145:," and required them to return the same amount when they left the co-op. Members of the co-op used scrip to pay for babysitting. Each piece of scrip was contractually deemed to pay for half an hour of babysitting. To earn more scrip, couples babysat other member's children. Administrators in the co-op were responsible for various tasks, such as matching couples needing a babysitter with couples that wanted to babysit. To "pay" for the administrative costs of the system, each member had an obligation to contribute fourteen hours' worth of scrip a year (i.e. 28 scrip). Some of the administration's scrip went to administrators to be spent and some was simply saved.
20:
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couples would have to spend more time babysitting before they acquired the amount necessary to leave the cooperative. Mitchell concludes that the problem is greater aggregate desire to save than can be funded by existing administrative debt, and that the solution is thus either to reduce (desire for) savings or, more likely increase spending by simply issuing more scrip.
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summer than in the winter. Instead, if the co-op modified the system so that the scrip is redeemable for less time in the upcoming summer than in the winter, there would be less incentive to save because members would get less "bang for their buck" if they chose to hold onto the scrip until the summer. In other words, Krugman is suggesting that the co-op should have an
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will most likely result in less member borrowing. Thus the demand for babysitting will be reduced. Similarly, the administration can decrease the amount of interest paid when demand for babysitting is low. And the system would help parents, because they would no longer have to save as much scrip because they could simply borrow more in the cases of an emergency.
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seasonality of babysitting, this might work. But suppose the seasonality is so strong that no one wants to go out in the winter even when the administration sets its interest rates to zero. That is, suppose no parents want to go out even when they can borrow money for free. In this hypothetical situation, the co-op has fallen into a liquidity trap.
565:
destroys net member savings. For example, if the administration lends ten hours' worth of scrip at 10% interest for one year (thus collecting eleven hours' worth of scrip in one year's time), then it has created ten hours' worth of scrip but will withdraw eleven hours in the future, thus reducing net private sector assets by one hour.
84:
Members naturally left the co-op as their children grew up, but many continued to work together in various organizations. In 2007, a number of the now elderly former co-op members from the 1960s and 1970s were involved in founding the
Capitol Hill Village, an organization dedicated to helping elderly
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Imagine that during the winter couples do not want to go out, but want to acquire more scrip for the summer. To compensate, the administration can lower the amount of extra scrip returned when parents want to borrow in the winter, and increase rates in the summer. Depending upon the strength of the
232:
According to
Krugman, the key problem is that the scrip's value is fixed. Couples know that each scrip they save in the winter can be redeemed for the same amount of time in the summer, giving them incentive to save because, psychologically speaking, each scrip's value is worth more to them in the
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This lending program would be advantageous to both the administration and parents. It gives the administration more tools to control demand for babysitting. If the administration observes that demand for babysitting is up, it can increase the interest members must pay when they borrow scrip, which
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view asserts that the co-op's administration should resolve the co-op's issues via "fiscal" policy. That is, the scrip system is fiat money, which can be created or destroyed at will by "spending" or "taxation", and the administration should simply inject more scrip into the system when demand is
564:
The emphasis on the net scrip of co-op members, which equal the amount injected into the co-op by the administration, is the distinguishing feature of the
Chartalist view. From this perspective, the function of introducing lending, as Krugman suggests, is that interest on this lending creates or
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The administration's initial reaction to the co-op's recession was to add new rules. But the measures did not resolve the inadequate demand for babysitting. Eventually, the co-op was able to alleviate the issue by giving new members thirty hours' worth of scrip, but only requiring them to return
568:
As a consequence of this difference, while
Krugman suggests using monetary policy to manage the economy, and resolving a liquidity trap by creating inflationary expectations to make saving less desirable, Miller suggests using fiscal policy to manage the economy (matching administrative debt to
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Mitchell criticizes the suggestion that price flexibility alone would resolve the demand problem. He notes that a fall in prices would reduce the price of babysitting. This, of course, also means that the amount of scrip received for babysitting would also be less. Thus, since parents made less
196:
Mitchell criticizes this because, he asserts, the falling wages of babysitters only solves the problem if it reduces the desire of couples to save, which is not supported by any research. The only effect of falling wages would be to increase the real value of nominal contracts. In other words,
173:
The co-op's problems occurred because of two issues: the scrip's value was fixed, and the ratio of scrip to couples was volatile. The cooperative could have made the ratio of scrip to couples fixed, by adjusting the amount of scrip entering the system via new members and leaving the system via
148:
At first, new members of the co-op felt, on average, that they should save more scrip before they began spending. So they babysat whenever the opportunity arose, but did not spend the scrip they acquired. Since babysitting opportunities only arise when other couples want to go out, there was a
252:(wages), not of the scrip (money), alleging that the correct solution is to let couples decide how much they charge for babysitting on their own; when there is high demand or low supply of babysitters, couples would be more willing to babysit if they were given more scrip for their services.
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Within a few years a new problem arose. There was too much scrip and a shortage of babysitting. As new members joined, more scrip was added to the system until couples had too much, but new members were not able to spend it because no one else wanted to babysit. In general, the cooperative
220:. Depending upon the economic conditions, the efficacy of the general system (i.e. the co-op) is partially dependent on interest rates. When times are good, it is best to have relatively high interest rates, and when times are bad the rates should be lower.
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to be money whose value is derived entirely from its official status as a means of exchange. Some alternative definitions also require that fiat money has no fixed value in terms of an objective standard. Under the latter definition the scrip is considered
80:
The co-op was founded in the late 1950s, and as of 2017 continues to operate. In 2010, there were twenty families in the co-op (down from its heyday of 250 families). Some of these are second-generation members of the co-op. It is open to new members.
106:
In the 1960s the position of secretary rotated monthly. This was seen as an onerous task, which is why it was rotated, and entailed taking babysitting requests, matching sitters with requests (hence being on call at all times), and balancing the
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From the
Chartalist perspective, the key point is the co-op board's deficits give co-op members additional scrip. This is because the co-op is a closed economy; assuming that there is a fixed amount of scrip, total savings is zero, so
512:. The deficit spending created government debt of ten hours per family. Since every piece of scrip spent by the administration is given to the members, the result is that couples were given an additional ten hours of scrip (i.e.
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couples choosing to leave the co-op. In addition, it could have let the scrip value adjust so that couples were paid more scrip to babysit when the supply of babysitters was small, and less when the supply was large.
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experienced regular problems because the administration took in more than it spent, and at times the system added too much scrip into the system via the amount issued to new members.
120:, was in extremely high demand, at least at some points, with a former member being quoted as saying "Oh my God, you would kill for scrip. ... You would sell your children for scrip."
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Former members Joan
Sweeney and Richard James Sweeney first presented the co-op as an allegory for an economy in a 1977 article, but it was little known until popularized by
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desired private savings), and resolving a liquidity trap by issuing more scrip, hence increasing the administrative debt, to fund this desired saving.
1472:
Hens, T.; Schenk-Hoppé, K. R.; Vogt, B. (2007). "The Great
Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co-op: Anecdote or Evidence for the Optimum Quantity of Money?".
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Another proposed solution is to put a maturity date upon the scrip, so that it must be spent, and people can borrow scrip through scrip "bonds".
708:"Slate has reposted my old piece on monetary economics as illustrated by the Capitol Hill Babysitting Co-op (which is still in existence!)"
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goes up. Initially when the administration spent twenty hours' worth of scrip and taxed twenty, there was no administrative debt (i.e.
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money, even as the supply of babysitters decreased, because of less incentive to babysit, the babysitters would not become wealthier.
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low, and reduce the amount of scrip when demand is high by increasing scrip fees or charging a levy (a "tax"). The co-op board's
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from couples with little scrip to those with more, which will encourage persons who have saved in the past to spend more.
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people continue living at home by providing a support community. The organization is modeled after Beacon Hill
Village in
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1044:"Baby-Sitting the Economy: The baby-sitting co-op that went bust teaches us something that could save the world"
843:"Baby-Sitting the Economy: The baby-sitting co-op that went bust teaches us something that could save the world"
216:
These hypothetical modification to the
Capitol Hill Babysitting Co-op makes its administration analogous to a
1354:
Lautzenheiser, Mark; YaĹźar, Yavuz (January 2005), "Krugman Meets Marx and Keynes at the Baby-sitting Co-op",
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to an economy's well-being. The allegory has received continuing attention, particularly in the wake of the
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and subsequent writings. Krugman has described the allegory as "a favorite parable" and "life-changing".
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941:; the Driscolls were the 24th couple to join, and this interview discusses the co-op in the 1960s.
609:), state that the money was paid back after one year, which appears to be a misunderstanding, as (
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47:-oriented model of an economy. The allegory illustrates several economic concepts, including the
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1091:, W. W. Norton & Company, pp. 8–11 (introduces model), 71–79 (applies to Japan),
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561:=10Ă—(number of members)), which may fulfill the private sector's desired savings quota.
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The co-op grew from 20 families in the early 1960s to more than 200 in the early 1970s.
44:
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989:
Peddling
Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in the Age of Diminished Expectations
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By the early 1970s the co-op was geographically split in two—north/south or east/west.
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947:"The Capitol Hill Babysitting Coop: Celebrating its 50th Year of Community Childcare"
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Double time was paid after midnight and between 5 pm and 7 pm (during supper time).
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28–31 (The Attack on Keynes: Infantile Keynesianism) and 92–93 (The Supply-Siders)
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879:"Monetary Theory and the Great Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co-op Crisis: Comment"
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592:) does not specify if double time was paid to sitters or to the secretary; (
1263:"Post-Modern Economics: The Return of Depression Economics by Paul Krugman"
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731:"A Village For the Elders: Neighbors' Plan Allows For Aging Without Moving"
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1409:"Optimizing scrip systems: efficiency, crashes, hoarders, and altruists"
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shortage of demand for babysitting. As a result, the co-op fell into a "
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On the Micro-Foundations of Money: The Capitol Hill Baby-Sitting Co-op
803:"Monetary Theory and the Great Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co-op Crisis"
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A modification to the co-op allegory creates a situation resembling a
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The Accidental Theorist and Other Dispatches from the Dismal Science
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between its members. The co-op is often used as an allegory for a
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264:(e.g. spending/issuing thirty, taxing twenty) is properly called
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The most common criticism of Krugman's interpretation, given by
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Hens, Thorsten; Schenk-Hoppe, Klaus Reiner; Vogt, Bodo (2003).
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189:, is that the effect of cheaper babysitting prices is rather a
39:, whose purpose is to fairly distribute the responsibility of
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134:
117:
1413:
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
1407:
Kash, Ian A.; Friedman, Eric J.; Halpern, Joseph Y. (2007).
1150:"The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008"
1062:—— (April 1, 1999a), "Four Percent Follies",
800:
419:. Thus, as the administration's savings become negative
137:, each piece was worth half an hour of babysitting time.
1144:), with preamble on the subsequent favorable reception.
596:) states "time-and-a-half for later hours" for sitters.
141:
The co-op gave each new member twenty hours' worth of "
1415:. San Diego, California, USA: ACM. pp. 305–315.
1320:"Krugman and His Economics of Keynesian Baby-Sitting"
1119:; a more technical description of a one-good economy.
613:) specifies that it was paid back when a family left.
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1307:"Krugman y su economĂa de los canguros keynesianos"
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153:". This illustrates the phenomenon known as the
1460:. Hamburg Institute of International Economics
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926:Ruth Ann Overbeck Capitol Hill History Project
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376:is aggregate member savings. In other words,
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928:, interviewed by Prosky, Ida, archived from
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248:) is that the problem is the fixed price of
920:Driscoll, Pat Taffe (January 19–20, 2006),
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1252:(All these references associated with the
1107:"The World's Smallest Macroeconomic Model"
1032:– via The Unofficial Krugman Archive
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1539:1957 establishments in Washington, D.C.
1534:Organizations based in Washington, D.C.
1271:Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics
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1066:, W. W. Norton & Company, pp.
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1524:Cooperatives based in Washington, D.C.
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1394:Bill Mitchell - Modern Monetary Theory
1371:and connects to the earlier Keynes of
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1034:; describes another co-op, which uses
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1340:
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1247:
1231:"How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?"
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185:response to this criticism, given by
1474:Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
1317:
1305:Rallo, Juan RamĂłn (March 16, 2009),
1229:—— (September 2, 2009),
1148:—— (December 1, 2008b),
1123:—— (October 13, 2008a),
886:Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
877:Sweeney, J.; Sweeney, R. J. (1977).
760:
349:is the administration's savings and
89:, and while it involves elements of
29:Capitol Hill Babysitting Cooperative
1026:"How Fast Can the US Economy Grow?"
1024:—— (July–August 1997),
922:"Interview with Pat Taffe Driscoll"
841:Krugman, Paul R. (14 August 1998).
729:Festa, Elizabeth (March 10, 2007),
13:
1400:
1388:Mitchell, Bill (August 23, 2009),
1088:The Return of Depression Economics
1042:—— (August 14, 1998),
268:, and should not be confused with
14:
1555:
1502:
161:twenty when they left the co-op.
1486:10.1111/j.1538-4616.2007.00068.x
1378:rather than the later Keynes of
945:Cavanaugh, Monica (April 2008),
1318:Lora, Manuel (March 27, 2009),
1261:Ritenour, Shawn (Spring 2000),
1117:from the original on 2009-05-27
1014:—— (Jan 30, 1997),
761:Gray, Joshua (March 27, 2009),
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16:Cooperative in Washington, D.C.
1288:Gordon, David (Jan 12, 2009),
1111:The Unofficial Krugman Archive
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554:{\displaystyle S_{m}=-S_{g}=-}
125:Cooperative system and history
1:
1215:"Adventures in Babysitting",
801:Sweeney, Joan and Richard J.
739:, p. F01, archived from
638:
315:{\displaystyle S_{g}+S_{m}=0}
201:Allegory for a liquidity trap
1085:—— (May 1999b),
412:{\displaystyle S_{m}=-S_{g}}
7:
1348:Alternative interpretations
10:
1560:
1390:"A baby-sitting economy …"
1254:Ludwig von Mises Institute
1125:"Baby-sitting the economy"
1105:—— (c. 2001),
994:W. W. Norton & Company
976:
611:Sweeney & Sweeney 1977
75:
51:and the importance of the
1311:Instituto Juan de Mariana
1294:The American Conservative
1174:10.1080/00343401003707367
958:: 118–119, archived from
96:Some additional details:
1160:(3), W. W. Norton: 383,
913:
575:
228:Hypothetical resolutions
191:redistribution of wealth
169:Hypothetical resolutions
1431:10.1145/1250910.1250955
1290:"Krugman's Nanny State"
1030:Harvard Business Review
605:Some sources, such as (
505:{\displaystyle S_{m}=0}
472:{\displaystyle S_{g}=0}
1297:; critical review of (
1280:; critical review of (
1211:, Macmillan, pp.
1195:; revised reprint of (
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23:The co-op in the 2000s
1363:; interprets via the
1207:(February 28, 2009),
767:The Voice of the Hill
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439:{\displaystyle S_{m}}
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369:{\displaystyle S_{m}}
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342:{\displaystyle S_{g}}
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1330:on February 23, 2014
1324:Mises Economics Blog
743:on December 25, 2008
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57:late-2000s recession
1529:Keynesian economics
1374:A Treatise on Money
1166:2010RegSt..44..383K
1081:; collected essays.
736:The Washington Post
255:Alternatively, the
87:Beacon Hill, Boston
69:Peddling Prosperity
1381:The General Theory
1339:; translation of (
1248:Austrian critiques
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246:Austrian critiques
242:Austrian economics
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1440:978-1-59593-653-0
1222:978-0-7167-7161-6
1007:978-0-393-03602-2
479:), which implies
237:monetary policy.
155:paradox of thrift
133:The co-op issued
49:paradox of thrift
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1480:(6): 1305–1333.
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1154:Regional Studies
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996:, pp.
250:babysitting
41:babysitting
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33:cooperative
1544:Child care
1518:Categories
1464:2010-04-01
1446:2010-04-01
1367:theory of
1341:Rallo 2009
1240:2009-11-01
1136:2010-04-02
1055:2010-03-19
969:2010-03-27
811:August 16,
639:References
624:fiat money
1422:0705.4110
1369:Karl Marx
1192:154414843
549:−
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151:recession
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1115:archived
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1162:Bibcode
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977:Krugman
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902:JSTOR
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712:Tweet
660:p. 16
576:Notes
244:(see
187:Pigou
143:scrip
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1490:SSRN
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