937:
percentage of failure rate applicable to the failure modes which are detected. The possibility that the detection means may itself fail latently should be accounted for in the coverage analysis as a limiting factor (i.e., coverage cannot be more reliable than the detection means availability). Inclusion of the detection coverage in the FMEA can lead to each individual failure that would have been one effect category now being a separate effect category due to the detection coverage possibilities. Another way to include detection coverage is for the FTA to conservatively assume that no holes in coverage due to latent failure in the detection method affect detection of all failures assigned to the failure effect category of concern. The FMEA can be revised if necessary for those cases where this conservative assumption does not allow the top event probability requirements to be met.
168:
dependent on the effectiveness and timeliness with which design problems are identified. Timeliness is probably the most important consideration. In the extreme case, the FMECA would be of little value to the design decision process if the analysis is performed after the hardware is built. While the FMECA identifies all part failure modes, its primary benefit is the early identification of all critical and catastrophic subsystem or system failure modes so they can be eliminated or minimized through design modification at the earliest point in the development effort; therefore, the FMECA should be performed at the system level as soon as preliminary design information is available and extended to the lower levels as the detail design progresses.
196:
to interfaces between systems and in fact at all functional interfaces. The purpose of these FMEAs is to assure that irreversible physical and/or functional damage is not propagated across the interface as a result of failures in one of the interfacing units. These analyses are done to the piece part level for the circuits that directly interface with the other units. The FMEA can be accomplished without a CA, but a CA requires that the FMEA has previously identified system level critical failures. When both steps are done, the total process is called an FMECA.
80:; often written with "failure modes" in plural) is the process of reviewing as many components, assemblies, and subsystems as possible to identify potential failure modes in a system and their causes and effects. For each component, the failure modes and their resulting effects on the rest of the system are recorded in a specific FMEA worksheet. There are numerous variations of such worksheets. An FMEA can be a qualitative analysis, but may be put on a quantitative basis when mathematical
267:
477:
part or component failure modes (such as fully fractured axle or deformed axle, or electrical contact stuck open, stuck short, or intermittent). A functional FMEA will focus on functional failure modes. These may be general (such as no function, over function, under function, intermittent function, or unintended function) or more detailed and specific to the equipment being analyzed. A PFMEA will focus on process failure modes (such as inserting the wrong drill bit).
1289:: analysis of products prior to production. These are the most detailed (in MIL 1629 called Piece-Part or Hardware FMEA) FMEAs and used to identify any possible hardware (or other) failure mode up to the lowest part level. It should be based on hardware breakdown (e.g. the BoM = bill of materials). Any failure effect severity, failure prevention (mitigation), failure detection and diagnostics may be fully analyzed in this FMEA.
179:(backward logic) failure analysis that may handle multiple failures within the item and/or external to the item including maintenance and logistics. It starts at higher functional / system level. An FTA may use the basic failure mode FMEA records or an effect summary as one of its inputs (the basic events). Interface hazard analysis, human error analysis and others may be added for completion in scenario modelling.
955:). This may influence the end effect probability of failure or the worst case effect Severity. The exact calculation may not be easy in all cases, such as those where multiple scenarios (with multiple events) are possible and detectability / dormancy plays a crucial role (as for redundant systems). In that case fault tree analysis and/or event trees may be needed to determine exact probability and risk levels.
1277:: before design solutions are provided (or only on high level) functions can be evaluated on potential functional failure effects. General Mitigations ("design to" requirements) can be proposed to limit consequence of functional failures or limit the probability of occurrence in this early development. It is based on a functional breakdown of a system. This type may also be used for Software evaluation.
32:
745:
reversed mode, too late functioning, erratic functioning, etc. Each end effect is given a
Severity number (S) from, say, I (no effect) to V (catastrophic), based on cost and/or loss of life or quality of life. These numbers prioritize the failure modes (together with probability and detectability). Below a typical classification is given. Other classifications are possible. See also
205:
the level in the hierarchy of the part to the sub-system, sub-system to the system, etc.), the basic hardware status, and the criteria for system and mission success. Every effort should be made to define all ground rules before the FMEA begins; however, the ground rules may be expanded and clarified as the analysis proceeds. A typical set of ground rules (assumptions) follows:
672:
All the potential causes for a failure mode should be identified and documented. This should be in technical terms. Examples of causes are: Human errors in handling, Manufacturing induced faults, Fatigue, Creep, Abrasive wear, erroneous algorithms, excessive voltage or improper operating conditions or use (depending on the used ground rules). A failure mode may given a
390:(AIAG) first published an FMEA standard for the automotive industry. It is now in its fourth edition. The SAE first published related standard J1739 in 1994. This standard is also now in its fourth edition. In 2019 both method descriptions were replaced by the new AIAG / VDA FMEA handbook. It is a harmonization of the former FMEA standards of AIAG,
66:
818:, like metal growing a crack, but not of critical length). It should be made clear how the failure mode or cause can be discovered by an operator under normal system operation or if it can be discovered by the maintenance crew by some diagnostic action or automatic built in system test. A dormancy and/or latency period may be entered.
438:
applicability to provide a meaningful input to critical procedures such as virtual qualification, root cause analysis, accelerated test programs, and to remaining life assessment. To overcome the shortcomings of FMEA and FMECA a failure modes, mechanisms and effect analysis (FMMEA) has often been used.
1243:
tool FMEA can augment or complement FTA and identify many more causes and failure modes resulting in top-level symptoms. It is not able to discover complex failure modes involving multiple failures within a subsystem, or to report expected failure intervals of particular failure modes up to the upper
744:
Determine the
Severity for the worst-case scenario adverse end effect (state). It is convenient to write these effects down in terms of what the user might see or experience in terms of functional failures. Examples of these end effects are: full loss of function x, degraded performance, functions in
204:
The ground rules of each FMEA include a set of project selected procedures; the assumptions on which the analysis is based; the hardware that has been included and excluded from the analysis and the rationale for the exclusions. The ground rules also describe the indenture level of the analysis (i.e.
191:
When performing an FMECA, interfacing hardware (or software) is first considered to be operating within specification. After that it can be extended by consequently using one of the 5 possible failure modes of one function of the interfacing hardware as a cause of failure for the design element under
936:
This type of analysis is useful to determine how effective various test processes are at the detection of latent and dormant faults. The method used to accomplish this involves an examination of the applicable failure modes to determine whether or not their effects are detected, and to determine the
476:
The specific manner or way by which a failure occurs in terms of failure of the part, component, function, equipment, subsystem, or system under investigation. Depending on the type of FMEA performed, failure mode may be described at various levels of detail. A piece part FMEA will focus on detailed
252:
From the above list, early identifications of SFPS, input to the troubleshooting procedure and locating of performance monitoring / fault detection devices are probably the most important benefits of the FMECA. In addition, the FMECA procedures are straightforward and allow orderly evaluation of the
195:
In addition, each part failure postulated is considered to be the only failure in the system (i.e., it is a single failure analysis). In addition to the FMEAs done on systems to evaluate the impact lower level failures have on system operation, several other FMEAs are done. Special attention is paid
162:
The FME(C)A is a design tool used to systematically analyze postulated component failures and identify the resultant effects on system operations. The analysis is sometimes characterized as consisting of two sub-analyses, the first being the failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), and the second,
671:
It is necessary to look at the cause of a failure mode and the likelihood of occurrence. This can be done by analysis, calculations / FEM, looking at similar items or processes and the failure modes that have been documented for them in the past. A failure cause is looked upon as a design weakness.
486:
For example; "fatigue or corrosion of a structural beam" or "fretting corrosion in an electrical contact" is a failure mechanism and in itself (likely) not a failure mode. The related failure mode (end state) is a "full fracture of structural beam" or "an open electrical contact". The initial cause
143:
Functional analyses are needed as an input to determine correct failure modes, at all system levels, both for functional FMEA or piece-part (hardware) FMEA. An FMEA is used to structure mitigation for risk reduction based on either failure mode or effect severity reduction, or based on lowering the
187:
The analysis should always be started by someone listing the functions that the design needs to fulfill. Functions are the starting point of a well done FMEA, and using functions as baseline provides the best yield of an FMEA. After all, a design is only one possible solution to perform functions
1252:
numbers, and multiplication is not defined for ordinal numbers. The ordinal rankings only say that one ranking is better or worse than another, but not by how much. For instance, a ranking of "2" may not be twice as severe as a ranking of "1", or an "8" may not be twice as severe as a "4", but
167:
should be a living document during development of a hardware design. It should be scheduled and completed concurrently with the design. If completed in a timely manner, the FMECA can help guide design decisions. The usefulness of the FMECA as a design tool and in the decision-making process is
1264:
The FMEA worksheet is hard to produce, hard to understand and read, as well as hard to maintain. The use of neural network techniques to cluster and visualise failure modes were suggested starting from 2010. An alternative approach is to combine the traditional FMEA table with set of bow-tie
437:
which provides detailed guides on applying the method. The standard failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) and failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) procedures identify the product failure mechanisms, but may not model them without specialized software. This limits their
809:
The means or method by which a failure is detected, isolated by operator and/or maintainer and the time it may take. This is important for maintainability control (availability of the system) and it is especially important for multiple failure scenarios. This may involve dormant failure
962:
like shown below, based on Mil. Std. 882. The higher the risk level, the more justification and mitigation is needed to provide evidence and lower the risk to an acceptable level. High risk should be indicated to higher level management, who are responsible for final decision-making.
135:
A successful FMEA activity helps identify potential failure modes based on experience with similar products and processes—or based on common physics of failure logic. It is widely used in development and manufacturing industries in various phases of the product life cycle.
163:
the criticality analysis (CA). Successful development of an FMEA requires that the analyst include all significant failure modes for each contributing element or part in the system. FMEAs can be performed at the system, subsystem, assembly, subassembly or part level. The
2453:
483:
Defects in requirements, design, process, quality control, handling or part application, which are the underlying cause or sequence of causes that initiate a process (mechanism) that leads to a failure mode over a certain time. A failure mode may have more causes.
238:
Early identification of single failure points (SFPS) and system interface problems, which may be critical to mission success and/or safety. They also provide a method of verifying that switching between redundant elements is not jeopardized by postulated single
1247:
Additionally, the multiplication of the severity, occurrence and detection rankings may result in rank reversals, where a less serious failure mode receives a higher RPN than a more serious failure mode. The reason for this is that the rankings are
1880:
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in Design (Design FMEA), Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in Manufacturing and Assembly Processes (Process FMEA), and Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis for Machinery (Machinery
234:
A documented uniform method of assessing potential failure mechanisms, failure modes and their impact on system operation, resulting in a list of failure modes ranked according to the seriousness of their system impact and likelihood of
1283:: analysis of systems or subsystems in the early design concept stages to analyse the failure mechanisms and lower level functional failures, specially to different concept solutions in more detail. It may be used in trade-off studies.
449:(OEMs) like Ford are updating their Customer Specific Requirements (CSR) to include the usage of specific FMEA software. For Ford specifically, these requirements had multiple-stage compliance deadlines of July and December of 2022.
2484:
735:
analysis and the failure mode ratios from a failure mode distribution catalog, such as RAC FMD-97. This method allows a quantitative FTA to use the FMEA results to verify that undesired events meet acceptable levels of risk.
1898:
Potential
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in Design (Design FMEA) and Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in Manufacturing and Assembly Processes (Process FMEA) and Effects Analysis for Machinery (Machinery
814:(e.g. No direct system effect, while a redundant system / item automatically takes over or when the failure only is problematic during specific mission or system states) or latent failures (e.g. deterioration failure
352:(SAE, an organization covering aviation and other transportation beyond just automotive, despite its name) publishing ARP926 in 1967. After two revisions, Aerospace Recommended Practice ARP926 has been replaced by
2435:
1927:
1228:) and retrospective approaches, have been found to have limited validity when used in isolation. Challenges around scoping and organisational boundaries appear to be a major factor in this lack of validity.
1223:
While FMEA identifies important hazards in a system, its results may not be comprehensive and the approach has limitations. In the healthcare context, FMEA and other risk assessment methods, including SWIFT
542:
The consequences of a failure mode. Severity considers the worst potential consequence of a failure, determined by the degree of injury, property damage, system damage and/or time lost to repair the failure.
425:
Although initially developed by the military, FMEA methodology is now extensively used in a variety of industries including semiconductor processing, food service, plastics, software, and healthcare.
1295:: analysis of manufacturing and assembly processes. Both quality and reliability may be affected from process faults. The input for this FMEA is amongst others a work process / task breakdown.
320:
Procedures for conducting FMECA were described in 1949 in US Armed Forces
Military Procedures document MIL-P-1629, revised in 1980 as MIL-STD-1629A. By the early 1960s, contractors for the
494:
Immediate consequences of a failure on operation, or more generally on the needs for the customer / user that should be fulfilled by the function but now is not, or not fully, fulfilled.
144:
probability of failure or both. The FMEA is in principle a full inductive (forward logic) analysis, however the failure probability can only be estimated or reduced by understanding the
929:
Incorrect. An erroneous indication to an operator due to the malfunction or failure of an indicator (i.e., instruments, sensing devices, visual or audible warning devices, etc.).
2509:
188:
that need to be fulfilled. This way an FMEA can be done on concept designs as well as detail designs, on hardware as well as software, and no matter how complex the design.
2432:
1924:
1734:
Applicability of NASA Contract
Quality Management and Failure Mode Effect Analysis Procedures to the USFS Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Lease Management Program
2344:
Kerk Y.W.; Tay K. M.; Lim C.P. (2017). "n
Analytical Interval Fuzzy Inference System for Risk Evaluation and Prioritization in Failure Mode and Effect Analysis".
790:
Critical (causes a loss of primary function; loss of all safety margins, 1 failure away from a catastrophe, severe damage, severe injuries, max 1 possible death)
1265:
diagrams. The diagrams provide a visualisation of the chains of cause and effect, while the FMEA table provides the detailed information about specific events.
536:
Severity (of the event) × probability (of the event occurring) × detection (probability that the event would not be detected before the user was aware of it).
464:
The AP replaces the former risk matrix and RPN in the AIAG / VDA FMEA handbook 2019. It makes a statement about the need for additional improvement measures.
92:
in the late 1950s to study problems that might arise from malfunctions of military systems. An FMEA is often the first step of a system reliability study.
1569:
487:
might have been "Improper application of corrosion protection layer (paint)" and /or "(abnormal) vibration input from another (possibly failed) system".
3029:
2389:"A perceptual computing-based method to prioritize failure modes in failure mode and effect analysis and its application to edible bird nest farming"
524:
The means of detection of the failure mode by maintainer, operator or built in detection system, including estimated dormancy period (if applicable).
2543:
1615:
732:
148:. Hence, FMEA may include information on causes of failure (deductive analysis) to reduce the possibility of occurrence by eliminating identified
1337:
1327:
41:
386:. Ford applied the same approach to processes (PFMEA) to consider potential process induced failures prior to launching production. In 1993 the
3365:
277:
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as an alternative to classic RPN model. In the new AIAG / VDA FMEA handbook (2019) the RPN approach was replaced by the AP (action priority).
2615:
1768:
364:
321:
242:
An effective method for evaluating the effect of proposed changes to the design and/or operational procedures on mission success and safety.
1995:
2303:
1589:
1359:
84:
models are combined with a statistical failure mode ratio database. It was one of the first highly structured, systematic techniques for
3237:
1808:
Matsumoto, K.; T. Matsumoto; Y. Goto (1975). "Reliability
Analysis of Catalytic Converter as an Automotive Emission Control System".
1156:
Development of designs and test systems to ensure that the failures have been eliminated or the risk is reduced to acceptable level.
2658:
1948:
2059:
912:/ working state, a second failure situation should be explored to determine whether or not an indication will be evident to all
2038:
289:
50:
3022:
2189:
Franklin, Bryony Dean; Shebl, Nada Atef; Barber, Nick (2012). "Failure mode and effects analysis: too little for too much?".
1861:
1240:
798:
Catastrophic (product becomes inoperative; the failure may result in complete unsafe operation and possible multiple deaths)
693:
Extremely unlikely (virtually impossible or No known occurrences on similar products or processes, with many running hours)
636:
Severely reduced aircraft deceleration on ground and side drift. Partial loss of runway position control. Risk of collision
445:, an international quality standard that requires companies to have an organization-specific documented FMEA process, many
1548:
1376:
1306:
430:
359:
During the 1970s, use of FMEA and related techniques spread to other industries. In 1971 NASA prepared a report for the
1371:
548:
Additional info, including the proposed mitigation or actions used to lower a risk or justify a risk level or scenario.
2608:
1522:
1315:
307:
245:
A basis for in-flight troubleshooting procedures and for locating performance monitoring and fault-detection devices.
774:
Very minor, no damage, no injuries, only results in a maintenance action (only noticed by discriminating customers)
3420:
3410:
3015:
2017:
1732:
1689:
387:
324:(NASA) were using variations of FMECA or FMEA under a variety of names. NASA programs using FMEA variants included
2304:"A new two-stage fuzzy inference system-based approach to prioritize failures in failure mode and effect analysis"
231:
It provides a documented method for selecting a design with a high probability of successful operation and safety.
1663:
446:
360:
171:
Remark: For more complete scenario modelling another type of reliability analysis may be considered, for example
2454:"A clustering-based failure mode and effect analysis model and its application to the edible bird nest industry"
2275:
Kmenta, Steven; Ishii, Koshuke (2004). "Scenario-Based
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Using Expected Cost".
3435:
2775:
2668:
2643:
1575:
1381:
657:
Require redundant independent brake hydraulic channels and/or require redundant sealing and classify o-ring as
391:
192:
review. This gives the opportunity to make the design robust against function failure elsewhere in the system.
2388:
3430:
3230:
3164:
2734:
2648:
1232:
500:
An identifier for system level and thereby item complexity. Complexity increases as levels are closer to one.
3144:
2996:
2601:
1552:
1225:
434:
285:
113:(failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis) to indicate that criticality analysis is performed too.
3415:
3370:
2811:
2724:
2111:
1518:
383:
923:
Normal. An indication that is evident to an operator when the system or equipment is operating normally.
3204:
2673:
1697:. National Aeronautics and Space Administration George C. Marshall Space Flight Center. 1974. M–GA–75–1
1740:. National Aeronautics and Space Administration George C. Marshall Space Flight Center. TM X–2567
212:
All inputs (including software commands) to the item being analyzed are present and at nominal values.
3425:
3089:
2821:
2806:
2095:
1851:
1497:
3292:
3223:
2836:
2714:
2709:
2653:
2232:
Shebl, N. A.; Franklin, B. D.; Barber, N. (2009). "Is failure mode and effect analysis reliable?".
1488:
926:
Abnormal. An indication that is evident to an operator when the system has malfunctioned or failed.
782:
Minor, low damage, light injuries (affects very little of the system, noticed by average customer)
3174:
3038:
2683:
2678:
1447:"On the use of fuzzy inference techniques in assessment models: part II: industrial applications"
1387:
367:
report described the application of FMEA to wastewater treatment plants. FMEA as application for
121:
89:
2003:
1257:
for further discussion. Various solutions to this problems have been proposed, e.g., the use of
3199:
2958:
2663:
2140:"Assessing the validity of prospective hazard analysis methods: A comparison of two techniques"
933:
PERFORM DETECTION COVERAGE ANALYSIS FOR TEST PROCESSES AND MONITORING (From ARP4761 Standard):
3344:
3266:
3149:
2892:
2862:
2638:
1399:
886:
The average time that a failure mode may be undetected may be entered if known. For example:
394:, SAE and other method descriptions. As of 2024, the AIAG / VDA FMEA Handbook is accepted by
382:
introduced FMEA to the automotive industry for safety and regulatory consideration after the
20:
2039:"17 December 2021 – Ford CSRs for use with IATF 16949 – International Automotive Task Force"
1731:
Dyer, Morris K.; Dewey G. Little; Earl G. Hoard; Alfred C. Taylor; Rayford
Campbell (1972).
3271:
3119:
2983:
2953:
2353:
1254:
341:
2420:
1912:
1759:
1446:
645:(1) Flight computer and maintenance computer will indicate "Left main brake, pressure low"
8:
3318:
3094:
3059:
2963:
2948:
2917:
2624:
1353:
1236:
415:
172:
149:
129:
117:
2357:
1790:
1761:
Application of Selected Industrial Engineering Techniques to Wastewater Treatment Plants
1571:
MIL-STD-1629A – Procedures for performing a failure mode effect and criticality analysis
731:
For a piece part FMEA, quantitative probability may be calculated from the results of a
3297:
3179:
3159:
3154:
2973:
2968:
2719:
2688:
2476:
2369:
2326:
2257:
2214:
2166:
2139:
1970:
1469:
379:
125:
2544:"Application of Self-Organizing Map to Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Methodology"
1356: – Failure analysis system used in safety engineering and reliability engineering
3169:
3099:
3069:
2927:
2867:
2249:
2206:
2171:
1857:
1717:
Design Analysis Procedure For Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
1431:
1365:
363:
recommending the use of FMEA in assessment of offshore petroleum exploration. A 1973
349:
46:
2330:
2261:
2218:
1473:
3375:
3328:
3194:
3104:
3064:
2932:
2902:
2831:
2826:
2765:
2750:
2558:
2524:
2480:
2468:
2403:
2373:
2361:
2318:
2284:
2241:
2198:
2161:
2151:
1817:
1645:
1623:
1597:
1461:
411:
85:
1554:
MIL-P-1629 – Procedures for performing a failure mode effect and critical analysis
140:
refers to studying the consequences of those failures on different system levels.
3261:
3129:
3109:
3049:
2978:
2877:
2872:
2816:
2791:
2755:
2562:
2439:
2245:
1931:
1405:
1393:
746:
333:
2576:
2138:
Potts H.W.W.; Anderson J.E.; Colligan L.; Leach P.; Davis S.; Berman J. (2014).
1730:
1715:
227:
Major benefits derived from a properly implemented FMECA effort are as follows:
3139:
3124:
3054:
2907:
2897:
2852:
2796:
2693:
2528:
2407:
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395:
337:
329:
325:
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2202:
1465:
3404:
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2857:
2729:
2433:
VDA: German automotive industry demands the highest quality from its products
1925:
VDA: German automotive industry demands the highest quality from its products
1396: – Estimation of risk associated with exposure to a given set of hazards
1321:
1249:
419:
2322:
2156:
2137:
1649:
1627:
1601:
1175:
Collect information to reduce future failures, capture engineering knowledge
1153:
Development of system requirements that minimize the likelihood of failures.
3302:
3114:
3074:
2922:
2253:
2210:
2175:
1390: – Sub-discipline of systems engineering that emphasizes dependability
1347:
81:
3007:
3189:
3184:
3084:
1896:
1878:
1258:
959:
951:
where probability and severity includes the effect on non-detectability (
1428:
System Reliability Theory: Models, Statistical Methods, and Applications
1408: – Statistical methods to improve the quality of manufactured goods
3079:
2912:
2060:"Ford Motor Company Customer-Specific Requirements For IATF-16949:2016"
1789:
Sperber, William H.; Stier, Richard F. (December 2009 – January 2010).
442:
399:
120:(forward logic) single point of failure analysis and is a core task in
2593:
2510:"Clustering and visualization of failure modes using an evolving tree"
2288:
3380:
3246:
348:. The civil aviation industry was an early adopter of FMEA, with the
69:
graph with an example of steps in a failure mode and effects analysis
1642:
Procedure for Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
1620:
State of the Art Reliability Estimate of Saturn V Propulsion Systems
1350: – Frequency with which an engineered system or component fails
512:
The failure effect as it applies at the next higher indenture level.
1821:
1567:
1547:
3215:
1517:
518:
The failure effect at the highest indenture level or total system.
2770:
1318: – Eight disciplines of team-oriented problem solving method
1193:
Improve the quality, reliability, and safety of a product/process
353:
1691:
Experimenters' Reference Based Upon Skylab Experiment Management
378:
The automotive industry began to use FMEA by the mid 1970s. The
3349:
3134:
2760:
1671:. National Aeronautics and Space Administration JPL. PD–AD–1307
1425:
1239:(FTA) is better suited for "top-down" analysis. When used as a
1178:
Early identification and elimination of potential failure modes
426:
345:
182:
1853:
Potential Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), 4th Edition
1235:
tool, FMEA may only identify major failure modes in a system.
949:
Risk is the combination of end effect probability and severity
940:
After these three basic steps the Risk level may be provided.
3391:
3276:
1946:
1791:"Happy 50th Birthday to HACCP: Retrospective and Prospective"
1596:. Westinghouse Electric Corporation Astronuclear Laboratory.
1115:
403:
368:
164:
110:
2542:
Chang, Wui Lee; Pang, Lie Meng; Tay, Kai Meng (March 2017).
1807:
1574:. Department of Defense (USA). MIL-STD-1629A. Archived from
1487:
Project Reliability Group (July 1990). Koch, John E. (ed.).
919:
Indications to the operator should be described as follows:
506:
The failure effect as it applies to the item under analysis.
2801:
1594:
Modes of Failure Analysis Summary for the Nerva B-2 Reactor
1324: – Defects which are the underlying cause of a failure
908:
If the undetected failure allows the system to remain in a
497:
Indenture levels (bill of material or functional breakdown)
372:
2508:
Chang, Wui Lee; Tay, Kai Meng; Lim, Chee Peng (Nov 2015).
2386:
2343:
2451:
2301:
1486:
1172:
Catalyst for teamwork and idea exchange between functions
407:
1971:"(FMEA/DFMEA/PFMEA) Failure Mode & Effects Analysis"
1665:
Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
1568:
United States Department of Defense (24 November 1980).
1211:
Reduce the possibility of same kind of failure in future
1942:
1940:
1644:. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 1966.
1490:
Jet Propulsion Laboratory Reliability Analysis Handbook
95:
A few different types of FMEA analyses exist, such as:
65:
2069:: 23 – via International Automotive Task Force.
1368: – Systems with high up-time, a.k.a. "always on"
1362: – Systematic preventive approach to food safety
433:(DRBFM) approach. The method is now supported by the
215:
All consumables are present in sufficient quantities.
1937:
1757:
1311:
Pages displaying wikidata descriptions as a fallback
916:
and what corrective action they may or should take.
615:
Brake manifold ref. designator 2b, channel A, o-ring
595:(D) Detection (indications to operator, maintainer)
2231:
2188:
1253:multiplication treats them as though they are. See
958:Preliminary risk levels can be selected based on a
896:
2 months, detected by scheduled maintenance block X
2057:
1334:) – Systematic technique for failure analysis
457:The following covers some basic FMEA terminology.
322:U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
1788:
1720:. Society for Automotive Engineers. 1967. ARP926.
1444:
1162:To help with design choices (trade-off analysis).
1159:Development and evaluation of diagnostic systems.
3402:
1947:Kymal, Chad; Gruska, Gregory F. (19 June 2019).
875:Fault is undetected by operators or maintainers
654:Check dormancy period and probability of failure
1402: – Authority in a particular area or topic
1338:Failure modes, effects, and diagnostic analysis
1328:Failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis
470:The loss of a function under stated conditions.
356:, which is now broadly used in civil aviation.
42:Failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis
1524:Performing a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
1184:Fulfill legal requirements (product liability)
890:Seconds, auto detected by maintenance computer
3231:
3023:
2609:
2268:
1996:"Performing Failure Mode and Effect Analysis"
1769:United States Environmental Protection Agency
1530:. Goddard Space Flight Center. 431-REF-000370
881:
604:Actions for further investigation / evidence
274:The examples and perspective in this section
2541:
2133:
2131:
2100:. Reliability Analysis Center. 1997. FMD–97.
1561:
1134:Changes are made to the operating conditions
766:No relevant effect on reliability or safety
552:
183:Functional failure mode and effects analysis
3037:
2507:
2274:
1758:Mallory, Charles W.; Robert Waller (1973).
1360:Hazard analysis and critical control points
1114:After this step the FMEA has become like a
943:
893:8 hours, detected by turn-around inspection
371:on the Apollo Space Program moved into the
19:"FMEA" redirects here. For other uses, see
3238:
3224:
3030:
3016:
2616:
2602:
1837:Potential Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
1426:Rausand, Marvin; Høyland, Arnljot (2004).
1214:Reduce the potential for warranty concerns
621:a) O-ring compression set (creep) failure
292:, or create a new section, as appropriate.
2165:
2155:
2128:
1993:
1557:. Department of Defense (US). MIL-P-1629.
1541:
1202:Minimize late changes and associated cost
1187:Improve company image and competitiveness
835:Certain – fault will be caught on test –
642:(V) Catastrophic (this is the worst case)
429:has taken this one step further with its
308:Learn how and when to remove this message
2659:Earth systems engineering and management
2079:
1131:A new cycle begins (new product/process)
725:Frequent (failure is almost inevitable)
717:Reasonably possible (repeated failures)
530:The likelihood of the failure occurring.
64:
2623:
2387:Chai K.C.; Tay K. M.; Lim C.P. (2016).
1384: – Contingency planning techniques
1208:Reduce system development time and cost
209:Only one failure mode exists at a time.
3403:
2452:Tay K.M.; Jong C.H.; Lim C.P. (2015).
2337:
2302:Jee T.L.; Tay K. M.; Lim C.P. (2015).
2082:Logistics: Principles and Applications
2058:Ford Motor Company (January 3, 2022).
2018:"Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)"
1771:. pp. 107–110. EPA R2–73–176
1454:Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making
1205:Reduce impact on company profit margin
3219:
3011:
2597:
2295:
1994:Fadlovich, Erik (December 31, 2007).
1968:
1438:
1143:Customer feedback indicates a problem
1127:The FMEA should be updated whenever:
630:Decreased pressure to main brake hose
248:Criteria for early planning of tests.
16:Analysis of potential system failures
2097:Failure Mode/Mechanism Distributions
1856:. Automotive Industry Action Group.
1849:
1834:
1614:
1588:
899:2 years, detected by overhaul task x
618:Internal leakage from channel A to B
365:U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
260:
25:
3245:
1894:
1876:
1839:. Automotive Industry Action Group.
1549:United States Department of Defense
1377:List of materials-testing resources
1307:Design review based on failure mode
431:design review based on failure mode
13:
1372:List of materials analysis methods
666:
648:Built-in test interval is 1 minute
623:b) surface damage during assembly
14:
3447:
3324:Failure mode and effects analysis
2694:Sociocultural Systems Engineering
2461:Neural Computing and Applications
1316:Eight disciplines problem solving
709:Occasional (occasional failures)
701:Remote (relatively few failures)
676:with a defined number of levels.
74:Failure mode and effects analysis
2517:Expert Systems with Applications
2311:IEEE Transactions on Reliability
1949:"Introducing the AIAG-VDA DFMEA"
804:
447:original equipment manufacturers
388:Automotive Industry Action Group
350:Society for Automotive Engineers
265:
30:
2569:
2535:
2501:
2445:
2426:
2414:
2380:
2225:
2182:
2104:
2088:
2073:
2051:
2031:
2010:
1987:
1962:
1918:
1906:
1888:
1870:
1843:
1828:
1801:
1782:
1751:
1724:
1708:
1682:
1656:
739:
574:Potential cause(s) / mechanism
199:
157:
2776:Systems development life cycle
2669:Enterprise systems engineering
2644:Biological systems engineering
1812:. SAE Technical Paper Series.
1634:
1608:
1582:
1511:
1480:
1419:
1382:Process decision program chart
1309: – critical design review
1218:
1140:New regulations are instituted
1137:A change is made in the design
545:Remarks / mitigation / actions
480:Failure cause and/or mechanism
452:
109:Sometimes FMEA is extended to
1:
3165:Rebound effect (conservation)
2735:System of systems engineering
2649:Cognitive systems engineering
2421:AIAG / VDA FMEA handbook 2019
2112:"MIL-STD-882 E SYSTEM SAFETY"
1913:AIAG / VDA FMEA handbook 2019
1413:
1166:
903:
56:Proposed since December 2023.
3145:Parable of the broken window
2563:10.1016/j.neucom.2016.04.073
2277:Journal of Mechanical Design
2246:10.1097/PTS.0b013e3181a6f040
2144:BMC Health Services Research
1622:. General Electric Company.
1445:Tay K. M.; Lim C.P. (2008).
1226:Structured What If Technique
1181:Emphasize problem prevention
435:American Society for Quality
7:
3371:Statistical process control
2812:Quality function deployment
2725:Verification and validation
2084:. McGraw Hill. p. 488.
1519:Goddard Space Flight Center
1299:
1244:level subsystem or system.
589:(P) Probability (estimate)
418:(formerly Daimler AG), and
288:, discuss the issue on the
222:
39:It has been suggested that
10:
3452:
3205:Tyranny of small decisions
2674:Health systems engineering
2529:10.1016/j.eswa.2015.04.036
2408:10.1016/j.asoc.2016.08.043
2366:10.1109/JSYST.2015.2478150
1810:SAE Technical Paper 750178
1287:Detailed design / hardware
1196:Increase user satisfaction
882:Dormancy or latency period
610:
607:Mitigation / requirements
598:Detection dormancy period
563:
533:Risk priority number (RPN)
256:
218:Nominal power is available
18:
3389:
3358:
3337:
3311:
3285:
3254:
3090:Excess burden of taxation
3045:
2992:
2941:
2845:
2822:Systems Modeling Language
2784:
2743:
2702:
2631:
2473:10.1007/s00521-014-1647-4
2234:Journal of Patient Safety
2203:10.1136/bmjqs-2011-000723
1498:Jet Propulsion Laboratory
1466:10.1007/s10700-008-9037-y
1281:Concept design / hardware
1122:
583:Next higher level effect
580:Local effects of failure
553:Example of FMEA worksheet
441:Following the release of
3293:Business process mapping
2837:Work breakdown structure
2715:Functional specification
2710:Requirements engineering
2654:Configuration management
2579:. Diametric Software Ltd
2191:BMJ Quality & Safety
2080:Langford, J. W. (1995).
1496:. Pasadena, California:
1268:
1190:Improve production yield
944:Risk level (P×S) and (D)
586:System-level end effect
509:Next higher level effect
3421:Reliability engineering
3411:Japanese business terms
3175:Self-defeating prophecy
3039:Unintended consequences
2684:Reliability engineering
2679:Performance engineering
2442:. Retrieved 2020-11-23.
2423:. Retrieved 2020-11-23.
2323:10.1109/TR.2015.2420300
2157:10.1186/1472-6963-14-41
1934:. Retrieved 2020-09-14.
1915:. Retrieved 2020-09-14.
1388:Reliability engineering
1147:
571:Potential failure mode
122:reliability engineering
3200:Tragedy of the commons
2959:Industrial engineering
2664:Electrical engineering
2396:Applied Soft Computing
1618:; et al. (1963).
733:reliability prediction
559:Example FMEA worksheet
416:Mercedes-Benz Group AG
361:U.S. Geological Survey
88:. It was developed by
70:
3436:Quality control tools
3345:Design of experiments
3267:Voice of the customer
3150:Paradox of enrichment
2893:Arthur David Hall III
2863:Benjamin S. Blanchard
2639:Aerospace engineering
1521:(GSFC) (1996-08-10).
1400:Subject-matter expert
659:critical part class 1
633:No left wheel braking
375:industry in general.
90:reliability engineers
68:
21:FMEA (disambiguation)
3431:Reliability analysis
3272:Value-stream mapping
3120:Inverse consequences
2984:Software engineering
2954:Computer engineering
2346:IEEE Systems Journal
1902:. SAE International.
1884:. SAE International.
1255:Level of measurement
601:Risk level P*S (+D)
461:Action priority (AP)
286:improve this section
276:may not represent a
49:into this article. (
3319:Root cause analysis
3095:Four Pests campaign
2964:Operations research
2949:Control engineering
2918:Joseph Francis Shea
2625:Systems engineering
2358:2017ISysJ..11.1589K
2000:Embedded Technology
1795:FoodSafety Magazine
1630:. RM 63TMP–22.
1551:(9 November 1949).
1354:Fault tree analysis
1237:Fault tree analysis
674:Probability Ranking
561:
173:fault tree analysis
130:quality engineering
118:inductive reasoning
3416:Lean manufacturing
3298:Process capability
3180:Self-refuting idea
3160:Perverse incentive
2974:Quality management
2969:Project management
2797:Function modelling
2720:System integration
2689:Safety engineering
2438:2021-03-02 at the
1930:2021-03-02 at the
557:
380:Ford Motor Company
126:safety engineering
71:
3398:
3397:
3213:
3212:
3170:Risk compensation
3005:
3004:
2928:Manuela M. Veloso
2868:Wernher von Braun
2577:"Building a FMEA"
2523:(20): 7235–7244.
2289:10.1115/1.1799614
2116:www.everyspec.com
1969:Webmaster, AIAG.
1863:978-1-60534-136-1
1366:High availability
1111:
1110:
879:
878:
802:
801:
729:
728:
664:
663:
318:
317:
310:
146:failure mechanism
63:
62:
58:
3443:
3426:Systems analysis
3329:Multi-vari chart
3240:
3233:
3226:
3217:
3216:
3195:Streisand effect
3105:Hawthorne effect
3065:Butterfly effect
3060:Braess's paradox
3032:
3025:
3018:
3009:
3008:
2933:John N. Warfield
2903:Robert E. Machol
2832:Systems modeling
2827:Systems analysis
2766:System lifecycle
2751:Business process
2618:
2611:
2604:
2595:
2594:
2589:
2588:
2586:
2584:
2573:
2567:
2566:
2548:
2539:
2533:
2532:
2514:
2505:
2499:
2498:
2496:
2495:
2489:
2483:. Archived from
2458:
2449:
2443:
2430:
2424:
2418:
2412:
2411:
2393:
2384:
2378:
2377:
2341:
2335:
2334:
2308:
2299:
2293:
2292:
2272:
2266:
2265:
2229:
2223:
2222:
2186:
2180:
2179:
2169:
2159:
2135:
2126:
2125:
2123:
2122:
2108:
2102:
2101:
2092:
2086:
2085:
2077:
2071:
2070:
2064:
2055:
2049:
2048:
2046:
2045:
2035:
2029:
2028:
2026:
2025:
2014:
2008:
2007:
2002:. Archived from
1991:
1985:
1984:
1982:
1981:
1966:
1960:
1959:
1957:
1956:
1944:
1935:
1922:
1916:
1910:
1904:
1903:
1892:
1886:
1885:
1874:
1868:
1867:
1847:
1841:
1840:
1832:
1826:
1825:
1805:
1799:
1798:
1786:
1780:
1779:
1777:
1776:
1766:
1755:
1749:
1748:
1746:
1745:
1739:
1728:
1722:
1721:
1712:
1706:
1705:
1703:
1702:
1696:
1686:
1680:
1679:
1677:
1676:
1670:
1660:
1654:
1653:
1652:. RA–006–013–1A.
1650:2060/19700076494
1638:
1632:
1631:
1628:2060/19930075105
1612:
1606:
1605:
1602:2060/19760069385
1586:
1580:
1579:
1578:on 22 July 2011.
1565:
1559:
1558:
1545:
1539:
1538:
1536:
1535:
1529:
1515:
1509:
1508:
1506:
1505:
1495:
1484:
1478:
1477:
1451:
1442:
1436:
1435:
1430:(2nd ed.).
1423:
1343:
1333:
1312:
966:
965:
821:
820:
752:
751:
679:
678:
562:
556:
412:Volkswagen Group
313:
306:
302:
299:
293:
269:
268:
261:
138:Effects analysis
86:failure analysis
54:
34:
33:
26:
3451:
3450:
3446:
3445:
3444:
3442:
3441:
3440:
3401:
3400:
3399:
3394:
3385:
3354:
3333:
3307:
3281:
3262:Project charter
3250:
3244:
3214:
3209:
3155:Parkinson's law
3050:Abilene paradox
3041:
3036:
3006:
3001:
2988:
2979:Risk management
2937:
2878:Harold Chestnut
2873:Kathleen Carley
2841:
2817:System dynamics
2792:Decision-making
2780:
2756:Fault tolerance
2739:
2698:
2627:
2622:
2592:
2582:
2580:
2575:
2574:
2570:
2546:
2540:
2536:
2512:
2506:
2502:
2493:
2491:
2487:
2456:
2450:
2446:
2440:Wayback Machine
2431:
2427:
2419:
2415:
2391:
2385:
2381:
2342:
2338:
2306:
2300:
2296:
2273:
2269:
2230:
2226:
2187:
2183:
2136:
2129:
2120:
2118:
2110:
2109:
2105:
2094:
2093:
2089:
2078:
2074:
2062:
2056:
2052:
2043:
2041:
2037:
2036:
2032:
2023:
2021:
2016:
2015:
2011:
1992:
1988:
1979:
1977:
1967:
1963:
1954:
1952:
1951:. qualitydigest
1945:
1938:
1932:Wayback Machine
1923:
1919:
1911:
1907:
1893:
1889:
1875:
1871:
1864:
1848:
1844:
1833:
1829:
1806:
1802:
1787:
1783:
1774:
1772:
1764:
1756:
1752:
1743:
1741:
1737:
1729:
1725:
1714:
1713:
1709:
1700:
1698:
1694:
1688:
1687:
1683:
1674:
1672:
1668:
1662:
1661:
1657:
1640:
1639:
1635:
1613:
1609:
1604:. WANL–TNR–042.
1587:
1583:
1566:
1562:
1546:
1542:
1533:
1531:
1527:
1516:
1512:
1503:
1501:
1493:
1485:
1481:
1449:
1443:
1439:
1424:
1420:
1416:
1411:
1406:Taguchi methods
1394:Risk assessment
1341:
1331:
1310:
1302:
1271:
1221:
1199:Maximize profit
1169:
1150:
1125:
974:
971:
946:
906:
884:
843:Almost certain
807:
747:hazard analysis
742:
669:
667:Probability (P)
555:
455:
443:IATF 16949:2016
314:
303:
297:
294:
283:
270:
266:
259:
225:
202:
185:
160:
59:
35:
31:
24:
17:
12:
11:
5:
3449:
3439:
3438:
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3428:
3423:
3418:
3413:
3396:
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3390:
3387:
3386:
3384:
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3378:
3373:
3368:
3362:
3360:
3356:
3355:
3353:
3352:
3347:
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3335:
3334:
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3326:
3321:
3315:
3313:
3309:
3308:
3306:
3305:
3300:
3295:
3289:
3287:
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3282:
3280:
3279:
3274:
3269:
3264:
3258:
3256:
3252:
3251:
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3242:
3235:
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3202:
3197:
3192:
3187:
3182:
3177:
3172:
3167:
3162:
3157:
3152:
3147:
3142:
3140:Osborne effect
3137:
3132:
3127:
3125:Jevons paradox
3122:
3117:
3112:
3107:
3102:
3100:Goodhart's law
3097:
3092:
3087:
3082:
3077:
3072:
3070:Campbell's law
3067:
3062:
3057:
3055:Adverse effect
3052:
3046:
3043:
3042:
3035:
3034:
3027:
3020:
3012:
3003:
3002:
3000:
2999:
2993:
2990:
2989:
2987:
2986:
2981:
2976:
2971:
2966:
2961:
2956:
2951:
2945:
2943:
2942:Related fields
2939:
2938:
2936:
2935:
2930:
2925:
2920:
2915:
2910:
2908:Radhika Nagpal
2905:
2900:
2898:Derek Hitchins
2895:
2890:
2885:
2880:
2875:
2870:
2865:
2860:
2855:
2853:James S. Albus
2849:
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2635:
2633:
2629:
2628:
2621:
2620:
2613:
2606:
2598:
2591:
2590:
2568:
2551:Neurocomputing
2534:
2500:
2467:(3): 551–560.
2444:
2425:
2413:
2379:
2336:
2317:(3): 869–877.
2294:
2267:
2224:
2197:(7): 607–611.
2181:
2127:
2103:
2087:
2072:
2050:
2030:
2009:
2006:on 2011-11-17.
1986:
1961:
1936:
1917:
1905:
1887:
1869:
1862:
1842:
1827:
1822:10.4271/750178
1800:
1781:
1750:
1723:
1707:
1681:
1655:
1633:
1607:
1581:
1560:
1540:
1510:
1479:
1460:(3): 283–302.
1437:
1417:
1415:
1412:
1410:
1409:
1403:
1397:
1391:
1385:
1379:
1374:
1369:
1363:
1357:
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1345:
1335:
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1298:
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1284:
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1267:
1220:
1217:
1216:
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1209:
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1203:
1200:
1197:
1194:
1191:
1188:
1185:
1182:
1179:
1176:
1173:
1168:
1165:
1164:
1163:
1160:
1157:
1154:
1149:
1146:
1145:
1144:
1141:
1138:
1135:
1132:
1124:
1121:
1120:
1119:
1109:
1108:
1105:
1102:
1099:
1096:
1093:
1090:
1086:
1085:
1082:
1079:
1076:
1073:
1070:
1067:
1063:
1062:
1059:
1056:
1053:
1050:
1047:
1044:
1040:
1039:
1036:
1033:
1030:
1027:
1024:
1021:
1017:
1016:
1013:
1010:
1007:
1004:
1001:
998:
994:
993:
990:
987:
984:
981:
978:
975:
972:
969:
945:
942:
931:
930:
927:
924:
905:
902:
901:
900:
897:
894:
891:
883:
880:
877:
876:
873:
869:
868:
865:
861:
860:
857:
853:
852:
849:
845:
844:
841:
837:
836:
833:
829:
828:
825:
806:
803:
800:
799:
796:
792:
791:
788:
784:
783:
780:
776:
775:
772:
768:
767:
764:
760:
759:
756:
741:
738:
727:
726:
723:
719:
718:
715:
711:
710:
707:
703:
702:
699:
695:
694:
691:
687:
686:
683:
668:
665:
662:
661:
655:
652:
649:
646:
643:
640:
639:(C) Occasional
637:
634:
631:
628:
625:
619:
616:
613:
609:
608:
605:
602:
599:
596:
593:
590:
587:
584:
581:
578:
577:Mission phase
575:
572:
569:
566:
554:
551:
550:
549:
546:
543:
540:
537:
534:
531:
528:
525:
522:
519:
516:
513:
510:
507:
504:
501:
498:
495:
492:
491:Failure effect
489:
481:
478:
474:
471:
468:
465:
462:
454:
451:
316:
315:
280:of the subject
278:worldwide view
273:
271:
264:
258:
255:
250:
249:
246:
243:
240:
236:
232:
224:
221:
220:
219:
216:
213:
210:
201:
198:
184:
181:
159:
156:
107:
106:
103:
100:
61:
60:
38:
36:
29:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3448:
3437:
3434:
3432:
3429:
3427:
3424:
3422:
3419:
3417:
3414:
3412:
3409:
3408:
3406:
3393:
3388:
3382:
3379:
3377:
3374:
3372:
3369:
3367:
3364:
3363:
3361:
3359:Control phase
3357:
3351:
3348:
3346:
3343:
3342:
3340:
3338:Improve phase
3336:
3330:
3327:
3325:
3322:
3320:
3317:
3316:
3314:
3312:Analyse phase
3310:
3304:
3301:
3299:
3296:
3294:
3291:
3290:
3288:
3286:Measure phase
3284:
3278:
3275:
3273:
3270:
3268:
3265:
3263:
3260:
3259:
3257:
3253:
3248:
3241:
3236:
3234:
3229:
3227:
3222:
3221:
3218:
3206:
3203:
3201:
3198:
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3163:
3161:
3158:
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3153:
3151:
3148:
3146:
3143:
3141:
3138:
3136:
3133:
3131:
3128:
3126:
3123:
3121:
3118:
3116:
3113:
3111:
3108:
3106:
3103:
3101:
3098:
3096:
3093:
3091:
3088:
3086:
3083:
3081:
3078:
3076:
3073:
3071:
3068:
3066:
3063:
3061:
3058:
3056:
3053:
3051:
3048:
3047:
3044:
3040:
3033:
3028:
3026:
3021:
3019:
3014:
3013:
3010:
2998:
2995:
2994:
2991:
2985:
2982:
2980:
2977:
2975:
2972:
2970:
2967:
2965:
2962:
2960:
2957:
2955:
2952:
2950:
2947:
2946:
2944:
2940:
2934:
2931:
2929:
2926:
2924:
2921:
2919:
2916:
2914:
2911:
2909:
2906:
2904:
2901:
2899:
2896:
2894:
2891:
2889:
2888:Barbara Grosz
2886:
2884:
2883:Wolt Fabrycky
2881:
2879:
2876:
2874:
2871:
2869:
2866:
2864:
2861:
2859:
2858:Ruzena Bajcsy
2856:
2854:
2851:
2850:
2848:
2844:
2838:
2835:
2833:
2830:
2828:
2825:
2823:
2820:
2818:
2815:
2813:
2810:
2808:
2805:
2803:
2800:
2798:
2795:
2793:
2790:
2789:
2787:
2783:
2777:
2774:
2772:
2769:
2767:
2764:
2762:
2759:
2757:
2754:
2752:
2749:
2748:
2746:
2742:
2736:
2733:
2731:
2730:Design review
2728:
2726:
2723:
2721:
2718:
2716:
2713:
2711:
2708:
2707:
2705:
2701:
2695:
2692:
2690:
2687:
2685:
2682:
2680:
2677:
2675:
2672:
2670:
2667:
2665:
2662:
2660:
2657:
2655:
2652:
2650:
2647:
2645:
2642:
2640:
2637:
2636:
2634:
2630:
2626:
2619:
2614:
2612:
2607:
2605:
2600:
2599:
2596:
2578:
2572:
2564:
2560:
2556:
2552:
2545:
2538:
2530:
2526:
2522:
2518:
2511:
2504:
2490:on 2017-09-22
2486:
2482:
2478:
2474:
2470:
2466:
2462:
2455:
2448:
2441:
2437:
2434:
2429:
2422:
2417:
2409:
2405:
2401:
2397:
2390:
2383:
2375:
2371:
2367:
2363:
2359:
2355:
2351:
2347:
2340:
2332:
2328:
2324:
2320:
2316:
2312:
2305:
2298:
2290:
2286:
2282:
2278:
2271:
2263:
2259:
2255:
2251:
2247:
2243:
2239:
2235:
2228:
2220:
2216:
2212:
2208:
2204:
2200:
2196:
2192:
2185:
2177:
2173:
2168:
2163:
2158:
2153:
2149:
2145:
2141:
2134:
2132:
2117:
2113:
2107:
2099:
2098:
2091:
2083:
2076:
2068:
2067:Ford IATF CSR
2061:
2054:
2040:
2034:
2019:
2013:
2005:
2001:
1997:
1990:
1976:
1972:
1965:
1950:
1943:
1941:
1933:
1929:
1926:
1921:
1914:
1909:
1901:
1900:
1891:
1883:
1882:
1873:
1865:
1859:
1855:
1854:
1850:AIAG (2008).
1846:
1838:
1835:AIAG (1993).
1831:
1823:
1819:
1815:
1811:
1804:
1796:
1792:
1785:
1770:
1763:
1762:
1754:
1736:
1735:
1727:
1719:
1718:
1711:
1693:
1692:
1685:
1667:
1666:
1659:
1651:
1647:
1643:
1637:
1629:
1625:
1621:
1617:
1611:
1603:
1599:
1595:
1591:
1585:
1577:
1573:
1572:
1564:
1556:
1555:
1550:
1544:
1526:
1525:
1520:
1514:
1499:
1492:
1491:
1483:
1475:
1471:
1467:
1463:
1459:
1455:
1448:
1441:
1434:. p. 88.
1433:
1429:
1422:
1418:
1407:
1404:
1401:
1398:
1395:
1392:
1389:
1386:
1383:
1380:
1378:
1375:
1373:
1370:
1367:
1364:
1361:
1358:
1355:
1352:
1349:
1346:
1339:
1336:
1329:
1326:
1323:
1322:Failure cause
1320:
1317:
1314:
1308:
1305:
1304:
1294:
1291:
1288:
1285:
1282:
1279:
1276:
1273:
1272:
1266:
1262:
1260:
1256:
1251:
1250:ordinal scale
1245:
1242:
1238:
1234:
1231:If used as a
1229:
1227:
1213:
1210:
1207:
1204:
1201:
1198:
1195:
1192:
1189:
1186:
1183:
1180:
1177:
1174:
1171:
1170:
1161:
1158:
1155:
1152:
1151:
1142:
1139:
1136:
1133:
1130:
1129:
1128:
1117:
1113:
1112:
1107:Unacceptable
1106:
1103:
1100:
1097:
1094:
1091:
1088:
1087:
1084:Unacceptable
1083:
1080:
1077:
1074:
1071:
1068:
1065:
1064:
1061:Unacceptable
1060:
1057:
1054:
1051:
1048:
1045:
1042:
1041:
1038:Unacceptable
1037:
1034:
1031:
1028:
1025:
1022:
1019:
1018:
1014:
1011:
1008:
1005:
1002:
999:
996:
995:
991:
988:
985:
982:
979:
976:
968:
967:
964:
961:
956:
954:
953:dormancy time
950:
941:
938:
934:
928:
925:
922:
921:
920:
917:
915:
911:
898:
895:
892:
889:
888:
887:
874:
871:
870:
866:
863:
862:
858:
855:
854:
850:
847:
846:
842:
839:
838:
834:
831:
830:
826:
823:
822:
819:
817:
813:
805:Detection (D)
797:
794:
793:
789:
786:
785:
781:
778:
777:
773:
770:
769:
765:
762:
761:
757:
754:
753:
750:
748:
737:
734:
724:
721:
720:
716:
713:
712:
708:
705:
704:
700:
697:
696:
692:
689:
688:
684:
681:
680:
677:
675:
660:
656:
653:
650:
647:
644:
641:
638:
635:
632:
629:
626:
624:
620:
617:
614:
611:
606:
603:
600:
597:
594:
592:(S) Severity
591:
588:
585:
582:
579:
576:
573:
570:
567:
564:
560:
547:
544:
541:
538:
535:
532:
529:
526:
523:
520:
517:
514:
511:
508:
505:
502:
499:
496:
493:
490:
488:
482:
479:
475:
472:
469:
466:
463:
460:
459:
458:
450:
448:
444:
439:
436:
432:
428:
423:
421:
420:Daimler Truck
417:
413:
409:
405:
401:
397:
393:
389:
385:
381:
376:
374:
370:
366:
362:
357:
355:
351:
347:
343:
339:
335:
331:
327:
323:
312:
309:
301:
291:
287:
281:
279:
272:
263:
262:
254:
247:
244:
241:
237:
233:
230:
229:
228:
217:
214:
211:
208:
207:
206:
197:
193:
189:
180:
178:
174:
169:
166:
155:
153:
152:
151:(root) causes
147:
141:
139:
133:
131:
127:
123:
119:
114:
112:
104:
101:
98:
97:
96:
93:
91:
87:
83:
79:
75:
67:
57:
52:
48:
44:
43:
37:
28:
27:
22:
3366:Control plan
3323:
3303:Pareto chart
3255:Define phase
3130:Murphy's law
3115:Hydra effect
3110:Hutber's law
3075:Cobra effect
2923:Katia Sycara
2807:Optimization
2581:. Retrieved
2571:
2554:
2550:
2537:
2520:
2516:
2503:
2492:. Retrieved
2485:the original
2464:
2460:
2447:
2428:
2416:
2399:
2395:
2382:
2349:
2345:
2339:
2314:
2310:
2297:
2280:
2276:
2270:
2240:(2): 86–94.
2237:
2233:
2227:
2194:
2190:
2184:
2147:
2143:
2119:. Retrieved
2115:
2106:
2096:
2090:
2081:
2075:
2066:
2053:
2042:. Retrieved
2033:
2022:. Retrieved
2012:
2004:the original
1999:
1989:
1978:. Retrieved
1975:www.aiag.org
1974:
1964:
1953:. Retrieved
1920:
1908:
1897:
1895:SAE (2008).
1890:
1879:
1877:SAE (1994).
1872:
1852:
1845:
1836:
1830:
1813:
1809:
1803:
1797:: 42, 44–46.
1794:
1784:
1773:. Retrieved
1760:
1753:
1742:. Retrieved
1733:
1726:
1716:
1710:
1699:. Retrieved
1690:
1684:
1673:. Retrieved
1664:
1658:
1641:
1636:
1619:
1616:Dill, Robert
1610:
1593:
1584:
1576:the original
1570:
1563:
1553:
1543:
1532:. Retrieved
1523:
1513:
1502:. Retrieved
1500:. JPL-D-5703
1489:
1482:
1457:
1453:
1440:
1427:
1421:
1348:Failure rate
1292:
1286:
1280:
1274:
1263:
1246:
1230:
1222:
1126:
1104:Unacceptable
1101:Unacceptable
1081:Unacceptable
957:
952:
948:
947:
939:
935:
932:
918:
913:
909:
907:
885:
815:
811:
808:
743:
740:Severity (S)
730:
673:
670:
658:
651:Unacceptable
622:
558:
503:Local effect
485:
473:Failure mode
456:
440:
424:
384:Pinto affair
377:
358:
319:
304:
295:
275:
251:
226:
203:
200:Ground rules
194:
190:
186:
176:
170:
161:
158:Introduction
150:
145:
142:
137:
134:
115:
108:
94:
82:failure rate
77:
73:
72:
55:
40:
3190:Social trap
3185:Serendipity
3085:Externality
2557:: 314–320.
2402:: 734–747.
2352:(3): 1–12.
2283:(6): 1027.
1259:fuzzy logic
1219:Limitations
973:Probability
960:risk matrix
527:Probability
453:Basic terms
235:occurrence.
116:FMEA is an
3405:Categories
3080:CSI effect
2913:Simon Ramo
2494:2019-07-14
2121:2017-01-04
2044:2024-07-30
2024:2012-02-15
1980:2024-07-30
1955:2020-12-02
1775:2012-11-10
1744:2011-08-16
1701:2011-08-16
1675:2010-03-13
1590:Neal, R.A.
1534:2013-08-25
1504:2013-08-25
1414:References
1275:Functional
1167:Advantages
904:Indication
816:mechanisms
565:FMEA Ref.
515:End effect
400:Stellantis
99:Functional
3381:Poka-yoke
3247:Six Sigma
2703:Processes
2632:Subfields
1241:bottom-up
914:operators
859:Moderate
521:Detection
290:talk page
239:failures.
177:deductive
175:(FTA); a
2997:Category
2744:Concepts
2583:13 March
2436:Archived
2331:20987880
2262:45635417
2254:19920447
2219:46106670
2211:22447819
2176:24467813
1928:Archived
1592:(1962).
1474:12269658
1300:See also
1233:top-down
1095:Moderate
1092:Moderate
1075:Moderate
1072:Moderate
1055:Moderate
1052:Moderate
1032:Moderate
1012:Moderate
970:Severity
827:Meaning
758:Meaning
685:Meaning
539:Severity
404:Honda NA
398:, Ford,
338:Magellan
298:May 2022
284:You may
253:design.
223:Benefits
2771:V-Model
2481:7821836
2374:5878974
2354:Bibcode
2167:3906758
1293:Process
824:Rating
755:Rating
682:Rating
627:Landing
612:1.1.1.1
467:Failure
354:ARP4761
342:Galileo
334:Voyager
257:History
105:Process
51:Discuss
3350:Kaizen
3135:Nocebo
2846:People
2761:System
2479:
2372:
2329:
2260:
2252:
2217:
2209:
2174:
2164:
2150:: 41.
1860:
1472:
1123:Timing
427:Toyota
346:Skylab
344:, and
330:Viking
326:Apollo
102:Design
47:merged
3392:DMAIC
3277:SIPOC
3249:tools
2785:Tools
2547:(PDF)
2513:(PDF)
2488:(PDF)
2477:S2CID
2457:(PDF)
2392:(PDF)
2370:S2CID
2327:S2CID
2307:(PDF)
2258:S2CID
2215:S2CID
2063:(PDF)
2020:. ASQ
1899:FMEA)
1881:FMEA)
1765:(PDF)
1738:(PDF)
1695:(PDF)
1669:(PDF)
1528:(pdf)
1494:(pdf)
1470:S2CID
1450:(PDF)
1432:Wiley
1342:FMEDA
1332:FMECA
1269:Types
1116:FMECA
1015:High
851:High
812:modes
568:Item
369:HACCP
165:FMECA
111:FMECA
2802:IDEF
2585:2020
2250:PMID
2207:PMID
2172:PMID
1858:ISBN
1148:Uses
1098:High
1078:High
1058:High
1035:High
910:safe
867:Low
373:food
128:and
78:FMEA
2559:doi
2525:doi
2469:doi
2404:doi
2362:doi
2319:doi
2285:doi
2281:126
2242:doi
2199:doi
2162:PMC
2152:doi
1818:doi
1646:hdl
1624:hdl
1598:hdl
1462:doi
1069:Low
1049:Low
1046:Low
1043:III
1029:Low
1026:Low
1023:Low
1009:Low
1006:Low
1003:Low
1000:Low
992:VI
983:III
408:BMW
392:VDA
45:be
3407::
3376:5S
2555:PP
2553:.
2549:.
2521:42
2519:.
2515:.
2475:.
2465:26
2463:.
2459:.
2400:49
2398:.
2394:.
2368:.
2360:.
2350:11
2348:.
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