Knowledge

1782: 2523:, pp. 9–10): "We may if we like distinguish four different lines along which the testing of a theory could be carried out. First there is the logical comparison of the conclusions among themselves, by which the internal consistency of the system is tested. Secondly, there is the investigation of the logical form of the theory, with the object of determining whether it has the character of an empirical or scientific theory, or whether it is, for example, tautological. Thirdly, there is the comparison with other theories, chiefly with the aim of determining whether the theory would constitute a scientific advance should it survive our various tests. And finally, there is the testing of the theory by way of empirical applications of the conclusions which can be derived from it. ... Here too the procedure of testing turns out to be deductive. With the help of other statements, previously accepted, certain singular statements—which we may call 'predictions'—are deduced from the theory; especially predictions that are easily testable or applicable. From among these statements, those are selected which are not derivable from the current theory, and more especially those which the current theory contradicts." 3203:.' Actually, I do specify such criteria. But Kuhn probably meant that ' standards have practical force only if they are combined with a time limit (what looks like a degenerating problem shift may be the beginning of a much longer period of advance)'. Since I specify no such time limit, Feyerabend concludes that my standards are no more than 'verbal ornament'. A related point was made by Musgrave in a letter containing some major constructive criticisms of an earlier draft, in which he demanded that I specify, for instance, at what point dogmatic adherence to a programme ought to be explained 'externally' rather than 'internally'. Let me try to explain why such objections are beside the point. One may rationally stick to a degenerating programme until it is overtaken by a rival and even after. What one must not do is to deny its poor public record. Both Feyerabend and Kuhn conflate methodological appraisal of a programme with firm heuristic advice about what to do. It is perfectly rational to play a risky game: what is irrational is to deceive oneself about the risk. This does not mean as much licence as might appear for those who stick to a degenerating programme. For they can do this mostly only in private." 2972:, p. 111: "Against the view here developed one might be tempted to object (following Duhem 28) that in every test it is not only the theory under investigation which is involved, but also the whole system of our theories and assumptions—in fact, more or less the whole of our knowledge—so that we can never be certain which of all these assumptions is refuted. But this criticism overlooks the fact that if we take each of the two theories (between which the crucial experiment is to decide) together with all this background knowledge, as indeed we must, then we decide between two systems which differ only over the two theories which are at stake. It further overlooks the fact that we do not assert the refutation of the theory as such, but of the theory together with that background knowledge; parts of which, if other crucial experiments can be designed, may indeed one day be rejected as responsible for the failure. (Thus we may even characterize a theory under investigation as that part of a vast system for which we have, if vaguely, an alternative in mind, and for which we try to design crucial tests.)" 2342:, chap. 1, sec. 3: "It seems that almost everybody believes in induction; believes, that is, that we learn by the repetition of observations. Even Hume, in spite of his great discovery that a natural law can neither be established nor made 'probable' by induction, continued to believe firmly that animals and men do learn through repetition: through repeated observations as well as through the formation of habits, or the strengthening of habits, by repetition. And he upheld the theory that induction, though rationally indefensible and resulting in nothing better than unreasoned belief, was nevertheless reliable in the main—more reliable and useful at any rate than reason and the processes of reasoning; and that 'experience' was thus the unreasoned result of a (more or less passive) accumulation of observations. As against all this, I happen to believe that in fact we never draw inductive inferences, or make use of what are now called 'inductive procedures'. Rather, we always discover regularities by the essentially different method of trial and error." 2768:, pp. 52–53, Introduction: "For several years, evolutionary theory has been under attack from critics who argue that the theory is basically a tautology. The tautology is said to arise from the fact that evolutionary biologists have no widely accepted way to independently define 'survival' and 'fitness.' That the statement, 'the fit survive,' is tautological is important, because if the critics are correct in their analysis, the tautology renders meaningless much of contemporary evolutionary theorizing. ... The definition of key evolutionary concepts in terms of natural selection runs the risk of making evolutionary theory a self-contained, logical system which is isolated from the empirical world. No meaningful empirical prediction can be made from one side to the other side of these definitions. One cannot usefully predict that nature selects the fittest organism since the fittest organism is by definition that which nature selects." 1805:, Lakatos and Popper agreed that universal laws cannot be logically deduced (except from laws that say even more). But unlike Popper, Lakatos felt that if the explanation for new laws cannot be deductive, it must be inductive. He urged Popper explicitly to adopt some inductive principle and sets himself the task to find an inductive methodology. However, the methodology that he found did not offer any exact inductive rules. In a response to Kuhn, Feyerabend and Musgrave, Lakatos acknowledged that the methodology depends on the good judgment of the scientists. Feyerabend wrote in "Against Method" that Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes is epistemological anarchism in disguise and Musgrave made a similar comment. In more recent work, Feyerabend says that Lakatos uses rules, but whether or not to follow any of these rules is left to the judgment of the scientists. This is also discussed elsewhere. 3429:: "Astrology is Sir Karl's most frequently cited example of a 'pseudo-science'. He says: 'By making their interpretations and prophecies sufficiently vague they were able to explain away anything that might have been a refutation of the theory had the theory and the prophecies been more precise. In order to escape falsification they destroyed the testability of the theory.' Those generalizations catch something of the spirit of the astrological enterprise. But taken at all literally, as they must be if they are to provide a demarcation criterion, they are impossible to support. The history of astrology during the centuries when it was intellectually reputable records many predictions that categorically failed. Not even astrology's most convinced and vehement exponents doubted the recurrence of such failures. Astrology cannot be barred from the sciences because of the form in which its predictions were cast." 917:, Popper discusses informally which statements among those that are considered in the logical structure are basic statements. A logical structure uses universal classes to define laws. For example, in the law "all swans are white" the concept of swans is a universal class. It corresponds to a set of properties that every swan must have. It is not restricted to the swans that exist, existed or will exist. Informally, a basic statement is simply a statement that concerns only a finite number of specific instances in universal classes. In particular, an existential statement such as "there exists a black swan" is not a basic statement, because it is not specific about the instance. On the other hand, "this swan here is black" is a basic statement. Popper says that it is a singular existential statement or simply a singular statement. So, basic statements are singular (existential) statements. 1422: 2780:, pp. 383–384: "Darwin's major contribution was, of course, the suggestion that evolution can be explained by the natural selection of random variations. Natural selection, which was at first considered as though it were a hypothesis that was in need of experimental or observational confirmation, turns out on closer inspection to be a tautology, a statement of an inevitable, although previously unrecognized, relation. It states that the fittest individuals in a population (defined as those which leave most offspring) will leave most offspring. Once the statement is made, its truth is apparent. This fact in no way reduces the magnitude of Darwin's achievement; only after it was clearly formulated, could biologists realize the enormous power of the principle as a weapon of explanation." 1740: 2997:, p. 91: "It may now be possible for us to answer the question: How and why do we accept one theory in preference to others? The preference is certainly not due to anything like a experiential justification of the statements composing the theory; it is not due to a logical reduction of the theory to experience. We choose the theory which best holds its own in competition with other theories; the one which, by natural selection, proves itself the fittest to survive. This will be the one which not only has hitherto stood up to the severest tests, but the one which is also testable in the most rigorous way. A theory is a tool which we test by applying it, and which we judge as to its fitness by the results of its applications." 3066:, p. 32): "For the naive falsificationist a theory is falsified by a ('fortified') 'observational' statement which conflicts with it (or which he decides to interpret as conflicting with it). For the sophisticated falsificationist a scientific theory T is falsified if and only if another theory T' has been proposed with the following characteristics: ( 1 ) T' has excess empirical content over T: that is, it predicts novel facts, that is, facts improbable in the light of, or even forbidden, by (2) T' explains the previous success of T, that is, all the unrefuted content of T is included (within the limits of observational error) in the content of T'; and (3) some of the excess content of T' is corroborated." 2390:, p. 19: "Various objections might be raised against the criterion of demarcation here proposed. In the first place, it may well seem somewhat wrong-headed to suggest that science, which is supposed to give us positive information, should be characterized as satisfying a negative requirement such as refutability. However, I shall show, in sections 31 to 46, that this objection has little weight, since the amount of positive information about the world which is conveyed by a scientific statement is the greater the more likely it is to clash, because of its logical character, with possible singular statements. (Not for nothing do we call the laws of nature 'laws': the more they prohibit the more they say.)" 2804:, p. 53, Introduction: "Even if it did not make a tautology of evolution theory, the use of natural selection as a descriptive concept would have serious drawbacks. While it is mathematically tractable and easy to model in the laboratory, the concept is difficult to operationalize in the field. For field biologists, it is really a hypothetical entity. Clear, unambiguous instances of the operation of natural selection are difficult to come by and always greeted with great enthusiasm by biologists (Kettlewell, 1959 ; Shepherd, 1960). Thus, although the concept has much to recommend it as an explanatory one, it seems an overly abstract formulation on which to base a descriptive science." 2951:, p. 2: "several courts have treated the abstract possibility of falsification as sufficient to satisfy this aspect of the screening of scientific evidence. This essay challenges these views. It first explains the distinct meanings of falsification and falsifiability. It then argues that while the Court did not embrace the views of any specific philosopher of science, inquiring into the existence of meaningful attempts at falsification is an appropriate and crucial consideration in admissibility determinations. Consequently, it concludes that recent opinions substituting mere falsifiability for actual empirical testing are misconstruing and misapplying Daubert." 1760: 847:. For example, the falsifiability of Newton's law of gravitation, as defined by Popper, depends purely on the logical relation it has with a statement such as "The brick fell upwards when released". A brick that falls upwards would not alone falsify Newton's law of gravitation. The capacity to verify the absence of conditions such as a hidden string attached to the brick is also needed for this state of affairs to eventually falsify Newton's law of gravitation. However, these applied methodological considerations are irrelevant in falsifiability, because it is a logical criterion. The empirical requirement on the potential falsifier, also called the 1744: 2172:. Thus if the state of affairs is imaginary, then the description is simply false and its negation is a true description of reality, in Tarski's sense." He continues (emphasis added) "Tarski's theory more particularly makes clear just what fact a statement P will correspond to if it corresponds to any fact: namely the fact that p. ... a false statement P is false not because it corresponds to some odd entity like a non-fact, but simply because it does not correspond to any fact: it does not stand in the peculiar relation of correspondence to a fact to anything real, though it stands in a relation like 'describes' to the 1589: 1308:) and the existence of the melting point. For example, he pointed out that had no neutrino been detected, it could have been because some conservation law is false. Popper did not argue against the problems of falsification per se. He always acknowledged these problems. Popper's response was at the logical level. For example, he pointed out that, if a specific way is given to trap the neutrino, then, at the level of the language, the statement is falsifiable, because "no neutrino was detected after using this specific way" formally contradicts it (and it is inter-subjectively-verifiable—people can repeat the experiment). 2237:, sec. 3: "Popper has always drawn a clear distinction between the logic of falsifiability and its applied methodology. The logic of his theory is utterly simple: if a single ferrous metal is unaffected by a magnetic field it cannot be the case that all ferrous metals are affected by magnetic fields. Logically speaking, a scientific law is conclusively falsifiable although it is not conclusively verifiable. Methodologically, however, the situation is much more complex: no observation is free from the possibility of error—consequently we may question whether our experimental result was what it appeared to be." 2535:, p. 9: "According to the view that will be put forward here, the method of critically testing theories, and selecting them according to the results of tests, always proceeds on the following lines. From a new idea, put up tentatively, and not yet justified in any way—an anticipation, a hypothesis, a theoretical system, or what you will—conclusions are drawn by means of logical deduction. These conclusions are then compared with one another and with other relevant statements, so as to find what logical relations (such as equivalence, derivability, compatibility, or incompatibility) exist between them." 2844:, p. 37: "In some of its earlier formulations (for example in Marx's analysis of the character of the 'coming social revolution') their predictions were testable, and in fact falsified. Yet instead of accepting the refutations the followers of Marx re-interpreted both the theory and the evidence in order to make them agree. In this way they rescued the theory from refutation; but they did so at the price of adopting a device which made it irrefutable. They thus gave a 'conventionalist twist' to the theory; and by this stratagem they destroyed its much advertised claim to scientific status." 3401:, pp. 155–156: "It is my view that the methods of the natural as well as the social sciences can be best understood if we admit that science always begins and ends with problems. The progress of science lies, essentially, in the evolution of its problems. And it can be gauged by the increasing refinement, wealth, fertility, and depth of its problems. ... The growth of knowledge always consists in correcting earlier knowledge. Historically, science begins with pre-scientific knowledge, with pre-scientific myths and pre-scientific expectations. And these, in turn, have no 'beginnings'." 880:, Vere and Gibson wrote " been considered problematic because theories are not simply tested through falsification but in conjunction with auxiliary assumptions and background knowledge." Despite the fact that Popper insisted that he is aware that falsifications are impossible and added that this is not an issue for his falsifiability criterion because it has nothing to do with the possibility or impossibility of falsifications, Stove and others, often referring to Lakatos original criticism, continue to maintain that the problems of falsification are a failure of falsifiability. 3377:, p. 802: "I suggest then that Sir Karl has characterized the entire scientific enterprise in terms that apply only to its occasional revolutionary parts. His emphasis is natural and common: the exploits of a Copernicus or Einstein make better reading than those of a Brahe or Lorentz; Sir Karl would not be the first if he mistook what I call normal science for an intrinsically uninteresting enterprise. Nevertheless, neither science nor the development of knowledge is likely to be understood if research is viewed exclusively through the revolutions it occasionally produces." 2856:, Sec. 2: "The Marxist account of history too, Popper held, is not scientific, although it differs in certain crucial respects from psychoanalysis. For Marxism, Popper believed, had been initially scientific, in that Marx had postulated a theory which was genuinely predictive. However, when these predictions were not in fact borne out, the theory was saved from falsification by the addition of ad hoc hypotheses which made it compatible with the facts. By this means, Popper asserted, a theory which was initially genuinely scientific degenerated into pseudo-scientific dogma." 1250: 3316:, p. 168) recognizes that formal rules in a methodology cannot be rational. Yet, at the level of the technology, that is, at the practical level, he says, scientists must nevertheless take decisions. Popper's methodology does not specify formal rules, but non-rational decisions will still have to be taken. He concludes that "Popper and Lakatos differ only over the levels at which they locate non-rationality in science: Lakatos at the level of an inductive principle which justifies technology, and Popper at the lower-level of technology itself." 3303:, p. 112: "It should be pointed out, however, that the methodology of scientific research programmes has more teeth than Duhem's conventionalism: instead of leaving it to Duhem's unarticulated common sense to judge when a 'framework' is to be abandoned, I inject some hard Popperian elements into the appraisal of whether a programme progresses or degenerates or of whether one is overtaking another. That is, I give criteria of progress and stagnation within a programme and also rules for the 'elimination' of whole research programmes." 2438:, pp. 7–8: "This latter is concerned not with questions of fact (Kant's quid facti?), but only with questions of justification or validity (Kant's quid juris?). Its questions are of the following kind. Can a statement be justified? And if so, how? Is it testable? Is it logically dependent on certain other statements? Or does it perhaps contradict them? In order that a statement may be logically examined in this way, it must already have been presented to us. Someone must have formulated it, and submitted it to logical examination." 3291:: "There is a sense in which Feyerabend is right. Lakatos fails to give precise mechanical rules for when a theory has been finally falsified. Yet an appropriate question might be whether such rules are possible or necessary to make science rational. ... There are, however, many rough and ready rules, the application of which has to be learned in practical contexts. ... This does not mean that precise rules cannot be used in certain contexts, but we need to use our judgement to decide when those rules are to be used." 817: 2816:, p. 342: "However, Darwin's own most important contribution to the theory of evolution, his theory of natural selection, is difficult to test. There are some tests, even some experimental tests; and in some cases, such as the famous phenomenon known as "industrial melanism", we can observe natural selection happening under our very eyes, as it were. Nevertheless, really severe tests of the theory of natural selection are hard to come by, much more so than tests of otherwise comparable theories in physics or chemistry." 2366:, p. 35: "As for Adler, I was much impressed by a personal experience. Once, in 1919, I reported to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian, but which he found no difficulty in analysing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings, although he had not even seen the child. Slightly shocked, I asked him how he could be so sure. 'Because of my thousandfold experience,' he replied; whereupon I could not help saying: 'And with this new case, I suppose, your experience has become thousand-and-one-fold.'" 1618:, Hume's argument precludes inductive logic, but only when the logic makes no use "of additional assumptions: in particular, about what is to be assigned positive prior probability". Inductive logic itself is not precluded, especially not when it is a deductively valid application of Bayes' theorem that is used to evaluate the probabilities of the hypotheses using the observed data and what is assumed about the priors. Gelman and Shalizi mentioned that Bayes' statisticians do not have to disagree with the non-inductivists. 1809: 1211: 1204: 809:, which are not expected to have a general justification: they may or may not be applicable depending on the background knowledge. Johnson-Laird wrote: "hilosophers have worried about which properties of objects warrant inductive inferences. The answer rests on knowledge: we don't infer that all the passengers on a plane are male because the first ten off the plane are men. We know that this observation doesn't rule out the possibility of a woman passenger." The reasoning pattern that was not applied here is 929:"A theory is scientific if and only if it divides the class of basic statements into the following two non-empty sub-classes: (a) the class of all those basic statements with which it is inconsistent, or which it prohibits—this is the class of its potential falsifiers (i.e., those statements which, if true, falsify the whole theory), and (b) the class of those basic statements with which it is consistent, or which it permits (i.e., those statements which, if true, corroborate it, or bear it out)." 2586:, p. 387: "Before using the terms 'basic' and 'basic statement', I made use of the term 'empirical basis', meaning by it the class of all those statements which may function as tests of empirical theories (that is, as potential falsifiers). In introducing the term 'empirical basis' my intention was, partly, to give an ironical emphasis to my thesis that the empirical basis of our theories is far from firm; that it should be compared to a swamp rather than to solid ground." 2571:"Yet even so, something has been gained. For in the practice of scientific research, demarcation is sometimes of immediate urgency in connection with theoretical systems, whereas in connection with singular statements, doubt as to their empirical character rarely arises. It is true that errors of observation occur and that they give rise to false singular statements, but the scientist scarcely ever has occasion to describe a singular statement as non-empirical or metaphysical." 3365:): "I am convinced that we can discover by means of purely mathematical constructions the concepts and laws connecting them with each other, which furnish the key to the understanding of natural phenomena. ... Experience remains, of course, the sole criterion of the physical utility of a mathematical construction. But the creative principle resides in mathematics. In a certain sense, therefore, I hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, as the ancients dreamed." 8213: 1151: 826:, appears to be the best so far". By his own account, because only a negative approach was supported by logic, Popper adopted a negative methodology. The purpose of his methodology is to prevent "the policy of immunizing our theories against refutation". It also supports some "dogmatic attitude" in defending theories against criticism, because this allows the process to be more complete. This negative view of science was much criticized and not only by Johnson-Laird. 1858: 9734: 3389:, p. 28: "Thus we have the following clash: the condition which Kuhn regards as the normal and proper condition of science is a condition which, if it actually obtained, Popper would regard as unscientific, a state of affairs in which critical science had contracted into defensive metaphysics. Popper has suggested that the motto of science should be: Revolution in permanence! For Kuhn, it seems, a more appropriate maxim would be: Not nostrums but normalcy!" 3143:, Part VI, Sec. II: "We have therefore to seek for principles, other than induction, such that, given certain data not of the form “this A is a B”, the generalization “'all A is B”' has a finite probability. Given such principles, and given a generalization to which they apply, induction can make the generalization increasingly probable, with a probability which approaches certainty as a limit when the number of favourable instances in indefinitely increased." 1262: 10426: 3256:, p. 15: "Lakatos realized and admitted that the existing standards of rationality, standards of logic included, are too restrictive and would have hindered science had they been applied with determination. He therefore permitted the scientist to violate them ... However, he demanded that research programmes show certain features in the long run — they must be progressive. In Chapter 16 of (and in my essay 'On the Critique of Scientific Reason': 3079:, p. 15), Kuhn says that the methodological rules are not sufficient to provide a logic of discovery: "rules or conventions like the following: 'Once a hypothesis has been proposed and tested, and has proved its mettle, it may not be allowed to drop out without 'good reason'. A 'good reason' may be, for instance: replacement of the hypothesis by another which is better testable; or the falsification of one of the consequences of the hypothesis.' 10436: 1072:, in this semantic perspective, falsifiability as defined by Popper means that in some observation structure (in the collection) there exists a set of observations which refutes the theory. An even stronger notion of falsifiability was considered, which requires, not only that there exists one structure with a contradicting set of observations, but also that all structures in the collection that cannot be expanded to a structure that satisfies 3010:): "In an earlier paper,' I distinguished three Poppers: Popper0, Popper1, and Popper2. Popper0 is the dogmatic falsificationist ... Popper1 is the naive falsificationist, Popper2 the sophisticated falsificationist. ... The real Popper has never explained in detail the appeal procedure by which some 'accepted basic statements', may be eliminated. Thus the real Popper consists of Popper1 together with some elements of Popper2." 1751:, a way to define how close a theory is to the truth, which he did not consider very significant, except (as an attempt) to describe a concept already clear in practice. Later, it was shown that the specific definition proposed by Popper cannot distinguish between two theories that are false, which is the case for all theories in the history of science. Today, there is still on going research on the general concept of verisimilitude. 264: 3413:, p. 37: "y making their interpretations and prophecies sufficiently vague were able to explain away anything that might have been a refutation of the theory had the theory and the prophecies been more precise. In order to escape falsification they destroyed the testability of their theory. It is a typical soothsayer's trick to predict things so vaguely that the predictions can hardly fail: that they become irrefutable." 860: 2616:, Introduction, sec. I: "Einstein's principle of proportionality of inert and (passively) heavy mass. This equivalence principle conflicts with many potential falsifiers: events whose observation is logically possible. Yet despite all attempts (the experiments by Eötvös, more recently refined by Rickle) to realize such a falsification experimentally, the experiments have so far corroborated the principle of equivalence." 36: 10451: 2306:, Introduction 1982: "Although the first sense refers to the logical possibility of a falsification in principle, the second sense refers to a conclusive practical experimental proof of falsity. But anything like conclusive proof to settle an empirical question does not exist. An entire literature rests on the failure to observe this distinction." For a discussion related to this lack of distinction, see 830: 2378:, p. 3: "However, a theory that has successfully withstood critical testing is thereby 'corroborated', and may be regarded as being preferable to falsified rivals. In the case of rival unfalsified theories, for Popper, the higher the informative content of a theory the better it is scientifically, because every gain in content brings with it a commensurate gain in predictive scope and testability." 944: 1266: 2402:: "Karl Popper, an Austrian-born British philosopher of science, in his Logik der Forschung (1935; The Logic of Scientific Discovery), insisted that the meaning criterion should be abandoned and replaced by a criterion of demarcation between empirical (scientific) and transempirical (nonscientific, metaphysical) questions and answers—a criterion that, according to Popper, is to be testability." 3241:, p. 458: "My third criticism concerns the question of whether Lakatos's methodology is in fact a methodology in the old-fashioned sense: whether, that is, it issues in advice to scientists. I shall argue that Lakatos once had sound views on this matter, but was led, mistakenly in my opinion, to renounce them. In renouncing them, he has gone a long way towards epistemological anarchism." 2569:, section 7, page 21: "If falsifiability is to be at all applicable as a criterion of demarcation, then singular statements must be available which can serve as premisses in falsifying inferences. Our criterion therefore appears only to shift the problem—to lead us back from the question of the empirical character of theories to the question of the empirical character of singular statements. 135: 77: 9722: 2832:): "In Marx's view, it is vain to expect that any important change can be achieved by the use of legal or political means; a political revolution can only lead to one set of rulers giving way to another set—a mere exchange of the persons who act as rulers. Only the evolution of the underlying essence, the economic reality can produce any essential or real change—a social revolution." 1862:). In the big picture presented by Kuhn, the routinely solved puzzles are corroborations. Falsifications or otherwise unexplained observations are unsolved puzzles. All of these are used in the informal process that generates a new kind of theory. Kuhn says that Popper emphasizes formal or logical falsifications and fails to explain how the social and informal process works. 194: 1697: 2676:, p. 611: "It does appear that some people think that I denied scientific character to the historical sciences, such as palaeontology, or the history of the evolution of life on Earth. This is a mistake, and I here wish to affirm that these and other historical sciences have in my opinion scientific character; their hypotheses can in many cases be tested." 326:. He argued that the only way to verify a claim such as "All swans are white" would be if one could theoretically observe all swans, which is not possible. On the other hand, the falsifiability requirement for an anomalous instance, such as the observation of a single black swan, is theoretically reasonable and sufficient to logically falsify the claim. 760: 3052:, p. 169): "To repeat: Popper offers a Darwinian account of the progress of knowledge. Progress is supposed to result negatively from the elimination by natural selection of defective alternatives. ... There is no genuine logic of discovery, only a psychology of invention juxtaposed to a methodology which appraises fully fledged theories." 3107:, section 23, 1st paragraph: "The requirement of falsifiability which was a little vague to start with has now been split into two parts. The first, the methodological postulate (cf. section 20), can hardly be made quite precise. The second, the logical criterion, is quite definite as soon as it is clear which statements are to be called 'basic'." 2705:: "This theory is widely held: it has variants in behaviourism, psychoanalysis, individual psychology, utilitarianism, vulgar-marxism, religion, and sociology of knowledge. Clearly this theory, with all its variants, is not falsifiable: no example of an altruistic action can refute the view that there was an egotistic motive hidden behind it." 1901:, arguing that science would not have progressed without making use of any and all available methods to support new theories. He rejected any reliance on a scientific method, along with any special authority for science that might derive from such a method. He said that if one is keen to have a universally valid methodological rule, 2414:, Sec. 1.9: "Quite apart from , I felt that psychology should be regarded as a biological discipline, and especially that any psychological theory of the acquisition of knowledge should be so regarded. Now if we transfer to human and animal psychology , we arrive, clearly, at the well-known method of trial and error-elimination." 2720:, p. 1038: "s indeed is the case in Maxwell's example, when existential statements are verified this is done by means of stronger falsifiable statements. ... What this means is this. Whenever a pure existential statement, by being empirically "confirmed", appears to belong to empirical science, it will in fact do so 1622: 2756:: "I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the term natural selection, in order to mark its relation to man's power of selection. But the expression often used by Mr. Herbert Spencer, of the Survival of the Fittest, is more accurate, and is sometimes equally convenient." 3095:, p. 32): "Once a hypothesis has been proposed and tested, and has proved its mettle, it may not be allowed to drop out without 'good reason'. A 'good reason' may be, for instance: replacement of the hypothesis by another which is better testable; or the falsification of one of the consequences of the hypothesis." 3218:, p. 6: "Although Paul Feyerabend and Alan Musgrave evaluated in opposite ways, they agreed about its nature. Feyerabend hailed it as an 'anarchism in disguise' (Feyerabend, Against Method, 1975), while Musgrave rather deplored the fact that Lakatos had 'gone a long way towards epistemological anarchism' ( 1769: 1876: 1835: 1831: 1347: 972: 943: 859: 804: 797: 1935: 1857: 1739: 1696: 1588: 1230: 821: 1743: 1667: 1111: 863: 796: 2319: 1421: 1249: 1226: 977: 855: 3061: 1827: 1768: 1613: 1163: 955: 867: 3081: 1730: 1300: 1261: 816: 1836: 759: 747: 1781: 1808: 1608: 1130: 829: 2270: 1621: 1772: 363: 1759: 1287: 2450:, Sec. 1.8: "The fundamental difference between my approach and the approach for which I long ago introduced the label 'inductivist' is that I lay stress on negative arguments, such as negative instances or counter-examples, refutations, and attempted refutations—in short, criticism". 1182: 2465:, p. 1005: "Newton's theory ... would equally be contradicted if the apples from one of my, or Newton's, apple trees were to rise from the ground (without there being a whirling about), and begin to dance round the branches of the apple tree from which they had fallen." 3119:, Introduction, V: "The hope further to strengthen this theory of the aims of science by the definition of verisimilitude in terms of truth and of content was, unfortunately, vain. But the widely held view that scrapping this definition weakens my theory is completely baseless." 968: 902:. They are the statements that can be used to show the falsifiability of a theory. Popper says that basic statements do not have to be possible in practice. It is sufficient that they are accepted by convention as belonging to the empirical language, a language that allows 1406: 779: 3199:, pp. 116–117: "The methodology of research programmes was criticized both by Feyerabend and by Kuhn. According to Kuhn: ' must specify criteria which can be used at the time to distinguish a degenerative from a progressive research programme; and so on. Otherwise, 2202: 1633: 3345:): "The supreme task of the physicist is to arrive at those universal elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built up by pure deduction. There is no logical path to these laws; only intuition, resting on sympathetic understanding of experience, can reach them." 3184:, Sec. 1.2.b: The other alternative is to ... replace the naive versions of methodological falsificationism ... by a sophisticated version which would give a new rationale of falsification and thereby rescue methodology and the idea of scientific progress. 1575: 1828: 2354:, part I, chap. 2, sec. 11: " dispense with the principle of induction: not because such a principle is as a matter of fact never used in science, but because I think that it is not needed; that it does not help us; and that it even gives rise to inconsistencies." 1511: 3264:) I have argued that this demand no longer restricts scientific practice. Any development agrees with it. The demand (standard) is rational, but it is also empty. Rationalism and the demands of reason have become purely verbal in the theory of Lakatos." See also 3035:, p. 27: "The theory of method, in so far as it goes beyond the purely logical analysis of the relations between scientific statements, is concerned with the choice of methods—with decisions about the way in which scientific statements are to be dealt with." 1442: 893: 993: 1158: 5803: 1609: 1203: 1187:, sometimes wrongly attributed to Popper, this shows the scientific character of paleontology or the history of the evolution of life on Earth, because it contradicts the hypothesis in paleontology that all mammals existed in a much more recent era. 2519:, Sec. 4), there is no discussion of factual observations except in those tests that compare the theory with factual observations, but in these tests too the procedure is mostly logical and involves observations that are only logical constructions ( 3172:, Sec. 1.1: I shall try to explain—and further strengthen—this stronger Popperian position which, I think, may escape Kuhn's strictures and present scientific revolutions not as constituting religious conversions but rather as rational progress. 1295: 1614: 1676: 1721: 1658: 1763: 822: 2544: 875: 1967: – Encryption techniques where an adversary cannot prove that the plaintext data exists - claim that a ciphertext decrypts to a particular plaintext can be falsified by possible decryption to another potential plaintext 1668: 801:, professor of psychology, also accepted Hume's conclusion that induction has no justification. For him induction does not require justification and therefore can exist in the same manner as Popper's quasi-induction does. 834: 1840:, such as Popper's example of missiles moving in a "non-Newtonian track", or consistent with Newtonian physics, such as objects not falling to the ground without "obvious" countervailing forces against Earth's gravity. 948:, an actual agreement is needed. This may require using a deeper empirical basis, hidden within the current empirical basis, to make sure that the properties or values used in the falsifier were obtained correctly ( 2168:, Chap.2, Sec.5: (emphasis added) "uman language is essentially descriptive (and argumentative), and an unambiguous description is always realistic: it is of something—of some state of affairs which may be real or 2792:, p. 90: "If, more especially, we accept that statistical definition of fitness which defines fitness by actual survival, then the theory of the survival of the fittest becomes tautological, and irrefutable." 2553:, p. 43) wrote: "But Popper's falsifiability or testability criterion does not presuppose that a definite distinction between testable and non testable statement is possible ... technology changes. Thus 2329: 2960: 271:, but even with no black swans to possibly falsify it, "All swans are white" would still be shown falsifiable by "Here is a black swan"—a black swan would still be a state of affairs, only an imaginary one. 1551: 2740:, p. 46: "he existential quantifier in the symbolized version of "Every solid has a melting point" is not inevitable; rather this statement is actually a negligent phrasing of what we really mean." 1549: 1584: 723: 5970: 7864: 1022: 10287: 3023:, p. 32): "Methodological rules are here regarded as conventions. They might be described as the rules of the game of empirical science. They differ from the rules of pure logic" 3048:, p. 149): "The important question of the possibility of a genuine logic of discovery" is the main divergence between Lakatos and Popper. About Popper's view, Zahar wrote (see 1909: 2279:"I have always stressed that even a theory which is obviously falsifiable in the first sense is never falsifiable in this second sense. (For this reason I have used the expression 864: 318: 1654: 1066: 149: 718: 643: 3131:, Sec. 3: Hume explicitly models his account of the fundamental principles of the mind's operations—the principles of association—on the idea of gravitational attraction. 4879: 597: 505: 1336:, as a synonym for "Natural Selection". Popper and others said that, if one uses the most widely accepted definition of "fitness" in modern biology (see subsection 1090: 1042: 3082: 689: 666: 571: 548: 1304: 617: 525: 482: 462: 6037: 925: 1112: 2865: 2213: 1832: 5622: 356: 5922: 1221: 964: 413:? This is the problem of induction. Suppose we want to put the hypothesis that all swans are white to the test. We come across a white swan. We cannot 7217: 6935: 4818: 11151: 6999: 2189:, to conform to the original, thus refused to make substantial corrections and only added notes and appendices and marked them with an asterisk (see 5482: 1936: 1700: 7741: 1690: 1258: 6836: 6304: 3160:, p. 167: "Lakatos urged Popper explicitly to adopt some inductive principle which would synthetically link verisimilitude to corroboration." 2426:, Sec. 85: "What I have here in mind is not a picture of science as a biological phenomenon ...: I have in mind its epistemological aspects." 1369: 8895: 2546: 748: 7844: 6735: 4799: 5083: 337:. He insisted that, as a logical criterion, his falsifiability is distinct from the related concept "capacity to be proven wrong" discussed in 434: 8852: 6856:. Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 4. London: Cambridge University Press. pp. 25–37. 6110: 4897: 1438: 7944: 6705: 2906: 1773: 153: 6576: 2482:, Sec. 8.52) liked to refer to invisible strings instead of some abstract law to explain this kind of evidence against Newton's Gravity. 5597: 10464: 4674: 11054: 9514: 7559: 7123: 3006: 2662: 2277: 8951: 1398:. Methods of the mathematical sciences are, however, applied in constructing and testing scientific models dealing with observable 1106: 6665: 11375: 9770: 9180: 5685: 379:, falsifiability has featured prominently in many scientific controversies and applications, even being used as legal precedent. 3222:, p. 458). Musgrave added: 'Lakatos deprived his standards of practical force, and adopted a position of "anything goes"' ( 8247: 6041:. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 111. Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 169–187. 2685: 1673: 1218: 1116:, since Newtonian physics does not deny that there could be forces acting on the apple that are stronger than Earth's gravity. 1374: 10497: 9351: 8862: 8056: 7822: 7703: 7663: 7622: 7571: 7540: 7500: 7421: 7181: 7096: 7077: 6987: 6915: 6760: 6637: 6386: 6321: 6256: 6129: 6102: 6083: 6019: 5988: 5900: 5872: 5851: 5695: 5634:. Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 4. London: Cambridge University Press. 5578: 5515: 5442: 5376: 5265: 5213: 5194: 5025: 5003: 4968: 4862: 4843: 4780: 4691: 4089: 2753: 2491: 7527:. The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant (1998 ed.). Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. 7447: 7427: 5271: 5056: 727:, a student and collaborator of Popper, to write "the mission is to classify truths, not to certify them". In contrast, the 10647: 5162: 4873: 1682: 1297: 1273: 3850: 10215: 9790: 9173: 8888: 7212: 6730: 6700: 6468: 5821: 5477: 5462: 5125: 4813: 2220:. Had the presumption concerning black swans in this metaphor be right, the statement would still have been falsifiable. 1125: 6997: 10176: 8923: 8671: 5605: 599:"the specific swan here is not white" (say black), then "all swans are white" is false. More accurately, the statement 7233: 4875: 11583: 11335: 11319: 11175: 10572: 9534: 9529: 9482: 9163: 8642: 8519: 8173: 8136: 8096: 8021: 7994: 7977: 7938: 7900: 7288: 6888: 6861: 6610: 6570: 6294: 6221: 6148: 6074: 6054: 5741: 5722: 5666: 5639: 5296: 5177: 5152: 4949: 4925: 1472: 295: 248: 230: 175: 116: 63: 11578: 10588: 10459: 10126: 6276: 5630: 1361: 1592: 1184: 997: 87: 11327: 10715: 9881: 9544: 2212:"All swans are white" is often chosen as an example of a falsifiable statement, because for some 1500 years, the 906:: "they must be testable by intersubjective observation (the material requirement)". See the examples in section 212: 157: 49: 6357: 6340: 805: 11191: 10245: 9714: 8881: 8782: 7203: 5826: 2880: 2499:, Sec 2.c. This requirement says that the statements that describe observations, the basic statements, must be 2105: 2096: 1604: 810: 5878: 3831: 11399: 10735: 10387: 10317: 9976: 5937: 4678:. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 125–142. 2985:, pp. 22–25. A fifth decision is mentioned later by Lakatos to allow even more theories to be falsified. 2500: 903: 852: 6647: 5751: 5598:"Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials" 11593: 11573: 11183: 11069: 10781: 9858: 9404: 9397: 8721: 7732: 7207: 7119:"Falsificationism and Statistical Learning Theory: Comparing the Popper and Vapnik-Chervonenkis Dimensions" 5596: 4903: 4667: 3713: 2886: 2075: 1317: 1164: 4808: 11383: 11215: 11032: 10596: 10322: 9763: 9256: 9231: 9216: 8716: 8622: 8532: 7593: 5657: 4986: 4099: 2829: 2069: 1538: 204: 7985: 7763: 7726: 7350:"A Vast Graveyard of Undead Theories: Publication Bias and Psychological Science's Aversion to the Null" 5472: 1993: 1559: 856: 11343: 11239: 11223: 11207: 11007: 10580: 10429: 10121: 9833: 8240: 7840: 7810: 6817: 5918: 5886: 2932: 724: 7960: 7918: 7609:. Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective. Vol. 2. New York: Springer. pp. 487–498. 5120: 2632:: "Since m measures fitness to survive by the objective fact of representation in future generations," 11423: 10975: 10960: 10791: 10612: 10490: 10454: 9429: 9409: 9317: 9313: 9236: 8928: 8857: 8658: 8650: 8547: 8392: 6725: 5143: 2891: 2646: 2046: 2006: 1902: 1886: 1047: 17: 7654: 5072: 694: 622: 11512: 11359: 11076: 10970: 10965: 10640: 10550: 10404: 10292: 10277: 10269: 10151: 9434: 9074: 9059: 9048: 9025: 8819: 8731: 8627: 8592: 8352: 1982: 1952: 1796: 1545:, which include falsifiability. The Daubert result cited Popper and other philosophers of science: 1324: 838: 428: 94: 8006: 2283: 2164: 1382: 691:"the thing here is a white swan". If what is observed is C being true while P is false (formally, 11486: 11199: 11002: 10980: 10725: 10372: 9672: 9419: 9414: 9387: 9322: 9276: 9271: 9206: 9099: 8799: 8632: 8508: 8442: 8264: 7971: 7523: 5536:"On 'Falsification' and 'Falsifiability': The First Daubert Factor and the Philosophy of Science" 1557:); K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 37 (5th ed. 1989) ( 1461: 1246: 1160: 987: 319: 8128: 8119: 8088: 8079: 7339: 6902:. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 3. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 3–13. 1365: 1340:), namely reproductive success itself, the expression "survival of the fittest" is a tautology. 768:"falsifications" that show that the law makes risky predictions, which is completely different. 144: 10910: 10876: 10545: 10297: 10146: 9961: 9813: 9756: 9627: 9617: 9035: 8961: 8918: 8746: 8666: 7649: 7648:. Handbook of the History of Logic. Vol. 10. Amsterdam; Boston: Elsevier. pp. 43–91. 3019: 2702: 1976: 1818: 1669: 1638:. Lakatos described four kind of falsificationisms in view of how they address these problems. 775: 353: 8165: 8156: 7928: 7299: 6695: 6190: 4961: 3359: 3269: 3261: 3044: 2515: 1646: 11407: 11027: 11012: 10916: 10393: 10382: 9886: 9477: 9472: 9424: 9392: 9382: 9341: 9121: 8998: 8904: 8847: 8824: 8804: 8686: 8557: 8497: 8233: 6558: 5781: 5713: 5561: 5540: 3860: 3844: 3723: 3342: 3288: 2654: 2629: 2609: 2122: 2011: 1877: 1329: 872:, these contradictions establish the value of the law, which may eventually be corroborated. 576: 287: 7110: 7037: 5949: 5842: 5430: 5035: 3791: 3426: 1704: 764:, contradictions with observations are not used to support eventual falsifications, but for 487: 11588: 11415: 11086: 11049: 10950: 10945: 10881: 10740: 10525: 10483: 10342: 10282: 10081: 9986: 9457: 9452: 9327: 9211: 9116: 9089: 8971: 8756: 8741: 7780: 6852: 6600: 5890: 4915: 4732: 3363: 1958: 1919: 1837: 1593: 1075: 1027: 798: 392: 365: 330: 8372: 7585: 7147: 6926: 5166:. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. Vol. 39. pp. 109–143. 1378:, mathematics is not concerned with the validity of theories based on observations in the 8: 11554: 11391: 10839: 10822: 10776: 10766: 10633: 10535: 9916: 9519: 9201: 9094: 9069: 9054: 8983: 8834: 8829: 8809: 8711: 8696: 8691: 8492: 7464: 7300:"Evolution experiments with microorganisms: the dynamics and genetic bases of adaptation" 6898: 2055: 2034: 1987: 1964: 1635: 1240: 1145: 806: 781: 771: 419: 396: 334: 55: 10141: 8217: 8192: 7784: 6658:"29+ Evidences for Macroevolution: The Scientific Case for Common Descent, Version 2.87" 6206: 4736: 3737: 2935:, United Nations special rapporteur. David H. Kaye is distinguished professor of law at 2608: 671: 648: 553: 530: 11476: 11466: 11267: 11143: 11017: 10938: 10902: 10710: 10235: 10225: 9996: 9901: 9667: 9622: 9509: 9332: 9153: 8988: 8978: 8487: 8277: 7798: 7770: 7379: 7327: 7258: 7250: 7187: 7152: 7056: 7052: 7016: 6966: 6803: 6657: 6538: 6498: 6443: 6177: 6173: 5768: 5549: 5350: 5327: 5315: 5242: 5171: 5104: 2475: 2022: 1686: 1605: 1456: 1432: 1357: 1173: 1069: 728: 602: 510: 467: 447: 323: 10066: 9956: 5453: 2031: – Paradox arising from the question of what constitutes evidence for a statement 11441: 11257: 11133: 10444: 10435: 10205: 10056: 10026: 9843: 9823: 9808: 9726: 9499: 9356: 9146: 9111: 9005: 8944: 8736: 8179: 8169: 8142: 8132: 8102: 8092: 8062: 8052: 8027: 8017: 7990: 7934: 7906: 7896: 7856: 7828: 7818: 7802: 7709: 7699: 7669: 7659: 7628: 7618: 7577: 7567: 7546: 7536: 7506: 7496: 7456: 7417: 7398: 7371: 7319: 7284: 7262: 7191: 7177: 7092: 7073: 6983: 6970: 6958: 6911: 6884: 6867: 6857: 6828: 6795: 6787: 6756: 6633: 6616: 6606: 6566: 6392: 6382: 6327: 6317: 6290: 6262: 6252: 6227: 6217: 6144: 6125: 6118: 6098: 6079: 6060: 6050: 6025: 6015: 6011: 6000: 5984: 5906: 5896: 5847: 5737: 5718: 5701: 5691: 5672: 5662: 5645: 5635: 5584: 5574: 5557: 5535: 5511: 5438: 5417: 5382: 5372: 5355: 5341: 5302: 5292: 5261: 5246: 5209: 5190: 5148: 5021: 4999: 4974: 4964: 4945: 4939: 4921: 4858: 4839: 4786: 4776: 4756: 4748: 4723: 4697: 4687: 3765: 3757: 2915: 2217: 2134: 2063: 2040: 1946: 1895: 1555: 1416: 402: 300: 11282: 10061: 9921: 9597: 8317: 6341:"The Beauty of Kettlewell's Classic Experimental Demonstration of Natural Selection" 1693: 1301: 11446: 11367: 11351: 11231: 10796: 10705: 10307: 9951: 9848: 9697: 9652: 9632: 9168: 9158: 9141: 8814: 8766: 8701: 8452: 8427: 8387: 8302: 8114: 8074: 8044: 8009: 7888: 7880: 7788: 7689: 7681: 7610: 7598: 7528: 7488: 7468: 7383: 7361: 7311: 7242: 7169: 7142: 7132: 7048: 7008: 6950: 6903: 6807: 6779: 6530: 6490: 6435: 6374: 6352: 6309: 6244: 6209: 6169: 6042: 6007: 5760: 5614: 5503: 5407: 5345: 5337: 5234: 4991: 4740: 4679: 3749: 2907: 2128: 2114: 2084: 1998: 1765: 1542: 1532: 1465: 1179: 990: 414: 357: 342: 11277: 8587: 7410: 7331: 1726:(statements that correspond to logically possible observations), selection of the 11461: 11456: 11037: 10992: 10827: 10801: 10745: 10520: 10399: 10255: 10195: 10185: 10086: 10051: 10046: 9906: 9891: 9818: 9687: 9647: 9569: 9524: 9361: 9266: 9251: 9226: 9040: 9020: 8706: 8572: 8567: 8462: 8417: 8297: 7887:. Synthese Library. Vol. 177. Dordrecht; Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 18–60. 7614: 7472: 7411: 7114: 6954: 6823: 6681: 6313: 5734: 5457: 5255: 5048: 5037: 5013: 4935: 4911: 4683: 2140: 2090: 2017: 1894: 1891: 1403: 1333: 1188: 776: 424: 423:) from "here is a white swan" to "all swans are white"; doing so would require a 7892: 7793: 7758: 7492: 6563: 5507: 2713: 2711: 1210: 839: 286: 93: 11123: 11064: 10897: 10817: 10720: 10555: 10337: 10302: 10161: 10071: 10021: 10016: 9991: 9926: 9896: 9871: 9738: 9607: 9467: 9106: 8482: 8477: 8467: 8377: 8342: 8332: 8307: 8282: 8272: 7694: 7106: 5238: 3091: 2936: 1849: 1748: 1375: 756: 732: 619: 410: 312: 98: 10041: 7713: 7137: 7118: 6907: 6046: 5863: 5801: 5618: 5386: 5115: 4721: 3416: 1579: 751: 11567: 11302: 11297: 11272: 11081: 11022: 10933: 10861: 10786: 10604: 10312: 10156: 10101: 10001: 9981: 9971: 9941: 9931: 9838: 9779: 9657: 9592: 9564: 9492: 9221: 9136: 8597: 8537: 8502: 8437: 8412: 8407: 8367: 8337: 8066: 7860: 7632: 7581: 7532: 7518: 7510: 7366: 7349: 7341: 6980: 6791: 6596: 6396: 6378: 6331: 6195: 6139: 5573:(1st English ed.). Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. 5111: 4978: 4790: 4768: 4752: 4709: 4701: 3761: 2910:, does not include the original Daubert factors or mention falsifiability or 2878: 2708: 2028: 1961: – Reasoning that is rationally compelling, though not deductively valid 1932: 1344: 1131: 772: 736: 440: 376: 8146: 8031: 7910: 7832: 7673: 7550: 7402: 7012: 6620: 6534: 6494: 6439: 6266: 6231: 6064: 6029: 5910: 5705: 5588: 5306: 2595: 1500: 1231: 156: 11157: 10955: 10886: 10846: 10674: 10540: 10410: 10366: 10131: 10076: 9946: 9866: 9800: 9702: 9682: 9637: 9612: 9602: 9574: 9504: 9462: 9336: 9290: 9261: 9241: 8681: 8612: 8457: 8327: 8312: 8256: 8183: 8106: 7962: 7721: 7602: 7594: 7483: 7375: 7323: 6962: 6832: 6799: 6721: 6366: 6308:. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 135–154. 5676: 5412: 5395: 5359: 4744: 3769: 3153: 3151: 3149: 2117: – Degree to which an observation is affected by one's presuppositions 1630: 1615: 1610: 1601: 1597: 1476: 740: 8048: 8013: 7460: 7173: 6783: 6248: 6213: 5421: 4995: 2256:, Introduction 1982: "We must distinguish two meanings of the expressions 1150: 761: 11481: 11471: 11451: 10871: 10851: 10761: 10684: 10506: 10332: 10327: 10106: 10036: 10011: 10006: 9936: 9911: 9828: 9692: 9677: 9662: 9642: 9559: 9487: 9304: 9294: 9281: 9246: 9196: 9126: 9079: 8966: 8956: 8761: 8617: 8607: 8552: 8527: 8472: 8447: 8432: 8402: 8382: 8357: 8287: 6871: 5649: 4760: 2911: 2043: – Interplay between observation, experiment, and theory in science 1970: 1854: 1370: 1269: 959: 831: 406: 388: 372: 346: 290: 8873: 8212: 7156: 7060: 6519:"Quantification of Theoretical Terms and the Falsifiability of Theories" 6424:"Falsifiability and the Semantic Eliminability of Theoretical Languages" 6181: 5553: 5102: 3146: 2602: 1553: 883: 755: 11292: 11287: 11262: 11042: 10866: 10730: 10679: 10656: 10439: 10136: 10096: 10091: 9579: 9308: 9299: 9286: 9030: 8993: 8771: 8751: 8602: 8577: 8542: 8397: 8362: 8347: 8322: 8292: 7641: 7443: 7392: 7254: 7246: 7199: 7039: 6592: 6160: 5772: 5225: 4144: 2087: – Ability of a scientific theory to generate testable predictions 1928: 1824: 1747: 1678: 1507: 1379: 1332:, Darwin used "Survival of the fittest", an expression first coined by 1292: 793: 329: 304: 268: 9733: 8085: 7020: 6542: 6502: 6447: 6199:. Vol. 87, no. 1215. Reed Business Information. p. 611. 4800:"On falsifiability and the null hypothesis in discussions and debates" 3753: 2743: 2538: 1475: 11533: 11519: 11517: 11507: 11491: 11059: 10997: 10856: 10689: 10166: 10031: 9876: 9346: 8939: 8726: 6518: 6478: 6423: 6371: 3280: 3278: 2835: 2726: 2313: 1990: – Principle that allows one to eliminate unlikely explanations 1880: 1871: 1790: 1689: 1387: 744: 283: 8125: 7989:(in German) (1992 ed.). München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag. 7315: 6158: 5816: 5764: 4438: 3801: 3592: 3590: 3588: 3586: 2692: 2560: 1754: 360: 341:. Even being a logical criterion, its purpose is to make the theory 10771: 10111: 9366: 9084: 8582: 7966:(Interview). Interviewed by S. Lannes and A. Boyer. pp. 82–88. 7775: 6936:"Testing the null hypothesis: the forgotten legacy of Karl Popper?" 3348: 3249: 3247: 2759: 2667: 2555: 2108: – Obsolete theories in natural philosophy and natural history 2025: – Evolutionary biology hypothetical posed by J. B. S. Haldane 1469: 1395: 1383: 1348: 1191: 787: 6559:"Philosophie of science and its relevance for the social sciences" 5332: 4510: 4363: 3275: 3163: 2783: 843: 10377: 9966: 9064: 8562: 6479:"Ramsey Eliminability and the Testability of Scientific Theories" 6463: 3583: 2795: 2441: 1399: 438: 9748: 6602: 6241: 5291:. Continuum Studies in Philosophy. London; New York: Continuum. 4007: 3895: 3893: 3807: 3244: 2679: 2417: 2049: – research collaboration by scientists with opposing views 10987: 10359: 9131: 8676: 8225: 6095: 4267: 3294: 3192: 3190: 3013: 2807: 2405: 1865: 10475: 8043:. Translated by Pickel, Andreas. London; New York: Routledge. 7883:(1984) . "Notes on Popper as Follower of Whewell and Peirce". 4399: 4243: 4231: 4120: 3532: 3368: 2393: 2196: 1843: 1464: 1265: 1194: 573:"the specific swan here is white", but if what is observed is 263: 11526: 10625: 8776: 8422: 7684:(2017). 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According to 978: 792: 7920: 7560:"Hume and Contemporary Philosophy: Legacy and Prospects" 7166: 7070: 6002: 5661:. Vol. II. Illinois: Open Court. pp. 798–819. 3026: 2179: 2160: 2158: 2125: – Questioning of claims lacking empirical evidence 8127:. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp.  8087:. Albany: State University of New York Press. pp.  8041: 7105: 6373:. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. 5846:. Vol. I. Illinois: Open Court. pp. 292–321. 5717:. Vol. I. Illinois: Open Court. pp. 241–273. 4594: 4558: 4546: 4474: 4462: 4204: 3965: 3602: 3466: 3442: 2731: 2223: 2110: 2101: 1812: 1541:, the court described scientific methodology using the 7163: 5690:(3rd ed.). 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Eggers Hansen, Troels (ed.). 4630: 4582: 4291: 4279: 4216: 4132: 4105: 3953: 3941: 3776: 3496: 3454: 2914:and neither does the majority opinion delivered by 2453: 2299: 2297: 1119: 920: 868:show its falsifiability. Unlike falsifications and 8155: 8118: 8078: 7725: 7198: 6816: 6117: 5999: 5869: 4836:The Philosophy of Science: Science and Objectivity 4606: 4126: 3929: 3520: 3481: 2975: 2819: 2619: 2506: 2345: 2206: 2137: – In logic, a statement which is always true 1881:Epistemological anarchism vs the scientific method 1791:Methodless creativity versus inductive methodology 1518: 1092:contain such a contradicting set of observations. 1084: 1060: 1036: 1016: 712: 683: 660: 637: 611: 591: 565: 542: 519: 499: 476: 456: 371:As a key notion in the separation of science from 7933:(2002 ed.). London and New York: Routledge. 7394:Four Central Issues in Popper's Theory of Science 7000:The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6565:. 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Routledge. 5923:"Sokal and Bricmont: Back to the Frying Pan" 5779: 5020:. New York: Dover Publications. p. 27. 4898:Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 4013: 2963: 2574: 1866:Unfalsifiability versus falsity of astrology 1662: 1017:{\displaystyle {\mathfrak {A}}\models \phi } 7521:(1787). Guyer, Paul; Wood, Allen W (eds.). 7413:Theory and Explanation in Social Psychology 7297: 6978:Yehuda, Elkana (2018). "Einstein and God". 6683:Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society 6421: 5960: 5947: 5161: 4669:. Leiden: New York : Kòln: E.J. Brill. 4405: 3899: 3257: 3128: 3069: 2650: 2037: – Analogy devised by Bertrand Russell 1859: 1844:Normal science versus revolutionary science 1802: 1497:It is testable against the empirical world; 1195:Simple examples of unfalsifiable statements 1178:A famous example of a basic statement from 527:is false. For example, given the statement 64:Learn how and when to remove these messages 10648: 10634: 10498: 10484: 9771: 9757: 8896: 8882: 8248: 8234: 7879: 7817:. Aldershot, UK; Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 6769: 6476: 6204:Popper, Karl (1983) . Bartley, III (ed.). 5978: 5203: 5184: 5140: 5082:. Federal Judiciary of the United States. 5034: 4985: 4600: 4071: 3872: 3742:Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 3735: 3265: 3253: 2777: 2596: 2492: 2240: 1446: 1209: 1044:is true when interpreted in the structure 364:falsifiable, can still be useful within a 11055:Relationship between religion and science 9552: 9515:Relationship between religion and science 8903: 7792: 7774: 7693: 7653: 7607:Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation 7482: 7365: 7168:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7146: 7136: 7124:Journal for General Philosophy of Science 6933: 6477:Simon, Herbert A.; Groen, Guy J. (1973). 6356: 5974:. Dordrecht: D. 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Chicago: Open Court. 5534:Kaye, David H. (2005). 5367:Grayling, A.C. (2019). 5208:(3rd ed.). Verso. 5121:Encyclopædia Britannica 4959:Dienes, Zoltan (2008). 4406:Morris & Brown 2021 4127:McLean v. Arkansas 1982 3129:Morris & Brown 2021 2869:, p. 9 in archived pdf. 1925:Intellectual Impostures 1519:McLean v. Arkansas 1982 1247:young-Earth creationism 986:Scientists such as the 799:Philip N. Johnson-Laird 592:{\displaystyle \neg Q=} 11532: 11501:Concepts in contention 11142: 11132: 11122: 11013:Objectivity in science 10911:Non-Euclidean geometry 10877:Methodological dualism 10838: 10460:WikiProject Philosophy 9814:Critical legal studies 9628:Alfred North Whitehead 9618:Charles Sanders Peirce 8747:Problem of other minds 8154:Watkins, John (1974). 7644:; Woods, John (eds.). 7270:Duhem, Pierre (1906). 7091:. Palgrave Macmillan. 6881:Science and Scepticism 6628:Stove, David (1982) . 6462:Shea, Brendan (2020). 6274:Popper, Karl (1995) . 5817:"Science and Ideology" 5498:Howson, Colin (2000). 4988:Model-Theoretic Logics 4817:(Fall 2017 ed.). 4745:10.1126/science.386510 4072:Elgin & Sober 2017 3873:Simon & Groen 1973 3437:Abbreviated references 2896:Rules of Evidence 2017 2722:not on its own account 2493:Nola & Sankey 2014 2291:and of its problems)." 1977:Metaphysical solipsism 1735:Naive falsificationism 1716: 1652:naive falsificationism 1573: 1524: 1284: 1155: 1086: 1062: 1038: 1018: 952:gives some examples). 941: 714: 685: 662: 639: 613: 593: 567: 544: 521: 501: 500:{\displaystyle \neg Q} 478: 458: 427:such as, for example, 335:problem of demarcation 288:philosopher of science 272: 11408:The Poverty of Theory 11028:Philosophy of science 10917:Uncertainty principle 10551:Popper's three worlds 10383:Law without the state 9727:Philosophy portal 9478:Hard and soft science 9473:Faith and rationality 9342:Scientific skepticism 9122:Scientific Revolution 8905:Philosophy of science 8825:Philosophy of science 8805:Faith and rationality 8687:Descriptive knowledge 8558:Feminist epistemology 8498:Nicholas Wolterstorff 8049:10.4324/9780203371107 8014:10.4324/9780203713990 7588:on 17 September 2016. 7235:Philosophical Studies 7174:10.1017/9781108671224 7013:10.1093/bjps/34.2.149 6925:Wigmore, Ivy (2017). 6784:10.1353/pbm.1959.0027 6605:. New York: Picador. 6535:10.1093/bjps/36.3.291 6495:10.1093/bjps/24.4.367 6440:10.1093/bjps/34.3.225 6285:Ridley, Mark (2003). 6249:10.4324/9780203535806 6214:10.4324/9780203713969 6189:Popper, Karl (1980). 6116:Popper, Karl (1972). 6093:Popper, Karl (1962). 6072:Popper, Karl (1959). 5943:on 28 September 2007. 5815:Martin, Eric (2017). 5371:. New York: Penguin. 5254:Fisher, R.A. (1930). 4996:10.1017/9781316717158 4838:. SAGE Publications. 2610:equivalence principle 2193:, Translators' note). 2123:Scientific skepticism 2012:Plausible deniability 1702: 1687:beta-inverse reaction 1561:) (emphasis deleted). 1547: 1509: 1454:In the ruling of the 1330:Alfred Russel Wallace 1268: 1153: 1087: 1085:{\displaystyle \phi } 1063: 1039: 1037:{\displaystyle \phi } 1019: 927: 811:enumerative induction 807:patterns of induction 715: 686: 663: 640: 614: 594: 568: 545: 522: 502: 479: 459: 266: 11416:The Scientific Image 11087:Structuration theory 11050:Qualitative research 10951:Criticism of science 10946:Critical rationalism 10882:Problem of induction 10526:Critical rationalism 10343:Virtue jurisprudence 10283:Deontological ethics 9453:Criticism of science 9328:Scientific formalism 9212:Constructive realism 9117:Scientific pluralism 9090:Problem of induction 8757:Procedural knowledge 8742:Problem of induction 8191:Woit, Peter (2018). 7200:De Pierris, Graciela 7068:Blaug, Mark (1992). 6818:"The Evolution Wars" 5413:10.1093/ije/27.4.543 5080:United States Courts 4917:The Blind Watchmaker 4809:"Logical Empiricism" 3354:Einstein wrote (see 3337:Einstein wrote (see 2828:, Chap.15 sec. III ( 1959:Defeasible reasoning 1920:Fashionable Nonsense 1838:begging the question 1543:five Daubert factors 1436:case (in 1982), the 1426:Use in courts of law 1076: 1048: 1028: 998: 849:material requirement 695: 672: 649: 623: 603: 577: 554: 531: 511: 488: 468: 464:we logically deduce 448: 393:Problem of induction 331:problem of induction 11594:Razors (philosophy) 11574:Analytic philosophy 11392:One-Dimensional Man 10840:Geisteswissenschaft 10823:Confirmation holism 10546:Popper's experiment 10536:Growth of knowledge 9520:Rhetoric of science 9458:Descriptive science 9202:Confirmation holism 9095:Scientific evidence 9055:Inductive reasoning 8984:Demarcation problem 8835:Virtue epistemology 8830:Social epistemology 8810:Formal epistemology 8697:Epistemic injustice 8692:Exploratory thought 8493:Ludwig Wittgenstein 7785:2017SHPMP..57...41M 7769:. Elsevier: 41–52. 7111:Schölkopf, Bernhard 4737:1979Sci...206..534B 4447:, Part VI, Sec. II. 3989:, pp. 294–295. 2900:Rule 702 Notes 2011 2057:Experimentum crucis 1988:Philosophical razor 1965:Deniable encryption 1731:associated theory. 1670:Duhem–Quine problem 1636:progress in science 1274:neutrino experiment 1241:Omphalos hypothesis 1235:Omphalos hypothesis 1146:Industrial melanism 1140:Industrial melanism 934:Thornton, Stephen, 824:critical discussion 753:logical possibility 397:Demarcation problem 366:critical discussion 311:contradicted by an 11467:Hans-Georg Gadamer 11268:Alexander Bogdanov 11144:Positivismusstreit 10939:Post-behavioralism 10903:history of science 10755:Principal concepts 10711:Logical positivism 10236:The Concept of Law 10226:Pure Theory of Law 9739:Science portal 9668:Carl Gustav Hempel 9623:Wilhelm Windelband 9510:Questionable cause 9333:Scientific realism 9154:Underdetermination 8989:Empirical evidence 8979:Creative synthesis 8488:Timothy Williamson 8278:Augustine of Hippo 7478:on 10 August 2019. 7247:10.1007/BF01305393 6632:. Pergamon Press. 5053:Cornell Law School 4519:, Chap. 1; Sec IX. 3597:Johnson-Laird 2006 2663:website complement 2023:Precambrian rabbit 1913:Sokal and Bricmont 1606:Bayesian inference 1503:It is falsifiable. 1457:McLean v. Arkansas 1448:McLean v. Arkansas 1433:McLean v. Arkansas 1358:Mathematical proof 1285: 1245:Some adherents of 1174:Precambrian rabbit 1168:Precambrian rabbit 1156: 1082: 1058: 1034: 1014: 853:inter-subjectively 729:logical empiricism 710: 684:{\displaystyle P=} 681: 661:{\displaystyle C=} 658: 635: 609: 589: 566:{\displaystyle Q=} 563: 543:{\displaystyle L=} 540: 517: 497: 474: 454: 354:Duhem–Quine thesis 324:logical positivism 273: 211:You can assist by 11561: 11560: 11548: 11547: 11544: 11543: 11442:Theodor W. Adorno 11258:Richard Avenarius 11134:Werturteilsstreit 11095: 11094: 11043:Sense-data theory 10741:Polish positivism 10716:Positivist school 10623: 10622: 10473: 10472: 10445:Philosophy portal 10206:The Spirit of Law 9844:Philosophy of law 9824:Economic analysis 9809:Constitutionalism 9746: 9745: 9588: 9587: 9500:Normative science 9357:Uniformitarianism 9112:Scientific method 9006:Explanatory power 8871: 8870: 8737:Privileged access 8373:Søren Kierkegaard 8115:Rescher, Nicholas 8075:Rescher, Nicholas 8058:978-0-415-39431-4 7881:Niiniluoto, Ilkka 7824:978-0-7546-5068-3 7705:978-1-78735-039-7 7682:Maxwell, Nicholas 7665:978-0-444-52936-7 7624:978-94-007-1179-2 7599:Hartmann, Stephan 7573:978-1-4438-4131-3 7542:978-0-521-35402-8 7502:978-3-319-26549-0 7423:978-1-4625-1848-7 7204:Friedman, Michael 7183:978-1-108-67122-4 7098:978-0-230-52476-7 7079:978-0-521-43678-6 6989:978-0-691-17790-8 6917:978-94-010-7860-3 6762:978-1-351-57619-2 6639:978-0-080-26792-0 6388:978-0-521-75594-8 6323:978-1-4020-9337-1 6306:Rethinking Popper 6258:978-0-415-11320-5 6131:978-0-19-875024-6 6104:978-0-415-28594-0 6085:978-0-415-27844-7 6021:978-0-262-66165-2 5990:978-1-317-49348-8 5902:978-0-8126-9197-9 5853:978-0-87548-141-8 5759:(424): 1242–249. 5697:978-0-226-45807-6 5625:on 11 April 2020. 5580:978-0-521-54830-4 5517:978-0-19-825037-1 5454:"Inductive Logic" 5444:978-90-277-0630-0 5378:978-0-241-30455-6 5267:978-1-176-62502-0 5260:. Рипол Классик. 5215:978-0-86091-646-8 5196:978-0-521-31641-5 5027:978-0-486-24511-9 5005:978-1-316-71715-8 4970:978-0-230-54230-3 4941:River Out of Eden 4864:978-0-19-088268-6 4845:978-0-7619-5101-8 4782:978-1-62466-038-2 4769:Chalmers, Alan F. 4731:(4418): 534–537. 4693:978-1-139-04650-3 4384:, pp. 96–97. 4312:, pp. 12–30. 4276:, pp. 26–27. 4004:, pp. 44–45. 3974:, pp. 18–19. 3861:p. 65 Footnote *1 3816:, sec. 13–15, 28. 3754:10.1111/jep.13090 2916:William Rehnquist 2641:For example, see 2320:falsified theory. 2135:Tautology (logic) 2064:Explanatory power 2041:Scientific method 1947:Black swan theory 1927:) the physicists 1517:William Overton, 1483:, p. 5, and 1312:Natural selection 612:{\displaystyle Q} 520:{\displaystyle L} 477:{\displaystyle Q} 457:{\displaystyle L} 403:scientific method 352:By contrast, the 259: 258: 251: 241: 240: 233: 186: 185: 178: 127: 126: 119: 68: 16:(Redirected from 11601: 11537: 11523: 11447:Gaston Bachelard 11368:Truth and Method 11352:World Hypotheses 11232:The Two Cultures 11147: 11137: 11127: 11112: 11111: 11101: 11100: 10843: 10797:Unity of science 10706:Legal positivism 10665: 10664: 10650: 10643: 10636: 10627: 10626: 10500: 10493: 10486: 10477: 10476: 10453: 10452: 10438: 10428: 10427: 10308:Legal positivism 10261: 10251: 10241: 10231: 10221: 10211: 10201: 10191: 9849:Sociology of law 9773: 9766: 9759: 9750: 9749: 9737: 9736: 9725: 9724: 9723: 9698:Bas van Fraassen 9653:Hans Reichenbach 9633:Bertrand Russell 9550: 9549: 9376:Philosophy of... 9159:Unity of science 8952:Commensurability 8898: 8891: 8884: 8875: 8874: 8815:Metaepistemology 8793:Related articles 8767:Regress argument 8702:Epistemic virtue 8453:Bertrand Russell 8428:Duncan Pritchard 8388:Hilary Kornblith 8303:Laurence BonJour 8250: 8243: 8236: 8227: 8226: 8215: 8200: 8187: 8159: 8150: 8122: 8110: 8082: 8070: 8035: 8000: 7981: 7975: 7967: 7956: 7954: 7952: 7923: 7914: 7876: 7874: 7872: 7836: 7806: 7796: 7778: 7753: 7751: 7749: 7729: 7717: 7697: 7677: 7657: 7636: 7589: 7584:. Archived from 7554: 7514: 7479: 7477: 7471:. Archived from 7469:Internet Archive 7454: 7439: 7437: 7435: 7406: 7387: 7369: 7344: 7335: 7294: 7275: 7266: 7229: 7227: 7225: 7195: 7160: 7150: 7140: 7115:Vapnik, Vladimir 7102: 7083: 7064: 7024: 6993: 6974: 6940: 6930: 6927:"Falsifiability" 6921: 6894: 6875: 6848: 6846: 6844: 6820: 6811: 6766: 6747: 6745: 6743: 6717: 6715: 6713: 6690: 6677: 6675: 6673: 6652: 6643: 6624: 6588: 6586: 6584: 6553: 6551: 6549: 6513: 6511: 6509: 6473: 6458: 6456: 6454: 6418: 6409: 6400: 6362: 6360: 6335: 6300: 6281: 6270: 6235: 6200: 6185: 6168:(3/4): 339–355. 6154: 6135: 6123: 6108: 6089: 6068: 6033: 6005: 5994: 5975: 5966: 5957: 5944: 5942: 5927: 5914: 5882: 5876: 5866: 5857: 5838: 5836: 5834: 5811: 5809: 5796: 5794: 5792: 5776: 5747: 5728: 5709: 5680: 5653: 5626: 5621:. Archived from 5602: 5592: 5565: 5530: 5521: 5494: 5492: 5490: 5467: 5458:Zalta, Edward N. 5448: 5425: 5415: 5390: 5363: 5353: 5335: 5310: 5283: 5281: 5279: 5250: 5233:(5): 1239–1276. 5219: 5200: 5181: 5175: 5167: 5158: 5137: 5135: 5133: 5107: 5098: 5096: 5094: 5088: 5077: 5068: 5066: 5064: 5044: 5031: 5014:Einstein, Albert 5009: 4982: 4955: 4936:Dawkins, Richard 4931: 4912:Dawkins, Richard 4907: 4901: 4891: 4889: 4887: 4868: 4849: 4830: 4828: 4826: 4803: 4798:Chiasma (2017). 4794: 4764: 4717: 4705: 4670: 4652: 4646: 4640: 4634: 4628: 4622: 4616: 4610: 4604: 4598: 4592: 4586: 4580: 4574: 4568: 4562: 4556: 4550: 4544: 4538: 4532: 4526: 4520: 4514: 4508: 4502: 4496: 4490: 4484: 4478: 4472: 4466: 4460: 4454: 4448: 4442: 4436: 4430: 4424: 4418: 4409: 4403: 4397: 4391: 4385: 4379: 4373: 4367: 4361: 4355: 4349: 4343: 4337: 4331: 4325: 4319: 4313: 4307: 4301: 4295: 4289: 4283: 4277: 4271: 4265: 4259: 4253: 4247: 4241: 4235: 4229: 4223: 4214: 4208: 4202: 4196: 4190: 4184: 4178: 4172: 4166: 4160: 4154: 4148: 4142: 4136: 4130: 4124: 4118: 4112: 4103: 4093: 4087: 4081: 4075: 4069: 4063: 4057: 4051: 4045: 4036: 4030: 4017: 4011: 4005: 3999: 3990: 3984: 3975: 3969: 3963: 3957: 3951: 3945: 3939: 3933: 3927: 3921: 3915: 3909: 3903: 3900:Rynasiewicz 1983 3897: 3888: 3882: 3876: 3870: 3864: 3854: 3848: 3838: 3829: 3823: 3817: 3811: 3805: 3795: 3789: 3783: 3774: 3773: 3733: 3727: 3717: 3711: 3705: 3699: 3693: 3687: 3681: 3675: 3669: 3663: 3657: 3651: 3645: 3636: 3630: 3624: 3618: 3612: 3606: 3600: 3594: 3581: 3575: 3569: 3563: 3554: 3548: 3542: 3536: 3530: 3524: 3518: 3512: 3506: 3500: 3494: 3488: 3479: 3473: 3464: 3458: 3452: 3446: 3430: 3420: 3414: 3408: 3402: 3396: 3390: 3384: 3378: 3372: 3366: 3352: 3346: 3335: 3329: 3323: 3317: 3310: 3304: 3298: 3292: 3282: 3273: 3258:Feyerabend 1978b 3251: 3242: 3236: 3227: 3226:, p. 478)." 3213: 3204: 3194: 3185: 3179: 3173: 3167: 3161: 3155: 3144: 3138: 3132: 3126: 3120: 3114: 3108: 3102: 3096: 3089: 3083: 3073: 3067: 3059: 3053: 3042: 3036: 3030: 3024: 3017: 3011: 3004: 2998: 2992: 2986: 2979: 2973: 2967: 2961: 2958: 2952: 2946: 2940: 2929: 2923: 2908:Daubert standard 2876: 2870: 2863: 2857: 2851: 2845: 2839: 2833: 2823: 2817: 2811: 2805: 2799: 2793: 2787: 2781: 2775: 2769: 2763: 2757: 2747: 2741: 2735: 2729: 2715: 2706: 2703:Introduction, xx 2696: 2690: 2683: 2677: 2671: 2665: 2651:Muehlenbein 2010 2639: 2633: 2623: 2617: 2606: 2600: 2593: 2587: 2581: 2572: 2564: 2558: 2542: 2536: 2530: 2524: 2513: 2504: 2489: 2483: 2472: 2466: 2460: 2451: 2445: 2439: 2433: 2427: 2421: 2415: 2409: 2403: 2397: 2391: 2385: 2379: 2373: 2367: 2361: 2355: 2349: 2343: 2337: 2331: 2327: 2321: 2317: 2311: 2301: 2292: 2251: 2238: 2232: 2221: 2210: 2204: 2200: 2194: 2183: 2177: 2162: 2129:Superdeterminism 2115:Theory-ladenness 2111: 2102: 2085:Predictive power 2081: 2052: 2035:Russell's teapot 1724:basic statements 1714: 1571: 1566:Harry Blackmun, 1533:Daubert standard 1527:Daubert standard 1522: 1466:creation science 1338:§ Evolution 1282: 1279: 1213: 1206: 1180:J. B. S. Haldane 1091: 1089: 1088: 1083: 1067: 1065: 1064: 1059: 1057: 1056: 1043: 1041: 1040: 1035: 1023: 1021: 1020: 1015: 1007: 1006: 991:Herbert A. Simon 939: 896:basic statements 889:Basic statements 719: 717: 716: 711: 690: 688: 687: 682: 667: 665: 664: 659: 644: 642: 641: 636: 618: 616: 615: 610: 598: 596: 595: 590: 572: 570: 569: 564: 549: 547: 546: 541: 526: 524: 523: 518: 506: 504: 503: 498: 483: 481: 480: 475: 463: 461: 460: 455: 444:: if from a law 254: 247: 236: 229: 225: 222: 216: 196: 195: 188: 181: 174: 170: 167: 161: 137: 136: 129: 122: 115: 111: 108: 102: 79: 78: 71: 60: 38: 37: 30: 21: 11609: 11608: 11604: 11603: 11602: 11600: 11599: 11598: 11564: 11563: 11562: 11557: 11540: 11496: 11462:Paul Feyerabend 11457:Wilhelm Dilthey 11430: 11307: 11246: 11163: 11106: 11091: 11038:Ramsey sentence 10993:Instrumentalism 10922: 10900: 10898:paradigm shifts 10891: 10828:Critical theory 10806: 10802:Verificationism 10750: 10746:Russian Machism 10694: 10659: 10654: 10624: 10619: 10560: 10521:Bold hypothesis 10509: 10504: 10474: 10469: 10455:WikiProject Law 10416: 10400:Question of law 10347: 10264: 10259: 10249: 10239: 10229: 10219: 10209: 10199: 10196:Treatise on Law 10189: 10171: 9853: 9819:Comparative law 9795: 9782: 9777: 9747: 9742: 9731: 9721: 9719: 9707: 9688:Paul Feyerabend 9648:Michael Polanyi 9584: 9570:Galileo Galilei 9539: 9525:Science studies 9441: 9371: 9362:Verificationism 9267:Instrumentalism 9252:Foundationalism 9227:Conventionalism 9185: 9021:Feminist method 8907: 8902: 8872: 8867: 8839: 8788: 8707:Gettier problem 8637: 8568:Foundationalism 8514: 8463:Wilfrid Sellars 8418:Alvin Plantinga 8298:George Berkeley 8265:Epistemologists 8259: 8254: 8208: 8203: 8176: 8139: 8099: 8059: 8024: 7997: 7969: 7968: 7950: 7948: 7941: 7903: 7870: 7868: 7825: 7747: 7745: 7706: 7666: 7655:10.1.1.504.2727 7646:Inductive Logic 7625: 7574: 7543: 7503: 7475: 7452: 7433: 7431: 7424: 7316:10.1038/nrg1088 7291: 7223: 7221: 7206:(4 June 2008). 7184: 7107:Corfield, David 7099: 7080: 7032: 7030:Further reading 7027: 6990: 6938: 6918: 6891: 6864: 6842: 6840: 6763: 6741: 6739: 6726:"Vienna Circle" 6711: 6709: 6671: 6669: 6640: 6613: 6582: 6580: 6573: 6547: 6545: 6507: 6505: 6452: 6450: 6389: 6324: 6297: 6259: 6224: 6151: 6132: 6105: 6086: 6057: 6022: 5991: 5940: 5925: 5903: 5870: 5854: 5832: 5830: 5807: 5790: 5788: 5782:"Rudolf Carnap" 5765:10.2307/2291263 5744: 5725: 5698: 5669: 5642: 5600: 5581: 5518: 5488: 5486: 5445: 5379: 5299: 5277: 5275: 5268: 5216: 5197: 5169: 5168: 5155: 5147:. London: NLB. 5131: 5129: 5092: 5090: 5086: 5075: 5062: 5060: 5028: 5006: 4971: 4952: 4928: 4895: 4885: 4883: 4865: 4846: 4824: 4822: 4783: 4694: 4660: 4655: 4647: 4643: 4635: 4631: 4623: 4619: 4611: 4607: 4601:Feyerabend 1993 4599: 4595: 4587: 4583: 4575: 4571: 4567:, p. 1010. 4563: 4559: 4551: 4547: 4539: 4535: 4527: 4523: 4515: 4511: 4503: 4499: 4491: 4487: 4479: 4475: 4467: 4463: 4455: 4451: 4443: 4439: 4431: 4427: 4419: 4412: 4404: 4400: 4392: 4388: 4380: 4376: 4368: 4364: 4356: 4352: 4344: 4340: 4332: 4328: 4320: 4316: 4308: 4304: 4296: 4292: 4284: 4280: 4272: 4268: 4260: 4256: 4248: 4244: 4236: 4232: 4224: 4217: 4209: 4205: 4197: 4193: 4185: 4181: 4173: 4169: 4161: 4157: 4149: 4145: 4137: 4133: 4125: 4121: 4113: 4106: 4094: 4090: 4082: 4078: 4070: 4066: 4058: 4054: 4050:, p. 1038. 4046: 4039: 4031: 4020: 4012: 4008: 4000: 3993: 3985: 3978: 3970: 3966: 3958: 3954: 3946: 3942: 3934: 3930: 3922: 3918: 3910: 3906: 3898: 3891: 3883: 3879: 3871: 3867: 3855: 3851: 3839: 3832: 3824: 3820: 3812: 3808: 3796: 3792: 3784: 3777: 3748:(6): 997–1002. 3734: 3730: 3718: 3714: 3706: 3702: 3694: 3690: 3686:, p. xxxv. 3682: 3678: 3670: 3666: 3658: 3654: 3646: 3639: 3631: 3627: 3619: 3615: 3607: 3603: 3595: 3584: 3576: 3572: 3564: 3557: 3549: 3545: 3537: 3533: 3525: 3521: 3513: 3509: 3501: 3497: 3489: 3482: 3474: 3467: 3459: 3455: 3447: 3443: 3439: 3434: 3433: 3421: 3417: 3409: 3405: 3397: 3393: 3385: 3381: 3373: 3369: 3353: 3349: 3336: 3332: 3324: 3320: 3311: 3307: 3299: 3295: 3283: 3276: 3266:Feyerabend 1981 3254:Feyerabend 1978 3252: 3245: 3237: 3230: 3214: 3207: 3195: 3188: 3180: 3176: 3168: 3164: 3156: 3147: 3139: 3135: 3127: 3123: 3115: 3111: 3103: 3099: 3090: 3086: 3080: 3074: 3070: 3060: 3056: 3043: 3039: 3031: 3027: 3018: 3014: 3005: 3001: 2993: 2989: 2980: 2976: 2968: 2964: 2959: 2955: 2947: 2943: 2930: 2926: 2877: 2873: 2864: 2860: 2852: 2848: 2840: 2836: 2824: 2820: 2812: 2808: 2800: 2796: 2788: 2784: 2778:Waddington 1959 2776: 2772: 2764: 2760: 2748: 2744: 2736: 2732: 2716: 2709: 2697: 2693: 2684: 2680: 2672: 2668: 2640: 2636: 2624: 2620: 2607: 2603: 2597:Ebbinghaus 2017 2594: 2590: 2582: 2575: 2570: 2565: 2561: 2543: 2539: 2531: 2527: 2514: 2507: 2490: 2486: 2473: 2469: 2461: 2454: 2446: 2442: 2434: 2430: 2422: 2418: 2410: 2406: 2398: 2394: 2386: 2382: 2374: 2370: 2362: 2358: 2350: 2346: 2338: 2334: 2328: 2324: 2318: 2314: 2310:, p. 142. 2302: 2295: 2278: 2272: 2265: 2252: 2241: 2233: 2224: 2211: 2207: 2201: 2197: 2184: 2180: 2163: 2156: 2151: 2146: 2141:Trial and error 2109: 2100: 2091:Reproducibility 2079: 2050: 2018:Pragmatic maxim 1942: 1915: 1892:Paul Feyerabend 1889: 1883: 1874: 1868: 1852: 1846: 1821: 1815: 1799: 1793: 1788: 1779: 1757: 1737: 1715: 1708: 1665: 1628: 1582: 1572: 1565: 1535: 1529: 1523: 1516: 1462:William Overton 1452: 1428: 1419: 1413: 1404:Albert Einstein 1376:formal sciences 1372: 1354: 1334:Herbert Spencer 1320: 1314: 1280: 1272:conducting the 1256: 1243: 1237: 1224: 1223: 1222: 1220: 1215: 1214: 1207: 1197: 1189:Richard Dawkins 1176: 1170: 1148: 1142: 1137: 1128: 1122: 1109: 1103: 1101:Newton's theory 1098: 1077: 1074: 1073: 1052: 1051: 1049: 1046: 1045: 1029: 1026: 1025: 1002: 1001: 999: 996: 995: 984: 962: 940: 933: 923: 900:test statements 891: 886: 841: 790: 777:verificationism 696: 693: 692: 673: 670: 669: 650: 647: 646: 624: 621: 620: 604: 601: 600: 578: 575: 574: 555: 552: 551: 532: 529: 528: 512: 509: 508: 489: 486: 485: 469: 466: 465: 449: 446: 445: 425:logical fallacy 411:scientific laws 399: 385: 255: 244: 243: 242: 237: 226: 220: 217: 210: 197: 193: 182: 171: 165: 162: 148:Please help by 147: 138: 134: 123: 112: 106: 103: 92: 86:has an unclear 80: 76: 39: 35: 28: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 11607: 11597: 11596: 11591: 11586: 11581: 11576: 11559: 11558: 11553: 11550: 11549: 11546: 11545: 11542: 11541: 11539: 11538: 11529: 11524: 11515: 11510: 11504: 11502: 11498: 11497: 11495: 11494: 11489: 11484: 11479: 11474: 11469: 11464: 11459: 11454: 11449: 11444: 11438: 11436: 11432: 11431: 11429: 11428: 11420: 11412: 11404: 11396: 11388: 11380: 11372: 11364: 11356: 11348: 11340: 11332: 11324: 11315: 11313: 11309: 11308: 11306: 11305: 11300: 11295: 11290: 11285: 11283:Émile Durkheim 11280: 11275: 11270: 11265: 11260: 11254: 11252: 11248: 11247: 11245: 11244: 11236: 11228: 11220: 11212: 11204: 11196: 11188: 11180: 11171: 11169: 11165: 11164: 11162: 11161: 11155: 11149: 11139: 11129: 11124:Methodenstreit 11118: 11116: 11108: 11107: 11097: 11096: 11093: 11092: 11090: 11089: 11084: 11079: 11074: 11073: 11072: 11065:Social science 11062: 11057: 11052: 11047: 11046: 11045: 11040: 11035: 11025: 11020: 11018:Operationalism 11015: 11010: 11005: 11000: 10995: 10990: 10985: 10984: 10983: 10978: 10973: 10968: 10963: 10953: 10948: 10943: 10942: 10941: 10930: 10928: 10927:Related topics 10924: 10923: 10921: 10920: 10914: 10907: 10905: 10893: 10892: 10890: 10889: 10884: 10879: 10874: 10869: 10864: 10859: 10854: 10849: 10844: 10835: 10833:Falsifiability 10830: 10825: 10820: 10818:Antipositivism 10814: 10812: 10808: 10807: 10805: 10804: 10799: 10794: 10789: 10784: 10779: 10774: 10769: 10764: 10758: 10756: 10752: 10751: 10749: 10748: 10743: 10738: 10733: 10728: 10723: 10721:Postpositivism 10718: 10713: 10708: 10702: 10700: 10696: 10695: 10693: 10692: 10687: 10682: 10677: 10671: 10669: 10661: 10660: 10653: 10652: 10645: 10638: 10630: 10621: 10620: 10618: 10617: 10609: 10601: 10593: 10585: 10577: 10568: 10566: 10562: 10561: 10559: 10558: 10556:Verisimilitude 10553: 10548: 10543: 10538: 10533: 10531:Falsifiability 10528: 10523: 10517: 10515: 10511: 10510: 10503: 10502: 10495: 10488: 10480: 10471: 10470: 10468: 10467: 10462: 10457: 10447: 10442: 10432: 10421: 10418: 10417: 10415: 10414: 10407: 10402: 10397: 10390: 10385: 10380: 10375: 10370: 10363: 10355: 10353: 10349: 10348: 10346: 10345: 10340: 10338:Utilitarianism 10335: 10330: 10325: 10320: 10315: 10310: 10305: 10303:Legal moralism 10300: 10298:Interpretivism 10295: 10290: 10285: 10280: 10274: 10272: 10266: 10265: 10263: 10262: 10252: 10242: 10232: 10222: 10212: 10202: 10192: 10181: 10179: 10173: 10172: 10170: 10169: 10164: 10159: 10154: 10149: 10144: 10139: 10134: 10129: 10124: 10119: 10114: 10109: 10104: 10099: 10094: 10089: 10084: 10079: 10074: 10069: 10064: 10059: 10054: 10049: 10044: 10039: 10034: 10029: 10024: 10019: 10014: 10009: 10004: 9999: 9994: 9989: 9984: 9979: 9974: 9969: 9964: 9959: 9954: 9949: 9944: 9939: 9934: 9929: 9924: 9919: 9914: 9909: 9904: 9899: 9894: 9889: 9884: 9879: 9874: 9869: 9863: 9861: 9855: 9854: 9852: 9851: 9846: 9841: 9836: 9831: 9826: 9821: 9816: 9811: 9805: 9803: 9797: 9796: 9794: 9793: 9787: 9784: 9783: 9776: 9775: 9768: 9761: 9753: 9744: 9743: 9741: 9729: 9717: 9712: 9709: 9708: 9706: 9705: 9700: 9695: 9690: 9685: 9680: 9675: 9673:W. V. O. Quine 9670: 9665: 9660: 9655: 9650: 9645: 9640: 9635: 9630: 9625: 9620: 9615: 9610: 9608:Rudolf Steiner 9605: 9600: 9598:Henri Poincaré 9595: 9589: 9586: 9585: 9583: 9582: 9577: 9572: 9567: 9562: 9556: 9554: 9547: 9541: 9540: 9538: 9537: 9532: 9527: 9522: 9517: 9512: 9507: 9502: 9497: 9496: 9495: 9485: 9480: 9475: 9470: 9468:Exact sciences 9465: 9460: 9455: 9449: 9447: 9446:Related topics 9443: 9442: 9440: 9439: 9438: 9437: 9432: 9427: 9422: 9417: 9412: 9405:Social science 9402: 9401: 9400: 9398:Space and time 9390: 9385: 9379: 9377: 9373: 9372: 9370: 9369: 9364: 9359: 9354: 9349: 9344: 9339: 9330: 9325: 9320: 9311: 9302: 9297: 9284: 9279: 9274: 9269: 9264: 9259: 9254: 9249: 9244: 9239: 9234: 9229: 9224: 9219: 9214: 9209: 9204: 9199: 9193: 9191: 9187: 9186: 9184: 9183: 9178: 9177: 9176: 9171: 9161: 9156: 9151: 9150: 9149: 9144: 9139: 9129: 9124: 9119: 9114: 9109: 9107:Scientific law 9104: 9103: 9102: 9092: 9087: 9082: 9077: 9072: 9067: 9062: 9057: 9052: 9045: 9044: 9043: 9038: 9028: 9023: 9018: 9016:Falsifiability 9013: 9008: 9003: 9002: 9001: 8991: 8986: 8981: 8976: 8975: 8974: 8964: 8959: 8954: 8949: 8948: 8947: 8945:Mill's Methods 8937: 8926: 8921: 8915: 8913: 8909: 8908: 8901: 8900: 8893: 8886: 8878: 8869: 8868: 8866: 8865: 8860: 8855: 8850: 8844: 8841: 8840: 8838: 8837: 8832: 8827: 8822: 8817: 8812: 8807: 8802: 8796: 8794: 8790: 8789: 8787: 8786: 8779: 8774: 8769: 8764: 8759: 8754: 8749: 8744: 8739: 8734: 8729: 8724: 8719: 8714: 8709: 8704: 8699: 8694: 8689: 8684: 8679: 8674: 8669: 8664: 8656: 8647: 8645: 8639: 8638: 8636: 8635: 8630: 8625: 8620: 8615: 8610: 8605: 8600: 8595: 8590: 8585: 8580: 8575: 8570: 8565: 8560: 8555: 8550: 8545: 8540: 8535: 8533:Constructivism 8530: 8524: 8522: 8516: 8515: 8513: 8512: 8505: 8500: 8495: 8490: 8485: 8483:Baruch Spinoza 8480: 8478:P. F. Strawson 8475: 8470: 8468:Susanna Siegel 8465: 8460: 8455: 8450: 8445: 8443:W. V. O. Quine 8440: 8435: 8430: 8425: 8420: 8415: 8410: 8405: 8400: 8395: 8390: 8385: 8380: 8375: 8370: 8365: 8360: 8355: 8350: 8345: 8343:Nelson Goodman 8340: 8335: 8333:Edmund Gettier 8330: 8325: 8320: 8318:René Descartes 8315: 8310: 8308:Gilles Deleuze 8305: 8300: 8295: 8290: 8285: 8283:William Alston 8280: 8275: 8273:Thomas Aquinas 8269: 8267: 8261: 8260: 8253: 8252: 8245: 8238: 8230: 8224: 8223: 8219:falsifiability 8207: 8206:External links 8204: 8202: 8201: 8197:Not even wrong 8188: 8174: 8151: 8137: 8111: 8097: 8071: 8057: 8036: 8022: 8001: 7995: 7982: 7972:cite interview 7957: 7939: 7924: 7915: 7901: 7877: 7837: 7823: 7807: 7754: 7718: 7704: 7678: 7664: 7642:Gabbay, Dov M. 7637: 7623: 7590: 7572: 7555: 7541: 7519:Kant, Immanuel 7515: 7501: 7480: 7465:Falsifiability 7440: 7422: 7407: 7388: 7360:(6): 555–561. 7345: 7336: 7310:(6): 457–469. 7295: 7289: 7276: 7267: 7241:(3): 313–336. 7230: 7196: 7182: 7161: 7103: 7097: 7084: 7078: 7065: 7033: 7031: 7028: 7026: 7025: 7007:(2): 149–171. 6994: 6988: 6975: 6949:(9): 919–920. 6931: 6922: 6916: 6895: 6889: 6876: 6862: 6849: 6812: 6767: 6761: 6748: 6718: 6691: 6678: 6653: 6644: 6638: 6625: 6611: 6597:Bricmont, Jean 6593:Sokal, Alan D. 6589: 6571: 6554: 6529:(3): 291–298. 6514: 6489:(4): 367–380. 6474: 6459: 6434:(3): 225–241. 6419: 6410: 6401: 6387: 6363: 6351:(4): 369–375. 6336: 6322: 6301: 6295: 6282: 6271: 6257: 6236: 6222: 6201: 6186: 6155: 6149: 6136: 6130: 6113: 6103: 6090: 6084: 6069: 6055: 6034: 6020: 5995: 5989: 5976: 5967: 5958: 5945: 5915: 5901: 5883: 5867: 5858: 5852: 5839: 5812: 5797: 5777: 5748: 5742: 5729: 5723: 5710: 5696: 5681: 5667: 5654: 5640: 5627: 5613:(3): 309–332. 5593: 5579: 5566: 5548:(4): 473–481. 5531: 5522: 5516: 5495: 5468: 5449: 5443: 5431:"Introduction" 5426: 5406:(4): 543–548. 5391: 5377: 5364: 5311: 5297: 5284: 5266: 5251: 5220: 5214: 5201: 5195: 5182: 5159: 5153: 5138: 5112:Feigl, Herbert 5108: 5099: 5069: 5045: 5032: 5026: 5010: 5004: 4983: 4969: 4956: 4950: 4932: 4926: 4908: 4892: 4869: 4863: 4850: 4844: 4831: 4804: 4795: 4781: 4765: 4718: 4706: 4692: 4671: 4661: 4659: 4656: 4654: 4653: 4651:, p. 545. 4649:Greenland 1998 4641: 4629: 4617: 4605: 4593: 4581: 4569: 4557: 4555:, p. 245. 4545: 4533: 4521: 4509: 4497: 4485: 4473: 4461: 4449: 4437: 4425: 4421:Henderson 2018 4410: 4398: 4386: 4374: 4362: 4358:Andersson 1994 4350: 4338: 4326: 4324:, p. 362. 4314: 4302: 4290: 4278: 4266: 4254: 4250:Hawthorne 2018 4242: 4238:Hawthorne 2018 4230: 4215: 4213:, p. 201. 4203: 4191: 4179: 4175:Wilkinson 2013 4167: 4155: 4143: 4131: 4119: 4104: 4088: 4076: 4064: 4062:, p. 295. 4052: 4037: 4035:, p. 299. 4018: 4006: 3991: 3976: 3964: 3952: 3940: 3928: 3916: 3904: 3889: 3877: 3865: 3849: 3830: 3818: 3806: 3790: 3775: 3728: 3712: 3700: 3688: 3676: 3664: 3652: 3637: 3625: 3613: 3601: 3582: 3570: 3555: 3543: 3539:MacLennan 2021 3531: 3519: 3507: 3495: 3480: 3478:, p. 397. 3465: 3453: 3440: 3438: 3435: 3432: 3431: 3415: 3403: 3391: 3379: 3367: 3347: 3330: 3318: 3305: 3293: 3274: 3243: 3228: 3205: 3186: 3174: 3162: 3145: 3133: 3121: 3109: 3097: 3084: 3068: 3054: 3037: 3025: 3012: 2999: 2987: 2974: 2962: 2953: 2941: 2937:Penn State Law 2924: 2871: 2858: 2846: 2834: 2818: 2806: 2794: 2782: 2770: 2758: 2742: 2730: 2707: 2691: 2678: 2666: 2634: 2618: 2601: 2588: 2573: 2559: 2537: 2525: 2505: 2484: 2467: 2452: 2440: 2428: 2416: 2404: 2392: 2380: 2368: 2356: 2344: 2332: 2322: 2312: 2293: 2287:but rather of 2285:falsifiability 2262:falsifiability 2239: 2222: 2205: 2195: 2178: 2153: 2152: 2150: 2147: 2145: 2144: 2138: 2132: 2126: 2120: 2119: 2118: 2112: 2103: 2094: 2088: 2082: 2073: 2067: 2061: 2053: 2038: 2032: 2026: 2020: 2015: 2009: 2004: 2003: 2002: 1996: 1985: 1980: 1974: 1968: 1962: 1956: 1950: 1943: 1941: 1938: 1917:In their book 1914: 1911: 1885:Main article: 1882: 1879: 1870:Main article: 1867: 1864: 1850:Paradigm shift 1848:Main article: 1845: 1842: 1817:Main article: 1814: 1811: 1795:Main article: 1792: 1789: 1787: 1784: 1778: 1775: 1756: 1753: 1749:verisimilitude 1736: 1733: 1709:Imre Lakatos, 1706: 1691:Grover Maxwell 1664: 1661: 1627: 1624: 1581: 1578: 1563: 1531:Main article: 1528: 1525: 1514: 1512:investigation. 1505: 1504: 1501: 1498: 1495: 1492: 1473:public schools 1451: 1445: 1427: 1424: 1412: 1409: 1353: 1350: 1316:Main article: 1313: 1310: 1259:Grover Maxwell 1255: 1252: 1239:Main article: 1236: 1233: 1217: 1216: 1208: 1201: 1200: 1199: 1198: 1196: 1193: 1172:Main article: 1169: 1166: 1144:Main article: 1141: 1138: 1136: 1133: 1124:Main article: 1121: 1118: 1105:Main article: 1102: 1099: 1097: 1094: 1081: 1055: 1033: 1013: 1010: 1005: 988:Nobel laureate 983: 980: 961: 958: 950:Andersson 2016 931: 922: 919: 890: 887: 885: 882: 840: 837: 789: 786: 757:psychoanalysis 733:Moritz Schlick 709: 706: 703: 700: 680: 677: 657: 654: 634: 631: 628: 608: 588: 585: 582: 562: 559: 539: 536: 516: 496: 493: 473: 453: 384: 381: 313:empirical test 276:Falsifiability 257: 256: 239: 238: 221:September 2024 200: 198: 191: 184: 183: 166:September 2024 141: 139: 132: 125: 124: 107:September 2024 88:citation style 83: 81: 74: 69: 43: 42: 40: 33: 26: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 11606: 11595: 11592: 11590: 11587: 11585: 11582: 11580: 11577: 11575: 11572: 11571: 11569: 11556: 11551: 11536: 11535: 11530: 11528: 11525: 11522: 11521: 11516: 11514: 11511: 11509: 11506: 11505: 11503: 11499: 11493: 11490: 11488: 11485: 11483: 11480: 11478: 11477:György Lukács 11475: 11473: 11470: 11468: 11465: 11463: 11460: 11458: 11455: 11453: 11450: 11448: 11445: 11443: 11440: 11439: 11437: 11433: 11426: 11425: 11421: 11418: 11417: 11413: 11410: 11409: 11405: 11402: 11401: 11397: 11394: 11393: 11389: 11386: 11385: 11381: 11378: 11377: 11373: 11370: 11369: 11365: 11362: 11361: 11357: 11354: 11353: 11349: 11346: 11345: 11341: 11338: 11337: 11333: 11330: 11329: 11325: 11322: 11321: 11317: 11316: 11314: 11310: 11304: 11303:Vienna Circle 11301: 11299: 11298:Berlin Circle 11296: 11294: 11291: 11289: 11286: 11284: 11281: 11279: 11278:Eugen Dühring 11276: 11274: 11273:Auguste Comte 11271: 11269: 11266: 11264: 11261: 11259: 11256: 11255: 11253: 11249: 11242: 11241: 11237: 11234: 11233: 11229: 11226: 11225: 11221: 11218: 11217: 11213: 11210: 11209: 11205: 11202: 11201: 11197: 11194: 11193: 11189: 11186: 11185: 11181: 11178: 11177: 11173: 11172: 11170: 11168:Contributions 11166: 11159: 11156: 11153: 11150: 11146: 11145: 11140: 11136: 11135: 11130: 11126: 11125: 11120: 11119: 11117: 11113: 11109: 11102: 11098: 11088: 11085: 11083: 11082:Structuralism 11080: 11078: 11075: 11071: 11068: 11067: 11066: 11063: 11061: 11058: 11056: 11053: 11051: 11048: 11044: 11041: 11039: 11036: 11034: 11031: 11030: 11029: 11026: 11024: 11023:Phenomenalism 11021: 11019: 11016: 11014: 11011: 11009: 11006: 11004: 11001: 10999: 10996: 10994: 10991: 10989: 10986: 10982: 10979: 10977: 10974: 10972: 10969: 10967: 10964: 10962: 10959: 10958: 10957: 10954: 10952: 10949: 10947: 10944: 10940: 10937: 10936: 10935: 10934:Behavioralism 10932: 10931: 10929: 10925: 10918: 10915: 10912: 10909: 10908: 10906: 10904: 10899: 10894: 10888: 10885: 10883: 10880: 10878: 10875: 10873: 10870: 10868: 10865: 10863: 10862:Human science 10860: 10858: 10855: 10853: 10850: 10848: 10845: 10842: 10841: 10836: 10834: 10831: 10829: 10826: 10824: 10821: 10819: 10816: 10815: 10813: 10809: 10803: 10800: 10798: 10795: 10793: 10790: 10788: 10787:Pseudoscience 10785: 10783: 10782:Justification 10780: 10778: 10775: 10773: 10770: 10768: 10765: 10763: 10760: 10759: 10757: 10753: 10747: 10744: 10742: 10739: 10737: 10734: 10732: 10729: 10727: 10724: 10722: 10719: 10717: 10714: 10712: 10709: 10707: 10704: 10703: 10701: 10697: 10691: 10688: 10686: 10683: 10681: 10678: 10676: 10673: 10672: 10670: 10666: 10662: 10658: 10651: 10646: 10644: 10639: 10637: 10632: 10631: 10628: 10615: 10614: 10610: 10607: 10606: 10605:Unended Quest 10602: 10599: 10598: 10594: 10591: 10590: 10586: 10583: 10582: 10578: 10575: 10574: 10570: 10569: 10567: 10563: 10557: 10554: 10552: 10549: 10547: 10544: 10542: 10539: 10537: 10534: 10532: 10529: 10527: 10524: 10522: 10519: 10518: 10516: 10512: 10508: 10501: 10496: 10494: 10489: 10487: 10482: 10481: 10478: 10466: 10463: 10461: 10458: 10456: 10448: 10446: 10443: 10441: 10437: 10433: 10431: 10423: 10422: 10419: 10413: 10412: 10408: 10406: 10403: 10401: 10398: 10396: 10395: 10391: 10389: 10386: 10384: 10381: 10379: 10376: 10374: 10371: 10369: 10368: 10364: 10362: 10361: 10357: 10356: 10354: 10350: 10344: 10341: 10339: 10336: 10334: 10331: 10329: 10326: 10324: 10321: 10319: 10316: 10314: 10313:Legal realism 10311: 10309: 10306: 10304: 10301: 10299: 10296: 10294: 10291: 10289: 10286: 10284: 10281: 10279: 10276: 10275: 10273: 10271: 10267: 10258: 10257: 10253: 10248: 10247: 10243: 10238: 10237: 10233: 10228: 10227: 10223: 10218: 10217: 10213: 10208: 10207: 10203: 10198: 10197: 10193: 10188: 10187: 10183: 10182: 10180: 10178: 10174: 10168: 10165: 10163: 10160: 10158: 10155: 10153: 10150: 10148: 10145: 10143: 10140: 10138: 10135: 10133: 10130: 10128: 10125: 10123: 10120: 10118: 10115: 10113: 10110: 10108: 10105: 10103: 10100: 10098: 10095: 10093: 10090: 10088: 10085: 10083: 10080: 10078: 10075: 10073: 10070: 10068: 10065: 10063: 10060: 10058: 10055: 10053: 10050: 10048: 10045: 10043: 10040: 10038: 10035: 10033: 10030: 10028: 10025: 10023: 10020: 10018: 10015: 10013: 10010: 10008: 10005: 10003: 10000: 9998: 9995: 9993: 9990: 9988: 9985: 9983: 9980: 9978: 9975: 9973: 9970: 9968: 9965: 9963: 9960: 9958: 9955: 9953: 9950: 9948: 9945: 9943: 9940: 9938: 9935: 9933: 9930: 9928: 9925: 9923: 9920: 9918: 9915: 9913: 9910: 9908: 9905: 9903: 9900: 9898: 9895: 9893: 9890: 9888: 9885: 9883: 9880: 9878: 9875: 9873: 9870: 9868: 9865: 9864: 9862: 9860: 9856: 9850: 9847: 9845: 9842: 9840: 9839:Legal history 9837: 9835: 9832: 9830: 9827: 9825: 9822: 9820: 9817: 9815: 9812: 9810: 9807: 9806: 9804: 9802: 9798: 9792: 9789: 9788: 9785: 9781: 9780:Jurisprudence 9774: 9769: 9767: 9762: 9760: 9755: 9754: 9751: 9740: 9735: 9730: 9728: 9718: 9716: 9713: 9710: 9704: 9701: 9699: 9696: 9694: 9691: 9689: 9686: 9684: 9681: 9679: 9676: 9674: 9671: 9669: 9666: 9664: 9661: 9659: 9658:Rudolf Carnap 9656: 9654: 9651: 9649: 9646: 9644: 9641: 9639: 9636: 9634: 9631: 9629: 9626: 9624: 9621: 9619: 9616: 9614: 9611: 9609: 9606: 9604: 9601: 9599: 9596: 9594: 9593:Auguste Comte 9591: 9590: 9581: 9578: 9576: 9573: 9571: 9568: 9566: 9565:Francis Bacon 9563: 9561: 9558: 9557: 9555: 9551: 9548: 9546: 9542: 9536: 9533: 9531: 9528: 9526: 9523: 9521: 9518: 9516: 9513: 9511: 9508: 9506: 9503: 9501: 9498: 9494: 9493:Pseudoscience 9491: 9490: 9489: 9486: 9484: 9481: 9479: 9476: 9474: 9471: 9469: 9466: 9464: 9461: 9459: 9456: 9454: 9451: 9450: 9448: 9444: 9436: 9433: 9431: 9428: 9426: 9423: 9421: 9418: 9416: 9413: 9411: 9408: 9407: 9406: 9403: 9399: 9396: 9395: 9394: 9391: 9389: 9386: 9384: 9381: 9380: 9378: 9374: 9368: 9365: 9363: 9360: 9358: 9355: 9353: 9352:Structuralism 9350: 9348: 9345: 9343: 9340: 9338: 9334: 9331: 9329: 9326: 9324: 9321: 9319: 9315: 9314:Received view 9312: 9310: 9306: 9303: 9301: 9298: 9296: 9292: 9288: 9285: 9283: 9280: 9278: 9275: 9273: 9270: 9268: 9265: 9263: 9260: 9258: 9255: 9253: 9250: 9248: 9245: 9243: 9240: 9238: 9235: 9233: 9230: 9228: 9225: 9223: 9222:Contextualism 9220: 9218: 9215: 9213: 9210: 9208: 9205: 9203: 9200: 9198: 9195: 9194: 9192: 9188: 9182: 9179: 9175: 9172: 9170: 9167: 9166: 9165: 9162: 9160: 9157: 9155: 9152: 9148: 9145: 9143: 9140: 9138: 9135: 9134: 9133: 9130: 9128: 9125: 9123: 9120: 9118: 9115: 9113: 9110: 9108: 9105: 9101: 9098: 9097: 9096: 9093: 9091: 9088: 9086: 9083: 9081: 9078: 9076: 9073: 9071: 9068: 9066: 9063: 9061: 9058: 9056: 9053: 9051: 9050: 9046: 9042: 9039: 9037: 9034: 9033: 9032: 9029: 9027: 9024: 9022: 9019: 9017: 9014: 9012: 9009: 9007: 9004: 9000: 8997: 8996: 8995: 8992: 8990: 8987: 8985: 8982: 8980: 8977: 8973: 8970: 8969: 8968: 8965: 8963: 8960: 8958: 8955: 8953: 8950: 8946: 8943: 8942: 8941: 8938: 8936: 8935: 8931: 8927: 8925: 8922: 8920: 8917: 8916: 8914: 8910: 8906: 8899: 8894: 8892: 8887: 8885: 8880: 8879: 8876: 8864: 8861: 8859: 8856: 8854: 8851: 8849: 8846: 8845: 8842: 8836: 8833: 8831: 8828: 8826: 8823: 8821: 8818: 8816: 8813: 8811: 8808: 8806: 8803: 8801: 8798: 8797: 8795: 8791: 8785: 8784: 8780: 8778: 8775: 8773: 8770: 8768: 8765: 8763: 8760: 8758: 8755: 8753: 8750: 8748: 8745: 8743: 8740: 8738: 8735: 8733: 8730: 8728: 8725: 8723: 8722:Justification 8720: 8718: 8715: 8713: 8710: 8708: 8705: 8703: 8700: 8698: 8695: 8693: 8690: 8688: 8685: 8683: 8680: 8678: 8675: 8673: 8670: 8668: 8665: 8663: 8661: 8657: 8655: 8653: 8649: 8648: 8646: 8644: 8640: 8634: 8631: 8629: 8626: 8624: 8621: 8619: 8616: 8614: 8611: 8609: 8606: 8604: 8601: 8599: 8598:Phenomenalism 8596: 8594: 8591: 8589: 8588:Naïve realism 8586: 8584: 8581: 8579: 8576: 8574: 8571: 8569: 8566: 8564: 8561: 8559: 8556: 8554: 8551: 8549: 8546: 8544: 8541: 8539: 8538:Contextualism 8536: 8534: 8531: 8529: 8526: 8525: 8523: 8521: 8517: 8511: 8510: 8506: 8504: 8503:Vienna Circle 8501: 8499: 8496: 8494: 8491: 8489: 8486: 8484: 8481: 8479: 8476: 8474: 8471: 8469: 8466: 8464: 8461: 8459: 8456: 8454: 8451: 8449: 8446: 8444: 8441: 8439: 8438:Hilary Putnam 8436: 8434: 8431: 8429: 8426: 8424: 8421: 8419: 8416: 8414: 8413:Robert Nozick 8411: 8409: 8408:John McDowell 8406: 8404: 8401: 8399: 8396: 8394: 8391: 8389: 8386: 8384: 8381: 8379: 8376: 8374: 8371: 8369: 8368:Immanuel Kant 8366: 8364: 8361: 8359: 8356: 8354: 8351: 8349: 8346: 8344: 8341: 8339: 8338:Alvin Goldman 8336: 8334: 8331: 8329: 8326: 8324: 8321: 8319: 8316: 8314: 8311: 8309: 8306: 8304: 8301: 8299: 8296: 8294: 8291: 8289: 8286: 8284: 8281: 8279: 8276: 8274: 8271: 8270: 8268: 8266: 8262: 8258: 8251: 8246: 8244: 8239: 8237: 8232: 8231: 8228: 8222:at Wiktionary 8221: 8220: 8214: 8210: 8209: 8198: 8194: 8189: 8185: 8181: 8177: 8175:0-87548-141-8 8171: 8167: 8163: 8158: 8152: 8148: 8144: 8140: 8138:0-8229-3617-8 8134: 8130: 8126: 8121: 8116: 8112: 8108: 8104: 8100: 8098:0-87395-372-X 8094: 8090: 8086: 8081: 8076: 8072: 8068: 8064: 8060: 8054: 8050: 8046: 8042: 8037: 8033: 8029: 8025: 8023:0-415-09112-8 8019: 8015: 8011: 8007: 8002: 7998: 7996:3-423-04586-8 7992: 7988: 7983: 7979: 7973: 7965: 7964: 7958: 7946: 7942: 7940:0-415-28589-5 7936: 7932: 7931: 7925: 7921: 7916: 7912: 7908: 7904: 7902:90-277-1835-0 7898: 7894: 7890: 7886: 7882: 7878: 7866: 7862: 7858: 7855:(24): 15–40. 7854: 7850: 7846: 7842: 7841:Miller, David 7838: 7834: 7830: 7826: 7820: 7816: 7812: 7811:Miller, David 7808: 7804: 7800: 7795: 7790: 7786: 7782: 7777: 7772: 7768: 7764: 7760: 7755: 7743: 7739: 7735: 7734: 7728: 7723: 7722:McGinn, Colin 7719: 7715: 7711: 7707: 7701: 7696: 7691: 7687: 7683: 7679: 7675: 7671: 7667: 7661: 7656: 7651: 7647: 7643: 7638: 7634: 7630: 7626: 7620: 7616: 7612: 7608: 7604: 7603:Uebel, Thomas 7600: 7596: 7591: 7587: 7583: 7579: 7575: 7569: 7565: 7561: 7556: 7552: 7548: 7544: 7538: 7534: 7530: 7526: 7525: 7520: 7516: 7512: 7508: 7504: 7498: 7494: 7490: 7486: 7481: 7474: 7470: 7467: at the 7466: 7462: 7458: 7451: 7450: 7445: 7441: 7429: 7425: 7419: 7415: 7414: 7408: 7404: 7400: 7396: 7395: 7389: 7385: 7381: 7377: 7373: 7368: 7363: 7359: 7355: 7351: 7346: 7342: 7337: 7333: 7329: 7325: 7321: 7317: 7313: 7309: 7305: 7301: 7296: 7292: 7290:0-691-02524-X 7286: 7282: 7277: 7273: 7268: 7264: 7260: 7256: 7252: 7248: 7244: 7240: 7236: 7231: 7219: 7215: 7214: 7209: 7205: 7201: 7197: 7193: 7189: 7185: 7179: 7175: 7171: 7167: 7162: 7158: 7154: 7149: 7144: 7139: 7134: 7130: 7126: 7125: 7120: 7117:(July 2009). 7116: 7112: 7108: 7104: 7100: 7094: 7090: 7085: 7081: 7075: 7071: 7066: 7062: 7058: 7054: 7050: 7046: 7042: 7041: 7035: 7034: 7022: 7018: 7014: 7010: 7006: 7002: 7001: 6995: 6991: 6985: 6981: 6976: 6972: 6968: 6964: 6960: 6956: 6952: 6948: 6944: 6937: 6932: 6928: 6923: 6919: 6913: 6909: 6905: 6901: 6896: 6892: 6890:0-691-07294-9 6886: 6882: 6877: 6873: 6869: 6865: 6863:0-521-07826-1 6859: 6855: 6850: 6838: 6834: 6830: 6826: 6825: 6819: 6813: 6809: 6805: 6801: 6797: 6793: 6789: 6785: 6781: 6777: 6773: 6768: 6764: 6758: 6755:. Routledge. 6754: 6749: 6737: 6733: 6732: 6727: 6723: 6722:Uebel, Thomas 6719: 6707: 6703: 6702: 6697: 6696:"Karl Popper" 6692: 6688: 6684: 6679: 6667: 6663: 6659: 6654: 6650: 6645: 6641: 6635: 6631: 6626: 6622: 6618: 6614: 6612:0-312-19545-1 6608: 6604: 6603: 6598: 6594: 6590: 6578: 6574: 6572:0-7619-6351-0 6568: 6564: 6560: 6555: 6544: 6540: 6536: 6532: 6528: 6524: 6520: 6515: 6504: 6500: 6496: 6492: 6488: 6484: 6480: 6475: 6471: 6470: 6465: 6460: 6449: 6445: 6441: 6437: 6433: 6429: 6425: 6420: 6416: 6411: 6407: 6402: 6398: 6394: 6390: 6384: 6380: 6376: 6372: 6368: 6367:Ruse, Michael 6364: 6359: 6354: 6350: 6346: 6342: 6337: 6333: 6329: 6325: 6319: 6315: 6311: 6307: 6302: 6298: 6296:1-4051-0345-0 6292: 6288: 6283: 6279: 6278: 6272: 6268: 6264: 6260: 6254: 6250: 6246: 6242: 6237: 6233: 6229: 6225: 6223:0-415-08400-8 6219: 6215: 6211: 6207: 6202: 6198: 6197: 6196:New Scientist 6192: 6187: 6183: 6179: 6175: 6171: 6167: 6163: 6162: 6156: 6152: 6150:0-87548-142-6 6146: 6142: 6137: 6133: 6127: 6122: 6121: 6114: 6112: 6106: 6100: 6096: 6091: 6087: 6081: 6077: 6076: 6070: 6066: 6062: 6058: 6056:90-277-2766-X 6052: 6048: 6044: 6040: 6035: 6031: 6027: 6023: 6017: 6013: 6009: 6004: 6003: 5996: 5992: 5986: 5983:. Routledge. 5982: 5977: 5973: 5968: 5964: 5959: 5955: 5951: 5946: 5939: 5935: 5931: 5924: 5920: 5919:Miller, David 5916: 5912: 5908: 5904: 5898: 5894: 5893: 5888: 5887:Miller, David 5884: 5880: 5875: 5874: 5868: 5864: 5859: 5855: 5849: 5845: 5840: 5828: 5824: 5823: 5818: 5813: 5806: 5805: 5798: 5787: 5783: 5778: 5774: 5770: 5766: 5762: 5758: 5754: 5749: 5745: 5743:0-521-28031-1 5739: 5735: 5730: 5726: 5724:0-87548-141-8 5720: 5716: 5711: 5707: 5703: 5699: 5693: 5689: 5688: 5682: 5678: 5674: 5670: 5668:0-87548-142-6 5664: 5660: 5655: 5651: 5647: 5643: 5641:0-521-07826-1 5637: 5633: 5628: 5624: 5620: 5616: 5612: 5608: 5607: 5599: 5594: 5590: 5586: 5582: 5576: 5572: 5567: 5563: 5559: 5555: 5551: 5547: 5543: 5542: 5537: 5532: 5528: 5527:How we reason 5523: 5519: 5513: 5509: 5505: 5501: 5496: 5484: 5480: 5479: 5474: 5469: 5465: 5464: 5459: 5455: 5450: 5446: 5440: 5436: 5432: 5427: 5423: 5419: 5414: 5409: 5405: 5401: 5397: 5392: 5388: 5384: 5380: 5374: 5370: 5365: 5361: 5357: 5352: 5347: 5343: 5339: 5334: 5329: 5325: 5321: 5317: 5312: 5308: 5304: 5300: 5298:0-8264-9026-3 5294: 5290: 5285: 5273: 5269: 5263: 5259: 5258: 5252: 5248: 5244: 5240: 5236: 5232: 5228: 5227: 5221: 5217: 5211: 5207: 5202: 5198: 5192: 5188: 5183: 5179: 5173: 5165: 5160: 5156: 5154:0-86091-008-3 5150: 5146: 5145: 5139: 5127: 5123: 5122: 5117: 5113: 5109: 5105: 5100: 5085: 5081: 5074: 5070: 5058: 5054: 5050: 5046: 5042: 5038: 5033: 5029: 5023: 5019: 5015: 5011: 5007: 5001: 4997: 4993: 4989: 4984: 4980: 4976: 4972: 4966: 4962: 4957: 4953: 4951:0-465-06990-8 4947: 4943: 4942: 4937: 4933: 4929: 4927:0-393-31570-3 4923: 4919: 4918: 4913: 4909: 4905: 4900: 4899: 4893: 4881: 4877: 4876: 4870: 4866: 4860: 4856: 4851: 4847: 4841: 4837: 4832: 4820: 4816: 4815: 4810: 4805: 4801: 4796: 4792: 4788: 4784: 4778: 4774: 4770: 4766: 4762: 4758: 4754: 4750: 4746: 4742: 4738: 4734: 4730: 4726: 4725: 4719: 4715: 4711: 4707: 4703: 4699: 4695: 4689: 4685: 4681: 4677: 4672: 4668: 4663: 4662: 4650: 4645: 4638: 4633: 4626: 4621: 4614: 4609: 4602: 4597: 4590: 4585: 4578: 4573: 4566: 4561: 4554: 4549: 4543:, p. 30. 4542: 4537: 4530: 4525: 4518: 4513: 4507:, p. 36. 4506: 4501: 4494: 4493:Thornton 2016 4489: 4483:, p. 60. 4482: 4481:Chalmers 2013 4477: 4471:, p. 59. 4470: 4469:Chalmers 2013 4465: 4458: 4453: 4446: 4441: 4434: 4429: 4422: 4417: 4415: 4407: 4402: 4395: 4390: 4383: 4378: 4371: 4366: 4359: 4354: 4347: 4342: 4335: 4330: 4323: 4318: 4311: 4306: 4300:, p. 86. 4299: 4294: 4288:, p. 83. 4287: 4282: 4275: 4270: 4264:, p. 88. 4263: 4258: 4251: 4246: 4239: 4234: 4228:, p. 82. 4227: 4222: 4220: 4212: 4207: 4200: 4195: 4188: 4183: 4176: 4171: 4165:, p. 25. 4164: 4159: 4152: 4147: 4140: 4135: 4128: 4123: 4117:, p. 12. 4116: 4111: 4109: 4101: 4097: 4092: 4085: 4084:Einstein 2010 4080: 4073: 4068: 4061: 4056: 4049: 4044: 4042: 4034: 4029: 4027: 4025: 4023: 4015: 4010: 4003: 3998: 3996: 3988: 3983: 3981: 3973: 3968: 3961: 3956: 3949: 3944: 3937: 3932: 3925: 3924:Theobald 2006 3920: 3913: 3908: 3901: 3896: 3894: 3886: 3881: 3874: 3869: 3862: 3858: 3853: 3846: 3842: 3837: 3835: 3828:, p. 22. 3827: 3822: 3815: 3810: 3803: 3799: 3794: 3788:, p. 92. 3787: 3782: 3780: 3771: 3767: 3763: 3759: 3755: 3751: 3747: 3743: 3739: 3732: 3725: 3721: 3716: 3709: 3704: 3698:, p. 62. 3697: 3696:Chalmers 2013 3692: 3685: 3680: 3673: 3668: 3662:, p. 30. 3661: 3656: 3649: 3644: 3642: 3634: 3629: 3623:, App. 1.III. 3622: 3617: 3610: 3605: 3598: 3593: 3591: 3589: 3587: 3579: 3574: 3567: 3562: 3560: 3552: 3551:Thornton 2007 3547: 3540: 3535: 3528: 3523: 3516: 3511: 3504: 3499: 3492: 3487: 3485: 3477: 3476:Grayling 2019 3472: 3470: 3462: 3457: 3450: 3445: 3441: 3428: 3424: 3419: 3412: 3407: 3400: 3395: 3388: 3383: 3376: 3371: 3364: 3361: 3357: 3351: 3344: 3340: 3334: 3327: 3322: 3315: 3309: 3302: 3297: 3290: 3286: 3285:Couvalis 1997 3281: 3279: 3271: 3267: 3263: 3259: 3255: 3250: 3248: 3240: 3239:Musgrave 1976 3235: 3233: 3225: 3224:Musgrave 1976 3221: 3220:Musgrave 1976 3217: 3212: 3210: 3202: 3198: 3193: 3191: 3183: 3178: 3171: 3166: 3159: 3154: 3152: 3150: 3142: 3137: 3130: 3125: 3118: 3113: 3106: 3101: 3094: 3088: 3078: 3072: 3065: 3058: 3051: 3047: 3041: 3034: 3029: 3022: 3016: 3009: 3003: 2996: 2991: 2984: 2978: 2971: 2966: 2957: 2950: 2945: 2938: 2934: 2928: 2921: 2917: 2913: 2909: 2905: 2901: 2897: 2893: 2889: 2888: 2883: 2882: 2875: 2868: 2862: 2855: 2854:Thornton 2016 2850: 2843: 2838: 2831: 2830:page 101 here 2827: 2822: 2815: 2810: 2803: 2802:Thompson 1981 2798: 2791: 2786: 2779: 2774: 2767: 2766:Thompson 1981 2762: 2755: 2751: 2746: 2739: 2734: 2727: 2723: 2719: 2714: 2712: 2704: 2700: 2695: 2688: 2682: 2675: 2670: 2664: 2660: 2656: 2652: 2648: 2644: 2638: 2631: 2627: 2622: 2615: 2611: 2605: 2598: 2592: 2585: 2580: 2578: 2568: 2563: 2556: 2552: 2548: 2547:Herbert Keuth 2541: 2534: 2529: 2522: 2518: 2517:Thornton 2016 2512: 2510: 2502: 2498: 2494: 2488: 2481: 2477: 2471: 2464: 2459: 2457: 2449: 2444: 2437: 2432: 2425: 2420: 2413: 2408: 2401: 2396: 2389: 2384: 2377: 2376:Thornton 2007 2372: 2365: 2360: 2353: 2348: 2341: 2336: 2326: 2316: 2309: 2305: 2300: 2298: 2290: 2289:falsification 2286: 2282: 2276: 2269: 2263: 2259: 2255: 2250: 2248: 2246: 2244: 2236: 2235:Thornton 2016 2231: 2229: 2227: 2219: 2215: 2209: 2199: 2192: 2188: 2182: 2175: 2171: 2167: 2161: 2159: 2154: 2142: 2139: 2136: 2133: 2130: 2127: 2124: 2121: 2116: 2113: 2107: 2104: 2098: 2095: 2092: 2089: 2086: 2083: 2077: 2074: 2071: 2068: 2065: 2062: 2059: 2058: 2054: 2048: 2045: 2044: 2042: 2039: 2036: 2033: 2030: 2029:Raven paradox 2027: 2024: 2021: 2019: 2016: 2013: 2010: 2008: 2005: 2000: 1999:Occam's razor 1997: 1995: 1992: 1991: 1989: 1986: 1984: 1981: 1978: 1975: 1972: 1969: 1966: 1963: 1960: 1957: 1954: 1951: 1948: 1945: 1944: 1937: 1934: 1933:Jean Bricmont 1930: 1926: 1922: 1921: 1910: 1908: 1907:anything goes 1904: 1900: 1898: 1893: 1888: 1878: 1873: 1863: 1861: 1856: 1851: 1841: 1839: 1833: 1829: 1826: 1820: 1810: 1806: 1804: 1798: 1786:Controversies 1783: 1774: 1770: 1767: 1761: 1752: 1750: 1745: 1741: 1732: 1729: 1725: 1720: 1712: 1705: 1701: 1698: 1694: 1692: 1688: 1684: 1680: 1675: 1671: 1660: 1657: 1653: 1649: 1645: 1641: 1637: 1632: 1623: 1619: 1617: 1612: 1607: 1603: 1599: 1595: 1590: 1587: 1577: 1570:, p. 593 1569: 1562: 1560: 1556: 1552: 1546: 1544: 1540: 1534: 1520: 1513: 1508: 1502: 1499: 1496: 1493: 1490: 1489: 1488: 1486: 1482: 1478: 1474: 1471: 1467: 1463: 1459: 1458: 1449: 1444: 1441: 1440: 1435: 1434: 1423: 1418: 1408: 1405: 1401: 1397: 1393: 1389: 1385: 1381: 1377: 1371: 1367: 1363: 1359: 1349: 1346: 1345:Ronald Fisher 1341: 1339: 1335: 1331: 1327: 1326: 1319: 1309: 1307: 1302: 1299: 1294: 1289: 1275: 1271: 1267: 1263: 1260: 1251: 1248: 1242: 1232: 1228: 1219: 1212: 1205: 1192: 1190: 1186: 1181: 1175: 1165: 1162: 1161:peppered moth 1152: 1147: 1132: 1127: 1117: 1115: 1114:controversial 1108: 1093: 1079: 1071: 1031: 1011: 1008: 992: 989: 979: 976: 970: 967: 957: 953: 951: 947: 937: 936:Thornton 2016 930: 926: 918: 916: 911: 909: 905: 901: 897: 881: 879: 873: 871: 865: 861: 857: 854: 850: 846: 836: 833: 827: 825: 820: 814: 812: 808: 802: 800: 795: 785: 783: 778: 774: 773:Vienna Circle 769: 767: 763: 758: 754: 749: 746: 742: 738: 737:Rudolf Carnap 734: 730: 726: 721: 707: 701: 698: 678: 675: 655: 652: 632: 626: 606: 586: 583: 560: 557: 537: 534: 514: 494: 471: 451: 443: 442: 441:modus tollens 437: 432: 430: 426: 422: 421: 416: 412: 408: 404: 398: 394: 390: 380: 378: 377:pseudoscience 374: 369: 367: 361: 359: 355: 350: 348: 344: 340: 336: 332: 327: 325: 321: 320:verifiability 316: 314: 310: 306: 302: 298: 297: 292: 289: 285: 281: 277: 270: 267:Here are two 265: 261: 253: 250: 235: 232: 224: 214: 208: 206: 201:This article 199: 190: 189: 180: 177: 169: 159: 155: 151: 145: 142:This article 140: 131: 130: 121: 118: 110: 100: 96: 90: 89: 84:This article 82: 73: 72: 67: 65: 58: 57: 52: 51: 46: 41: 32: 31: 19: 11422: 11414: 11406: 11398: 11390: 11382: 11374: 11366: 11358: 11350: 11342: 11334: 11326: 11318: 11238: 11230: 11222: 11214: 11206: 11198: 11190: 11182: 11174: 11158:Science wars 10956:Epistemology 10887:Reflectivism 10847:Hermeneutics 10832: 10699:Declinations 10675:Antihumanism 10668:Perspectives 10611: 10603: 10595: 10587: 10579: 10571: 10541:Open society 10530: 10411:Usul al-Fiqh 10409: 10392: 10388:Legal system 10365: 10358: 10256:Law's Empire 10254: 10244: 10234: 10224: 10214: 10204: 10194: 10184: 9859:Philosophers 9801:Legal theory 9703:Larry Laudan 9683:Imre Lakatos 9638:Otto Neurath 9613:Karl Pearson 9603:Pierre Duhem 9575:Isaac Newton 9505:Protoscience 9463:Epistemology 9337:Anti-realism 9335: / 9316: / 9307: / 9293: / 9291:Reductionism 9289: / 9262:Inductionism 9242:Evolutionism 9047: 9015: 8934:a posteriori 8933: 8929: 8781: 8682:Common sense 8660:A posteriori 8659: 8651: 8613:Reductionism 8507: 8458:Gilbert Ryle 8328:Fred Dretske 8313:Keith DeRose 8257:Epistemology 8218: 8196: 8161: 8124: 8084: 8040: 8005: 7986: 7961: 7949:. 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Retrieved 4812: 4772: 4728: 4722: 4713: 4675: 4666: 4644: 4632: 4620: 4608: 4596: 4584: 4572: 4560: 4553:Lakatos 1974 4548: 4536: 4531:, p. 7. 4524: 4512: 4505:Lakatos 1978 4500: 4488: 4476: 4464: 4457:Watkins 1984 4452: 4445:Russell 1948 4440: 4433:Russell 1998 4428: 4401: 4389: 4382:Lakatos 1978 4377: 4365: 4353: 4341: 4334:Lakatos 1974 4329: 4317: 4310:Lakatos 1978 4305: 4293: 4281: 4269: 4257: 4245: 4233: 4211:Lehmann 1993 4206: 4199:Wigmore 2017 4194: 4187:Chiasma 2017 4182: 4170: 4163:Lakatos 1978 4158: 4146: 4139:Daubert 1993 4134: 4122: 4091: 4079: 4067: 4060:Maxwell 1974 4055: 4033:Maxwell 1974 4009: 3987:Maxwell 1974 3967: 3960:Dawkins 1986 3955: 3948:Dawkins 1995 3943: 3931: 3919: 3907: 3880: 3868: 3852: 3826:Lakatos 1978 3821: 3809: 3793: 3745: 3741: 3731: 3715: 3703: 3691: 3679: 3667: 3655: 3635:, App. 1.II. 3628: 3616: 3604: 3578:Watkins 1984 3573: 3546: 3541:, Chap. 8.1. 3534: 3522: 3510: 3505:, p. 1. 3498: 3463:, p. X. 3461:Harding 1976 3456: 3444: 3418: 3406: 3394: 3387:Watkins 1970 3382: 3370: 3350: 3333: 3321: 3308: 3301:Lakatos 1978 3296: 3216:Watkins 1989 3200: 3197:Lakatos 1978 3182:Lakatos 1978 3177: 3170:Lakatos 1978 3165: 3141:Russell 1948 3136: 3124: 3112: 3100: 3087: 3071: 3064:Lakatos 1978 3057: 3040: 3028: 3015: 3008:Lakatos 1978 3002: 2990: 2983:Lakatos 1978 2977: 2965: 2956: 2944: 2927: 2919: 2903: 2885: 2879: 2874: 2861: 2849: 2837: 2821: 2809: 2797: 2785: 2773: 2761: 2745: 2733: 2725: 2721: 2694: 2686: 2681: 2669: 2637: 2621: 2604: 2591: 2562: 2554: 2540: 2528: 2487: 2470: 2443: 2431: 2419: 2407: 2395: 2383: 2371: 2359: 2347: 2335: 2325: 2315: 2308:Rosende 2009 2288: 2284: 2280: 2274: 2267: 2261: 2257: 2208: 2198: 2186: 2181: 2173: 2169: 2056: 1924: 1918: 1916: 1906: 1896: 1890: 1875: 1853: 1834: 1830: 1822: 1807: 1800: 1780: 1771: 1762: 1758: 1746: 1742: 1738: 1727: 1723: 1718: 1717: 1713:, p. 24 1711:Lakatos 1978 1703: 1699: 1695: 1666: 1655: 1651: 1647: 1643: 1639: 1631:Imre Lakatos 1629: 1620: 1616:Colin Howson 1591: 1585: 1583: 1574: 1568:Daubert 1993 1558: 1554: 1550: 1548: 1536: 1510: 1506: 1481:Pennock 2000 1477:Michael Ruse 1460:case, Judge 1455: 1453: 1447: 1437: 1431: 1429: 1420: 1373: 1342: 1323: 1321: 1303: 1290: 1286: 1257: 1244: 1229: 1225: 1177: 1157: 1129: 1110: 985: 974: 971: 965: 963: 954: 942: 928: 924: 914: 912: 899: 895: 892: 877: 874: 869: 866: 862: 858: 848: 844: 842: 828: 823: 818: 815: 803: 791: 770: 765: 752: 750: 741:Otto Neurath 725:David Miller 722: 439: 435: 433: 418: 407:observations 400: 370: 362: 351: 328: 317: 308: 294: 293:in his book 280:refutability 279: 275: 274: 260: 245: 227: 218: 205:copy editing 203:may require 202: 172: 163: 150:spinning off 143: 113: 104: 85: 61: 54: 48: 47:Please help 44: 11589:Karl Popper 11513:Objectivity 11482:Karl Popper 11472:Thomas Kuhn 11452:Mario Bunge 11203:(1879–1884) 11138:(1909–1959) 10872:Metaphysics 10852:Historicism 10767:Demarcation 10762:Consilience 10685:Rationalism 10507:Karl Popper 10333:Paternalism 10328:Natural law 10190:(c. 355 BC) 10037:Montesquieu 9829:Legal norms 9693:Ian Hacking 9678:Thomas Kuhn 9663:Karl Popper 9643:C. D. Broad 9560:Roger Bacon 9488:Non-science 9430:Linguistics 9410:Archaeology 9305:Rationalism 9295:Determinism 9282:Physicalism 9247:Fallibilism 9197:Coherentism 9127:Testability 9080:Observation 9075:Objectivity 9036:alternative 8967:Correlation 8957:Consilience 8762:Proposition 8732:Objectivity 8618:Reliabilism 8608:Rationalism 8553:Fallibilism 8528:Coherentism 8473:Ernest Sosa 8448:Thomas Reid 8433:James Pryor 8403:G. E. Moore 8393:David Lewis 8383:Saul Kripke 8378:Peter Klein 8358:Susan Haack 8288:Robert Audi 7951:3 September 7444:Hume, David 6193:. Letters. 6191:"Evolution" 5541:Jurimetrics 5326:(1): 8–38. 5093:19 November 5043:(1): 31–55. 4886:22 February 4637:Miller 2000 4589:Martin 2017 4565:Popper 1974 4541:Garcia 2006 4529:Miller 1994 4517:Popper 1962 4435:, Chap. VI. 4348:, Note 70a. 4346:Popper 1974 4262:Howson 2000 4252:, Sec. 2.1. 4240:, Sec. 3.2. 4151:Krafka 2002 4096:Popper 1995 4048:Popper 1974 4016:, Sec. 8.1. 3972:Dienes 2008 3936:Wallis 2005 3857:Popper 1959 3843:, pp.  3841:Popper 1959 3814:Popper 1959 3720:Popper 1959 3708:Popper 1959 3684:Popper 1983 3660:Popper 1972 3650:, Sec. 1.9. 3648:Popper 1972 3633:Popper 1972 3621:Popper 1972 3609:Popper 1959 3599:, Chap. 13. 3580:, Sec. 7.2. 3566:Popper 1959 3527:Creath 2017 3503:Miller 1994 3491:Popper 1972 3451:, Sec. 2.3. 3425:, pp.  3411:Popper 1962 3399:Popper 1994 3339:Yehuda 2018 3326:Popper 1959 3287:, pp.  3117:Popper 1983 3105:Popper 1959 3093:Popper 1959 3033:Popper 1959 3021:Popper 1959 2995:Popper 1959 2970:Popper 1962 2912:testability 2867:Krafka 2002 2842:Popper 1962 2826:Popper 1995 2814:Popper 1978 2790:Popper 1994 2752:, pp.  2750:Darwin 1869 2718:Popper 1974 2699:Popper 1983 2674:Popper 1980 2659:Ridley 2003 2643:Cruzan 2018 2626:Fisher 1930 2614:Popper 1983 2584:Popper 1962 2567:Popper 1959 2533:Popper 1959 2521:Popper 1959 2480:Watkins1984 2463:Popper 1974 2448:Popper 1972 2436:Popper 1959 2424:Popper 1959 2412:Popper 1972 2388:Popper 1959 2364:Popper 1962 2352:Popper 1959 2340:Popper 1983 2304:Popper 1983 2281:falsifiable 2275:Falsifiable 2268:Falsifiable 2258:falsifiable 2254:Popper 1983 2191:Popper 1959 2166:Popper 1972 1971:Fallibilism 1855:Thomas Kuhn 1679:beta decays 1586:falsifiable 1411:Historicism 1352:Mathematics 1293:beta decays 1281: 1956 1270:Clyde Cowan 1070:Rynasiewicz 845:methodology 832:fallibilist 389:Inductivism 373:non-science 291:Karl Popper 269:black swans 11568:Categories 11293:Ernst Mach 11288:Ernst Laas 11263:A. J. Ayer 11251:Proponents 11070:Philosophy 10867:Humanities 10811:Antitheses 10680:Empiricism 10657:Positivism 10514:Philosophy 10440:Law portal 10067:Petrażycki 10057:Pashukanis 10052:Olivecrona 9987:Hägerström 9902:Blackstone 9580:David Hume 9553:Precursors 9435:Psychology 9415:Economics‎ 9309:Empiricism 9300:Pragmatism 9287:Positivism 9277:Naturalism 9147:scientific 9031:Hypothesis 8994:Experiment 8863:Discussion 8853:Task Force 8772:Simplicity 8752:Perception 8628:Skepticism 8603:Positivism 8578:Infinitism 8543:Empiricism 8398:John Locke 8363:David Hume 8353:Anil Gupta 8348:Paul Grice 8323:John Dewey 8293:A. J. Ayer 7776:1703.02389 7714:1004353997 7040:Dialectica 6583:27 January 6345:BioScience 6161:Dialectica 5833:4 November 5387:1054371393 5226:Erkenntnis 4658:References 4613:Broad 1979 4459:, Sec 8.5. 4115:Smith 2000 4002:Keuth 2005 3912:Rudge 2005 3885:Simon 1985 3786:Stove 1982 3722:, p.  3710:, Sec. 68. 3568:, Sec. 85. 3515:Uebel 2019 3358:, p.  3341:, p.  3314:Zahar 1983 3268:, p.  3260:, p.  3158:Zahar 1983 3050:Zahar 1983 3046:Zahar 1983 2738:Keuth 2005 2653:, p.  2645:, p.  2628:, p.  2551:Keuth 2005 2400:Feigl 1978 1929:Alan Sokal 1899:hypothesis 1415:See also: 1356:See also: 1343:Darwinist 956:possible. 794:David Hume 417:argue (or 387:See also: 343:predictive 305:hypothesis 299:(1934). A 213:editing it 154:relocating 99:footnoting 50:improve it 11534:Verstehen 11520:Phronesis 11508:Knowledge 11492:Max Weber 11312:Criticism 11060:Sociology 10998:Modernism 10976:pluralism 10961:anarchism 10857:Historism 10777:Induction 10690:Scientism 10200:(c. 1270) 10082:Pufendorf 10017:Llewellyn 9877:Aristotle 9420:Geography 9388:Chemistry 9347:Scientism 9142:ladenness 8962:Construct 8940:Causality 8727:Knowledge 8712:Induction 8662:knowledge 8654:knowledge 8067:212627154 7963:L'Express 7861:0124-6127 7803:119401938 7650:CiteSeerX 7633:706920414 7582:817562250 7511:923649072 7446:(1896) . 7263:171003093 7192:219957500 6971:205512848 6843:9 January 6792:1529-8795 6724:(2019) . 6599:(1998) . 6397:366517438 6332:260208425 6287:Evolution 6109:excerpt: 5804:Knowledge 5489:7 January 5333:1006.3868 5247:203071483 5172:cite book 4979:182663275 4791:847985678 4753:0036-8075 4702:925355415 4577:Kuhn 1996 4408:, Sec. 4. 4394:Fine 2019 4360:, Chap 3. 4322:Pera 1989 4298:Mayo 2018 4286:Mayo 2018 4226:Mayo 2018 3902:, Sec. 2. 3798:Shea 2020 3762:1356-1294 3449:Mayo 2018 3423:Kuhn 1970 3375:Kuhn 1974 3077:Kuhn 1970 2949:Kaye 2005 2497:Shea 2020 2330:invalid". 2203:concepts. 2170:imaginary 1872:Astrology 1485:Ruse 2010 1388:structure 1380:empirical 1135:Evolution 1080:ϕ 1032:ϕ 1012:ϕ 1009:⊨ 966:empirical 745:A.J. Ayer 705:¬ 702:∧ 645:in which 630:⇒ 581:¬ 492:¬ 358:empirical 309:logically 284:deductive 56:talk page 18:Falsified 11555:Category 10971:nihilism 10966:idealism 10896:Related 10772:Evidence 10430:Category 10352:Concepts 10318:Legalism 10270:Theories 10157:Voegelin 10127:Scaevola 10087:Radbruch 10062:Perelman 10047:Nussbaum 9992:Jellinek 9957:Habermas 9952:Gurvitch 9922:Durkheim 9892:Beccaria 9715:Category 9367:Vitalism 9190:Theories 9164:Variable 9085:Paradigm 8972:function 8930:A priori 8919:Analysis 8912:Concepts 8848:Category 8667:Analysis 8652:A priori 8643:Concepts 8583:Innatism 8520:Theories 8147:19264362 8117:(1989). 8077:(1977). 8032:26159482 7945:Archived 7911:10996819 7865:Archived 7843:(2014). 7833:57641308 7813:(2006). 7748:22 April 7742:Archived 7724:(2002). 7674:54111232 7551:36438781 7428:Archived 7403:51946605 7376:26168112 7324:12776215 7218:Archived 7157:40390670 7061:42971398 6963:23249368 6837:Archived 6833:16116981 6800:13667389 6742:22 April 6736:Archived 6706:Archived 6672:21 April 6666:Archived 6621:39605994 6577:Archived 6369:(2010). 6267:30156902 6232:25130665 6182:42970324 6065:17982125 6030:39262003 5921:(2000). 5911:30353251 5889:(1994). 5827:Archived 5706:34548541 5589:54503549 5554:29762910 5483:Archived 5360:22364575 5307:62742611 5272:Archived 5126:Archived 5114:(1978). 5084:Archived 5057:Archived 4938:(1995). 4914:(1986). 4880:Archived 4825:21 April 4819:Archived 4771:(2013). 4495:, Sec 5. 4100:Chap. 15 3802:Sec. 2.c 3770:30575209 3611:, Sec 2. 2174:spurious 1940:See also 1823:Section 1707:—  1564:—  1515:—  1470:Arkansas 1384:quantity 932:—  347:testable 333:and the 95:citation 11435:Critics 11160:(1990s) 11154:(1980s) 11148:(1960s) 11128:(1890s) 10981:realism 10913:(1830s) 10901:in the 10465:changes 10378:Justice 10132:Schmitt 10122:Savigny 10102:Reinach 10027:Maistre 10022:Luhmann 9997:Jhering 9947:Grotius 9932:Ehrlich 9927:Dworkin 9917:Cardozo 9897:Bentham 9887:Bastiat 9872:Aquinas 9425:History 9393:Physics 9383:Biology 9181:more... 9169:control 9065:Inquiry 8783:more... 8563:Fideism 8509:more... 8184:2580491 8166:371–412 8129:118–123 8107:3034395 8089:119–123 7871:11 June 7781:Bibcode 7384:6100616 7255:4319794 7224:18 June 6808:9434812 6712:19 June 5773:2291263 5677:2580491 5460:(ed.). 5422:9758105 5351:4476974 5278:12 June 4733:Bibcode 4724:Science 3312:Zahar ( 2918:in the 2902:). 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