2453:, and any list party which does not receive at least a specified percentage of list votes will not be allocated any seats, even if it received enough votes to have otherwise receive a seat. Examples of countries using the Sainte-Laguë method with a threshold are Germany and New Zealand (5%), although the threshold does not apply if a party wins at least one electorate seat in New Zealand or three electorate seats in Germany. Sweden uses a modified Sainte-Laguë method with a 4% threshold, and a 12% threshold in individual constituencies (i.e. a political party can gain representation with a minuscule representation on the national stage, if its vote share in at least one constituency exceeded 12%). Norway has a threshold of 4% to qualify for
924:
1667:
59:
899:
911:
2417:; in this method, the quota is called a "divisor". For a given value of the divisor, the population count for each region is divided by this divisor and then rounded to give the number of legislators to allocate to that region. In order to make the total number of legislators come out equal to the target number, the divisor is adjusted to make the sum of allocated seats after being rounded give the required total.
2386:/1.2. That is, the modified method changes the sequence of divisors used in this method from (1, 3, 5, 7, ...) to (1.4, 3, 5, 7, ...). This makes it more difficult for parties to earn only one seat, compared to the unmodified Sainte-Laguë's method. With the modified method, such small parties do not get any seats; these seats are instead given to a larger party.
2433: + 1/2, so at each step the next region to get a seat will be the one with the largest value of this quotient. That means that this successive adjustment method for implementing Webster's method allocates seats in the same order to the same regions as the Sainte-Laguë method would allocate them.
3229:
3160:
Mathematically, divisor methods for allocating seats to parties on the basis of party vote shares are identical to divisor methods for allocating seats to geographic units on the basis of the unit's share of the total population. ... Similarly, the Sainte-Laguë method is identical to a method devised
2632:, but uses different divisors. The Jefferson/D'Hondt method favors larger parties while the Webster/Sainte-Laguë method doesn't. The Webster/Sainte-Laguë method is generally seen as more proportional, but risks an outcome where a party with more than half the votes can win fewer than half the seats.
2409:
Webster and Sainte-Laguë methods should be treated as two methods with the same result, because the
Webster method is used for allocating seats based on states' population, and the Sainte-Laguë based on parties' votes. Webster invented his method for legislative apportionment (allocating legislative
2389:
Norway further amends this system by utilizing a two-tier proportionality. The number of members to be returned from each of Norway's 19 constituencies (former counties) depends on the population and area of the county: each inhabitant counts one point, while each km counts 1.8 points. Furthermore,
2420:
One way to determine the correct value of the divisor would be to start with a very large divisor, so that no seats are allocated after rounding. Then the divisor may be successively decreased until one seat, two seats, three seats and finally the total number of seats are allocated. The number of
2436:
In 1980 the German physicist Hans
Schepers, at the time Head of the Data Processing Group of the German Bundestag, suggested that the distribution of seats according to d'Hondt be modified to avoid putting smaller parties at a disadvantage. German media started using the term Schepers Method and
1184:
In this example, 230,000 voters decide the disposition of 8 seats among 4 parties. Since 8 seats are to be allocated, each party's total votes are divided by 1, then by 3, and 5 (and then, if necessary, by 7, 9, 11, 13, and so on by using the formula above) every time the number of votes is the
3237:
2342:
1028:
attempt to distribute seats in proportion to the votes for each political party, i.e. a party with 30% of votes would receive 30% of seats. Exact proportionality is not possible because only whole seats can be distributed. Different
2178:
2457:
that are allocated according to the national distribution of votes. This means that even though a party is below the threshold of 4% nationally, they can still get seats from constituencies in which they are particularly popular.
1188:
For comparison, the "True proportion" column shows the exact fractional numbers of seats due, calculated in proportion to the number of votes received. (For example, 100,000/230,000 × 8 = 3.48.)
2410:
seats to regions based on their share of the population) rather than elections (allocating legislative seats to parties based on their share of the votes) but this makes no difference to the calculations in the method.
3319:
2182:
Second, the error for each party is weighted according to the vote share of each party to represent each voter equally. In the last step, the errors for each party are summed up. This error is identical to the
1793:
stipulates each region must be allocated at least 3 seats and that the ratio of electors to seats is as nearly as possible the same for each, the
Commission found the Sainte-Laguë method produced the smallest
3020:
3294:
1142:
2192:
1969:
882:
2043:
566:
1998:
approach. First, the difference between the seats-to-votes ratio for a party and the ideal seats-to-votes ratio is calculated and squared to obtain the error for the party
1033:, of which the Sainte-Laguë method is one, exist to distribute the seats according to the votes. Different apportionment methods show different levels of proportionality,
585:
1166:
Whichever party has the highest quotient gets the next seat allocated, and their quotient is recalculated. The process is repeated until all seats have been allocated.
3337:
1912:
1885:
1838:
3016:
3129:
2036:
2016:
1992:
1858:
2704:
Sainte-Laguë, André. "La représentation proportionnelle et la méthode des moindres carrés." Annales scientifiques de l'école
Normale Supérieure. Vol. 27. 1910.
1169:
The
Webster/Sainte-Laguë method does not ensure that a party receiving more than half the votes will win at least half the seats; nor does its modified form.
3287:
2607:
952:
789:
3232:[The Iraqi House of Representatives votes for the electoral law and schedules next meeting to Thursday after approving Kirkuk's elections law].
2673:
1041:. The Sainte-Laguë method minimizes the average seats-to-votes ratio deviation and empirically shows the best proportionality behavior and more equal
3487:
17:
2730:
1790:
3937:
3382:
For example with three seats, a 55-25-20 vote is seen to be more proportionally represented by an allocation of 1-1-1 seats than by 2-1-0.
3705:
643:
3362:
3320:"European Parliament (Number of MEPs and Distribution between Electoral Regions) (United Kingdom and Gibraltar) Order 2008 - Hansard"
2399:
1009:
3201:
2718:
Pennisi, Aline. "Disproportionality indexes and robustness of proportional allocation methods." Electoral
Studies 17.1 (1998): 3-19.
1765:
would allocate four seats to party A and no seats to party D, reflecting the D'Hondt method's overrepresentation of larger parties.
3833:
3685:
3455:
675:
537:
532:
3932:
3710:
945:
638:
3695:
3480:
994:
320:
3413:
2918:
2581:
4059:
3341:
2949:(2003), "Degrees of proportionality of proportional representation formulas", in Grofman, Bernard; Lijphart, Arend (eds.),
844:
95:
1012:(Act of 25 June 1842, ch 46, 5 Stat. 491). The same method was independently invented in 1910 by the French mathematician
3742:
1101:
2778:
2573:
938:
1045:
for different sized parties among apportionment methods. Among other common methods, the D'Hondt method favours large
3473:
3153:
2958:
2881:
2535:
839:
3927:
3873:
829:
579:
550:
490:
3230:"البرلمان العراقي يصوت بالإجماع على قانون الانتخابات ويرفع جلسته الى الخميس المقبل بعد قراءة قانون انتخابات كركوك"
3176:
1920:
4054:
3725:
2577:
2539:
561:
86:
2519:
4097:
4077:
3853:
624:
1974:
The Sainte-Laguë method approximates proportionality by optimizing the seats-to-votes ratio among all parties
688:
3250:
2684:
2543:
266:
251:
236:
3896:
3881:
3700:
2558:
502:
425:
346:
3690:
2398:
Webster proposed the method in the United States
Congress in 1832 for proportional allocation of seats in
3947:
3670:
3660:
3521:
2337:{\displaystyle error=\sum _{i}v_{i}*error_{i}=\sum _{i}{v_{i}*\left({\frac {s_{i}}{v_{i}}}-1\right)^{2}}}
1774:
867:
314:
296:
137:
3912:
3603:
3441:
758:
741:
708:
472:
460:
430:
231:
189:
122:
3436:
2635:
When there are two parties, the
Webster method is the unique divisor method which is identical to the
3962:
3917:
3863:
3775:
3446:
3116:
2402:. In 1842 the method was adopted (Act of June 25, 1842, ch 46, 5 Stat. 491). It was then replaced by
614:
607:
91:
2527:
3952:
3838:
3796:
3715:
3640:
3576:
3534:
3036:"Don't let the lawyers do the math: Some problems of legislative districting in the UK and the USA"
2979:
2648:
2636:
2414:
2403:
1786:
1066:
1030:
668:
596:
448:
435:
418:
395:
373:
336:
326:
2753:
2018:. To achieve equal representation of each voter, the ideal ratio of seats share to votes share is
1162:
is the number of seats that have been allocated so far to that party, initially 0 for all parties.
877:
4102:
3977:
3967:
3942:
3758:
3635:
3571:
2623:
2450:
2355:
1782:
1074:
1054:
1038:
1013:
983:
794:
648:
331:
763:
4018:
3957:
3820:
2467:
823:
703:
633:
440:
3143:
2978:
Miller, Nicholas R. (February 2013), "Election inversions under proportional representation",
2965:
2390:
one seat from each constituency is allocated according to the national distribution of votes.
1777:, it is particularly important to avoid bias between large parties and small parties to avoid
3922:
3843:
3608:
2592:
1062:
1034:
731:
571:
455:
261:
240:
172:
150:
2184:
3992:
3561:
2531:
1890:
1863:
1816:
1811:
1042:
998:
986:
862:
849:
817:
81:
8:
3972:
3566:
2585:
2173:{\displaystyle error_{i}=(a_{i}-a_{ideal})^{2}=\left({\frac {s_{i}}{v_{i}}}-1\right)^{2}}
1487:
The 8 highest entries (in the current round of calculation) are marked by asterisk: from
1176:; that is, in order to be allocated seats, a minimum percentage of votes must be gained.
1173:
1058:
1050:
768:
602:
255:
4013:
3623:
3581:
3017:"Distribution of UK Members of the European Parliament ahead of the European elections"
2850:
2842:
2797:
2523:
2446:
2429: + 1 exactly when the divisor equals the population of the region divided by
2021:
2001:
1977:
1843:
1795:
928:
799:
410:
194:
2953:, Agathon series on representation, vol. 1, Algora Publishing, pp. 170–179,
2749:
3982:
3891:
3848:
3768:
3613:
3598:
3556:
3409:
3149:
3099:
3057:
2954:
2914:
2877:
2870:
2854:
2629:
2600:
1799:
1762:
1078:
923:
834:
804:
726:
663:
497:
224:
199:
182:
50:
3460:
3076:
2729:
Schuster, Karsten; Pukelsheim, Friedrich; Drton, Mathias; Draper, Norman R. (2003).
2703:
2610:
in 2011 as the method for calculating the distribution of seats in elections to the
4023:
3655:
3511:
3496:
3401:
3262:
3206:
3091:
3047:
2906:
2834:
2793:
2745:
1785:
showed theoretically that the Sainte-Laguë method shows the lowest average bias in
1778:
1025:
915:
872:
751:
465:
341:
167:
161:
143:
132:
127:
115:
76:
38:
3130:
Stortinget; General
Elections; The main features of the Norwegian electoral system
4071:
3987:
3828:
3806:
3618:
3539:
3529:
3507:
2825:
Lijphart, Arend (1990). "The
Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-85".
2801:
1046:
978:
903:
736:
591:
556:
477:
388:
291:
214:
156:
34:
3405:
2910:
2779:"Which Electoral Formula Is the Most Proportional? A New Look with New Evidence"
2717:
3886:
3591:
3551:
3369:
2946:
2611:
2604:
2554:, correcting the disproportionality of the D'Hondt method for the other seats.
2454:
1005:
990:
773:
713:
698:
509:
378:
353:
204:
3393:
3052:
3035:
2898:
4091:
3630:
3103:
3061:
1995:
782:
482:
270:
108:
71:
46:
3117:
Holmberg, Kaj (2019), "A new method for optimal proportional representation"
2382:/1.4, though from the general 2018 elections onwards, Sweden has been using
3645:
3586:
3450:
3275:
1666:
522:
286:
279:
209:
2981:
Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, New Orleans, March 8-10, 2013
58:
4028:
3791:
3730:
3650:
3546:
3398:
Proportional Representation: Apportionment Methods and Their Applications
3119:. Linköping, Sweden: Linköping University Department of Mathematics, p.8.
2903:
Proportional Representation: Apportionment Methods and Their Applications
2588:
to constituent countries of the United Kingdom and the English regions.
2584:
has used the method from 2003 to 2013 to distribute British seats in the
2495:
1008:. In 1842 the method was adopted for proportional allocation of seats in
1004:
The method was first described in 1832 by American statesman and senator
400:
358:
301:
246:
898:
3801:
3737:
3142:
Badie, Bertrand; Berg-Schlosser, Dirk; Morlino, Leonardo, eds. (2011),
3095:
2846:
1070:
2731:"Seat biases of apportionment methods for proportional representation"
2346:
It was shown that this error is minimized by the Sainte-Laguë method.
4038:
4033:
3077:"La représentation proportionnelle et la méthode des moindres carrés"
2551:
2511:
2475:
368:
363:
3465:
2838:
3858:
1090:
619:
3720:
2596:
2565:
2547:
2515:
2507:
2471:
405:
2437:
later German literature usually calls it Sainte-Laguë/Schepers.
4008:
2899:"From Reals to Integers: Rounding Functions and Rounding Rules"
2569:
2561:
between electoral districts and for votes to seats allocation.
2503:
2499:
2487:
2483:
2367:
2363:
1093:
are calculated for each party. The formula for the quotient is
910:
3400:, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 159–183,
3251:
Sainte-Laguë method to decide PR seats, Ram Kumar Kamat, 2022
2728:
2491:
2359:
1789:, confirmed by different theoretical and empirical ways. The
2557:
Some cantons in Switzerland use the Sainte-Laguë method for
1805:
1498:
The below chart is an easy way to perform the calculation:
3392:
Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2017), Pukelsheim, Friedrich (ed.),
3003:
Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote
2905:, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 59–70,
2897:
Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2017), Pukelsheim, Friedrich (ed.),
2872:
Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote
2674:"Seat bias formulas in proportional representation systems"
2479:
2374: = 0). These countries changed the quotient from
3141:
2413:
Webster's method is defined in terms of a quota as in the
3145:
International Encyclopedia of Political Science, Volume 1
2370:, change the quotient formula for parties with no seats (
1053:
over small parties. While favoring large parties reduces
1001:
for different sized parties among apportionment methods.
3171:
3169:
2867:
3461:
Java D'Hondt, Saint-Lague and Hare-Niemeyer calculator
3394:"Securing System Consistency: Coherence and Paradoxes"
3276:
Bericht 09.1775.02 der vorberatenden Spezialkommission
3166:
2466:
The Webster/Sainte-Laguë method is currently used in
2195:
2046:
2024:
2004:
1980:
1923:
1893:
1866:
1846:
1819:
1156:
is the total number of votes that party received, and
1104:
3202:"New votes-to-seats system makes elections 'fairer'"
3288:"Distribution of UK MEPs between electoral regions"
3084:
Annales scientifiques de l'École normale supérieure
1137:{\displaystyle {\text{quotient}}={\frac {V}{2s+1}}}
997:system. The Sainte-Laguë method shows a more equal
2869:
2608:Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government
2421:allocated seats for a given region increases from
2336:
2172:
2030:
2010:
1986:
1963:
1906:
1879:
1852:
1832:
1495:; for each, the corresponding party gets a seat.
1136:
1089:After all the votes have been tallied, successive
3456:Elections New Zealand explanation of Sainte-Laguë
2406:and in 1911 the Webster method was reintroduced.
4089:
3128:Norway's Ministry of Local Government website;
2951:Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences
2349:
3000:
2964:See in particular the section "Sainte-Lague",
2617:
1185:biggest for the current round of calculation.
3481:
3442:Seats Calculator with the Sainte-Laguë method
2996:
2994:
1791:European Parliament (Representation) Act 2003
1061:as well. The Sainte-Laguë method shows fewer
946:
3938:Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives
3074:
2564:The Webster/Sainte-Laguë method was used in
1964:{\displaystyle a_{i}={\frac {s_{i}}{v_{i}}}}
27:Proportional-representation electoral system
3001:Balinski, Michel L.; Peyton, Young (1982).
2667:
2665:
2663:
2614:, the country's upper house of parliament.
1860:is the ratio between the fraction of seats
989:for allocating seats in a parliament among
3488:
3474:
3391:
3161:by the American legislator Daniel Webster.
2991:
2941:
2939:
2937:
2935:
2896:
2868:Balinski, Michel; H. Peyton Young (1982).
2671:
1665:
953:
939:
3051:
2400:United States congressional apportionment
1806:Proportionality under Sainte-Laguë method
1010:United States congressional apportionment
3181:The Federal Returning Officer of Germany
2945:
2824:
2699:
2697:
2660:
2510:it is used on the federal level for the
3933:Independence of irrelevant alternatives
3711:Sequential proportional approval voting
3447:Java implementation of Webster's method
2932:
2713:
2711:
14:
4090:
3033:
2977:
2776:
2440:
995:party-list proportional representation
3495:
3469:
2827:The American Political Science Review
2694:
2550:it is used for leveling seats in the
1647:
977:
3068:
2708:
2591:The method has been proposed by the
1654:Party-list PR — Sainte-Laguë method
3743:Indirect single transferable voting
3293:. Electoral Commission. July 2013.
3263:"Danish Parliamentary Election Law"
3040:Mathematical and Computer Modelling
3019:. European Parliament. 2007-06-04.
2622:The method belongs to the class of
2461:
24:
3385:
3363:"House of Lords Reform Draft Bill"
2798:10.1093/oxfordjournals.pan.a029822
57:
25:
4114:
3430:
2514:, and on the state level for the
3034:McLean, Iain (1 November 2008).
3023:from the original on 2019-07-04.
922:
909:
897:
845:McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem
491:Semi-proportional representation
123:First preference plurality (FPP)
3376:
3355:
3338:"Ireland's Green Party website"
3330:
3312:
3300:from the original on 2021-09-04
3280:
3269:
3255:
3244:
3222:
3194:
3135:
3122:
3110:
3027:
3009:
2971:
2578:Palestinian Legislative Council
3854:Mixed ballot transferable vote
2890:
2861:
2818:
2770:
2722:
2672:Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2007).
2111:
2072:
1084:
883:Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem
840:Moulin's impossibility theorem
805:Conflicting majorities paradox
13:
1:
3437:Excel Sainte-Laguë calculator
2750:10.1016/S0261-3794(02)00027-6
2654:
1768:
1019:
709:Frustrated majorities paradox
4055:Comparison of voting systems
3897:Satisfaction approval voting
3882:Single non-transferable vote
3701:Proportional approval voting
3236:. 2013-11-04. Archived from
2580:in 2006. The United Kingdom
2559:biproportional apportionment
2350:Modified Sainte-Laguë method
1635:
1632:
1624:
1619:
1600:
1595:
1576:
1571:
1548:
1543:
1057:, this can be achieved with
878:Condorcet dominance theorems
818:Social and collective choice
7:
3661:Graduated majority judgment
3406:10.1007/978-3-319-64707-4_9
2911:10.1007/978-3-319-64707-4_3
2681:4th ECPR General Conference
2642:
2618:Comparison to other methods
1775:proportional representation
1773:When apportioning seats in
544:By mechanism of combination
315:Proportional representation
18:Webster/Sainte-Laguë method
10:
4119:
3913:Condorcet winner criterion
3604:First-past-the-post voting
2393:
1887:and the fraction of votes
1179:
742:Multiple districts paradox
473:Fractional approval voting
461:Interactive representation
4068:
4060:Voting systems by country
4047:
4001:
3963:Mutual majority criterion
3918:Condorcet loser criterion
3905:
3872:
3864:Vote linkage mixed system
3819:
3784:
3776:Largest remainders method
3751:
3678:
3669:
3520:
3503:
3132:; accessed 22 August 2009
3075:Sainte-Laguë, A. (1910).
3053:10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.025
1737:
1664:
1653:
1650:
1629:
1067:largest remainder methods
689:Paradoxes and pathologies
538:Mixed-member proportional
533:Mixed-member majoritarian
528:By results of combination
419:Approval-based committees
3953:Majority loser criterion
3839:Additional member system
3797:Hagenbach-Bischoff quota
3716:Single transferable vote
3641:Positional voting system
3577:Minimax Condorcet method
3535:Combined approval voting
2777:Benoit, Kenneth (2000).
2649:Hagenbach-Bischoff quota
2630:Jefferson/D'Hondt method
2625:highest-averages methods
2415:largest remainder method
1075:highest averages methods
993:, or among parties in a
868:Condorcet's jury theorem
669:Double simultaneous vote
644:Rural–urban proportional
639:Dual-member proportional
601:
590:
557:Parallel (superposition)
449:Fractional social choice
436:Expanding approvals rule
265:
250:
235:
166:
155:
131:
3978:Resolvability criterion
3968:Participation criterion
3943:Later-no-harm criterion
3759:Highest averages method
3372:. May 2011. p. 16.
3177:"Sainte-Laguë/Schepers"
2628:. It is similar to the
2599:as a reform for use in
2451:political fragmentation
2358:, some countries, e.g.
2356:political fragmentation
1063:apportionment paradoxes
1055:political fragmentation
1039:political fragmentation
1035:apportionment paradoxes
795:Tyranny of the majority
572:Fusion (majority bonus)
389:Quota-remainder methods
4019:First-preference votes
3958:Monotonicity criterion
3928:Independence of clones
3631:Simple majoritarianism
2603:elections, and by the
2536:North Rhine-Westphalia
2468:Bosnia and Herzegovina
2338:
2174:
2032:
2012:
1988:
1965:
1908:
1881:
1854:
1840:for a political party
1834:
1138:
929:Mathematics portal
835:Majority impossibility
824:Impossibility theorems
620:Negative vote transfer
441:Method of equal shares
62:
4098:Apportionment methods
3923:Consistency criterion
3844:Alternative vote plus
3609:Instant-runoff voting
3324:hansard.parliament.uk
3148:, SAGE, p. 754,
2449:can be set to reduce
2339:
2175:
2033:
2013:
1989:
1966:
1909:
1907:{\displaystyle v_{i}}
1882:
1880:{\displaystyle s_{i}}
1855:
1835:
1833:{\displaystyle a_{i}}
1798:when compared to the
1139:
1031:apportionment methods
975:French pronunciation:
732:Best-is-worst paradox
721:Pathological response
456:Direct representation
109:Single-winner methods
61:
3993:Seats-to-votes ratio
3764:Webster/Sainte-Laguë
2582:Electoral Commission
2540:Rhineland-Palatinate
2193:
2044:
2022:
2002:
1978:
1921:
1891:
1864:
1844:
1817:
1812:seats-to-votes ratio
1102:
1059:electoral thresholds
1043:seats-to-votes ratio
999:seats-to-votes ratio
987:apportionment method
979:[sɛ̃t.la.ɡy]
916:Economics portal
863:Median voter theorem
82:Comparative politics
3973:Plurality criterion
3572:Kemeny–Young method
2690:on 7 February 2009.
2586:European Parliament
2441:Threshold for seats
1761:In comparison, the
1174:electoral threshold
971:Sainte-Laguë method
904:Politics portal
615:Vote linkage system
586:Seat linkage system
173:Ranked-choice (RCV)
4014:Election threshold
3948:Majority criterion
3624:Supplementary vote
3096:10.24033/asens.627
2786:Political Analysis
2544:Schleswig-Holstein
2447:election threshold
2334:
2271:
2223:
2185:Sainte-Laguë Index
2170:
2028:
2008:
1984:
1961:
1904:
1877:
1850:
1830:
1796:standard deviation
1783:André Sainte-Laguë
1429:seats after round
1370:seats after round
1303:seats after round
1236:seats after round
1200:(1 seat per round)
1172:Often there is an
1134:
1014:André Sainte-Laguë
969:, also called the
800:Discursive dilemma
759:Lesser evil voting
634:Supermixed systems
337:Largest remainders
195:Round-robin voting
63:
4085:
4084:
3983:Reversal symmetry
3892:Cumulative voting
3874:Semi-proportional
3849:Mixed single vote
3815:
3814:
3691:Mixed single vote
3599:Exhaustive ballot
3562:Copeland's method
3557:Condorcet methods
3497:Electoral systems
3415:978-3-319-64707-4
2920:978-3-319-64707-4
2738:Electoral Studies
2520:Baden-Württemberg
2314:
2262:
2214:
2151:
2031:{\displaystyle 1}
2011:{\displaystyle i}
1987:{\displaystyle i}
1959:
1853:{\displaystyle i}
1759:
1758:
1640:
1639:
1485:
1484:
1427:Party D quotient
1368:Party C quotient
1301:Party B quotient
1234:Party A quotient
1132:
1108:
1026:electoral systems
963:
962:
850:Gibbard's theorem
790:Dominance paradox
727:Perverse response
431:Phragmen's method
297:Majority judgment
225:Positional voting
183:Condorcet methods
51:electoral systems
16:(Redirected from
4110:
4024:Liquid democracy
3676:
3675:
3656:Two-round system
3567:Dodgson's method
3490:
3483:
3476:
3467:
3466:
3425:
3424:
3423:
3422:
3389:
3383:
3380:
3374:
3373:
3367:
3359:
3353:
3352:
3350:
3349:
3340:. Archived from
3334:
3328:
3327:
3316:
3310:
3309:
3307:
3305:
3299:
3292:
3284:
3278:
3273:
3267:
3266:
3259:
3253:
3248:
3242:
3241:
3226:
3220:
3219:
3217:
3215:
3207:The Jakarta Post
3198:
3192:
3191:
3189:
3187:
3173:
3164:
3163:
3139:
3133:
3126:
3120:
3114:
3108:
3107:
3081:
3072:
3066:
3065:
3055:
3046:(9): 1446–1454.
3031:
3025:
3024:
3013:
3007:
3006:
2998:
2989:
2987:
2986:
2975:
2969:
2963:
2943:
2930:
2929:
2928:
2927:
2894:
2888:
2887:
2876:. Yale Univ Pr.
2875:
2865:
2859:
2858:
2822:
2816:
2815:
2813:
2812:
2806:
2800:. Archived from
2783:
2774:
2768:
2767:
2765:
2764:
2758:
2752:. Archived from
2735:
2726:
2720:
2715:
2706:
2701:
2692:
2691:
2689:
2683:. Archived from
2678:
2669:
2462:Usage by country
2343:
2341:
2340:
2335:
2333:
2332:
2331:
2326:
2322:
2315:
2313:
2312:
2303:
2302:
2293:
2282:
2281:
2270:
2258:
2257:
2233:
2232:
2222:
2179:
2177:
2176:
2171:
2169:
2168:
2163:
2159:
2152:
2150:
2149:
2140:
2139:
2130:
2119:
2118:
2109:
2108:
2084:
2083:
2068:
2067:
2037:
2035:
2034:
2029:
2017:
2015:
2014:
2009:
1993:
1991:
1990:
1985:
1970:
1968:
1967:
1962:
1960:
1958:
1957:
1948:
1947:
1938:
1933:
1932:
1914:for that party:
1913:
1911:
1910:
1905:
1903:
1902:
1886:
1884:
1883:
1878:
1876:
1875:
1859:
1857:
1856:
1851:
1839:
1837:
1836:
1831:
1829:
1828:
1802:and Hare quota.
1779:strategic voting
1669:
1659:Number of seats
1645:
1644:
1521:True proportion
1501:
1500:
1192:
1191:
1143:
1141:
1140:
1135:
1133:
1131:
1114:
1109:
1106:
984:highest averages
981:
976:
955:
948:
941:
927:
926:
914:
913:
902:
901:
857:Positive results
752:Strategic voting
649:Majority jackpot
606:
595:
466:Liquid democracy
342:National remnant
332:Highest averages
269:
254:
239:
171:
162:Alternative vote
160:
144:Partisan primary
136:
77:Mechanism design
30:
29:
21:
4118:
4117:
4113:
4112:
4111:
4109:
4108:
4107:
4088:
4087:
4086:
4081:
4064:
4043:
3997:
3988:Smith criterion
3901:
3868:
3829:Parallel voting
3811:
3807:Imperiali quota
3780:
3747:
3665:
3619:Contingent vote
3582:Nanson's method
3540:Unified primary
3530:Approval voting
3516:
3499:
3494:
3433:
3428:
3420:
3418:
3416:
3390:
3386:
3381:
3377:
3365:
3361:
3360:
3356:
3347:
3345:
3336:
3335:
3331:
3318:
3317:
3313:
3303:
3301:
3297:
3290:
3286:
3285:
3281:
3274:
3270:
3261:
3260:
3256:
3249:
3245:
3228:
3227:
3223:
3213:
3211:
3200:
3199:
3195:
3185:
3183:
3175:
3174:
3167:
3156:
3140:
3136:
3127:
3123:
3115:
3111:
3079:
3073:
3069:
3032:
3028:
3015:
3014:
3010:
2999:
2992:
2984:
2976:
2972:
2961:
2947:Lijphart, Arend
2944:
2933:
2925:
2923:
2921:
2895:
2891:
2884:
2866:
2862:
2839:10.2307/1963530
2823:
2819:
2810:
2808:
2804:
2781:
2775:
2771:
2762:
2760:
2756:
2733:
2727:
2723:
2716:
2709:
2702:
2695:
2687:
2676:
2670:
2661:
2657:
2645:
2637:Hamilton method
2620:
2464:
2443:
2404:Hamilton method
2396:
2352:
2327:
2308:
2304:
2298:
2294:
2292:
2291:
2287:
2286:
2277:
2273:
2272:
2266:
2253:
2249:
2228:
2224:
2218:
2194:
2191:
2190:
2164:
2145:
2141:
2135:
2131:
2129:
2128:
2124:
2123:
2114:
2110:
2092:
2088:
2079:
2075:
2063:
2059:
2045:
2042:
2041:
2023:
2020:
2019:
2003:
2000:
1999:
1979:
1976:
1975:
1953:
1949:
1943:
1939:
1937:
1928:
1924:
1922:
1919:
1918:
1898:
1894:
1892:
1889:
1888:
1871:
1867:
1865:
1862:
1861:
1845:
1842:
1841:
1824:
1820:
1818:
1815:
1814:
1808:
1771:
1642:
1517:
1182:
1118:
1113:
1105:
1103:
1100:
1099:
1087:
1022:
974:
959:
921:
920:
908:
896:
888:
887:
854:
830:Arrow's theorem
820:
810:
809:
778:
748:
737:No-show paradox
718:
704:Cloning paradox
694:Spoiler effects
691:
681:
680:
655:
542:
525:
515:
514:
487:
478:Maximal lottery
445:
426:Thiele's method
415:
385:
317:
307:
306:
292:Approval voting
280:Cardinal voting
276:
221:
215:Maximal lottery
179:
111:
101:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
4116:
4106:
4105:
4103:Daniel Webster
4100:
4083:
4082:
4069:
4066:
4065:
4063:
4062:
4057:
4051:
4049:
4045:
4044:
4042:
4041:
4036:
4031:
4026:
4021:
4016:
4011:
4005:
4003:
3999:
3998:
3996:
3995:
3990:
3985:
3980:
3975:
3970:
3965:
3960:
3955:
3950:
3945:
3940:
3935:
3930:
3925:
3920:
3915:
3909:
3907:
3903:
3902:
3900:
3899:
3894:
3889:
3887:Limited voting
3884:
3878:
3876:
3870:
3869:
3867:
3866:
3861:
3856:
3851:
3846:
3841:
3836:
3831:
3825:
3823:
3817:
3816:
3813:
3812:
3810:
3809:
3804:
3799:
3794:
3788:
3786:
3782:
3781:
3779:
3778:
3773:
3772:
3771:
3766:
3755:
3753:
3749:
3748:
3746:
3745:
3740:
3735:
3734:
3733:
3728:
3723:
3713:
3708:
3703:
3698:
3693:
3688:
3682:
3680:
3673:
3667:
3666:
3664:
3663:
3658:
3653:
3648:
3643:
3638:
3633:
3628:
3627:
3626:
3621:
3616:
3614:Coombs' method
3606:
3601:
3596:
3595:
3594:
3592:Schulze method
3589:
3584:
3579:
3574:
3569:
3564:
3554:
3552:Bucklin voting
3549:
3544:
3543:
3542:
3537:
3526:
3524:
3518:
3517:
3504:
3501:
3500:
3493:
3492:
3485:
3478:
3470:
3464:
3463:
3458:
3453:
3444:
3439:
3432:
3431:External links
3429:
3427:
3426:
3414:
3384:
3375:
3370:Cabinet Office
3354:
3329:
3311:
3279:
3268:
3254:
3243:
3240:on 2017-09-23.
3221:
3193:
3165:
3154:
3134:
3121:
3109:
3067:
3026:
3008:
2990:
2970:
2959:
2931:
2919:
2889:
2882:
2860:
2833:(2): 481–496.
2817:
2792:(4): 381–388.
2769:
2744:(4): 651–676.
2721:
2707:
2693:
2658:
2656:
2653:
2652:
2651:
2644:
2641:
2619:
2616:
2612:House of Lords
2605:United Kingdom
2463:
2460:
2455:leveling seats
2442:
2439:
2395:
2392:
2351:
2348:
2330:
2325:
2321:
2318:
2311:
2307:
2301:
2297:
2290:
2285:
2280:
2276:
2269:
2265:
2261:
2256:
2252:
2248:
2245:
2242:
2239:
2236:
2231:
2227:
2221:
2217:
2213:
2210:
2207:
2204:
2201:
2198:
2167:
2162:
2158:
2155:
2148:
2144:
2138:
2134:
2127:
2122:
2117:
2113:
2107:
2104:
2101:
2098:
2095:
2091:
2087:
2082:
2078:
2074:
2071:
2066:
2062:
2058:
2055:
2052:
2049:
2027:
2007:
1983:
1972:
1971:
1956:
1952:
1946:
1942:
1936:
1931:
1927:
1901:
1897:
1874:
1870:
1849:
1827:
1823:
1807:
1804:
1800:D'Hondt method
1770:
1767:
1763:D'Hondt method
1757:
1756:
1751:
1746:
1741:
1735:
1734:
1731:
1728:
1725:
1722:
1719:
1718:
1715:
1712:
1709:
1706:
1703:
1702:
1699:
1696:
1693:
1690:
1687:
1686:
1683:
1680:
1677:
1674:
1671:
1670:
1663:
1660:
1656:
1655:
1652:
1649:
1638:
1637:
1634:
1631:
1627:
1626:
1623:
1618:
1615:
1612:
1607:
1603:
1602:
1599:
1594:
1591:
1588:
1583:
1579:
1578:
1575:
1570:
1565:
1560:
1555:
1551:
1550:
1547:
1542:
1537:
1532:
1527:
1523:
1522:
1519:
1514:
1511:
1508:
1505:
1483:
1482:
1477:
1471:
1461:
1455:
1449:
1443:
1437:
1431:
1424:
1423:
1418:
1412:
1406:
1400:
1390:
1384:
1378:
1372:
1365:
1364:
1359:
1349:
1343:
1333:
1327:
1321:
1311:
1305:
1298:
1297:
1292:
1286:
1276:
1270:
1264:
1254:
1248:
1238:
1231:
1230:
1224:
1221:
1218:
1215:
1212:
1209:
1206:
1203:
1181:
1178:
1164:
1163:
1157:
1147:
1146:
1145:
1144:
1130:
1127:
1124:
1121:
1117:
1112:
1086:
1083:
1079:d'Hondt method
1021:
1018:
1006:Daniel Webster
991:federal states
967:Webster method
961:
960:
958:
957:
950:
943:
935:
932:
931:
919:
918:
906:
893:
890:
889:
886:
885:
880:
875:
870:
865:
853:
852:
847:
842:
837:
832:
821:
816:
815:
812:
811:
808:
807:
802:
797:
792:
777:
776:
774:Turkey-raising
771:
766:
761:
747:
746:
745:
744:
734:
729:
717:
716:
714:Center squeeze
711:
706:
701:
699:Spoiler effect
692:
687:
686:
683:
682:
679:
678:
673:
672:
671:
658:By ballot type
654:
653:
652:
651:
646:
641:
631:
630:
629:
628:
627:
622:
612:
611:
610:
599:
576:
575:
574:
569:
564:
559:
541:
540:
535:
526:
521:
520:
517:
516:
513:
512:
510:Limited voting
507:
506:
505:
486:
485:
480:
475:
470:
469:
468:
463:
444:
443:
438:
433:
428:
414:
413:
408:
403:
398:
384:
383:
382:
381:
379:Localized list
376:
371:
366:
361:
351:
350:
349:
347:Biproportional
344:
339:
334:
318:
313:
312:
309:
308:
305:
304:
299:
294:
289:
275:
274:
259:
244:
220:
219:
218:
217:
212:
207:
202:
192:
178:
177:
176:
175:
164:
151:Instant-runoff
148:
147:
146:
138:Jungle primary
125:
114:Single vote -
112:
107:
106:
103:
102:
100:
99:
89:
84:
79:
74:
68:
65:
64:
54:
53:
43:
42:
26:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
4115:
4104:
4101:
4099:
4096:
4095:
4093:
4080:
4079:
4074:
4073:
4067:
4061:
4058:
4056:
4053:
4052:
4050:
4046:
4040:
4037:
4035:
4032:
4030:
4027:
4025:
4022:
4020:
4017:
4015:
4012:
4010:
4007:
4006:
4004:
4000:
3994:
3991:
3989:
3986:
3984:
3981:
3979:
3976:
3974:
3971:
3969:
3966:
3964:
3961:
3959:
3956:
3954:
3951:
3949:
3946:
3944:
3941:
3939:
3936:
3934:
3931:
3929:
3926:
3924:
3921:
3919:
3916:
3914:
3911:
3910:
3908:
3904:
3898:
3895:
3893:
3890:
3888:
3885:
3883:
3880:
3879:
3877:
3875:
3871:
3865:
3862:
3860:
3857:
3855:
3852:
3850:
3847:
3845:
3842:
3840:
3837:
3835:
3832:
3830:
3827:
3826:
3824:
3822:
3818:
3808:
3805:
3803:
3800:
3798:
3795:
3793:
3790:
3789:
3787:
3783:
3777:
3774:
3770:
3767:
3765:
3762:
3761:
3760:
3757:
3756:
3754:
3750:
3744:
3741:
3739:
3736:
3732:
3729:
3727:
3724:
3722:
3719:
3718:
3717:
3714:
3712:
3709:
3707:
3704:
3702:
3699:
3697:
3694:
3692:
3689:
3687:
3684:
3683:
3681:
3677:
3674:
3672:
3668:
3662:
3659:
3657:
3654:
3652:
3649:
3647:
3644:
3642:
3639:
3637:
3634:
3632:
3629:
3625:
3622:
3620:
3617:
3615:
3612:
3611:
3610:
3607:
3605:
3602:
3600:
3597:
3593:
3590:
3588:
3585:
3583:
3580:
3578:
3575:
3573:
3570:
3568:
3565:
3563:
3560:
3559:
3558:
3555:
3553:
3550:
3548:
3545:
3541:
3538:
3536:
3533:
3532:
3531:
3528:
3527:
3525:
3523:
3522:Single-winner
3519:
3515:
3513:
3509:
3502:
3498:
3491:
3486:
3484:
3479:
3477:
3472:
3471:
3468:
3462:
3459:
3457:
3454:
3452:
3448:
3445:
3443:
3440:
3438:
3435:
3434:
3417:
3411:
3407:
3403:
3399:
3395:
3388:
3379:
3371:
3364:
3358:
3344:on 2011-07-21
3343:
3339:
3333:
3325:
3321:
3315:
3296:
3289:
3283:
3277:
3272:
3264:
3258:
3252:
3247:
3239:
3235:
3231:
3225:
3210:. 28 May 2018
3209:
3208:
3203:
3197:
3182:
3178:
3172:
3170:
3162:
3157:
3155:9781412959636
3151:
3147:
3146:
3138:
3131:
3125:
3118:
3113:
3105:
3101:
3097:
3093:
3089:
3085:
3078:
3071:
3063:
3059:
3054:
3049:
3045:
3041:
3037:
3030:
3022:
3018:
3012:
3004:
2997:
2995:
2983:
2982:
2974:
2967:
2962:
2960:9780875862675
2956:
2952:
2948:
2942:
2940:
2938:
2936:
2922:
2916:
2912:
2908:
2904:
2900:
2893:
2885:
2883:0-300-02724-9
2879:
2874:
2873:
2864:
2856:
2852:
2848:
2844:
2840:
2836:
2832:
2828:
2821:
2807:on 2018-07-28
2803:
2799:
2795:
2791:
2787:
2780:
2773:
2759:on 2016-02-15
2755:
2751:
2747:
2743:
2739:
2732:
2725:
2719:
2714:
2712:
2705:
2700:
2698:
2686:
2682:
2675:
2668:
2666:
2664:
2659:
2650:
2647:
2646:
2640:
2638:
2633:
2631:
2627:
2626:
2615:
2613:
2609:
2606:
2602:
2598:
2594:
2589:
2587:
2583:
2579:
2575:
2571:
2567:
2562:
2560:
2555:
2553:
2549:
2545:
2541:
2537:
2533:
2529:
2525:
2521:
2517:
2513:
2509:
2505:
2501:
2497:
2493:
2489:
2485:
2481:
2477:
2473:
2469:
2459:
2456:
2452:
2448:
2438:
2434:
2432:
2428:
2424:
2418:
2416:
2411:
2407:
2405:
2401:
2391:
2387:
2385:
2381:
2377:
2373:
2369:
2365:
2361:
2357:
2347:
2344:
2328:
2323:
2319:
2316:
2309:
2305:
2299:
2295:
2288:
2283:
2278:
2274:
2267:
2263:
2259:
2254:
2250:
2246:
2243:
2240:
2237:
2234:
2229:
2225:
2219:
2215:
2211:
2208:
2205:
2202:
2199:
2196:
2188:
2186:
2180:
2165:
2160:
2156:
2153:
2146:
2142:
2136:
2132:
2125:
2120:
2115:
2105:
2102:
2099:
2096:
2093:
2089:
2085:
2080:
2076:
2069:
2064:
2060:
2056:
2053:
2050:
2047:
2039:
2025:
2005:
1997:
1996:least squares
1981:
1954:
1950:
1944:
1940:
1934:
1929:
1925:
1917:
1916:
1915:
1899:
1895:
1872:
1868:
1847:
1825:
1821:
1813:
1803:
1801:
1797:
1792:
1788:
1787:apportionment
1784:
1780:
1776:
1766:
1764:
1755:
1752:
1750:
1747:
1745:
1742:
1740:
1736:
1732:
1729:
1726:
1723:
1721:
1720:
1716:
1713:
1710:
1707:
1705:
1704:
1700:
1697:
1694:
1691:
1689:
1688:
1684:
1681:
1678:
1675:
1673:
1672:
1668:
1662:Seats %
1661:
1658:
1657:
1651:Popular vote
1646:
1643:
1628:
1622:
1616:
1613:
1611:
1608:
1605:
1604:
1598:
1592:
1589:
1587:
1584:
1581:
1580:
1574:
1569:
1566:
1564:
1561:
1559:
1556:
1553:
1552:
1546:
1541:
1538:
1536:
1533:
1531:
1528:
1525:
1524:
1520:
1515:
1512:
1509:
1506:
1503:
1502:
1499:
1496:
1494:
1490:
1481:
1478:
1476:
1472:
1470:
1469:
1465:
1462:
1460:
1456:
1454:
1450:
1448:
1444:
1442:
1438:
1436:
1432:
1430:
1426:
1425:
1422:
1419:
1417:
1413:
1411:
1407:
1405:
1401:
1399:
1398:
1394:
1391:
1389:
1385:
1383:
1379:
1377:
1373:
1371:
1367:
1366:
1363:
1360:
1358:
1357:
1353:
1350:
1348:
1344:
1342:
1341:
1337:
1334:
1332:
1328:
1326:
1322:
1320:
1319:
1315:
1312:
1310:
1306:
1304:
1300:
1299:
1296:
1293:
1291:
1287:
1285:
1284:
1280:
1277:
1275:
1271:
1269:
1265:
1263:
1262:
1258:
1255:
1253:
1249:
1247:
1246:
1242:
1239:
1237:
1233:
1232:
1229:
1225:
1222:
1219:
1216:
1213:
1210:
1207:
1204:
1202:
1201:
1197:
1194:
1193:
1190:
1186:
1177:
1175:
1170:
1167:
1161:
1158:
1155:
1152:
1151:
1150:
1128:
1125:
1122:
1119:
1115:
1110:
1098:
1097:
1096:
1095:
1094:
1092:
1082:
1080:
1076:
1072:
1068:
1064:
1060:
1056:
1052:
1048:
1044:
1040:
1036:
1032:
1027:
1024:Proportional
1017:
1015:
1011:
1007:
1002:
1000:
996:
992:
988:
985:
980:
972:
968:
956:
951:
949:
944:
942:
937:
936:
934:
933:
930:
925:
917:
912:
907:
905:
900:
895:
894:
892:
891:
884:
881:
879:
876:
874:
873:May's theorem
871:
869:
866:
864:
861:
860:
859:
858:
851:
848:
846:
843:
841:
838:
836:
833:
831:
828:
827:
826:
825:
819:
814:
813:
806:
803:
801:
798:
796:
793:
791:
788:
787:
786:
785:
784:
783:majority rule
781:Paradoxes of
775:
772:
770:
767:
765:
762:
760:
757:
756:
755:
754:
753:
743:
740:
739:
738:
735:
733:
730:
728:
725:
724:
723:
722:
715:
712:
710:
707:
705:
702:
700:
697:
696:
695:
690:
685:
684:
677:
674:
670:
667:
666:
665:
662:
661:
660:
659:
650:
647:
645:
642:
640:
637:
636:
635:
632:
626:
623:
621:
618:
617:
616:
613:
609:
604:
600:
598:
593:
589:
588:
587:
584:
583:
582:
581:
577:
573:
570:
568:
565:
563:
560:
558:
555:
554:
553:
552:
547:
546:
545:
539:
536:
534:
531:
530:
529:
524:
523:Mixed systems
519:
518:
511:
508:
504:
501:
500:
499:
496:
495:
494:
493:
492:
484:
483:Random ballot
481:
479:
476:
474:
471:
467:
464:
462:
459:
458:
457:
454:
453:
452:
451:
450:
442:
439:
437:
434:
432:
429:
427:
424:
423:
422:
421:
420:
412:
409:
407:
404:
402:
399:
397:
394:
393:
392:
391:
390:
380:
377:
375:
372:
370:
367:
365:
362:
360:
357:
356:
355:
352:
348:
345:
343:
340:
338:
335:
333:
330:
329:
328:
327:Apportionment
325:
324:
323:
322:
316:
311:
310:
303:
300:
298:
295:
293:
290:
288:
285:
284:
283:
282:
281:
272:
268:
263:
262:Antiplurality
260:
257:
253:
248:
245:
242:
238:
233:
230:
229:
228:
227:
226:
216:
213:
211:
208:
206:
203:
201:
198:
197:
196:
193:
191:
190:Condorcet-IRV
188:
187:
186:
185:
184:
174:
169:
165:
163:
158:
154:
153:
152:
149:
145:
142:
141:
139:
134:
129:
126:
124:
121:
120:
119:
117:
110:
105:
104:
97:
93:
90:
88:
85:
83:
80:
78:
75:
73:
72:Social choice
70:
69:
67:
66:
60:
56:
55:
52:
48:
47:Social choice
45:
44:
40:
36:
32:
31:
19:
4076:
4070:
3763:
3686:Mixed-member
3671:Proportional
3646:Score voting
3587:Ranked pairs
3506:Part of the
3505:
3451:cut-the-knot
3419:, retrieved
3397:
3387:
3378:
3357:
3346:. Retrieved
3342:the original
3332:
3323:
3314:
3302:. Retrieved
3282:
3271:
3257:
3246:
3238:the original
3234:Almada Press
3233:
3224:
3212:. Retrieved
3205:
3196:
3184:. Retrieved
3180:
3159:
3144:
3137:
3124:
3112:
3087:
3083:
3070:
3043:
3039:
3029:
3011:
3002:
2980:
2973:
2950:
2924:, retrieved
2902:
2892:
2871:
2863:
2830:
2826:
2820:
2809:. Retrieved
2802:the original
2789:
2785:
2772:
2761:. Retrieved
2754:the original
2741:
2737:
2724:
2685:the original
2680:
2634:
2624:
2621:
2601:Dáil Éireann
2590:
2568:in 1993, in
2563:
2556:
2516:legislatures
2465:
2444:
2435:
2430:
2426:
2422:
2419:
2412:
2408:
2397:
2388:
2383:
2379:
2375:
2371:
2353:
2345:
2189:
2181:
2040:
1973:
1809:
1772:
1760:
1753:
1748:
1743:
1738:
1641:
1620:
1609:
1596:
1585:
1572:
1567:
1562:
1557:
1544:
1539:
1534:
1529:
1497:
1492:
1488:
1486:
1479:
1474:
1467:
1466:
1463:
1458:
1452:
1446:
1440:
1434:
1428:
1420:
1415:
1409:
1403:
1396:
1395:
1392:
1387:
1381:
1375:
1369:
1361:
1355:
1354:
1351:
1346:
1339:
1338:
1335:
1330:
1324:
1317:
1316:
1313:
1308:
1302:
1294:
1289:
1282:
1281:
1278:
1273:
1267:
1260:
1259:
1256:
1251:
1244:
1243:
1240:
1235:
1227:
1199:
1198:
1195:
1187:
1183:
1171:
1168:
1165:
1159:
1153:
1148:
1088:
1069:such as the
1065:compared to
1023:
1003:
970:
966:
964:
856:
855:
822:
780:
779:
764:Exaggeration
750:
749:
720:
719:
693:
657:
656:
625:Mixed ballot
580:Compensatory
578:
551:compensatory
548:
543:
527:
489:
488:
447:
446:
417:
416:
387:
386:
374:List-free PR
319:
287:Score voting
278:
277:
223:
222:
210:Ranked pairs
181:
180:
113:
4029:Spoilt vote
3792:Droop quota
3731:Schulze STV
3706:Rural–urban
3651:STAR voting
3547:Borda count
3304:21 December
3090:: 529–542.
2966:pp. 174–175
2593:Green Party
2496:New Zealand
1504:Denominator
1085:Description
664:Single vote
567:Conditional
562:Coexistence
411:Quota Borda
401:Schulze STV
359:Closed list
302:STAR voting
247:Borda count
4092:Categories
4048:Comparison
3802:Hare quota
3752:Allocation
3738:Spare vote
3726:Hare-Clark
3696:Party-list
3421:2021-09-02
3348:2011-02-20
2926:2021-09-01
2811:2016-02-11
2763:2016-02-02
2655:References
2576:, and the
2354:To reduce
1769:Properties
1226:Seats won
1073:and other
1071:Hare quota
1051:coalitions
1020:Motivation
769:Truncation
498:Cumulative
321:Party-list
96:By country
87:Comparison
4039:Unseating
4034:Sortition
3636:Plurality
3512:Economics
3186:28 August
3104:0012-9593
3062:0895-7177
2855:146438586
2552:Folketing
2512:Bundestag
2476:Indonesia
2317:−
2284:∗
2264:∑
2235:∗
2216:∑
2154:−
2086:−
1994:with the
1091:quotients
676:Dual-vote
369:Panachage
364:Open list
354:List type
232:Plurality
128:Two-round
116:plurality
39:Economics
3906:Criteria
3859:Scorporo
3508:politics
3295:Archived
3214:19 April
3021:Archived
2643:See also
1724:Party D
1708:Party C
1692:Party B
1676:Party A
1530:100,000*
1491:down to
1107:quotient
1077:such as
982:), is a
396:Hare STV
35:Politics
33:A joint
4078:Project
3769:D'Hondt
3721:CPO-STV
3679:Systems
2847:1963530
2597:Ireland
2566:Bolivia
2548:Denmark
2532:Hamburg
2524:Bavaria
2508:Germany
2472:Ecuador
2394:History
1610:20,000*
1606:Party D
1586:30,000*
1582:Party C
1568:16,000*
1563:26,667*
1558:80,000*
1554:Party B
1540:20,000*
1535:33,333*
1526:Party A
1518:won (*)
1489:100,000
1457:20,000
1451:20,000
1445:20,000
1439:20,000
1433:20,000
1414:10,000
1408:10,000
1402:10,000
1386:30,000
1380:30,000
1374:30,000
1345:16,000
1329:26,667
1323:26,667
1307:80,000
1288:14,286
1272:20,000
1266:20,000
1250:33,333
1241:100,000
1228:(bold)
1180:Example
1149:where:
1047:parties
406:CPO-STV
256:Baldwin
205:Schulze
200:Minimax
118:methods
4072:Portal
4009:Ballot
3785:Quotas
3514:series
3412:
3152:
3102:
3060:
2957:
2917:
2880:
2853:
2845:
2570:Poland
2542:, and
2528:Bremen
2504:Sweden
2500:Norway
2488:Latvia
2484:Kosovo
2368:Sweden
2364:Norway
1733:12.5%
1717:12.5%
1711:13.0%
1701:37.5%
1695:34.8%
1685:37.5%
1679:43.5%
1648:Party
1590:10,000
1493:16,000
1473:6,667
1464:20,000
1393:30,000
1352:16,000
1336:26,667
1314:80,000
1279:20,000
1257:33,333
271:Coombs
41:series
4002:Other
3821:Mixed
3366:(PDF)
3298:(PDF)
3291:(PDF)
3080:(PDF)
2985:(PDF)
2851:S2CID
2843:JSTOR
2805:(PDF)
2782:(PDF)
2757:(PDF)
2734:(PDF)
2688:(PDF)
2677:(PDF)
2546:. In
2506:. In
2492:Nepal
2360:Nepal
1739:TOTAL
1727:8.7%
1630:Total
1617:4,000
1614:6,667
1593:6,000
1516:Seats
1196:round
608:'MMP'
597:'AMS'
3510:and
3410:ISBN
3306:2019
3216:2019
3188:2021
3150:ISBN
3100:ISSN
3058:ISSN
2955:ISBN
2915:ISBN
2878:ISBN
2574:2001
2502:and
2480:Iraq
2366:and
1810:The
1754:100%
1744:100%
1625:0.7
1601:1.0
1577:2.8
1549:3.5
1049:and
1037:and
965:The
549:Non-
503:SNTV
92:List
49:and
37:and
3834:MMP
3449:at
3402:doi
3092:doi
3048:doi
2907:doi
2835:doi
2794:doi
2746:doi
2595:in
2572:in
2518:of
2445:An
2425:to
2378:to
2038:.
1468:0+1
1397:0+1
1356:2+1
1340:1+1
1318:0+1
1283:2+1
1261:1+1
1245:0+1
267:el.
252:el.
241:IRV
237:el.
4094::
4075:—
3408:,
3396:,
3368:.
3322:.
3204:.
3179:.
3168:^
3158:,
3098:.
3088:27
3086:.
3082:.
3056:.
3044:48
3042:.
3038:.
2993:^
2934:^
2913:,
2901:,
2849:.
2841:.
2831:84
2829:.
2788:.
2784:.
2742:22
2740:.
2736:.
2710:^
2696:^
2679:.
2662:^
2639:.
2538:,
2534:,
2530:,
2526:,
2522:,
2498:,
2494:,
2490:,
2486:,
2482:,
2478:,
2474:,
2470:,
2362:,
2187:.
1781:.
1730:1
1714:1
1698:3
1682:3
1636:8
1513:/5
1510:/3
1507:/1
1475:1
1459:0
1453:0
1447:0
1441:0
1435:0
1416:1
1410:1
1404:1
1388:0
1382:0
1376:0
1347:2
1331:1
1325:1
1309:0
1290:3
1274:2
1268:2
1252:1
1223:7
1220:6
1217:5
1214:4
1211:3
1208:2
1205:1
1081:.
1016:.
603:NZ
592:UK
168:US
157:UK
140:)
133:US
3489:e
3482:t
3475:v
3404::
3351:.
3326:.
3308:.
3265:.
3218:.
3190:.
3106:.
3094::
3064:.
3050::
3005:.
2988:.
2968:.
2909::
2886:.
2857:.
2837::
2814:.
2796::
2790:8
2766:.
2748::
2431:s
2427:s
2423:s
2384:V
2380:V
2376:V
2372:s
2329:2
2324:)
2320:1
2310:i
2306:v
2300:i
2296:s
2289:(
2279:i
2275:v
2268:i
2260:=
2255:i
2251:r
2247:o
2244:r
2241:r
2238:e
2230:i
2226:v
2220:i
2212:=
2209:r
2206:o
2203:r
2200:r
2197:e
2166:2
2161:)
2157:1
2147:i
2143:v
2137:i
2133:s
2126:(
2121:=
2116:2
2112:)
2106:l
2103:a
2100:e
2097:d
2094:i
2090:a
2081:i
2077:a
2073:(
2070:=
2065:i
2061:r
2057:o
2054:r
2051:r
2048:e
2026:1
2006:i
1982:i
1955:i
1951:v
1945:i
1941:s
1935:=
1930:i
1926:a
1900:i
1896:v
1873:i
1869:s
1848:i
1826:i
1822:a
1749:8
1633:8
1621:1
1597:1
1573:3
1545:3
1480:1
1421:1
1362:3
1295:3
1160:s
1154:V
1129:1
1126:+
1123:s
1120:2
1116:V
1111:=
973:(
954:e
947:t
940:v
605::
594::
273:)
264:(
258:)
249:(
243:)
234:(
170::
159::
135::
130:(
98:)
94:(
20:)
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
