336:). Replacements for the other arms and services were handled by the Army Service Forces. Casualties in combat units, particularly infantry units, exceeded the capacity of the RTCs to replace them. By February 1944, some 35,249 men had been taken from combat units in training for use as replacements; another 29,521 had been transferred from low priority units to fill up units preparing to move overseas. Between April and September 1944, as casualties in Normandy began to bite, some 91,747 men were stripped from twenty-two divisions in the United States. Maintaining 700,000 men in infantry units required 1,800,000 men in the infantry arm by April 1945. Over 1,000,000 replacements were shipped between September 1943 and August 1945, of whom 82% were infantry. Volunteers for the infantry were accepted from other arms and services. By 1944, all new inductees were being sent to RTCs, where they were trained for 13 to 17 weeks before being sent to combat units. As casualties mounted, a massive comb-out began as the Army Ground Forces struggled to provide replacements. Personnel from non-combat assignments were pulled from duty, hastily trained, and then reassigned to units as combat infantry replacements.
348:
the organization, training, and equipment of this unit was poured the accumulated experience of four years' intensive effort. But, mainly because of personnel exigencies the control of which lay beyond the jurisdiction of the Army Ground Forces, the 65th was about the least ready for combat of all divisions trained in World War II. Its regiments had never worked with their supporting battalions of artillery in field exercises. The division commander had never maneuvered his command as a unit; in fact, the division had never been together, except for reviews and demonstrations, and its composition had changed greatly from one assembly to another. In the infantry regiments, only one man in four had been with the division for a year, and almost every fourth man had joined his unit within the past three months. The division was more of a hodgepodge than a team.
450:) in July 1943 it was apparent that there would not be sufficient troop carrier aircraft to employ them in the manner for which they had been intended. The activation of the 15th Airborne Division in 1943 was canceled, but this did nothing to reduce the disproportionate ratio of airborne to infantry divisions, as all divisions scheduled for activation in late 1943 were eventually canceled. General McNair considered converting the airborne divisions in the United States to light divisions but following the failure of the light division concept, the decision was taken to ship them as airborne divisions, cognizant of the fact that they would operate as light infantry divisions.
102:
78:
120:
508:
combined training with the infantry divisions. Later, it became standard practice to attach a non-divisional tank battalion to each infantry division where possible. Almost 4,000 personnel were cut from the division establishment although the number of
Sherman tanks was only reduced by a quarter. While the old armored division organization was cumbersome and inefficient, the new was flexible but sometimes too lean and light, requiring supplementing. All armored divisions were converted to the new tables except the
332:(RTCs). As new divisions were mobilized, they took their manpower directly from reception centers. The RTCs provided replacements for filler, and were organized to provide replacements in the proportion of units in the army. Army Ground Forces was responsible for training replacements for the four statutory arms (infantry, cavalry, field and coast artillery) and the three new pseudo-arms (armor, antiaircraft artillery, and
316:. However, it also meant that divisions were kept in the line longer than anticipated and took heavier casualties. In three months of intensive combat, an infantry division could expect 100% casualties in its three infantry regiments. Units were maintained by a continuous flow of individual replacements. Such conditions placed great strain on the combat soldier who remained in action until he became a casualty.
25:
697:
304:
became fixed at a lower level than expected. Army strength was fixed at 7,500,000 enlisted men in 1942 and was subsequently cut to 7,004,000 enlisted men in 1943. Further cuts of 433,000 men were made by March 1945. As a result, divisions scheduled for activation in the second half of 1943 were postponed to 1944, then canceled entirely, and no new divisions were formed after June 1943.
283:
many theaters, so overall direction was exercised by the War
Department's General Staff. GHQ also did not become the equivalent of a theater command for the Zone of Interior; administrative authority was exercised by the G-4 of the War Department's General Staff through the Corps Areas and Service Commands. Instead, GHQ was drawn into the enormous task of raising and training an army.
320:
For example, trucks were replaced, wherever possible, by trailers. While admittedly not as useful as trucks, not only were they cheaper to produce, but they required less personnel to maintain, and less space to ship. As a result of economies, 89 divisions were active in 1945 for the same number of personnel as required to man 75 in 1943. General
291:
abolished and their functions, duties, and powers were transferred to the Army Ground Forces. McNair also became responsible for four new "pseudo-arms" – airborne, armor, anti-aircraft and tank destroyer. He had the power to reorganize the ground army, cutting across traditional lines without branch rivalries.
560:. All other cavalry units were converted to the mechanized cavalry reconnaissance role. However, they only spent about 6% of their time on reconnaissance tasks, leading to a postwar consensus that either they lacked the combat power to perform their assigned role or had simply been misused altogether.
524:
Although also frequently out-ranged by their German counterparts, American artillery built up a reputation for effectiveness and the infantry increasingly relied on the artillery to get them forward. The War
Department General Staff ignored the Army Ground Force's recommendations for a powerful heavy
474:
No arm was in such urgent demand in 1942 as anti-aircraft units, and these units were shipped at high priority as soon as, and sometimes even before, they were fully trained. Once the Allied Air Forces began to get the upper hand, demand tapered off and it became apparent that anti-aircraft units had
303:
In 1942, it was estimated that between 200 and 350 divisions would be required to defeat
Germany and Japan. However, only 89 divisions were ultimately readied. This was partially because requirements for service troops and overhead was greater than anticipated, and because the Army's overall strength
483:
While Army Ground Forces endeavored to provide the troops with the best equipment available, they were not always able to provide better equipment than the German enemy. This was particularly apparent with respect to armor. American commanders tended, when forced to make a choice, to prefer mobility
282:
As World War II approached, the role of GHQ remained a training function and a few months after Pearl Harbor, the command was redesignated as HQ, Army Ground Forces in recognition of its revised mission. The concept of a general headquarters was not realized in practice because the war was fought in
347:
If the plans for building and training this division had been carried out as originally laid down by
General McNair and his staff, the 65th when it moved overseas in 1945 might have been the most battleworthy of the long line of divisions produced by the Army Ground Forces. For into the planning of
319:
Energetic and painstaking efforts were made by Army Ground Forces to optimize the divisions for combat operations. Non-essential troops and equipment were eliminated. The principle was established that a unit would have only the equipment that it would normally need. Other economies were also made.
507:
Trimming the tables of organization of the armored divisions in 1943, Army Ground Forces cut the number of tank battalions in the armored division from 6 to 3 and reduced the number of tanks from 390 to 263. In process, the number of non-divisional tank battalions increased to 65, permitting more
385:
divisions. These divisions had more transport than regular infantry divisions. However the proportion of infantry in the armored divisions was increased in 1943, and the regular infantry division actually had sufficient transport if trucks were taken from other duties, so the additional shipping
503:
In 1942, the
Operations Division (OPD) of the War Department General Staff estimated that, by the end of 1943, 140 divisions would be mobilized, of which 46 would be armored. A severe shortage of shipping space, combined with Army Ground Forces doubts about whether this was the correct ratio of
290:
of 28 February 1942 and War
Department Circular No. 59 of 2 March 1942, GHQ became Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, and opened at the Army War College on 9 March 1942. The posts of the chiefs of the four traditional combat arms – Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery – were
580:
and a decision was made that half of all tank destroyer battalions would be equipped with towed guns, emphasizing the defensive role. This decision was reversed after the towed battalions lost large numbers of guns over-run or stuck in mud and snow during the
Ardennes offensive. Later, good
551:
was formed twice. Originally a bi-racial division, its white components were broken up to provide troops for armored units. It was reformed as a colored division only to be broken up again to provide service units. Two non-divisional cavalry regiments served as infantry in the
409:
felt that they had insufficient firepower, and they performed unsatisfactorily in training maneuvers, so the 71st and 89th were converted to regular infantry divisions. Despite its jungle training, the 71st
Infantry Division was rushed to Europe in response to the German
324:
pointed out that the division, while initially well-balanced, soon became unbalanced in combat as the infantry took casualties faster than other arms, requiring the relief of the entire division when most of its components were capable of further effort.
581:
self-propelled gun carriages became available, but massed enemy armor became scarce and most tank destroyer units began operating as field artillery. Some 25 tank destroyer battalions were inactivated to fill depleted infantry and armoured divisions.
294:
Since later commands, such as the
Continental Army Command and Forces Command were redesignations of their predecessors, they celebrated their birthday as 9 March 1942, the day Army Ground Forces were established.
266:
chose to exercise actual command of the Army’s tactical units through the War Department General Staff rather than through GHQ. Marshall delegated only the training functions to GHQ and charged its chief of staff
542:
was shipped to Australia, where it was originally envisioned that it could operate in the mounted role. However, by the time it embarked, the defense of Australia was no longer paramount and it served in the
246:
for the mobilization of enlisted personnel. The Adjutant General retained mobilization responsibility for officer personnel. The GHQ (Initial) (Enlisted) was further allotted 2 September 1939 to the Trenton
461:
regiment almost identical to a standard infantry regiment and more support units, a total of 12,979 men. Airborne divisions in ETO were reorganized on this establishment. The 11th Airborne Division in the
307:
By May 1945, 96% of all tactical troops were overseas. No new units were forming and there were no reserves. Fortunately, these sufficed to bring about the defeat of Germany and Japan, largely because the
529:
prove that air power could not substitute for heavy artillery. As a result, over 100 medium and heavy artillery battalions were activated in 1944, mostly through the conversion of coast artillery units.
496:
medium tank found itself out-performed by German tanks which began appearing in 1943. Opposition from Army Ground Forces was one of the primary factors for the late and limited introduction of the
279:
with the authority for supervision of the training of the Army’s mobile units. However, since Marshall saw McNair infrequently and seldom visited GHQ, it was in practice McNair who directed GHQ.
525:
artillery arm, authorizing only 81 medium and 54 heavy non-divisional artillery battalions instead of the 140 and 101 recommended by Army Ground Forces, only to have combat experience in
339:
The result was that divisions embarking for overseas in late 1944 and early 1945 had much less training than those leaving earlier. The last division to depart for overseas, the
219:
Army Ground Forces traced its origins back to mobilization plans created as early as 1921 as a headquarters for directing US field armies overseas, similar to that of the
1284:
466:(SWPA) remained on the old AGF establishment. With a strength of only 8,500 men, it had one parachute infantry regiment and two smaller glider infantry regiments.
286:
In March 1942, there was a sweeping reorganization of the Army that reduced the number of officers reporting to the chief of staff. Under Executive Order 9082
46:
598:
207:. Its strength of 780,000 troops on 1 May 1942 grew to a peak of 2,200,000 by 1 July 1943. Thereafter its strength declined as units departed for
235:
1259:
1250:
1241:
1214:
1153:
1141:
1279:
457:(ETO) favored a larger airborne division than Army Ground Forces, developing a larger division with two parachute infantry regiments, a
33:
1274:
569:
557:
259:
255:, Washington, D.C. The Headquarters Company, GHQ, was constituted 8 July 1941 and activated 14 July 1941 at the Army War College.
1136:
Green, Constance McLaughlin; Thomson, Harry C.; Roots, Peter C. (1955), "The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War",
431:
427:
423:
402:
398:
390:
378:
340:
374:
370:
366:
362:
358:
381:
Infantry Divisions were converted to motorized divisions, intended to operate with armored divisions, similar to the German
539:
513:
509:
623:
614:
504:
infantry armored units, led to this being revised downward to just 16 armored divisions actually being active in 1943.
268:
152:
1222:
1181:
594:
590:
489:
589:
Army Ground Forces survived the post-war reorganization of the War Department. It became Army Field Forces in 1948,
526:
203:. Throughout their existence, Army Ground Forces were the largest training organization ever established in the
454:
252:
386:
space required for them did not appear worthwhile, and all were converted back to regular infantry divisions.
272:
220:
196:
1205:
691:
U.S. Army Order of Battle, 1919-1941, Volume 1. The Arms: Major Commands and Infantry Organizations, 1919-41
1173:
313:
231:
329:
1148:
Greenfield, Kent; Palmer, Robert R.; Wiley, Bell I. (1947), "The Organization of Ground Combat Troops",
548:
447:
443:
188:
602:
641:
632:
553:
544:
463:
439:
328:
This eventually brought the entire training program down. In 1941, replacements were produced by
164:
38:
1198:: Historical Office, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces
577:
435:
389:
Three light divisions were formed, in response to combat experience in 1942 and 1943. The
8:
1246:
1237:
411:
200:
287:
77:
405:
as a light truck division. Theater commanders were lukewarm about the concept. General
263:
125:
262:
was designated as the commanding general of GHQ. After the activation of GHQ, General
1238:
Origins of the Army Ground Forces General Headquarters, United States Army, 1940–1942
1218:
1177:
1157:
406:
321:
251:) Military District. The headquarters was partially activated on 26 July 1940 at the
243:
208:
617:
394:
276:
239:
155:
1255:
644:
635:
484:
to firepower. The result was a number of uninspiring designs. In particular, the
458:
382:
172:
167:
1192:
A History of Command and Control of Army Forces in the Continental United States
1099:
488:
was a dud which convinced Army Ground Forces that heavy tanks were no good and
333:
1100:"Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army tank destroyer Doctrine in World War II"
475:
been over-produced. Many units were then broken up for infantry replacements.
1268:
701:
573:
485:
414:. The 10th remained a special mountain division and fought as such in Italy.
238:
for mobilization responsibility. It was partially organized 9 August 1932 at
204:
107:
1161:
497:
309:
192:
1195:
224:
693:. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press. p. 95, 97.
493:
248:
626:
160:
572:
was probably the most controversial. Tank destroyers based on the
700:
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the
24:
601:(TRADOC) in 1973. FORSCOM wears the former Army Ground Forces'
312:
carried most of the burden of fighting the German Army on the
1203:
Palmer, Robert R.; Wiley, Bell I.; Keast, William R. (1948),
1170:
Through Mobility We Conquer: The Mechanization of US Cavalry
242:
GHQ (Initial) (Enlisted) was allotted 1 October 1933 to the
516:, which remained under the old, with some modifications.
1206:"The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops"
1147:
1119:
1049:
1037:
1025:
1001:
989:
977:
965:
953:
941:
905:
833:
821:
809:
797:
785:
773:
761:
737:
725:
713:
676:
492:
that Army Ground Forces did not really want one. The
187:were one of the three autonomous components of the
1204:
593:(CONARC) in 1955, and was ultimately divided into
1285:Military units and formations established in 1942
1135:
1013:
538:Two horse cavalry divisions existed in 1941. The
1266:
1202:
1073:
929:
917:
893:
881:
869:
857:
845:
599:United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
298:
401:as one specializing in jungle warfare, and the
393:was formed as a light division specializing in
288:"Reorganizing the Army and the War Department"
1260:United States Army Center of Military History
1251:United States Army Center of Military History
1242:United States Army Center of Military History
1215:United States Army Center of Military History
1154:United States Army Center of Military History
1142:United States Army Center of Military History
230:General Headquarters was constituted in the
16:Component of the US Army during World War II
1247:A Short History of the Army Ground Forces
743:
49:of all important aspects of the article.
1256:Training in Mountain and Winter Warfare
1167:
1085:
1061:
1267:
45:Please consider expanding the lead to
1189:
749:
664:
688:
352:
18:
1120:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
1050:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
1038:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
1026:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
1002:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
990:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
978:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
966:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
954:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
942:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
906:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
834:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
822:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
810:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
798:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
786:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
774:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
762:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
738:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
726:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
714:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
677:Greenfield, Palmer & Wiley 1947
442:) were formed, but as early as the
13:
1280:United States Army in World War II
1231:
1150:United States Army in World War II
234:on 15 August 1927 and allotted to
14:
1296:
1097:
595:United States Army Forces Command
563:
1275:American Theater of World War II
695:
469:
118:
100:
76:
23:
1113:
1091:
1079:
1067:
1055:
1043:
1031:
1019:
1014:Green, Thomson & Roots 1955
1007:
995:
983:
971:
959:
947:
935:
923:
911:
899:
887:
875:
863:
851:
839:
827:
815:
803:
791:
779:
37:may be too short to adequately
1074:Palmer, Wiley & Keast 1948
930:Palmer, Wiley & Keast 1948
918:Palmer, Wiley & Keast 1948
894:Palmer, Wiley & Keast 1948
882:Palmer, Wiley & Keast 1948
870:Palmer, Wiley & Keast 1948
858:Palmer, Wiley & Keast 1948
846:Palmer, Wiley & Keast 1948
767:
755:
731:
719:
707:
682:
670:
658:
638:22 January 1945 – 22 June 1945
629:14 July 1944 – 20 January 1945
455:European Theater of Operations
253:United States Army War College
47:provide an accessible overview
1:
1129:
608:
576:proved too vulnerable in the
299:Organization of ground troops
221:American Expeditionary Forces
1174:University Press of Kentucky
547:in the dismounted role. The
519:
330:Replacement Training Centers
82:AGF Shoulder Sleeve Insignia
7:
1168:Hofmann, George F. (2006),
1016:, pp. 236–239, 278–287
647:29 June 1945 – 9 March 1948
620:9 March 1942 – 13 July 1944
584:
500:into the European Theater.
417:
10:
1301:
533:
214:
444:Allied invasion of Sicily
422:Five airborne divisions (
189:Army of the United States
146:
141:
131:
113:
95:
87:
75:
70:
689:Clay, Steven E. (2010).
651:
603:shoulder sleeve insignia
591:Continental Army Command
478:
1211:US Army in World War II
1190:Moenk, Jean R. (1972),
1172:, Lexington, Kentucky:
1138:US Army in World War II
554:South West Pacific Area
545:South West Pacific Area
464:South West Pacific Area
195:, the others being the
1098:Gabel, Christopher R.
578:North African campaign
350:
343:, fared worst of all:
341:65th Infantry Division
345:
1152:, Washington, D.C.:
1140:, Washington, D.C.:
549:2nd Cavalry Division
540:1st Cavalry Division
236:the Adjutant General
490:Ordnance Department
403:89th Light Division
399:71st Light Division
391:10th Light Division
201:Army Service Forces
159:Lieutenant General
1122:, pp. 423–434
1107:Leavenworth Papers
1088:, pp. 387–388
1076:, pp. 55, 493
1052:, pp. 233–235
1040:, pp. 326–335
1028:, pp. 392–394
1004:, pp. 418–423
968:, pp. 342–349
956:, pp. 336–339
944:, pp. 487–488
932:, pp. 422–423
860:, pp. 171–172
848:, pp. 227–229
824:, pp. 193–194
812:, pp. 244–246
776:, pp. 216–217
624:Lieutenant General
615:Lieutenant General
570:tank destroyer arm
412:Ardennes Offensive
269:Lieutenant General
264:George C. Marshall
185:Army Ground Forces
153:Lieutenant General
126:United States Army
71:Army Ground Forces
1213:, Washington DC:
558:China Burma India
353:Special divisions
322:Douglas MacArthur
244:Second Corps Area
209:overseas theaters
178:
177:
64:
63:
1292:
1227:
1208:
1199:
1186:
1164:
1144:
1123:
1117:
1111:
1110:
1104:
1095:
1089:
1083:
1077:
1071:
1065:
1059:
1053:
1047:
1041:
1035:
1029:
1023:
1017:
1011:
1005:
999:
993:
987:
981:
975:
969:
963:
957:
951:
945:
939:
933:
927:
921:
915:
909:
903:
897:
891:
885:
879:
873:
867:
861:
855:
849:
843:
837:
831:
825:
819:
813:
807:
801:
795:
789:
783:
777:
771:
765:
759:
753:
747:
741:
735:
729:
723:
717:
711:
705:
699:
698:
694:
686:
680:
674:
668:
662:
618:Lesley J. McNair
395:mountain warfare
277:Lesley J. McNair
240:Washington, D.C.
156:Lesley J. McNair
137:2,200,000 (1943)
124:
122:
121:
106:
104:
103:
80:
68:
67:
59:
56:
50:
27:
19:
1300:
1299:
1295:
1294:
1293:
1291:
1290:
1289:
1265:
1264:
1258:. 1946. At the
1249:. 1946. At the
1240:. 1946. At the
1234:
1232:Further reading
1225:
1184:
1132:
1127:
1126:
1118:
1114:
1102:
1096:
1092:
1084:
1080:
1072:
1068:
1060:
1056:
1048:
1044:
1036:
1032:
1024:
1020:
1012:
1008:
1000:
996:
988:
984:
976:
972:
964:
960:
952:
948:
940:
936:
928:
924:
916:
912:
904:
900:
892:
888:
880:
876:
868:
864:
856:
852:
844:
840:
832:
828:
820:
816:
808:
804:
796:
792:
784:
780:
772:
768:
760:
756:
748:
744:
736:
732:
724:
720:
712:
708:
696:
687:
683:
675:
671:
663:
659:
654:
645:Jacob L. Devers
636:Joseph Stilwell
611:
587:
566:
536:
522:
481:
472:
459:glider infantry
448:Operation Husky
420:
383:Panzergrenadier
355:
301:
217:
197:Army Air Forces
181:
173:Jacob L. Devers
170:
168:Joseph Stilwell
163:
158:
148:
136:
119:
117:
101:
99:
83:
60:
54:
51:
44:
32:This article's
28:
17:
12:
11:
5:
1298:
1288:
1287:
1282:
1277:
1263:
1262:
1253:
1244:
1233:
1230:
1229:
1228:
1223:
1200:
1187:
1182:
1165:
1145:
1131:
1128:
1125:
1124:
1112:
1090:
1078:
1066:
1054:
1042:
1030:
1018:
1006:
994:
982:
970:
958:
946:
934:
922:
910:
898:
886:
874:
872:, pp. 173
862:
850:
838:
826:
814:
802:
790:
778:
766:
754:
742:
730:
718:
706:
681:
669:
656:
655:
653:
650:
649:
648:
639:
630:
621:
610:
607:
597:(FORSCOM) and
586:
583:
565:
564:Tank destroyer
562:
535:
532:
521:
518:
480:
477:
471:
468:
419:
416:
354:
351:
334:tank destroyer
300:
297:
260:Chief of Staff
216:
213:
179:
176:
175:
150:
144:
143:
139:
138:
135:780,000 (1942)
133:
129:
128:
115:
111:
110:
97:
93:
92:
89:
85:
84:
81:
73:
72:
62:
61:
41:the key points
31:
29:
22:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1297:
1286:
1283:
1281:
1278:
1276:
1273:
1272:
1270:
1261:
1257:
1254:
1252:
1248:
1245:
1243:
1239:
1236:
1235:
1226:
1224:0-16-001906-0
1220:
1216:
1212:
1207:
1201:
1197:
1193:
1188:
1185:
1183:0-8131-2403-4
1179:
1175:
1171:
1166:
1163:
1159:
1155:
1151:
1146:
1143:
1139:
1134:
1133:
1121:
1116:
1108:
1101:
1094:
1087:
1082:
1075:
1070:
1064:, p. 289
1063:
1058:
1051:
1046:
1039:
1034:
1027:
1022:
1015:
1010:
1003:
998:
992:, p. 349
991:
986:
980:, p. 177
979:
974:
967:
962:
955:
950:
943:
938:
931:
926:
920:, p. 218
919:
914:
908:, p. 245
907:
902:
896:, p. 208
895:
890:
884:, p. 201
883:
878:
871:
866:
859:
854:
847:
842:
836:, p. 318
835:
830:
823:
818:
811:
806:
800:, p. 242
799:
794:
788:, p. 226
787:
782:
775:
770:
764:, p. 198
763:
758:
751:
746:
740:, p. 152
739:
734:
727:
722:
715:
710:
703:
702:public domain
692:
685:
678:
673:
666:
661:
657:
646:
643:
640:
637:
634:
631:
628:
625:
622:
619:
616:
613:
612:
606:
605:to this day.
604:
600:
596:
592:
582:
579:
575:
574:M3 Half-track
571:
561:
559:
555:
550:
546:
541:
531:
528:
517:
515:
511:
505:
501:
499:
495:
491:
487:
486:M6 Heavy Tank
476:
470:Anti-aircraft
467:
465:
460:
456:
451:
449:
445:
441:
437:
433:
429:
425:
415:
413:
408:
404:
400:
396:
392:
387:
384:
380:
376:
372:
368:
364:
360:
357:In 1942, the
349:
344:
342:
337:
335:
331:
326:
323:
317:
315:
314:Eastern Front
311:
305:
296:
292:
289:
284:
280:
278:
274:
273:Major General
270:
265:
261:
256:
254:
250:
245:
241:
237:
233:
228:
226:
222:
212:
210:
206:
205:United States
202:
198:
194:
190:
186:
180:Military unit
174:
169:
166:
162:
157:
154:
151:
145:
140:
134:
130:
127:
116:
112:
109:
108:United States
98:
94:
90:
86:
79:
74:
69:
66:
58:
48:
42:
40:
35:
30:
26:
21:
20:
1210:
1191:
1169:
1149:
1137:
1115:
1106:
1093:
1086:Hofmann 2006
1081:
1069:
1062:Hofmann 2006
1057:
1045:
1033:
1021:
1009:
997:
985:
973:
961:
949:
937:
925:
913:
901:
889:
877:
865:
853:
841:
829:
817:
805:
793:
781:
769:
757:
752:, p. 13
745:
733:
721:
709:
690:
684:
672:
667:, p. 23
660:
588:
567:
537:
523:
506:
502:
498:M26 Pershing
482:
473:
452:
421:
388:
356:
346:
338:
327:
318:
310:Soviet Union
306:
302:
293:
285:
281:
257:
232:Regular Army
229:
218:
193:World War II
184:
182:
65:
52:
36:
34:lead section
1196:Fort Monroe
728:, p. 8
716:, p. 6
679:, p. 5
258:The Army’s
225:World War I
55:August 2010
1269:Categories
1130:References
750:Moenk 1972
665:Moenk 1972
609:Commanders
494:M4 Sherman
249:New Jersey
149:commanders
142:Commanders
520:Artillery
407:MacArthur
91:1942–1948
39:summarize
627:Ben Lear
585:Post-war
418:Airborne
171:General
161:Ben Lear
1162:6993009
642:General
633:General
534:Cavalry
271:(later
215:Origins
191:during
165:General
147:Notable
96:Country
1221:
1180:
1160:
397:, the
123:
114:Branch
105:
88:Active
1103:(PDF)
652:Notes
527:Italy
479:Armor
440:101st
1219:ISBN
1178:ISBN
1158:OCLC
568:The
556:and
512:and
453:The
438:and
436:82nd
432:17th
428:13th
424:11th
379:90th
377:and
199:and
183:The
132:Size
514:3rd
510:2nd
375:9th
371:8th
367:7th
363:6th
359:4th
227:.
223:in
1271::
1217:,
1209:,
1194:,
1176:,
1156:,
1105:.
434:,
430:,
426:,
373:,
369:,
365:,
361:,
275:)
211:.
1109:.
704:.
446:(
247:(
57:)
53:(
43:.
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
