588:. Within this market structure, the market is highly concentrated and several firms control a significant share of market sales. The emergence of oligopoly market forms is mainly attributed to the monopoly of market competition, i.e., the market monopoly acquired by enterprises through their competitive advantages, and the administrative monopoly due to government regulations, such as when the government grants monopoly power to an enterprise in the industry through laws and regulations and at the same time imposes certain controls on it to improve efficiency. The main characteristics of an oligopoly are:
737:-firm concentration ratio, one usually uses sales revenue to calculate market share, however, concentration ratios based on other measures such as production capacity may also be used. For a monopoly, the 4-firm concentration ratio is 100 per cent whilst for perfect competition, the ratio is zero. Moreover, studies indicate that a concentration ratio of between 40 and 70 percent suggests that the firm operates as an oligopoly. These figures are viable but should be used as a 'rule of thumb' as it is important to consider other market factors when analysing concentration ratios.
530:' and consists of one firm that produces a unique product or service without close substitutes. Whilst pure monopolies are rare, monopoly power is far more common and can be seen in many industries even with more than one supplier in the market. Firms with monopoly power can charge a higher price for products (higher markup) as demand is relatively inelastic. They also see a falling rate of labour share as firms divest from expensive inputs such as labour. Often, firms with monopoly power exist in industries with high barriers to entry, which include, but are not limited to:
652:, the sources of market power is derived from distinctiveness of the good and or seller. For a monopolist, distinctiveness is a necessary condition that needs to be satisfied but this is just the starting point. Without barriers to entries, above normal profits experienced by monopolists would not persist as other sellers of homogenous or similar goods would continue to enter the industry until above normal profits are diminished until the industry experiences
42:
396:
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312:(MC) without losing revenue. This indicates that the magnitude of market power is associated with the gap between P and MC at a firm's profit maximising level of output. The size of the gap, which encapsulates the firm's level of market dominance, is determined by the residual demand curve's form. A steeper reverse demand indicates higher earnings and more dominance in the market. Such propensities contradict
333:(DWL) and a decline in consumer surplus. This is viewed as socially undesirable and has implications for welfare and resource allocation as larger firms with high markups negatively effect labour markets by providing lower wages. Perfectly competitive markets do not exhibit such issues as firms set prices that reflect costs, which is to the benefit of the customer. As a result, many countries have
432:"Perfect Competition" refers to a market structure that is devoid of any barriers or interference and describes those marketplaces where neither corporations nor consumers are powerful enough to affect pricing. In terms of economics, it is one of the many conventional market forms and the optimal condition of market competition. The concept of
714:
power. Measures of concentration summarise the share of market or industry activity accounted for by large firms. An advantage of using concentration as an empirical tool to quantify market power is the requirement of only needing revenue data of firms which results in the corresponding disadvantage of the inconsideration of costs or profits.
797:-firm concentration ratio, large firms are given more weight in the HHI and as a result, the HHI conveys more information. However the HHI has its own limitations as it is sensitive to the definition of a market, therefore meaning you cannot use it to cross-examine different industries, or do analysis over time as the industry changes.
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The
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is another measure of concentration and is the sum of the squared market shares of all firms in a market. The HHI is a more widely used indicator in economics and government regulation. The index reflects not only the market share of large firms within the market,
697:
Magnitude of a firm's market power is shown by a firm's ability to deviate from an elastic demand curve and charge a higher price (P) above its marginal cost (C), commonly referred to as a firm's mark-up or margin. The higher a firm's mark-up, the larger the magnitude of power. This said, markups are
624:
Oligopolistic firms are believed to operate within the confines of the kinked demand function. This means that when firms set prices above the prevailing price level (P*), prices are relatively elastic because individuals are likely to switch to a competitor's product as a substitute. Prices below P*
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It is salient to note that only a few firms make up the market share. Hence, their market power is large as a collective and each firm has little or no market power independently. For firms trying to enter these industries, unless they can start with a large production scale and capture a significant
517:
The word monopoly is used in various instances referring to a single seller of a product, a producer with an overwhelming level of market share, or refer to a large firm. All of these treatments have one unifying factor which is the ability to influence the market price by altering the supply of the
320:
The market power of any individual firm is controlled by multiple factors, including but not limited to, their size, the structure of the market they are involved in, and the barriers to entry for the particular market. A firm with market power has the ability to individually affect either the total
898:
under section 2 restricts firms from engaging in anticompetitive conduct by utilising an individual firm's power to manipulate the market or partake in anticompetitive acts. A firm can be found in breach of the act if they have leveraged their market power to unfairly gain further market power in a
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Where P represents the price of the good set by the firm and MC representing the firm's marginal cost.The formula focuses on the nature of monopoly and emphasising welfare economic implications of the Pareto optimal principle. Although Lerner is usually credited for the price/cost margin index, the
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High start-up costs. This barrier makes it difficult for new entrants to succeed as the initial creation costs are ingrained within the industry. Firms like power, cable television and telecommunication companies fall within this category. A firm seeking to enter such industries require the ability
488:
as it shares elements present in both market structures that are on different ends of the market structure spectrum. Monopolistic competition is a type of market structure defined by many producers that are competing against each other by selling similar goods which are differentiated, thus are not
316:
markets, where market participants have no market power, P = MC and firms earn zero economic profit. Market participants in perfectly competitive markets are consequently referred to as 'price takers', whereas market participants that exhibit market power are referred to as 'price makers' or 'price
617:
407:
depicts how different industries are characterized and differentiated based upon the types of goods the firms sell (homogenous/heterogenous) and the nature of competition within the industry. The degree of market power firms assert in different markets are relative to the market structure that the
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Factors of
Production Barriers. An important influencing factor of market power is the control of the supply of factors of production to produce the good. Factors of production can be divided into tangible land, capital, and intangible human resources, intelligence, etc. As the industrial economy
680:
Government policies/regulations. One significant technique of governmental action to create monopolies is the granting of franchises and operating licenses. This is due to the fact that no other businesses are permitted by law to operate without a franchise. A prime example are patents granted to
508:
Firms within this market structure are not price takers and compete based on product price, quality and through marketing efforts, setting individual prices for the unique differentiated products. Examples of industries with monopolistic competition include restaurants, hairdressers and clothing.
713:
of the largest firms in the market account for a significant portion of the economic activities quantifiable by various metrics such as sales, employment, active users. Recent macroeconomic market power literature indicates that concentration ratios are the most frequently used measure of market
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Brand loyalty of consumers and value placed by consumers on reputation. Incumbent firms often have a competitive advantage over new entrants as customers are familiar with the product and service. An incumbent firm can engage in several entry-deterring strategies such as limit pricing, predatory
468:
As all firms in the market are price takers, they essentially hold zero market power and must accept the price given by the market. A perfectly competitive market is logically impossible to achieve in a real world scenario as it embodies contradiction in itself and therefore is considered an
740:
An advantage of concentration ratios as an empirical tool for studying market power is that it requires only data on revenues and is thus easy to compute. The corresponding disadvantage is that concentration is about relative revenue and includes no information about costs or profits.
356:, holding excess capacity and strategic bundling. A firm usually has market power by having a high market share although this alone is not sufficient to establish the possession of significant market power. This is because highly concentrated markets may be contestable if there are no
307:
to influence the price at which it sells a product or service by manipulating either the supply or demand of the product or service to increase economic profit. In other words, market power occurs if a firm does not face a perfectly elastic demand curve and can set its price (P) above
374:
Regulators are able to assess the level of market power and dominance a firm has and measure competition through the use of several tools and indicators. Although market power is extremely difficult to measure, through the use of widely used analytical techniques such as
371:, or the exercise of a group of participants' collective market power. An example of which was seen in 2007, when British Airways was found to have colluded with Virgin Atlantic between 2004 and 2006, increasing their surcharges per ticket from ÂŁ5 to ÂŁ60.
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as a result of differentiated goods providing sellers with some degree of market power; however, profits approaches zero as more competitive toughness increases in the industry. The main characteristics of monopolistic competition include:
685:
changes to a knowledge-based economy, the control of the supply of intangible factors of production such as talent, intelligence, information, etc. will become more and more of a barrier to entry for companies with unlimited market power.
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is a widely accepted and applied method of estimating market power in a monopoly. It compares a firm's price of output with its associated marginal cost where marginal cost pricing is the "socially optimal level" achieved in market with
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market share, the high average costs will make it impossible for them to compete with the existing firms. Generally, when a firm operating in an oligopolistic market adjusts prices, other firms in the industry will be directly impacted.
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manner that is detrimental to the market and consumers. The measurement of market power is key in determining a breach of the act and can be determined from multiple measurements as discussed in measurements of market power above.
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but also the market structure outside of large firms, and therefore, more accurately reflects the degree of influence of large firms on the market. For example, in a market with two firms, each with 50% market share, the HHI is
911:
The degree to which a firm can raise its price above marginal cost depends on the shape of the demand curve at a firm's profit maximising level of output. Consequently, the relationship between market power and the
902:
In
Australia, consumer law allows for firms to have significant market power and utilise it, as long as it is determined to not have “the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition”
632:, either tacit or overt to exercise market power and manipulate prices to control demand and revenue for a collection of firms. A group of firms that explicitly agree to affect market price or output is called a
681:
pharmaceutical companies which prevent competitors from creating and selling their specific goods. These patents give the drug companies a virtual monopoly in the protected product for the term of the patent.
440:. This occurs when the quantity supplied by sellers in the market equals the quantity demanded by buyers in the market at the current price. Firms competing in a perfectly competitive market faces a
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Increasing returns to scale. Firms that experience increasing returns to scale also experience decreasing average total costs and therefore become more profitable with size and higher demand levels.
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352:. As a result, legislation recognises that firms with market power can, in some circumstances, damage the competitive process. In particular, firms with market power are accused of limit pricing,
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complicated to measure as they are reliant on a firm's marginal costs and as a result, concentration ratios are the more common measures as they require only publicly accessible revenue data.
662:
High barriers to entry. These barriers include the control of scarce resources, increasing returns to scale, technological superiority and government created barriers to entry.
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High barriers to entry. This includes, but is not limited to, 'technology challenges, government regulations, patents, start-up costs, or education and licensing requirements'.
791:
894:
Market power within competition law can be used to determine whether or not a firm has unfairly manipulated the market in their favour, or to the detriment of entrants. The
424:. Perfect competition and monopoly represent the two extremes of market structure, respectively. Monopolistic competition and oligopoly exist in between these two extremes.
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826:(1934) believes that market power is the monopoly manufacturers' ability to raise prices above their marginal cost. This notion can be expressed by using the formula:
104:
1087:
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1021:
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firms in the market. For example, a 4-firm concentration ratio measures the total market share of the four largest firms in an industry. In order to calculate the
694:
Measuring market power is inherently complex because the most widely used measures are sensitive to the definition of a market and the range of analysis.
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pricing and strategic bundling. Microsoft has substantial pricing or market power due to technological superiority in its design and production processes.
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are believed to be relatively inelastic as competitive firms are likely to mimic the change in prices, meaning less gains are experienced by the firm.
804:
Relationship between the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index and market structure. The greater the Herfindahl-Hirschman value, the greater the market power.
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with its operating system. In this respect, the notion of dominance and dominant position in EU Antitrust Law is a strictly related aspect.
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quantity or price in the market. This said, market power has been seen to exert more upward pressure on prices due to effects relating to
2221:
2036:
Vatiero, M. (2009). An
Institutionalist Explanation of Market Dominances. World Competition. Law and Economics Review, 32(2):221–226.
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If no individual participant in the market has significant market power, anti-competitive conduct can only take place through
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448:, therefore, no economic profits are present. The following criteria need to be satisfied in a perfectly competitive market:
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who was an
American economist. It is important to note that this graph is a simplistic example of a kinked demand curve.
2402:"Relationship between concentration ratio and Herfindahl-Hirschman index: A re-examination based on majorization theory"
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or other legislation intended to limit the ability of firms to accrue market power. Such legislation often regulates
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and as a result, price increases lead to a lower quantity demanded. The decrease in supply creates an economic
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793:= 0.50 + 0.50 = 0.50. The HHI for a monopoly is 1 whilst for perfect competition, the HHI is zero. Unlike the
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895:
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194:
17:
2660:"Who Invented the Lerner Index? Luigi Amoroso, the Dominant Firm Model, and the Measurement of Market Power"
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good or service through its own production decisions. The most discussed form of market power is that of a
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1474:
1429:
Vatiero, Massimiliano (2010). "The
Ordoliberal Notion of Market Power: An Institutionalist Reassessment".
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In economics, market structure can profoundly affect the behavior and financial performance of firms.
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2623:
Elzinga, Kenneth G.; Mills, David E. (2011). "The Lerner Index of
Monopoly Power: Origins and Uses".
364:. Invariably, this limits the incumbent firm's ability to raise its price above competitive levels.
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477:
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and profitable deviations that can be made by raising prices. Price makers face a downward-sloping
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is an example of an organization that has market power due to control over scarce resources — oil.
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case dealt with an allegation that
Microsoft illegally exercised its market power by bundling its
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Lábaj, Martin; Morvay, Karol; Silanič, Peter; Weiss, Christoph; Yontcheva, Biliana (2018-03-28).
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By remaining consistent with the strict definition of market power as any firm with a positive
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1907:, How Market Power Fosters Creative Production, University of Michigan Press, pp. 25–53,
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Leslie, C. (2013). PREDATORY PRICING AND RECOUPMENT. Columbia Law Review, 113(7), 1695–1771.
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and market power approaches zero. The equation is derived from the monopolist pricing rule:
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706:
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Perloff, J: Microeconomics Theory & Applications with
Calculus page 369. Pearson 2008.
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McDermott, John F. M. (2015-05-19). "Perfect competition, methodologically contemplated".
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represents a theoretical market structure where the market reaches an equilibrium that is
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1566:(6th ed.). Printed in the United States of America 6th Edition. pp. 171–172.
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generalized version was fully derived prior to WWII by Italian neoclassical economist,
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White, Lawrence J. (2013-07-01), Thomas, Christopher R.; Shughart, William F. (eds.),
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2019:
1908:
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ratio, the more market power the firm possesses. As PED increases in magnitude, the
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firms operate in. There are four main forms of market structures that are observed:
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2753:"The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2014"
1592:"Market structure and competition in transition: results from a spatial analysis"
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The graph below depicts the kinked demand curve hypothesis which was proposed by
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and more moderate versions of these extremes exist. A monopoly is considered a '
387:, regulators are able to oversee and attempt to restore market competitiveness.
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to spend millions of dollars before starting operations and generating revenue.
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1830:"Oligopolistic vs. monopolistic competition: Do intersectoral effects matter?"
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Davis, Douglas D. (2018). "Market Power and Collusion in Laboratory Markets".
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Samuelson & Nordhaus, Microeconomics, 17th ed. (McGraw-Hill 2001) at 184.
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Samuelson & Nordhaus, Microeconomics, 17th ed. (McGraw-Hill 2001) at 183.
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Ability of a firm to raise the market price of a commodity over marginal cost
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2361:"Macroeconomics and Market Power: Context, Implications, and Open Questions"
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1285:"Macroeconomics and Market Power: Context, Implications, and Open Questions"
709:, also referred to as industry concentration, refers to the extent of which
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Macroeconomics and Market Power: Context, Implications, and Open Questions.
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1945:"Monopoly power as a market failure | Economics Online | Economics Online"
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2117:"Section 3: Characteristics of an Oligopoly Industry | Inflate Your Mind"
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729:-firm concentration ratio gives the combined market share of the largest
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640:) being one of the most well known example of an international cartel.
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All firms have relatively small market share and cannot influence price
2093:"Barriers to Entry - Types of Barriers to Markets & How They Work"
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Borenstein, Severin; Bushnell, James; Knittel, Christopher R. (1999).
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Market power provides firms with the ability to engage in unilateral
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1514:"Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Measures"
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Lin, Jing; Ma, Xin; Talluri, Srinivas; Yang, Cheng-Hu (2021-02-09).
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2047:"Oligopoly - characteristics | Economics Online | Economics Online"
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perfect substitutes. In the short term, firms are able to obtain
1876:"Monopolistic Competition - Overview, How It Works, Limitations"
1828:
d’Aspremont, Claude; Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe (June 2016).
2809:"The Theory of Industrial Organization", Tirole, MIT Press 1988
2309:"Perceptions regarding strategic and structural entry barriers"
633:
338:
143:
2512:"The New Merger Guidelines and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index"
1998:"The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications*"
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Theory of value; an axiomatic analysis of economic equilibrium
2790:
1996:
De Loecker, Jan; Eeckhout, Jan; Unger, Gabriel (2020-05-01).
1398:"The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications"
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Control of key resources (required in production of the good)
441:
2069:
Global Oligopoly : a Key Idea for Business and Society
663:
637:
636:, with the organization of petroleum-exporting countries (
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Sun, Baowen; Jing, Wenjun; Zhao, Xuankai; He, Yi (2017).
1511:
1939:
1937:
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The Great Reversal: How America Gave Up on Free Markets
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Krugman & Wells, Microeconomics 2d ed. (Worth 2009)
1995:
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1396:
Unger, Gabriel; Eeckhout, Jan; De Loecker, Jan (2020).
1395:
1324:
Pleatsikas, Christopher (2018). "Perfect Competition".
2791:
Brickley, Smith and Zimmerman (13 October 2008). "7".
2222:"Market Power: How Does it Arise? How is it Measured?"
1991:
1989:
1934:
1475:"Retail channel management decisions under collusion"
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982:{\displaystyle {\frac {P}{MC}}={\frac {PED}{1+PED}}.}
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There are several sources of market power including:
551:
A well-known example of monopolistic market power is
2793:
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture
1154:{\displaystyle {\frac {P-MC}{P}}=-{\frac {1}{PED}}.}
341:
and sometimes introduces a judicial power to compel
2549:Spierdijk, Laura; Zaouras, Michalis (2017-09-02).
2477:"Glossary: Learn more about IBISWorld's key terms"
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2194:"Interdependence in Oligopolies | Revision World"
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1326:The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management
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1799:(8th ed.). Boston: Pearson Addison-Wesley.
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480:can be described as the "middle ground" between
2592:"Research on market power and market structure"
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1239:Landes, William M.; Posner, Richard A. (1981).
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1958:
1750:The Economics of Food and Agricultural Markets
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1899:McKenzie, Richard B.; Lee, Dwight R. (2008),
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2551:"The Lerner index and revenue maximization"
2228:, Oxford University Press, pp. 30–65,
2226:The Oxford Handbook of Managerial Economics
2210:
1898:
1795:Krugman, Paul R.; Maurice Obstfeld (2009).
580:Another form of market power is that of an
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1797:International economics: theory and policy
1780:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (
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1174:Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
916:(PED) can be summarised by the equation:
244:Enforcement authorities and organizations
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1479:European Journal of Operational Research
1362:The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
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1747:
1561:
1428:
1164:
906:
701:
14:
3622:
3574:English historical school of economics
3528:Structure–conduct–performance paradigm
2596:International Journal of Crowd Science
2275:
1671:
1271:
595:Homogenous or differentiated products.
3635:Power (social and political) concepts
2826:
2773:
2736:
2494:
2219:
1557:
1555:
1359:
1176:for his analysis of market power and
2306:
2255:
2066:
1676:. New Haven: Yale University Press.
1530:10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol20-No4-3
399:Different types of market structures
1707:Journal of Post Keynesian Economics
469:idealised framework by economists.
390:
24:
2400:KvĂĄlseth, Tarald O. (2018-10-11).
2278:"On the Relevance of Market Power"
2138:"Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger"
2109:
2002:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
1637:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
1552:
1402:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
575:
40:
25:
3646:
2731:Competition and Consumer Act 2010
2664:Review of Industrial Organization
2307:Lutz, Clemens H. M. (July 2010).
1241:"Market Power in Antitrust Cases"
512:
252:International Competition Network
2785:Journal of Economic Perspectives
2365:Journal of Economic Perspectives
1289:Journal of Economic Perspectives
786:{\displaystyle \sum (S_{i})^{2}}
601:Interaction/strategic behaviour.
2745:
2723:
2706:
2651:
2616:
2583:
2542:
2503:
2469:
2460:
2393:
2300:
2269:
2186:
2160:
2129:
2085:
2060:
2039:
2030:
1892:
1868:
1821:
1788:
1741:
1698:
1665:
1624:
890:Connection with Competition Law
808:
452:Producers sell homogenous goods
3594:Historical school of economics
2136:Stigler, George J (May 1950).
1633:"What is Perfect Competition?"
1505:
1466:
1457:
1422:
1370:10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2836
1317:
1232:
857:
842:
774:
760:
592:A few sellers and many buyers.
473:Monopolistic competition power
257:List of competition regulators
13:
1:
2795:(3rd ed.). McGraw-Hill.
2568:10.1080/13504851.2016.1254333
2510:Calkins, Stephen (Mar 1983).
2427:10.1016/j.heliyon.2018.e00846
2359:Syverson, Chad (2019-08-01).
1719:10.1080/01603477.2015.1050335
1609:10.1080/00036846.2017.1374535
1334:10.1057/978-1-137-00772-8_558
1225:
896:Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890
461:No barriers to enter and exit
3538:Theory of two-level planning
3033:New institutional economists
2479:. 2018-12-08. Archived from
2142:The American Economic Review
1431:European Competition Journal
7:
3018:Edward Lawrence Wheelwright
2819:. Harvard University Press.
2097:Corporate Finance Institute
2071:(1st ed.). Routledge.
1880:Corporate Finance Institute
1183:
690:Measurement of market power
628:An oligopoly may engage in
303:refers to the ability of a
10:
3651:
3513:Penalty of taking the lead
2067:Carr, Christopher (2020).
1901:"Deadweight-Loss Monopoly"
1491:10.1016/j.ejor.2021.01.046
914:price elasticity of demand
871:{\displaystyle L=(P-MC)/P}
745:Herfindahl-Hirschman index
565:United States v. Microsoft
522:, but other forms such as
455:All firms are price takers
381:Herfindahl-Hirschman index
124:Anti-competitive practices
90:Herfindahl–Hirschman index
59:History of competition law
3556:
3420:
3337:
3104:
3031:
2860:
2676:10.1007/s11151-012-9355-7
2609:10.1108/IJCS-08-2017-0009
2555:Applied Economics Letters
2326:10.1007/s11187-008-9159-1
1846:10.1007/s00199-015-0905-8
721:-firm concentration ratio
428:Perfect competition power
350:anti-competitive behavior
3609:Post-Keynesian economics
3589:French historical school
2861:Institutional economists
2658:Giocoli, Nicola (2012).
2625:American Economic Review
2313:Small Business Economics
1748:Barkley, Andrew (2016).
478:Monopolistic competition
414:monopolistic competition
3584:Evolutionary psychology
3448:Conspicuous consumption
2854:Institutional economics
2779:Syverson, Chad. 2019. "
1672:Debreu, Gerard (1959).
1631:Robinson, Joan (1934).
1562:Besanko, David (2013).
1283:Syverson, Chad (2019).
1023:is always greater than
644:Sources of market power
501:Many sellers and buyers
498:Differentiated products
444:that is equal to their
3579:Evolutionary economics
3421:Key concepts and ideas
3377:Donald Angus MacKenzie
3003:George W. Stocking Sr.
2923:John Kenneth Galbraith
2276:Kaplow, Louis (2017).
1905:In Defense of Monopoly
1364:. pp. 8260–8263.
1328:. pp. 1272–1275.
1155:
1083:
1052:
1017:
983:
872:
805:
787:
621:
400:
169:Occupational licensing
45:
3630:Imperfect competition
3569:Development economics
3478:Hiding hand principle
3468:Effective competition
3339:Economic sociologists
3106:Behavioral economists
2968:Wesley Clair Mitchell
2637:10.1257/aer.101.3.558
2516:California Law Review
2168:"Kinked Demand Curve"
1564:ECONOMICS OF STRATEGY
1220:Dominance (economics)
1195:Imperfect competition
1172:was awarded the 2014
1156:
1084:
1053:
1018:
984:
873:
803:
788:
619:
398:
314:perfectly competitive
44:
3498:Market concentration
3463:Countervailing power
3269:Sendhil Mullainathan
3096:Oliver E. Williamson
2928:Walton Hale Hamilton
2873:Clarence Edwin Ayres
1443:10.5235/ecj.v6n3.689
1215:Price discrimination
1200:Market concentration
1165:Nobel Memorial Prize
1100:
1082:{\displaystyle P/MC}
1062:
1051:{\displaystyle P/MC}
1031:
1016:{\displaystyle P/MC}
996:
923:
907:Elasticity of demand
833:
754:
707:Market concentration
702:Concentration ratios
377:concentration ratios
212:Occupational closure
207:Dividing territories
195:Essential facilities
95:Market concentration
3548:Veblenian dichotomy
3458:Conventional wisdom
3453:Conspicuous leisure
3443:Bounded rationality
3433:Administered prices
3254:Brigitte C. Madrian
3056:Steven N. S. Cheung
2938:Albert O. Hirschman
2933:Orris C. Herfindahl
2418:2018Heliy...400846K
2378:10.1257/jep.33.3.23
1752:. Minneapolis, MN.
1302:10.1257/jep.33.3.23
1178:economic regulation
1027:and the higher the
820:perfect competition
654:perfect competition
620:Kinked Demand Curve
504:Free entry and exit
482:perfect competition
458:Perfect information
434:perfect competition
410:perfect competition
3564:Cultural economics
3428:Accelerator effect
3244:George Loewenstein
3184:Catherine C. Eckel
2903:John Maurice Clark
2868:Werner Abelshauser
2774:Further references
2538:– via JSTOR.
2282:Harvard Law Review
2156:– via JSTOR.
2015:10.1093/qje/qjz041
1975:. 23 February 2019
1518:The Energy Journal
1415:10.1093/qje/qjz041
1245:Harvard Law Review
1151:
1079:
1048:
1013:
979:
868:
806:
783:
622:
535:Economies of scale
401:
231:Regulatory capture
46:
3617:
3616:
3438:Barriers to entry
3304:Robert J. Shiller
3264:Matteo Motterlini
3008:Lars PĂĄlsson Syll
2561:(15): 1075–1079.
2243:978-0-19-978295-6
2198:revisionworld.com
2174:. 17 October 2018
1914:978-0-472-11615-7
1806:978-0-321-49304-0
1759:978-1-944548-22-3
1602:(15): 1694–1715.
1596:Applied Economics
1379:978-1-349-95188-8
1343:978-0-230-53721-7
1210:Predatory pricing
1146:
1122:
1089:ratio approaches
974:
939:
560:operating systems
547:Legal regulations
540:Predatory pricing
358:barriers to entry
354:predatory pricing
293:
292:
222:Misuse of patents
217:Predatory pricing
202:Exclusive dealing
85:Barriers to entry
73:Coercive monopoly
16:(Redirected from
3642:
3523:Shortage economy
3508:Market structure
3473:Herfindahl index
3397:Laurent Thévenot
3392:Richard Swedberg
3387:Lynette Spillman
3372:Mark Granovetter
3357:James S. Coleman
3329:Georg Weizsäcker
3324:Robert W. Vishny
3289:Klaus M. Schmidt
3239:Jeffrey R. Kling
3134:Douglas Bernheim
3023:Erich Zimmermann
3013:Thorstein Veblen
2993:Herbert A. Simon
2988:François Simiand
2963:Jesse W. Markham
2943:Geoffrey Hodgson
2883:Shimshon Bichler
2847:
2840:
2833:
2824:
2823:
2813:Thomas Philippon
2806:
2767:
2766:
2764:
2763:
2749:
2743:
2740:
2734:
2727:
2721:
2710:
2704:
2703:
2655:
2649:
2648:
2620:
2614:
2613:
2611:
2587:
2581:
2580:
2570:
2546:
2540:
2539:
2507:
2501:
2498:
2492:
2491:
2489:
2488:
2473:
2467:
2464:
2458:
2457:
2447:
2429:
2397:
2391:
2390:
2380:
2356:
2347:
2346:
2328:
2304:
2298:
2297:
2288:(5): 1303–1407.
2273:
2267:
2264:
2253:
2252:
2251:
2250:
2217:
2208:
2207:
2205:
2204:
2190:
2184:
2183:
2181:
2179:
2164:
2158:
2157:
2133:
2127:
2126:
2124:
2123:
2113:
2107:
2106:
2104:
2103:
2089:
2083:
2082:
2064:
2058:
2057:
2055:
2054:
2043:
2037:
2034:
2028:
2027:
2017:
1993:
1984:
1983:
1981:
1980:
1969:"Monopoly Power"
1965:
1956:
1955:
1953:
1952:
1941:
1932:
1931:
1930:
1929:
1896:
1890:
1889:
1887:
1886:
1872:
1866:
1865:
1840:(1–2): 299–324.
1825:
1819:
1818:
1792:
1786:
1785:
1779:
1771:
1745:
1739:
1738:
1702:
1696:
1695:
1669:
1663:
1662:
1652:
1628:
1622:
1621:
1611:
1587:
1578:
1577:
1559:
1550:
1549:
1509:
1503:
1502:
1470:
1464:
1461:
1455:
1454:
1426:
1420:
1419:
1417:
1393:
1384:
1383:
1357:
1348:
1347:
1321:
1315:
1314:
1304:
1280:
1269:
1268:
1236:
1205:Natural monopoly
1190:Bargaining power
1160:
1158:
1157:
1152:
1147:
1145:
1131:
1123:
1118:
1104:
1088:
1086:
1085:
1080:
1072:
1057:
1055:
1054:
1049:
1041:
1022:
1020:
1019:
1014:
1006:
988:
986:
985:
980:
975:
973:
956:
945:
940:
938:
927:
877:
875:
874:
869:
864:
792:
790:
789:
784:
782:
781:
772:
771:
555:market share in
491:economic profits
405:Market structure
391:Market structure
285:
278:
271:
176:Product bundling
78:Natural monopoly
30:
29:
21:
3650:
3649:
3645:
3644:
3643:
3641:
3640:
3639:
3620:
3619:
3618:
3613:
3552:
3533:Technostructure
3488:Instrumentalism
3483:Hirschman cycle
3416:
3412:Viviana Zelizer
3382:Joel M. Podolny
3333:
3259:Gary McClelland
3224:Daniel Kahneman
3219:David Ryan Just
3214:Charles A. Holt
3194:Urs Fischbacher
3179:Stephen Duneier
3169:Werner De Bondt
3100:
3027:
2978:Jonathan Nitzan
2918:Robert H. Frank
2908:John R. Commons
2888:Robert A. Brady
2856:
2851:
2803:
2776:
2771:
2770:
2761:
2759:
2751:
2750:
2746:
2741:
2737:
2728:
2724:
2711:
2707:
2656:
2652:
2621:
2617:
2588:
2584:
2547:
2543:
2528:10.2307/3480160
2508:
2504:
2499:
2495:
2486:
2484:
2475:
2474:
2470:
2465:
2461:
2398:
2394:
2357:
2350:
2305:
2301:
2274:
2270:
2265:
2256:
2248:
2246:
2244:
2218:
2211:
2202:
2200:
2192:
2191:
2187:
2177:
2175:
2166:
2165:
2161:
2134:
2130:
2121:
2119:
2115:
2114:
2110:
2101:
2099:
2091:
2090:
2086:
2079:
2065:
2061:
2052:
2050:
2045:
2044:
2040:
2035:
2031:
1994:
1987:
1978:
1976:
1967:
1966:
1959:
1950:
1948:
1943:
1942:
1935:
1927:
1925:
1915:
1897:
1893:
1884:
1882:
1874:
1873:
1869:
1834:Economic Theory
1826:
1822:
1807:
1793:
1789:
1773:
1772:
1760:
1746:
1742:
1703:
1699:
1684:
1670:
1666:
1650:10.2307/1883878
1629:
1625:
1588:
1581:
1574:
1560:
1553:
1510:
1506:
1471:
1467:
1462:
1458:
1427:
1423:
1394:
1387:
1380:
1358:
1351:
1344:
1322:
1318:
1281:
1272:
1257:10.2307/1340687
1237:
1233:
1228:
1186:
1167:
1135:
1130:
1105:
1103:
1101:
1098:
1097:
1068:
1063:
1060:
1059:
1037:
1032:
1029:
1028:
1002:
997:
994:
993:
957:
946:
944:
931:
926:
924:
921:
920:
909:
892:
860:
834:
831:
830:
811:
777:
773:
767:
763:
755:
752:
751:
747:
723:
704:
692:
646:
578:
576:Oligopoly power
515:
475:
430:
393:
331:deadweight loss
323:Nash equilibria
289:
185:Refusal to deal
164:Tacit collusion
110:Relevant market
34:Competition law
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
3648:
3638:
3637:
3632:
3615:
3614:
3612:
3611:
3606:
3604:Microeconomics
3601:
3596:
3591:
3586:
3581:
3576:
3571:
3566:
3560:
3558:
3557:Related fields
3554:
3553:
3551:
3550:
3545:
3540:
3535:
3530:
3525:
3520:
3515:
3510:
3505:
3500:
3495:
3493:Kuznets cycles
3490:
3485:
3480:
3475:
3470:
3465:
3460:
3455:
3450:
3445:
3440:
3435:
3430:
3424:
3422:
3418:
3417:
3415:
3414:
3409:
3407:Harrison White
3404:
3402:Carlo Trigilia
3399:
3394:
3389:
3384:
3379:
3374:
3369:
3364:
3359:
3354:
3349:
3343:
3341:
3335:
3334:
3332:
3331:
3326:
3321:
3316:
3314:Richard Thaler
3311:
3306:
3301:
3296:
3291:
3286:
3284:Howard Rachlin
3281:
3276:
3274:Michael Norton
3271:
3266:
3261:
3256:
3251:
3246:
3241:
3236:
3231:
3226:
3221:
3216:
3211:
3206:
3201:
3199:Herbert Gintis
3196:
3191:
3186:
3181:
3176:
3171:
3166:
3161:
3156:
3154:David Cesarini
3151:
3146:
3141:
3136:
3131:
3126:
3121:
3116:
3114:George Ainslie
3110:
3108:
3102:
3101:
3099:
3098:
3093:
3088:
3083:
3081:Douglass North
3078:
3073:
3068:
3066:Harold Demsetz
3063:
3058:
3053:
3048:
3046:Armen Alchian
3043:
3041:Daron Acemoglu
3037:
3035:
3029:
3028:
3026:
3025:
3020:
3015:
3010:
3005:
3000:
2998:Frank Stilwell
2995:
2990:
2985:
2983:Warren Samuels
2980:
2975:
2970:
2965:
2960:
2955:
2950:
2945:
2940:
2935:
2930:
2925:
2920:
2915:
2913:Richard T. Ely
2910:
2905:
2900:
2895:
2893:Daniel Bromley
2890:
2885:
2880:
2875:
2870:
2864:
2862:
2858:
2857:
2850:
2849:
2842:
2835:
2827:
2821:
2820:
2810:
2807:
2802:978-0073375823
2801:
2788:
2775:
2772:
2769:
2768:
2757:NobelPrize.org
2744:
2735:
2722:
2714:15 U.S.C.
2705:
2670:(3): 181–191.
2650:
2631:(3): 558–564.
2615:
2602:(3): 210–222.
2582:
2541:
2522:(2): 402–429.
2502:
2493:
2468:
2459:
2412:(10): e00846.
2392:
2348:
2299:
2268:
2254:
2242:
2209:
2185:
2159:
2128:
2108:
2084:
2077:
2059:
2038:
2029:
2008:(2): 561–644.
1985:
1957:
1933:
1913:
1891:
1867:
1820:
1805:
1787:
1758:
1740:
1713:(4): 687–703.
1697:
1682:
1664:
1643:(1): 104–120.
1623:
1579:
1572:
1551:
1504:
1485:(2): 700–710.
1465:
1456:
1437:(3): 689–707.
1421:
1408:(2): 561–644.
1385:
1378:
1349:
1342:
1316:
1270:
1251:(5): 937–996.
1230:
1229:
1227:
1224:
1223:
1222:
1217:
1212:
1207:
1202:
1197:
1192:
1185:
1182:
1166:
1163:
1162:
1161:
1150:
1144:
1141:
1138:
1134:
1129:
1126:
1121:
1117:
1114:
1111:
1108:
1078:
1075:
1071:
1067:
1047:
1044:
1040:
1036:
1012:
1009:
1005:
1001:
990:
989:
978:
972:
969:
966:
963:
960:
955:
952:
949:
943:
937:
934:
930:
908:
905:
891:
888:
879:
878:
867:
863:
859:
856:
853:
850:
847:
844:
841:
838:
810:
807:
780:
776:
770:
766:
762:
759:
746:
743:
722:
716:
703:
700:
691:
688:
687:
686:
682:
678:
674:
670:
667:
645:
642:
603:
602:
599:
596:
593:
577:
574:
549:
548:
545:
542:
537:
528:market failure
514:
513:Monopoly power
511:
506:
505:
502:
499:
474:
471:
466:
465:
462:
459:
456:
453:
438:Pareto optimal
429:
426:
392:
389:
291:
290:
288:
287:
280:
273:
265:
262:
261:
260:
259:
254:
246:
245:
241:
240:
239:
238:
233:
228:
219:
214:
209:
204:
199:
198:
197:
192:
182:
173:
172:
171:
166:
161:
156:
146:
135:
133:Monopolization
127:
126:
120:
119:
118:
117:
115:Merger control
112:
107:
102:
97:
92:
87:
82:
81:
80:
75:
61:
53:
52:
51:Basic concepts
48:
47:
37:
36:
26:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3647:
3636:
3633:
3631:
3628:
3627:
3625:
3610:
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19:
18:Pricing power
3543:Veblen goods
3503:Market power
3502:
3347:Jens Beckert
3319:Amos Tversky
3294:Eldar Shafir
3159:Kay-Yut Chen
3086:Mancur Olson
3061:Ronald Coase
2958:Hunter Lewis
2948:János Kornai
2816:
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2760:. Retrieved
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2485:. Retrieved
2481:the original
2471:
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2405:
2395:
2371:(3): 23–43.
2368:
2364:
2319:(1): 19–33.
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2148:(2): 23–34.
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2049:. 2020-01-20
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2005:
2001:
1977:. Retrieved
1972:
1949:. Retrieved
1947:. 2020-01-29
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442:market price
431:
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385:Lerner index
373:
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347:
327:demand curve
319:
301:market power
300:
294:
236:Rent-seeking
149:Price fixing
100:Market power
99:
3518:Satisficing
3229:Ariel Kalil
3124:Nava Ashraf
3071:Avner Greif
2878:Joe S. Bain
1973:xplaind.com
1170:Jean Tirole
611:Paul Sweezy
570:web browser
553:Microsoft's
343:divestiture
159:Bid rigging
3624:Categories
3204:Uri Gneezy
3189:Armin Falk
3174:Paul Dolan
3119:Dan Ariely
2762:2021-04-25
2487:2021-04-18
2249:2021-04-25
2203:2021-04-18
2122:2021-04-18
2102:2021-04-18
2053:2021-04-18
1979:2021-04-20
1951:2021-04-20
1928:2021-04-25
1885:2021-04-27
1768:1151088067
1226:References
992:The ratio
586:oligopsony
317:setters'.
226:copyrights
105:SSNIP test
3309:Uwe Sunde
3129:Ofer Azar
2700:153832234
2684:0889-938X
2645:154743000
2577:1350-4851
2436:2405-8440
2387:0895-3309
2024:0033-5533
1862:155013659
1854:0938-2259
1815:174112719
1776:cite book
1735:154042857
1727:0160-3477
1618:0003-6846
1538:0195-6574
1499:0377-2217
1451:154973650
1311:201326865
1128:−
1110:−
849:−
758:∑
630:collusion
582:oligopoly
524:monopsony
418:oligopoly
369:collusion
335:antitrust
297:economics
138:Collusion
68:oligopoly
2815:. 2019.
2718:§ 2
2692:43550398
2454:30338305
2343:67784475
2335:40802429
2294:44865537
2178:18 April
1546:41326187
1184:See also
520:monopoly
486:monopoly
422:monopoly
383:and the
64:Monopoly
2536:3480160
2445:6190613
2414:Bibcode
2406:Heliyon
2154:1818020
1659:1883878
1265:1340687
339:mergers
144:cartels
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634:cartel
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484:and a
420:, and
379:, the
2696:S2CID
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2641:S2CID
2532:JSTOR
2339:S2CID
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2290:JSTOR
2172:Toppr
2150:JSTOR
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1858:S2CID
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1261:JSTOR
180:tying
153:cases
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1811:OCLC
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813:The
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664:OPEC
638:OPEC
362:exit
305:firm
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1035:P
1025:1
1011:C
1008:M
1004:/
1000:P
977:.
971:D
968:E
965:P
962:+
959:1
954:D
951:E
948:P
942:=
936:C
933:M
929:P
866:P
862:/
858:)
855:C
852:M
846:P
843:(
840:=
837:L
795:N
779:2
775:)
769:i
765:S
761:(
735:N
731:N
727:N
719:N
284:e
277:t
270:v
155:)
151:(
20:)
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