Blantyre mining disaster

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leave pillars (or stoops) about 20 yards (18 m) square behind. During this stage only around 30% of the coal was extracted. Eventually the whole district consisted of a grid pattern of passageways around stoops. The final stage in extraction was "stooping". The furthermost roof was supported by pit props and the stoops removed. Once a complete row of stoops had gone the props were removed from the furthest part which would collapse into the space ("goaf" or "gove") behind. During this process settlement and fracturing of the roof and seams above could occur, potentially releasing larger quantities of gas.

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then back to the upcast. The air from number 3 pit entered the workings associated with number 2 pit in the east and circulated around number 2 pit's south-eastern portion before finally reaching the upcast. The air circuit at 3,500 yards (3,200 m) might not be considered excessive, but when both pits are added the total circuit was 8,096 yards (7,403 m). After the disaster this policy of using the air from number 3 workings to ventilate number 2 workings was roundly condemned in the trade press: "It is a very dangerous system, and should be abandoned at once".

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Air came down number 1 pit and the current was split to ventilate the north and south workings respectively. The south current passed along the south level for 770 yards (700 m) to the southern extremity. It passed through the longwall workings there and returned via the older stoop and room workings before joining the north current return and passing up the upcast, number 5 pit. The inspectors report concluded "1 That the arrangements for the ventillation of this pit were sufficient, and that the quantity of air sent in was ample under ordinary conditions".

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attaching the indicator as "not proper" and "not ... to be the best mode known to engineers". Michael Flanagan, a furnaceman at the pithead, reported that Cleland said "the indicator was wrong" and Flanagan observed that the indicator was further down than it should have been. The manager, Watson, admitted under cross-examination that it was the duty of the oversman to examine the indicator but he did not do so. Most witnesses also gave Cleland a good character reference. After a short retirement, the jury returned a verdict of

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normal air supply was restored and recovery work could commence. All the men in the northern part of the colliery had left their work and headed for number 2 pit, only to be overcome by chokedamp before reaching safety. Ventilation continued until Saturday 27 when the debris at the foot of number 3 shaft could be cleared. By Sunday the first bodies could be brought up number 3 shaft, but it was not until Thursday 1 November that the mine was free of gas and recovery could be carried on from both downcast pits.

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a group of men, and shortly afterwards Mr Watson (the manager) proceeded up the communication mine into number 1 pit's workings. Parties descended the blind pit into the main coal and other parties searched the north workings and both reported all was well. Exploration of the south workings was stopped by falls and afterdamp. Various attempts were made to recover the bodies during the Thursday, but it was 04:00 on Friday before the whole workings could be reached and recovery completed.

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number 2 pit and sent to Glasgow Infirmary, but all died within the month. Rescue parties explored number 3 pit as far as they could, but were limited by chokedamp and firedamp. Seventeen bodies were found and brought to the foot of the blocked number 3 shaft for later retrieval. The shaft was unstable, and if it closed up the rescuers would be deprived of air so they retreated until the shaft could be secured from above. All hope of finding more survivors was abandoned.

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73 m) from the pit head, about a quarter of the shaft's total depth. Cleland was advised to stay but left shortly afterwards. After going home to clean up and change Cleland was observed heading across the fields towards Glasgow but was overtaken by a policeman and arrested. After helping down Gerrity, Patterson had returned to the engine house and seen that the indicator now showed 7 fathoms (42 ft; 13 m) although the cage had not moved in the meantime.

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vicinity of the seat of the explosion little burning was seen, the supposition was that a firedamp explosion had raised dust in the passageways and the coal dust had exploded. The official investigation tentatively suggested that shot firing had displaced the gas towards the area where men were smoking and that a naked flame there triggered off the explosion.

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area where stooping was occurring, so that the place most likely to be liberating firedamp was being ventilated with firedamp laden air from number 3 pit. The official report notes that naked flames and blasting were allowed throughout the colliery, except in the area around the stooping. Near there no blasting was permitted and all lamps had to be "

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The explosion was first noticed on the surface as a "sharp retort" at 21:00 on Wednesday 2 July 1879. Once John White, the oversman, had been summoned an attempt was made to lower the cage, but it stuck. White then descended number 3 pit and found that the men there were unaware of the explosion. He,

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At the time of the accident, Mr J T Robson (Assistant Government Inspector for the district) and Mr Robert Robson (his assistant) were in the colliery office with Mr Watson, the manager. Robert Robson descended number 2 pit and went to the bottom of the number 3 shaft to supervise the recovery of the

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The report states: "These gauze or safety lamps were not Davy lamps, but of a kind in common use throughout Scotland. They are much larger than the Davy lamp and give a better light. Mr Moore has frequently tested them in gas, and on no occasion has the gas been exploded outside". Lupton, writing 15

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The investigations commenced as soon as the air was safe. Significant damage had been done in both the number 2 and number 3 workings, though particularly in number 3 pit. Damage in number 2 pit was mainly in the south eastern part, that in communication with, and ventilated from, pit 3. This was the

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The following day, Tuesday 23 October, an underground engine at the upcast was adapted to assist the ventilation. The slide valve was removed and steam sent down. The escaping hot steam rising up the upcast drew the air around the mine in the same way that the furnaces would. By this means 70% of the

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Ventilation in the splint coal was more complex. Air from number 3 pit was split in two and passed along the north and south levels. After passing through the respective workings the two currents passed through the north and south headings before recombining on the "rise" (west) side and passing into

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On 5 March 1878 at No. 3 Pit, six men were killed when the cage they were in was drawn up past the top of the pit and 32 feet (9.8 m) into the pithead wheels. The cage was wrecked and overturned, throwing six men to the bottom of the 900 ft (270 m) shaft. A seventh man (James Gerrity)

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Number 3 pit was blocked by debris falling from the damaged shaft and by tubs and similar being blown up the shaft. The cages and ropes had been damaged, so an attempt at descending was made in a "kettle", basically a large bucket. Air was still travelling down the shaft and voices could be heard at

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At around 09:00 a blast was heard on the surface and flame and steam rushed up number 3 pit for a few minutes. Smoke was seen from the upcast pit and air came from number 2. Nothing was seen from number 1 pit, but below ground the miners felt the blast and at once ascended. The smoke was seen in the

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Air was drawn down number 2 and split in two. The larger portion went north, circulated around the north-west workings for 3,674 yards (3,360 m) before returning to the upcast pit. The smaller part was led to the south, circulated around the south-western area for 2,901 yards (2,653 m) and

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The 1879 disaster occurred in the ell coal, the shallowest of the three seams. The coal was worked from number 1 pit which was the downcast. There was a "blind pit" down to the main coal, which was no longer being worked, and a communication mine down to the splint coal at the foot of pit number 3.

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Cleland was charged with culpable homicide and tried at the High Court in Glasgow on 24 April. At the trial Patterson said that when he touched the indicator it was "very loose. He had never noticed it so loose before". Two engineers called for the defence at the trial also criticised the method of

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The engine keeper, Arthur Cleland, stated that "something had gone wrong" with the indicator to the colliery engineer, James Patterson, was in the vicinity at the time of the accident. Patterson examined the indicator which showed the cage's position and found it registered 40 fathoms (240 ft;

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On the morning of 22 October 1877 nothing was thought to be amiss. The officials seemed to think that the workings were in their normal state. At 04:40 four firemen inspected number 2 pit. At 05:30 the regular workmen started to descend. The firemen assured the workers all was well and ascended to

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The alternative method of working the coal was the longwall system. Two headers were driven forward to the far end of the district and an interconnecting passageway excavated. The passageway was supported by props and the long wall on the shaft side of the passage excavated. As this wall retreated

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Most of the coal was worked using the Newcastle system, also known as "pillar and stall" or "stoop and room". A heading was driven into the coal and at intervals along it rooms were excavated, around 12 feet (3.7 m) wide. As the rooms got deeper another heading was driven from room to room to

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Not all the safety lamps were found; however, one was found that was unlocked. Smoking materials including matches were found in the clothes of the deceased, one man was found with a half full pipe in his hand. Several men had unofficial (and therefore illegal) lamp-keys on them. In the immediate

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A brattice was constructed to divert the air passing from number 3 pit directly to the upcast, and by this means More's dook became passable by 22:00. Four survivors were found, all badly injured. One of them, a boy, died shortly afterwards. The remaining three were brought to the surface through

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The mine owner erected a 5.5-metre-tall granite monument to mark the two explosion disasters. An engraved dedication reads: "William Dixon Ltd—in memory of 240 of their workmen who were killed by explosions in Blantyre Colliery on 22nd October, 1877 and 2nd July 1879 and many of whom are buried

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of 1886 and so the shielding of gauzes from direct currents of air had not yet been introduced. Notwithstanding Moore's claims for the Scottish safety lamp, the report's conclusions call for the banning of naked lights and the introduction of locked Davy lamps which "are better than the present

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In collieries at that time air circulation was induced by a furnace at the base of the upcast pit. Hot air rising up the pit, as if up a chimney, drew the exhausted and contaminated air out of the galleries. Downcast pits let the fresh air in to replace it. The route the air took was carefully

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The report also roundly criticises poor discipline (including shots being fired by unauthorised workers), poor ventilation around old or incomplete stoops and the whole method of ventilating one pit from another. The report does not come to a firm conclusion about how the explosion started.

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here". There is also a memorial to the Catholic miners killed in the disaster of October 1877 which is located in Dalbeath Cemetery, London Road, Glasgow. In addition a memorial commemorating the centenary is located at Blantyre Cross, Blantyre. An incomplete list of the deaths is given in

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Although the owners banned the men from opening lamps or from taking smoking materials below ground, several prosecutions had occurred for breaches of the rules. The last such was the day before the explosion when a miner was fined £2 (equivalent to £257 in 2023) for opening his lamp.

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years later, inveighs against modifications to the Davy lamp including: "The larger the lamp the greater the force of the explosion, and if the lamp were too large, the explosion would force the flame through the gauze; for that reason the diameter of the gauze must never be larger than 1

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It is reported that, six months after the accident, Dixon's raised summonses against 34 widows whose husbands had been killed and who had not left the tied cottages which they and their husbands had rented from the mining company. They were evicted two weeks later, on 28 May 1878.

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Conditions in the mine were held to be poor by the colliers. The previous year the miners had sought a wage rise to compensate for the poor safety and been refused. They went on strike and were immediately sacked. Since the miners lived in

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surrounding area so miners and managers hurried to the pithead. Shortly after 10:00 the Inspector of Mines, Mr Moore, and the Assistant Inspector, Mr Robson, were alerted by telegraph. They arrived at the colliery at noon.

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controlled by doors and partitions. At Blantyre pit, number 5 was the upcast shaft for pits 1, 2 and 3. About 5 tons of coal were burnt per day in two out of three grates, each 7 feet (2.1 m) by 4 feet (1.2 m).

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The ell coal was mainly worked by stoop and room, with longwall in the southern part only. The main was exclusively worked by longwall and the splint (apart from a trial section) worked by stoop and room.

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the roof was propped and the furthermost props removed, allowing the overburden to collapse into the goaf. With longwall the same fracturing and gas release that stooping could cause was always present.

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Numbers 2 and 5 shafts were close to each other, within 30 yards (27 m). Number 3 shaft was 680 yards (620 m) away. Number 1 shaft was between the two but only reached the ell and main coals.

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the bottom, below the blockage. Number 2 pit was relatively undamaged; normal winding operations could continue. Moore, Robson and some engineers went down number 2 pit but were stopped by falls and

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bodies from a flooded sump. Meanwhile, several men descended number 3 pit in a "kettle" to examine the shaft for damage. The shaft itself being undamaged, the bodies were recovered that way.

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Blantyre was also the scene of two further disasters in 1878 and 1879. There was a succession of lesser fatalities, some of which—particularly in the earlier years—were caused by firedamp.

1429: 280:. Pits No. 2 and No. 3 of William Dixon's Blantyre Colliery were the site of an explosion which killed 207 miners, possibly more, with the youngest being a boy of 11. It was known that 1383: 394:

Air for the ell coal was drawn down pit number 1. At the base it split north and south then after passing around the respective parts of the workings it was led to the upcast pit.

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No. 4. 24 feet (7.3 m) by 8 feet (2.4 m) working the splint coal. At the time of the explosion No. 4 had not yet connected with the rest of the colliery.

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The Lanarkshire coalfield in the vicinity of Blantyre had three seams of coal being worked in the 1870s. They were the ell coal, 7 feet (2.1 m) thick at 117

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Firemen: miners who in earlier times looked for firedamp and set fire to it in a controlled manner. By 1877 their duties only extended to testing for firedamp.

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was present in the pit and it is likely that this was ignited by a naked flame. The accident left 92 widows and 250 fatherless children.

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An area lying in the south east quadrant from number 2 pit close to, and in communication with, the workings from number 3 pit.

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where air was expelled. Men and materials commonly travelled in downcast pits as the air in upcast pits was hot and foul.

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sign reports and have breakfast. Having received these assurances the workforce went about their various tasks.

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A brattice is a partition (usually of timber, but in an emergency possibly of cloth) which seals off air flow

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the workings of number 2 pit. On average the air circuit was 2,400 yards (2,200 m) in number 3 pit.

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they were therefore evicted by force. The mine owners then brought in Irish Catholics to work the mine.

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Reports of the Inspectors of Mines of the Antracite Coal Regions of Pennsylvania for the year 1879

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from an unnamed local singer. The text first appears in LLoyd's 1951 book "coaldust ballads".

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Report by the Inspectors of Mines to both houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty

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managed to hold on until he was assisted down and, apart from being shaken, was unhurt.

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Report by the Inspectors of Mines to both houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty

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Ventillation of mines was not done by using piped air, instead one or more pits were

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No. 1, 24 feet (7.3 m) by 8 feet (2.4 m) working the ell and main coals.

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Calling for volunteers for the exploring parties - Illustrated London News 1877

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No. 5. 10 feet (3.0 m) diameter used as the upcast for numbers 1, 2 and 3.

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Firedamp explosion (possible cause: smoking) triggering a coal dust explosion.

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No. 3. 24 feet (7.3 m) by 8 feet (2.4 m) working the splint coal.

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No. 2. 16 feet (4.9 m) by 8 feet (2.4 m) working the splint coal.

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High Blantyre Colliery, General View of the Pits – The Pictorial World 1877

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recorded a song called "Blantyre Explosion". It appears on his 1985 album

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Firedamp explosion caused by either a naked flame or a modified Davy lamp

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A smaller area with workings to the north and south of number 3 pit.

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5 or more killed, the definition used by the Durham Mining Museum.

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Moore, Ralph; Wales, T.E.; Willis, James (22 November 1877),

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rich air from the incomplete combustion of coal or firedamp,

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The list of the killed is read out - Illustrated London News

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An area lying in the south-west quadrant from number 2 pit.

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An area lying in the north-west quadrant from number 2 pit.

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Mining, an elementary treatise on the getting of minerals

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Explosion of fire-damp at Blantyre Colliery [?]

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Miners have traditionally referred to various gases as

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where air was drawn down into the mine and one or more

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Report by the Inspectors of Mines quoted at length in

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inch". In addition, the Blantyre explosion was before

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Four main districts were formed in the splint coal:

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Catrine: Stenlake Publishing Ltd. p. 30. 835: 1350: 1216:"Luzerne and Carbon Counties: Eastern District" 1075: 1051: 973: 1109: 936: 934: 932: 862: 713:– nitrogen and carbon dioxide with no oxygen, 640:List of disasters in Great Britain and Ireland 1262: 997: 751: 258:Explosion of fire-damp at Blantyre Colliery. 1180:Explosion of fire-damp at Blantyre Colliery 929: 1204:: CS1 maint: location missing publisher ( 591:A memorial window at St Joseph's, Blantyre 761:inflation figures are based on data from 1329: 1308: 1287: 1222:, Harrisburg: Lane S Hart, State printer 1135: 1130: 961: 923: 874: 586: 464: 435: 414: 294: 1443: 597: 315:The Blantyre colliery had five shafts: 1527: 1467: 1456:from the original on 30 September 2019 1446:"1877 Pit Disaster – List of the Dead" 1269:, Edinburgh: Johnston Publishing Ltd, 1266:Blantyre and the blackness of darkness 1231: 1069: 1045: 1033: 898: 276:, Scotland, was Scotland's worst ever 1386:from the original on 12 December 2019 1376:"The Ejection of the Blantyre Widows" 1253: 1213: 1093: 1021: 1009: 985: 762: 618:. It had previously been recorded by 1600:1879 disasters in the United Kingdom 1595:1878 disasters in the United Kingdom 1590:1877 disasters in the United Kingdom 1410:from the original on 24 October 2017 1339:from the original on 18 October 2014 1318:from the original on 18 October 2014 1297:from the original on 18 October 2014 1187:from the original on 18 October 2014 1120:from the original on 18 October 2014 526: 440:Rescue operations - The Graphic 1877 16:1877 industrial accident in Scotland 1480:from the original on 2 January 2018 1397: 1373: 1360:from the original on 3 October 2014 1290:Blantyre Disaster 22nd October 1877 1081: 1057: 13: 531: 431: 14: 1611: 1585:19th century in South Lanarkshire 1535:Coal mining disasters in Scotland 1444:Veverka, Paul (22 October 2015), 1432:from the original on 30 June 2019 1356:, Scottish Mining Website, 2014, 1335:, Scottish Mining Website, 2014, 1314:, Scottish Mining Website, 2014, 1293:, Scottish Mining Website, 2014, 556: 460: 1400:"1877 Disaster Memorial Service" 1311:Blantyre Disaster 5th March 1878 1273:from the original on 9 June 2007 1242:from the original on 5 July 2020 1161: 940: 477: 1332:Blantyre Disaster 2nd July 1879 1144:National Mining Museum Scotland 1102: 742: 687: 678: 661: 1476:, The Story of the Explosion, 1425:Blantyre and David Livingstone 1263:The Scotsman (26 April 2006), 892: 836:Moore, Wales & Willis 1877 652: 385: 1: 788: 697:. The most common damps are: 290: 1575:History of South Lanarkshire 1468:Wright, Rev Stewart (1885), 517: 410: 7: 1580:Blantyre, South Lanarkshire 1422:South Lanarkshire Council, 1165:A Brief History of Blantyre 633: 582: 405: 368: 138:No 3 Pit, Blantyre Scotland 10: 1616: 1048:, section: Shielded Lamps. 901:The Scottish Coal Industry 863:Alexander & Moore 1879 1284:Scottish Mining Website: 1214:Jones, William S (1880), 1136:Anderson, Lynsey (2014), 887:South Lanarkshire Council 577: 507:Bedford Colliery Disaster 262: 254: 246: 238: 230: 222: 214: 199: 190: 182: 174: 166: 158: 150: 142: 134: 119: 110: 98: 90: 82: 74: 66: 58: 50: 39:22 October 1877 35: 26: 1470:"The Annals of Blantyre" 1183:, Rutherglen, Scotland, 1139:Blantyre Mining Disaster 899:Hutton, Guthrie (2022). 645: 603: 303: 270:Blantyre mining disaster 22:Blantyre mining disaster 1474:Scottish mining website 1404:Blantye's's Ain Website 1380:Blantye's's Ain Website 1232:Lupton, Arnold (1893), 988:, plan facing page 229. 763:Clark, Gregory (2017). 1540:Coal mines in Scotland 1036:, section: Davy Lamps. 592: 470: 441: 420: 300: 123:5 March 1878 1555:1879 mining disasters 1550:1878 mining disasters 1545:1877 mining disasters 590: 468: 439: 418: 298: 203:2 July 1879 1511:55.78472°N 4.10639°W 1254:Raven, John (1978), 974:Blantyre Parish 2014 733:and other damps and 154:Winding gear overrun 1507: / 23: 1516:55.78472; -4.10639 1398:Sim, Bill (2015), 1374:Sim, Bill (2017), 1256:Victoria's Inferno 759:Retail Price Index 703:– mainly methane, 608:Irish folk artist 593: 471: 442: 421: 301: 234:Coal mine disaster 226:Blantyre, Scotland 146:Coal mine disaster 70:Coal mine disaster 62:Blantyre, Scotland 21: 998:The Scotsman 2006 910:978-1-84033-928-4 731:hydrogen sulphide 527:Further incidents 266: 265: 178:Culpable homicide 99:OS grid reference 1607: 1570:1879 in Scotland 1565:1878 in Scotland 1560:1877 in Scotland 1522: 1521: 1519: 1518: 1517: 1512: 1508: 1505: 1504: 1503: 1500: 1488: 1487: 1485: 1464: 1463: 1461: 1450:Blantyre Project 1440: 1439: 1437: 1418: 1417: 1415: 1394: 1393: 1391: 1368: 1367: 1365: 1347: 1346: 1344: 1326: 1325: 1323: 1305: 1304: 1302: 1281: 1280: 1278: 1259: 1250: 1249: 1247: 1226:plan of Blantyre 1223: 1209: 1203: 1195: 1194: 1192: 1173: 1168:, archived from 1158: 1157: 1155: 1150:on 16 April 2017 1146:, archived from 1128: 1127: 1125: 1097: 1091: 1085: 1079: 1073: 1067: 1061: 1055: 1049: 1043: 1037: 1031: 1025: 1019: 1013: 1007: 1001: 995: 989: 983: 977: 971: 965: 959: 944: 938: 927: 921: 915: 914: 896: 890: 884: 878: 872: 866: 860: 839: 833: 782: 781: 779: 777: 755: 749: 746: 740: 691: 685: 682: 676: 665: 659: 656: 500: 499: 495: 210: 208: 130: 128: 106: 46: 44: 24: 20: 1615: 1614: 1610: 1609: 1608: 1606: 1605: 1604: 1525: 1524: 1515: 1513: 1509: 1506: 1501: 1498: 1496: 1494: 1493: 1491: 1483: 1481: 1459: 1457: 1435: 1433: 1413: 1411: 1389: 1387: 1363: 1361: 1353:Blantyre Parish 1342: 1340: 1321: 1319: 1300: 1298: 1276: 1274: 1245: 1243: 1197: 1196: 1190: 1188: 1172:on 13 July 2011 1153: 1151: 1123: 1121: 1105: 1100: 1092: 1088: 1080: 1076: 1068: 1064: 1056: 1052: 1044: 1040: 1032: 1028: 1020: 1016: 1008: 1004: 996: 992: 984: 980: 972: 968: 960: 947: 939: 930: 922: 918: 911: 897: 893: 885: 881: 873: 869: 861: 842: 834: 795: 791: 786: 785: 775: 773: 756: 752: 747: 743: 721:carbon monoxide 692: 688: 683: 679: 666: 662: 657: 653: 648: 636: 606: 585: 580: 559: 534: 532:1878 lift crash 529: 520: 510:safety lamps". 505:(1882) and the 497: 493: 492: 480: 463: 434: 432:Rescue attempts 413: 408: 388: 371: 306: 293: 278:mining accident 206: 204: 195: 126: 124: 115: 102: 42: 40: 31: 17: 12: 11: 5: 1613: 1603: 1602: 1597: 1592: 1587: 1582: 1577: 1572: 1567: 1562: 1557: 1552: 1547: 1542: 1537: 1490: 1489: 1465: 1441: 1419: 1395: 1371: 1370: 1369: 1348: 1327: 1306: 1282: 1260: 1251: 1238:, Chapter 11, 1229: 1211: 1174: 1159: 1133: 1106: 1104: 1101: 1099: 1098: 1086: 1074: 1062: 1050: 1038: 1026: 1014: 1012:, p. 230. 1002: 990: 978: 966: 945: 928: 916: 909: 891: 879: 867: 840: 792: 790: 787: 784: 783: 770:MeasuringWorth 750: 741: 686: 677: 660: 650: 649: 647: 644: 643: 642: 635: 632: 605: 602: 584: 581: 579: 576: 558: 557:1879 explosion 555: 533: 530: 528: 525: 519: 516: 503:Trimdon Grange 479: 476: 462: 461:Recovery phase 459: 433: 430: 412: 409: 407: 404: 387: 384: 370: 367: 358: 357: 354: 351: 348: 333: 332: 329: 326: 323: 320: 305: 302: 292: 289: 264: 263: 260: 259: 256: 252: 251: 248: 244: 243: 240: 236: 235: 232: 228: 227: 224: 220: 219: 216: 212: 211: 201: 197: 196: 191: 188: 187: 184: 180: 179: 176: 172: 171: 170:Arthur Cleland 168: 164: 163: 160: 156: 155: 152: 148: 147: 144: 140: 139: 136: 132: 131: 121: 117: 116: 111: 108: 107: 104:NS 68269 56240 100: 96: 95: 92: 88: 87: 84: 80: 79: 76: 72: 71: 68: 64: 63: 60: 56: 55: 52: 48: 47: 37: 33: 32: 27: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 1612: 1601: 1598: 1596: 1593: 1591: 1588: 1586: 1583: 1581: 1578: 1576: 1573: 1571: 1568: 1566: 1563: 1561: 1558: 1556: 1553: 1551: 1548: 1546: 1543: 1541: 1538: 1536: 1533: 1532: 1530: 1523: 1520: 1479: 1475: 1471: 1466: 1455: 1451: 1447: 1442: 1431: 1427: 1426: 1420: 1409: 1405: 1401: 1396: 1385: 1381: 1377: 1372: 1359: 1355: 1354: 1349: 1338: 1334: 1333: 1328: 1317: 1313: 1312: 1307: 1296: 1292: 1291: 1286: 1285: 1283: 1272: 1268: 1267: 1261: 1257: 1252: 1241: 1237: 1236: 1230: 1227: 1221: 1217: 1212: 1207: 1201: 1186: 1182: 1181: 1175: 1171: 1167: 1166: 1160: 1149: 1145: 1141: 1140: 1134: 1132: 1131:Blantyre 1879 1119: 1115: 1114: 1108: 1107: 1096:, p. 94. 1095: 1090: 1083: 1078: 1071: 1066: 1059: 1054: 1047: 1042: 1035: 1030: 1023: 1018: 1011: 1006: 999: 994: 987: 982: 975: 970: 963: 962:Blantyre 1878 958: 956: 954: 952: 950: 942: 937: 935: 933: 925: 924:Blantyre 1877 920: 912: 906: 902: 895: 888: 883: 876: 875:Anderson 2014 871: 864: 859: 857: 855: 853: 851: 849: 847: 845: 837: 832: 830: 828: 826: 824: 822: 820: 818: 816: 814: 812: 810: 808: 806: 804: 802: 800: 798: 793: 772: 771: 766: 760: 754: 745: 738: 737: 732: 728: 727: 722: 718: 717: 712: 708: 707: 702: 701: 696: 690: 681: 674: 670: 664: 655: 651: 641: 638: 637: 631: 629: 625: 621: 617: 616: 611: 610:Christy Moore 601: 599: 589: 575: 571: 567: 563: 554: 552: 546: 542: 538: 524: 515: 511: 508: 504: 488: 486: 478:Investigation 475: 467: 458: 454: 452: 448: 438: 429: 425: 417: 403: 399: 395: 392: 383: 379: 375: 366: 364: 363:tied cottages 355: 352: 349: 346: 345: 344: 341: 339: 330: 327: 324: 321: 318: 317: 316: 313: 311: 297: 288: 285: 283: 279: 275: 271: 261: 257: 253: 249: 245: 241: 237: 233: 229: 225: 221: 217: 213: 202: 198: 194: 193:1879 disaster 189: 185: 181: 177: 173: 169: 165: 161: 157: 153: 149: 145: 141: 137: 133: 122: 118: 114: 113:1878 disaster 109: 105: 101: 97: 93: 89: 85: 81: 77: 73: 69: 65: 61: 57: 53: 49: 38: 34: 30: 29:1877 disaster 25: 19: 1492: 1482:, retrieved 1473: 1458:, retrieved 1449: 1434:, retrieved 1424: 1412:, retrieved 1403: 1388:, retrieved 1379: 1362:, retrieved 1352: 1341:, retrieved 1331: 1320:, retrieved 1310: 1299:, retrieved 1289: 1275:, retrieved 1265: 1255: 1244:, retrieved 1234: 1219: 1189:, retrieved 1179: 1170:the original 1164: 1152:, retrieved 1148:the original 1138: 1122:, retrieved 1112: 1103:Bibliography 1089: 1077: 1065: 1053: 1041: 1029: 1017: 1005: 993: 981: 969: 919: 900: 894: 882: 870: 774:. Retrieved 768: 753: 744: 734: 724: 714: 710: 704: 698: 689: 680: 672: 668: 663: 654: 624:Dick Gaughan 620:Ewan MacColl 615:Ordinary Man 613: 607: 598:Veverka 2015 594: 572: 568: 564: 560: 547: 543: 539: 535: 521: 512: 489: 481: 472: 455: 443: 426: 422: 400: 396: 393: 389: 380: 376: 372: 359: 342: 337: 334: 314: 307: 286: 269: 267: 192: 112: 28: 18: 1514: / 1258:, Broadside 1070:Wright 1885 1046:Lupton 1893 1034:Lupton 1893 628:A. L. Lloyd 485:gauze lamps 386:Ventilation 1529:Categories 1502:04°06′23″W 1499:55°47′05″N 1414:23 October 1390:23 October 1364:14 October 1343:14 October 1322:14 October 1301:14 October 1277:14 October 1246:19 October 1224:(includes 1191:12 October 1124:12 October 1094:Raven 1978 1022:Jones 1880 1010:Jones 1880 986:Jones 1880 789:References 551:not proven 338:Blind pits 291:Background 207:1879-07-02 186:Not proven 127:1878-03-05 43:1877-10-22 1484:1 January 1460:1 October 736:afterdamp 726:stinkdamp 716:whitedamp 711:chokedamp 706:blackdamp 518:Aftermath 451:chokedamp 447:afterdamp 411:Explosion 255:Inquiries 91:Inquiries 1478:archived 1454:archived 1430:archived 1408:archived 1384:archived 1358:archived 1337:archived 1316:archived 1295:archived 1271:archived 1240:archived 1200:citation 1185:archived 1154:15 April 1118:archived 1082:Sim 2015 1058:Sim 2017 700:firedamp 669:downcast 634:See also 583:Memorial 406:Disaster 369:Workings 282:firedamp 274:Blantyre 223:Location 135:Location 59:Location 1436:30 June 496:⁄ 310:fathoms 205: ( 183:Verdict 175:Charges 167:Accused 125: ( 41: ( 1162:Anon, 907: 673:upcast 578:Legacy 247:Deaths 159:Deaths 83:Deaths 776:7 May 695:damps 646:Notes 604:Music 304:Seams 239:Cause 218:21:00 151:Cause 75:Cause 54:09:30 1486:2018 1462:2019 1438:2019 1416:2017 1392:2017 1366:2014 1345:2014 1324:2014 1303:2014 1279:2014 1248:2014 1206:link 1193:2014 1156:2017 1126:2014 941:Anon 905:ISBN 778:2024 622:and 268:The 231:Type 215:Time 200:Date 143:Type 120:Date 67:Type 51:Time 36:Date 757:UK 709:or 487:". 86:207 1531:: 1472:, 1452:, 1448:, 1428:, 1406:, 1402:, 1382:, 1378:, 1218:, 1202:}} 1198:{{ 1142:, 1116:, 948:^ 931:^ 843:^ 796:^ 767:. 729:– 719:– 600:. 553:. 453:. 250:28 1228:) 1208:) 1084:. 1072:. 1060:. 1024:. 1000:. 964:. 943:. 926:. 913:. 889:. 877:. 865:. 838:. 780:. 498:2 494:1 209:) 162:6 129:) 45:)

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