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agreement that
Operation Lifeline Sudan would a UN "umbrella organization" that would grant both diplomatic legitimacy and operational capacity to humanitarian aid distributed to both sides of the Second Sudanese Civil War. Central to this agreement was the principle that "corridors of tranquility" would allow for the safe transportation and impartial distribution of essential food aid through either the air or through roads. This new humanitarian intervention, made with the agreement of both Sudan and rebel factions in the south, was noteworthy in its guarantee of passages through which humanitarian aid could be delivered in a neutral manner without being disrupted by armed combatants
122:. Subsequently, what has been characterized by the UN as a complex emergency emerged due to the large number of civilian casualties, the failure of the state and economy, and an increase in security threats to any potential humanitarian interventions. The increasing spillover from the conflict onto other countries in the form of refugees as well as increasing media coverage of the growing crisis led to a call for organizations like the UN to intervene and provide humanitarian assistance.
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government to neutrally distribute aid. These negotiations pioneered the creation of a rules-based humanitarian space in which aid could be distributed without fear of interference by parties on either side of the conflict. It has also been noted that OLS was crucial in creating an environment in which the SPLM/A and the
Sudanese government could begin preliminary peace negotiations. This is because it created common humanitarian ground that allowed both parties to slowly build trust.
160:
17:
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factions shifted with the development of the conflict, creating an environment where OLS was vulnerable to the interests of the parties that it was negotiating with. Additionally, many have suggested that
Operation Lifeline Sudan prolonged the conflict by legitimizing the SPLM/A and other rebel factions through both negotiating with them and through providing them with aid. This is driven by the concern that aid may be channeled into supporting the military.
134:. It aimed to use planes to fly relief packages to areas that were particularly devastated by the conflict. UN officials believed that a "food neutral program" where food aid would be equally provided to both the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A would be the most effective at mitigating the effects of the crisis. One of the first tests of this neutral model came with the attempted concurrent distribution of aid to the SPLM/A held city of
142:. But, the Sudanese government, fearing negative international media attention because of the dire state of affairs in Wau, rejected the plan, causing UN officials to backtrack their distribution of aid to Yirol due to fears of losing their credibility as a neutral humanitarian actor. This failure was compounded by the Sudanese government under
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which dictated that interventions like it would usually operate in deference to the domestic government. This led to the
Southern sector becoming more independent, allowing it to focus more on distributing humanitarian aid. The Southern sector of OLS was also able to use its provision as a negotiator
209:
in
Khartoum. This cooperation led to this sector prioritizing the delivery of aid to internally-displaced individuals that had gathered around the capital of Khartoum. It also led to this sector undertaking operations that were substantively aligned with the development priorities of the Sudanese
231:
Operation
Lifeline Sudan has been noted to have been highly successful in delivering humanitarian aid in a conflict region. This is especially significant given that it was the first instance of the UN negotiating with a non-state actor like the SPLM/A alongside a state actor like the Sudanese
181:
This alignment of interests was intensified by international frustration over continued suffering, as well as the diplomatic hostility shown towards international parties under
Operation Rainbow. Consequently, a 1989 conference dedicated to relief operations was held in Khartoum, leading to an
146:
declaring that they would not be able to guarantee the security of airports in the south of Sudan where the UN and non-governmental organizations would need to fly in to distribute aid. The Sadiq government, citing concerns amid frustration with perceived overbearing attitude of the UN and WFP
235:
However, Operation
Lifeline Sudan also experienced difficulty in facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid when parties did not respect its mandate. This difficulty was made worse by the fluidity of the Second Sudanese Civil War, as the priorities of both the government and southern rebel
210:
government. Consequently, the
Northern sector of OLS was significantly more intertwined with the government's interests and regulations, leading it to be less independent and more stagnant. Conversely, the Southern sector of Operation Lifeline Sudan was defined by its cooperation with the
204:
Alongside these provisions, OLS was logistically divided into
Northern and Southern sectors that would respectively focus on the northern and southern parts of the conflict region in Sudan. The Northern sector of Operation Lifeline Sudan was noted to have coordinated extensively with the
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officials involved in the effort, declared that they would no longer support the equal distribution of food to both it and the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A began to similarly opposed the principle of food neutral aid and formed their own humanitarian organization known as the
167:
Operation Lifeline Sudan was created in 1989 under a unique combination of circumstances that led a convergence of international attention alongside an openness to cooperation by both the Sudanese Government and the SPLM/A. In 1988, severe flooding and famine in
54:
to provide humanitarian assistance throughout war-torn and drought-afflicted regions in the South. Operation Lifeline Sudan was established in April 1989 in response to a devastating war-induced famine and other humanitarian consequences of the
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led to massive international media coverage of the ongoing crisis in the region. Additionally, by this point, both the Sudanese Government and the SPLM/A had begun to make moves towards peace. This movement was supported by a newly supportive
286:
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erupted between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A. This conflict, alongside massive famine and socioeconomic instability, led to over 2 million casualties. An additional 5 million people became
287:"Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium | Looking back to look ahead? Reviewing key lessons from Operation Lifeline Sudan and past humanitarian operations in South Sudan"
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The first of these UN interventions, dubbed Operation Rainbow, was launched in 1986 with the support of several donor governments and under the management of the
67:) to deliver humanitarian assistance to all civilians in need, regardless of their location or political affiliation. This included over 100,000 returnees from
151:. Amidst this rejection by both parties, international actors lost interest and viewed the operation as a publicity stunt that failed to consider sovereignty.
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The UN would be the primary negotiator with all relevant parties whose territory that it either transported or delivered humanitarian aid in.
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Ojaba, Elizabeth; Leonardo, Anne Itto; Leonardo, Margaret Itto (December 2002). "Food Aid in Complex Emergencies: Lessons from Sudan".
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between the Sudanese government and South Sudanese rebels. It was the result of negotiations between the UN, the Government of
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All relevant parties would respect and not hinder the delivery or transportation of humanitarian aid to populations in crisis.
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The UN would remain neutral and would be responsible for coordinating OLS with all relevant parties involved in the conflict.
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Operation Lifeline Sudan had three explicit provisions that it was mandated to focus on by its agreement:
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This mission lasted until the conclusion of the Second Sudanese Civil War with the signing of the 2005
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Taylor-Robinson, S. "Operation Lifeline Sudan"," J Med Ethics. 2002 Feb; 28(1): 49–51.
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Humanitarianism under siege : a critical review of operation lifeline Sudan
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REQUIEM FOR THE SUDAN : war, drought, and disaster relief on the nile
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The challenges of famine relief : emergency operations in the Sudan
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82:. It is unique in being the first instance of the UN dealing with a
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Planes used by Operation Lifeline Sudan to airdrop humanitarian aid
627:. Minear, Larry, 1936-. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
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BURR, J. MILLARD. COLLINS, ROBERT O. BURR, J MILLARD. (2019).
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As a result of the breakdown of various provisions of the
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while over 500,000 more fled to neighboring countries as
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at Conciliation Resources, 2005. Retrieved 2017-02-11.
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Southern Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA)
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214:. Because the SPLM/A and its regional allies were
63:and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (
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75:was the primary forward operations hub for OLS.
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61:Sudan
52:Sudan
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