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and tensions between the two leaders surfaced strongly in the preparations for the party's leadership election in
September 1994. The election was held amid a heightened competition between the two contending figures for leadership of the party. The party was experiencing its most difficult internal power struggle since it had been formed. New political fault lines were emerging as the party leaders tried to define and articulate their political agendas in Kabul. Both sides were determined to win in order to dominate leadership positions and consequently change the political direction of the party. The venue for the forthcoming elections also proved to be contentious. Akbari was pressing for the elections to be held in Bamyan where he felt stronger. By contrast, Mazari and his supporters pushed for elections in Kabul where he had cultivated a larger support base among urbanised Hazaras. Given the political differences and personal rivalries between the two leaders, the first election of the secretary general of the party was hotly contested. It was also particularly sensitive given the context of the civil war in Kabul, with regards to which both figures were proposing different political directions for the party. Akbari hoped he could alter the role of the party in the war and in the conflict in Kabul in favour of Rabbani's government through his election as secretary general of the party. Consequently, the election of secretary general gained a paramount importance for both sides in the civil war to maintain or change the political alignments of the party in their favour.
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ideological backgrounds rushed to Kabul in 2002 and volunteered to play a role in the party. Ideas for reform and restructuring the party were presented to Karim
Khalili and Muhammad Mohaqiq, who were seen as the key leaders. While the need to change and broaden the party leadership has frequently been acknowledged by both Mohaqiq and Khalili, most reformists (including clerics) have been frustrated by lack of practical will and determination of the senior leaders. With the disintegration of its military structures and the necessity to transform into a full political party, Hezb-e Wahdat faced an extremely difficult challenge that required radical changes. The transition from a military to political organisation has been similarly difficult for other Afghan organisations created during the years of war. But Hizb-e Wahdat faced a unique predicament of its own, deriving from the emergence of a much larger educated class among the Hazaras. Wahdat's political cadres were mostly clerics educated in religious schools in Afghanistan or in Iran and Iraq. In their rise to political leadership they fiercely competed with university-educated challengers and remained sceptical and fearful of modern educated politicians. They suddenly found themselves forced to engage with western notions of democracy, human rights, etcetera. As in 1992, opening the doors of the party to more educated Hazara cadres was a precondition for meeting reformist expectations, but the return to the country of many young Hazaras educated in Iran and
548:
Akbari's faction won the positions of heads of cultural and military committees, which they had strongly pressed for. He and his supporters believed that by dominating the cultural and military committees they could manipulate the war and propaganda machine of the party in favour of the
Rabbani government, their external ally. Karim Khalili, who would later become the leader of the party, was elected as chief of its political affairs committee. The voting patterns during the elections offer important insights into the internal politics of the party. Members of Nasr and Pasdaran, the two largest and most powerful numerically and politically, dominated the process as well as the two emergent factions. While Nasr maintained its cohesiveness, most other smaller organisations were divided. All former members of Nasr in the council voted for Mazari, testifying to the lasting cohesiveness of Nasr as a political block within Wahdat. By contrast, while most former members of Pasdaran supported Akbari, some of them cast their votes for Mazari. For instance, Ali Jan Zahidi, Ghulam Hussain Shafaq, Hayatullah Balaghi and Abdul Ahmed Fayaz, previously important local leaders of Pasdaran, threw their support behind Mazari. Similarly, most former members of Harakat and Nahzat followed Pasdaran, while most of Sazman-e Daawat and Mostazafin supported Mazari. Other organisations such as Shuray-e Ittefaq and Jabh-e Motahid were bitterly divided.
477:, a former member of Nasr and first secretary general of Wahdat, was the main agent of the explicit transformation of the party into a platform for the rights and political demands of the Hazaras. When he arrived in Kabul in 1992, he further opened the door of the party to Hazaras of all social and ideological backgrounds. A group of former leftists and government bureaucrats joined the inner circle of the party leadership, generating further rifts. This was a real test of political tolerance of the more conservative section of the clergy. While the party was created to unify the predominantly Islamist and clerical organizations, in Kabul it confronted groups of educated Hazaras much larger than had been the case in the provinces; these were also mostly leftist and relatively well organized. The question of whether the party should accept these individuals divided the party leadership. The ulema (Scholars) needed the knowledge and experiences of these educated Hazaras to help the party adjust to an urban political setting. The party suffered from a chronic shortage of members who had benefited from a modern education. Furthermore, most of the clerics had little familiarity with the politics of Kabul. Most of them were educated in religious centers in
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experiencing intensive factional and ethnic rivalries. Declining faith in the future of the government facilitated the emergence of new political alignments largely between members of the same ethnic groups, cutting across the ideological divide between the mujahedin and the PDPA officials. In the meantime, negotiations on the formation of an interim government led by the Sunni organizations based in
Peshawar excluded the Hazara alliance based in Tehran. The combined effect of these developments among the Hazara organizations was greater awareness of the need for more collective and assertive bargaining with their Sunni counterparts if they were to be taken seriously. It was against this background that a more radical demand for unification and merger of all existing political-military organizations into a single party dominated the politics of the region. Several meetings were held throughout the region in which the nature and composition of the new party and the role of existing organizations in it were debated extensively. In August 1988, the provincial center of
604:-led Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programme and operating under the new legal and political environment. As mentioned earlier, Hezb-e Wahdat's military structure disintegrated under the Taliban, and as a result in late 2001 the organisation was in no way comparable to other anti-Taliban organisations in terms of military structure and hardware. Its leaders lacked the political and military resources to reorganise their fighters on any significant scale. In June 2005 the only major military structure controlled by the party, the Ninth Corps, was disbanded, ending financial support from the centre to Wahdat's military wing. Lacking resources and with a weak organisation, the party saw its military activities almost come to a halt; only in northern Afghanistan did some elements of it survive. Wahdat's weakness vis-à-vis other, better resourced military-political organisations was compounded. On the positive side, its leaders can claim credit for effectively having given up their military wing.
399:, was the main Shiite party that refused to join Wahdat. The party was dominated by non-Hazara Shiites. Initially, the party was represented in a series of negotiations, but Mohsini later declined to sign, having presented a number of conditions to be met. His conditions were interpreted as an unwillingness to join a party in which historical Hazara grievances and political aspirations predominated. Nonetheless, sections of his party joined Hezb-e Wahdat either because the new party was more promising for the political future of the Hazaras or because the pressure to join was so strong that it could not be resisted. The party's core could resist the pressure to join mainly because it was located outside the region. However, it did lose a substantial section of its Hazara following to Hezb-e Wahdat, a fact underlining the growing importance of ethnic identities in the aftermath of jihad in the country.
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that shifted the party headquarters to Kabul. He was warmly received by
Mohaqiq, who was deputy chair and Planning Minister of the Interim Administration, and other senior figures of the organisation. In the Transitional Administration, Khalili replaced Mohaqiq as a vice-president, becoming the highest Hazara official in the government. Until before the presidential election of 2005, Muhaqiq was at least officially heading the political affairs committee of Hezb-e Wahdat in Kabul. Their relationship, however, soon started unravelling. Apparently, Muhaqiq had adopted a more confrontational approach within the government on the issues of development and reconstruction plans in Hazara areas. It is alleged that his powers as the Minister of Planning were being transferred to the more powerful and assertive finance ministry, under the leadership of the western educated technocrat
297:, a hastily assembled region-wide organization Soon it was challenged and overthrown by several new radical Islamist groups that engaged in endless power and ideological struggles, however, these were nonviolent and the various groups were still targeting the USSR forces in unity. The wars and conflicts were launched and fought against the USSR forces with strong ideological fervor. However, none of the organizations were able to determine the outcome of the political control of Hazarajat in their favor. Towards the second half of the 1980s a complete stalemate was emerging in the region, with each organization confined to specific pockets of territory. As a result, there was an overwhelming desire for change felt both by the villagers and senior leaders of the organizations to unite.
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36 members, but the growing need for expansion and inclusion of other figures and groups into the party resulted in a constant increase in size. The first congress of the party in
September 1991 urged the party leadership to facilitate integration of other Shiite groups and figures into the party. As such it was also resolved that the central and supervisory councils could be expanded as needed. At its peak, the Central Council included more than 80 members representing nearly all religious and political groups and influential figures in the region, as well as Hazara figures from the cities. It was through membership and division of power within this council that the party managed to hold the previously fragmented and hostile Hazara political groupings together.
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the formation of a mujahedin government in Kabul, which were dominated by the Sunnis. A Hezb-e Wahdat delegation to
Peshawar, sent to negotiate a possible inclusion in the process, returned to Bamyan badly disappointed. In a central council meeting in Bamyan, the delegation headed by Abdul Ali Mazari raised the issue of deliberating a new political strategy. Some of the Sunni fundamentalist parties had basically ignored the Shiite claims of any form of effective representation in a future government. In opposition to Hezb-e Wahdat's demand of a quarter share in future power-sharing arrangements, some of the Sunni parties stated that the Shiites did not count as a significant community, deserving to be included in the negotiation process.
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the brunt of
Taliban anger this time. Thousands of Hazaras were massacred or imprisoned. Thirdly, in a few weeks the Taliban captured Bamyan, the new headquarters of the party, in another dramatic move. This marked the end of Hezb-e Wahdat's political life as a cohesive political organisation. The fall of these two cities proved to be much more than military defeats. Nearly all of the territories under its control were captured by the Taliban. Its political and military cadres fled into neighbouring countries. Khalili went to Iran. From amongst the senior leaders, only Muhaqiq after a brief period in Iran returned quickly to Afghanistan and organised a resistance front in the
600:
Wahdat had a modest weight; Muhammad
Mohaqiq represented the party as one of the deputy chairmen and Minister of Planning. Members of Harakat and Akbari's Wahdat mostly represented the Shiites in the Interim Administration as well as the Transitional Administration in 2002-2003. Moreover, in the new political circumstances, the party needed to adapt to the new political realities in the country. The new political order established under the auspices of the international community required the military-political organisations to transform into civilian political parties. This entailed disbanding their military wings, disarming under the
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1989 less than a year after its liberation. It became a center of political leadership and power for the new party beyond and away from the local factional and personal rivalries of local commanders. What contrasted the negotiation process for the formation of Wahdat with similar previous efforts was that it was essentially a process initiated from within the
Hazarajat region. The process was informed and shaped by the realities of war, factionalism, and loss of control of the political leadership over military commanders within the region. Conversely, the previous coalition-building efforts were centered in
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painstakingly long and complex process, which experienced repeated setbacks and obstacles, because each party sought to maximize their role in the process. This turned out to be a major contentious issue throughout several rounds of negotiations in the run up to formation of the party. Smaller parties pressed for equal representation of all groups while the more powerful ones demanded greater power and a share of the positions in the unified party. Eventually the latter argument prevailed; Nasr and Pasdaran persuaded other organizations to concede to proportional representation.
411:. However, Wasiq, Nehzat's main military commander in the district, refused to dismantle his military structure and continued to operate under the name of Nahzat. This resulted in a military confrontation with the formerly Nasr commanders who were fighting on behalf of Hezb-e Wahdat. The conflict resulted in the total defeat of Nahzat and other smaller organisations in this district in 1993. As a result, Wahdat in Jaghori and most other parts of Ghazni established itself through the military victory of the former Nasr forces.
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Wahdat's leaders were endeavoring to strike a balance between ethnicity and religion. The result was an Islamic ideology used to express and further the rights of a historically disadvantaged community; a strong desire for unity of the Hazaras was its main driving force. In fact, ideologically, Nasr's trademark combination of ethnic nationalism and radical Islamism increasingly became the ideology of Wahdat, an ethnic discourse dominated by, and expressed through, an Islamic language.
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Tehran. The fragmentation of the Hazara mujahedin had given the Iranians effective leverage to control small organizations, often tied to various religious authorities and government agencies in Iran. The Iranians feared that a single party based inside Afghanistan could mean they would lose control over the movement. Furthermore, the increasingly evident ethnic discourse within the party was seen unfavorably by the Iranian authorities who had for years tried to promote a more pan-
52:
516:. Members of the delegations were tasked with exploring a common political strategy for collectively bargaining over the rights of minorities in future political arrangements. The delegations to Panjshir and the north of the country reached important agreements with Massoud and the future leaders of the emergent Junbish-e Milli Islami, which underpinned a new political agreement that became known as Paiman-e Jabalu-Seraj, or the Jabalu-seraj agreement named after the area in
158:
1648:
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atrocious conflicts. Wahdat became an important part of the conflict for nearly three years. This provoked intense internal debates within the party. The questions of external alignments further inflamed the internal tensions. Muhammad Akbari rose as leader of a pro-Massoud camp within the party, challenging the wisdom of Abdul Ali Mazari's refusal to join Burhanuddin Rabbani's and Massoud's government and his participation in an alliance with
332:. This further facilitated and encouraged the formation of a regional organization. The operation that resulted in the collapse of the government in the town was coordinated jointly by different mujahidin forces in the region. Sazman-e Nasr (Victory Organization) played a central and coordinating role in the attack. This development marked complete the elimination of any presence of the Kabul government within the entire Hazarajat region
457:. It called for further efforts to incorporate all other genuine Shiite groups into the party and to act in solidarity with all Islamic organizations of the Sunnis. The language of the manifesto clearly indicates that Wahdat was to be, at least predominately, a Shiite organization, despite references to solidarity and cooperation with the Sunni organizations. It demanded an equal status for Shiite jurisprudence alongside the
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chaired by ulema. Only technical and insignificant positions such as health and archaeological committees were headed by non-clerical figures. Furthermore, the non-clerical figures were mostly acting on behalf of their senior clerical leaders. But an opening of the party to the growing secular intelligentsia meant that their monopoly over the political leadership of Hazara society risked being undermined.
557:
plot remain unknown, Mazari later claimed that Qasim Fahim, then Rabbani's head of the intelligence department, was working with Akbari to militarily force him out of leadership. According to the allegations, Massoud was funding and arming as many as 20,000 troops to allow Akbari to take over Wahdat's leadership in Kabul and establish its control in Hazarajat as well.
630:. Mohaqiq left the cabinet in controversy in 2004. Khalili and Mohaqeq have since engaged in personal rivalry and competition for power within the government as well as for leadership among the Hazaras. Their rivalry came to the fore when Mohaqiq decided to stand as a candidate for presidential elections in 2005 and Khalili ran as the second vice-president with
508:
the leaders in Peshawar. Government officials of various ethnic communities were also contacted to join or support the new alliance. The new strategy was communicated with various political and military players in the country through delegations and representatives. Fifty delegations were dispatched to several parts of the country, including the
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the former leftists were given any position of authority within the party leadership, their strengthening relationship with, and perceived influence on, Abdul Ali Mazari angered the more conservative sections of the party. Most notable in this regard was Muhammad Akbari, who consistently opposed Wahdat's alliance with non-jihadi groups such as
308:, Iran in 1985. It was the most effective attempt to achieve unity of action by the leaderships of the organizations and was to become an important precedent for the formation of Hizb-e Wahdat. However, while the alliance provided the Hazara mujahedin with a common political voice in negotiations and bargaining with the
625:
The situation of Hezb-e Wahdat in early 2009 and its political fragmentation can best be explained by the leadership style of its leaders. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Taliban, Khalili was widely recognised as leader of the party. In April 2002 he flew to Kabul from Bamyan, in a move
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was overrun by the Taliban; the city was the second important centre of the northern alliance after the fall of Kabul and also held a major concentration of Wahdat's troops and civilian Hazaras. Hezb-e Wahdat had played the key role in repelling a Taliban offensive on the city in 1997 and was to bear
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withdrawal in January 1988, the collapse of the Kabul government was believed to be imminent and a dramatic reconfiguration of political alignments was in the making. This was happening at a time when the Kabul government and the ruling Hezb-e Demokratik-e Khalq (People's Democratic Party, PDPA) were
543:
The differences between Abdul Ali Mazari and Akbari resulted in the first major split within the party. After the split, both leaders maintained separate political and military organisations under the name of Wahdat, with Abdul Ali Mazari maintaining the main body of the party. The growing rivalries
531:
The alliance of Wahdat, Junbesh and Massoud's Shuray-e Nezar, or Supervisory Council, collapsed as they attempted to take control of Kabul. Similarly, the political arrangements among the Sunni mujahedin organisations also fell apart, turning the city into a battleground for the most devastating and
485:
and had mainly engaged in politics in rural Hazarajat. Finally, Wahdat fighters lacked military skills suitable to an urban environment. Despite that, many key figures in the central council opposed the inclusion of the educated Kabulis in the party, viewing them as godless communists. While none of
435:
The ambition to integrate previously hostile organizations into a single party had achieved a great degree of success. Officially, all the previous organizations except Harakat were dissolved and their military structures were dismantled. A relatively stable political order was restored in the areas
414:
One after the other the smaller parties were pressured or coaxed to join the process. In November 1989, the remnant of Behisthi's Shuray-e Ittefaq also joined. His decision to participate in the unification process was a turning point in the development of clerical leadership in the Hazarajat, as it
402:
The military class that had flourished during the civil war posed one of the main obstacles to unification. Nahzat-e Islami is a good example of military commanders refusing to unite in spite of the agreement of their leaders. Its senior leaders participated in the unification process and hosted one
386:
The search for change and unity was instigated and led in particular by the senior leaders of the two main organizations, Pasdaran and Nasr, which were the most exposed to the threat of deligitimisation as a result of their loss of control over their military commanders. The path to unity had been a
599:
Thus Hezb-e Wahdat participated in the post-Taliban political process with little of its past political and military weight. Wahdat still claimed to represent the Hazaras and the Hazarajat region fell under its control as the Taliban regime was overthrown. In the Interim Administration (2001–2002),
503:
The idea of building an Islamic government and promoting religious fraternity rapidly ran into difficulties. Hezb-e Wahdat's stance as the representative of the Hazara mujahedin was not welcomed by its Sunni counterparts in Peshawar. Instead, it was effectively excluded from the negotiations around
461:
school, dominant among Sunnis in the country. As a religious party, Hezb-e Wahdat can be credited with an openness and inclusiveness exceptional in a conservative society like Afghanistan. In an exceptional move among the Afghan mujahedin, the party included ten women members in its central council
378:
The next and most important body within the party was its Central Council. This organ was the most powerful deliberative and decision-making authority within the party. Because of the importance attached to it, its membership expanded in a most dramatic manner. Originally, it was planned to include
374:
Shuray-e Aali Nezarat, (the Supreme Supervisory Council), was meant to include high-ranking religious figures and experts. In its supervisory role, the council was tasked to monitor all levels of the party and serve as the highest leadership and control mechanism over all activities and policies of
335:
Henceforth Bamyan was the center of important political developments. It injected a new stimulus into the ongoing unification process among the mujahedin organizations in the region. The town hosted the final meeting that resulted in the declaration of the Misaq-e Wahdat or the unity treaty in July
556:
against him, Mazari ordered his troops to attack and expel all his opponents from the western part of the capital. Consequently, Akbari, his supporters and his allies in Harakat were forced to flee into areas controlled by Massoud in the north of the capital. While the exact details of the alleged
547:
The elections were held amid a climate of distrust and violence. By gaining 43 votes (out of 82 members of the central council present), Abdul Ali Mazari was re-elected as leader. Akbari with 33 votes was elected as his first deputy. Similarly, agreements were reached on 20 other key appointments.
507:
Three days of deliberations in the party's central council in Bamyan produced a new strategy: working out an alliance of the country's historically deprived ethnic communities. This new strategy was to be pursued with the military commanders of various communities in the provinces rather than with
616:
While a few of Wahdat's founders continued to exercise leadership and political power, most others were not as lucky. The failure to revive party structures left many of them politically marginalised. Second rank officials of Hezb-e Wahdat, such as most members of the central council, have mostly
607:
The second and most pressing demand for reform came from within the Hazara political community. Reforming and reviving the party as the largest and most influential Hazara organisation was a central priority for most of the Hazara intellectual and clerical elites. Many educated Hazaras of various
470:
regime in Kabul and the failure to form an Islamic government, the warring factions turned to their ethnic and regional support bases. While Islamism remained the officially proclaimed ideology of most groups, ethnic demands and power struggles surfaced as major sources of political mobilization.
340:
and were often under the direct influence of the Iranian authorities. Once it was formed, its leaders faced the challenge of convincing their representatives at the Shuray-e Eatelaf and officials of the Iranian government, who were more at ease with dealing with a coalition of separate parties in
349:
in Afghan affairs at that time, is alleged to have tried to prevent the formation of Hizb-e Wahdat in order to maintain his influence. Eventually, once the party was formed, the Iranians decided to work with it and supported it in the early days of its existence. But, as the subsequent course of
612:
was out of all proportion with the threat that had been represented by the limited number of leftists and government officials welcomed into Wahdat in 1992. After 2001, the party nominally maintained its old structure in which seven of the eleven commissions within the Jaghori of the party were
551:
Moreover, distrust and suspicions continued to undermine the new appointments. The role of external players, particularly that of Rabbani's government, was crucial. It is believed that the Rabbani government had been working through their contacts with Akbari to undermine Mazari and turn Hezb-e
448:
groups in Afghanistan. The process was accompanied by the gradual rise to dominance of the clergy in the political leadership of the region, and in fact it marked the final victory of the clerical Islamists. By unifying under the new name they further consolidated their political dominance. The
638:. By standing in opposition to the government, he championed the rights of Hazaras and continued to undermine Karim Khalili. The personalisation of leadership was not limited to Mohaqiq and Khalili and resulted in the fragmentation of the party into the following four splinter organizations.
274:
264:
By 2009, however, Hezb-e Wahdat was so fragmented and divided that the political weight it carried in the country bore little resemblance to what it had once been. It had fragmented into at least four competing organizations, each claiming ownership of the name and legacy of Hezb-e Wahdat.
569:
was elected as the new party leader. He reorganised the party, re-established control over the Hazarajat region and joined Massoud and Junbesh against the newly emerged Taliban threat in a new alliance called the Supreme Council for Defence of the Motherland, which was later known as the
560:
The split opened a deep and long standing political division among the Hazaras of Afghanistan. While Mazari and his successor Khalili commanded the support of most of the Hazaras, Akbari mostly operated in opposition to them. Following the death of Mazari at the hands of the
390:
Smaller parties were pressured and even intimidated into joining the process. Many groups had no other choice than joining it: the cost of standing outside would have been unbearable. The following two examples provide insight into the complexity of the process.
366:
As the name Wahdat (Unity) indicates, the main objective of the party was to unify all Shiite mujahedin organizations under a single political leadership. It was created in response to a strong urge for unity among the Hazara leaders as well as commoners.
465:
The main point, however, is that the movement gradually tilted towards its ethnic support base. Subsequent political developments in Kabul exposed the difficulties of establishing an Islamic government in the country. With the fall of the
256:
ethnic support base and became the key vehicle of the community's political demands and aspirations. Its ideological background and ethnic support base has continuously shaped its character and political agenda. Through the anti-Soviet
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and the Hazara leftists. On the other hand, the leftists did not seek any official positions within the party ranks. They were mostly concerned with ensuring their personal security and avoiding persecution by the mujahedin.
582:
In its history, the party suffered three major defeats. The first defeat was marked by its downfall in Kabul and the death of Mazari at the hands of the Taliban in March 1995. Secondly, in August 1998 the northern city of
419:
hegemony by important non-Khomeinist elements of the clergy. Behishthi's Shura was different from other organizations. He represented the conservative and non-revolutionary component of the ulema. He was a follower of the
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Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. ‘The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009’, Crisis States Working Papers (Working Paper no.51) page 7-8, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
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Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. ‘The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009’, Crisis States Working Papers (Working Paper no.51) page 6-7, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
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Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. ‘The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009’, Crisis States Working Papers (Working Paper no.51) page 5-6, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
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Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. "The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009", Crisis States Working Papers (Working Paper no.51) page 2-3, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
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Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. ‘The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009’, Crisis States Working Papers (Working Paper no.51) page 19, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
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Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. ‘The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009’, Crisis States Working Papers (Working Paper no.51) page 13, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
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Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. ‘The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009’, Crisis States Working Papers (Working Paper no.51) page 11, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
1227:
Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. ‘The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009’, Crisis States Working Papers (Working Paper no.51) page 10, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
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Harpviken, Kristian Berg. 1998. ‘The Hazara of Afghanistan: The Thorny Path towards Political Unity, 1978–1992’, in Touraj Atabaki & John O’Kane (eds): 103, Post-Soviet Central Asia. London: I. B. Tauris
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Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. ‘The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009’, Crisis States Working Papers (Working Paper no.51) page 9, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
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Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. ‘Divide and Rule: State Penetration in Hazarajat (Afghanistan) from Monarchy to the Taliban’, Crisis States Working Papers (Series 2) 42, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
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Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. ‘The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009’, Crisis States Working Papers (Working Paper no.51) page 8, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
1133:
Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. ‘The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009’, Crisis States Working Papers (Working Paper no.51) page 8, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
1113:
Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. ‘The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009’, Crisis States Working Papers (Working Paper no.51) page 7, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
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Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. ‘The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009’, Crisis States Working Papers (Working Paper no.51) page 6, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
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Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. ‘The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009’, Crisis States Working Papers (Working Paper no.51) page 5, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
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Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. ‘The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009’, Crisis States Working Papers (Working Paper no.51) page 4, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
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Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. "The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009", Crisis States Working Papers (Working Paper no.51) page 2, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
850:
Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. "The Dissipation of Political Capital among Afghanistan’s Hazaras: 2001-2009", Crisis States Working Papers (Working Paper no.51) page 1, London: Crisis States Research Centre,
969:
Harpviken, Kristian Berg. 1998. ‘The Hazara of Afghanistan: The Thorny Path towards Political Unity, 1978–1992’, in Touraj Atabaki & John O’Kane (eds), Post-Soviet Central Asia. London: I. B. Tauris.
978:
Yakawlangi, Qorban Ali Earfani. 1993. Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan: Az kongara ta kongarah (Hezb-e Wahdat: from Congress to Congress) p271. Qom, Iran: Afghanistan Authors Cultural Centre.
428:’s revolutionary Islamism and dominant among Afghan Shiites until the early 1980s. By the time Hezb-e Wahdat was in the making, Beheshti was reduced to leading a small fraction of the Shura in
596:. Wahdat It never managed to recover after the fall of Mazar e sharif and Bamyan into the hands of the Taliban, because of the high losses in its rank and file and at the leadership levels.
931:
Yakawlangi, Qorban Ali Earfani. 1993. Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan: Az kongara ta Kogarah (Hezb-e Wahdat: from Congress to Congress). Qom, Iran: Afghanistan Authors Cultural Centre.
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Wahdat into an ally. Mazari strongly suspected Akbari of trying to undermine him. A few weeks after the party elections, in response to an alleged coup plan by Akbari and sections of
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political developments (discussed below) shows, the party was to pursue a rather independent political strategy, often in conflict with Iranian policies and interests in the country.
987:
Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. ‘At the Sources of Factionalism and Civil in Hazarajat’, Crisis States Working Papers (Series 2) 41 - 30-1, London: Crisis States Research Centre, LSE
1213:
Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2006. ‘The Failure of a Clerical Proto-State: Hazarajat, 1979-1984’, Crisis States Working Papers (Series 2) 6, London: Crisis States Research Centre, LSE
878:
Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2006. "The Failure of a Clerical Proto-State: Hazarajat, 1979-1984", Crisis States Working Papers (Series 2) 6, London: Crisis States Research Centre, LSE
1018:
Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2006. ‘The Failure of a Clerical Proto-State: Hazarajat, 1979-1984’, Crisis States Working Papers (Series 2), London: Crisis States Research Centre, LSE
382:
The Wahdat Manifesto also provided for the formation of provincial- and district-level councils that would report to their relevant committees at the headquarters in Bamyan.
904:
Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. 2009. "At the Sources of Factionalism and Civil in Hazarajat", Crisis States Working Papers (Series 2) 41, London: Crisis States Research Centre, LSE
1094:
Waezi, Hamza. 1999. ‘Afghanistan wa ta’arozat-e stratezhi haye faramilli’ (Afghanistan and Conflicts of Transnational Strategies), Siraj, Quarterly Journal 15: pp.27-78
1694:
444:
Ideologically, most Hezb-e Wahdat leaders were political Islamists. In a way the formation of the party was the culmination of a process of Islamisation of the Hazara
1075:
Dawlatabadi, Basir Ahmed. 1992. Shenasnameh ahzab wa jaryanat-e siasey-e Afghanistan (An introduction to political parties and currents in Afghanistan) 246. Qom, Iran
895:
Dawlatabadi, Basir Ahmed. 1992. "Shenasnameh ahzab we Haryana-e Casey-e Afghanistan" ("An Introduction to Political Parties and Currents in Afghanistan)." Qom, Iran
300:
Several attempts to make peace and ensure stability failed. Alliances and coalitions were crafted and dismantled. The most important and effective of them were the
2010:
1540:
294:
1913:
233:
political party founded in 1989. Like most contemporary major political parties in Afghanistan, Hezb-e Wahdat is rooted in the turbulent period of the
960:
Canfield, Robert L. 2004. New Trends Among the Hazaras: From ‘The Amity of Wolves’ to ‘the Practice of Brotherhood’. St. Louis: Washington University.
237:
in Afghanistan in the 1980s. It was formed to bring together nine separate and mostly inimical military and ideological groups into a single entity.
1066:
Harpviken, Kristian Berg. 1995. ‘Political Mobilization among the Hazaras of Afghanistan’, dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Oslo
1197:
1030:
2015:
1757:
1687:
1518:
825:
649:
316:, Pakistan, it failed to tackle the incessant ideological friction within the party. To stabilize the region a more radical move was required.
1333:
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853:
1923:
1918:
1841:
1821:
1762:
1523:
880:
830:
660:
868:
Farr, Grant M. 1988. "The Rise and Fall of an Indigenous Group: The Shura of the Hazarajat", Afghanistan Studies Journal No.1: pp. 48-61
617:
been unable to find a state job. Many of them opted to reside in their home areas in the Hazarajat, far away from leaderships in Kabul.
2025:
1786:
1680:
2020:
1866:
1811:
1703:
755:
plural of 'mujahed', holy fighters, the militants that fought the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.
449:
Wahdat manifesto emphasized the continuation and intensification of efforts for the creation of an Islamic government based on the
184:
1887:
20:
1801:
1856:
1826:
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Samangani, M. Hussain Safarzadah. 2001. Salami-e Jihad Dar Afghanistan (Years of Jihad in Afghanistan), Volume 2 Qom, Iran
1882:
2030:
2005:
2000:
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1796:
820:
1816:
1442:
1326:
922:
Dawlatabadi, Basir Ahmed. 1999. Shura-e Eatelaf, (The Council of Alliance). Tehran: Thaqalain Cultural Organisation
241:
1861:
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political Islamism during the period of jihad. Husain Ibrahimi, the representative of the Iranian supreme leader
1954:
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1535:
1437:
462:
and had devoted an entire committee for women's affairs that was headed by a university-educated Hazara woman.
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436:
under its control. However, the party suffered from serious structural problems and ideological differences.
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113:
1319:
1194:
1027:
261:
and the civil war, Hezb-e Wahdat accumulated significant political capital among Afghanistan's Hazaras.
1974:
1892:
1597:
680:
170:
1382:
189:
1979:
1774:
1530:
537:
179:
358:
1651:
1295:
849:
445:
877:
574:’. In contrast, Akbari joined the Taliban when they took control of Bamyan in September 1998.
1831:
1737:
634:. Subsequently, Mohaqiq joined the main opposition alliance, the Understanding Front, led by
1163:
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528:
from Hezb-e Wahdat as his deputy and General Dostum as commander of its military affairs.
424:
school of thought, a moderate, non-political and conservative line of thinking opposed to
8:
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122:
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was the ideology of most of its key leaders, but the party gradually tilted towards its
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1270:
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404:
74:
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370:
In its organizational hierarchy, the party included the following key structures:
1969:
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92:
59:
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282:
230:
106:
51:
1942:
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1412:
329:
157:
1402:
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http://www.hazara.net/hazara/organizations/hizbwahdat/hizbwahdat.html
1028:
http://www.hazara.net/hazara/organizations/hizbwahdat/hizbwahdat.html
533:
467:
290:
609:
425:
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4. Hezb-e Wahdat Islami Millat-e Afghanistan (Qurban Ali Erfani)
593:
562:
521:
289:
Following the collapse of the pro-Soviet Kabul government in the
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where one of the final negotiations took place in April 1992.
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102:
482:
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337:
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Roundel of Hezbe Wahdat's air force during the Civil War.
140:
1184:
Giustozzi, Antonio. 2009. Empires of Mud. London: Hurst.
601:
1541:
Revolutionary Council of Islamic Unity of Afghanistan
304:, an alliance of eight major organizations formed in
1914:
Liberation Organization of the People of Afghanistan
1702:
1255:
1253:
1223:
1221:
1219:
1004:
1002:
1992:
1341:
1164:هفته نامه مشارکت ملي (Mosharekat-e Melli weekly)
577:
248:and some other parts of the country. Political
16:Primarily Hazara political party in Afghanistan
1250:
1216:
999:
293:in 1979, the region fell under the control of
2011:Shia Islamic political parties in Afghanistan
1688:
1327:
220:
34:
621:The Political Fragmentation of Hezb-e Wahdat
1919:National Revolutionary Party of Afghanistan
1842:Progressive Democratic Party of Afghanistan
1822:National Solidarity Movement of Afghanistan
1763:National Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan
1758:People's Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan
831:National Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan
826:People's Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan
403:of the meetings in their stronghold in the
244:, it emerged as one of the major actors in
1695:
1681:
1334:
1320:
540:, who had emerged as the main opposition.
36:
1787:Islamic Dawah Organisation of Afghanistan
650:Hezb-e Wahdat Islami Mardum-e Afghanistan
439:
1924:People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
1867:National Solidarity Party of Afghanistan
1812:National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan
357:
272:
1888:Communist (Maoist) Party of Afghanistan
693:Most of these terms are loanwords from
689:Glossary of Dari (Afghan Persian) words
524:was chosen as head of the new council,
21:Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen
1993:
1802:National Congress Party of Afghanistan
661:Hezb-e Wahdat Milli Islami Afghanistan
2016:Political parties established in 1989
1857:National Islamic Front of Afghanistan
1676:
1315:
1193:‘Hezb-e Wahdat. Party structure’, at
498:
281:with Deputy Prime Minister of Russia
1827:National United Party of Afghanistan
1657:
641:1.Hezb-e Wahdat Islami Afghanistan (
208:
1883:Afghanistan Liberation Organization
1271:"Afghanistan through its own media"
1237:BBC Persian Service, March 13, 2004
221:
13:
213:Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan
201:Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan
31:Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan
14:
2042:
1837:Pashtoons Social Democratic Party
1797:National Coalition of Afghanistan
821:List of Islamic political parties
2026:Political parties in Afghanistan
1817:National Movement of Afghanistan
1704:Political parties in Afghanistan
1656:
1647:
1646:
1443:Abdul Khaliq Hazara (politician)
235:anti-Soviet resistance movements
156:
50:
42:Hezb-e Wahdat Islami Afghanistan
2021:Political parties of minorities
1862:Islamic Movement of Afghanistan
1847:Solidarity Party of Afghanistan
1730:Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
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1955:Progressive Youth Organization
1712:Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
1536:Progressive Youth Organization
1438:Abdul Khaliq Hazara (assassin)
934:
925:
916:
907:
898:
889:
871:
862:
843:
415:symbolized the recognition of
1:
1807:National Front of Afghanistan
836:
512:and the northern province of
328:fell into the hand of Hazara
319:With the announcement of the
268:
1373:Muhammad Hussain Sadiqi Nili
578:Hezb e Wahdat (Post-Taliban)
7:
1593:Battle of Kabul (1992–1996)
814:
10:
2047:
1975:Lists of political parties
1893:Watan Party of Afghanistan
18:
2031:Islamic political parties
1965:
1901:
1875:
1728:
1710:
1642:
1606:
1575:
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681:Mosharekat-e Melli Weekly
209:حزب وحدت اسلامی افغانستان
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37:حزب وحدت اسلامی افغانستان
35:
28:
2006:Hezbe Wahdat politicians
2001:Hazara political parties
1383:Sayed Mohammad Ali Jawid
19:Not to be confused with
1980:Politics of Afghanistan
1775:Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin
1531:Hazara Democratic Party
1037:(accessed May 29, 2009)
312:organizations based in
285:, May 14, 2009, Moscow.
242:Second Afghan Civil War
180:Politics of Afghanistan
1567:Enlightenment Movement
446:anti-Soviet resistance
440:Ideology and ethnicity
363:
286:
1832:New Afghanistan Party
1598:Kuchi–Hazara conflict
1576:Battles and Conflicts
361:
276:
1780:Hezb-i Islami Khalis
1488:Abdul Qayyum Sajjadi
1743:Afghan Mellat Party
1468:Sayed Askar Mousavi
1408:Hussain Ali Yousafi
1378:Sayyid Ali Beheshti
1358:Faiz Muhammad Kateb
684:, a weekly magazine
397:Shaikh Asif Mohsini
1478:Ramazan Bashardost
1473:Ahmad Shah Ramazan
1302:2016-03-03 at the
1200:2010-12-01 at the
1033:2010-12-01 at the
883:2007-06-26 at the
856:2016-03-03 at the
795:Council, Assembly
499:Political strategy
364:
287:
119:Hazara nationalism
1988:
1987:
1852:Truth and Justice
1670:
1669:
1607:Artists and Poets
1583:Battle of Uruzgan
1562:Tabassum movement
1555:Grassroots groups
1507:Political parties
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215:"), shortened to
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1738:Afghan Hezbollah
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1453:Muhammad Mohaqiq
1388:Mir Yazdanbakhsh
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654:Muhammad Mohaqiq
590:Balkhab district
536:, the leader of
526:Mohammad Mohaqiq
475:Abdul Ali Mazari
405:Jaghori district
295:Shura-ye Inqilab
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89:Preceded by
75:Abdul Ali Mazari
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1792:Jamiat-e Islami
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1629:Shakeeb Hamdard
1619:Safdar Tawakoli
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510:Panjshir valley
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409:Ghazni province
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302:Shura-ye Etelaf
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1493:Abbas Noyan
1428:Azra Jafari
1351:Key figures
432:of Ghazni.
283:Igor Sechin
240:During the
227:Unity Party
107:Afghanistan
1995:Categories
1943:Nasr Party
1418:Sima Samar
1413:Akram Yari
837:References
785:Guardians
751:Mujahideen
725:Agreement
703:Dari Words
417:Khomeinist
375:the party.
330:mujahideen
269:Background
229:"), is an
151:Party flag
1934:factions)
1403:Khodaidad
765:Movement
745:Covenant
715:Alliance
534:Hekmatyar
468:communist
395:, led by
291:Hazarajat
190:Elections
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815:See also
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426:Khomeini
314:Peshawar
250:Islamism
222:حزب وحدت
114:Ideology
1932:Parcham
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1281:5 April
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563:Taliban
522:Massoud
225:, "the
211:, "the
165:Website
81:Founded
71:Founder
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761:Nahzat
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721:Etefaq
711:Etelaf
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277:Abdul
254:Hazara
231:Afghan
133:Colors
60:Leader
1928:Khalq
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741:Misaq
514:Balkh
451:Quran
422:Khoei
310:Sunni
259:jihad
246:Kabul
145:green
137:Black
103:Kabul
1930:and
1283:2020
1175:LSE.
1144:LSE.
771:Nasr
731:Hezb
483:Iraq
481:and
479:Iran
453:and
338:Iran
205:Dari
143:and
84:1989
1297:LSE
1275:BBC
1260:LSE
1247:LSE
1228:LSE
1154:LSE
1134:LSE
1124:LSE
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1104:LSE
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592:of
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