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71:– that whatever one clearly and distinctly perceives is true: "I now seem to be able to lay it down as a general rule that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true" (AT VII 35). He goes on in the same Meditation to argue for the existence of a benevolent God, in order to defeat his skeptical argument in the first Meditation that God might be a deceiver. He then says that without his knowledge of God's existence, none of his knowledge could be certain.
199:. Frankfurt suggests that Descartes's arguments for the existence of God, and for the reliability of reason, are not intended to prove that their conclusions are true, but to show that reason leads to them. Thus, reason is validated by being shown to confirm its own validity instead of leading to a denial of its validity by being shown to be incapable of demonstrating the existence of a benevolent God.
124:
Descartes' own response to this criticism, in his "Author's
Replies to the Fourth Set of Objections", is first to give what has become known as the Memory response; he points out that in the fifth Meditation (at AT VII 69–70) he did not say that he needed God to guarantee the truth of his clear and
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presents the memory defense as follows: "When one is actually intuiting a given proposition, no doubt can be entertained. So any doubt there can be must be entertained when one is not intuiting the proposition." He goes on to argue: "The trouble with
Descartes's system is not that it is circular;
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You are not yet certain of the existence of God, and you say that you are not certain of anything. It follows from this that you do not yet clearly and distinctly know that you are a thinking thing, since, on your own admission, that knowledge depends on the clear knowledge of an existing God; and
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When I said that we can know nothing for certain until we are aware that God exists, I expressly declared that I was speaking only of knowledge of those conclusions which can be recalled when we are no longer attending to the arguments by means of which we deduced them. (AT VII
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nor that there is an illegitimate relation between the proofs of God and the clear and distinct perceptions The trouble is that the proofs of God are invalid and do not convince even when they are supposedly being intuited."
144:, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind" (AT VII 140). Finally, he points out that the certainty of clear and distinct ideas does not depend upon God's guarantee (AT VII 145–146). The
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was another one of
Descartes' objectors, likewise arguing that God's existence cannot be used to prove that what one clearly and distinctly perceives is true.
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is an inference: "When someone says 'I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist' he does not deduce existence from thought by means of a
402:
385:
Carriero, John (2008). "The
Cartesian Circle and the Foundations of Knowledge". In Broughton, Janet; Carriero, John (eds.).
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Descartes' proof of the reliability of clear and distinct perceptions takes as a premise God's existence as a non-deceiver.
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this you have not proved in the passage where you draw the conclusion that you clearly know what you are. (AT VII 124–125)
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370:. Vol. 2. Translated by John Cottingham; Robert Stoothoff; Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge University Press. 1984.
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true and certain, that is, time-bound, and objectively possible (and does not need the guarantee of God).
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Many commentators, both at the time that
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Descartes' proofs of God's existence presuppose the reliability of clear and distinct perceptions.
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Another defense of
Descartes against the charge of circularity is developed by
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Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: the
Defense of Reason in Descartes' Meditations
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in particular is self-verifying, indubitable, immune to the strongest doubt.
93:, and then claims that God is the guarantor of his clear and distinct ideas.
455:
Hatfield, Gary (2006). "The
Cartesian Circle". In Gaukroger, Stephen (ed.).
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The
Cartesian circle is a criticism of the above that takes this form:
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true and certain (with the guarantee of God), while the former is
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414:"Descartes' Dualism: Correcting Some Misconceptions"
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Descartes argues – for example, in the third of his
171:The distinction appropriate here is that between
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16:Error in reasoning attributed to René Descartes
451:Reprinted by Princeton University Press, 2007.
389:. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. pp. 302–318.
125:distinct ideas, only to guarantee his memory:
457:The Blackwell Guide to Descartes' Meditations
101:The first person to raise this criticism was
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134:Secondly, he explicitly denies that the
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470:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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482:Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry
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237:. Oxford University Press. p. 49.
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57:, which is itself guaranteed by God.
418:Journal of the History of Philosophy
412:Christofidou, Andrea (April 2001).
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49:. He argued that the existence of
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468:. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
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395:10.1002/9780470696439.ch18
251:, ed. by Charles Adam and
466:"Descartes' Epistemology"
445:Frankfurt, Harry (1970).
233:Cottingham, John (1988).
97:Descartes' contemporaries
387:A Companion to Descartes
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509:Philosophical arguments
288:"The Cartesian Circle"
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53:is proven by reliable
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430:10.1353/hph.2003.0098
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249:Oeuvres de Descartes
214:Ontological argument
459:. pp. 122–141.
165:Andrea Christofidou
152:Modern commentators
38:) is an example of
514:Informal fallacies
342:, pp. 219–220
209:Circular reasoning
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484:. Penguin Books.
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340:Christofidou 2001
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55:perception
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