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justifying moral beliefs (a primarily epistemological view)—this form of the view more often goes by the name "moral sense theory". However, some theorists take the view to be one which claims that both moral facts and how one comes to be justified in believing them are necessarily bound up with human emotions.
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thinks that in principle, we can. For naturalists, rightness and wrongness are nothing more than certain combinations of natural, non-evaluative properties. Since we can in principle build mechanical detectors for all these natural properties, the ethical naturalist thinks wrongness is something that
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Ethical intuitionists claim that only an agent with a moral sense can observe natural properties and through them discover the moral properties of the situation. Without the moral sense, you might see and hear all the colors and yelps, but the moral properties would remain hidden, and there would be
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However, though the wrongness is obvious, we may find it very difficult to list the features of the scene which account for the wrongness. We discover wrongness through observing natural properties with our five senses. Can we list the necessary and sufficient conditions such that any action which
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One way to understand the moral sense is to draw an analogy between it and other kinds of senses. Beauty is something we see in some faces, artworks and landscapes. We can also hear it in some pieces of music. We clearly do not need an independent aesthetic sense faculty to perceive beauty in the
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are discovered by emotional responses to experience. Some take it to be primarily a view about the nature of moral facts or moral beliefs (a primarily metaphysical view)—this form of the view more often goes by the name "sentimentalism". Others take the view to be primarily about the nature of
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for the rationalist version and "moral sense theory" for the empiricist version. (This will be the use of the terms here. However, the terminology is not ultimately important, so long as one keeps in mind the relevant differences between these two models of non-inferential moral knowledge.)
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criticizes the epistemic basis of moral sentimentalism because of beliefs formed in response to morally irrelevant factors. These factors change our moral decisions, but they should not because they do not have a bearing on the morality of the decision. The example he uses is the
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world. Our ordinary five senses are quite enough to observe it, though merely observing something beautiful is not by itself enough to appreciate its beauty. Suppose we give a name to this ability to appreciate the beauty in things we see: let's call it the aesthetic sense.
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For a recent criticism of sentimentalism (as a primarily metaphysical thesis), see François
Schroeter (2006). D'Arms and Jacobson (2000) also provide a recent critique; however, they criticize "simple sentimentalism" and defend a more "sophisticated sentimentalism".
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This aesthetic sense does not come automatically to all people with perfect vision and hearing, so it is fair to describe it as something extra, something not wholly reducible to vision and hearing. As the aesthetic sense informs us about what is beautiful, we can
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to refer to the general position that we have some non-inferential moral knowledge (that is, basic moral knowledge that is not inferred from or based on any proposition). On this definition, moral sense theory is a form of ethical intuitionism.
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Kane, Robert H. Quest for
Meaning: Values, Ethics, and the Modern Experience. Lecture 6, "Hume and the Challenge of Relativism"and Lecture 7, "Cultural Diversity, Human Nature, and the Social Sciences". The Teaching
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of it. Empirical data shows that people chose differently between the two scenarios despite the consequences being the same; the only difference being pulling a switch in the former and pushing the man in the latter.
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The moral sense is often described as providing information in a way analogous to other sensory modalities, such as sight in the perception of colors. It is contrasted with the way in which one acquires
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as informing us of what is good. People with a functioning moral sense get a clear impression of wrongness when they see (or perhaps even imagine) someone being mugged, for example.
287:(1759). Smith focused less on a single faculty of the moral sense and more on the various sentiments that make up the moral feelings that ground moral judgments.
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205:(372–289 BCE). The eponymous text deals with an innate moral sense possessed by all human beings. All orthodox interpretations of
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The ethical intuitionist typically disagrees (although, it is not essential to the view): they see a wide conceptual gap between
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in principle no way to ever discover them (except, of course, via testimony from someone else with a moral sense).
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An Essay On the Nature and
Conduct of the Passions and Affections, With Illustrations Upon the Moral Sense
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concerning the discovery of moral truths. Moral sense theory typically holds that distinctions between
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Popular historical advocates of some version of the moral sense theory or sentimentalism include the
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247:(1694–1746) developed a version of moral sense theory. The chief statements of his theory occur in
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The key opponents of moral sense theory (as a primarily epistemological view) are rationalist
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Arguably the most prominent defender of moral sense theory in the history of philosophy is
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The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (
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The first prominent moral sense theory (especially using the term "sense") is found in
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Theory in moral epistemology and meta-ethics concerning the discovery of moral truths
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accept this view, several unorthodox groups make a point of refuting it (see:
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An
Inquiry Concerning the Original of Our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good
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236:(1671–1713). His major work espousing a form of moral sense theory is
585:(Winter 2018 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
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In the West, the first prominent moral sense theory is found in
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Prinz, Jesse (2006). "The
Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments",
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Fieser, James (2006). "David Hume (1711-1776) - Moral Theory",
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213:). This line of thinking reached its most extreme iteration in
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An
Inquiry Into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue
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D'Arms, J. & Jacobson, D. (2000). "Sentiment and Value",
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Adam Smith also advanced a form of moral sense theory in his
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266:(1711–1776). While he discusses morality in Book 3 of his
530:, 2 Vols., Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Company.
472:, J. Fieser and B.H. Dowden (eds.) U. Tennessee/Martin. (
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Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2006a). "Moral
Skepticism",
240:(first published in an unauthorized edition in 1699).
490:Kauppinan, Antii (2014). " Moral Sentimentalism",
450:Cohon, Rachel (2004). "Hume's Moral Philosophy",
439:Campbell, Richmond (2003). "Moral Epistemology",
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188:models of this. One may thus distinguish between
132:(1723–1790). Some contemporary advocates include
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180:However, it is important to distinguish between
46:but its sources remain unclear because it lacks
483:(Winter 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (
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479:Gill, Michael B. (2006). "Lord Shaftesbury ",
293:(1710–1796) defends moral sense theory in his
275:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
234:Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury
295:Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind
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77:Learn how and when to remove this message
310:argued on behalf of moral sense theory.
583:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
542:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
481:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
470:The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
452:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
441:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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238:An Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit
343:satisfies these conditions is wrong?
465:, Vol. 110, No. 4, pp. 722–748.
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610:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
551:Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2006b).
351:a machine could eventually detect.
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434:References and further reading
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581:, in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.),
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356:natural facts and evaluations
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526:Raphael, D.D. (ed.) (1991).
164:Intuition versus moral sense
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555:, Oxford University Press.
544:, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (
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577:Kauppinen, Antti (2018),
630:Epistemological theories
519:Huemer, Michael (2005).
443:Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (
269:Treatise of Human Nature
160:form of sentimentalism.
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413:and compares it to the
118:3rd Earl of Shaftesbury
96:) is a theory in moral
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579:"Moral Sentimentalism"
514:The Right and the Good
251:(1725; Treatise II of
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498:Moore, G.E. (1903).
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512:Ross, W.D. (1930).
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386:(2005), and other
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564:References
390:, such as
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130:Adam Smith
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