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Charity auction

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48: 20: 571:. If the free-rider problem dominates, then bids and consequently auction revenues would be depressed. On the other hand, bids could rise because they are subsidized by charitable sentiment Theoretical work has investigated the properties of different formats of charity auctions under the assumption that bidders care about the charity's revenue. The general result is that private benefits from charitable giving can translate into a “charity premium,” an increase in auction revenue resulting from charitable donations. 559:
In a charity auction the winning payment benefits a cause that is presumably valued by the bidder as well as competing bidders. Thus, the bidder receives a benefit from his own payment – both the item won and the value the donation supports the organization – and other bidders do as well, as their
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Altruism is commonly considered to be the principle motive in donation behavior, and this altruism could very much depend on the proportion of the proceeds that is donated to charity. Altruism is often confused with empathy, leading to paradoxes such as avoiding fundraisers.
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12. ERnan Haruvy, Peter Popkowski Leszczyc, Greg Allenby, Russell Belk, Catherine Eckel, Robert Fisher, Sherry Xin Li, John A. List, Yu Ma, and Yu Wang. (2020). "Fundraising design: key issues, unifying framework, and open puzzles." Marketing Letters 31, no. 4,
538:. These events are typically hosted in hotels or ballrooms, and dinner or cocktails may be served to guests. Charity auctions aimed at business leaders and other well-off potential donors often take the form of a formal gala. 551:
are experiential items that cannot typically be bought in the store, including meetings with celebrities, an autographed guitar, and naming rights for characters in a forthcoming novel. In one notable example, Musician
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There are three primary approaches to academic research on charity auctions: (1) utility-based (Economics discipline), (2) appeals-based (Marketing discipline), and (3) societal-based (Sociology discipline).
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charity is supported. Therefore, bidders have two objectives that could be in conflict with one another: to win items that they value but also to support a charitable cause in part by driving up the price.
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Andreoni, J., Rao, J. M., & Trachtman, H. (2017). Avoiding the ask: A field experiment on altruism, empathy, and charitable giving. Journal of political Economy, 125(3), 625-653
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DellaVigna, S., List, J. A., & Malmendier, U. (2012). Testing for altruism and social pressure in charitable giving. The quarterly journal of economics, 127(1), 1-56.
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Ernan Haruvy and Peter Popkowski Leszczyc (2009). Bidder motives in cause-related auctions. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 26(4), 324-331.
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Goeree, J. K., Maasland, E., Onderstal, S., & Turner, J. L. (2005). How (not) to raise money. Journal of Political Economy, 113(4), 897–918.
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sold 100 of his guitars in a charity auction in 1999 and raised $ 5 million for his substance abuse treatment facility.
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and Peter Popkowski Leszczyc (2015). The Loser’s Bliss in Auctions with Price Externality. Games, 6(3), 191-213.
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Engers, M. P., & McManus, B. P. (2007). Charity auctions. International Economic Review, 48(3), 953–994.
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Engers, M., & McManus, B. (2007). Charity auctions. International Economic Review, 48(3), 953-994.
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Engers, M., & McManus, B. (2007). Charity auctions. International Economic Review, 48(3), 953-994.
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(2008-11-11). 563:This makes the charity auction a 46: 741: 732: 547:, items that sell well in such 723: 713: 704: 695: 686: 674: 665: 632: 606:Hawthorne, Fran (2011-10-18). 599: 1: 592: 7: 583: 10: 785: 483:Private electronic market 178:Generalized second-price 173:Generalized first-price 228:Simultaneous ascending 24: 769:Contexts for auctions 263:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves 22: 143:Discriminatory price 453:Revenue equivalence 138:Deferred-acceptance 645:The New York Times 612:The New York Times 569:free-rider problem 223:Sealed first-price 25: 541:According to the 525: 524: 303:Cancellation hunt 253:Value of revenues 123:Click-box bidding 16:Fundraising event 776: 748: 745: 739: 736: 730: 727: 721: 717: 711: 708: 702: 699: 693: 690: 684: 678: 672: 669: 663: 662: 660: 659: 636: 630: 629: 627: 626: 603: 528:Charity auctions 517: 510: 503: 448:Price of anarchy 298:Calor licitantis 50: 27: 26: 784: 783: 779: 778: 777: 775: 774: 773: 754: 753: 752: 751: 746: 742: 737: 733: 728: 724: 718: 714: 709: 705: 700: 696: 691: 687: 679: 675: 670: 666: 657: 655: 637: 633: 624: 622: 604: 600: 595: 586: 577: 521: 492: 462: 427: 332: 328:Tacit collusion 277: 193:Multi-attribute 17: 12: 11: 5: 782: 772: 771: 766: 764:Charity events 750: 749: 740: 731: 722: 712: 703: 694: 685: 673: 664: 631: 597: 596: 594: 591: 585: 582: 576: 573: 544:New York Times 523: 522: 520: 519: 512: 505: 497: 494: 493: 491: 490: 485: 480: 474: 471: 470: 464: 463: 461: 460: 458:Winner's curse 455: 450: 445: 439: 436: 435: 429: 428: 426: 425: 420: 415: 410: 405: 400: 395: 390: 385: 380: 375: 370: 365: 360: 355: 350: 344: 341: 340: 334: 333: 331: 330: 325: 320: 315: 310: 305: 300: 295: 289: 286: 285: 279: 278: 276: 275: 270: 265: 260: 255: 250: 245: 240: 235: 230: 225: 220: 215: 210: 205: 200: 195: 190: 185: 180: 175: 170: 165: 160: 155: 150: 145: 140: 135: 130: 125: 120: 115: 110: 105: 100: 95: 90: 85: 84: 83: 78: 73: 62: 59: 58: 52: 51: 43: 42: 36: 35: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 781: 770: 767: 765: 762: 761: 759: 744: 735: 726: 716: 707: 698: 689: 682: 677: 668: 654: 650: 646: 642: 635: 621: 617: 613: 609: 602: 598: 590: 581: 572: 570: 566: 561: 557: 555: 550: 546: 545: 539: 537: 533: 532:raising funds 530:are a way of 529: 518: 513: 511: 506: 504: 499: 498: 496: 495: 489: 486: 484: 481: 479: 476: 475: 473: 472: 469: 466: 465: 459: 456: 454: 451: 449: 446: 444: 443:Digital goods 441: 440: 438: 437: 434: 431: 430: 424: 421: 419: 416: 414: 411: 409: 406: 404: 401: 399: 396: 394: 391: 389: 386: 384: 381: 379: 376: 374: 371: 369: 366: 364: 361: 359: 356: 354: 351: 349: 346: 345: 343: 342: 339: 336: 335: 329: 326: 324: 321: 319: 316: 314: 311: 309: 306: 304: 301: 299: 296: 294: 291: 290: 288: 287: 284: 281: 280: 274: 271: 269: 266: 264: 261: 259: 256: 254: 251: 249: 246: 244: 243:Uniform price 241: 239: 238:Traffic light 236: 234: 231: 229: 226: 224: 221: 219: 216: 214: 211: 209: 206: 204: 201: 199: 196: 194: 191: 189: 186: 184: 181: 179: 176: 174: 171: 169: 166: 164: 161: 159: 156: 154: 151: 149: 146: 144: 141: 139: 136: 134: 131: 129: 128:Combinatorial 126: 124: 121: 119: 116: 114: 111: 109: 106: 104: 103:Best/not best 101: 99: 98:Barter double 96: 94: 91: 89: 86: 82: 79: 77: 74: 72: 69: 68: 67: 64: 63: 61: 60: 57: 54: 53: 49: 45: 44: 41: 38: 37: 33: 29: 28: 21: 743: 734: 725: 715: 706: 697: 688: 681:Ernan Haruvy 676: 667: 656:. Retrieved 644: 634: 623:. Retrieved 611: 601: 587: 578: 562: 558: 554:Eric Clapton 542: 540: 527: 526: 378:Domain names 362: 233:Single-price 133:Common value 565:public good 93:Anglo-Dutch 76:Bidding fee 758:Categories 658:2023-01-27 625:2023-01-27 593:References 348:Algorithms 248:Unique bid 203:No-reserve 653:0362-4331 620:0362-4331 536:charities 413:Virginity 268:Walrasian 198:Multiunit 108:Brazilian 88:Amsterdam 720:371-380. 584:Altruism 549:auctions 488:Software 478:Ebidding 403:Spectrum 368:Children 338:Contexts 218:Scottish 188:Knapsack 183:Japanese 113:Calcutta 40:Auctions 32:a series 30:Part of 383:Flowers 373:Players 363:Charity 323:Suicide 318:Sniping 313:Rigging 293:Shading 283:Bidding 258:Vickrey 213:Reverse 163:Forward 158:English 71:Chinese 66:All-pay 651:  618:  468:Online 433:Theory 408:Stamps 398:Slaves 273:Yankee 168:French 148:Double 118:Candle 81:Dollar 423:Wives 388:Loans 353:Autos 153:Dutch 56:Types 649:ISSN 616:ISSN 534:for 418:Wine 393:Scam 308:Jump 208:Rank 358:Art 760:: 647:. 643:. 614:. 610:. 34:on 661:. 628:. 516:e 509:t 502:v

Index


a series
Auctions
Auction Room, Christie's, circa 1808.
Types
All-pay
Chinese
Bidding fee
Dollar
Amsterdam
Anglo-Dutch
Barter double
Best/not best
Brazilian
Calcutta
Candle
Click-box bidding
Combinatorial
Common value
Deferred-acceptance
Discriminatory price
Double
Dutch
English
Forward
French
Generalized first-price
Generalized second-price
Japanese
Knapsack

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