856:, where he was supposed to find work in a war plant, and then send the information collected to Hansen in Mexico. Additionally, Schroell and Hansen were to recruit new men for the expansion of the network into the Central American countries. Allied intelligence knew of the plan through intercepts, so in August 1944, shortly after Hansen and Schroell arrived in country, most of the German agents were arrested by Argentine authorities, permanently ending all effective espionage activity by Department VID 4 in the Western Hemisphere. The Germans that managed to escape continued to conduct minor espionage operations in Latin America until the end of the war in 1945, but never again did the amount of clandestine radio traffic return to its former level.
837:
operation, traffic volume increased to as much as fifteen messages a day. In
January 1944, the Argentine government arrested several German and Spanish agents, and Becker and Franczok were forced into hiding. Communications between Argentina and Germany were interrupted for about a month. When communications were reestablished, Becker asked Berlin for radio equipment, money, and secret ink materials. This request resulted in Operation Jolle, which eventually turned into a mission not only to resupply Becker's network in South America, but also to establish additional clandestine radio stations in Mexico, the United States, and
968:
41:
743:, a number of the more active agents of the Chilean ring were arrested in the fall of 1942. Enough escaped to permit von Bohlen to rebuild another network, known as the PQZ group. When von Bohlen went back to Germany late in 1943, his group was sufficiently well organized so that he could leave it, as well as a large sum of money and equipment, in the hands of Bernardo Timmerman, who carried on until his arrest in February 1944. When Timmerman was arrested, the espionage rings in Chile were "smashed," but again some Germans managed to escape to Argentina, where they continued operating.
828:, attempted to fabricate a link between Lüning and the German submarines operating in the Caribbean, claiming that he was in contact with them via radio, to provide the public with an explanation for their failures early in the U-boat campaign. Accordingly, Allied officials elevated Lüning's importance to that of a "master spy," but there is no evidence that he ever encountered a single piece of important information during his tenure in Cuba. Lüning was found guilty of espionage and executed in Cuba in November 1942, the only German spy executed in Latin America during World War II.
752:
85:
575:
789:
from contacts in the United States, there is no evidence that
Nicolaus was successful in obtaining any vital military secrets. He was successful in leaving behind the nucleus of an organization which was able to maintain some activities throughout the war, although it was of little value to the German war-effort, other than its nuisance value in occupying the attention of Allied counter-intelligence agencies.
1183:
873:
but the traffic was probably more useful to the Allies than it was to the
Germans, because it did reveal the identities of collaborators in the South American countries, including a former Argentine minister of marine and the head of the Paraguayan Air Force. The Allies also were able to obtain from clandestine traffic the details of planning for the December 20, 1943 revolution in
519:. When Becker arrived in São Paulo, he transformed Engels' operation into an organization that reported on all subjects of interest to German intelligence. This meant that, in addition to collecting economy-related information, the agents collected information about shipping, war production, military movements in the United States, and political and military affairs in Brazil.
956:, which was in charge of Allied counter-espionage in South America during World War II, refused to give blanket approval for such usage but a compromise was reached: information from clandestine communications was fused with information from other sources in preparing the indictment. This was Operation Bolívar's final contribution to the Allied war effort.
623:, and reestablished contact with Berlin. After receiving Becker's orders, Franczok moved to the new control station in Buenos Aires in May 1943, Lange proceeded to Chile, and Hartmuth was left in Paraguay. Becker hoped to establish clandestine radio stations in every South American republic, but was successful only in Paraguay, Chile, and Argentina.
909:. This appointment served to cover his actual mission: to proceed to Germany to assure that country that Argentina had no intention of severing relations with her. He was also to confer with the Security Service and other German officials on matters of mutual interest and was to obtain German permission for the return to Argentina from
724:("COTRAS"), formerly a branch of Norddeutscher Lloyd. Von Schulz Hausman had been the manager of the Norddeutscher Lloyd Shipping Agency in Chile before moving to Argentina, and had been succeeded in that job by Dittman. Other PYLREW personnel who had been associated with Norddeutscher Lloyd were Hans Blume (
788:
Between 1940 and 1942, Nicolaus organized an extensive network which maintained contact with other spy rings in South
America and attempted to obtain information from the United States. While technical data from American publications was extracted or photographed and some general information obtained
680:
When Lange went to Chile, there was already an agent organization and radio station in operation, so Lange fitted himself into it as an independent operator with his own sources. The station, using callsign PYL to communicate with REW in
Germany, had been established in April or May 1941, apparently
631:
Engels's group was not the only one active in Brazil. Three other clandestine radio stations, each serving a different spy net, began operating in the country in 1941. In May, Rio de
Janeiro's LIR radio station started communicating with MAX in Germany. The LIRMAX group, as it was called, eventually
872:
effort against
Operation Bolívar in 1944. He pointed out that the type of information transmitted by an enemy agent depends largely on what happens to be available at his location. Bolívar agents were able to provide reports on the movements of merchant shipping and on local political developments,
885:
In addition to revealing the identities of German spies and sympathizers, the interception of clandestine traffic allowed the Allies to maintain continuity on the agents operating in the
Western Hemisphere. This information led to a number of arrests, the most celebrated at the time being that of
836:
The first clandestine information passed from
Argentina to Germany concerned finances, the organization of the South American net, Argentine politics, and the establishment of a courier system between Argentina and Spain using crewmen aboard Spanish merchant vessels. Once the network entered full
586:
Significant German espionage activity in Brazil ended in March 1942, when
Brazilian authorities rounded up all suspected enemy agents. Becker was not in country, having returned to Germany to meet with his superiors. During this time Becker was put in charge of all German espionage activities in
717:), in Mexico. The PYLREW net's tie with Operation Bolívar was revealed through intercept, particularly in July 1941, when von Bohlen was instructed by radio to contact von Heyer in Rio de Janeiro to obtain a supply of secret inks and developers which von Bohlen had ordered from Germany.
487:), who arrived in the country shortly thereafter. After protests from the German embassy in Argentina in August 1940, the objective of the operation was revised to one of espionage only. Becker and Lange were soon discovered by Argentine authorities, so they moved their operations to
801:
was minor, despite the country's importance to the Allied war-effort, and was eliminated by Allied counter-intelligence forces before it could become an effective part of the Bolívar network. To establish a clandestine radio station in Cuba, the Abwehr sent
663:
There were other overlaps of personnel as well, because both groups cooperated extensively with each other. Von Heyer's cover was his job with the Theodore Wille Company, several of whose employees were involved in another spy net centered on station CIT in
522:
Although Bolívar was a Security Service project in origin, many of the agents responsible for collecting information were part of the Abwehr. One of the Abwehr spies in the United States that frequently traveled to Brazil to speak with Engels was
810:. Lüning was an incompetent spy because he failed to master the basics of espionage. For example, he was never able to get his radio working correctly, he did not understand how to use the secret ink he was supplied, and he missed drop boxes.
941:, on December 17, 1943, to inform Great Britain that Hellmuth's appointment had been cancelled and that if the British would release Hellmuth, his letters patent would also be cancelled and the British could then do with him as they saw fit.
429:
Argentine authorities arrested most of the German agents operating in their country in mid-1944, ending all effective Bolívar activity. Furthermore, the information collected during the operation is believed to have been more useful to the
852:) deliver the supplies to Buenos Aires via ship, and then travel to Mexico, where they would build a transmitter for communicating with the control station in Argentina. From Mexico, Schroell traveled to the
1187:
434:, who intercepted much of the secret transmissions, than to Germany. It also had the effect of swaying key power brokers of the region out of neutrality and into the American sphere, namely
672:
and Rio de Janeiro. It communicated with Germany's LFS station, but was only operational from September 1941 to January 1942. It was also not connected with the CELALD-LIRMAX-CIT groups.
1271:
668:. The CIT group began operations in June 1941, but was only active in Brazil. A third smaller group, consisting of two agents, Fritz Noak and Herbert Winterstein, was located between
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on a ship traveling from Spain to Buenos Aires. Lange, Hartmuth, and Franczok, who airmailed one transmitter to Paraguay before leaving Brazil, established a temporary station at
933:, British authorities arrested him. Argentina made a formal protest to Britain. When the ramifications of the affair were learned, however, there was a change in position. The
135:
595:, while also opening up smaller stations in other South American countries, which would relay information to the control station. Heinz Lange, who had escaped Brazil to
898:
and had extensive contacts in the highest reaches of the Argentine government. As a result of negotiations between Harnisch and various Argentine officials, including
475:) was the main figure in the operation and the man personally responsible for organizing most of the intelligence gathering in Latin America. Becker was first sent to
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George Nicolaus was the head of the spy ring in Mexico before his arrest in the spring of 1942. A competent individual, he had served with distinction in the
914:
865:
923:
197:
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before opening a maritime freight office in Valparaiso. Reiners' sister was married to Blume, and Reiners' wife was the drop for the agents of the net.
128:
952:, it requested permission to use clandestine Bolívar information, which had been intercepted by Allied intelligence, as part of its evidence. The
1107:
890:
on November 4, 1943. An Argentine naval officer, Hellmuth, unbeknownst to Argentina, was a German collaborator. His control, Hans Harnisch (
223:
121:
515:, the CEL, and used a radio transmitter owned by his electric company to relay information acquired by agents in both Brazil and the
922:
Most of the details of this planning were known to the Allies through intercepted Bolívar radio traffic. As a consequence, when the
877:
and another in Chile which was "nipped in the bud." Both of these were backed by Germans working through the Argentine government.
591:, which centered around radio communications, and ordered to make Buenos Aires his control station for communicating directly with
934:
603:), a Department VID 2 agent who had also escaped Brazil, was sent to organize a network in Paraguay. An agent named Franczok (
558:); the military attaché in Buenos Aires, General Niedefuhr; and the naval attaché in Buenos Aires, Captain Dietrich Niebuhr (
415:. Overall, the Germans were successful in establishing a secret radio communications network from their control station in
369:
1256:
777:, spent many years in Colombia, and returned to Germany in November 1938. In January 1939, he was re-commissioned in the
739:
As result of information collected by American counter-intelligence agencies and given to the Chilean government by the
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173:
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785:. Late in 1939, before Operation Bolívar began, Nicolaus was sent to Mexico to establish an espionage network there.
740:
411:, and was primarily concerned with the collection and transmission of clandestine information from Latin America to
1331:
1291:
507:, the German military's intelligence agency, in 1939 to collect and transmit economy-related intelligence from the
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remains open, sabotage of Chilean copper mines thwarted. Majority of Latin American nations join the Allies,
813:
In spite of his lack of competence, after his premature arrest in August 1942, Allied officials, including
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1050:"Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II"
615:
In February 1943, after considerable difficulty, Becker managed to return to Argentina as a
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869:
1194:
Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II
574:
8:
599:
before the arrests, was ordered to organize a spy network in Chile, and Johnny Hartmuth (
321:
260:
1326:
953:
825:
562:), who headed the espionage organization in Argentina. In mid-1941, Herbert von Heyer (
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Establishment and operation of clandestine communications between Latin America and
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701:, and the United States. The major figures in the organization were von Bohlen in
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during the war. Other important Bolívar spies included the German naval and air
442:, but also strategically positioned nations producing much needed goods such as
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In early 1946, when the State Department was preparing a case against the
905:
and various cabinet ministers, Hellmuth was appointed Argentine consul in
841:, which would pass information to Germany via the South American network.
512:
113:
1087:"German Espionage and Sabotage Against the United States in World War II"
949:
774:
759:
1135:
Hitler's Man in Havana: Heinz Luning and Nazi Espionage in Latin America
620:
945:
929:, aboard which Hellmuth was traveling to Spain, made a routine stop at
713:; Friedrich von Schulz Hausman, in Buenos Aires; and George Nicolaus (
607:), was put in charge of the radio network that was to be established.
539:
906:
694:
685:). By February 1942, reports were being passed from agents in Chile,
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taped inside the label of an envelope sent by German agents from
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403:. It was under the operational control of Section D (4) from the
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1108:"Documents Show Chile Foiled Nazi Plot to Attack Panama Canal"
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operation in South America, wrote an evaluation of the Allied
948:
government of Argentina regarding its wartime support of the
543:
447:
566:) joined the organization to provide maritime intelligence.
798:
686:
652:). Von Heyer, who also worked with Engels' CELALD group as
640:. It was centered on a commercial information service, the
451:
1272:
Military history of the United States during World War II
1126:
1124:
1302:
Battles and operations of World War II involving Mexico
1297:
Battles and operations of World War II involving Brazil
681:
by Ludwig von Bohlen and Friedrich von Schulz Hausman (
1121:
963:
728:), a radio technician at PYL, and Heinrich Reiners (
1158:
1156:
644:(RITA), which was managed by Herbert O. J. Muller (
419:, as well as a courier system involving the use of
1132:
648:). The radio station was run by Friedrich Kemper (
511:to Germany. Engels established a radio station in
1164:"The University Press of Kentucky – Title Detail"
1243:
1153:
894:), claimed to be the personal representative of
632:expanded to operate in Brazil and in Argentina,
1267:Military history of Germany during World War II
1100:
919:, carrying a load of German-supplied weapons.
844:The plan was to have two agents named Hansen (
491:, where they met with Gustav Albrecht Engels (
479:in May 1940, originally with orders to commit
732:), who had worked for Norddeutscher Lloyd in
426:for the shipment of paper-form intelligence.
129:
720:The PYLREW organization was centered on the
781:and assigned to the Abwehr headquarters in
495:), another German spy and the owner of the
143:
1221:. Stanford University Press. p. 520.
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1218:The "Nazi Menace" in Argentina, 1931–1947
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503:. Engels was originally recruited by the
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864:Commander L. T. Jones, the head of the
582:photograph of Johannes Siegfried Becker
483:, along with his partner, Heinz Lange (
1244:
1214:
1009:
709:), the actual head of the network, in
531:), who was one of the most successful
16:WWII German espionage in Latin America
935:Argentine minister of foreign affairs
866:United States Coast Guard cryptologic
471:Johannes Siegfried Becker (codename:
117:
880:
831:
13:
1208:
14:
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982:Latin America during World War II
466:
1186: This article incorporates
1181:
1139:. University Press of Kentucky.
966:
83:
39:
722:Compañía Transportes Marítimos
1:
1002:
997:British Security Coordination
937:instructed his ambassador in
859:
797:German espionage activity in
461:
337:Utah prisoner of war massacre
569:
7:
1131:Schoonover, Thomas (2008).
959:
642:Informadora Rapida Limitada
610:
10:
1363:
1257:History of Central America
1215:Newton, Ronald C. (1992).
854:Southwestern United States
820:, General Manuel Benítez,
405:Foreign Security Service (
1277:Argentina in World War II
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626:
370:Saint Pierre and Miquelon
343:Central and South America
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96:
78:
70:
59:
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38:
26:
21:
1312:1940s in Central America
1262:History of North America
1252:History of South America
1202:National Security Agency
913:on the Argentine tanker
675:
550:); the naval attaché in
497:General Electric Company
198:Estevan Point Lighthouse
100:Nazi strategic failure.
1332:Intelligence operations
1292:Uruguay in World War II
792:
147:American Theater (WWII)
108:does not join the Axis.
1347:Clandestine operations
1342:World War II espionage
1337:Nazis in South America
1317:1940s in North America
1307:1940s in South America
1287:Mexico in World War II
1282:Brazil in World War II
1188:public domain material
888:Osmar Alberto Hellmuth
766:
583:
160:Battle of the Atlantic
992:Spain in World War II
754:
660:in the LIRMAX group.
577:
546:, Ludwig von Bohlen (
974:Latin America portal
870:signals intelligence
310:Fire balloon attacks
903:Pedro Pablo Ramírez
322:Great Papago Escape
954:United States Navy
826:Nelson Rockefeller
767:
584:
509:Western Hemisphere
273:Lordsburg killings
881:Hellmuth Incident
832:End of operations
818:Fulgencio Batista
705:; Bruno Dittman (
554:, Hermann Bohny (
382:Operation Bolívar
378:
377:
278:Lookout Air Raids
216:Point Maisonnette
181:Angler POW escape
112:
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22:Operation Bolívar
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1322:1940s in Germany
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236:Aleutian islands
231:Machita incident
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1232:. Retrieved
1217:
1193:
1180:
1169:February 28,
1167:. Retrieved
1134:
1111:. Retrieved
1102:
1090:. Retrieved
1056:. Retrieved
987:Nazi Germany
943:
925:
921:
916:Buenos Aires
915:
891:
884:
863:
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845:
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835:
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804:Heinz Lüning
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556:Uncle Ernest
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477:Buenos Aires
472:
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458:(platinum).
428:
406:
401:World War II
381:
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354:
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332:Point Judith
315:
300:Port Chicago
293:
288:Fort Stanton
268:Fort Stevens
261:
215:
208:
186:St. Lawrence
102:Panama Canal
91:Nazi Germany
33:World War II
27:Part of the
775:World War I
771:German Army
760:Mexico City
693:, Ecuador,
525:Dušan Popov
349:River Plate
305:Fort Lawton
256:Los Angeles
203:Bowmanville
191:Bell Island
74:1940 – 1945
1246:Categories
1234:2016-12-26
1003:References
860:Assessment
711:Valparaíso
462:Operations
450:(copper),
1327:Spy rings
1058:April 26,
946:Peronista
907:Barcelona
900:President
815:President
756:Microdots
695:Guatemala
570:Argentina
513:São Paulo
444:Venezuela
417:Argentina
393:espionage
262:Pastorius
167:Caribbean
106:Argentina
60:Objective
1113:June 28,
960:See also
931:Trinidad
850:Valiente
707:Dinterin
703:Santiago
691:Colombia
654:Humberto
621:Asunción
617:stowaway
611:Paraguay
597:Paraguay
564:Humberto
481:sabotage
456:Colombia
388:for the
386:codename
384:was the
48:Location
875:Bolivia
783:Hanover
773:during
638:Ecuador
634:Uruguay
540:attaché
533:British
501:Krefeld
493:Alfredo
446:(oil),
421:Spanish
407:Ausland
399:during
362:Pelikan
355:Bolívar
294:Pelikan
246:Ellwood
209:Kiebitz
97:Outcome
1225:
1143:
1092:May 4,
939:London
911:Sweden
846:Cojiba
824:, and
808:Havana
764:Lisbon
747:Mexico
734:Panama
699:Mexico
683:Casero
670:Santos
666:Recife
656:, was
650:Koenig
636:, and
627:Brazil
593:Berlin
505:Abwehr
489:Brazil
485:Jansen
440:Brazil
436:Mexico
432:Allies
413:Europe
390:German
316:Elster
174:Canada
88:
65:Europe
1198:(PDF)
1190:from
1053:(PDF)
676:Chile
658:Vesta
646:Prinz
601:Guapo
560:Diego
544:Chile
473:Sargo
448:Chile
1223:ISBN
1171:2021
1141:ISBN
1115:2017
1094:2013
1060:2013
950:Axis
892:Boss
799:Cuba
793:Cuba
779:Heer
726:Flor
687:Peru
605:Luna
548:Bach
529:Ivan
452:Peru
438:and
409:-SD)
71:Date
924:SS
806:to
762:to
730:Tom
715:Max
580:NSA
578:An
542:in
499:in
395:in
31:of
1248::
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1155:^
1123:^
1068:^
1011:^
697:,
689:,
1237:.
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1173:.
1149:.
1117:.
1096:.
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527:(
137:e
130:t
123:v
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
