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SRAM cell has two stable states, which normally represent the zero and one logical states. If the transistors of an SRAM cell were identical, the cell will be perfectly balanced and it will randomly start into one of the two stable states. However, even the smallest differences between transistor parameters will create a cell imbalance and will push the SRAM cell into one of the two stable states with a higher probability than the other state. Given that most SRAM cells have its own preferred state every time they are powered, from an SRAM array of cells a unique and random pattern of zeros and ones can be obtained. This pattern is like a chip’s fingerprint, since it is unique to a particular SRAM and hence to a particular chip.
629:
design houses can strongly enhance security level by implementing oxide rupture PUF in its IC design, without concerns about the reliability and life time issue and can get rid of the additional costs from complicated ECC (Error
Correction Code) circuits. Oxide rupture PUF can extract uniformly-distributed binary bits through amplification and self-feedback mechanism, the random bits are activated upon enrollment, and due to a large entropy bit pool, users are provided the desired flexibility to choose their own key-generation and management approaches. Security level can be upgraded by oxide rupture PUF's intrinsic truly randomness and invisible features.
587:: Recent reports have shown that transistor-based PUFs, in particular the SRAM PUF, are subject to cloning. Metal resistance PUFs are not subject to these types of cloning attacks due to the high complexity associated with 'trimming' wires in the clone as a means of matching resistances. Moreover, by adding one or more shielding layers in the thicker upper metal layers that overlay the underlying PUF (which is built using the lower metal layers), front-side probing attacks designed to extract the metal resistances for the clone is extremely difficult or impossible.
741:: The magnetic head acts as a stimulus on the PUF and amplifies the random magnetic signal. Because of the complex interaction of the magnetic head, influenced by speed, pressure, direction and acceleration, with the random components of the PUF, each swipe of the head over the magnetic PUF will yield a stochastic, but very distinctive signal. Think of it as a song with thousands of notes. The odds of the same notes recurring in an exact pattern from a single card swiped many times are 1 in 100 million, but overall the melody remains very recognizable.
735:: The personal data encoded on the magnetic stripe contributes another layer of randomness. When the card is encoded with personal identifying information, the odds of two encoded magstripe cards having an identical magnetic signature are approximately 1 in 10 billion. The encoded data can be used as a marker to locate significant elements of the PUF. This signature can be digitized and is generally called a magnetic fingerprint. An example of its use is in the Magneprint brand system.
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mechanism for characterizing the PUF is intrinsic to, or embedded within, the evaluating device itself. This property can currently only be held by PUFs of entirely electronic design, as the evaluation processing can only be done through the involvement of electronic circuitry, and therefore can only be inseparable to an electronic randomness probing mechanism. Intrinsic evaluation is beneficial as it can allow this evaluation processing and post-processing (such as
565:: Temperature and voltage (TV) variations represent one of the most significant challenges for PUFs in applications that require re-generation of exactly the same bitstring later in time, e.g., encryption. Metal resistance (unlike transistors) varies linearly with temperature and is independent of voltage. Therefore, metal resistance provides a very high level of robustness to changing environmental conditions.
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induced by lithography variations. Such interconnection uncertainty however is incompatible to CMOS VLSI circuits due to issues like short circuit, floating gate voltages etc. for transistors. One solution is to use strongly skewed latches to ensure the stable operating state of each CMOS transistor hence ensuring the circuit itself is immune against environmental and operational variations.
577:: The wear-out mechanism for metal is electro-migration, which like TV variations, adversely affects the ability of the PUF to reproduce the same bitstring over time. However, the electro-migration process is well understood and can be completely avoided with proper sizing of the metal wires, vias and contacts. Transistor reliability issues, e.g., NBTI (
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utilize those existing non-idealities to distinguish among transmitter instances. RF-PUF does not use any additional hardware at the transmitter and can be used as a stand-alone physical-layer security feature, or for multi-factor authentication, in conjunction with network-layer, transport-layer and application-layer security features.
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produces a 1 or a 0, depending on which transition comes first. Many circuits realizations are possible and at least two have been fabricated. When a circuit with the same layout mask is fabricated on different chips, the logic function implemented by the circuit is different for each chip due to the random variations of delays.
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manufacturing steps, and that randomness derived from the inherent variation of the device’s typical manufacture process cannot be as directly manipulated. Explicit randomness sources can show benefit in that the source of randomness can be deliberately chosen, for instance to maximize variation (and therefore
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pattern a second time is physically impossible due to the inexactness of the process, the sheer number of particles, and the random geometry of their shape and size. The randomness introduced during the manufacturing process cannot be controlled. This is a classic example of a PUF using intrinsic randomness.
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Oxide rupture PUF is a type of PUF benefiting from randomness obtained from inhomogeneous natural gate oxide properties occurring in IC manufacturing process. Along with the truly random, un-predictable and highly stable properties, which is the most ideal source for physical unclonable function. IC
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has slightly different physical properties. These lead to small differences in electronic properties, such as transistor threshold voltages and gain factor. The start-up behavior of an SRAM cell depends on the difference of the threshold voltages of its transistors and other transistor parameters. An
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process. This also typically correlates with the intended application for each PUF concept. As an example, PUFs that probe uniqueness through electronic characterization are most suitable for authenticating electronic circuits or components due to the ease of integration. On the other hand, PUFs that
1808:
in ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS’04). New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2004, pp. 82–91. AND Y. Dodis, L. Reyzin, and A. Smith, “Fuzzy extractors: How to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data,” in EUROCRYPT’04, ser. LNCS, C. Cachin and J. Camenisch, Eds., vol.
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together in a slurry during the manufacturing process. The particles have many different shapes and sizes. The slurry is applied to a receptor layer. The particles land in a random fashion, much like pouring a handful of wet magnetic sand onto a carrier. To pour the sand to land in exactly the same
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The digitally modulated data in modern communication circuits are subjected to device-specific unique analog/RF impairments such as frequency error/offset and I-Q imbalance (in the transmitter), and are typically compensated for at the receiver which rejects these non-idealities. RF-PUF, and RF-DNA
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When the slurry dries, the receptor layer is sliced into strips and applied to plastic cards, but the random pattern on the magnetic stripe remains and cannot be changed. Because of their physically unclonable functions, it is highly improbable that two magnetic stripe cards will ever be identical.
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The metal resistance-based PUF derives its entropy from random physical variations in the metal contacts, vias and wires that define the power grid and interconnect of an IC. There are several important advantages to leveraging random resistance variations in the metal resources of an IC including:
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One major way that PUFs are categorized is based on examining from where the randomness or variation of the device is derived. This source of uniqueness is either applied in an explicit manner, through the deliberate addition of extra manufacturing steps, or occurring in an implicit manner, as part
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Since many computer systems have some form of DRAM on board, DRAMs can be used as an effective system-level PUF. DRAM is also much cheaper than static RAM (SRAM). Thus, DRAM PUFs could be a source of random but reliable data for generating board identifications (chip ID). The advantage of the DRAM
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The
Bistable Ring PUF or BR-PUF was introduced by Q. Chen et al. in. The BR-PUF is based on the idea that a ring of even number of inverters has two possible stable states. By duplicating the inverters and adding multiplexers between stages, it is possible to generate exponentially large number of
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implementations, making them of particular interest for security solutions. SRAM-based PUF technology has been investigated extensively. Several research papers explore SRAM-based PUF technology on topics such as behavior, implementation, or application for anti-counterfeiting purposes. Notable is
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One way to categorise the numerous PUF concepts is by how the source of variation within each PUF is measured. For instance some PUFs examine how the source of uniqueness interacts with, or influences, an electronic signal to derive the signature measurement while others examine the effects on the
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B. Skoric, G.-J. Schrijen, W. Ophey, R. Wolters, N. Verhaegh, and J. van
Geloven. Experimental hardware for coating PUFs and optical PUFs. In P. Tuyls, B. Skoric, and T. Kevenaar, editors, Security with Noisy Data – On Private Biometrics, Secure Key Storage and Anti-Counterfeiting, pages 255-268.
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processes, facilitating mass-production of many devices in parallel. This type of PUF requires atom-level engineering to clone and is the smallest, highest bit density PUF known to date. Furthermore, this type of PUF could be effectively reset by purposely overbiasing the device to cause a local
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will arise. The placement of the light scattering particles is an uncontrolled process and the interaction between the laser and the particles is very complex. Therefore, it is very hard to duplicate the optical PUF such that the same speckle pattern will arise, hence the postulation that it is
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at this scale, whilst the quantum mechanics are dictated by the random atomic structure. Cloning this type of structure is practically impossible due to the large number of atoms involved, the uncontrollable nature of processes on the atomic level and the inability to manipulate atoms reliably.
619:
Digital PUF overcomes the vulnerability issues in conventional analog silicon PUFs. Unlike the analog PUFs where the fingerprints come from transistors' intrinsic process variation natures, the fingerprints of digital circuit PUFs are extracted from the VLSI interconnect geometrical randomness
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A delay PUF exploits the random variations in delays of wires and gates on silicon. Given an input challenge, a race condition is set up in the circuit, and two transitions that propagate along different paths are compared to see which comes first. An arbiter, typically implemented as a latch,
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is one of the great advantages of using the Via PUF technology in IC implementation. The Via or
Contact holes of PUF are scattered around all over the chip. No need to form array blocks like the SRAM PUF. Practically impossible to distinguish PUF Vias from regular logic Vias, making IC reverse
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fabrication process. The technology is the outcome of the reverse thinking process. Rather than meeting the design rules, it makes the sizes of Via or
Contact be smaller than the requirements in a controlled manner, resulting in unpredictable or stochastic formation of Via or Contact, i.e. 50%
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with logic, in the publication that introduced the PUF acronym and the first integrated PUF of any type. A multiplexor-based PUF has been described, as has a secure processor design using a PUF and a multiplexor-based PUF with an RF interface for use in RFID anti-counterfeiting applications.
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In a similar manner to the classification of a PUF by its randomness source, PUF concepts can be divided by whether or not they can evaluate in an intrinsic manner. An PUF is described as intrinsic if its randomness is of implicit origin and can evaluate itself internally. This means that the
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between each couple of metal wires will be random up to a certain extent. This unique randomness can be used to obtain a unique identifier for the device carrying the
Coating PUF. Moreover, the placement of this opaque PUF in the top layer of an IC protects the underlying circuits from being
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coating for the sole purpose of PUF fingerprinting would add additional manufacturing steps and would make the PUF concept or implementation fall into the explicit category. Implicit randomness sources show benefit in that they do not have additional costs associated with introducing more
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is offering SRAM PUF implementations to add security to secure government and sensitive commercial applications on the company's flash-based devices and development boards. More recent applications include: a secure sensor-based authentication system for the IoT, incorporation in
73:, adding additional CMOS components is possible without introducing extra fabrication steps, and would count as an implicit source of randomness, as would deriving randomness from components that were already part of the design to start with. Adding, for example, a randomized
571:: Metal is (currently) the only conducting material on the chip that is layered, effectively enabling high density, and very compact, PUF entropy sources. Advanced processes create 11 or more metal layers on top of the (x,y) plane of the underlying transistors.
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is well understood, there are several ways to counteract the aging tendency. Anti-aging strategies have been developed that cause SRAM PUF to become more reliable over time, without degrading the other PUF quality measures such as security and efficiency.
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presented the first DRAM PUF that uses the randomness in the power-up behavior of DRAM cells. Other types of DRAM PUFs include ones based on the data retention of DRAM cells, and on the effects of changing the write and read latency times used in DRAMs.
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Leveraging the same quantum derived difficulty to clone as the
Quantum Electronic PUF, a Quantum PUF operating in the optical regime can be devised. Imperfections created during crystal growth or fabrication lead to spatial variations in the bandgap of
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Cao, Yameng; Robson, Alexander J.; Alharbi, Abdullah; Roberts, Jonathan; Woodhead, Christopher
Stephen; Noori, Yasir Jamal; Gavito, Ramon Bernardo; Shahrjerdi, Davood; Roedig, Utz (2017). "Optical identification using imperfections in 2D materials".
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Using a standard-sized card, the odds of any two cards having an exact matching magnetic PUF are calculated to be 1 in 900 million. Further, because the PUF is magnetic, each card will carry a distinctive, repeatable and readable magnetic signal.
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SRAM PUFs were initially used in applications with high security requirements, such as in defense, to protect sensitive government and military systems, and in the banking industry, to secure payment systems and financial transactions. In 2010,
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Some SRAM-based security systems in the 2000s refer to "chip identification" rather than the more standard term of "PUF." The research community and industry have now largely embraced the term PUF to describe this space of technology.
663:. When an attacker tries to remove (a part of) the coating, the capacitance between the wires is bound to change and the original unique identifier will be destroyed. It was shown how an unclonable RFID tag is built with coating PUFs.
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become extremely important. The intrinsic randomness within a quantum confinement PUF originates from the compositional and structural non-uniformities on the atomic level. The physical characteristics are dependent on the effects of
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J. Ju, R. Chakraborty, R. Rad, J. Plusquellic, Bit String
Analysis of Physical Unclonable Functions based on Resistance Variations in Metals and Transistors, Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2012, pp. 13–20.
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methods, that are then converted into electronic signal forming a hybrid measurement system. This allows for easier communication at a distance between the separate physical authenticating tag or object and the evaluating device.
472:. This approach allows a device to create a strong device-unique secret key from the SRAM PUF and power down with no secret key present. By using helper data, the exact same key can be regenerated from the SRAM PUF when needed.
36:, which can affect their performance. Therefore, rather than just being random, the real power of a PUF is its ability to be different between devices, but simultaneously to be the same under different environmental conditions.
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D. J. Jeon, et al., A Physical Unclonable Function with Bit Error Rate < 2.3x10-8 based on Contact Formation Probability without Error Correction Code, IEEE J. Solid-State Circuits, vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 805-816, March
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J. Ju, R. Chakraborty, C. Lamech and J. Plusquellic, Stability Analysis of a Physical Unclonable Function based on Metal Resistance Variations, accepted Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2013.
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The Via PUF based Hardware RoT (Root of Trust) chips are currently applied in various markets such as telecommunications, appliances, and IoT devices in the forms of Wifi/BLE modules, smart door locks, IP cameras, IR
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The Butterfly PUF is based on cross-coupling of two latches or flip-flops. The mechanism being used in this PUF is similar to the one behind the SRAM PUF but has the advantage that it can be implemented on any SRAM
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PUF is based on the fact that the stand-alone DRAM already present in a system on a chip can be used for generating device-specific signatures without requiring any additional circuitry or hardware. Tehranipoor
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An operational IC slowly but gradually changes over time, i.e. it ages. The dominant aging effect in modern ICs that at the same time has a large impact on the noisy behavior of the SRAM PUF is NBTI. Since the
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Xiong, W.; Schaller, A.; Anagnostopoulos, N.A.; Saleem, M.U.; Gabmeyer, S.; Katzenbeisser, S.; Szefer, J. (2016). "Run-Time Accessible DRAM PUFs in Commodity Devices". In Gierlichs, B.; Poschmann, A. (eds.).
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Kim, J. S.; Patel, M.; Hassan, H.; Mutlu, O. (2018). "The DRAM Latency PUF: Quickly Evaluating Physical Unclonable Functions by Exploiting the Latency-Reliability Tradeoff in Modern Commodity DRAM Devices".
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the implementation of secure secret key storage without storing the key in digital form. SRAM PUF-based cryptographic implementations have been commercialized by Intrinsic ID, a spin-out of
99:) to occur without having the unprocessed PUF readout exposed externally. This incorporation of the randomness characterization and evaluation processing into one unit reduces the risk of
382:, etc. The technology supports the security functionalities such as anti-counterfeiting, secure boot, secure firmware copy protection, secure firmware update and secure data integrity.
646:. Above a normal IC, a network of metal wires is laid out in a comb shape. The space between and above the comb structure is filled with an opaque material and randomly doped with
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Qingqing Chen, et al. Characterization of the bistable ring PUF. In: Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE), 2012. IEEE, 2012. pp. 1459–1462.
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R. Maes and V. van der Leest, "Countering the effects of silicon aging on SRAM PUFs", Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Hardw.-Oriented Secur. Trust (HOST 2014), pp. 148-153 available at
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probability of making the electrical connection. The technology details are published in 2020 for the first time while the technology is already in mass production in 2015 by
308:: Thanks to the metallic property, once "via" or "contact" are formed in a structure, they stay there nearly permanently regardless of PVT variation, which means 0% of
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419:. Since the SRAM PUF can be connected directly to standard digital circuitry embedded on the same chip, they can be immediately deployed as a hardware block in
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Helinski, R.; Acharyya, D.; Plusquellic, J. (2009). "A physical unclonable function defined using power distribution system equivalent resistance variations".
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Georgios Selimis, Mario Konijnenburg, Maryam Ashouei, Jos Huisken, Harmke de Groot, Vincent van der Leest, Geert-Jan Schrijen, Marten van Hulst, Pim Tuyls, "
348:: Uniqueness is an important property of PUF since it would guarantee that one chip ID is always different from other chips. The Via PUF reports 0.4999 of
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Christoph Böhm, Maximilian Hofer, "Using SRAMs as Physical Unclonable Functions", Austrochip – Workshop on Microelectronics, Oct 7, 2009, Graz, Austria
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SRAM PUF response is a noisy fingerprint since a small number of the cells, close to equilibrium is unstable. In order to use SRAM PUF reliably as a
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Tehranipoor, F.; Karimian, N.; Xiao, K.; Chandy, J. A. (2015). "DRAM based Intrinsic Physical Unclonable Functions for System Level Security".
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Roberts, J.; Bagci, I. E.; Zawawi, M. A. M.; Sexton, J.; Hulbert, N.; Noori, Y. J.; Young, M. P.; Woodhead, C. S.; Missous, M. (2015-11-10).
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Intrinsic ID’s Scalable Hardware Root of Trust IP Delivers Device Authentication for IoT Security in NXP LPC Microcontroller Portfolio
747:: The stochastic behavior of the PUF in concert with the stimulus of the head makes the magnetic stripe card an excellent tool for
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value closed to the ideal uniqueness of 0.5. The 'InbornID' of the Via PUF stands for on-chip unique ‘inborn’ ID of a silicon chip.
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structures from standard digital library with regular core voltage. No high voltage, and so no special circuitry like
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can capture spatially-dependent photoluminescence to produce complex maps of unique information from 2D monolayers.
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Evaluation of 90nm 6T-SRAM as Physical Unclonable Function for secure key generation in wireless sensor nodes
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29:, is a physical entity that is embodied in a physical structure and is easy to evaluate but hard to predict.
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An optical PUF which was termed POWF (physical one-way function) consists of a transparent material that is
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Microsemi to offer Intrinsic-ID security in FPGAs and systems-on-chip for sensitive military applications
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on a chip as a PUF. The use of SRAM as a PUF was introduced in 2007 simultaneously by researchers at the
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GreenWaves Technologies Licenses Intrinsic ID Hardware Root of Trust for RISC-V AI Application Processor
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It has been shown that quantum confinement effects can be used to construct a PUF, in devices known as
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yield) or increase cloning difficulty (for example harnessing randomness from smaller feature sizes).
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of the typical manufacture processes. For example, in the case of electronic PUFs manufactured in
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524:-based IoT application processors to secure intelligent, battery-operated sensing devices at the
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Intrinsic ID to showcase TrustedSensor IoT Security Solution at InvenSense Developers Conference
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authenticate physical objects tend to probe the PUF using a second process, such as optical or
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Pim Tuyls, Geert-Jan Schrijen, Boris Skoric, Jan van Geloven, Nynke Verhaegh and Rob Wolters:
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2018 ISSCC "A PUF scheme using competing oxide rupture with bit error rate approaching zero"
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All PUFs are subject to environmental variations such as temperature, supply voltage and
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Tony Fitzpatrick, Nov. 11, 2004, "Magneprint technology licensed to TRAX Systems, Inc."
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Magneprint - Electrical Engineers, Physicists Design System to Combat Credit Card Fraud
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A categorized sample of the collection of over 40 PUF concepts so far suggested
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or helper data algorithm are not required. The technology is verified by the
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2020 GSA Forum "Via PUF Technology as a Root of Trust in IoT Supply Chain"
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started using SRAM PUF technology to secure SmartMX-powered assets against
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2011 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
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2027:
Bahar Talukder, B. M. S.; Ray, B.; Forte, D.; Rahman, M. T. (2019).
468:. These algorithms perform two main functions: error correction and
2045:
1380:
1237:
407:
These PUFs use the randomness in the power-up behavior of standard
1950:
1606:
Jorge Guajardo, Sandeep S. Kumar, Geert-Jan Schrijen, Pim Tuyls,
1017:
Jorge Guajardo, Sandeep S. Kumar, Geert-Jan Schrijen, Pim Tuyls,
425:
51:
1503:
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
1124:
Proceedings of the 25th edition on Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI
2204:
R. Pappu, "Physical One-Way Functions", PhD Thesis, MIT, 2001.
1696:
1285:
R. Pappu, "Physical One-Way Functions", PhD Thesis, MIT, 2001.
521:
920:
Proceedings of the ACM Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI (GLSVLSI)
435:
Due to deep submicron manufacturing process variations, every
1619:
1581:
1297:
1295:
1121:
786:
581:) and HCI, on the other hand, are more difficult to mitigate.
317:
2026:
1620:
Holcomb, Daniel; Wayne Burleson; Kevin Fu (September 2009).
460:, post-processing is required. This can be done by applying
1301:
1036:
Proceedings of the 46th Annual Design Automation Conference
1033:
546:
293:
70:
2093:
1707:
1302:
Pappu, R.; Recht, B.; Taylor, J.; Gershenfeld, N. (2002).
1292:
1077:
898:
Physically unclonable functions: Concept and constructions
107:
attacks aimed at the communication between the two areas.
2094:
Skoric, B.; Maubach, S.; Kevenaar, T.; Tuyls, P. (2006).
1916:
http://www.ece.unm.edu/~jimp/pubs/PG_TG_PUF_ALL_FINAL.pdf
811:
measurements. It has been shown that an angle-adjustable
1221:"Using Quantum Confinement to Uniquely Identify Devices"
1218:
963:
334:
closed to the ideal value of 0.5. The technology passed
1954:
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2016
1582:
Holcomb, Daniel; Wayne Burleson; Kevin Fu (July 2007).
1535:
1436:
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2007
1364:
298:
1809:
3027. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2004, pp. 523– 540.
1470:
Method and apparatus for fingerprinting magnetic media
1429:"RF-DNA: Radio-Frequency Certificates of Authenticity"
846:
489:
2182:
http://news-info.wustl.edu/tips/page/normal/4159.html
1019:"FPGA Intrinsic PUFs and Their Use for IP Protection"
650:
particles. Because of the random placement, size and
1984:
1903:
http://www.ece.unm.edu/~jimp/pubs/dac2010_FINAL.pdf
1845:, Military & Aerospace Electronics, August 2011
1758:
1117:
1115:
642:A coating PUF can be built in the top layer of an
1831:NXP and Intrinsic-ID to raise smart chip security
1759:Tuyls, Pim; Šcorić, Boris; Kevenaar, Tom (2007).
789:beam shines on the material, a random and unique
301:. Few characteristics of Via PUF are followings:
2253:
2171:. Aip.org (2005-02-01). Retrieved on 2013-10-30.
1500:
1112:
910:
324:Q-100 Grade 3 test for automotive applications.
1591:Proceedings of the Conference on RFID Security
1426:
1214:
1212:
1204:"Read-proof hardware from protective coatings"
1029:
1027:
1013:
1011:
447:
273:
1166:Miao, Jin; Li, Meng; Roy, Subhendu; Yu, Bei.
959:
957:
842:
840:
671:As the size of a system is reduced below the
292:" or "contact" formation during the standard
1466:
1198:
1196:
692:. These devices can be produced in standard
312:and thus the post processing stages such as
1690:
1602:
1600:
1209:
1161:
1159:
1024:
1008:
944:
942:
1944:
1806:“Reusable cryptographic fuzzy extractors,”
1486:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
1360:
1358:
1073:
1071:
954:
931:
929:
837:
700:
597:challenge-response pairs from the BR-PUF.
2062:
2044:
2020:
1978:
1752:
1735:
1725:
1640:
1557:
1379:
1338:
1262:
1236:
1193:
1183:
1181:
973:
872:
666:
428:, and as of 2019, are available on every
50:reflection of incident light, or another
1597:
1156:
939:
785:with light scattering particles. When a
771:
705:
1670:
1668:
1355:
1165:
1068:
926:
552:
464:, such as ‘helper data algorithms’ or
85:
2254:
1178:
797:
632:
278:
44:
1467:Indeck, R. S.; Muller, M. W. (1994).
579:negative-bias temperature instability
528:, and the replacement of traditional
394:A PUF based on a delay loop, i.e., a
39:
1665:
895:
623:
591:
475:
432:from 350 nm down to 7 nm.
288:The Via PUF technology is based on "
63:
659:inspected by an attacker, e.g. for
490:SRAM PUF in commercial applications
13:
911:Verbauwhede, I.; Maes, R. (2011).
807:that can be characterized through
330:of the Via PUF achieves 0.4972 of
14:
2273:
1538:IEEE Design and Test of Computers
1427:Dejean, G.; Kirovski, D. (2007).
563:Temperature and voltage stability
539:
2243:
2237:
2231:
2221:
2211:
2198:
2186:
2174:
2155:
2146:
2129:
2087:
1933:
1920:
1907:
1895:
1884:
1872:
1869:, Press Release, September 2018
1860:
1857:, Press Release, September 2015
1848:
1836:
1824:
1812:
1798:
1785:
1701:
1677:
1613:
1575:
1566:
1529:
1494:
1460:
1420:
1279:
710:
336:NIST Special Publication 800-92
1629:IEEE Transactions on Computers
904:
889:
776:
733:Personalizing the magnetic PUF
637:
614:
365:: The Via PUF technology uses
363:Standard Manufacturing Process
359:engineering almost impossible.
322:Automotive Electronics Council
320:standard tests and passed the
27:physically unclonable function
1:
1791:J.-P. Linnartz and P. Tuyls,
831:
2142:10.1007/978-1-84628-984-2_15
1962:10.1007/978-3-662-53140-2_21
1697:Intrinsic ID company website
1444:10.1007/978-3-540-74735-2_24
1304:"Physical One-Way functions"
749:dynamic token authentication
739:Stimulating the magnetic PUF
385:
34:electromagnetic interference
18:Physical unclonable function
7:
2064:10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2923174
1881:, Press Release, March 2019
1727:10.3390/electronics11010135
1476:. United States of America.
900:. Springer. pp. 11–48.
715:A magnetic PUF exists on a
600:
462:error correction techniques
448:Post-processing of SRAM PUF
417:University of Massachusetts
409:static random-access memory
402:
274:Electronic-measurement PUFs
10:
2278:
2206:Physical One-Way Functions
1287:Physical One-Way Functions
283:
135:
1769:10.1007/978-1-84628-984-2
1515:10.1109/tvlsi.2005.859470
822:
694:semiconductor fabrication
690:resonant-tunneling diodes
346:Uniqueness and ‘InbornID’
230:
211:
208:
141:
138:
25:), sometimes also called
2262:Cryptographic primitives
1398:10.1088/2053-1583/aa8b4d
1206:, CHES 2006, pp 369–383.
1088:10.1109/HST.2011.5955011
697:rearrangement of atoms.
413:Philips High Tech Campus
2136:Springer London, 2008.
2109:(2): 024902–024902–11.
1996:10.1109/HPCA.2018.00026
1331:10.1126/science.1074376
1132:10.1145/2742060.2742069
1044:10.1145/1629911.1630089
853:Applied Physics Reviews
753:forensic identification
745:Uses for a magnetic PUF
701:Hybrid-measurement PUFs
644:integrated circuit (IC)
441:Integrated Circuit (IC)
815:, simple optics and a
667:Quantum Electronic PUF
654:of the particles, the
220:Quantum Electronic PUF
984:10.1145/586110.586132
673:de Broglie wavelength
470:privacy amplification
314:error correction code
125:Intrinsic evaluation?
1990:. pp. 194–207.
1550:10.1109/MDT.2007.179
1082:. pp. 134–141.
1038:. pp. 676–681.
968:. pp. 148–160.
717:magnetic stripe card
553:Metal resistance PUF
239:Quantum Optical PUF
166:Metal resistance PUF
86:Intrinsic evaluation
2115:2006JAP...100b4902S
2055:2019IEEEA...781106B
1651:10.1109/tc.2008.212
1390:2017TDM.....4d5021C
1323:2002Sci...297.2026P
1317:(5589): 2026–2030.
1247:2015NatSR...516456R
865:2019ApPRv...6a1303M
813:transmission filter
798:Quantum Optical PUF
772:Explicit randomness
706:Implicit randomness
677:quantum confinement
661:reverse-engineering
652:dielectric strength
633:Explicit randomness
513:reverse engineering
279:Implicit randomness
119:Measurement process
112:
45:Measurement process
2167:2013-11-01 at the
1737:20.500.13003/19829
1225:Scientific Reports
1126:. pp. 15–20.
765:digital signatures
761:one-time passwords
458:cryptographic keys
110:
40:PUF categorization
2123:10.1063/1.2209532
2005:978-1-5386-3659-6
1971:978-3-662-53140-2
1509:(10): 1200–1205.
1453:978-3-540-74734-5
1255:10.1038/srep16456
1097:978-1-4577-1059-9
896:Maes, R. (2013).
874:10.1063/1.5079407
859:(11303): 011303.
809:photoluminescence
682:quantum mechanics
675:, the effects of
624:Oxide Rupture PUF
592:Bistable Ring PUF
476:Aging of SRAM PUF
454:unique identifier
342:randomness tests.
271:
270:
198:Oxide Rupture PUF
174:Bistable Ring PUF
122:Randomness source
101:man-in-the-middle
64:Randomness source
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1778:978-184628-983-5
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1705:
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1644:
1635:(9): 1198–1210.
1626:
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1595:
1594:
1593:. Malaga, Spain.
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946:
937:
933:
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923:
917:
908:
902:
901:
893:
887:
886:
876:
849:"A PUF taxonomy"
844:
509:theft-of-service
466:fuzzy extractors
350:Hamming Distance
136:Fully Electronic
113:
109:
93:error correction
2277:
2276:
2272:
2271:
2270:
2268:
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2199:
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2179:
2175:
2169:Wayback Machine
2160:
2156:
2151:
2147:
2134:
2130:
2098:
2092:
2088:
2039:: 81106–81120.
2025:
2021:
2006:
1983:
1979:
1972:
1949:
1945:
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1900:
1896:
1889:
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1833:, EETimes, 2010
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1642:10.1.1.164.6432
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1016:
1009:
994:
975:10.1.1.297.5196
962:
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947:
940:
934:
927:
915:
909:
905:
894:
890:
845:
838:
834:
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791:speckle pattern
779:
774:
713:
708:
703:
669:
640:
635:
626:
617:
603:
594:
555:
542:
515:. Since 2011,
492:
478:
450:
430:technology node
405:
396:ring oscillator
388:
340:NIST SP 800-90B
286:
281:
276:
88:
66:
57:radio frequency
47:
42:
12:
11:
5:
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1544:(6): 570–580.
1528:
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799:
796:
794:"unclonable".
778:
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769:
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757:key generation
742:
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721:barium ferrite
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456:or to extract
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332:Hamming weight
325:
310:bit error rate
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2103:J. Appl. Phys
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1374:(4): 045021.
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540:Butterfly PUF
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1763:. Springer.
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1713:
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1692:
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1559:1721.1/34469
1541:
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1506:
1502:
1496:
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1371:
1368:2D Materials
1367:
1340:1721.1/45499
1314:
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1171:
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1079:
1035:
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805:2D materials
801:
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738:
732:
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711:Magnetic PUF
687:
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627:
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607:
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406:
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362:
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345:
327:
305:
287:
258:Magnetic PUF
105:side-channel
89:
67:
48:
31:
26:
22:
16:
15:
2033:IEEE Access
1714:Electronics
777:Optical PUF
656:capacitance
638:Coating PUF
615:Digital PUF
575:Reliability
415:and at the
371:charge pump
306:Reliability
228:Optical PUF
206:Coating PUF
190:Digital PUF
2046:1808.02584
1804:X. Boyen,
1720:(1): 135.
1381:1706.07949
1238:1502.06523
1172:Iccad 2016
993:1581136129
922:: 455–460.
832:References
817:CCD camera
648:dielectric
585:Resiliency
437:transistor
380:sensor hub
328:Randomness
75:dielectric
2073:2169-3536
1746:2079-9292
1637:CiteSeerX
1482:cite book
1406:2053-1583
1231:: 16456.
970:CiteSeerX
517:Microsemi
505:tampering
386:Delay PUF
356:Obscurity
212:Extrinsic
150:Delay PUF
142:Intrinsic
2256:Category
2165:Archived
2081:51940311
1523:11325408
1414:35147364
1349:12242435
1273:26553435
883:86448102
601:DRAM PUF
569:Ubiquity
403:SRAM PUF
264:Implicit
261:Magnetic
209:Explicit
182:DRAM PUF
158:SRAM PUF
139:Implicit
116:PUF name
2111:Bibcode
2051:Bibcode
2014:4562667
1386:Bibcode
1319:Bibcode
1311:Science
1264:4639737
1243:Bibcode
1150:2287478
1106:8067138
1062:2537549
1002:1788365
861:Bibcode
501:cloning
426:Philips
284:Via PUF
231:Optical
133:Via PUF
97:hashing
80:entropy
52:optical
2079:
2071:
2012:
2002:
1968:
1775:
1744:
1657:
1639:
1521:
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1094:
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972:
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823:RF PUF
763:, and
608:et al.
522:RISC-V
439:in an
247:RF PUF
2099:(PDF)
2077:S2CID
2041:arXiv
2010:S2CID
1659:60072
1655:S2CID
1625:(PDF)
1587:(PDF)
1519:S2CID
1474:(PDF)
1432:(PDF)
1410:S2CID
1376:arXiv
1307:(PDF)
1233:arXiv
1146:S2CID
1102:S2CID
1058:S2CID
998:S2CID
936:2020.
916:(PDF)
879:S2CID
787:laser
783:doped
318:JEDEC
267:1994
253:2002
242:2017
234:2002
223:2015
215:2006
201:2018
193:2016
185:2015
177:2011
169:2009
161:2007
153:2002
145:2015
128:Year
2069:ISSN
2000:ISBN
1966:ISBN
1773:ISBN
1742:ISSN
1488:link
1448:ISBN
1402:ISSN
1345:PMID
1269:PMID
1136:ISBN
1092:ISBN
1048:ISBN
988:ISBN
547:FPGA
526:edge
511:and
483:NBTI
338:and
299:ICTK
294:CMOS
103:and
71:CMOS
2138:doi
2119:doi
2107:100
2059:doi
1992:doi
1958:doi
1765:doi
1732:hdl
1722:doi
1647:doi
1554:hdl
1546:doi
1511:doi
1440:doi
1394:doi
1335:hdl
1327:doi
1315:297
1259:PMC
1251:doi
1128:doi
1084:doi
1040:doi
980:doi
869:doi
530:OTP
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290:via
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