War guilt question

3004: 1256:, recognition of Germany as having sole culpability was a lie. He resigned in June 1919 to avoid having to sign the treaty, which bore the seeds of its own rebuttal. Brockdorff-Rantzau had moreover said before the Allies at Versailles: "But also in the manner of waging war, Germany wasn't the only one to make mistakes, each nation made them. I do not wish to respond to accusations with accusations, but if we are asked to make amends, we must not forget the armistice." The violence with which the treaty was imposed forced the Germans to refute it. By its nature, the treaty deprived the Weimar Republic of any historical confrontation with its own history. The thesis of responsibility derived its strength from the fact that for the first time, a country's responsibility had been officially established. 1021: 3845:, was invalid. A feature of American "revisionist" historians of the 1920s was a tendency to treat Germany as a victim of the war and the Allies as the aggressors. The objective of Fay and Barnes was to put an end to reparations imposed on Germany, by attempting to prove what they regarded as the moral invalidity of Article 231. The exiled Wilhelm praised Barnes upon meeting him in 1926. According to Barnes, Wilhelm "was happy to know that I did not blame him for starting the war in 1914. He disagreed with my view that Russia and France were chiefly responsible. He held that the villains of 1914 were the international Jews and Free Masons who, he alleged, desired to destroy national states and the Christian religion." 1319:, founded a "Working Group for a Policy of Justice" (Heidelberg Association) on 3 February 1919. It attempted to clarify the question of guilt scientifically, and wanted to have the degree of culpability and violations of international law examined by an arbitration court. It combined this with criticism of the policy of the Entente powers toward Germany and fought their alleged "war guilt lie" even before the Treaty of Versailles was signed. A four-member delegation of the Association was to reject the Allied theories of war guilt on behalf of the Foreign Office and, to this end, handed over a "Memorandum on the Examination of the War Guilt Question" (also called the "Professorial Memorandum") in Versailles. 1052:, the European vision quickly took hold. Decisions were made without Germany, which was excluded from the debates. France, which had served as the main battleground, wanted to ensure a peace of revenge through Clemenceau: "The time has come for a heavy settling of scores". The Treaty of Versailles was above all a "treaty of fear": each former enemy tried to protect his own country. Moreover, the Allies still behaved like enemies when they presented the peace conditions to the German delegation, which finally was invited to attend on 7 May 1919. The deadline for ratification of the treaty was in fifteen days; after that, military operations could resume. 2598: 4396:

as major factors by which all of Europe's great powers contributed to the outbreak of war, albeit with differences in degree. He also considered domestic minority conflicts in multinational Austria. Nevertheless, he named the small leadership circles, especially in Berlin and Vienna, as the main culprits for the fact that the July crisis of 1914 led to war. The decision makers had shown a high willingness to take risks and at the same time had aggravated the crisis with mismanagement and miscalculations, until the only solution seemed to them to be the "flight forward" into war with the other great powers.

990:

propagandistic, and others. These efforts to deal with the war guilt question began during treaty negotiations in Paris, continued throughout the life of the Weimar Republic, and contributed to the rise of the NSDAP (Nazi) Party—which seized power in 1933, bringing the Weimar Republic to an end—and to 1939 and the outbreak of World War II. Furthermore, the harsh terms of land reduction of Germany after World War I, which reduced Germany's land size by 13 percent, aggravated and intensified tensions between Germany and the European Allied powers, and lead to calls to retake the lost land.

2822:(DNVP), which won 15.1 per cent of the seats compared to only 10.3 per cent in 1919. For five years, the SPD was absent from all governments between 30 November 1923 and 29 June 1928. According to Jean-Pierre Gougeon, the decline of the SPD was due to the fact that it had not sufficiently democratized the country since the proclamation of the Weimar Republic. Judges, civil servants and high-ranking civil servants had not been replaced, and they often remained loyal to the emperor, all the more so since military propaganda blamed the republic for his abdication. 5624: 3916: 6490: 2765: 6478: 4372:" offered front-line soldiers heroic images for identification, in order to redirect their horror, and their fears of death and defeat into the opposite of what they had experienced. To the "homeland," the "front-line fighters" were held up as role models to prevent insubordination, desertion, public agitation against a war of conquest, and maintaining solidarity of soldiers and civilians against it. This had created a persistent, mass mentality that set the course for the postwar success of war-glorifying myths such as the 1239:, of "revenge and plans for rape". Germany was stunned by the terms of the treaty. The government claimed it was a ploy to dishonor the German people. The impact of the treaty was first and foremost moral. The moral punishment was a heavier burden to bear than the material one. Treaty clauses that reduced territory, the economy, and sovereignty were seen as a means of making Germany morally grovel. The new Weimar Republic underscored the unprecedented injustice of the treaty, which was described as an act of violence and a 2664:. Instead of German military personnel carrying out the signing, civilian delegates, representing the Weimar Republic, which had been established nnly two days earlier, signed for Germany. As the generals refused to bear responsibility for the defeat, the general staff circulated an image of the republic as a symbol of defeat. This maneuver was all the more underhanded since Ludendorff had recognized the need for an armistice. Colonel Von Thaer also stated that on 1 October 1918 Ludendorff considered himself defeated. 2327: 6466: 5449: 4121: 3726: 3199: 2888: 2205: 2021: 1876: 3518: 1211:

be held financially liable for the damage to land and people that the German imperial troops had caused, especially in France. The Treaty of Versailles therefore laid the groundwork for the reparation claims against the German Reich, in an amount which was not initially determined. The representatives of the German Empire therefore protested Article 231 not merely for reasons of self-justification, but with the aim of undermining the moral basis of the enemy's demands as a whole. The

70: 2142: 1980: 3633:

the German army would be numerically as decisively inferior to those of its opponents as the German navy already was on the sea. Thus in both cases the supposedly counterproductive and dangerous foreign policies of Germany and Austria-Hungary culminating in their gamble in 1914 are linked to a wider problem and at least partly explained by it: the failure or refusal of their regimes to reform and modernize in order to meet their internal political and social problems.

2645:. Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff, having come out of retirement, enjoyed great prestige. In 1916, Hindenburg was appointed Chief of Staff, and in 1917, a monumental statue was erected in Berlin in his honor. William II gradually lost his power, to the benefit of the two generals, who took the country in hand. Ludendorff proposed the institution of a compulsory labor service to increase yields, which he believed to be insufficient. Bethmann Hollweg refused, but the 4583: 5134:

goodwill found a voice; tragic because the consequences of the first clash ended the lives of ten million human beings, tortured the emotional lives of millions more, destroyed the benevolent and optimistic culture of the European continent and left, when the guns at last fell silent four years later, a legacy of political rancor and racial hatred so intense that no explanation of the causes of the Second World War can stand without reference to those roots."

11557: 12270: 1596: 1718: 926: 2676:

would have meant renouncing submarine warfare, which the army did not want under any circumstances since it represented the possibility of destroying 40% of British tonnage. The army did not want a peace in which Germany would be the loser. One goal of their submarine warfare was to pressure Great Britain into suing for peace and allowing Germany to set its own conditions. The only consequence would be the entry of the United States into the war.

1066: 2472: 4595: 531: 981:(US$ 33 billion) to the Allied Powers. In addition, Article 231 stated that "Germany accepts responsibility of Germany and her allies causing all the loss and damage..." but was mistranslated or interpreted in Germany as an admission by Germany of responsibility for causing the war. This, plus the heavy burden of reparations was taken as an injustice and national humiliation, and that Germany had signed "away her honor". 4607: 2685: 545: 29: 1369:

picture of reality". For this reason, he proposed to publish all the acts of the powers involved in the war, even going so far as wishing to question the personalities who determined the history of their own countries at the time of the outbreak of war as well as any witnesses having important evidence. Few social-democratic representatives supported the project, one exception being

3878:, the responsibilities for military action against Serbia were clear at the end of July 1914: "The machinations of a hateful adversary compel Me, in order to preserve the honor of My Monarchy and to protect its position of power ... to take up the sword." However, the Serbian government had sent Vienna a warning in the run-up to the Sarajevo attack, which was not taken seriously. 3339:

will pay for everything!" This was perceived by the French public not only as a justification for reparations, but also as a demonstrative statement of political and moral guilt. The Socialists, too, saw only a partial responsibility on the part of the French in the war and also insisted on Germany's civil liability under Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles.

3688:

Germany and Austria, which initiated the war, displayed greater activity because Germany was better prepared for war and Austria's internal crisis was steadily worsening, and notwithstanding the additional fact that the decision on the timing of the war was for all practical purposes ultimately taken by Germany and England.

9204:

Soutou, Georges-Henri (1994). "Die Kriegsziele des Deutschen Reiches, Frankreichs, Großbritanniens und der Vereinigten Staaten während des Ersten Weltkrieges: ein Vergleich" [The war aims of the German Empire, France, Great Britain, and the United States during World War I: a comparison.]. In

5133:

Opening lines of John Keegan's First World War: "The First World War was a tragic and unnecessary conflict. Unnecessary because the train of events that led to its outbreak might have been broken at any point during the five weeks of crisis that preceded the first clash of arms had prudence or common

5007:

Law for the Protection of the Republic: Originally passed in July 1922 after the assassination of Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau by right-wing extremists, the law set up special courts to address politically motivated violence, and established severe penalties for political murders, and government

4395:

argued that the structural causes of the war, which went beyond individual government decisions, could be found in the alliance system of the European great powers and their gradual formation of blocs. Like Fischer and others, he too saw the naval arms race and competition in the conquest of colonies

4035:

Given that Germany wanted, desired and covered up the Austrian-Serbian war and, trusting in German military superiority, deliberately chose to enter into conflict with Russia and France in 1914, the German Imperial leadership bears a considerable part of the historical responsibility for the outbreak

3103:

I want to be a prophet again today: If international financial Jewry inside and outside of Europe should succeed once more in plunging the peoples of the world into a war, the result would not be the Bolshevization of the earth and thus the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation of the Jewish race in

2443:

had recognized the usefulness of this policy at the time; Germany's central location in Europe pushed politicians like Bismarck to form alliances to avoid the nightmare scenario of possible encirclement. After having ensured the neutrality of Russia and Austria-Hungary in 1881 with the singing of the

2191:

countries, of which Germany was only one, and that Germany had made no advance war preparations, certainly not for a long war. Fabian's book went against the general opinion, and acknowledged that Germany was largely to blame for the outbreak of war because of the attitude of its leading politicians.

4300:

More recent publications by and large stick to the earlier view, namely that Germany contributed significantly to the fact "that as the crisis widened, alternative strategies for de-escalation did not bear fruit ... Given Germany's policy until 23 July to exert pressure on the Viennese government to

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contradicted sociohistorical explanations in 1991 with his view that the "war, the German readiness for war and the crisis policy" were not a consequence of the German social system. He modified Lloyd George's "slide into war" thesis and referred to disastrous military plans and war decisions of the

3977:

stated in his opening statement that the fight against the war guilt question at the time of the Weimar Republic finally led to the worldwide success of German theses, which he still maintained in his 1950 essay: "The German thesis that there could be no question of a long-prepared invasion of their

1549:) was an umbrella organization founded in 1921 by the German Foreign Ministry, as part of an attempt to gain control over German patriotic organizations which were calling for a revision of the Treaty of Versailles and its war guilt clause. It had a board of directors and a business office under Dr. 4787:

Nein, man ist in Deutschland noch weit ab von jeder Erkenntnis. Wie man das Schuldbekenntnis verweigert, so verweigert man auch dem guten Willen der Andern verstockt den Glauben. Man sieht noch immer nur die Gier, die Ränke, die Arglist der Andern, und die belebendste Hoffnung ist, daß dereinst der

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the question of influential factors that possibly made the First World War the necessary conditions and preparatory groundwork for the Second World War and its crimes and significantly contributed to the outbreak and course of the Second World War: Thus, many speak of the "Great seminal catastrophe

4320:

the question of political room for maneuver, or the inevitability of rearmament and the policy of alliances before the war. With this question, the earlier classification of the era as imperialist became more varied and nuanced. In most cases, the common culpability of all European hegemonic powers

3687:

The examination of the facts shows, on the contrary, that the policy of all the Great Powers, including Russia, objectively led to the World War. The responsibility for the war is borne by the ruling circles of all the Great Powers without exception, notwithstanding the fact that the governments of

3338:

had insisted in 1919 on the contractual establishment of sole guilt on the part of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The payment of reparations for war damage incurred and the permanent weakening of the arch-enemy were the principal motives of this attitude, and were taken up by the public: '"The Krauts

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on 20 August 1919. Its four subcommittees were tasked with examining the causes of the war, what brought about its loss, what missed opportunities for peace had presented themselves, and if international laws had been broken. The inquiry continued for thirteen years, until the Nazi Party victory in

1210:

Historians today take a more nuanced view of the causes of World War I than is expressed in the treaty. Article 231 was not intended to evaluate historical events, but to legally and morally legitimize the peace terms that were disadvantageous to the German Reich. Moreover, the German Empire was to

4995:

Die Schuld der deutschen Regierung war dabei, daß sie, um den Frieden nur ja zu erhalten, die günstigen Stunden des Losschlagens immer versäumte, sich in das Bündnis zur Erhaltung des Weltfriedens verstrickte und so endlich das Opfer einer Weltkoalition wurde, die eben dem Drang nach Erhaltung des

3632:

Consensus historians recognize further that Germany, already in 1914 largely isolated diplomatically and threatened with encirclement by the Triple Entente, faced an imminent future threat, that once Russia had completed its announced plans for military expansion, scheduled for completion by 1917,

3548:

As soon as Germany was no longer considered its number one military and economic competitor, British policy sought alliances with France and Russia. The British maneuvering first created illusions of British neutrality on the German side, then fears of encirclement, and thus strengthened Germany's

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made a peace proposal. It was refused by Germany, which did not want to hear about American mediation. On 31 January 1917, Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg sent a secret note to Wilson to achieve peace. The German conditions were too high for this initiative to be considered a serious one. Moreover, it

1858:

were moving in the same direction and managed to change the representation put forward by the Social Democrats that war was a necessary condition for a successful social revolution. This led to the reunification of a minority of the party with the Social Democrats in 1924 and the inclusion of some

3679:

Following Lenin's theory of imperialism, the Soviet Union's state-imposed view of history assigned the blame for the war to all "capitalist states" and allowed scarcely any independent research into the causes of the war. Beginning in about 1925, attempts were made to exonerate the tsarist system

3133:

The public media battle didn't wait for the end of the war in countries involved in the war. As their armies began to clash, the opposing governments engaged in a media battle attempting to avoid blame for causing the war, and casting blame on other countries, through the publication of carefully

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of Austria served as a catalyst for war and "reflected the sharp tension that prevailed between Austria and Hungary for a number of years" The carte blanche given by William II to the Austrian emperor had, according to Fabian, also other reasons, in particular the willingness of Germany to wage a

1806:

A pacifist movement was formed in the Weimar Republic, which demonstrated on 1 August, anti-war day. Its members came from different backgrounds: left-wing parties, liberal and anti-militarist groups, former soldiers, officers and generals. They took on the question of responsibility. The role of

1751:

No, people in Germany are still far from any kind of recognition. Just as one refuses to acknowledge guilt, so also does one stubbornly refuse to believe in the good will of others. One still sees only greed, intrigue, and malice in others, and the most invigorating hope is that the day will come

680:

A century later, debate continues into the 21st century. The main outlines of the debate include: how much diplomatic and political room to maneuver was available; the inevitable consequences of pre-war armament policies; the role of domestic policy and social and economic tensions in the foreign

2625:

The role of the army explains the mechanisms of the war guilt question. The roots of military supremacy are to be found in Prussia and in the system, established by Bismarck, in which Prussian militarism gained importance in the years after the unification of the Reich. As Helmuth von Moltke the

9267:

Thoss, Bruno (1994). "Der Erste Weltkrieg als Ereignis und Erlebnis. Paradigmenwechsel in der westdeutschen Weltkriegsforschung seit der Fischer-Kontroverse" [The First World War as event and experience. Paradigm Shift in West German World War Research since the Fischer Controversy]. In

3610:

Numerical inferiority and geographic location meant that in the event of war, Germany could not simply remain on the defensive: It had to act decisively and attack. ... Maintaining and breaking alliances became an end in itself, more important than keeping the peace. Consequently, no state bore

3041:

The fault of the German government was that, in order to keep the peace, it always missed the favorable hours for striking out, got entangled in the alliance for the preservation of world peace and thus finally became the victim of a world coalition, which precisely opposed the pressure for the

5158:

Zahlenmäßige Unterlegenheit und geografische Lage bedeuteten, dass im Kriegsfall Deutschland nicht einfach in der Defensive bleiben konnte: Es musste entschlossen handeln und angreifen. Der Erhalt und das Zerbrechen von Allianzen wurden zum Selbstzweck, wichtiger als die Wahrung des Friedens.

1368:

Solf's proposal was based on the analysis of the political situation and the negotiations between the powers in July 1914 and the positions taken by their respective governments. Solf laid the foundations for a neutral scientific research that should eventually provide a "complete and faithful

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parties tended to emphasize the moral war guilt of the imperial leaders and associated it with social rather than legal consequences, the provisional government in Berlin in early 1919 called for a "neutral" international court to exclude the question of war guilt from the upcoming Paris peace

1560:

To further this aim, the Committee held seminars, conducted special workshops for the press, unions, and liaison personnel; and held exhibitions, conventions, and rallies. The Committee exploited and distributed the War Guilt Section's documentary collections, and circulated works of foreign

1556:

Its mission was to forge a uniform public opinion about the war by moderating extreme protestations of innocence on the right, and of acquiescence in accusations of guilt on the left. In practice, this amounted to silencing those admitting any guilt on the part of Germany, with the intent of

1467:

and which had been set up after the armistice. Its role was to collect documents from various sources, including the Bolsheviks, for use by to counter the Allied allegations at Versailles. The documents collected by the Special Bureau were used in German negotiations in Paris, as part of the

3430:, who only shortly earlier had accused the government of not having done enough to prevent the war, now pleaded for "national unity." Oxford historians also placed sole blame on Germany in 1914 and stressed that no propaganda was involved in taking an uncritical view of the Triple Entente's 2190:

in 1925. His book, although out of print a year after publication, was one of the books banned after Adolf Hitler came to power and examines the events that led to the war. The general opinion of German historians at the time was that responsibility for the outbreak was shared among various

1496:

However, documentation from the War Guilt Section was not considered by the delegates of the victorious powers at the Paris Conference or in the years that followed. The only concession from the Allies, was waiving their demand for extradition of the German "main war criminals" after 1922.

989:

This sense of an unjust and excessive financial burden imposed by the victorious Allied Powers based on a misplaced accusation of blame for having caused the war caused resentment and anger in Germany and resulted in vigorous efforts on multiple fronts to oppose it, including diplomatic,

3091:

in 1934: "... under the masterful and meritorious leadership of the journal and its staff," German war guilt research had made "considerable progress". Most military historians employed at the Reich Archives welcomed the suppression of the war guilt question in favor of the military war

3601:

According to John Leslie, the real authors of the war were not to be sought solely in Berlin, as the Fritz Fischer school had always maintained, but also in Vienna. In his view, a group of "hawks" in the Austrian Foreign Ministry had unleashed the war. The Scottish military historian

2588:

sent a telegram in which he stated that Germany would mobilize, but William II asserted that there was no longer any reason to declare war since Serbia accepted the ultimatum. Various futile attempts at peace were made, such as the proposal of 27 July to hold a four-power conference.

2859:. For him, "all German laws are nothing more than the anchoring of the peace treaties". Hitler took part in the war and was very much marked by the military collapse. Antisemitism also made its appearance as did attacks against personalities of Jewish origin, such as the one against 3142:

appeared on 4 August 1914, and was the first such book to come out. It contains 36 documents. Within a week, most other combatant countries had published their own book, each named with a different color name. France held off until 1 December 1914, when they finally published their

3379:, Poincaré and his associates had pushed for the quickest possible Russian mobilization. Stefan Schmidt came to a similar conclusion in 2009 in his research in the Paris archives. The Fischer debate triggered a self-critical view in France of French policy in the years after 1914. 4891:

In jedem anderen Staate waren Militär und Marine nichts als Instrumente der auswärtigen Politik. In dem militarisierten Deutschland hatten sie eine Sonderstellung, waren sie, seit Bismarck ihnen nicht mehr im Wege stand, mächtiger als ein Reichskanzler und weit beliebter als alle

3414:

Until about 1955, the British debate on war guilt fluctuated between a determination of Germany's sole guilt and an equal share of war guilt, or innocence, of all the powers involved. The change in historical viewpoint was strongly influenced by current policies toward Germany.

3314:

France's war propaganda, which since 1914 had seen the country as long threatened by Germany and finally attacked under a pretext, initially continued to have the same effect after the end of the war: the official view of history was shaped by works such as the Senate Report by

1170:

affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her

2797:, which alleged that the government formed by the socialists betrayed the army by signing the armistice while still in a state of combat. German nationalism, incarnated by the defeated military, did not recognize the legitimacy of the Weimar Republic. This legend weakened the 1640:

also worked to refute German responsibility for the war, and for war crimes. To this end, it produced technical reports for the parliamentary commission and published eighteen volumes on the subject of "The First World War 1914–1918" from 1925 until it was taken over by the

3655:

All thought they were acting under outside pressure. All of them thought that the war was being forced on them by their opponents. However, all of them made decisions that contributed to the escalation of the crisis. To that extent, they all bear responsibility, not just

4297:, two works that disputed whether Germany contributed any more to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 through its actions or inactions than the other great powers did. Since their appearance, the debate has once again been considered open, according to some scholars. 2840:(NSDAP), which would make the Treaty of Versailles and the question of responsibility its trademark issue: "But the war guilt question can also lead to the poisoning of relations between peoples, it can become a weapon forged for the hand of international nationalism." 3701:

This view is disputed by individual studies on the concrete behavior of the business community before the war. Nevertheless, economic interests and structures are also recognized as a factor in the war by historians researching traditional diplomatic history (e.g.

2630:

In any other state, the army and navy are nothing but instruments of foreign policy. In militarized Germany, they had a special position; since Bismarck no longer stood in their way, they were more powerful than an Imperial Chancellor and far more popular than all

9994:

Konrad H. Jarausch, Der nationale Tabubruch. Wissenschaft, Öffentlichkeit und Politik in der Fischer-Kontroverse, dans : Martin Sabrow, Ralph Jessen, Klaus Große Kracht (Hrsg.): Zeitgeschichte als Streitgeschichte. Große Kontroversen seit 1945, Beck 2003,

1387:

At the beginning of World War I, all of the main combatants published bound versions of diplomatic correspondence, with greater or lesser accuracy, partly for domestic consumption and also partly to influence other actors about the responsibility for the war.

4368:) analyzed how soldiers, military leaders, and wartime propaganda reacted to the front-line experience of mass destruction. Attempts had been made to refute doubts about the defensive character of the war by placing it in an aggressive-nationalist context. " 1452:

The position of the SPD party majority, which was tied to its own approval of the war from 1914 to 1918 and left the imperial administrative apparatus almost untouched, continued to determine the domestic political reappraisal of the war. With an eye to the

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of the Treaty of Versailles is at the heart of the issue; also known as the "War Guilt Clause", article 231 delineated German responsibility for the war. English and French were the official languages of the treaty; in French, it was known formally as

11761: 4673:

Mais aussi dans la manière de faire la guerre l'Allemagne n'a pas commis seule des fautes, chaque nation en a commis. Je ne veux pas répondre aux reproches par des reproches, mais, si on nous demande de faire amende honorable, il ne faut pas oublier

3501:

Although Fischer's work reinforces the assumption that German leaders bore the greatest portion of responsibility for the outbreak and prolongation of World War I, it obliges British historians all the more to look again at the British government's

3086:

Under the new political guidelines, German historians no longer asked about war guilt but about the politically necessary steps to effectively prevent a new world war allegedly imposed from outside. Julius Hashagen wrote retrospectively about the

1569:, through guides, pamphlets, and broadsides. They used works of foreign revisionists to strengthen the case for exculpation at home, while striving to maintain a united front at home in order to influence revisionists abroad, such as the American 3848:

The German Foreign Ministry lavished special "care" upon the efforts of both Fay and Barnes with generous use of the German archives, and in the case of Barnes, research funds provided by the German government. The German government liked Fay's

3697:

on the eve of war", while in 1991 Willibald Gutsche argued that in 1914, "in addition to the coal and steel monopolists, influential representatives of the big banks and electrical and shipping monopolies were also not inclined towards peace".

1401:

After the conclusion of the war and the draconian aspects of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany launched various propaganda efforts to counter the imputation of guilt upon Germany by the victorious Allies, starting with the War Guilt Section

883:

began in August 1918, and the position of Germany and the Central Powers deteriorated, leading them to sue for peace. Initial offers were rejected, and Germany's position became more desperate. Awareness of impending military defeat sparked

681:

relations of the states involved; the role of public opinion and their experience of war in the face of organized propaganda; the role of economic interests and top military commanders in torpedoing deescalation and peace negotiations; the

3054:, demands for disarmament, the "disparagement of living and dead war heroes," and the "disparagement of national symbols" as "military treason" This met with enthusiastic approval from some prominent legal scholars of the time, such as 2805:, proclaimed the republic, and refused (for some of its members) to vote for war credits in 1914. Hindenburg spoke of the "division and relaxation of the will to victory" driven by internal party interests. Socialists are labeled, the " 5564:

Niemann, Heinz (2015). "Die Debatte um Kriegsursachen und Kriegsschuld in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie zwischen 1914 und 1924" [The Debate on the Causes of War and War Guilt in German Social Democracy between 1914 and 1924].

1183:

The treaty assigned the role of aggressor in World War I to Germany and her allies alone. It meant an initial isolation of Germany, which saw itself as the scapegoat for the misdeeds of the other European states before the World War.

3549:

readiness for war. Britain's alliance policy had forced Germany to go to war after the Russian general mobilization. He denied a significant role of militarism and imperialism as a factor, as well as any significant opposition of

9632: 7225:"Das Regenbogen-Buch": deutsches Wiessbuch, österreichisch-ungarisches Rotbuch, englisches Blaubuch, französisches Gelbbuch, russisches Orangebuch, serbisches Blaubuch und belgisches Graubuch, die europäischen Kriegsverhandlungen 3374:

jointly advocated a version of Lloyd George's thesis that none of the governments involved had deliberately sought war. In his 1993 book, Mark B. Hayne advanced the thesis of substantial French complicity. In order to thwart the

4151: 3438:, who saw the war as a "struggle of liberty against militarism," tried to prove that Germany had deliberately risked a "European conflagration" in order to force England to honor its "moral obligations" to France and Belgium. 3575:

The First World War was a tragic and unnecessary conflict. Unnecessary because the train of events that led to its outbreak might have been broken at any point during the five weeks of crisis that preceded the first clash of

4165:, is a useful starting point for translations, but translators must revise errors as necessary and confirm that the translation is accurate, rather than simply copy-pasting machine-translated text into the English Knowledge. 3770:, is a useful starting point for translations, but translators must revise errors as necessary and confirm that the translation is accurate, rather than simply copy-pasting machine-translated text into the English Knowledge. 3243:, is a useful starting point for translations, but translators must revise errors as necessary and confirm that the translation is accurate, rather than simply copy-pasting machine-translated text into the English Knowledge. 2932:, is a useful starting point for translations, but translators must revise errors as necessary and confirm that the translation is accurate, rather than simply copy-pasting machine-translated text into the English Knowledge. 2249:, is a useful starting point for translations, but translators must revise errors as necessary and confirm that the translation is accurate, rather than simply copy-pasting machine-translated text into the English Knowledge. 2065:, is a useful starting point for translations, but translators must revise errors as necessary and confirm that the translation is accurate, rather than simply copy-pasting machine-translated text into the English Knowledge. 1920:, is a useful starting point for translations, but translators must revise errors as necessary and confirm that the translation is accurate, rather than simply copy-pasting machine-translated text into the English Knowledge. 3853:

so much that it purchased hundreds of copies in various languages to hand out for free at German embassies and consulates. The German government allowed books that were pro-German in their interpretation, such as Barnes's

3692:

Marxism's models for explaining guilt for the war assign a major part of the blame for its outbreak to economic factors and big banks. In 1976 Reinhold Zilch criticized the "clearly aggressive aims of Reichsbank President

667:, although not without provoking a great deal of controversy, it also made it possible to identify other aspects of the conflict, such as the role of the masses and the question of Germany's special path to democracy, the 3840:

produced works that claimed that Germany was not responsible for war. Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, which had seemingly assigned all responsibility for the war to Germany and thus justified the Allied claim to

3229: 1906: 10337:

The Guilt of Germany for the War of German Aggression : Prince Karl Lichnowsky's Memorandum; Being the Story of His Ambassadorship at London from 1912 to August, 1914, Together with Foreign Minister Von Jagow's

3108:

In the early summer of 1940, the Nazi regime presented the rapid conquest of Belgium and France as the true end of the First World War, transforming the defeat of 1918 into a delayed victory. Liberal historians like

1681:

The primacy of government policy and the traditional German attraction to "great leaders" contradicts, in part unintentionally, the logic of the legend which arose from fateful forces, of non-responsibility for the

1364:

on 29 November 1918. For Solf, the creation of a neutral commission was the only way to bring international peace, to create lasting guarantees against possible wars, and to restore the confidence of the people.

8403:

Krumeich, Gerd (1994). "Vergleichende Aspekte der 'Kriegsschulddebatte' nach dem ersten Weltkrieg" [Comparative aspects of the 'war guilt debate' after the First World War]. In Michalka, Wolfgang (ed.).

7876:

Gutsche, Willibald (1991). "Die Außenpolitik des Kaiserreichs in der Geschichtsschreibung der DDR" [The Foreign Policy of the German Empire in the Historiography of the GDR]. In Schöllgen, Gregor (ed.).

3134:

selected documents, basically consisting of diplomatic exchanges, selected and ordered to cast them in the best light possible. Sometimes, according to other combatants, they were misleading, or even falsified.

11756: 3544:

was exacerbated by several things, including the 1905 British decision to build large battleships, a 1911 meeting of British generals, admirals, and government, and a lack of British willingness to negotiate.

2854:

From the second point of the NSDAP's 25-point program, Adolf Hitler demanded that the German people be treated in the same way as other nations and demanded the abrogation of the Treaties of Versailles and of

2235: 3383:

criticized Fischer for considering German war aims in isolation from those of the other powers and for neglecting the interactions involved. He also put into perspective the importance of Bethmann Hollweg's

10020:

Matthew Stibbe, The Fischer Controversy over German War Aims in the First World War and its Reception by East German Historians, 1961–1989. Dans : The Historical Journal 46/2003, pp. 649–668. (in

3358:

demonstrated falsifications in the Yellow Book, but received little attention. Parallel to the German attempts to show documentary evidence of the innocence of the German Empire in the outbreak of war, the

2721:, Germany renewed contacts with other countries. The borders that were defined by the Treaty of Versailles were also at the heart of the grievances of the German government, which requested their revision. 2051: 3394:. Following Fischer, and also French and Russian sources, Ferro found the chief responsibility lay with Germany and secondarily with the Entente powers. Germany had the most pronounced desire to wage war. 1477:

In the same way that color books did, the Office collected documents to counter accusations that Germany and Austria-Hungary had planned the world war and had "intentionally" disregarded the international

3756: 875:

on 1 August. Within days the other powers followed suit, and before the end of the month the war extended to Japan (siding with the United Kingdom) and, in November, to the Ottoman Empire (with Germany).

1468:"Professors' Memorandum" presented to the allies on 27 May 1919. It was probably written by von Bülow, but signed by the professors for "patriotic reasons". In 1919, this became the "War Guilt Section" ( 4000:

was the first to research all accessible archive holdings according to the war aims of the Central Powers before and during the war. In October 1959 his essay about German war objectives was published.

2918: 1752:

when these dark forces will be made to serve their own interests. The rulers of today still haven't learned anything from the world war; the old illusion, the old megalomania, still dominates them.

4788:

Tag komme, der diese dunklen Mächte den eigenen Interessen dienstbar mache. Noch haben die heute Regierenden nichts aus dem Weltkrieg gelernt, noch beherrscht sie der alte Wahn, der alte Machtwahn.

3907:

agrees with this, but also sees Germany as responsible: "...the main part of the responsibility for the outbreak of the war must still be situated in the decisions of Austria-Hungary and Germany".

7230:

The Rainbow Book: German White Book, Austrian-Hungarian Red Book, English Blue Book, French Yellow Book, Russian Orange Book, Serbian Blue Book and Belgian Grey Book, the European war negotiations

5187:(Fatherland Instruction) was used to describe the propagandistic influence exerted both on German soldiers as well as on the home front to promote the views and goals of the Supreme Army Command ( 4252:, on the other hand, used foreign archival material to emphasize German-Austrian efforts to achieve an amicable or separate peace since 1915, and lack of crisis management by Germany's opponents. 3824:

Academic work in the English-speaking world in the later 1920s and 1930s, blamed the participants more or less equally. In the early 1920s, several American historians opposed to the terms of the

2811:" ("the homeless"). Hindenburg continued to emphasize the innocence of the army, stating: "The good core of the Army is not to blame. Its performance is as admirable as that of the officer corps. 11912: 11552: 7799:

Geiss, Imanuel (1978c). "Sozialstruktur und imperialistische Dispositionen im Zweiten Deutschen Kaiserreich" [Social Structure and Imperialist Dispositions in the Second German Empire].

3594:, Keegan doubted Germany's primary culpability in the outbreak of war. These historians point to a willingness of the British public to intervene, and the rather confrontational policies of the 3449:, Michael Howard, and Jonathan Steinberg took into account hitherto neglected economic, social-historical, and military-historical aspects as well as the role of Austria-Hungary. John Gooch, in 4803:

Die Völker haben keinen Krieg gewollt, kein Volk hat ihn gewollt; durch die Borniertheit, Fahrlässigkeit und Böswilligkeit der Diplomaten ist es zu diesem »dümmsten aller Kriege« gekommen.

4293: 4075:

for the outbreak of the war, but continued to deny the Empire's continuous striving for hegemony before and during the war. Gerhard Ritter stuck to his view of a foreign policy "encirclement" (

9384:

von Strandmann, Pogge (1994). "Britische Historiker und der Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs" [British historians and the outbreak of the First World War]. In Michalka, Wolfgang (ed.).

3628:, the German fears of encirclement in 1914 were based on reality and resulted from a lack of willingness on the part of Germany and Austria-Hungary to carry out social and political reforms: 11952: 9238:

Strachan, Hew (2004). "Wer war schuld? – Wie es zum Ersten Weltkrieg kam." [Who was to blame? - How the First World War came about.]. In Burgdorff, Stephan; Andresen, Karen (eds.).

4770: 3481:

British historians mostly agreed with Fischer's main theses, but subsequently began a nuanced and critical examination of Britain's own responsibility for the First World War. For example,

3536:

that the world war was avoidable with the crisis management available to European diplomacy at the time, and that only Britain's entry into the war escalated it to a pan-European war. The

3083:

in December 1934 and linked it to the expectation that at last the "honor of the nation", which had been "most grievously violated" by the Treaty of Versailles, would be "fully restored".

2744:, a man of compromise but above all a defender of German interests, succeeded in getting Germany to join the League of Nations on 8 September 1926. If international relations were calmed, 2656:

At the opening of armistice negotiations, Germany was in the grip of revolutionary uprisings. A commission, presided over by Matthias Erzberger, was set up to sign the armistice treaty at

3680:

from the central blame that imperial German and Weimar era nationalist historians had assigned to it. To facilitate the view, the Soviet Union published files from the tsarist archives.

1360:

proposed a bill to establish an international tribunal to analyze events before and during the war. This bill originated in a proposal made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

1714:, it is absolutely necessary to expose the faults of pre-war German policy and to acknowledge responsibility in order to achieve a prosperous democracy and a retreat from militarism. 4244:

and the Soviet Union have also been evaluated. Prompted by Fischer's theses, researchers increasingly devoted themselves to German policy in the states occupied by the Kaiserreich.

3092:

historiography that began in 1934, but the Nazi regime's measures, which they had initially welcomed, were soon directed against some of the historians associated with the journal.

3065:

in 1933, a "Führer word" by Hitler ended the German war guilt debate following the previously propagated "war guilt lie" and in line with British historians of the appeasement era:

12070: 4011:(Historical Journal) marked the beginning of a controversy that lasted until about 1985 and permanently changed the national conservative consensus on the question of war guilt. 8665:

Ludendorff's Own Story, August 1914-November 1918: The Great War from the Siege of Liège to the Signing of the Armistice as Viewed from the Grand Headquarters of the German Army

2430: 4953:"Aber die Kriegsschuldfrage kann auch zu einer Vergiftung der Völkerbeziehungen führen, kann zu einer Waffe in der Hand des internationalen Nationalismus umgeschmiedet werden." 1438:. The inquiry's findings were hampered by lack of cooperation from both the government and the military and were in general watered down and deflected blame away from Germany. 2836:

Fabian foresaw the consequences that the war guilt question could have for the rise of extremism, which had been awakened in Germany as early as 1920 with the creation of the

1851: 10469: 9967:

Geiss, Imanuel (1972). "Die Fischer-Kontroverse. Ein kritischer Beitrag zum Verhältnis zwischen Historiographie und Politik in der Bundesrepublik". In Geiss, Imanuel (ed.).

4248:

presented concrete plans for the forced expulsion and resettlement of Poles and Jews and, in 1981, blamed government action on the nationalism of important interest groups.

3897: 3606:

emphasizes the economic competition between Germany and England, Germany's isolation in foreign policy, and what he sees as a disastrous effect of the policy of alliances:

1704:

While most of the German media denounced the treaty, others believed that the question of responsibility for the war should be dealt with at a moral level. One example was

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to be impossible: "Austria wanted the ultimatum to be rejected; Germany, which according to Tirpitz already knew the main points of it on July 13, wanted the same thing."

3095:

On 30 January 1937, Hitler revoked the German signature to the "war guilt article" 231 of the Treaty of Versailles. On 30 January 1939 he justified his war policy in the

11871: 8944:

Ritter, Gerhard (1950). "Gegenwärtige Lage und Zukunftsaufgaben deutscher Geschichtswissenschaft" [Present Situation and Future Tasks of German Historiography].

4175: 3591: 3253: 2942: 2259: 2075: 1521:) was a "clearinghouse for officially desirable views on the outbreak of the war" and for circulating these views faster and more broadly. The center was created by the 1249:", put the responsibility for the war on Germany. Germany was required under the treaty to return territories taken and redraw the border between Belgium and Germany. 9935:(in German). Vol. 59. Die verdrängte Niederlage. Politische Öffentlichkeit und Kriegsschuldfrage in der Weimarer Republik. Gœttingue: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1485:

The department also acted as an "internal censorship office", determined which publications were to be praised or criticized, and prepared official statements for the

4092:

noted, when Fischer published his findings in 1961, that Fischer instantly rendered obsolete every book previously published on the subject of responsibility for the

1796:

The people did not want war, no people wanted it; through the narrow-mindedness, negligence, and malice of the diplomats this "stupidest of all wars" has come about.

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through slander campaigns based on various allegations: namely, that the SDP not only betrayed the army and Germany by signing the armistice, but also repressed the

2671:

held the socialists responsible for the defeat, Fabian asserted that the defeat was due to the failure of possible peace initiatives. On 21 December 1916, President

1525:

in order to bring to the public documents which would unify public opinion towards the official line. It was prolific, with Wegerer writing more than 300 articles.

1187:

The one-sided apportionment of blame to Germany triggered a national debate. The signatures by Hermann Müller and Johannes Bell, who had come to office through the

5184: 4369: 2439:), which Fabian characterizes as "Europe's downfall". The system of alliances set up in the summer of 1914 and its complexity made the outbreak of war inevitable. 1686:

Nevertheless, some aspects remain to be studied, such as the influence of the economy, the masses, or ideology, on the course of the war. The evolution towards a "

3962:), Albertini comes to the conclusion that all European governments had a share of responsibility in the outbreak of the war, while pointing to German pressure on 1655:

methodical interrogation of witnesses and analysis of reports from subordinate military services where collections of military mail become new historical sources.

11535: 3453:

denied that "anyone wanted the war at all." William H. Dawson, who shortly before had seen "German militarism" as the sole cause of the war, now singled out the

2874:

The war guilt issue strengthened right-wing extremist movements and led to a radicalization of German society and eventually to the fall of the Weimar Republic.

1824: 1812: 1414:). Two additional units were created in April 1921, in an effort to appear to be independent of the ministry: the Center for the Study of the Causes of the War ( 8263:]. Vaterländischen Schriften (in German). Vol. 7 Kriegschuldlüge 1919 . Mannheim: Reinhard Welz Vermittler Verlag e.K. pp. 238–257 (vol. 7 p.19). 8052: 3380: 8169: 1373:. The Landsberg project was rejected by the Allies, who demanded that the major German war criminals be handed over to them, and abandoned this idea in 1922. 11670: 4380: 3445:

were published in Britain from 1926 to 1938. Germany's welcome entry into the League of Nations then triggered a turnaround. Now, British historians such as

3435: 2740:, and in return Germany was assured that it would no longer be occupied by France. The war guilt question did not block its foreign policy. Foreign Minister 1840: 11897: 1860: 576: 1561:

revisionists from the United States and Britain. They did not solely address the question of war guilt, but also of reparations, armaments, colonies, the

957:

Though hostilities ended on 11 November, a formal state of war continued for months and various treaties were signed amongst the former belligerents. The

12109: 11720: 11596: 4384: 1816: 1351: 4861:Österreich wollte die Nichtannahme des Ultimatums, Deutschland, das laut Tirpitz bereits am 13. Juli die wichtigsten Punkte kannte, wollte das gleiche. 3320: 11388: 10017:

Gregor Schöllgen, Griff nach der Weltmacht? 25 Jahre Fischer-Kontroverse, dans : Historisches Jahrbuch 106 (1986), pp. 386–406. (in German)

8474:

Review of: N. Ferguson: The War of the World | H-Soz-Kult. Communication and Specialized Information for the Historical Sciences | History on the Web

8469:

Rezension zu: N. Ferguson: The War of the World | H-Soz-Kult. Kommunikation und Fachinformation für die Geschichtswissenschaften | Geschichte im Netz

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Nevertheless, he saw the initiative for the world war on the side of the Entente, so that the German war guilt for him consisted in the failure of a

4185:

Do not translate text that appears unreliable or low-quality. If possible, verify the text with references provided in the foreign-language article.

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Do not translate text that appears unreliable or low-quality. If possible, verify the text with references provided in the foreign-language article.

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Do not translate text that appears unreliable or low-quality. If possible, verify the text with references provided in the foreign-language article.

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Do not translate text that appears unreliable or low-quality. If possible, verify the text with references provided in the foreign-language article.

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Do not translate text that appears unreliable or low-quality. If possible, verify the text with references provided in the foreign-language article.

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Do not translate text that appears unreliable or low-quality. If possible, verify the text with references provided in the foreign-language article.

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Do not translate text that appears unreliable or low-quality. If possible, verify the text with references provided in the foreign-language article.

12244: 4283: 5193:). The primary aim was to strengthen the will to persevere in the face of the increasingly difficult military and economic situation from 1916 on. 4103:

Since around 1970, Fischer's work has stimulated increased research into the socio-economic causes of war. These include the orientation toward a

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Hahn, Eric J. C.; Carole Fink; Isabell V. Hull; MacGregor Knox (1985). "The German Foreign Ministry and the Question of War Guilt in 1918–1919".

7640: 7603: 4275: 4089: 4002: 455: 7252:

Bestuschew, Igor W. (1967). "Die russische Außenpolitik von Februar bis Juni 1914" [Russian Foreign Policy from February to June 1914].

7113: 12221: 12133: 9598: 8527:

Leslie, John (1988). "Österreich-Ungarn vor dem Kriegsausbruch" [Austria-Hungary before the Outbreak of War]. In Ralph Melville (ed.).

5719: 1617: 1606: 1550: 648:, as well as the general public. The war guilt question pervaded the history of the Weimar Republic. Founded shortly before the signing of the 11876: 10841: 4478: 1512: 1506: 7147:

Markus Pöhlmann: Kriegsgeschichte und Geschichtspolitik: Der Erste Weltkrieg. Die amtliche Militärgeschichtsschreibung 1914–1956 (Rezension)

12295: 11797: 3055: 1430: 947: 11994: 11696: 8350:[The Question of War Guilt and Contemporary Historical Research in Germany. Historiographical Aftermath of the First World War]. 7216:...she had not plotted the Great War, had not desired a war, and had made genuine, though belated and ill-organized efforts to avert it. 5145:

die eigentlichen Urheber des Kriegs nicht nur in Berlin, wie die Fritz-Fischer-Schule immer behauptet hat, sondern auch in Wien zu suchen

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the role of domestic politics, social tensions, and economic interests in the escalation of foreign policy among all participating states

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Germany had not plotted the Great War, had not desired a war, and had made genuine, though belated and ill-organized efforts to avert it.

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was signed in 1887. The isolation of France was the basis of Bismarckian policy in order to be able to ensure the security of the Reich.

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also saw World War I in 1999 as caused not by deliberate action on the part of the powers but by the fatal automatism of the alliances:

1582: 12165: 11462: 9976:

Klaus Große Kracht, Die zankende Zunft. Historische Kontroversen in Deutschland nach 1945, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2005,

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Schroeder, Paul W (27 September 2016) . "Embedded counterfactuals and World War I as an unavoidable war.". In Schroeder, Paul W (ed.).

4133: 4060:

supported Fischer in 1963–64 with a two-volume collection of documents, referring in it to the destruction of important files from the

1342:. After the conditions of Versailles became known, they demanded the deletion of the paragraph on the extradition of the "war-guilty". 687:

theory; and the long-term trends which tend to contextualise the First World War as a condition or preparation for the Second, such as

8347: 8286: 7611:

France. Ministère des affaires étrangères; Commission de publication des documents relatifs aux origines de la guerre de 1914 (1936).

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France. Ministère des affaires étrangères; Commission de publication des documents relatifs aux origines de la guerre de 1914 (1936).

3003: 12211: 9963:

Volker Berghahn, "Die Fischer-Kontroverse - 15 Jahre danach", in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 6 (1980), pp. 403–419. (in German)

2562: 1482:. This was also intended to provide foreign historians and journalists with exculpatory material to influence public opinion abroad. 4327:

the role of mob mentality and war experiences and their interaction with war propaganda. This is addressed in the Bruno Thoss essay.

11821: 11520: 11127: 10367: 10225:

Krieg - Frieden - Abrüstung. Die Haltung der europäischen und amerikanischen Kirchen zur Frage der deutschen Kriegsschuld 1914-1933

9469:

Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Band 4: Vom Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges bis zur Gründung der beiden deutschen Staaten 1914–1949

7739:(1978a). "Die Kriegsschuldfrage - das Ende eines nationalen Tabus" [The War Guilt Question - the End of a National Taboo]. 4498: 4278:

wrote in 2003 that Germany had largely sabotaged efforts at diplomatic deescalation and therefore bore a large share of the blame.

4016: 3487: 1540: 1534: 569: 12075: 5326: 2570:, William II wrote "The situation with the Serbs must be dealt with, and quickly. Walter Fabian judged the ultimatum addressed to 2461: 1699: 1322:

After the Allies rejected the proposals and demanded instead the extradition of the "war-culpable individuals", Otto Landsknecht (

900:. The Central Powers collapsed, with the new Republic capitulating to the victorious Allies and ending hostilities by signing the 872: 11957: 11792: 11606: 11530: 11308: 8996:

Militärisch-politische Zwangslage, die unsere Diplomatie im Moment der großen Weltkrisis im Juli 1914 geradezu in Fesseln schlug.

8633:

Der Politiker Eduard Bernstein: eine Untersuchung zu seinem politischen Wirken in der Frühphase der Weimarer Republik (1918-1924)

7152:

Markus Pöhlmann: History of War and Historical Politics: The First World War. Official Military Historiography 1914–1956 (review)

4982:

Der Kampf des Jahres 1914 wurde den Massen, wahrhaftiger Gott, nicht aufgezwungen, sondern von dem gesamten Volke selbst begehrt.

4538: 4533: 4426: 4406: 3418:

In the summer of 1914, opinions on war guilt in Britain were in part critical of the government and pacifist, partly fatalist or

2540: 2482: 1176: 1130: 128: 11972: 19:

This article is about the debate over responsibility for World War I. For the notion of collective guilt for the Holocaust, see

12310: 12051: 12033: 11984: 11638: 4548: 3050:

that the claim that Germany had caused World War I should be punished with the death penalty; and so should other acts such as

3047: 2856: 2649:

was established on 5 December 1917. On 13 July 1917, the Chancellor was forced to resign under pressure from the two generals,

2512: 1454: 1102: 958: 738: 10006:

John Anthony Moses, The Politics of Illusion. The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography, London 1975 (Nachdruck 1985),

5025:, a non-existent word in German, and used in quotation marks in German text where it appears, but readily understandable as a 2582: 1270: 11381: 10601: 10149: 10124: 10045: 9940: 9423:. Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Go̊ttingen : philol.-hist. Klasse, 3, 40. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 9399: 9357: 9315: 9283: 9249: 9220: 9194: 9108: 9034: 8887: 8866: 8821: 8799: 8778: 8736: 8707: 8673: 8641: 8592: 8571: 8538: 8509: 8448: 8419: 8385: 8328: 8268: 8243: 8214: 8158: 8111: 8083: 8033: 8004: 7975: 7944: 7911: 7858: 7822: 7781: 7752: 7695: 7662: 7511: 7480: 7451: 7310: 4313:

the Central Powers bearing primary responsibility for the outbreak of the war, even if it could not be blamed on them alone.

3211: 2626:

Younger showed, in various wars such as the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the Chief of the General Staff wielded great power.

1888: 868: 810: 509: 440: 373: 7351:"'Oh! What a Lovely War!' Zum Forschungsertrag und zu den Tendenzen ausgewählter Neuerscheinungen über den Ersten Weltkrieg" 2851:, for whom the "rescue of the fatherland" required "the joint action of all parties on national soil, including the NSDAP". 2831: 12206: 12175: 11645: 11576: 10908: 8993:

Military-political predicament that virtually shackled our diplomacy at the moment of the great world crisis in July 1914.

8839: 7353:["Oh! What a Lovely War!". On the Research Output and Trends of Selected New Publications on the First World War]. 3943:

wrote that "A politico-military situation held our diplomacy prisoner at the time of the great world crisis of July 1914."

2814:

This slander had electoral consequences for the Social Democrats. In the 1920 election, the percentage of SPD seats in the

2581:

tried to defuse events at the last moment, the army threw its full weight into the effort in order to force the situation.

1846:

At the first pacifist congress in June 1919, when a minority led by Ludwig Quidde repudiated the Treaty of Versailles, the

9989:

Historische Forschung und politische Kultur in Deutschland. Die Debatte 1914–1980 über den Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges

9167: 2519: 1274: 1109: 12185: 11963: 11841: 11831: 11621: 11467: 10755: 10738: 10571: 5156:"Numerical inferiority and geographic location..." is a back-translation from German in Burgdorf & Wiegrefe (2004): " 4272:

more differentiated way than by Fischer also from the pan-European power constellations and crisis situations before 1914

4170: 3248: 2937: 2788: 2254: 2070: 1083: 562: 336: 104: 8348:"Kriegsschuldfrage und zeithistorische Forschung in Deutschland. Historiographische Nachwirkungen des Ersten Weltkriegs" 4270:(2004), Germany's decisive contribution to the outbreak of war in 1914 has been widely acknowledged, but explained in a 2617: 2217: 677:

were able to confront the war guilt question by advancing the general discussion without compromising German interests.

12140: 11902: 10646: 10611: 10556: 10285: 10110: 9079: 8636:. Gesprächskreis Geschichte (in German). Vol. 40. Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Historisches Forschungszentrum. 8533:. Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, 134,2. Vol. 2. Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag. 7812: 4193: 3781: 3683:

Soviet historian Igor Bestushev disputed the attempt at national exoneration and stated in opposition to Fritz Fischer:

3390:, on which Fischer based his thesis of continuous German planning for hegemony. A position counter to this was held by 3271: 2960: 2798: 2277: 2093: 1931: 885: 475: 269: 124: 11540: 10310: 797:, during and after the treaties that established the peace, and continuing on throughout the fifteen-year life of the 11650: 11616: 11601: 11095: 10999: 10836: 10324: 10299: 10239: 10210: 10188: 10170: 10085: 9981: 9894: 9778: 9732: 9717: 9699: 9681: 9663: 9648: 9617: 9592: 9577: 9536: 9473:

German Social History. Vol. 4: From the Beginning of World War I to the Founding of the Two German States, 1914-1949.

8757: 8481: 7890: 7419: 7159: 4938:

Den guten Kern des Heers trifft keine Schuld. Seine Leistung ist ebenso bewunderungswürdig wie die des Offizierkorps.

2819: 1457:, that began on 18 January 1919, by late 1918 the Foreign Office had already established the "Bülow Special Office" ( 1435: 1149: 780: 11704: 8316:

Dynamiken des Erinnerns in der internationalen Jugendarbeit: Geschichte, Gedenken und Pädagogik zum Ersten Weltkrieg

4301:

take advantage of the situation and to deal with the Serbs, Germany undoubtedly did have a special responsibility".

4206:

Content in this edit is translated from the existing German Knowledge article at ]; see its history for attribution.

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Content in this edit is translated from the existing German Knowledge article at ]; see its history for attribution.

3738: 3422:. After the German invasion of Belgium, Germany alone was considered to have caused the war, even by Prime Minister 3284:

Content in this edit is translated from the existing French Knowledge article at ]; see its history for attribution.

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Content in this edit is translated from the existing French Knowledge article at ]; see its history for attribution.

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Fabian showed that Germany had an undeniable share of responsibility in the war. Even if the emperor and chancellor

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Content in this edit is translated from the existing French Knowledge article at ]; see its history for attribution.

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Content in this edit is translated from the existing French Knowledge article at ]; see its history for attribution.

1944:

Content in this edit is translated from the existing French Knowledge article at ]; see its history for attribution.

1116: 938: 12315: 12273: 11989: 11665: 11628: 11501: 11374: 9455:

von Wegerer, Alfred (1934). "Versailles und die Ehre der Nation" [Versailles and the Honor of the Nation].

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The public debate on longer-term causes of the war continues. Today, it relates primarily to the following topics:

2033: 827:, which accounted for millions more) making it one of the largest and deadliest wars in history. By July 1914, the 119: 11826: 11772: 11633: 5608: 4330:

the role of military leaders and military interests that scuttled efforts to de-escalate and to negotiate a peace.

170: 12325: 11732: 11714: 11547: 10961: 10561: 4451: 4421: 3029:

The fight of the year 1914 was certainly not forced upon the masses, good God! but desired by the entire people.

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Kriegsgeschichte und Geschichtspolitik: Der Erste Weltkrieg. Die amtliche Militärgeschichtsschreibung 1914–1956

10011: 10000: 9100:

Frankreichs Außenpolitik in der Julikrise 1914: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Ausbruchs des Ersten Weltkrieges

7268:; Mahr, Dr. A. C. (June 1926). "A New Interpretation of the "Responsibility" Clause in the Versailles Treaty". 4483: 4461: 4456: 4446: 4431: 2900: 2585: 2508: 2497: 1847: 1663: 1098: 1087: 673:. This debate, which obstructed German political progress for many years, also showed that politicians such as 150: 109: 10251:

The German White-book: Authorized Translation. Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the War, with Supplements

5547:

Die Deutsche Nationalversammlung im Jahre 1919 in ihrer Arbeit für den Aufbau des neuen deutschen Volksstaates

5234: 1493:

later wrote about this: "In its origin, the research was virtually a continuation of the war by other means."

1326:

Bavaria) called for a national state tribunal on 12 March 1919, to try them. This was supported by only a few

11689: 11581: 11455: 11238: 11014: 10876: 10780: 10679: 7939:]. Critische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, 59 (in German). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 4914: 4668: 4543: 4441: 4436: 2578: 1784:, contributors to the review, supported the same point of view. On 23 July 1919, Tucholsky wrote a review of 1253: 901: 664: 606: 12025: 9838:

Les Responsabilités de la guerre. Quatorze questions par René Gerin. Quatorze réponses par Raymond Poincaré.

4100:. Fischer's own position on German responsibility for World War I has become known as the "Fischer thesis." 4023:

drew conclusions from detailed analysis of the long-term causes of war and their connection the foreign and

653: 11922: 11258: 10986: 10856: 10360: 10203:

Erster Weltkrieg – Zweiter Weltkrieg: Ein Vergleich. Krieg, Kriegserlebnis, Kriegserfahrung in Deutschland.

9147: 7621:]. Vol. Tome XI, (24 juillet-4 août 1914) (3e Série, (1911-1914) ed.). Imprimerie Nationale. 7584:]. Vol. Tome X, (17 mars-23 juillet 1914) (3e Série, (1911-1914) ed.). Imprimerie Nationale. 4471: 3367: 2445: 2393: 1167: 836: 142: 11782: 8321:

Dynamics of Memory in International Youth Work: History, Commemoration and Pedagogy of the First World War

5522:[Proceedings of the German Reichstag: 84th Session of the National Assembly from 20 August 1919]. 5143:"Leslie quotation "The real authors of the war..." is a back-translation from German in Melville (1988): " 3403: 2818:

was 21.6 per cent, down from 38 per cent in 1919. Right-wing parties gradually gained ground, such as the

11999: 11967: 11917: 11725: 11675: 11566: 11053: 10966: 10418: 9007:

Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Die Tragödie der Staatkunst: Bethmann Hollweg als Kriegskanzler 1914-1917

7688:

Prussian Military Spirit and Unleashing War in 1914: Three Studies on the Outbreak of the First World War

4904: 2815: 2702:

with Soviet Russia was signed, reducing Germany's isolation. Implementation of the treaty was considered

2646: 2178: 2153: 1991: 1625:, took over. The Foreign Office conducted the historiography of the Weimar Republic in parallel with the 162: 114: 99: 94: 49: 11443: 4107:, the imperial monarchy's inability to reform domestic policy, and domestic competition over resources. 12148: 11881: 11655: 10976: 10888: 10866: 10785: 10770: 10586: 10566: 10408: 7683:

Preussischer Militärgeist und Kriegsentfesselung 1914: drei Studien zum Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges

5551:

The German National Assembly in 1919 in its Work for the Establishment of the New German People's State

5519: 4967:...die gesamte deutsche Gesetzgebung nichts anderes als eine Verankerung der Friedensverträgereference. 4573: 4241: 3409: 2601: 819:

took place mostly in Europe between 1914 and 11 November 1918, and involved mobilization of 70 million

341: 311: 84: 12104: 9420:

Generalstabsdienst an der Front und in der O. H. L.: Aus Briefen und Tagebuchaufzeichnungen, 1915-1919

5327:"Aftermath of World War I and the Rise of Nazism, 1918–1933 - United States Holocaust Memorial Museum" 4387:

emphasized the opportunities for détente between the major European powers that had existed until the

11228: 10413: 9624: 7937:

The Repressed Defeat. The Public Sphere in Politics and the War Guilt Question in the Weimar Republic

7528: 7177: 7125: 6145: 5404: 4831:

Ausdruck der scharfen Spannung, die seit einer Reihe von Jahren zwischen Österreich-Ungarn herrschte.

4553: 4388: 3997: 3169: 3128: 2641:

When war broke out, the military staff intended to emerge victorious within six weeks, thanks to the

1045: 867:(the "Central Powers"). After a series of events, ultimatums, and mobilizations, some of them due to 824: 637: 158: 154: 89: 10276:

Mombauer, Annika. "Guilt or Responsibility? The Hundred-Year Debate on the Origins of World War I."

9828:

Die wahren Schuldigen. Die Beweise, das Verbrechen des gemeinen Rechts, das diplomatische Verbrechen

9558: 5727: 2566:

preventive war for fear of Russian mobilization. In marginal notes on a report by German ambassador

12320: 11947: 11927: 11484: 11419: 11205: 11167: 11004: 10775: 7933:

Die verdrängte Niederlage. Politische Öffentlichkeit und Kriegsschuldfrage in der Weimarer Republik

6847: 4201: 4085:, which in his view, had rendered any German striving for hegemony as purely illusory adventurism. 4067:

After a battle of speeches lasting several hours at the 1964 Historians' Day, Fischer's main rival

3789: 3279: 3096: 2968: 2699: 2692: 2567: 2285: 2101: 1939: 1732: 1188: 166: 10273:

Jörg Richter, Kriegsschuld und Nationalstolz. Politik zwischen Mythos und Realität, Katzmann, 2003

8254: 5520:"Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages: 84. Sitzung der Nationalversammlung vom 20. August 1919" 12099: 11341: 11215: 11195: 11172: 11152: 11112: 11075: 11024: 10898: 10861: 10631: 10353: 8627: 6850:[Teaching materials on the Fischer Controversy] (in German). Berlin: Humboldt University. 4565: 4493: 4215: 3842: 3803: 3293: 3051: 2982: 2868: 2745: 2299: 2115: 1953: 1642: 1338:

attacked him violently and accused the government representatives of treason in the sense of the

1212: 1076: 974: 925: 433: 134: 36:

joined with Germany shortly after the war started. Italy remained neutral in 1914 and joined the

20: 11474: 11438: 10078:

An der Schwelle zum Totalen Krieg. Die militärische Debatte über den Krieg der Zukunft 1919–1939

7350: 7116:[Omnibus review: Literature report: 'First World War' - H-Soz-u-Cult / Reviews / Books] 2597: 2533: 1123: 1020: 11907: 11861: 11710: 11142: 11117: 11080: 10939: 10871: 10700: 10591: 10581: 4466: 3561: 3522: 2718: 880: 852: 823:

and resulted in over 20 million military and civilian deaths (exclusive of fatalities from the

750: 299: 193: 9692:

Die Schalen des Zorns. Großbritannien, Deutschland und das Heraufziehen des Ersten Weltkrieges

9098: 8564:

Shaping Opinions in War: War Experiences of German Soldiers and Their Interpretation 1914-1918

8148: 5618: 12249: 11303: 11122: 11107: 11070: 8877: 8770:

Der autoritäre Nationalstaat: Verfassung, Gesellschaft und Kultur des deutschen Kaiserreiches

8695: 8314: 7657:. Kontroversen um die Geschichte (in German). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 7652: 7223: 7190: 5244: 4416: 4411: 4373: 4222: 3866:

that were critical of German actions in 1914, were not permitted to be published in Germany.

3810: 3300: 3163: 3157: 3138: 3062: 2989: 2794: 2407: 2347: 2306: 2122: 1960: 1390: 1339: 1216: 1192: 840: 618: 614: 496: 138: 11866: 7963: 2493: 1464: 12020: 11737: 11085: 11029: 10913: 10851: 10846: 10816: 10748: 10726: 10674: 10576: 9349:

Franz Joseph I: Kaiser von Österreich und König von Ungarn 1830-1916 : eine Biographie

8983:]. Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, 2 (in German). Vol. 2. Munich: R. Oldenbourg. 8302: 7209: 5553:] (in German). Berlin: Norddeutsche Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt. pp. 150–153. 4237: 4053: 3952:, Friedrich Meinecke supports the same idea. Foreign research, such as that of the Italian 3825: 3151: 2773: 2373: 1710:("World Stage"), a left-liberal journal founded in November 1918. According to its editor, 1667: 1659: 1612: 1599: 1010: 970: 913: 714: 692: 649: 610: 491: 319: 306: 198: 9071: 7823:"Wilhelmine Germany and the First World War (1890-1918) | Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (1925)" 7554:

Griff nach der Weltmacht : die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18

1854:

made the question of responsibility a central theme. The independent Social Democrats and

617:, this debate also took place in other countries involved in the conflict, such as in the 8: 11742: 11268: 11162: 11137: 11132: 11009: 10954: 10893: 10799: 10530: 10464: 10162:

Meinungslenkung im Krieg. Kriegserfahrungen deutscher Soldaten und ihre Deutung 1914–1918

10091: 9823: 9795:, « L'article 231 du traité de Versailles. Sa genèse et sa signification », in 9705: 8897: 8559:

Meinungslenkung im Krieg: Kriegserfahrungen deutscher Soldaten und ihre Deutung 1914-1918

7928: 4245: 3991: 3829: 2802: 2668: 2605: 1711: 1671: 1370: 1331: 1196: 645: 629: 12064: 11479: 10626: 9843: 9833: 9186:

Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe

8467: 7145: 4751:

Die Forschung war im Ursprung geradezu eine Fortsetzung des Krieges mit anderen Mitteln.

4288: 3956:, is not taken into account. In his three-volume critical work, published in 1942-1943 ( 3915: 3324: 2847:

gave its support to Adolf Hitler as early as 1936, in particular through its president,

2728:

were signed. They solved the problem of the borders, with Germany accepting the loss of

1757: 1736: 11571: 11334: 11327: 11182: 11147: 11034: 11019: 10949: 10927: 10903: 10831: 10765: 10695: 10525: 10494: 10403: 10380: 9464: 9159: 8961: 8809: 7634: 7597: 7414:]. Kultur- und Zeitfragen, 19 (in German) (1st ed.). Bremen: Ernst Oldenburg. 7337: 7287: 7114:"Sammelrez: Literaturbericht: 'Erster Weltkrieg' - H-Soz-u-Kult / Rezensionen / Bücher" 5704: 4506: 4488: 4267: 4068: 4024: 3920: 3881:"We started the war, not the Germans and even less the Entente," was the assessment of 3859: 3837: 3715: 3556:

However, these theses were mostly rejected despite praise for their economic analyses.

3347: 3335: 3145: 3110: 2764: 2711: 2657: 2449: 2413: 1777: 1570: 1304: 1236: 1041: 1037: 820: 633: 286: 246: 218: 58: 10069: 9984:(Recension de Manfred Kittel, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, München-Berlin) (in German) 8167: 6151: 4304: 3982:

soon became generalized within the huge international specialist research community."

3316: 2612:. From 1916, the two generals took over the military and political affairs of Germany. 1611:

From 1914 on, the German army exerted a great influence on German historiography. The

1316: 11939: 11288: 11263: 11210: 11157: 10971: 10743: 10535: 10320: 10295: 10255: 10235: 10206: 10184: 10166: 10145: 10120: 10106: 10081: 10051: 10041: 10007: 9996: 9977: 9936: 9890: 9774: 9728: 9713: 9695: 9677: 9659: 9644: 9633:

fr:Référence:Les Buts de guerre de l'Allemagne impériale (Fritz Fischer)#Trévise 1970

9613: 9588: 9573: 9532: 9511: 9503: 9443: 9424: 9405: 9395: 9372: 9353: 9321: 9311: 9289: 9279: 9255: 9245: 9226: 9216: 9190: 9122: 9114: 9104: 9085: 9075: 9030: 9011: 8984: 8965: 8932: 8911: 8883: 8862: 8827: 8817: 8795: 8774: 8753: 8732: 8713: 8703: 8679: 8669: 8647: 8637: 8598: 8588: 8567: 8544: 8534: 8515: 8505: 8477: 8454: 8444: 8425: 8415: 8391: 8381: 8334: 8324: 8264: 8239: 8220: 8210: 8154: 8135: 8107: 8079: 8039: 8029: 8010: 8000: 7981: 7971: 7950: 7940: 7917: 7907: 7886: 7864: 7854: 7808: 7787: 7777: 7758: 7748: 7724: 7701: 7691: 7668: 7658: 7622: 7585: 7561: 7540: 7517: 7507: 7486: 7476: 7447: 7425: 7415: 7391: 7370: 7362: 7306: 7291: 7265: 7233: 7196: 7155: 5582: 5574: 5026: 4249: 4197: 4097: 4028: 3785: 3694: 3644: 3625: 3386: 3371: 3343: 3275: 3181: 3175: 2964: 2864: 2753: 2741: 2440: 2281: 2097: 1935: 1836: 1832: 1566: 1447: 962: 889: 674: 251: 174: 10135: 10103:

Le Dernier Été de l'Europe : Qui a déclenché la Première Guerre mondiale ?

9641:

Der lange Weg in die Katastrophe, Die Vorgeschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges 1815–1914

5707:[Tucholsy - War: Juli 14 - Emil Ludwig (Reviews and critiques)] (in German). 12254: 11412: 11350: 11298: 11293: 11283: 11278: 11273: 11100: 11065: 11039: 10711: 10515: 10484: 10439: 10434: 10131: 9687: 9493: 9151: 8953: 8659: 8150:

The Pan-German League and Radical Nationalist Politics in Interwar Germany, 1918-39

7999:. Kleine Vandenhoeck-Reihe. Vol. 1458. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 7329: 7279: 4559: 4334: 4255: 4072: 4041: 3833: 3427: 3419: 2860: 2725: 2707: 2609: 1855: 1675: 1490: 1486: 1335: 1246: 1200: 1048:

for the Italians met to prepare the peace treaty. Rather than sticking to Wilson's

893: 864: 213: 208: 203: 10141: 9771:

Die nervöse Großmacht. Aufstieg und Untergang des deutschen Kaiserreichs 1871–1918

8440:

Juli 1914: Eine Bilanz. Mit einem Anhang: 50 Schlüsseldokumente zum Kriegsausbruch

5069:

Das Deutsche Weißbuch über den Ausbruch des deutsch-russisch-französischen Krieges

3046:

In 1930, the Reichstag faction of the Nazi party demanded, as an amendment to the

1801:

Kurt Tucholsky, cited in: Kritiken und Rezensionen, Gesammelte Schriften 1907-1935

1768: 1723: 1706: 625: 12239: 11813: 11489: 11253: 11248: 11243: 11190: 10616: 10335: 10333: 10314: 10289: 10249: 10160: 9792: 9738: 9437: 9418: 9385: 9347: 9305: 9269: 9239: 9206: 9184: 9061: 9024: 9005: 8974: 8901: 8856: 8789: 8768: 8747: 8726: 8691: 8663: 8631: 8610: 8582: 8557: 8528: 8499: 8438: 8405: 8371: 8233: 8204: 8125: 8101: 8073: 8023: 7994: 7901: 7844: 7771: 7714: 7681: 7612: 7575: 7501: 7470: 7441: 7300: 7270: 4587: 4521: 4392: 4308: 4093: 3963: 3953: 3932: 3904: 3886: 3882: 3587: 3537: 3470: 3458: 3376: 3351: 3042:

preservation of world peace with a resolute determination in favor of world war.

3012: 2848: 2749: 2729: 2642: 1828: 1622: 1394:

was the first of these to appear, and was published in 1914, with numerous other

1308: 1232: 1025: 999: 897: 860: 798: 786: 602: 594: 383: 9482:"War Guilt Propaganda Conducted by the German Foreign Ministry During the 1920s" 7320:

Cline, Catherine Ann (1988). "British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles".

5071:" ("The German White Book about the Outbreak of the German-Russian-French War"). 4321:

is highlighted, without diminishing the triggering moves by Germany and Austria.

4263: 3931:

After the fall of the Nazi regime, conservative historians from the time of the

3638:

Paul W Schroeder, Embedded counterfactuals and World War I as an unavoidable war

3557: 2326: 12305: 12123: 11751: 11747: 11400: 11355: 11233: 11220: 10883: 10641: 10234:

CD-ROM, Fachverlag für Kulturgeschichte und deren Vermittlung, Bielefeld 2005,

8957: 8053:"Der Erste Weltkrieg in der deutschen und internationalen Geschichtsschreibung" 7558:

Reaching for World Power : The War Aims Policy of Imperial Germany 1914/18

7466: 7437: 7283: 5272: 5056:

Weder der Kaiser, noch die Regierung, noch das Volk haben diesen Krieg gewollt.

4599: 4212:{{Translated|de|Kriegsschuldfrage#Forschung im deutschen Sprachraum seit 1990}} 4082: 4071:

conceded considerable responsibility of the German leadership under Chancellor

4045: 3979: 3940: 3875: 3595: 3529: 3034: 3008: 2672: 1781: 1357: 1033: 848: 844: 832: 641: 601:) is the public debate that took place in Germany for the most part during the 549: 535: 276: 37: 33: 9951:

L'Or et le Sang. Les Buts de guerre économiques de la Première Guerre mondiale

9515: 9089: 8602: 8395: 8338: 8256:

Der Vertrag von Versailles und seine Folgen: Propagandakrieg gegen Deutschland

8224: 7762: 7565: 7429: 5573:(1). Förderverein für Forschungen zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung: 54–66. 3889:, shortly after the war. It had been "about the existence of the fatherland". 3517: 2871:, and the resulting unemployment became campaign themes for NSDAP supporters. 2489: 879:

After four years of war on multiple fronts in Europe and around the world, an

12289: 12113: 10596: 10055: 9507: 9447: 9409: 9376: 9325: 9301: 9293: 9259: 9230: 9126: 9118: 9015: 8988: 8936: 8915: 8831: 8717: 8683: 8651: 8548: 8519: 8458: 8429: 8261:

The Treaty of Versailles and its Consequences: Propaganda War against Germany

8139: 8043: 8014: 7985: 7954: 7921: 7868: 7791: 7736: 7728: 7705: 7672: 7626: 7589: 7537:

German War Aims – Revolutionization and Separate Peace in the East, 1914-1918

7490: 7403: 7395: 7374: 7366: 7200: 7195:(in German). Vol. 1. 1933, das Jahr der Revolution. Lübeck: C. Coleman. 5586: 5578: 5080:

The German White Book was translated and published in English the same year.

4611: 4516: 4057: 3900:

in 1919, took a similar view: The delegation made a confession of war guilt.

3703: 3423: 2183: 1312: 1296: 1292: 856: 663:

While the war guilt question made it possible to investigate the deep-rooted

363: 10183:(= Krieg in der Geschichte 12). Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, Paderborn 2002, 10080:(= Krieg in der Geschichte 13). Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, Paderborn 2002, 9921: 9428: 7544: 7533:

Deutsche Kriegsziele Revolutionierung und Separatfrieden im Osten, 1914-1918

7521: 2867:

in 1922. Hyperinflation due to reparations, the economic downturn after the

609:. Structured in several phases, and largely determined by the impact of the 10981: 10656: 10651: 10621: 10520: 10474: 10259: 10037: 9669: 9057: 8749:

Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus: Hrsg. und verfasst von Wolfgang J. Mommsen

7903:

The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War, 1898-1914

7237: 5106: 4511: 4345: 3936: 3603: 3446: 3018: 2688: 2429:

Fabian's first field of research was the domination of pre-war politics by

1820: 1811:

transformation is also worth noting. Among them: Hans-Georg von Beerfelde,

1361: 1228: 1204: 828: 688: 472: 468: 403: 393: 354: 241: 11366: 2661: 1474:), and its purpose was to counter the war guilt accusation of the Allies. 1215:

burdened the new republican state; they were one of several causes of the

69: 16:

Debate about the level of responsibility of Germany in the First World War

11494: 10991: 10705: 10540: 10489: 9103:. Pariser Historische Studien #90. Munich: R. Oldenbourg. pp. 417–. 8200: 8121: 7846:

La social-démocratie allemande, 1830-1996: de la révolution au réformisme

4104: 4061: 3893: 3568: 3550: 3541: 3431: 3122: 1785: 1395: 1382: 966: 917: 816: 794: 793:) took place in the context of the German defeat by the Allied Powers in 732: 656:, after which it was subsequently taken up as a campaign argument by the 256: 9804:

Kriegsschuld und Reparationen auf der Pariser Friedenskonferenz von 1919

9163: 7446:(in German). Translated by Kochmann, Klaus. Stuttgart: Dt. Verlag-Anst. 6979: 4582: 3069:

Neither the Kaiser, nor the government, nor the people wanted this war.

2141: 1979: 1583:

fr:Kriegsschuldfrage § Traitement de la question et responsabilités

12057: 11700: 11200: 10821: 9712:(= Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte 17). Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2002, 9525:

Die Reichsbank und die finanzielle Kriegsvorbereitung von 1907 bis 1914

7885:] (in German). WBG Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. p. 84. 7648: 7408:

Die Kriegsschuldfrage. Grunsätzliches und Tatsächliches zu ihrer Lösung

7341: 7178:"LeMO Kapitel - Weimarer Republik - Innenpolitik - Kriegsschuldreferat" 4204: