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Natural monopoly

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tend to decrease with the increase in the total production output. The reason is that the actual product of the enterprise as it continues to expand, the original fixed costs are gradually diluted. This is particularly evident in companies with significant fixed-cost investments. Natural monopolies arise where the largest supplier in an industry, often the first supplier in a market, has an overwhelming cost advantage over other actual or potential competitors; this tends to be the case in industries where fixed costs predominate, creating economies of scale that are large in relation to the size of the market, as is the case in water and electricity services. The fixed cost of constructing a competing transmission network is so high, and the marginal cost of transmission for the incumbent so low, that it effectively bars potential competitors from the monopolist's market, acting as a nearly insurmountable barrier to entry into the market place.
127:. The marginal cost is the cost to the company of serving one more customer. In an industry where a natural monopoly does not exist, the vast majority of industries, the marginal cost decreases with economies of scale, then increases as the company has growing pains (overworking its employees, bureaucracy, inefficiencies, etc.). Along with this, the average cost of its products decreases and increases. A natural monopoly has a very different cost structure. A natural monopoly has a high fixed cost for a product that does not depend on output, but its marginal cost of producing one more good is roughly constant, and small. 20: 1556: 162:
the unit product price of a company that produces a specific product alone is higher than the corresponding unit product price of a joint production company, the companies that make it separately will lose money. These companies will either withdraw from the production field or be merged, forming a monopoly. Therefore, well-known American economists Samuelson and Nordhaus pointed out that economies of scope can also produce natural monopolies.
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part of the government, either to subject the business to reasonable conditions for the general advantage or to retain such power over it, that the profits of the monopoly may at least be obtained for the public." So, a legal prohibition against non-government competitors is often advocated. Whereby the rates are not left to the market but are regulated by the government; maximising profits, and subsequently societal reinvestment.
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The superiority of reward is not here the consequence of competition, but of its absence: not a compensation for disadvantages inherent in the employment, but an extra advantage; a kind of monopoly price, the effect not of a legal, but of what has been termed a natural monopoly... independently of...
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The costs of building telecommunication poles and growing a cell network would just be too exhausting for other competitors to exist. Electricity requires grids and cables whilst water services and gas both require pipelines whose costs are just too high to be able to have existing competitors in the
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A firm with high fixed costs requires a large number of customers in order to have a meaningful return on investment. This is where economies of scale become important. Since each firm has large initial costs, as the firm gains market share and increases its output the fixed cost (what they initially
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Companies that take advantage of economies of scale often run into problems of bureaucracy; these factors interact to produce an "ideal" size for a company, at which the company's average cost of production is minimized. If that ideal size is large enough to supply the whole market, then that market
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reduces the number of possible entrants into the industry regardless of the earning of the corporations within. The production cost of an enterprise is not fixed, except for the effect of technology and other factors; even under the same conditions, the unit production cost of an enterprise can also
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As with all monopolies, a monopolist that has gained its position through natural monopoly effects may engage in behaviour that abuses its market position. In cases where exploitation occurs, it often leads to calls from consumers for government regulation. Government regulation may also come about
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Once a natural monopoly has been established because of the large initial cost and that, according to the rule of economies of scale, the larger corporation (to a point) has a lower average cost and therefore an advantage over its competitors. With this knowledge, no firms will attempt to enter the
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above the general level. A trade may also, from the nature of the case, be confined to so few hands, that profits may admit of being kept up by a combination among the dealers. It is well known that even among so numerous a body as the London booksellers, this sort of combination long continued to
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In real life, companies produce or provide single goods and services but often diversify their operations. Suppose the cost of having multiple products by one enterprise is lower than making them separately by several enterprises. In that case, it indicates that there is an economy of scope. Since
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Mill also applied the term to land, which can manifest a natural monopoly by virtue of it being the only land with a particular mineral, etc. Furthermore, Mill referred to network industries, such as electricity and water supply, roads, rail and canals, as "practical monopolies", where "it is the
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is an American co-op that provides the majority of clearing and financial settlement across the securities industry ensuring they cannot abuse their market position to raise costs. In recent years a combined cooperative and open-source alternative to emergent web monopolies has been proposed, a
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All the natural monopolies (meaning thereby those which are created by circumstances, and not by law) which produce or aggravate the disparities in the remuneration of different kinds of labour, operate similarly between different employments of capital. If a business can only be advantageously
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The costs of laying tracks and building networks coupled with that of buying or leasing the trains prohibits or deters the entry of any competitor. Rail transport also fits other characteristics of a natural monopoly because it is assumed to be an industry with significant long run economies of
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Common arguments in favour of regulation include the desire to limit a company's potentially abusive or unfair market power, facilitate competition, promote investment or system expansion, or stabilise markets. This is especially true in the case of essential utilities like electricity where a
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Mill's initial use of the term concerned natural abilities. In contrast, common contemporary usage refers solely to market failure in a particular type of industry such as rail, post or electricity. Mill's development of the idea that 'what is true of labour, is true of capital'. He continues;
1507:, with all x being non-negative. In other words, if all companies have the same production cost function, the one with the better technology should monopolize the entire market such that the total cost is minimized, thus causing natural monopoly due to its technological advantage or condition. 564: 1889:
in each of these areas, many of which operate internationally bidding on utility contracts in other countries. However, this approach can raise its own problems. In the past, some governments have used the state-provided utility services as a source of cash flow for funding other government
1873:. In some countries an early solution to this perceived problem was government provision of, for example, a utility service. Enabling a monopolistic company with the ability to change prices without regulation can have devastating effects in society. For example, in Bolivia’s 185:(1977) provides the current formal definition of a natural monopoly. He defines a natural monopoly as "n industry in which multi-firm production is more costly than production by a monopoly" (p. 810). Baumol linked the definition to the mathematical concept of 1823:
Mill criticised Smith's neglect of an area that could explain wage disparity (the term itself was already in use in Smith's times, but with a slightly different meaning). Taking up the examples of professionals such as jewellers, physicians and lawyers, he said,
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artificial monopolies , there is a natural monopoly in favour of skilled labourers against the unskilled, which makes the difference of reward exceed, sometimes in a manifold proportion, what is sufficient merely to equalize their advantages.
63:. Specifically, an industry is a natural monopoly if the total cost of one firm, producing the total output, is lower than the total cost of two or more firms producing the entire production. In that case, it is very probable that a company ( 816: 1021:
Proposition: Global scale economies are sufficient but not necessary for (strict) ray subadditivity, the condition for natural monopoly in the production of a single product or in any bundle of outputs produced in fixed proportions.
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management where a monopoly's users or workers own the monopoly. For instance, the web's open-source architecture has both stimulated massive growth and avoided a single company controlling the entire market. The
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for a product few can refuse. In general, though, regulation occurs when the government believes that the operator, left to his own devices, would behave in a way that is contrary to the
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carried on by a large capital, this in most countries limits so narrowly the class of persons who can enter into the employment, that they are enabled to keep their
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A graphical explanation of the inefficiencies of having several competitors in a naturally monopolistic market. AC = average cost (per customer), D = demand.
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Saidu, Balkisu (8 May 2009). "Regulating the Abuse of the Natural Monopoly of Pipelines in the Gas Industry vis-Ă -vis the Provision of Third Party Access".
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relative to the size of the market give the largest supplier in an industry, often the first supplier in a market, an overwhelming advantage over potential
559:{\displaystyle {\frac {C(\sum v_{j}y)}{\sum v_{j}}}<\sum {\frac {v_{i}}{\sum v_{j}}}{\frac {C(v_{i}y)}{v_{i}}}={\frac {\sum C(v_{i}y)}{\sum v_{j}}}} 1877:, a firm with a monopoly on the supply of water excessively increased water rates to fund a dam, leaving many unable to afford the essential good. 1535:
public market. However, natural monopolies are usually regulated and they face increasing competition from private networks and specialty carriers.
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In recent years, bodies of information have observed the correlation between utility subsidies and welfare improvements. Today, across the world,
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It is generally believed that there are two reasons for natural monopolies: one is economies of scale, and the other is economies of scope.
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invested) is divided among a larger number of customers. Therefore, in industries with large initial investment requirements,
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are widely used to provide state-run water, electricity, gas, telecommunications, mass-transportation and postal services.
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On the other hand if firms produce many products scale economies are neither sufficient nor necessary for subadditivity:
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Proposition: Neither ray concavity nor ray average costs that decline everywhere are necessary for strict subadditivity.
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Proposition: Strict economies of scale are sufficient but not necessary for ray average cost to be strictly declining.
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All industries have costs associated with entering them. Often, a large portion of these costs is required for
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Filippini, Massimo (June 1998). "Are Municipal Electricity Distribution Utilities Natural Monopolies?".
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Baumol, William J., 1977. "On the Proper Cost Tests for Natural Monopoly in a Multiproduct Industry",
1446:{\displaystyle {\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}c(x)&=c(x^{1})+c(x^{2})+...+c(x^{k})\end{aligned}}}} 732: 667: 1874: 1782: 1081: 28: 2281: 2014:
W. J. Baumol, 1976. "Scale Economies, Average Cost and the Profitability of Marginal-Cost Pricing"
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at the request of a business hoping to enter a market otherwise dominated by a natural monopoly.
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Proposition: Strict concavity of a cost function is not sufficient to guarantee subadditivity.
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predominate, creating large economies of scale about the size of the market; examples include
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Book II, Chapter XIV 'Of the Differences of Wages in different Employments', para. 13-4
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For a discussion of the historical origins of the term 'natural monopoly' see Mosca.
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Proposition: Scale economies are neither necessary nor sufficient for subadditivity.
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Proposition: Strictly declining ray average cost implies strict ray subadditivity.
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could be a driver-owned cooperative developing and sharing open-source software.
1870: 1698: 1677: 1623: 1547: 39:, one seller can serve the entire market at the downward-sloping section of its 1940: 1866: 1840: 1646: 1628: 182: 116: 104: 96: 80: 76: 2141: 2468: 1914: 1735: 1703: 186: 120: 2388: 1950: 1749: 1662: 1613: 72: 43:, meaning that it will have lower average costs than any potential entrant. 1909:
Alternatives to a state-owned response to natural monopolies include both
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The development of the concept of natural monopoly is often attributed to
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exist. I have already mentioned the case of the gas and water companies.
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declines as output increases over a much larger range of output levels.
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Water, Electricity, and the Poor: Who Benefits from Utility Subsidies?
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A wave of nationalisation across Europe after World War II created
1577: 1516: 133: 64: 52: 95:, etc. Natural monopolies were recognized as potential sources of 873:. The cost function is not concave, average cost increases after 2349: 1945: 1657: 55:
in an industry in which high infrastructural costs and other
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Optimal regulation: the economic theory of natural monopoly
1992:, 2012. Microeconomics, Pearson Education, England, p. 394. 1928: 804: 92: 2350:
Baumol, William J.; Panzar, J. C.; Willig, R. D. (1982).
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Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure
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The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought
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Therefore the cost function is strictly subadditivite.
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Therefore the cost function is strictly subadditivite.
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advocated government regulation to make them serve the
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Natural Monopoly Regulation: Principles and Practices
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New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 2331:Berg, Sanford; John Tschirhart (1988). 2211:Cochabamba! : water war in Bolivia 2208: 866:{\displaystyle y_{r}<y_{b}<y_{s}} 704:in the piecewise-linear cost function: 31:is a natural monopoly. Due to enormous 2467: 2111:Economics: A Contemporary Introduction 1500:{\displaystyle \sum _{i=1}^{k}x^{i}=x} 1314:Mathematical Notation of Subadditivity 1118:in the cost function for two outputs: 2418: 2227: 2213:. Cambridge, Mass.: South End Press. 2162: 2123: 2113:. Thomson South-Western. p. 319. 189:; specifically, subadditivity of the 2256:. Washington, DC: World Bank. 2005. 1025: 177: 900:and ray average cost is greater at 13: 2324: 1554: 1018:Combining all propositions gives: 67:) or minimal number of companies ( 14: 2491: 2427:. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. 2243:"General Concepts: Introduction." 2165:The Journal of Structured Finance 1766:International Competition Network 263:{\displaystyle v_{1}y,...,v_{n}y} 2450:. New York, NY, USA: Blackwell. 2309:from the original on 2016-02-05 2295: 2270: 2246: 2202: 2191: 2156: 2117: 2101: 2095:Principles of Political Economy 2081:Principles of Political Economy 2067:Principles of Political Economy 2053:Principles of Political Economy 2025:Principles of Political Economy 1820:Principles of Political Economy 2404:. Cambridge University Press. 2400:The Theory of Natural Monopoly 2335:. Cambridge University Press. 2087: 2073: 2059: 2045: 2031: 2017: 2008: 1995: 1983: 1771:List of competition regulators 1434: 1421: 1400: 1387: 1378: 1365: 1352: 1346: 1280: 1268: 1259: 1247: 1232: 1220: 721: 715: 697:{\displaystyle c_{1}<c_{2}} 627: 611: 599: 580: 535: 519: 491: 475: 413: 394: 346: 327: 300: 281: 99:as early as the 19th century; 1: 2109:McEachern, Willam A. (2005). 1976: 1855: 1111:{\displaystyle 0<k<1/2} 110: 1880: 1037: 655: 203: 7: 1934: 1510: 1071:{\displaystyle 0<a<1} 10: 2496: 2442:Waterson, Michael (1988). 2419:Train, Kenneth E. (1991). 1813:, who (writing before the 1638:Anti-competitive practices 1604:Herfindahl–Hirschman index 1573:History of competition law 1539: 212:Consider n output vectors 2142:10.1080/09672560802037623 2042:(1776) Book I, Chapter 10 2003:American Economic Review 1913:licensed technology and 1875:2000 Cochabamba protests 29:electricity transmission 23:In small countries like 2389:10.1111/1467-8292.00077 2209:Olivera, Oscar (2004). 2124:Mosca, Manuela (2008). 1927:, where, for instance, 166:is a natural monopoly. 2107:On subways, see also, 1905:Alternative regulation 1846: 1831: 1815:marginalist revolution 1683:Occupational licensing 1559: 1501: 1480: 1447: 1293: 1202: 1112: 1072: 1000: 948: 921: 894: 867: 812: 698: 634: 560: 371: 264: 174:or monopoly develops. 138: 44: 1887:state-owned companies 1836: 1826: 1558: 1502: 1460: 1448: 1294: 1203: 1113: 1073: 1001: 949: 947:{\displaystyle y_{r}} 922: 920:{\displaystyle y_{s}} 895: 893:{\displaystyle y_{b}} 868: 813: 699: 635: 561: 372: 265: 136: 22: 2480:Monopoly (economics) 2396:Sharkey, W. (1982). 2177:10.3905/jsf.13.4.105 1956:Price-cap regulation 1925:platform cooperative 1726:Occupational closure 1721:Dividing territories 1709:Essential facilities 1609:Market concentration 1457: 1334: 1214: 1123: 1082: 1050: 961: 931: 904: 877: 824: 709: 668: 574: 385: 275: 216: 16:Concept in economics 1865:monopoly creates a 1197: 1179: 1164: 1146: 2239:2013-10-03 at the 1745:Regulatory capture 1560: 1526:Telecommunications 1497: 1443: 1441: 1439: 1289: 1198: 1183: 1165: 1150: 1132: 1108: 1068: 996: 944: 917: 890: 863: 808: 803: 694: 630: 556: 367: 260: 156:average total cost 139: 89:telecommunications 45: 41:average cost curve 2434:978-0-262-20084-4 2411:978-0-521-27194-3 2365:978-0-15-513910-7 2342:978-0-521-33893-6 2263:978-0-8213-6342-3 2220:978-0-896-08702-6 2039:Wealth of Nations 1807: 1806: 1736:Misuse of patents 1731:Predatory pricing 1716:Exclusive dealing 1599:Barriers to entry 1587:Coercive monopoly 1303: 1302: 1026:Multiproduct case 1014: 1013: 647: 646: 554: 505: 467: 432: 178:Formal definition 57:barriers to entry 2487: 2461: 2449: 2438: 2426: 2415: 2403: 2392: 2369: 2357: 2346: 2318: 2317: 2315: 2314: 2299: 2293: 2292: 2290: 2289: 2280:. 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2319: 2294: 2269: 2262: 2245: 2226: 2219: 2201: 2190: 2171:(4): 105–112. 2155: 2136:(2): 317–353. 2116: 2100: 2086: 2072: 2058: 2044: 2030: 2016: 2007: 1994: 1981: 1980: 1978: 1975: 1974: 1973: 1968: 1963: 1958: 1953: 1948: 1943: 1941:Network effect 1936: 1933: 1906: 1903: 1882: 1879: 1867:captive market 1857: 1854: 1841:rate of profit 1805: 1804: 1802: 1801: 1794: 1787: 1779: 1776: 1775: 1774: 1773: 1768: 1760: 1759: 1755: 1754: 1753: 1752: 1747: 1742: 1733: 1728: 1723: 1718: 1713: 1712: 1711: 1706: 1696: 1687: 1686: 1685: 1680: 1675: 1670: 1660: 1649: 1647:Monopolization 1641: 1640: 1634: 1633: 1632: 1631: 1629:Merger control 1626: 1621: 1616: 1611: 1606: 1601: 1596: 1595: 1594: 1589: 1575: 1567: 1566: 1565:Basic concepts 1562: 1561: 1551: 1550: 1541: 1538: 1537: 1536: 1523: 1512: 1509: 1496: 1493: 1488: 1484: 1478: 1473: 1470: 1467: 1463: 1436: 1431: 1427: 1423: 1420: 1417: 1414: 1411: 1408: 1405: 1402: 1397: 1393: 1389: 1386: 1383: 1380: 1375: 1371: 1367: 1364: 1361: 1358: 1356: 1354: 1351: 1348: 1345: 1342: 1341: 1315: 1312: 1305: 1304: 1301: 1300: 1288: 1285: 1282: 1279: 1276: 1273: 1270: 1267: 1264: 1261: 1258: 1255: 1252: 1249: 1246: 1243: 1240: 1237: 1234: 1231: 1228: 1225: 1222: 1219: 1195: 1190: 1186: 1182: 1177: 1172: 1168: 1162: 1157: 1153: 1149: 1144: 1139: 1135: 1131: 1128: 1107: 1103: 1099: 1096: 1093: 1090: 1087: 1067: 1064: 1061: 1058: 1055: 1043: 1042: 1027: 1024: 1016: 1015: 1012: 1011: 995: 990: 986: 982: 979: 974: 970: 966: 941: 937: 914: 910: 887: 883: 860: 856: 852: 847: 843: 839: 834: 830: 805: 798: 794: 790: 787: 784: 782: 777: 773: 769: 768: 763: 759: 755: 752: 749: 747: 742: 738: 734: 733: 731: 726: 723: 720: 717: 714: 691: 687: 683: 678: 674: 661: 660: 649: 648: 645: 644: 629: 626: 621: 617: 613: 610: 607: 604: 601: 598: 593: 589: 585: 582: 579: 550: 546: 542: 537: 534: 529: 525: 521: 518: 515: 509: 502: 498: 493: 490: 485: 481: 477: 474: 463: 459: 455: 449: 445: 439: 436: 428: 424: 420: 415: 412: 407: 403: 399: 396: 393: 364: 360: 356: 352: 348: 345: 340: 336: 332: 329: 326: 323: 318: 314: 310: 306: 302: 299: 294: 290: 286: 283: 280: 259: 254: 250: 246: 243: 240: 237: 234: 231: 226: 222: 209: 208: 183:William Baumol 179: 176: 117:microeconomics 112: 109: 97:market failure 81:water services 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 2492: 2481: 2478: 2476: 2473: 2472: 2470: 2459: 2457:0-631-14007-7 2453: 2448: 2447: 2440: 2436: 2430: 2425: 2424: 2417: 2413: 2407: 2402: 2401: 2394: 2390: 2386: 2382: 2378: 2377: 2371: 2367: 2361: 2356: 2355: 2348: 2344: 2338: 2334: 2329: 2328: 2308: 2304: 2298: 2284:on 2016-02-05 2283: 2279: 2273: 2265: 2259: 2255: 2249: 2242: 2238: 2235: 2230: 2222: 2216: 2212: 2205: 2199: 2194: 2186: 2182: 2178: 2174: 2170: 2166: 2159: 2151: 2147: 2143: 2139: 2135: 2131: 2127: 2120: 2112: 2104: 2097: 2096: 2090: 2083: 2082: 2076: 2069: 2068: 2062: 2055: 2054: 2048: 2041: 2040: 2034: 2027: 2026: 2020: 2011: 2004: 1998: 1991: 1986: 1982: 1972: 1969: 1967: 1964: 1962: 1959: 1957: 1954: 1952: 1949: 1947: 1944: 1942: 1939: 1938: 1932: 1930: 1926: 1921: 1916: 1915:co-operatives 1912: 1902: 1900: 1895: 1893: 1888: 1878: 1876: 1872: 1868: 1862: 1853: 1850: 1845: 1842: 1835: 1830: 1825: 1822: 1821: 1816: 1812: 1800: 1795: 1793: 1788: 1786: 1781: 1780: 1778: 1777: 1772: 1769: 1767: 1764: 1763: 1762: 1761: 1757: 1756: 1751: 1748: 1746: 1743: 1741: 1737: 1734: 1732: 1729: 1727: 1724: 1722: 1719: 1717: 1714: 1710: 1707: 1705: 1704:Group boycott 1702: 1701: 1700: 1697: 1695: 1691: 1688: 1684: 1681: 1679: 1676: 1674: 1671: 1668: 1664: 1661: 1659: 1656:Formation of 1655: 1654: 1653: 1650: 1648: 1645: 1644: 1643: 1642: 1639: 1636: 1635: 1630: 1627: 1625: 1622: 1620: 1617: 1615: 1612: 1610: 1607: 1605: 1602: 1600: 1597: 1593: 1590: 1588: 1585: 1584: 1583: 1579: 1576: 1574: 1571: 1570: 1569: 1568: 1564: 1563: 1557: 1553: 1552: 1549: 1546: 1545: 1531: 1527: 1524: 1518: 1515: 1514: 1508: 1494: 1491: 1486: 1482: 1476: 1471: 1468: 1465: 1461: 1429: 1425: 1418: 1415: 1412: 1409: 1406: 1403: 1395: 1391: 1384: 1381: 1373: 1369: 1362: 1359: 1357: 1349: 1343: 1329: 1326:at an output 1325: 1321: 1311: 1308: 1299: 1286: 1283: 1277: 1274: 1271: 1265: 1262: 1256: 1253: 1250: 1244: 1241: 1238: 1235: 1229: 1226: 1223: 1217: 1208: 1193: 1188: 1184: 1180: 1175: 1170: 1166: 1160: 1155: 1151: 1147: 1142: 1137: 1133: 1129: 1126: 1105: 1101: 1097: 1094: 1091: 1088: 1085: 1065: 1062: 1059: 1056: 1053: 1045: 1044: 1040: 1039: 1036: 1035: 1034: 1031: 1023: 1019: 1010: 1007: 993: 988: 984: 980: 977: 972: 968: 964: 955: 939: 935: 912: 908: 885: 881: 858: 854: 850: 845: 841: 837: 832: 828: 818: 796: 792: 788: 785: 780: 775: 771: 761: 757: 753: 750: 745: 740: 736: 729: 724: 718: 712: 689: 685: 681: 676: 672: 663: 662: 658: 657: 654: 653: 652: 643: 640: 624: 619: 615: 608: 605: 602: 596: 591: 587: 583: 577: 569: 568:Which gives: 566: 548: 544: 540: 532: 527: 523: 516: 513: 507: 500: 496: 488: 483: 479: 472: 461: 457: 453: 447: 443: 437: 434: 426: 422: 418: 410: 405: 401: 397: 391: 380: 377: 362: 358: 354: 350: 343: 338: 334: 330: 324: 321: 316: 312: 308: 304: 297: 292: 288: 284: 278: 257: 252: 248: 244: 241: 238: 235: 232: 229: 224: 220: 211: 210: 206: 205: 202: 201: 200: 197: 194: 192: 191:cost function 188: 187:subadditivity 184: 175: 173: 167: 163: 159: 157: 151: 148: 144: 135: 131: 128: 126: 122: 121:marginal cost 118: 108: 106: 102: 98: 94: 90: 86: 82: 78: 74: 73:capital costs 70: 66: 62: 58: 54: 50: 42: 38: 34: 30: 26: 21: 2445: 2422: 2399: 2380: 2374: 2353: 2332: 2311:. Retrieved 2297: 2286:. Retrieved 2282:the original 2272: 2253: 2248: 2229: 2210: 2204: 2193: 2168: 2164: 2158: 2133: 2129: 2119: 2110: 2103: 2093: 2089: 2079: 2075: 2065: 2061: 2051: 2047: 2037: 2033: 2023: 2019: 2010: 2002: 1997: 1985: 1951:Market forms 1908: 1896: 1884: 1863: 1859: 1851: 1847: 1837: 1832: 1827: 1818: 1808: 1750:Rent-seeking 1663:Price fixing 1614:Market power 1591: 1327: 1323: 1319: 1317: 1309: 1306: 1209: 1119: 1032: 1029: 1020: 1017: 1008: 956: 819: 705: 650: 641: 570: 567: 381: 378: 271: 198: 195: 181: 168: 164: 160: 152: 140: 129: 114: 48: 46: 2005:67, 809–22. 1961:Public good 1911:open source 1673:Bid rigging 1453:such that 1324:subadditive 1307:Therefore: 379:Therefore: 105:public good 85:electricity 61:competitors 37:market size 33:fixed costs 25:New Zealand 2469:Categories 2383:(2): 157. 2313:2016-01-30 2288:2016-01-30 1990:Perloff, J 1977:References 1966:Quasi-rent 1856:Regulation 1740:copyrights 1619:SSNIP test 143:investment 125:fixed cost 111:Definition 35:and small 2185:153866300 2150:154480729 1652:Collusion 1582:oligopoly 1530:Utilities 1462:∑ 994:≤ 965:≤ 606:∑ 584:∑ 541:∑ 514:∑ 454:∑ 438:∑ 419:∑ 398:∑ 355:∑ 331:∑ 309:∑ 285:∑ 172:oligopoly 69:oligopoly 2307:Archived 2237:Archived 1935:See also 1892:currency 1578:Monopoly 1517:Railways 1511:Examples 954:. Also: 79:such as 65:monopoly 53:monopoly 1881:History 1658:cartels 1540:History 2454:  2431:  2408:  2362:  2339:  2260:  2217:  2183:  2148:  1946:LoopCo 1522:scale. 1041:Proof 659:Proof 207:Proof 2181:S2CID 2146:S2CID 1694:tying 1667:cases 927:than 51:is a 2452:ISBN 2429:ISBN 2406:ISBN 2360:ISBN 2337:ISBN 2258:ISBN 2215:ISBN 1929:Uber 1738:and 1692:and 1580:and 1528:and 1242:> 1095:< 1089:< 1078:and 1063:< 1057:< 1046:Let 978:< 851:< 838:< 820:Let 789:> 754:< 682:< 664:Let 603:< 435:< 322:< 123:and 93:mail 2385:doi 2173:doi 2138:doi 1330:if 1322:is 2471:: 2381:69 2379:. 2305:. 2179:. 2169:13 2167:. 2144:. 2134:15 2132:. 2128:. 119:: 107:. 91:, 87:, 83:, 47:A 27:, 2460:. 2437:. 2414:. 2391:. 2387:: 2368:. 2345:. 2316:. 2291:. 2266:. 2223:. 2187:. 2175:: 2152:. 2140:: 1798:e 1791:t 1784:v 1669:) 1665:( 1532:: 1519:: 1495:x 1492:= 1487:i 1483:x 1477:k 1472:1 1469:= 1466:i 1435:) 1430:k 1426:x 1422:( 1419:c 1416:+ 1413:. 1410:. 1407:. 1404:+ 1401:) 1396:2 1392:x 1388:( 1385:c 1382:+ 1379:) 1374:1 1370:x 1366:( 1363:c 1360:= 1353:) 1350:x 1347:( 1344:c 1328:x 1320:c 1287:2 1284:= 1281:) 1278:1 1275:, 1272:0 1269:( 1266:C 1263:+ 1260:) 1257:0 1254:, 1251:1 1248:( 1245:C 1239:3 1236:= 1233:) 1230:1 1227:, 1224:1 1221:( 1218:C 1194:a 1189:2 1185:y 1181:+ 1176:k 1171:2 1167:y 1161:k 1156:1 1152:y 1148:+ 1143:a 1138:1 1134:y 1130:= 1127:C 1106:2 1102:/ 1098:1 1092:k 1086:0 1066:1 1060:a 1054:0 989:1 985:c 981:2 973:2 969:c 940:r 936:y 913:s 909:y 886:b 882:y 859:s 855:y 846:b 842:y 833:r 829:y 797:B 793:y 786:y 781:, 776:2 772:c 762:B 758:y 751:y 746:, 741:1 737:c 730:{ 725:= 722:) 719:y 716:( 713:C 690:2 686:c 677:1 673:c 628:) 625:y 620:i 616:v 612:( 609:C 600:) 597:y 592:j 588:v 581:( 578:C 549:j 545:v 536:) 533:y 528:i 524:v 520:( 517:C 508:= 501:i 497:v 492:) 489:y 484:i 480:v 476:( 473:C 462:j 458:v 448:i 444:v 427:j 423:v 414:) 411:y 406:j 402:v 395:( 392:C 363:i 359:v 351:/ 347:) 344:y 339:i 335:v 328:( 325:C 317:j 313:v 305:/ 301:) 298:y 293:j 289:v 282:( 279:C 258:y 253:n 249:v 245:, 242:. 239:. 236:. 233:, 230:y 225:1 221:v

Index


New Zealand
electricity transmission
fixed costs
market size
average cost curve
monopoly
barriers to entry
competitors
monopoly
oligopoly
capital costs
public utilities
water services
electricity
telecommunications
mail
market failure
John Stuart Mill
public good
microeconomics
marginal cost
fixed cost

investment
barrier to entry
average total cost
oligopoly
William Baumol
subadditivity

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