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Confrontation analysis

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127: 20: 336: 269: 169: 365:. Instead, the aim is to find the dilemmas facing characters and so help to predict how they will change the table itself. Such prediction requires not only analysis of the model and its dilemmas, but also exploration of the reality outside the model; without this it is impossible to decide which ways of changing the model in order to eliminate dilemmas might be rationalized by the characters. 61:
but considers that instead of resolving the game, the players often redefine the game when interacting. Emotions triggered from the potential interaction play a large part in this redefinition. So whereas game theory looks on an interaction as a single decision matrix and resolves that, confrontation
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I am in debt to Professor Nigel Howard, whose explanation of Confrontation Analysis and Game Theory at a seminar in 1998 excited my interest. Our subsequent discussions helped me to order my thoughts and the lessons I had learned into a coherent structure with the result that, for the first time, I
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P. Bennett, J. Bryant and N. Howard, 'Drama Theory and Confrontation Analysis' — can be found (along with other recent PSM methods) in: J. V. Rosenhead and J. Mingers (eds) Rational Analysis for a Problematic World Revisited: problem structuring methods for complexity, uncertainty and conflict,
287:, and in particular its artillery the UN had an additional capability to engage Bosnian Serb weapons; they added the card "Use artillery against Bosnian Serbs". Because of this, the UN's threat of air strikes became more credible. The situation changed to that of the Second Card Table: 575:– A user discussion group. Deals with applications of Confrontation analysis to current politics, military campaigns, business problems, psychology, etc. Also contains a good introduction and glossary of the terms used in Confrontation Analysis. 247:
that occur to the parties following from the structure of the card tables. It states that motivated by the desire to eliminate these dilemmas, the parties involved will CHANGE THE CARD TABLE, to eliminate their problem.
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Faced with this new situation, the Bosnian Serbs modified their position to accept the UN proposal. The final table was an agreement as shown in the Final Card table (see thumbnail and picture).
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Second Card Table: The UN eliminated the Bosnian "hostage" card and brought in an additional, credible "Artillery" card, changing the situation in their favour: The Bosnian Serbs now have two
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Firstly, it withdrew its forces from the positions where they were vulnerable to being taken hostage. This action eliminated the Bosnian Serbs' option (card) of taking hostages.
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in that the Bosnian Serbs are not going to do the three things they want them to (not attack the enclaves, withdraw the heavy weapons and not take hostages). It also has a
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Final Card Table: The final situation. The Bosnian Serbs modified their position to eliminate their dilemmas. This involved accepting their initial goals as unobtainable
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in that the Bosnian Serbs do not believe they will actually use the air strikes, as they think the UN will submit to their position, for fear of having hostages taken.
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Confrontation analysis looks on an interaction as a sequence of confrontations. During each confrontation the parties communicate until they have made their
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analysis looks on the interaction as a sequence of linked interactions, where the decision matrix changes under the influence of precisely defined emotional
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Confrontation analysis does not necessarily produce a win-win solution (although end states are more likely to remain stable if they do); however, the word
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technique used to structure, understand and think through multi-party interactions such as negotiations. It is the underpinning mathematical basis of
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Initial Card Table: The UN threatens to use air strikes, but is not believed by the Bosnian Serbs: The UN has three dilemmas The Bosnians have none
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The UN said it would initiate air strikes. However the Bosnian Serbs DID NOT BELIEVE them. (Hence the question mark on the Card Table).
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Sometimes analysis of the ticks and crosses can be supported by values showing the payoff to each of the parties.
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Faced with these dilemmas, the UN modified the card table to eliminate its dilemmas. It took two actions:
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J. Bryant, The Six Dilemmas of Collaboration: inter-organisational relationships as drama, Wiley, 2003.
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Screenshot illustrating the use of confrontation analysis in a computer-aided role play depicting the
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was able to understand my experiences within a theoretical model which allowed me to use them further
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The Bosnian Serbs said they would NOT withdraw their heavy weapons, but the UN did not believe them.
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In the situation at the start the Bosnian Serbs have no dilemmas, but the UN has four. It has three
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If no further changes were made then what the sides were saying would happen was (see 1st column):
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If no further changes were made then what the sides were saying would happen was (see 1st column):
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should not necessarily imply that any negotiations should be carried out in an aggressive way.
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The UN said it would use air strikes. This time, however, the Bosnian Serbs believed them.
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Proceedings of the 6th international Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium
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a brief "How to" manual on doing Confrontation Analysis without using an Options Table.
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The Bosnian Serbs said they would attack the enclaves, but the UN did not believe them.
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as structure to support role-playing for training, analysis and decision rehearsal.
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The Bosnian Serbs said they would take hostages if the UN uses air strikes
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The UN said it would use artillery. The Bosnian Serbs believed this.
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Confrontation analysis then specifies a number of precisely defined
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The Bosnian Serbs said they would NOT withdraw their heavy weapons
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drew its inspiration from the theory of confrontation analysis.
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contains an illustrated explanation of Confrontation Analysis.
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clear to one another. These positions can be expressed as a
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Confrontation Analysis: How to win operations other than war
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in the early 1990s drawing from his work on game theory and
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Each side had a position as to what they wanted to happen:
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An interaction as a sequence of confrontations where the
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understanding the tables used in confrontation analysis
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How to structure disputes using Confrontation Analysis
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The Bosnian Serbs said they would attack the enclaves
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NOT to withdraw their heavy weapons from the enclaves
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models, but are not built with the aim of finding a
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enclaves surrounded and were threatening to attack.
134:changes as the parties struggle to eliminate their 314:The Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons 219:The Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons 153:) and what will happen if they cannot agree (the 1707: 74:Confrontation analysis was devised by Professor 297:NOT to withdraw heavy weapons from the enclaves 165:changes as players attempt to eliminate these. 499:This example developed from that described in 85:Much of the theoretical background to General 645: 114:Confrontation analysis can also be used in a 16:Operational analysis derived from game theory 311:The Bosnian Serbs NOT to attack the enclaves 216:The Bosnian Serbs NOT to attack the enclaves 593:an iPhone app to do Confrontation Analysis. 290:The Bosnian Serbs wanted (see 4th column): 198:The Bosnian Serbs wanted (see 4th column): 652: 638: 659: 27:. The software was written by Professor 388: 386: 384: 382: 380: 334: 267: 167: 125: 18: 222:The Bosnian Serbs NOT to take hostages. 1708: 483: 481: 474:definition of Options Board/Card table 633: 377: 180:(Initial Card Table), taken from the 69: 534: 532: 519: 517: 468: 466: 464: 462: 460: 415: 413: 478: 283:Secondly, with the addition of the 13: 701:First-player and second-player win 398: 14: 1742: 566: 529: 514: 457: 427:Greek Dungeons and German Dragons 410: 300:For the UN NOT to use air strikes 294:To be able to attack the enclaves 208:For the UN NOT to use air strikes 202:To be able to attack the enclaves 808:Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium 525:definition of Persuasion Dilemma 307:The UN wanted (See 5th column): 212:The UN wanted (See 5th column): 544: 540:definition of Rejection Dilemma 505:Confrontations in War and Peace 303:For the UN NOT to use artillery 818:Evolutionarily stable strategy 624:Speed Confrontation Management 493: 438: 157:). These interactions produce 1: 746:Simultaneous action selection 371: 1678:List of games in game theory 858:Quantal response equilibrium 848:Perfect Bayesian equilibrium 783:Bayes correlated equilibrium 176:Consider the example on the 7: 1731:Problem structuring methods 1147:Optional prisoner's dilemma 878:Self-confirming equilibrium 600:', CCRP Publications, 1999. 10: 1747: 1612:Principal variation search 1328:Aumann's agreement theorem 991:Strategy-stealing argument 903:Trembling hand equilibrium 833:Markov perfect equilibrium 828:Mertens-stable equilibrium 503:, Tait A, Howard N (1999) 1648:Combinatorial game theory 1635: 1594: 1376: 1320: 1307:Princess and monster game 1102: 1004: 911: 863:Quasi-perfect equilibrium 788:Bayesian Nash equilibrium 769: 668: 446:Letting agency case study 121: 1663:Evolutionary game theory 1396:Antoine Augustin Cournot 1282:Guess 2/3 of the average 1079:Strictly determined game 873:Satisfaction equilibrium 691:Escalation of commitment 612:Paradoxes of Rationality 1668:Glossary of game theory 1267:Stackelberg competition 893:Strong Nash equilibrium 1693:Tragedy of the commons 1673:List of game theorists 1653:Confrontation analysis 1363:Sprague–Grundy theorem 883:Sequential equilibrium 803:Correlated equilibrium 489:definition of Position 340: 280: 173: 138: 112: 105:General Rupert Smith, 40:Confrontation analysis 36: 1466:Jean-François Mertens 585:Confrontation Manager 394:definition of Dilemma 338: 271: 182:1995 Bosnian Conflict 171: 129: 97: 22: 1595:Search optimizations 1471:Jennifer Tour Chayes 1358:Revelation principle 1353:Purification theorem 1292:Nash bargaining game 1257:Bertrand competition 1242:El Farol Bar problem 1207:Electronic mail game 1172:Lewis signaling game 716:Hierarchy of beliefs 285:Rapid Reaction Force 107:The Utility of Force 92:The Utility of Force 48:operational analysis 1726:Operations research 1643:Bounded rationality 1262:Cournot competition 1212:Rock paper scissors 1187:Battle of the sexes 1177:Volunteer's dilemma 1049:Perfect information 976:Dominant strategies 813:Epsilon-equilibrium 696:Extensive-form game 614:', MIT Press, 1971. 429:, James Macintosh, 406:The future of Libya 274:persuasion dilemmas 253:persuasion dilemmas 57:It is derived from 1622:Paranoid algorithm 1602:Alpha–beta pruning 1481:John Maynard Smith 1312:Rendezvous problem 1152:Traveler's dilemma 1142:Gift-exchange game 1137:Prisoner's dilemma 1054:Large Poisson game 1021:Bargaining problem 926:Backward induction 898:Subgame perfection 853:Proper equilibrium 557:2019-09-15 at the 451:2019-09-15 at the 435:, 9 November 2011. 357:are isomorphic to 341: 281: 278:rejection dilemmas 174: 139: 70:Derivation and use 37: 1701: 1700: 1607:Aspiration window 1576:Suzanne Scotchmer 1531:Oskar Morgenstern 1426:Donald B. Gillies 1368:Zermelo's theorem 1297:Induction puzzles 1252:Fair cake-cutting 1227:Public goods game 1157:Coordination game 1031:Intransitive game 961:Forward induction 843:Pareto efficiency 823:Gibbs equilibrium 793:Berge equilibrium 741:Simultaneous game 257:rejection dilemma 155:threatened future 116:decision workshop 80:metagame analysis 25:Siege of Sarajevo 1738: 1688:Topological game 1683:No-win situation 1581:Thomas Schelling 1561:Robert B. Wilson 1521:Merrill M. Flood 1491:John von Neumann 1401:Ariel Rubinstein 1386:Albert W. Tucker 1237:War of attrition 1197:Matching pennies 838:Nash equilibrium 761:Mechanism design 726:Normal-form game 681:Cooperative game 654: 647: 640: 631: 630: 579:Dilemma Explorer 561: 548: 542: 536: 527: 521: 512: 497: 491: 485: 476: 470: 455: 442: 436: 417: 408: 402: 396: 390: 110: 44:dilemma analysis 1746: 1745: 1741: 1740: 1739: 1737: 1736: 1735: 1716:Formal sciences 1706: 1705: 1702: 1697: 1631: 1617:max^n algorithm 1590: 1586:William Vickrey 1546:Reinhard Selten 1501:Kenneth Binmore 1416:David K. Levine 1411:Daniel Kahneman 1378: 1372: 1348:Negamax theorem 1338:Minimax theorem 1316: 1277:Diner's dilemma 1132:All-pay auction 1098: 1084:Stochastic game 1036:Mean-field game 1007: 1000: 971:Markov strategy 907: 773: 765: 736:Sequential game 721:Information set 706:Game complexity 676:Congestion game 664: 658: 573:Dilemmas Galore 569: 564: 559:Wayback Machine 549: 545: 537: 530: 522: 515: 498: 494: 486: 479: 471: 458: 453:Wayback Machine 443: 439: 432:Financial Times 418: 411: 403: 399: 391: 378: 374: 124: 111: 104: 72: 42:(also known as 17: 12: 11: 5: 1744: 1734: 1733: 1728: 1723: 1718: 1699: 1698: 1696: 1695: 1690: 1685: 1680: 1675: 1670: 1665: 1660: 1655: 1650: 1645: 1639: 1637: 1633: 1632: 1630: 1629: 1624: 1619: 1614: 1609: 1604: 1598: 1596: 1592: 1591: 1589: 1588: 1583: 1578: 1573: 1568: 1563: 1558: 1553: 1551:Robert Axelrod 1548: 1543: 1538: 1533: 1528: 1526:Olga Bondareva 1523: 1518: 1516:Melvin Dresher 1513: 1508: 1506:Leonid Hurwicz 1503: 1498: 1493: 1488: 1483: 1478: 1473: 1468: 1463: 1458: 1453: 1448: 1443: 1441:Harold W. Kuhn 1438: 1433: 1431:Drew Fudenberg 1428: 1423: 1421:David M. Kreps 1418: 1413: 1408: 1406:Claude Shannon 1403: 1398: 1393: 1388: 1382: 1380: 1374: 1373: 1371: 1370: 1365: 1360: 1355: 1350: 1345: 1343:Nash's theorem 1340: 1335: 1330: 1324: 1322: 1318: 1317: 1315: 1314: 1309: 1304: 1299: 1294: 1289: 1284: 1279: 1274: 1269: 1264: 1259: 1254: 1249: 1244: 1239: 1234: 1229: 1224: 1219: 1214: 1209: 1204: 1202:Ultimatum game 1199: 1194: 1189: 1184: 1182:Dollar auction 1179: 1174: 1169: 1167:Centipede game 1164: 1159: 1154: 1149: 1144: 1139: 1134: 1129: 1124: 1122:Infinite chess 1119: 1114: 1108: 1106: 1100: 1099: 1097: 1096: 1091: 1089:Symmetric game 1086: 1081: 1076: 1074:Signaling game 1071: 1069:Screening game 1066: 1061: 1059:Potential game 1056: 1051: 1046: 1038: 1033: 1028: 1023: 1018: 1012: 1010: 1002: 1001: 999: 998: 993: 988: 986:Mixed strategy 983: 978: 973: 968: 963: 958: 953: 948: 943: 938: 933: 928: 923: 917: 915: 909: 908: 906: 905: 900: 895: 890: 885: 880: 875: 870: 868:Risk dominance 865: 860: 855: 850: 845: 840: 835: 830: 825: 820: 815: 810: 805: 800: 795: 790: 785: 779: 777: 767: 766: 764: 763: 758: 753: 748: 743: 738: 733: 728: 723: 718: 713: 711:Graphical game 708: 703: 698: 693: 688: 683: 678: 672: 670: 666: 665: 657: 656: 649: 642: 634: 628: 627: 621: 615: 608: 605: 601: 594: 588: 582: 576: 568: 567:External links 565: 563: 562: 543: 528: 513: 492: 477: 456: 437: 409: 397: 375: 373: 370: 333: 332: 329: 326: 323: 316: 315: 312: 305: 304: 301: 298: 295: 241: 240: 237: 234: 231: 224: 223: 220: 217: 210: 209: 206: 203: 123: 120: 102: 71: 68: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 1743: 1732: 1729: 1727: 1724: 1722: 1719: 1717: 1714: 1713: 1711: 1704: 1694: 1691: 1689: 1686: 1684: 1681: 1679: 1676: 1674: 1671: 1669: 1666: 1664: 1661: 1659: 1656: 1654: 1651: 1649: 1646: 1644: 1641: 1640: 1638: 1636:Miscellaneous 1634: 1628: 1625: 1623: 1620: 1618: 1615: 1613: 1610: 1608: 1605: 1603: 1600: 1599: 1597: 1593: 1587: 1584: 1582: 1579: 1577: 1574: 1572: 1571:Samuel Bowles 1569: 1567: 1566:Roger Myerson 1564: 1562: 1559: 1557: 1556:Robert Aumann 1554: 1552: 1549: 1547: 1544: 1542: 1539: 1537: 1534: 1532: 1529: 1527: 1524: 1522: 1519: 1517: 1514: 1512: 1511:Lloyd Shapley 1509: 1507: 1504: 1502: 1499: 1497: 1496:Kenneth Arrow 1494: 1492: 1489: 1487: 1484: 1482: 1479: 1477: 1476:John Harsanyi 1474: 1472: 1469: 1467: 1464: 1462: 1459: 1457: 1454: 1452: 1449: 1447: 1446:Herbert Simon 1444: 1442: 1439: 1437: 1434: 1432: 1429: 1427: 1424: 1422: 1419: 1417: 1414: 1412: 1409: 1407: 1404: 1402: 1399: 1397: 1394: 1392: 1389: 1387: 1384: 1383: 1381: 1375: 1369: 1366: 1364: 1361: 1359: 1356: 1354: 1351: 1349: 1346: 1344: 1341: 1339: 1336: 1334: 1331: 1329: 1326: 1325: 1323: 1319: 1313: 1310: 1308: 1305: 1303: 1300: 1298: 1295: 1293: 1290: 1288: 1285: 1283: 1280: 1278: 1275: 1273: 1270: 1268: 1265: 1263: 1260: 1258: 1255: 1253: 1250: 1248: 1247:Fair division 1245: 1243: 1240: 1238: 1235: 1233: 1230: 1228: 1225: 1223: 1222:Dictator game 1220: 1218: 1215: 1213: 1210: 1208: 1205: 1203: 1200: 1198: 1195: 1193: 1190: 1188: 1185: 1183: 1180: 1178: 1175: 1173: 1170: 1168: 1165: 1163: 1160: 1158: 1155: 1153: 1150: 1148: 1145: 1143: 1140: 1138: 1135: 1133: 1130: 1128: 1125: 1123: 1120: 1118: 1115: 1113: 1110: 1109: 1107: 1105: 1101: 1095: 1094:Zero-sum game 1092: 1090: 1087: 1085: 1082: 1080: 1077: 1075: 1072: 1070: 1067: 1065: 1064:Repeated game 1062: 1060: 1057: 1055: 1052: 1050: 1047: 1045: 1043: 1039: 1037: 1034: 1032: 1029: 1027: 1024: 1022: 1019: 1017: 1014: 1013: 1011: 1009: 1003: 997: 994: 992: 989: 987: 984: 982: 981:Pure strategy 979: 977: 974: 972: 969: 967: 964: 962: 959: 957: 954: 952: 949: 947: 946:De-escalation 944: 942: 939: 937: 934: 932: 929: 927: 924: 922: 919: 918: 916: 914: 910: 904: 901: 899: 896: 894: 891: 889: 888:Shapley value 886: 884: 881: 879: 876: 874: 871: 869: 866: 864: 861: 859: 856: 854: 851: 849: 846: 844: 841: 839: 836: 834: 831: 829: 826: 824: 821: 819: 816: 814: 811: 809: 806: 804: 801: 799: 796: 794: 791: 789: 786: 784: 781: 780: 778: 776: 772: 768: 762: 759: 757: 756:Succinct game 754: 752: 749: 747: 744: 742: 739: 737: 734: 732: 729: 727: 724: 722: 719: 717: 714: 712: 709: 707: 704: 702: 699: 697: 694: 692: 689: 687: 684: 682: 679: 677: 674: 673: 671: 667: 663: 655: 650: 648: 643: 641: 636: 635: 632: 625: 622: 619: 616: 613: 609: 606: 602: 599: 595: 592: 589: 586: 583: 580: 577: 574: 571: 570: 560: 556: 553: 547: 541: 535: 533: 526: 520: 518: 510: 506: 502: 496: 490: 484: 482: 475: 469: 467: 465: 463: 461: 454: 450: 447: 441: 434: 433: 428: 424: 422: 416: 414: 407: 401: 395: 389: 387: 385: 383: 381: 376: 369: 366: 364: 360: 356: 351: 349: 348:confrontation 344: 337: 330: 327: 324: 321: 320: 319: 313: 310: 309: 308: 302: 299: 296: 293: 292: 291: 288: 286: 279: 275: 270: 266: 263: 260: 258: 254: 249: 246: 238: 235: 232: 229: 228: 227: 221: 218: 215: 214: 213: 207: 204: 201: 200: 199: 196: 193: 191: 187: 186:Bosnian Serbs 183: 179: 170: 166: 164: 160: 156: 152: 148: 144: 137: 133: 128: 119: 117: 108: 101: 96: 94: 93: 88: 83: 81: 77: 67: 65: 60: 55: 53: 49: 45: 41: 34: 30: 26: 21: 1703: 1652: 1541:Peyton Young 1536:Paul Milgrom 1451:HervĂ© Moulin 1391:Amos Tversky 1333:Folk theorem 1044:-player game 1041: 966:Grim trigger 604:Wiley, 2001. 596:N. Howard, ' 546: 508: 495: 440: 430: 426: 421:Mike Young's 400: 367: 362: 354: 352: 347: 345: 342: 317: 306: 289: 282: 277: 273: 264: 261: 256: 252: 250: 244: 242: 225: 211: 197: 194: 175: 162: 158: 154: 150: 146: 142: 140: 135: 131: 115: 113: 98: 90: 87:Rupert Smith 84: 76:Nigel Howard 73: 63: 56: 52:drama theory 43: 39: 38: 33:Rupert Smith 31:for General 29:Nigel Howard 1721:Game theory 1658:Coopetition 1461:Jean Tirole 1456:John Conway 1436:Eric Maskin 1232:Blotto game 1217:Pirate game 1026:Global game 996:Tit for tat 931:Bid shading 921:Appeasement 771:Equilibrium 751:Solved game 686:Determinacy 669:Definitions 662:game theory 610:N. Howard, 591:Confronteer 359:game theory 355:card tables 59:game theory 1710:Categories 1302:Trust game 1287:Kuhn poker 956:Escalation 951:Deterrence 941:Cheap talk 913:Strategies 731:Preference 660:Topics of 372:References 163:card table 147:card table 132:card table 1486:John Nash 1192:Stag hunt 936:Collusion 143:positions 1627:Lazy SMP 1321:Theorems 1272:Deadlock 1127:Checkers 1008:of games 775:concepts 555:Archived 449:Archived 363:solution 276:and two 245:dilemmas 161:and the 159:dilemmas 151:position 136:dilemmas 103:—  89:'s book 64:dilemmas 46:) is an 35:in 1996. 1379:figures 1162:Chicken 1016:Auction 1006:Classes 501:Smith R 190:Bosniak 109:(p.xvi) 122:Method 1117:Chess 1104:Games 425:" – 178:right 798:Core 550:See 538:See 523:See 487:See 472:See 444:See 404:See 392:See 353:The 188:had 1377:Key 54:. 1712:: 1112:Go 531:^ 516:^ 507:. 480:^ 459:^ 412:^ 379:^ 66:. 1042:n 653:e 646:t 639:v

Index

Screenshot illustrating the use of confrontation analysis in a role play written by Professor Nigel Howard in a computer-aided role play depicting the Siege of Sarajevo
Siege of Sarajevo
Nigel Howard
Rupert Smith
operational analysis
drama theory
game theory
Nigel Howard
metagame analysis
Rupert Smith
The Utility of Force
The Utility of Force


right
1995 Bosnian Conflict
Bosnian Serbs
Bosniak

Rapid Reaction Force

game theory





definition of Dilemma
The future of Libya

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