duckworth, (Oxford), 1978.
1509:Waldron (2002), pp. 148-149.
601:The New York Review of Books
282:Contested versus contestable
74:In a paper delivered to the
7:
1904:Communication and Cognition
1823:The Philosophical Quarterly
1679:The Philosophical Quarterly
1609:, Heath, (Lexington), 1974.
1408:Emphasis added to original.
1221:complex-structured concepts
815:
398:, substantially different "
308:
10:
2042:
1568:Teaching Political Science
1319:" (Connolly, 1974, p. 40).
1274:" (Gallie, 1956a, p. 174).
428:The disputed concepts are
2026:Philosophical terminology
1886:Journal of Medical Ethics
1446:Hampshire (1965), p. 230.
1210:" (Baldwin (1997), p. 10.
1048:, it is obvious that two
983:Gray (1977), p. 344.
941:is often described as an
699:Laying down a particular
108:"—used in the domains of
1341:the argument, it is not
1067:" (Garver, 1990, p. 259)
866:
799:in Gallie's term is an "
532:Concepts and conceptions
1816:Philosophy and Rhetoric
1714:Philosophy and Rhetoric
1700:Philosophy and Rhetoric
1283:Swanton (1985), p. 815.
1174:Gallie (1956a), p. 180.
1165:Gerring (1999), p. 385.
1019:Gallie (1956a), p. 167.
114:sustainable development
2011:Philosophy of religion
2001:Concepts in aesthetics
1788:Biology and Philosophy
1156:Freeden (1998), p. 56.
1085:Clarke (1979), p. 124.
1076:Clarke (1979), p. 123.
1042:financial institutions
1010:Gallie (1956a) p. 168.
956:Garver (1978), p. 168.
522:single common exemplar
474:their own particular (
434:changing circumstances
126:philosophy of religion
1984:California Law Review
1858:Power: A Radical View
1533:New Political Science
1382:. It commences with "
1249:" in its character: "
1145:essentially contested
916:Encyclopedia of Power
568:(the abstract, ideal
389:variously describable
174:technical terminology
122:philosophy of history
71:Problem in philosophy
1735:New Literary History
1388:…I try to answer it
1292:Mason (1990), p. 85.
1232:Mason (1990), p. 96.
1183:Gray (1977), p. 337.
1001:Rhodes (2000), p. 1.
843:Ideograph (rhetoric)
770:essentially disputed
385:constituent elements
118:political philosophy
76:Aristotelian Society
1925:A Theory of Justice
1547:A Theory of Freedom
1473:Gray (1999), p. 96.
1455:See Waldron (2002).
1384:But the theory of…
1339:a pre-requisite for
1094:See Gallie (1956a).
1052:have been confused.
396:relative importance
362:, and they deliver
80:Walter Bryce Gallie
1977:Law and Philosophy
1795:The Concept of Law
1781:Thought and Action
1347:entirely different
1337:This agreement is
705:utilitarian ethics
619:utilitarian ethics
371:internally complex
162:empirical evidence
78:on 12 March 1956,
1386:" and ends with "
1044:and the other of
691:Appealing to the
536:Scholars such as
104:", "power", and "
96:notions—such as "
69:
68:
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1774:Political Theory
1561:Critical Inquiry
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2021:Social concepts
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1779:Hampshire, S.,
1527:
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781:incommensurable
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684:of "fairness".
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419:stronger reason
404:interpretations
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37:help improve it
34:
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1952:
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1930:Rhodes, M.R.,
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1793:Hart, H.L.A.,
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833:Metaphilosophy
830:
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814:
813:
812:
811:
810:
789:Jeremy Waldron
786:
785:
776:
773:
768:, rather than
766:hotly disputed
756:
753:
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747:
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712:
709:Jeremy Bentham
697:
638:
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581:instantiations
573:
546:Ronald Dworkin
533:
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383:The different
381:
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1893:Siedentop, L.
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538:H. L. A. Hart
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1545:Benn, S.I.,
1539:
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930:. Retrieved
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848:Natural kind
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585:realizations
584:
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550:Steven Lukes
535:
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192:archetypical
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1947:Rorty, R.,
1923:Rawls, J.,
1856:Lukes, S.,
1828:Lewis, D.,
1368:conceptions
1317:enlightened
1303:contestable
1125:rationality
932:12 November
896:Daly (2012)
801:intensifier
682:conceptions
610:suum cuique
577:conceptions
447:in advance.
234:catachresis
148:eclecticism
90:qualitative
49:August 2024
1995:Categories
1830:Convention
1525:References
1498:definition
1431:orthopraxy
1305:" concept.
1141:philosophy
1063:Which is "
736:conception
701:conception
661:conception
650:conception
615:conception
613:) and its
554:conflation
542:John Rawls
507:aggressive
496:irrational
445:prescribed
430:open-ended
378:as a whole
373:character.
360:evaluative
144:skepticism
110:aesthetics
94:evaluative
1435:orthodoxy
1243:democracy
1129:democracy
1117:the novel
853:Vagueness
838:Ambiguity
797:essential
772:concepts.
511:defensive
488:incorrect
441:predicted
328:democracy
230:decimated
140:dogmatism
2016:Rhetoric
1621:Voluntas
1109:morality
1050:homonyms
1031:polysemy
816:See also
678:act upon
575:(b) the
566:concepts
564:(a) the
498:) users.
492:improper
484:superior
423:a reason
320:religion
309:Features
294:homonymy
288:polysemy
261:homonymy
259:, etc. (
222:polysemy
1484:Westlaw
1364:concept
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