518:§32. Let us consider a man going round a town with a shopping list in his hand. Now it is clear that the relation of this list to the things he actually buys is one and the same whether his wife gave him the list or it is his own list; and that there is a different relation where a list is made by a detective following him about. If he made the list itself, it was an expression of intention; if his wife gave it him, it has the role of an order. What then is the identical relation to what happens, in the order and the intention, which is not shared by the record? It is precisely this: if the list and the things that the man actually buys do not agree, and if this and this alone constitutes a mistake, then the mistake is not in the list but in the man's performance (if his wife were to say: “Look, it says butter and you have bought margarine”, he would hardly reply: “What a mistake! we must put that right” and alter the word on the list to “margarine”); whereas if the detective's record and what the man actually buys do not agree, then the mistake is in the record.
683:
to go to L, and proceed accordingly? Surely not. To posit anything more complicated than, as it were, a literal translation of the dance into bee mentalese is surely superfluous. The comprehending bee merely acquires an inner representation that is at the same time a picture, as it were, of the location of nectar (relative to its hive) and that guides the bee's direction of flight. The very same representation tells in one breath both what is the case and what to do about it. I call representations having this sort of double aspect "pushmi-pullyu" representations (or "PPRs") after Hugh
Lofting's charming two-headed Janus-faced creature by that name.
350:; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his art. Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is suitably called truth. Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice. (
22:
687:
Millikan suggests that many perceptual representations (including those in humans) have such a dual function, both providing an agent information about the state of affairs in the world and suggesting action possibilities to change that state of affairs. She further remarked on the similarity between
682:
What then occurs in the head of a bee who understands a fellow bee's dance? Does the bee come to believe there is nectar at location L, desire to collect nectar, know that to collect nectar at L requires going to L, hence desire to go to L, hence, no other desires being stronger at the moment, decide
677:
has also written influentially about representations, noting that many primitive representations used by animals are characterized by a dual direction of fit; she terms such representations "pushmi-pullyu representations." As an example, she cites the role of bee dances in both informing other bees
370:
In a detailed analysis of the distinctions between various scenarios, such as (a) mislabeling a triangle as a square (which Austin regarded as an act of linguistic violence) and (b) inaccurately describing a triangular object as a square (which Austin considered an act of factual violence), Austin
162:
In both cases, the issue is how representations are considered satisfactory. Beliefs and descriptive statements are considered satisfactory when the states of affairs they represent match the world; i.e. when they are true. Desires and orders are considered satisfactory when world matches the state
476:
altered to fit the propositional content by representing the world as being so altered, unlike sense 2. E.g.: "I declare you man and wife". The 'doubled' direction is therefore always world-to-word-to-world. For obvious reasons, Searle calls sentences of this type
1061:, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge), 1979. (N.B. This is a reprint of the same paper that was published twice, in 1975 and 1976, under two different titles: (a) Searle, J.R., "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts", pp. 344–369 in Gunderson, K. (ed.),
367:. Austin did not use the distinction between different directions of fit to contrast commands or expressions of intention to assertions, or desires to beliefs. He rather distinguishes different ways of asserting that an item is of a certain type.
149:
directions of fit. In the former, utterances such as indicative sentences attempt to describe the world; for a statement, the state of affairs is considered appropriate if the content expressed by the words fit the way the world really is (a
488:
There is no direct question of achieving success of fit between the propositional content and the world, because success of fit is presupposed by the utterance. E.g.: "I'm glad I married you" presupposes that the speaker is married to the
154:
direction of fit). In the latter, utterances such as imperative sentences attempt to cause a change in the world; for an order, the state of affairs is considered appropriate when the world changes to fit the words (a
121:
direction of fit). In the latter, mental states such as desires motivate the agent to change the world in order to fit the desired state in the mind (the world changes to fit the mind, thus desires have a
461:
To achieve success of fit the world must change to match the propositional content of the utterance. E.g.: "Will you marry me?", "I want to marry him", "You'd just better marry her, buddy!", etc.
334:), as said above. Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case with the mind that receives its knowledge from things.
252:
fit occurs when a fan of Smith's team opines that they deserved to win the match, even though they lost. In this case, the world would have to change to make the sports fan's wish become true.
117:) directions of fit. In the former, mental states such as beliefs are subject to updates in order to fit evidence provided by the world (the mind changes to fit the world, thus beliefs have a
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was, by far, "the best illustration" of the distinction between the tasks of " the words (more strictly their propositional content) to match the world… the world to match the words":
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intentionally. If a person has the belief that action (A) will lead to state (S), and has the desire that state (S) obtain, then he will perform action (A). The action is directly
240:
fit occurs when, say, a sports journalist correctly names Jones as a goal scorer; while if the journalist mistakenly names Smith as the goal scorer, the printed account does
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has similarly been observed to be an attempt to construe representations with dual direction of fit, uniting predictions (mind-to-world) and actions (world-to-mind).
32:
576:. In the event of a mismatch between the mental state and the world, the mental state is in some sense false or wrong and should perhaps be changed.
1111:
43:
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is true. Beliefs, some philosophers have argued, aim at the truth and so aim to fit the world. A belief is satisfied when it fits the world.
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and desires. If there is a mismatch between the mental state and the world, the world is in some sense wrong and should perhaps be changed.
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699:
However, Millikan's openness to Gibson's framework has not been typical of philosophers of mind, and later philosophers such as
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about the location of resources (indicative, or dance-to-world) and directing their action (imperative, or world-to-dance):
342:, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not, our thoughts or our words about it are true or false.
1065:, University of Minnesota Press, (Minneapolis), 1975; and (b) Searle, J.R., "A Classification of Illocutionary Acts",
61:
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never employed the term "the direction of fit", Searle has strongly argued that the following passage from her work
309:
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Churchland, Paul, "Conceptual progress and word/world relations: In search of the essence of natural kinds",
330:
604:
974:
Nicholas Shea, "Perception vs Action: The
Computations May Be The Same But The Direction Of Fit Differs,"
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Vol. 9: AI, Connectionism and
Philosophical Psychology, Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1995, p. 188.
190:
A desire, on the other hand, normally expresses a yet to be realized state of affairs and so has a
36:
that states a
Knowledge editor's personal feelings or presents an original argument about a topic.
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have explored the possibility of action-oriented perception without endorsing affordance theory.
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be altered to match the content of the judge's utterance (i.e., the criminal must be executed).
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the world, through the fact of that utterance; and, in this case, the judge is generating a
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A way to account for the difference is that a (rational) person that holds the belief that
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by simultaneous presence of the two mental states; no further explanation is needed.
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fits an independently existing state of affairs in the world. E.g.: "We are married".
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introduced a conceptual differentiation. He labeled these distinctions as follows:
296:
1057:
Searle, J.R., "A Taxonomy of
Illocutionary Acts", pp. 1–19 in Searle, J.R.,
637:
The term "direction of fit" refers to the two ways in which attitudes can relate
592:, states that are yet to exist) are states with a world-to-mind direction of fit.
419:
557:, states that currently exist) are states with a mind-to-world direction of fit.
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Millikan, R.G., "On
Reading Signs: Some Differences Between Us and Others," in
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The propositional object of desire is regarded not as fact -- not, that is, as
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536:
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Ruth
Millikan, "On Reading Signs: Some Differences Between Us and Others," in
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attitudes , a proposition is grasped as patterned after the world; whereas in
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When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists in
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of belief and desire; and second, to distinguish between types of linguistic
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attitudes , the proposition is grasped as a pattern for the world to follow.
398:": in the case of naming something, the difference between the fitting of a
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fit, and must be altered such that it matches the real world. Conversely, a
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Vol. 9: AI, Connectionism and
Philosophical Psychology (1995), pp. 185-200.
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86:. It is commonly applied in two related senses: first, to distinguish the
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Perhaps the first to speak of a "direction of fit" was the philosopher
198:, unlike a belief, doesn't depict the world as being in the state that
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But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in
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is true. Desire is a state that is satisfied when the world fits it.
1003:: The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 1955
183:, say) depicts the world as being in a state of affairs such that
651:
432:
and Daniel
Vanderveken assert that there are only four possible "
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fit (see below). So, if the judge's opinion is upheld, the world
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framework of neural representations developed by neuroscientist
561:
172:
1054:, ed. D. Kimbrough Oller and Ulrike Griebel, MIT Press, 2004.
930:, ed. D. Kimbrough Oller and Ulrike Griebel, MIT Press, 2004.
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In achieving success of fit the propositional content of the
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217:, will revise his belief, whereas a person that desires that
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Expression and
Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts
1059:
Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts
616:
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represents the distinguishing feature between two types of
300:, Part I, Question 21, Article 2), there are two kinds of "
267:
202:; rather it expresses a desire that the world be such that
33:
personal reflection, personal essay, or argumentative essay
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Evolution of Communication Systems: A Comparative Approach
928:
Evolution of Communication Systems: A Comparative Approach
163:
of affairs they represent; i.e. when they are fulfilled.
995:, Basil Blackwell, (Oxford), 1963 (first edition 1957).
527:
According to Velleman, when used in the domain of the
775:
Mental Imagery: Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience
692:
in the ecological perception theory of psychologist
255:However, in the case of, say, a judge delivering a
1083:, The MIT Press, (Cambridge, Massachusetts), 2001.
1033:, Vol.101, No.401, (January 1992), pp. 59–83.
791:Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
410:The concept of direction of fit can also apply to
1043:Millikan, R.G., "Pushmi-pullyu Representations",
414:: e.g., statements, guesses and conjectures have
383:X and Y, the distinction between the matching of
1103:
1090:, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge), 1985.
1076:, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge), 1985.
1008:Austin, J.L., "How to Talk: Some Simple Ways",
94:, such as indicative and imperative sentences.
663:, having been brought about -- but rather as
1097:, Vol.26, No.1, (March 1992), pp. 3–26.
358:
872:Searle & Vanderveken, (1985), pp.52-53.
1005:, Oxford University Press, (Oxford), 1962.
1093:Velleman, J.D., "The Guise of the Good",
793:, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 7.
285:
62:Learn how and when to remove this message
777:, Oxford University Press, 2023, p. 129.
522:
1010:Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
472:To achieve success of fit the world is
1112:Concepts in the philosophy of language
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1036:Kissine, Mikhail. "Direction of fit".
961:Nanay, "Do we see apples as edible?"
948:Nanay, "Action-oriented Perception,"
688:such representations and the role of
483:4. The null or empty direction of fit
456:2. The world-to-word direction of fit
441:1. The word-to-world direction of fit
348:the equation of the thing to the mind
340:the equation of the mind to the thing
1086:Searle, J.R. & Vanderveken, D.,
328:Truth consists in the equation of (
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1012:, Vol.53, (1953), pp. 227–246.
213:when confronted with evidence that
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1117:Concepts in the philosophy of mind
1088:Foundations of Illocutionary Logic
950:The European Journal of Philosophy
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748:, "Pushmi-pullyu Representations"
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841:"Two Epistemic Directions of Fit"
379:": in the case of one wanting to
179:direction of fit. A belief (that
1069:, Vol.5, (1976), pp. 1–24.)
194:direction of fit. A desire that
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976:Behavioral and Brain Sciences
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331:adaequatio rei et intellectus
225:in the face of evidence that
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133:, in particular advocates of
78:is used in the philosophy of
881:See Searle (1975/1976/1979).
493:Searle used this notion of "
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1001:How to Do Things With Words
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221:can retain his desire that
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1045:Philosophical Perspectives
993:Intention (Second Edition)
750:Philosophical Perspectives
497:" to create a taxonomy of
352:emphasis added to original
359:In philosophy of language
171:In philosophy of mind, a
418:direction of fit, while
131:philosophers of language
1040:50.198 (2007): 113-128.
939:Millikan (1995), p. 191
630:According to Velleman:
320:) and world ("things",
262:to a criminal declared
234:philosopher of language
978:36, 2013, pp. 228-229.
952:20, 2012, pp. 430–446.
908:Velleman, (1992), p.8.
829:Searle (2001), p.37-8.
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308:), both understood as
286:In medieval philosophy
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141:, distinguish between
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1081:Rationality in Action
965:92, 2011, pp. 305–322
863:Austin (1953), p.234.
728:Triangle of reference
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523:In philosophy of mind
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402:, and the fitting of
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899:Anscombe, 1963, p.56
820:Searle (2001), p.37.
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387:and the matching of
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1067:Language in Society
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1027:"Direction of Fit"
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890:Searle, 1985, p.3.
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603:In some forms of
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49:
30:
787:John Searle
771:Bence Nanay
701:Bence Nanay
690:affordances
566:perceptions
537:intentional
430:John Searle
412:speech acts
314:intellectus
139:John Searle
129:Similarly,
1106:Categories
734:References
716:Andy Clark
597:intentions
586:(singular
570:hypotheses
551:(singular
244:display a
167:In general
92:utterances
665:faciendum
648:cognitive
613:faciendum
589:faciendum
574:fantasies
511:Intention
504:Although
489:listener.
448:utterance
74:The term
722:See also
652:conative
583:Facienda
420:commands
260:sentence
137:such as
562:beliefs
474:thereby
306:veritas
113:(i.e.,
105:(i.e.,
97:First,
38:Please
661:factum
625:caused
609:factum
572:, and
554:factum
389:Y to X
385:X to Y
318:oratio
264:guilty
175:has a
173:belief
109:) and
849:4 May
844:(PDF)
548:Facta
391:; and
381:match
302:truth
272:alter
266:by a
257:death
232:To a
227:not-p
215:not-p
1095:Noûs
1031:Mind
851:2011
706:The
617:mind
611:and
280:must
268:jury
145:and
696:.
646:In
621:act
324:):
322:res
304:" (
242:not
1108::
1029:,
1020:15
789:,
773:,
568:,
564:,
542::
501:.
236:a
229:.
853:.
485:.
469:.
458:.
443:.
406:.
394:"
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354:)
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223:p
219:p
211:p
204:p
200:p
196:p
185:p
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