810:) (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("We are confronted here with a statute which, if interpreted literally, produces an absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional, result. Our task is to give some alternative meaning to the word "defendant" in Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) that avoids this consequence; and then to determine whether Rule 609(a)(1) excludes the operation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403.") Other textualists might reach alternative conclusions. Scalia's apparent inconsistency is perhaps explained by his choice to sometimes adhere to the more venerable judicial canons of interpretation, such as the
741:
to have been understood by the whole
Congress which voted on the words of the statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it), and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated – a compatibility that, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in mind. I would not permit any of the historical and legislative material discussed by the Court, or all of it combined, to lead me to a result different from the one that these factors suggest.
736:
majority (wrongly, in his view) took this meeting the standard for the enhanced penalty. He writes that "a proper textualist" would have decided differently: "The phrase 'uses a gun' fairly connoted use of a gun for what guns are normally used for, that is, as a weapon. As I put the point in my dissent, when you ask someone, 'Do you use a cane?' you are not inquiring whether he has hung his grandfather's antique cane as a decoration in the hallway." Justice Scalia has also written:
206:
802:) (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I have been willing, in the case of civil statutes, to acknowledge a doctrine of 'scrivener's error' that permits a court to give an unusual (though not unheard of) meaning to a word which, if given its normal meaning, would produce an absurd and arguably unconstitutional result") and even break it (see, e.g.,
765:
applications of a statute are not merely less desirable but in fact raise "grave constitutional doubts." That, we have said, only permits us to adopt one rather than another permissible reading of the statute, but not, by altering its terms, "to ignore the legislative will in order to avoid constitutional adjudication.
629:
legislature has no "genuine" collective intent concerning the proper resolution of statutory ambiguity (and that, even if it did, there would be no reliable basis for equating the views of a committee or sponsor with the "intent" of
Congress as a whole); second, that giving weight to legislative history offends the
675:
brings the whole philosophy into disrepute. I am not a strict constructionist, and no one ought to be... A text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means." Similarly, textualism should not be confused with the "
740:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the
Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely
674:
as a synonym for textualism. Nevertheless, although a textualist could be a strict constructionist, these are distinctive views. To illustrate this, we may quote
Justice Scalia, who warns that "extualism should not be confused with so-called strict constructionism, a degraded form of textualism that
717:
might mean "manufactured by a foreigner" rather than "manufactured in a foreign country." I think not. Words, like syllables, acquire meaning not in isolation but within their context. While looking up the separate word "foreign" in a dictionary might produce the reading the majority suggests, that
858:
is the perspective of statutory interpretation in which the judges should construe statutes to execute their legislative purpose. Textualism is the perspective of statutory interpretation in which the courts should read the words of that statutory text as any ordinary member of congress would have
1198:
Jackson wrote that he preferred to "give to the enumerated powers the scope and elasticity afforded by what seem to be reasonable, practical implications, instead of the rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire textualism." 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring). Jackson's use of the term should be
735:
As an illustrative example, Justice Scalia refers to a case in which the law provided for a longer sentence when the defendant "uses a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime." In the case, the defendant had offered to trade an unloaded gun as barter for cocaine, and the
628:
Textualist judges have contended, with much practical impact, that courts should not treat committee reports or sponsors' statements as authoritative evidence of legislative intent. These judges base their resistance to that interpretive practice on two major premises: first, that a 535-member
764:
more worthy, and every statutory claim less worthy, of judicial review, there would be no basis for writing that preference into a statute that makes no distinction between the two. We have rejected such judicial rewriting of legislation even in the more appealing situation where particular
597:: "We ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used ... We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statutes mean." The magazine
718:
approach would also interpret the phrase "I have a foreign object in my eye" as referring, perhaps, to something from Italy. The phrase "of foreign manufacture" is a common usage, well understood to mean "manufactured abroad."
565:
The textualist will "look at the statutory structure and hear the words as they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words." The textualist thus does not give weight to
1092:
847:
have rejected key elements of textualism, stating that statements made in the Second
Reading speech by Ministers introducing an Act may be used in the interpretation of that act.
620:
Member of
Congress would have read them. They look for the meaning "that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the
225:
499:
253:
387:
1106:
1393:
792:." This doctrine accounts for the situation when on the very face of the statute, it is apparent that there is a mistake of expression. (See, e.g.,
179:
367:
377:
492:
1388:
605:: "The Court’s conservative majority says it adheres to the doctrinal trail of the late Justice Antonin Scalia, who was a textualist (
485:
347:
232:
827:
337:
195:
357:
342:
316:
1174:
1027:"Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws"
990:
911:
321:
172:
237:
807:
776:
727:
362:
685:
602:
601:
described the difference between textualism and orginalism at the end of
December 2023 in this way with respect to the
407:
311:
273:
1199:
approached with caution, however, as what he had in mind in criticizing textualism was not the textualism known today.
1369:
1331:
1228:
794:
382:
220:
689:, which looked to the dictionary definitions of words, without reference to common public understanding or context.
165:
906:
Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional
Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review (2001)
697:
Textualism looks to the ordinary meaning of the language of the text, but it looks at the ordinary meaning of the
888:
268:
448:
304:
839:
Textualism was influential in
Australia, and was particularly prominent in the interpretative approach of Sir
817:
The word "textualism" was first used by Mark
Pattison in 1863 to criticize Puritan theology, according to the
569:
materials when attempting to ascertain the meaning of a text. Textualism is often erroneously conflated with
473:
402:
148:
138:
878:
844:
372:
258:
93:
1165:(2010). "Textualism and the Constitution". In Bruce Miroff; Raymond Seidelman; Todd Swanstrom (eds.).
818:
590:
1011:
1026:
811:
624:." The textualist cares about the statutory purpose to the extent that is suggested from the text.
43:
1093:"Law and Justice: Will Trump's Disqualification Turn on Whether an 1869 Case Was Wrongly Decided?"
443:
397:
38:
24:
758:
Even if we were to assume, however, contrary to all reason, that every constitutional claim is
667:
468:
299:
123:
799:
1323:
1316:
998:
1344:(1992). "The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law".
924:
89:
8:
1241:
651:
593:, although not a textualist himself, well-captured this philosophy, and its rejection of
566:
433:
352:
117:
85:
754:
Textualists do not, generally, accept the authority of the Courts to "refine" statutes:
1357:
1299:
1270:
1249:
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1097:
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1057:
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656:
638:
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542:
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523:
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453:
417:
392:
283:
263:
133:
113:
59:
1365:
1327:
1170:
1135:
975:
963:
907:
868:
822:
706:
630:
554:
69:
1341:
1291:
1065:
955:
873:
840:
714:
617:
527:
102:
1236:
646:
516:
153:
108:
1311:
1162:
825:
first used the word "textualism" in a Supreme Court opinion a century later in
789:
771:
594:
582:
578:
534:
1169:(Seventh ed.). Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning. pp. 288–294.
1139:
1382:
967:
676:
546:
412:
278:
143:
64:
1209:
Brannon, Valerie. "Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends".
680:
634:
611:
What was society’s original understanding then as to what those words mean?
526:
the ordinary meaning of the legal text, where no consideration is given to
947:
616:
Textualists argue courts should read the words of a statutory text as any
959:
883:
855:
570:
538:
438:
98:
1303:
1274:
1253:
1077:
948:"Unleashed and Unbound: Living Textualism in Bostock V. Clayton County"
760:
660:
574:
1129:
713:
The statute excludes only merchandise "of foreign manufacture," which
701:, not merely the possible range of meaning of each of its constituent
1282:
Manning, John F. (2001). "Textualism and the Equity of the Statute".
205:
1295:
1069:
573:, and was advocated by United States Supreme Court Justices such as
927:(1988). "The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction".
671:
550:
519:
730:(1988) Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
1131:
Statutory interpretation : theories, tools, and trends
1318:
A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law
1152:
Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 23 (1997).
1055:
Holmes (1899). "The Theory of Legal Interpretation".
784:
Textualists acknowledge the interpretive doctrine of
679:" approach, a simpler theory used prominently by the
1322:. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp.
1315:
1167:Debating Democracy: A Reader in American Politics
1018:
749:, 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) Scalia, J., concurring
1380:
649:, "Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine", 97
589:that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver."
1189:17 Oxford English Dictionary 854 (2d ed. 1989)
1090:
581:; the latter staked out his claim in his 1997
1261:Nelson, Caleb (2005). "What is Textualism?".
1239:(2005). "Textualism and Legislative Intent".
493:
173:
1155:
850:
923:
991:"The Constitution and Legislative History"
522:in which the interpretation of the law is
500:
486:
180:
166:
1394:Theories of constitutional interpretation
828:Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
549:, or significant questions regarding the
1281:
1235:
607:What are the words used by the framers?
1381:
1356:
1340:
1310:
1260:
1161:
1054:
988:
1364:. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
1091:James D. Zirin (December 27, 2023).
945:
900:
1362:Misreading Law Misreading Democracy
1208:
1127:
1034:The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
788:(slip of the tongue), also called "
670:is often misused by laypersons and
13:
1389:Supreme Court of the United States
1220:
1024:
686:Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill
78:General theories of interpretation
14:
1405:
804:Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.
795:United States v. X-Citement Video
1229:Legal Theory Lexicon: Textualism
1036:. University of Utah. p. 92
204:
1202:
1192:
1183:
889:Traditionalist theology (Islam)
747:Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.
52:General rules of interpretation
1211:Congressional Research Service
1146:
1121:
1084:
1048:
982:
939:
917:
1:
894:
560:
474:Common good constitutionalism
139:Common good constitutionalism
39:Constitutional interpretation
989:Nourse, Victoria F. (2014).
946:Lund, Nelson Robert (2020).
879:Letter and spirit of the law
845:Acts Interpretation Act 1901
834:
7:
929:Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
862:
613:)." (emphasis in original)
603:United States Supreme Court
368:Right to keep and bear arms
10:
1410:
692:
378:Criminal procedural rights
851:Textualism v. purposivism
819:Oxford English Dictionary
591:Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
812:constitutional avoidance
449:Political process theory
44:Statutory interpretation
952:SSRN Electronic Journal
444:Substantive due process
25:Judicial interpretation
16:Constitutional doctrine
1006:Cite journal requires
782:
779:Scalia, J., dissenting
752:
733:
668:Strict constructionism
665:
609:) and an originalist (
469:Strict constructionism
373:Right to trial by jury
363:Freedom of association
124:Strict constructionism
925:Easterbrook, Frank H.
756:
738:
711:
626:
1232:, Legal Theory Blog.
1128:Brannon, Valerie C.
960:10.2139/ssrn.3651120
843:. Amendments to the
633:mandated process of
524:based exclusively on
418:Comprehensible rules
388:Freedom from slavery
348:Freedom of the press
292:Government structure
254:Separation of powers
198:of the United States
1358:Nourse, Victoria F.
567:legislative history
545:it was intended to
434:Living Constitution
353:Freedom of assembly
338:Freedom of religion
118:legislative history
86:Living Constitution
1103:Washington Monthly
1098:Washington Monthly
599:Washington Monthly
454:Judicial restraint
413:Right to candidacy
300:Legislative branch
196:Constitutional law
134:Purposive approach
114:legislative intent
60:Plain meaning rule
1342:Farber, Daniel A.
1226:Solum, Lawrence,
1176:978-0-495-91347-4
1025:Scalia, Antonin.
912:978-0-7006-1141-6
869:Judicial activism
808:490 U.S. 504, 527
790:scrivener's error
777:486 U.S. 592, 619
728:486 U.S. 281, 319
724:K-Mart v. Cartier
715:the majority says
707:Noscitur a sociis
683:in cases such as
510:
509:
358:Right to petition
343:Freedom of speech
330:Individual rights
284:Tiers of scrutiny
259:Individual rights
190:
189:
94:Living instrument
1401:
1375:
1353:
1337:
1321:
1307:
1278:
1257:
1237:Manning, John F.
1215:
1214:
1206:
1200:
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1190:
1187:
1181:
1180:
1159:
1153:
1150:
1144:
1143:
1125:
1119:
1118:
1116:
1114:
1109:on July 14, 2024
1105:. Archived from
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874:Legal positivism
841:Garfield Barwick
780:
750:
731:
663:
631:constitutionally
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398:Equal protection
383:Right to privacy
322:Local government
317:State government
305:Executive branch
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103:original meaning
21:
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1404:
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1312:Scalia, Antonin
1296:10.2307/1123509
1223:
1221:Further reading
1218:
1207:
1203:
1197:
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1188:
1184:
1177:
1163:Scalia, Antonin
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1070:10.2307/1321531
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695:
664:
647:John F. Manning
645:
563:
506:
312:Judicial branch
238:Judicial review
197:
186:
154:Legal formalism
111:
109:Original intent
17:
12:
11:
5:
1407:
1397:
1396:
1391:
1377:
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1370:
1354:
1338:
1332:
1308:
1279:
1269:(2): 347–418.
1258:
1248:(2): 419–450.
1233:
1222:
1219:
1217:
1216:
1201:
1191:
1182:
1175:
1154:
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1064:(6): 417–420.
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1008:|journal=
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823:Robert Jackson
786:lapsus linguae
772:Webster v. Doe
767:
743:
720:
694:
691:
652:Colum. L. Rev.
643:
595:intentionalism
583:Tanner Lecture
579:Antonin Scalia
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1284:Colum. L. Rev
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677:plain meaning
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1346:Vand. L. Rev
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1290:(1): 1–127.
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1130:
1123:
1111:. Retrieved
1107:the original
1096:
1086:
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1050:
1038:. Retrieved
1033:
1020:
999:cite journal
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