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After the arrival of the strike force, the leading helicopter crew who been there earlier told
Colonel Aprelkin that they were not on their target location, but the commander, Colonel Aprelkin disagreed and stated that the strike force had not yet arrived at the target location. He ordered the pilot
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command plane would follow the main strike force and do a photo evaluation of the raid, while the forces themselves would be led by
Colonel Vladimir Aprelkin. The plan was complicated as the target was at a large distance and Soviet helicopters couldn't reach the target without refueling. Ultimately
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After some time they came across a road with a civilian bus driving on it but no such roads were on the Soviet map. Colonel
Aprelkin was again informed but now the Colonel saw some buildings and he was convinced that it was their target of Robat Jaali. He issued an order to the force to engage.
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The
Soviets soon realised it wasn't their target but an ordinary civilian asphalt factory which was closed on that day. At the same time, General Tabunshchikov who came for damage assessment saw the situation and informed Colonel Aprelkin over radio that the strike force had crossed the Iranian
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Mujahideen became aware of the Soviet failure and were able to evacuate their base before the Soviet raid. The, Iranian government filed diplomatic protests with the Soviet Union. Soviet officials issued a formal statement accepting responsibility for the mistake and compensation was paid. The
386:. By that time a group of Iranian Army tanks approached and started firing, the Soviets were again ordered not to engage; the Iranians retook the factory. The Soviets hastily retreated, leaving some personnel behind who they were forced to walk the three hours back to the Afghan border.
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The operation did not go as planned. Just as the helicopters flew from their base for refueling point, they faced a severe sandstorm causing them to split into small groups, each of which had to reach the point on its own with the last groups reaching at night.
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The lead helicopter landed at the purported target and soon others in the strike force also landed. In about twenty minutes, the Soviet soldiers came out of their helicopters and captured the compound which was guarded by only two civilian guards.
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had been ordered by the
General not to engage. "It was bad enough that we had attacked the Iranian town," Tabunshchikov said, "and there was no need to escalate the problem by shooting down Iranian airplanes over Iran." The Iranian
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border and landed near the town of Harmak. General
Tabunshchikov ordered the strike force to evacuate immediately. He informed his superiors telling them, "Our troops are on foreign territory!"
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had been raging on for two years, and seemingly wasn't close to an end. The
Soviets were in the control of major population centres while the rural areas were mostly under Mujahideen control.
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On the morning of 5 April, the strike force departed from the refueling point for the target, with
Colonel Aprelkin as a passenger in the frontal helicopter. At the specified time, two
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official Soviet inquiry put the blame on
Colonel Aprelkin for inaccurate navigating and unauthorised attack. He was demoted but remained as a commander in Afghanistan.
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However, some flares were released too high, and a strong wind blew them off course by several kilometres and they landed on the
Iranian side of the border.
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special forces, would assemble about 50 kilometres from Robat Jaali for refueling on 4 April. The next morning, the target would be bombed by about 12
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just a few kilometres from the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran tripoint, given the nickname of "The Bermuda Triangle" by the Soviets. According to
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who would capture the target along with all its supplies. Then after six hours they would be refueled and return to base.
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In March 1982, the Soviets decided to destroy a vital supply base at the village of Robat Jaali in southern
286:, and to maintain operational secrecy the Soviet military did not inform either the Afghan Army or
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to keep flying towards the flares and the rest of the strike group followed.
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The operation was commanded by General Anatoly Tabunshchikov, who in an
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refers to the accidental infiltration of Iranian territory during the
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from the Iranian Air Force arrived and opened fire on the landed
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it was decided that a force of 600 Soviet troops, including
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330:to mark the location of the target and the other
250:and accidentally destroyed an asphalt factory in
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560:Military operations involving the Soviet Union
485:"Russian invasion of Iran, operation South"
510:"When Soviets accidentally invaded Iran"
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290:as both had many Mujahideen informants.
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369:, they were followed by two more
334:successfully bombed the target.
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535:1982 in international relations
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127:General Anatoly Tabunshchikov
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545:Aerial operations and battles
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68:destroyed and several damaged
460:"When the USSR invaded Iran"
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570:Iran–Soviet Union relations
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550:April 1982 events in Asia
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136:Colonel Vladimir Aprelkin
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540:1982 in military history
382:managed to destroy two
363:F-4 Phantom II fighters
112:Commanders and leaders
240:1982 Harmak incident
215:Casualties and losses
19:1982 Harmak incident
280:Soviet intelligence
326:dropped parachute
565:Soviet–Afghan War
264:Soviet–Afghan War
244:Soviet–Afghan War
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188:Soviet Air Forces
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60:Iranian victory
26:Soviet–Afghan War
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373:. The Soviet
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530:1982 in Iran
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209:Spetsnaz GRU
166:Iranian army
106:Soviet Union
79:Belligerents
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39:5 April 1982
276:Afghanistan
248:Afghanistan
200:Soviet Army
524:Categories
399:References
258:Background
390:Aftermath
227:destroyed
314:Incident
300:Spetsnaz
270:Planning
229:Several
44:Location
24:Part of
375:MiG-23s
295:Antonov
233:damaged
332:Su-17s
328:flares
324:Su-17s
304:Su-17s
284:Moscow
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56:Result
384:Mi-8s
367:Mi-8s
380:F-4s
371:F-4s
361:Two
308:Mi-8
288:KHAD
252:Iran
231:Mi-8
225:Mi-8
93:Iran
66:Mi-8
36:Date
117:N/A
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