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206:. Signification is the imposition of a meaning on an utterance, but supposition is taking a meaningful term as standing in for something. According to Peter of Spain "Hence signification is prior to supposition. Neither do they belong to the same thing. For to signify belongs to an utterance, but to supposit belongs to a term already, as it were, put together out of an utterance and a signification." An easy way to see the difference is in our
275:
The
Medieval logicians give elaborate sets of syntactical rules for determining when a term supposits discretely, determinately, confusedly, or confusedly and distributively. So for example the subject of a negative claim, or indefinite one supposits determinately, but the subject of a singular claim
404:
says "Ampliation is the extension of a common term from a lesser supposition to a greater one." In practice, if I speak of the past, or the future, or make a modal claim, the terms I use get ampliated to supposit for past things, future things, or possible things, rather than their usual supposition
367:
That is basically how the theory works, a much thornier problem is exactly what the theory is for. Some commentators, like
Michael Loux, have suggested that the theory of ascent and descent to particulars is intended to provide truth conditions for the quantifiers. T. K. Scott has suggested that the
221:
Medieval logicians divided supposition into many different kinds; the jargons for the different kinds, their relations and what they all mean get complex, and differ greatly from logician to logician. Paul Spade's webpage has a series of helpful diagrams here. The most important division is probably
271:
Personal supposition was further divided in types such as discrete, determinate, merely confused, and confused and distributive. In 1966 T.K. Scott proposed giving a separate name for
Medieval discussions of the subvarieties of personal supposition, because he thought it was a fairly distinct issue
280:
gives 15 rules for determining which type of personal supposition a term is using. Further the medieval logicians did not seem to dispute about the details of the syntactic rules for determining type of personal supposition. These rules seem to be important because they were linked to theories of
247:
is not standing in for any particular cup, but for the idea of a cup in the human mind (according to Ockham, and many medieval logicians, but not according to John
Buridan). Personal supposition in contrast is when the term supposits for what it signifies. If I say
238:
I64, 8) "Simple supposition occurs when a term supposits for an intention of the soul, but is not take significatively." The idea is that simple supposition happens when the term is standing in for a human concept rather than for the object itself. If I say
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was used in a different way). However, supposition was a different semantic relationship from signification. Signification was a conventional relationship between utterances and objects mediated by the particularities of a language.
222:
between material, simple, personal, and improper supposition. A term supposits materially when it is used to stand in for an utterance or inscription, rather than for what it signifies. When I say
326:. Here I am referring not to a determinate particular cup, but to all cups "fused" together, that is all cups "confusedly." This is called confused and distributive supposition.
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in
English, so it is in personal supposition. A term is in improper supposition if it is suppositing for an object, but a different object than it signifies, as in my example
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were its principal developers. By the 14th century it seems to have drifted into at least two fairly distinct theories, the theory of "supposition proper", which included an "
234:
rather than for a piece of pottery. Material supposition is a medieval way of doing the work we would do today by using quotation marks. According to Ockham (
364:. Here descent to disjunction fails, and descent to conjunction fails, but "ascent from particulars" is valid. This is called "merely confused supposition."
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as the predicate term. Further cup is a common term, including many particular cups within it. So if I "descend to particulars" I can re-phrase my claim as
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cannot just be suppositing for all the cups that exist, but for cups in the past as well. Here I am expanding the normal supposition of the terms I use.
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for present actual things. Thus, ampliation becomes the medieval theory for explaining modal and tense logics within the theory of supposition.
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from the other varieties of supposition. He proposed calling the subvarieties of personal supposition a theory of "modes of supposition."
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Paul Spade has suggested that by the 14th century the theory of modes of personal supposition wasn't aimed at anything at all anymore.
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Supposition was a semantic relation between a term and what that term was being used to talk about. So, for example, in the suggestion
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352:. On the other hand, if it happened to be the case that there was only one coffee cup left in the world, it would be true that
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If I had an infinite disjunction of all particular cups, it could stand in for the term cup, in its simple supposition in
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162:" and is much like a theory of reference, and the theory of "modes of supposition" whose intended function is not clear.
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I want to buy this cup or I want to buy that cup, or I want to buy that other cup - and so on for all cups.
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supposits discretely, while the subject of an affirmative claim supposits confusedly and determinately.
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I cannot descend to a disjunction of particulars, or to a conjunction of particulars, but only because
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as a term of the language
English is being used to supposit for the wine contained in the cup.
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However, the predicate of a universal affirmative claim won't really fit any of these models.
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This cup isn't a table, AND that cup isn't a table, AND that other cup isn't a table, AND ...
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is already a particular. This kind of personal supposition is called discrete supposition.
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I mean some determinate cup, but I don't necessarily know which one yet. Likewise if I say
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logic that was probably aimed at giving accounts of issues similar to modern accounts of
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Thoughts, Words, and Things. An
Introduction to Late Medieval Logic and Semantic Theory
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Thoughts, words and things: An introduction to late mediaeval logic and semantic theory
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Formalizing
Medieval Logical Theories. Suppositio, Consequentiae and Obligationes
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but the theory of personal supposition was aimed at answering the question
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Medieval
Supposition Theory Revisited. Studies in Memory of L. M. de Rijk
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All coffee cups are this cup, and all coffee cups are that cup, and ...
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All coffee cups are this cup, or all coffee cups are that cup, or ...
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theory of supposition proper was designed to answer the question
450:(Version 1.1 ed.). Author. pp. 243–308. Archived from
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An Essay
Towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language
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119:
687:
Annotated Bibliography on the Medieval Theories of Supposition
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of a term was the object the term referred to. (In grammar,
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This is called determinate supposition. That is when I say
426:
Medieval Foundations of the Western intellectual Tradition
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This cup isn't a table, or that cup isn't a table or ...
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This cup isn't a table or that one isn't a table or ...
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Introduction to Buridan: Sophisms on Meaning and Truth
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supposits for all the cups that exist. But if I say
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descent to particulars and ascent from particulars.
214:as an utterance signifies a cup as an object, but
178:is suppositing for the wine contained in the cup.
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288:I've made an indefinite affirmative claim, with
64:but its sources remain unclear because it lacks
256:is standing in for the object that is called a
602:The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy
595:Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy
518:, Text, Translation, Introduction, and Notes,
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569:, Dordrecht: Springer, 2011, pp. 1229-1236.
1431:Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
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714:
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394:Some cups were made of lead in Roman times
370:What kind of thing are you talking about?
230:to supposit materially for the utterance
95:Learn how and when to remove this message
635:"Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms"
374:How many of them are you talking about?
266:
14:
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597:Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
441:Spade, Paul Vincent (August 9, 2002).
695:
651:
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241:Cups are an important type of pottery
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622:, New York: oxford University Press.
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663:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
644:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
567:Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy
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32:Extended chord § 18th century
25:
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516:Peter of Spain Summaries of Logic
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600:McGrade, A.S. (editor), (2003).
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654:"Medieval Theories of Modality"
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348:, but still less does it imply
1371:Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
672:Mediaeval Logic and Philosophy
604:, Cambridge University Press.
541:De Rijk, Lambertus M. (1967).
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493:University of Notre Dame Press
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461:
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356:, so I can validly infer from
134:context. Philosophers such as
30:For supposition in music, see
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1:
1252:Principle of compositionality
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379:
1401:Philosophical Investigations
575:& Martha Kneale (1962).
358:All coffee cups are that cup
354:All coffee cups are that cup
314:On the other hand, if I say
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1242:Modality (natural language)
620:Articulating medieval Logic
224:Cup is a monosyllabic word,
10:
1583:
1381:Language, Truth, and Logic
1121:Theological noncognitivism
1006:Contrast theory of meaning
1001:Causal theory of reference
732:Index of language articles
579:. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
29:
1521:
1466:Philosophy of information
1453:
1302:
1154:
1066:Mediated reference theory
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1391:Two Dogmas of Empiricism
489:Ockham's Theory of Terms
386:No cups are made of lead
362:All coffee cups are cups
342:All coffee cups are cups
331:This cup is made of gold
50:This article includes a
27:Branch of medieval logic
1192:Use–mention distinction
1036:Direct reference theory
520:Oxford University Press
473:Appleton-Century-Crofts
306:Some cup isn't a table,
79:more precise citations.
1126:Theory of descriptions
1061:Linguistic determinism
723:Philosophy of language
565:in H. Lagerlund (ed.)
534:Bos, E.P. (ed. 2013),
483:Loux, Michael (1974).
1237:Mental representation
1172:Linguistic relativity
1056:Inquisitive semantics
555:. New York: Springer.
430:Yale University Press
1557:Theories of language
1421:Naming and Necessity
1331:De Arte Combinatoria
1130:Definite description
1091:Semantic externalism
676:Paul Vincent Spade.
670:Paul Vincent Spade.
577:Development of Logic
545:. Assen: Van Gorcum.
485:Ockham on Generality
298:I want to buy a cup.
267:Modes of supposition
226:I am using the word
1562:Medieval philosophy
1471:Philosophical logic
1461:Analytic philosophy
1267:Sense and reference
1146:Verification theory
1101:Situation semantics
467:Scott, T.K (1966).
308:I could substitute
302:I want to buy a cup
286:I want to buy a cup
144:William of Sherwood
1321:Port-Royal Grammar
1217:Family resemblance
1136:Theory of language
1111:Supposition theory
563:Supposition Theory
262:Drink another cup.
166:Supposition proper
108:Supposition theory
52:list of references
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1543:
1046:Dynamic semantics
652:Knuuttila, Simo.
610:978-0-521-00063-5
583:Kretzmann, Norman
559:Dutilh Novaes, C.
549:Dutilh Novaes, C.
543:Logica Modernorum
316:No cup is a table
208:drink another cup
172:Drink another cup
140:William of Ockham
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16:(Redirected from
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1567:History of logic
1506:Formal semantics
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71:Please help
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1476:Linguistics
1441:Limited Inc
1361:On Denoting
1187:Proposition
838:de Saussure
803:Ibn Khaldun
591:Jan Pinborg
384:When I say
284:When I say
174:, the term
77:introducing
1551:Categories
1536:Discussion
1531:Task Force
1481:Pragmatics
1272:Speech act
1202:Categories
1116:Symbiosism
1071:Nominalism
983:Watzlawick
863:Bloomfield
783:Chrysippus
409:References
380:Ampliation
187:suppositum
183:suppositum
160:ampliation
1513:Semiotics
1501:Semantics
1351:Alciphron
1287:Statement
1222:Intension
1162:Ambiguity
1041:Dramatism
1021:Cratylism
773:Eubulides
768:Aristotle
748:Confucius
329:If I say
252:the term
243:the term
120:plurality
116:reference
1526:Category
1486:Rhetoric
1311:Cratylus
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1257:Property
1177:Language
1155:Concepts
993:Theories
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933:Hintikka
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828:Mauthner
798:Averroes
788:Zhuangzi
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593:(1982).
561:(2011),
551:(2007),
335:this cup
128:modality
112:medieval
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908:Chomsky
893:Derrida
883:Russell
868:Bergson
853:Tillich
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660:(ed.).
641:(ed.).
514:(2014)
424:(1976)
322:I mean
204:English
192:Poculum
73:improve
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973:Lewis
963:Quine
948:Grice
898:Whorf
858:Sapir
843:Frege
793:Xunzi
763:Plato
682:(PDF)
656:. In
637:. In
455:(PDF)
448:(PDF)
360:, to
198:what
196:Latin
124:tense
58:, or
1262:Sign
1167:Cant
953:Ryle
923:Ayer
848:Boas
606:ISBN
398:cups
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1207:Set
487:in
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